U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants:
Strategic Planning Guide

JAIBG OJJDP *Summary*

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) was established by the President and Congress through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974, Public Law 93–415, as amended. Located within the Office of Justice Programs of the U.S. Department of Justice, OJJDP's goal is to provide national leadership in addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency and improving juvenile justice.

OJJDP sponsors a broad array of research, program, and training initiatives to improve the juvenile justice system as a whole, as well as to benefit individual youth-serving agencies. These initiatives are carried out by seven components within OJJDP, described below.

Research and Program Development Division develops knowledge on national trends in juvenile delinquency; supports a program for data collection and information sharing that incorporates elements of statistical and systems development; identifies how delinquency develops and the best methods for its prevention, intervention, and treatment; and analyzes practices and trends in the juvenile justice system.

Training and Technical Assistance Division provides juvenile justice training and technical assistance to Federal, State, and local governments; law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections personnel; and private agencies, educational institutions, and community organizations.

Special Emphasis Division provides discretionary funds to public and private agencies, organizations, and individuals to replicate tested approaches to delinquency prevention, treatment, and control in such pertinent areas as chronic juvenile offenders, community-based sanctions, and the disproportionate representation of minorities in the juvenile justice system.

State Relations and Assistance Division supports collaborative efforts by States to carry out the mandates of the JJDP Act by providing formula grant funds to States; furnishing technical assistance to States, local governments, and private agencies; and monitoring State compliance with the JJDP Act.

Information Dissemination Unit informs individuals and organizations of OJJDP initiatives; disseminates information on juvenile justice, delinquency prevention, and missing children; and coordinates program planning efforts within OJJDP. The unit's activities include publishing research and statistical reports, bulletins, and other documents, as well as overseeing the operations of the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse.

Concentration of Federal Efforts Program promotes interagency cooperation and coordination among Federal agencies with responsibilities in the area of juvenile justice. The program primarily carries out this responsibility through the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, an independent body within the executive branch that was established by Congress through the JJDP Act.

Missing and Exploited Children's Program seeks to promote effective policies and procedures for addressing the problem of missing and exploited children. Established by the Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984, the program provides funds for a variety of activities to support and coordinate a network of resources such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children; training and technical assistance to a network of 47 State clearinghouses, nonprofit organizations, law enforcement personnel, and attorneys; and research and demonstration programs.

The mission of OJJDP is to provide national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent juvenile victimization and respond appropriately to juvenile delinquency. This is accomplished through developing and implementing prevention programs and a juvenile justice system that protects the public safety, holds juvenile offenders accountable, and provides treatment and rehabilitative services based on the needs of each individual juvenile.

Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants: Strategic Planning Guide

Summary

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January 1999

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This document was prepared under contract number OJP–98–154–M from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice.

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The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

Foreword

In 1998, Congress increased the Federal investment in juvenile justice by enacting the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) program. Funds available through this new program provide States and units of local government with badly needed resources to begin making critical improvements to the infrastructure of the juvenile justice system.

In particular, JAIBG funds enable units of local government and States to promote accountability in the juvenile justice system through support for juvenile facilities; accountability-based sanctions; the hiring of additional juvenile judges, probation officers, prosecutors, and public defenders; pretrial services; juvenile gun and drug courts; and controlled substance testing. JAIBG also supports interagency information-sharing programs that enable the juvenile and criminal justice systems, schools, and social services agencies to make informed decisions regarding the early identification, control, supervision, and treatment of juveniles who repeatedly commit serious or violent delinquent acts. Finally, JAIBG authorizes programs that use law enforcement to protect school personnel and students from drug, gang, and youth violence.

Each of these areas of activity supports our efforts to intervene with juveniles who have committed a crime, to hold them accountable, and to provide them with the direction and support they need to avoid committing further offenses.

Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants: Strategic Planning Guide is intended to serve as a planning tool, providing a conceptual framework to analyze juvenile justice system needs and determine the most effective use of JAIBG funds. The *Guide* shows how results-based decisionmaking can be applied in the JAIBG program to identify desired results, create and track indicators of progress toward achieving those results, and assess program performance so that adjustments can be made that will improve the delivery of programs and services in the juvenile justice system. The *Guide* will also benefit a broad spectrum of planners and practitioners by providing them with information that can be used to foster local efforts to employ results-based decisionmaking across a variety of disciplines.

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Acknowledgments

This *Guide* was prepared by Anna E. Danegger, Carol E. Cohen, and Cheryl D. Hayes of The Finance Project with Gwen A. Holden, a consultant to The Finance Project formerly with the National Criminal Justice Association. It draws heavily from the works of Mark Friedman and Atelia Melaville, as found in The Finance Project's publications *A Strategy Map for Results-Based Budgeting, A Guide to Results and Indicators,* and *A Guide to Performance Measures.*

The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance in providing information for this *Guide:* D. Brenner Brown, Carla A. Daniels, Michael L. Lee, Mary F. Santonastasso, Douglas W. Thomas, and Beverlee E. Venell. We would also like to thank the following people who reviewed and provided helpful comments on a draft of this *Guide:* Rodney Albert, Mark Friedman, Eileen M. Garry, Emily Martin, Gail Olezene, James Thomas, John Tuell, Barry Van Lare, and John J. Wilson.

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Executive Summary

This executive summary presents an overview of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) publication *Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants: Strategic Planning Guide.*

This guide was prepared for OJJDP by Anna E. Danegger, Carol E. Cohen, and Cheryl D. Hayes of The Finance Project with Gwen A. Holden, a consultant to The Finance Project formerly with the National Criminal Justice Association. It draws heavily from the works of Mark Friedman and Atelia Melaville, as found in The Finance Project's publications *A Strategy Map for Results-Based Budgeting, A Guide to Results and Indicators,* and *A Guide to Performance Measures.*

Introduction

The Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG)[1] program was created by Congress to promote greater accountability in the juvenile justice system. The law authorizes the Attorney General to provide grants to the States to strengthen their policies, programs, and administrative systems that foster the creation of safe communities. The underlying supposition is that young people, their families, and the juvenile justice system must be accountable for improving the quality of life in every community.

Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants: Strategic Planning Guide (Guide) begins and ends with the importance of focusing on results. It presents a conceptual framework and the operational steps for identifying desired results, creating and tracking measurable indicators of progress toward those results, and assessing program performance. It is intended to guide planning for JAIBG program grants.

Beyond this specific application, however, the ideas presented in the *Guide* can provide a springboard for strengthening results-based decisionmaking across States' and communities' juvenile justice systems. The JAIBG program is one in a constellation of Federal funding streams that support policies, programs, and institutions to promote the creation of safe communities and to reduce the incidence and negative consequences of juvenile crime and delinquency. While the results-based approach discussed here can improve decisionmaking for JAIBG State and local initiatives, its real value may be realized over time by the extent to which it can leverage a stronger focus on results and bring coherence to State and local activities that are supported by a fragmented array of Federal, State, and local programs and funding streams.

The JAIBG program

In fiscal year 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice received $250 million for the new JAIBG program. Grants are made to eligible States on a formula basis (based on the State's population under age 18), with at least 75 percent of the funds, absent a waiver, to be passed through to or used by the States to benefit units of local government.

The Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants program was created by Congress to promote greater accountability in the juvenile justice system.

[1]Public Law 105–119 (Nov. 26, 1997).

JAIBG funds may be used to develop programs in the following 12 program purpose areas established by Congress:

1. Building, expanding, renovating, or operating temporary or permanent juvenile corrections or detention facilities, including training of correctional personnel.
2. Developing and administering accountability-based sanctions for juvenile offenders.
3. Hiring additional judges, probation officers, and court-appointed defenders, and funding pretrial services for juveniles, to ensure the smooth and expeditious administration of the juvenile justice system.
4. Hiring additional prosecutors, so that more cases involving violent juvenile offenders can be prosecuted and backlogs reduced.
5. Providing funding to enable prosecutors to address drug, gang, and youth violence problems more effectively.
6. Providing funding for technology, equipment, and training to assist prosecutors in identifying and expediting the prosecution of violent juvenile offenders.
7. Providing funding to enable juvenile courts and juvenile probation offices to be more effective and efficient in holding juvenile offenders accountable and reducing recidivism.
8. Establishing court-based juvenile justice programs that target young firearms offenders through the creation of juvenile gun courts for the adjudication and prosecution of juvenile firearms offenders.
9. Establishing drug court programs for juveniles so as to provide continuing supervision over juvenile offenders with substance abuse problems and to provide the integrated administration of other sanctions and services.
10. Establishing and maintaining interagency information-sharing programs that enable the juvenile and criminal justice systems, schools, and social services agencies to make more informed decisions regarding the early identification, control, supervision, and treatment of juveniles who repeatedly commit serious delinquent or criminal acts.
11. Establishing and maintaining accountability-based programs that work with juvenile offenders who are referred by law enforcement agencies or that are designed, in cooperation with law enforcement officials, to protect students and school personnel from drug, gang, and youth violence.
12. Implementing a policy of controlled substance testing for appropriate categories of juveniles within the juvenile justice system.

Not less than 45 percent of JAIBG funds, excluding a 10-percent set-aside for administration, must be allocated for program purpose areas 3 through 9, and not less than 35 percent must be allocated for program purpose areas 1, 2, and 10. This distribution formula must be followed unless the State or local government certifies that the interests of public safety and juvenile crime control would be better served by expending the funds in another proportion.[2]

Program implementation activities for States and localities

- Designated State Agencies (DSA's) submit completed JAIBG applications to OJJDP for review.
- DSA's and eligible units of local government establish Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions to develop JAIBG-coordinated enforcement plans.
- Each DSA establishes an interest-bearing trust fund for JAIBG funds.
- DSA's draw down the administrative share of their respective JAIBG allocations.
- DSA's and eligible units of local government develop coordinated enforcement plans.
- Eligible units of local government submit coordinated enforcement plans to the DSA.
- DSA's submit documentation to OJJDP demonstrating that the State and eligible units of local government have completed the required coordinated enforcement plans.
- DSA's distribute JAIBG program funds to eligible units of local government and other intended recipients in accordance with provisions of State and local coordinated enforcement plans.

States and units of local government eligible to receive JAIBG funds must convene Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions (JCEC's).[3] These coalitions in turn must develop the coordinated enforcement plans that provide the basis for distribution and expenditure of JAIBG funds.

The requirement for States and units of local government to plan for the use of JAIBG funds presents them with an opportunity to experiment with results-based planning and decisionmaking.

What is results-based decisionmaking?

Results-based decisionmaking is a different approach to setting priorities, defining a course of State and local action, measuring progress, and maintaining accountability for improving service effects, not just counting effort. It is not an end in itself, and it is not a proven technology waiting for replication. Instead, it is an approach ready to be tried and adapted to the needs of specific States and

[2]See appendix A for additional detail.

[3]State Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions must include law enforcement and social service agencies involved in juvenile crime prevention. Local JCEC's must include individuals representing police, sheriffs, prosecutors, State or local probation services, juvenile courts, schools, businesses, religious-affiliated institutions, and fraternal, nonprofit, or social service organizations involved in crime prevention. See Section 4.2 of the *Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) Program Guidance Manual FY 1998* (OJJDP, 1998) for details on these JCEC's.

One way or another, the juvenile justice system must move more intentionally to align the use of resources with the long-term goals of improving the well-being of children and families and improving the quality of life in their communities.

localities. The real test of its usefulness is whether it leads to improved results—safer communities, fewer victims of juvenile crime and delinquency, fewer juvenile offenders, and fewer repeat juvenile offenders.

One way or another, the juvenile justice system must move more intentionally to align the use of resources with the long-term goals of improving the well-being of children and families and improving the quality of life in their communities. Results-based decisionmaking (which can encompass planning, budgeting, management, and accountability) is a process of setting results, creating and tracking indicators of progress toward those results, and assessing program performance in order to make decisions that lead to improved results for children, families, and communities. The current movement toward strategic planning and results-based accountability reflects decades-long attempts by States and localities to answer some key questions: What does this country want for its children, youth, and other citizenry? What are the basic conditions of well-being that all children and youth must have to make the most of their potential? How can these conditions be created, and whose job is it to do so? Finally, how will the American people know if or when these conditions have been met?

Using results-based decisionmaking to plan for the expenditure of JAIBG funds can improve all aspects of how a State manages its JAIBG program. It can improve decisions about the State's allocation of funds among the 12 program purpose areas. It can lead to better decisions about funds that the State provides to local governments or administers on their behalf. It can inform State decisions on the technical assistance and other services provided to local governments concerning their allocation of JAIBG funds. It can improve a State's measurement and assessment of its performance in achieving its objectives using JAIBG funds. Likewise, results-based decisionmaking by local governments can help ensure better use of JAIBG funds at the local level.

Expanded role of JAIBG Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions

- Conduct a needs assessment to determine priority areas for investment of JAIBG funds.
- Plan for the use of JAIBG funds by initiating a planning process: identify results, indicators, and performance measures.
- Develop a coordinated enforcement plan (required).
- Establish a results-accountability structure to evaluate/monitor the impact of new programs and funds.
- Develop a method for engaging the public in the ongoing process of defining cross-sector results, investing for measurable change, and measuring performance.

Implementing a results-based decisionmaking process

The heart of results-based decisionmaking lies in connecting the things that matter for the long-term well-being of society to the work of actually deciding how to use available resources. The concepts of strategic planning and accountability for results are literally businesslike: Start with the results wanted for juveniles, families, and communities and work backward to the means to achieve those results.

The beginning stage of this work usually takes the form of a working list of results and indicators developed by a collaborative group charged with identifying desired conditions of well-being for children, families, and communities. The strength of this beginning work depends in part on the capabilities of the group and its political legitimacy and credibility (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 1996). More political standing at the start will allow the work to progress faster and give it a better chance to take root.

The State and local coalitions that must be established in order to receive JAIBG funds[4] are a very good forum for this sort of collaborative planning body. In addition, to the extent that private nonprofit entities or community-based organizations will be used to carry out the development and administration of accountability-based sanctions for juvenile offenders (as encouraged in Section 1806 of H.R. 3), it is appropriate to bring these groups to the planning process at this point.

A list of grounded results and indicators can help decisionmakers invest strategically in juvenile justice and crime prevention. It can ensure that an accountability system for the JAIBG program is established. It is also useful in facilitating the identification of innovative practices that will help achieve desired results. This framework allows for a move from data and results to "what works" and a proposed strategic plan for implementation.

In order to plan a method for investing JAIBG dollars to get the best possible return on investments—or to achieve the best results possible—it is important to start with an agreement of what results are intended. But before agreement can be reached on intended results, agreement is needed on what is meant by "result."

- A "result" (or "outcome"[5]) is a bottom-line condition of well-being for juveniles, families, or communities. Results are matters of common sense, above and beyond the jargon of bureaucracy. They are about

A list of grounded results and indicators can help decisionmakers invest strategically in juvenile justice and crime prevention.

[4]As referenced in footnote 3, State JCEC's must include law enforcement and social service agencies involved in juvenile crime prevention. Local JCEC's must include individuals representing police, sheriffs, prosecutors, State or local probation services, juvenile courts, schools, businesses, and religious-affiliated institutions, and fraternal, nonprofit, or social service organizations involved in crime prevention.

[5]In some parts of the country, the term "outcomes" has taken on a political meaning very different from the way in which the term is used here. This *Guide* uses "outcomes" and "results" interchangeably to describe conditions of well-being. Such statements of well-being often span conventional political boundaries and provide a common ground for those with widely different ideas about how best to achieve those outcomes.

Deciding where to go is only the beginning of the process of planning for achieving results.

the fundamental desires of citizens and the overarching purposes of government. These results are not "owned" by any single government agency or system. By definition, they cross over agency and program lines and public and private sectors. Examples of results include healthy and nurturing families, safe and supportive communities, and young people avoiding trouble.[6] These are outcomes that all individuals want for their own children, families, and communities. If results are defined carefully, they will still be important in 10, 50, or 100 years. Because they have that kind of staying power, results are the right place to start thinking about what achievements are wanted and how to get there from here.

Deciding where to go is only the beginning of the process of planning for achieving results. This process also involves devising methods to track progress:

- An "indicator" (or "benchmark"[7]) is a measure, for which data are available, that helps quantify the achievement of—or community-level progress toward—agreed-upon results. Indicators help answer the question, How would we know a result if we achieved it? Because results are broad statements of what citizens want and governments set out to achieve, no single indicator or piece of data is likely to signal full attainment of any given result. There is no one complete measure of juveniles staying out of trouble. Examples of indicators include rates of juvenile delinquency, teen drug use, and gang membership.[8] An essential element of this definition is that the data for an indicator are currently available. This is not about wished-for knowledge, but about real-world information that is actually produced.[9]
- A "performance measure" is a measure of the effectiveness of agency or program service delivery. These are measures of how well public or private agencies and programs are working. Typical performance measures address matters of timeliness, cost effectiveness, and compliance with standards, such as percent of youth in community-based care versus percent in institutional care, percent of juveniles with repeat (and escalating seriousness of) offenses, or case ratio for probation workers. Such measures are absolutely essential to running programs well. But they are very different from results and indicators. They have to do with the service response to social problems, not the conditions society is trying to improve. It is possible—even common—for individual programs to be considered successful while overall conditions get worse.

[6]Youth development goals as laid out in the *Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders* (Howell, 1995) include healthy and nurturing families, safe communities, school attachment, prosocial peer relations, personal development and life skills, and healthy lifestyle choices.

[7]There is a difference in how the term "benchmark" is used in public- and private-sector applications. The public sector often uses the term "benchmark" to mean an indicator or performance measure. The private sector uses the term to mean a particular level of (desired and achievable) performance.

[8]The *Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders* (Howell, 1995) indicates substance abuse, delinquency, teenage pregnancy, school dropout, and violence as relevant indicators (or risk factors) for health and behavior problems.

[9]Note that, unlike the positive nature of result statements, indicators are almost always based on negative data. The reason is simple: Most of the data collected are for things that go wrong.

The most important distinction between results, indicators, and performance measures is between ends and means. Results and indicators have to do with ends. Performance measures and the programs they describe have to do with means. The end being sought is not "better service" but better results. These distinctions will help in describing planning and accountability processes that are built on clear thinking about intended achievements and chosen strategies.

As States and localities work to adopt a list of results and corresponding indicators, they should keep both product and process in mind. Experience suggests that the most effective frameworks are manageable, coherent, persuasive, strength based, politically credible, and responsive to local variation. These six characteristics should inform both the creation of results and indicators lists and the process that keeps them alive.

Using accountability systems

Results accountability, which relies on having developed a working list of results and indicators, demonstrates whether a program should exist as part of a larger strategy to improve the well-being of juveniles, families, and communities. Performance measurement picks up at this point, taking as a given that a program needs to exist, and moves on to the next step of answering whether it is working or not. Once decisionmakers, planners, practitioners, and managers know how they are doing, they can use that information to assess progress toward achieving the intended results and can restructure resource allocations directed at reaching those results.

Accountability systems—whether results or performance—are not ends in themselves, but means to the ends of improved conditions of well-being for children, families, and communities. The technology of accountability will always be developmental and controversial. If accountability is real, it affects things that matter. It provides consequences for success and failure. Without such systems, public and private entities will fuel cynicism about performance and, worse, deserve such cynicism. Results-based accountability systems can help build public confidence in government and community institutions and, more important, help create improved results for children, families, and communities.

Conclusion: The myth of Sisyphus

Most strategic planning systems use circular charts to depict the planning process. Just when you think you are finished, it seems that you are beginning all over again, like Sisyphus, condemned to an eternity of pushing a boulder up a steep hill only to have it roll back down as it neared the top of the hill. This is not the intent of strategic planning. Rather, it is intended to offer a sense of ownership and a method for accomplishment. But promoting continuous improvement through the use of results, indicators, and performance measures is necessarily iterative. As you translate this work into your own environment, understand that although it is difficult—and seems endless—progress is always a continuous exercise.

If accountability is real, it affects things that matter. It provides consequences for success and failure.

Steps to implementing a results-based planning/decisionmaking process

Results-Based Planning/Decisionmaking Framework

- Develop a working list of results and indicators.
- Adopt a politically grounded list of results and indicators.
- Agree on performance measures.
- Establish performance-based accountability structures.

Decisionmaking Tools

- Create a bibliography for selected results, gathering documentation on the effectiveness of programs.
- Identify “what works.”
- Collect data on indicators to target areas for improvement or investment (point-in-time, baseline, and forecast indicators reports and cost-of-bad-results baselines).

Decisionmaking Processes

- Establish a planning process/local planning council.
- Identify needs.
- Agree on goals.
- Establish spending priorities within the 12 JAIBG program purpose areas.
- Assess progress toward achieving intended results.
- Restructure resource allocations directed at intended results.

Introduction

The Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG)[1] program was created by Congress to promote greater accountability in the juvenile justice system. The law that created it authorizes the Attorney General to provide grants to the States to strengthen their policies, programs, and administrative systems that foster the creation of safe communities. The underlying supposition is that young people, their families, and the juvenile justice system must be accountable for improving the quality of life in every community.

This *Guide* begins and ends with the importance of focusing on results. It presents a conceptual framework and the operational steps for identifying desired results, creating and tracking measurable indicators of progress toward those results, and assessing program performance. In the first instance, it is intended to guide planning, budgeting, management, and accountability for programs supported by JAIBG.

Beyond this specific application, however, the ideas presented here can provide a springboard for strengthening results-based decisionmaking across States' and communities' juvenile justice systems. The JAIBG program is one in a constellation of Federal funding streams—both inside and outside the U.S. Department of Justice—that support policies, programs, and institutions to promote the creation of safe communities and to reduce the incidence and negative consequences of juvenile crime and delinquency. The results-based approach discussed here can improve decisionmaking for JAIBG State and local initiatives. Yet over time, its real value may be realized by the extent to which it can leverage a stronger focus on results and bring coherence to State and local activities that are supported by the wide array of Federal, State, and local programs and funding streams.

Results-based decisionmaking is a different—and it would seem promising—approach to setting priorities, defining a course of State and local action, measuring progress, and maintaining accountability for improving service outputs, not just counting inputs. It is not an end in itself, and it is not a proven technology waiting for replication. Instead, it is an approach ready to be tried and adapted to the needs of specific States and localities. The real test of its usefulness is whether it leads to improved results—safer communities, fewer victims of juvenile crime and delinquency, fewer juvenile offenders, and fewer repeat juvenile offenders. One way or another, the juvenile justice system must move more intentionally to align the use of resources with the long-term goals of improving the well-being of children and families and improving the quality of life in their communities.

Young people, their families, and the juvenile justice system must be accountable for improving the quality of life in every community.

The JAIBG Program

For fiscal year (FY) 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice received $250 million for the new JAIBG program. These JAIBG program funds will nearly double the amount of grant money—bringing it to $505.2 million—administered by the

[1]Public Law 105–119 (Nov. 26, 1997).

JAIBG grants promote greater accountability in the juvenile justice system.

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).[2] OJJDP juvenile justice programs are among the more than 50 criminal and juvenile justice grant-in-aid initiatives administered by bureaus and offices of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (OJP).

The JAIBG program provides grants to States and units of local government to enhance their efforts to combat serious and violent juvenile crime and to promote greater accountability in the juvenile justice system. JAIBG is based on Title III of H.R. 3, the House-passed Juvenile Accountability Block Grants Act of 1997, and funded in the FY 1998 Appropriations Act for the U.S. Department of Justice. Grants are made to eligible States on a formula basis (based on the State's population under age 18), with at least 75 percent of the funds, absent a waiver, to be passed through by the States to units of local government.[3]

JAIBG funds may be used to develop programs in the following 12 program purpose areas established by Congress:

1. Building, expanding, renovating, or operating temporary or permanent juvenile correction or detention facilities, including training of correctional personnel.
2. Developing and administering accountability-based sanctions for juvenile offenders.
3. Hiring additional judges, probation officers, and court-appointed defenders, and funding pretrial services for juveniles, to ensure the smooth and expeditious administration of the juvenile justice system.
4. Hiring additional prosecutors so that more cases involving violent juvenile offenders can be prosecuted and backlogs reduced.
5. Providing funding to enable prosecutors to address drug, gang, and youth violence problems more effectively.
6. Providing funding for technology, equipment, and training to assist prosecutors in identifying and expediting the prosecution of violent juvenile offenders.
7. Providing funding to enable juvenile courts and juvenile probation offices to be more effective and efficient in holding juvenile offenders accountable and reducing recidivism.
8. Establishing court-based juvenile justice programs that target young firearms offenders through the creation of juvenile gun courts for the adjudication and prosecution of juvenile firearms offenders.

[2]In addition to JAIBG, these juvenile justice grant programs include the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Formula Grants ($96.5 million) and Discretionary Grant ($45.3 million) Programs, Concentration of Federal Efforts ($.2 million), Part D–Gangs ($12 million), Part E–State Challenge Activities ($10 million), Part G–Mentoring ($12 million), Title V–Community Prevention Grants Program ($20 million), Combating Underage Drinking Program ($25 million), Substance Abuse Reduction Program ($5 million), Victims of Child Abuse Act ($7 million), Missing and Exploited Children's Program ($12.3 million), and Violent Crime Act ($9.9 million).

[3]To be eligible for FY 1998 JAIBG funds, States must certify their active or prospective consideration of the following four areas: (1) prosecution of juveniles as adults, (2) graduated sanctions, (3) juvenile recordkeeping, and (4) parental supervision. In addition, a State may be required to pass through a lower percentage of funds to units of local government if the State obtains a waiver by demonstrating that the State bears the primary financial burden for the administration of juvenile justice within that State. See the *Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) Program Guidance Manual FY 1998* (OJJDP, 1998) for more information.

Program implementation activities for States and localities

- Designated State Agencies (DSA's) submit completed JAIBG applications to OJJDP for review.
- DSA's and eligible units of local government establish Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions to develop JAIBG-coordinated enforcement plans.
- Each DSA establishes an interest-bearing trust fund for JAIBG funds.
- DSA's draw down the administrative share of their respective JAIBG allocations.
- DSA's and eligible units of local government develop coordinated enforcement plans.
- Eligible units of local government submit coordinated enforcement plans to the DSA.
- DSA's submit documentation to OJJDP demonstrating that the State and eligible units of local government have completed the required coordinated enforcement plans.
- DSA's distribute JAIBG program funds to eligible units of local government and other intended recipients in accordance with provisions of State and local coordinated enforcement plans.

9. Establishing drug court programs for juveniles so as to provide continuing supervision over juvenile offenders with substance abuse problems and to provide the integrated administration of other sanctions and services.
10. Establishing and maintaining interagency information-sharing programs that enable the juvenile and criminal justice systems, schools, and social services agencies to make more informed decisions regarding the early identification, control, supervision, and treatment of juveniles who repeatedly commit serious delinquent or criminal acts.
11. Establishing and maintaining accountability-based programs that work with juvenile offenders who are referred by law enforcement agencies or that are designed, in cooperation with law enforcement officials, to protect students and school personnel from drug, gang, and youth violence.
12. Implementing a policy of controlled substance testing for appropriate categories of juveniles within the juvenile justice system.

Other than a maximum of 10 percent of funds set aside for administration, not less than 45 percent of total JAIBG funds must be allocated for program purpose areas 3 through 9, and not less than 35 percent must be allocated for program purpose areas 1, 2, and 10. This distribution formula must be followed

Requisite elements for an effective juvenile justice system

The primary objective of the JAIBG program is "… promoting greater accountability in the juvenile justice system."[1] To this end, the program creates a new Federal grant-in-aid initiative to provide funds to States and units of local government to strengthen the capacity of the juvenile justice system to address serious and violent juvenile crime. In formulating strategies to implement JAIBG and to achieve the accountability-based reforms envisioned by Congress, States and units of local government should take into consideration certain requisite elements of an effective approach to enhancing the juvenile justice system's response to serious and violent juvenile crime. These requisite elements include:

- Articulating a clear mission for the juvenile justice system that reflects the fundamental beliefs and values of the community; establishes expectations and performance standards for the components of that system—police, courts, prosecution, defense, probation, and corrections; and holds juvenile offenders accountable for their actions.
- Establishing positive, collaborative relationships among police, educators, juvenile justice agency officials, youth service providers, and community leaders in developing and implementing strategies to address the problem of serious and violent juvenile crime.
- Creating a continuum of interventions and graduated sanctions for juvenile offenders that feature immediate, noninstitutional, service-intensive interventions for first-time and nonserious offenders; intermediate sanctions that are centered on intensive community-based supervision of juvenile offenders; and incarceration for juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for serious and violent juvenile offenses and who pose a threat to the safety of the community.
- Providing adequate personnel, facilities, and services to support implementation of strategies to address serious and violent juvenile crime, including (1) personnel: judges, hearing officers, prosecutors, defense counsel, probation officers, court administrative personnel, and correctional officers; (2) facilities: interview rooms, courtrooms, and secure detention and correctional facilities; and (3) services: client intake, including needs assessment; risk, medical, and mental health screening; counseling; and substance abuse treatment.

continued on next page

[1]H.R. 3 (May 8, 1997), Section 1801(b).

- Offering specialized training for police, the judiciary, prosecutors, defense counsel, and probation officers in handling cases involving juveniles charged with or convicted of serious and violent juvenile crimes.
- Upgrading automated information systems to expedite prosecution and improve management of cases involving juveniles charged with criminal offenses.
- Instituting adequate aftercare programs for and followup monitoring of juvenile offenders who are released from secure custody upon completing sentences for serious and violent crimes.
- Committing sufficient funding for adequate staff, facilities, training, services, information systems, and other resources to fully implement strategies to enhance the capacity of the juvenile justice system to address serious and violent juvenile crime.

unless the State or local government certifies that the interests of public safety and juvenile crime control would be better served by expending the funds in another proportion.[4]

In order to use any JAIBG funds, each State and unit of local government qualifying for and receiving these funds must have a plan for reducing juvenile crime. A State or local Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition (JCEC) with members including law enforcement and social service agencies must develop these plans.[5] Plans must be based on an analysis of juvenile justice system needs that determines the uses of funds—within the 12 program areas—that will achieve the greatest impact on reducing juvenile delinquency, improving the juvenile justice system, and increasing accountability for juvenile offenders.

What Is Results-Based Decisionmaking?

Results-based decisionmaking (which can encompass planning, budgeting, management, and accountability) is a process of setting results, creating and tracking indicators of progress towards those results, and assessing program performance in order to make decisions that lead to improved results for children, families, and communities. The movement toward strategic planning and results-based accountability reflects decades-long attempts by States and localities to answer some key questions: What is wanted for children, youth, and other citizenry? What are the basic conditions of well-being that all children and

[4]See appendix A for additional details.

[5]State Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions must include law enforcement and social service agencies involved in juvenile crime prevention. Local JCEC's must include individuals representing police, sheriffs, prosecutors, State or local probation services, juvenile courts, schools, businesses, religious-affiliated institutions, and fraternal, nonprofit, or social service organizations involved in crime prevention. See Section 4.2 of the *Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) Program Guidance Manual FY 1998* (OJJDP, 1998) for details on these JCEC's.

Expanded role of JAIBG Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions

- Conduct a needs assessment to determine priority areas for investment of JAIBG funds.
- Plan for the use of JAIBG funds by initiating a planning process: identify results, indicators, and performance measures.
- Develop a coordinated enforcement plan (required).
- Establish a results-accountability structure to evaluate/monitor the impact of new programs and funds.
- Develop a method for engaging the public in the ongoing process of defining cross-sector results, investing for measurable change, and measuring performance.

youth must have to make the most of their potential? How can these conditions be created and whose job is it to do so? Finally, how will the American people know if or when these conditions have been met?

Getting to these questions has not been easy. They have grown out of the frustration that communities and governments at all levels have felt as they have watched seemingly intractable problems grow more severe despite the continuing input of substantial resources by dozens of public and private agencies.

As they struggled to find out how they could be trying so hard and yet accomplishing so little, States, counties, cities, and communities interested in reform came to several important realizations. Together, these ideas have begun to radically change the way that we think about how to plan, design, finance, deliver, and evaluate services.

- First, the most intractable problems facing children and youth are interrelated. Fragmented solutions need to be pieced together into comprehensive strategies.
- Second, States and communities need to focus more attention on what is happening to children, families, and communities than on what agencies and programs are doing to and for them.
- Third, government and public agencies need to work in partnership with families, community organizations, and the private sector to set new directions and see real improvement.
- Finally, all States and local jurisdictions need to decide on the most important results they want for their children and communities, measure their success in achieving those results, and then use that know-how to make better decisions about additional services to provide.

The heart of results-based decisionmaking lies in this last idea: If results are things that matter for the long-term well-being of society, then how can they be connected to the work of actually deciding how to use resources?

The Boston strategy on youth violence: Achieving results by planning for prevention

Officials in the city of Boston, MA, attribute an impressive decline in youth violence involving firearms to the success of the city's youth violence prevention strategy. From 1993 through 1997, the number of homicide arrests of juveniles dropped from 14 to 3. In 1996, no juvenile was arrested on a homicide charge in the city. Moreover, the number of arrests of juveniles on charges of aggravated assault and battery with a firearm declined from 32 to 22 from 1993 to 1997.[1]

These benchmarks in youth violence reduction are the achievements of the Boston Strategy on Youth Violence, an intergovernmental, multiagency collaborative initiative that has engaged more than 400 criminal justice officials, social services providers, residents, local merchants, and educators in integrating juvenile violence reduction objectives into the city's overall neighborhood policing strategic plan. At the heart of the strategy is the application of community problem identification and resolution techniques to reducing the number of incidents of youth violence, in particular, incidents involving firearms.

A key feature of Boston's youth violence prevention strategy is its integration of crime intervention, enforcement, and prevention protocols and resources into a targeted approach to reducing youth violence. A central element of the strategy is Operation Ceasefire, an interagency, interdisciplinary initiative to issue an immediate response to flareups of youth gang violence, expedite prosecutions of perpetrators of that violence, and disrupt firearms trafficking to youth gang members. Strategy components also include targeted apprehension and prosecution of hardcore youthful offenders; intensified supervision of high-risk probationers; support and assistance for families of youthful offenders; expanded services for youth at risk of becoming involved in violent behavior; job and life skills training for youth; and assistance for children who witness violence.

The contributions of a host of State, county, and city partners in the Boston Strategy on Youth Violence have been complemented by substantial support and financial assistance from several Federal collaborators in that initiative, including the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the U.S. Attorney's Office; and the U.S. Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Institute of Justice, and Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services.

Source: Boston Police Department, Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development. 1997 (Spring). *The Boston Strategy on Youth Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Enforcement.* Boston, MA: Boston Police Department.

[1]Statistics provided by the Boston Police Department, Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development (June 16, 1998).

A growing number of States, counties, cities, and communities are engaged in the work of identifying the results they want for their youth.

The concepts of strategic planning and accountability for results are literally businesslike: Start with the desired results for juveniles, families, and communities and work backward to the means to achieve those results. But how can this rather simple concept be translated into practice in the complex environment of public decisionmaking?

A growing number of States, counties, cities, and communities are engaged in the work of identifying the results they want for their youth. They are pushing their juvenile justice systems to plan according to these results and to hold themselves accountable for their performance. In some cases, these efforts focus on matters of family and child safety; in other cases, they concentrate on a more broadly based articulation of a desired quality of life for all citizens. In each case, however, the challenge is the same: to get from talking about results to actually doing something about them.

Why Undertake Results-Based Decisionmaking Now?

The requirement for States and units of local government to plan for the use of JAIBG funds presents them with an opportunity to experiment with results-based planning and decisionmaking.

Using results-based decisionmaking to plan for JAIBG funds can improve all aspects of how a State manages its JAIBG program. It can improve decisions about the allocation of funds among the 12 program purpose areas at both the State and local levels. It can lead to better decisions about funds that the State provides to local governments or administers on their behalf. It can inform State decisions on technical assistance and other services provided to local governments concerning their allocation of JAIBG funds. It can also improve a State's measurement and assessment of its performance in achieving its objectives using JAIBG funds. Likewise, results-based decisionmaking by local governments can help ensure better use of JAIBG funds at the local level.

Of course, results-based decisionmaking is applicable beyond the JAIBG program. Many States and communities across the country have used results-based decisionmaking in other juvenile and criminal justice programs; other service areas affecting children, families, and communities; and across whole systems of government. Several examples of these endeavors will be presented in this *Guide*. This experience provides valuable models, insights, and lessons for States and communities seeking to make the best use of JAIBG funds. Experimentation with results-based decisionmaking around JAIBG funds, in turn, can inform a State's or community's efforts to improve decisionmaking in the larger set of juvenile justice programs and in other domains.

This *Guide* is intended to provide basic information on how to plan for results in the context of the JAIBG program. It begins by laying out a set of principles for ensuring accountability in juvenile justice systems. It then discusses in some detail the processes of planning for positive results through JAIBG, developing a results-based accountability system, and measuring program performance to

ensure that investments reap their intended results. The *Guide* also provides examples illustrating successful attempts to undertake results-based decision-making. These examples are useful models for States and communities considering this approach.

The *Guide* is not intended to be a detailed roadmap to results-based decision-making that can be immediately applied in a particular State or community. Other work by The Finance Project and others goes into more detail about the steps, issues, and challenges in undertaking this work and the need to tailor the process to the unique needs and circumstances of each State or community.[6] In addition, the *Guide* does not provide specific guidance on how to allocate funds among and within the JAIBG's 12 program purpose areas and which projects to fund within these program purpose areas. OJJDP has commissioned papers that cover each of these 12 areas that will examine issues and considerations pertaining to spending for each purpose.[7]

Common sense and experience support the concept that keeping juveniles out of trouble is preferable—socially, economically, and in many other ways—to having them in the juvenile justice system.

Principles for Ensuring Accountability in Juvenile Justice Systems

The JAIBG program is focused on improving accountability in juvenile justice systems. The four interrelated principles set forth below can help guide State and local Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions in planning for results that will enhance accountability under the JAIBG program.[8] Each of the principles, while important in and of itself, is also part of a larger whole. The principles provide an overarching framework for planning for and tracking movement toward desired accountability results—a sort of compass for assessing direction and adjusting course as needed.

- **Preventing problems before they become crises is the most effective and cost-effective way to address the needs of troubled children, their families, and the communities in which they live.** Common sense and experience support the concept that keeping juveniles out of trouble is preferable—socially, economically, and in many other ways—to having them in the juvenile justice system. Preventing problems before they occur involves a whole group of systems and services outside juvenile justice—education, health, social services, recreation, and others—working together to provide safe and responsible opportunities for youth and alternatives to delinquent and criminal behavior. If juveniles do enter the justice system, a critical goal should be to prevent recidivism and the escalating seriousness of problem incidents. This requires employing appropriate interventions, services, and strategies to work with juveniles who have committed acts of varying seriousness and who are in various parts of the juvenile justice system.

[6]See appendix C, listing of selected resources.
[7]These papers are expected to be available in spring 1999.
[8]These principles of accountability also apply to a broader range of juvenile justice programs.

Law enforcement agencies, religious institutions, and service and charitable organizations need to coordinate their activities and services to offer the range of needed services to juveniles.

- **State and local juvenile justice systems play the leading role in responding appropriately to juvenile crime, delinquency, and status offenses.** As the institutions with primary responsibility for responding to all juvenile offenses (including, but not limited to, acts that would be serious or violent crimes if committed by an adult), juvenile justice systems must be prepared to use their resources and influence to provide a continuum of services and to employ appropriate interventions for juveniles. As noted above, this role includes coordinating various parts of the juvenile justice system and working with systems outside juvenile justice to prevent problems from occurring or worsening. The juvenile justice system can be expected to retain responsibility for most juvenile offenders. Even juveniles who are waived to adult criminal courts and convicted of crimes often receive postconviction services from the juvenile justice system.
- **Parents and community institutions share responsibility for creating safe, secure environments and for taking steps to respond to crime and violence when they occur.** Parents bear a major responsibility for supporting, protecting, instructing, and disciplining their children and seeking appropriate assistance when necessary. But other community groups and institutions also need to consider their roles in and opportunities for promoting a positive environment for juveniles, minimizing opportunities for them to get into trouble, and contributing to the remediation of problems when necessary. Schools, for example, have a responsibility to maintain a safe and secure environment for students and to identify and refer troubled youth to appropriate law enforcement and social service agencies. Businesses can consider the impact of their policies and practices—such as parents' work hours, dependent care benefits, and youth apprenticeship programs—on the juveniles in their community. Law enforcement agencies, religious institutions, and service and charitable organizations need to coordinate their activities and services to offer the range of needed services to juveniles. No community institution can do it all, but every member of the community needs to consider what it can do to prevent or ameliorate the impacts of juvenile crime and delinquency.
- **Juveniles who engage in criminal misconduct must be held accountable for their actions.** Despite the positive efforts of families and communities, some juveniles will get in trouble. This behavior will range from less serious offenses, such as shoplifting and joyriding, to serious and violent crimes, such as drug dealing, gang violence, and even murder. Juveniles who commit serious and violent offenses must bear the consequences. However, these consequences should be appropriate to the acts. Juvenile justice systems should provide for a continuum of available responses—including, for example, restitution, fines, supervised release, out-of-home placement, and short- and long-term incarceration. Moreover, these responses should be applied depending on both the severity of the act, including the individual circumstances of the juvenile's involvement, and the juvenile's prior history of offending, such as through a policy of graduated sanctions.

Planning for Positive Results Through the JAIBG Program

Understanding results, indicators, and performance measures

In order to plan a method for investing JAIBG dollars to get the best possible return on investments—or to achieve the best results possible—it is important to start with an agreement of what results are intended. But before agreement can be reached on intended results, agreement is needed on what is meant by "result."

- A "result" (or "outcome"[9]) is a bottom-line condition of well-being for juveniles, families, or communities. Results are matters of common sense, above and beyond the jargon of bureaucracy. They are about the fundamental desires of citizens and the overarching purposes of government. These results are not "owned" by any single government agency or system. By definition, they cross over agency and program lines and public and private sectors. Examples of results include healthy and nurturing families, safe and supportive communities, and young people avoiding trouble.[10] These are outcomes that all individuals want for their own families, children, and communities. If results are defined carefully, they will still be important in 10, 50, or 100 years. Because they have that kind of staying power, results are the right place to start thinking about what achievements are wanted and how to get there from here.

Deciding where to go is only the beginning of the process of planning for how to get there. This process also involves devising methods to track progress in achieving intended results:

- An "indicator" (or "benchmark"[11]) is a measure, for which data are available, that helps quantify the achievement of—or community-level progress toward—agreed-upon results. Indicators help answer the question, How can a result be recognized if it is achieved? Because results are broad statements of what citizens want and governments set out to achieve, no single indicator or piece of data is likely to signal full attainment of any given result. There is no one complete measure of juveniles staying out of trouble. Examples of indicators include rates of juvenile delinquency, teen drug use, and gang membership.[12] An essential element of this definition is that the data for an indicator are currently available. This is not about

If results are defined carefully, they will still be important in 10, 50, or 100 years.

[9]In some parts of the country, the term "outcomes" has taken on a political meaning very different from the way in which the term is used here. The *Guide* uses "outcomes" and "results" interchangeably to describe conditions of well-being. Such statements of well-being often span conventional political boundaries and provide a common ground for those with widely different ideas about how best to achieve those outcomes.

[10]Youth development goals as laid out in the *Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders* (Howell, 1995) include healthy and nurturing families, safe communities, school attachment, prosocial peer relations, personal development and life skills, and healthy lifestyle choices.

[11]There is a difference in how the term "benchmark" is used in public and private sector applications. The public sector often uses the term "benchmark" to mean an indicator or performance measure. The private sector uses the term to mean a particular level of (desired and achievable) performance.

[12]The *Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders* (Howell, 1995) indicates substance abuse, delinquency, teenage pregnancy, school dropout, and violence as relevant indicators (or risk factors) for health and behavior problems.

The end being sought is not "better service" but better results.

wished-for knowledge, but about real-world information actually produced.[13]

- A "performance measure" is a measure of the effectiveness of agency or program service delivery. These are measures of how well public or private agencies and programs are working. Typical performance measures address matters of timeliness, cost effectiveness, and compliance with standards, such as percent of youth in community-based care versus percent in institutional care, percent of juveniles with repeat (and escalating seriousness of) offenses, or case ratio for probation workers. Such measures are absolutely essential to running programs well. They are, however, very different from results and indicators. They have to do with the service response to social problems, not the conditions targeted for improvement. It is possible, even common, for individual programs to be considered successful while overall conditions get worse.

The most important distinction in these concepts is between ends and means. Results and indicators have to do with ends. Performance measures and the programs they describe have to do with means. The end being sought is not "better service" but better results. These distinctions will help in describing planning and accountability processes that are built on clear thinking about desired achievements and the chosen strategies for getting there.

Identifying results and indicators: Key characteristics and implementation issues

Because results and indicators provide the starting point for a planning process and a framework for implementing systems of accountability, development of a results-and-indicators list is a first step.

A working list

The beginning stage of this work usually takes the form of a working list of results and indicators developed by a collaborative group charged with identifying desired conditions of well-being for children, families, and communities. The strength of this beginning work depends in part on the capabilities of the group and its political legitimacy and credibility (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 1996). More political standing at the start will allow the work to progress faster and give it a better chance to take root. For example, San Antonio, TX, established a Crime Prevention Commission that consisted of representatives of religious, school, business, law enforcement, local government, and media organizations. The commission developed an action plan that included four indicators of improvement, including increased youth accountability and responsibility. This commission remains active and has seen a 30.7-percent reduction of overall crime within the organization's target area since 1992 (President's Crime Prevention Council, 1997:19).

[13]Note that, unlike the positive nature of result statements, indicators are almost always based on negative data. The reason is simple: Most of the data collected are for things that go wrong.

The State and local coalitions that must be established in order to receive JAIBG funds[14] provide an excellent forum for this sort of collaborative planning body. In addition, to the extent that private nonprofit entities or community-based organizations will be used to carry out the development and administration of accountability-based sanctions for juvenile offenders (as encouraged in Section 1806 of H.R. 3), it is appropriate to bring these groups to the planning process at this point.

There are many examples of lists of results and corresponding indicators that have been developed around the country. These examples can be used as reference points in States and localities just beginning this work. Among the best known are Oregon's Benchmarks and Minnesota's Milestones. Oregon's work was extended to communities across the State, using the State's strategic plan as an example. Portland's Police Bureau created one such plan, Operation ReFocus (President's Crime Prevention Council, 1997).

One of the most important challenges in this stage of the work is to keep the lists of both results and indicators short. It is not hard to come up with a long list of results, and any public service professional can easily list 20 or more indicators for a given result. It is harder to be sparse. For each result, the group should identify three or four primary indicators to represent what the result "means for us" in measurable and measured terms. This is difficult, but absolutely essential to the clarity and coherence of the later work.

Indicators that are not selected here should not be discarded, but can be placed on a second list for use in later parts of the process. It is also advisable to keep a third list of desired indicators where data need to be developed or improved. Over time, groups may add to or move indicators from one list to another within this structure.

The following criteria can be used to select the primary indicators from a longer list of candidates.

- **Communication power.** One of the principal purposes of a results/indicators framework is to communicate with the public and other constituencies about "how we're doing" on juvenile justice and other aspects of community well-being. It is possible to think of this in terms of a "public square test." If it were necessary to stand in a public square and explain, with only two or three pieces of data, "what we mean by safe communities," what two or three pieces of data would you use? Obviously, you could bring a thick report to the square and begin a long recitation, but the crowd would thin out quickly. No one will listen to, absorb, or understand more than a few pieces of descriptive data. Measures must be powerful, on the level of common sense, and compelling, not arcane and bureaucratic. The point here is to achieve power and clarity with diverse audiences.

One of the most important challenges is to keep the lists of both results and indicators short.

[14]As referenced in footnote 5, State JCEC's must include law enforcement and social service agencies involved in juvenile crime prevention. Local JCEC's must include individuals representing police, sheriffs, prosecutors, State or local probation services, juvenile courts, schools, businesses, religious-affiliated institutions, and fraternal, nonprofit, or social service organizations involved in crime prevention.

Indicators run in herds. If one is going in the right direction, chances are that the rest are as well.

- **Proxy power.** Another simple truth about indicators is that they run in herds. If one is going in the right direction, chances are that the rest are as well. You do need enough indicators to ensure that you are collecting true data and that you are not producing undesired results as a byproduct of achieving intended results, but you do not need 20 indicators telling you the same thing. Pick the indicators that have the greatest proxy power (i.e., that are most likely to match the direction of the other indicators).

  The second important dimension of the proxy criterion is the extent to which there is an established relationship between the data element and the result it represents. Is the indicator a good proxy, not just for other indicators but for the result itself? The strongest linkage is, of course, based in research, but less formal, commonsense linkages can also be important and useful. (For example, it is commonly accepted that the crime rate is a good indicator of whether we have "safe communities.")

- **Data power.** Last, but not least, it is important that the indicators chosen to represent the result are ones for which high-quality data are available and that demonstrate progress or the lack thereof on a regular and frequent basis. Ideally, such data elements would be updated on a monthly or quarterly basis, with a relatively short timelag. This would enable those overseeing this process to plot the new point on the curve and assess progress—or the lack of progress—in relation to the baseline on a regular basis.

In a recent effort in the Lamoille Valley region of Vermont, the process of choosing primary and secondary indicators involved ranking each of the candidate indicators on these three criteria. A high, medium, or low rank was assigned for each indicator on each criterion. For the data-power ranking, the participants also assessed the availability of both current and historical baseline data. The expense of collecting the data was coded with one, two, or three dollar signs. This process helped build consensus on a list of primary indicators that could be ranked high in all three categories, with current and historical data available at reasonable effort and expense.

It is important to view the list of results and indicators as a functioning whole to be sure that the statements are internally consistent and complete. It may also be valuable to consider the idea of checks and balances between selected indicators. It should be possible to examine the extent to which improvement on one indicator may be made at the expense of another. By testing an indicator set for natural checks and balances and defining success as improvement on complementary indicators, the chances of real progress are improved. Consider as examples the relationship between the number of juvenile offenders committed to secure juvenile correctional facilities and the availability of funding for community-based services for first-time, nonviolent juvenile offenders, or the number of juveniles waived to criminal courts for prosecution as adults and the availability of appropriate placements in juvenile and adult correctional facilities for juveniles convicted of serious and violent crimes. In each case, having both indicators on the list can serve as a partial safeguard against the later development of narrow or expedient strategies that solve one problem by creating another. This safeguard structure does not have to appear in (and expand) the primary list of indicators. It is also possible to link primary indicators with complementary indicators on the secondary list.

A politically grounded list

If results are to serve as a basis for serious decisionmaking, then they must attract or acquire political standing. In addition, a fully developed State framework should support the development of local results and indicators and provide for local variations that reflect local needs and priorities. This also should include a process for periodic review, update, and change at both the State and local levels. To date, only one State, Oregon, has developed a results/indicators framework that substantively meets all of these criteria. The State and a number of counties in Oregon have grounded their use of benchmarks in State and local

Planning in Colorado: Strategic, community-based response to crime

The State of Colorado currently is engaged in implementing an interagency initiative to produce a multiyear, locally driven strategic plan that would encompass all program development and spending for substance abuse; delinquency prevention; and children, youth, and families in the State. At the heart of this strategic planning approach is the belief that local officials are positioned best to determine the service-related needs and problems of their respective jurisdictions.

A key player in Colorado's strategic planning approach is the State's Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ). Nationally, DCJ has been a forerunner and devotee of using locally developed empirical data as the basis for identifying service gaps and sociological predictors of risk that, in turn, provide the foundation for strategic planning.

DCJ, which manages Federal criminal and juvenile justice grant-in-aid programs in the State, has used the funds made available by Federal grant programs to leverage collaboration among local groups in planning to address crime problems and to encourage communities to adopt crime prevention and reduction strategies that have been proven to be effective or show promise. DCJ's Build A Generation initiative, for example, provides incentive funding to communities to incorporate research on risk reduction into local strategies for reducing juvenile crime. Adapted from the Communities That Care planning model developed by researchers at the University of Washington at Seattle, the Build A Generation initiative encourages communities to engage in collaborative planning efforts to develop a continuum of appropriate interventions for troubled youth. In addition to providing incentive funding, DCJ also offers technical assistance and training to local officials engaged in collaborative planning initiatives to reduce juvenile crime.

Source: National Criminal Justice Association. 1998 (Spring). Community-based planning: Promoting a neighborhood response to crime. *Policy and Practice.* Washington, DC: National Criminal Justice Association.

In a well-designed list, the relationship between each result and each indicator is clear and unambiguous.

law. A number of other States, cities, and counties also are making progress in this direction.

There are two good approaches available to link State and local development of results and indicators. States can create a core list that counties and communities can add to—or they can create a comprehensive list that counties and communities can choose from, add to, and modify. Either approach works. One approach that does not work is for a State to develop and mandate a list that everyone must use without variation. State processes must treat local partners with respect and must honor legitimate variations in local needs and priorities.

As States and localities work to adopt a results-and-indicators list, they should keep both product and process in mind. Experience suggests that the most effective frameworks are manageable, coherent, persuasive, strength based, politically credible, and responsive to local variation. These six characteristics should inform the creation of lists of results and indicators and the process that keeps them alive.

- **Manageable.** As one private sector leader involved in developing a results-and-indicators framework put it, "What I want is something I can carry around in my pocket and use." The number of results and indicators should be small enough to summarize community expectations in key areas on a single page if possible—and to require no more than a reasonable outlay of resources to track on a frequent basis.
- **Coherent.** Taken together, the results and indicators that form the framework should convey a simple but complete picture of community expectations. The selection of the results and indicators should suggest comprehensive, cross-cutting strategies. In a well-designed list, the relationship between each result and each indicator is clear and unambiguous, and the conceptual distinctions between results, indicators, and performance measures are clearly defined and consistently used.
- **Persuasive.** An effective list should ring true and make sense to people. Results should reflect the basic conditions that everyone—regardless of income, race, ethnicity, or religion—wants for juveniles, their families, and communities. Indicators should capture the most "commonsense" measures of whether the desired results are being reached. The language used should be as simple and as brief as possible.
- **Strength based.** The tone and presentation should emphasize the importance of positive youth development, long-term investment strategies, and short- and long-term remediation.
- **Politically credible.** To become a useful planning tool, a results-and-indicators list must be recognized as a legitimate statement of what an entire community—not just its government or public agencies—thinks is essential. At the same time, the list must be owned and embraced by the institutions responsible for setting public policy and delivering services.
- **Responsive.** Whether a list is developed by a State or locality, it must be of value to a wide variety of users. It should allow for local variation and should use indicators that can be measured with sub-State data whenever possible.

Implementing an Accountability System for the JAIBG Program

A list of grounded results and indicators can help decisionmakers invest strategically in juvenile justice and crime prevention. It can ensure that an accountability system for the JAIBG program is established. In addition, it is useful in facilitating the identification of innovative practices that will help achieve desired results. This framework allows for a move from data and results to "what works" and a proposed strategic plan for implementation.

Collecting data on indicators to target areas for improvement or investment

Agencies and organizations that work on youth and community well-being often set themselves up for failure by creating unrealistic expectations and

Steps to implementing a results-based planning/decisionmaking process

Results-Based Planning/Decisionmaking Framework

- Develop a working list of results and indicators.
- Adopt a politically grounded list of results and indicators.
- Agree on performance measures.
- Establish performance-based accountability structures.

Decisionmaking Tools

- Create a bibliography for selected results, gathering documentation on the effectiveness of programs.
- Identify "what works."
- Collect data on indicators to target areas for improvement or investment (point-in-time, baseline, and forecast indicators reports and cost-of-bad-results baselines).

Decisionmaking Processes

- Establish a planning process/local planning council.
- Identify needs.
- Agree on goals.
- Establish spending priorities within the 12 JAIBG program purpose areas.
- Assess progress toward achieving intended results.
- Restructure resource allocations directed at intended results.

Once a baseline is crafted to show the direction and speed of change of a result or indicator, what is "good" and "bad" performance can be gauged.

impossible standards for success. A large part of this problem is attributable to the way in which data are used to define success or failure. The typical approach to defining success is what can be called, for want of a better term, "point-to-point" improvement. If the juvenile violent crime arrest rate is now 506 per 100,000 youth,[15] the tendency is to define success as any reduction of this rate (to, for example, 450 over the next 2 years). This kind of definition of success is a setup. Most social conditions are more complex than this. These conditions have direction and inertia—which can be shown through baselines.

Once a baseline is crafted to show the direction and speed of change of a result or indicator, what is "good" and "bad" performance can be gauged—and so can what works either to slow the rate at which things get worse or turn the curve in the right direction. Success, then, is turning away from the curve or beating the baseline, not turning on a dime to achieve some arbitrary lower target.

There are at least two kinds of baselines that should serve as reference points for beginning to quantify the climate into which a prevention or intervention program is introduced and for holding programs accountable for positive results through self-evaluation of success and failure.

Indicators reports

Indicators reports are valuable baselines for action. They can be viewed in terms of three stages of development:

- **Annual point-in-time** reports generally begin as a report card showing the status of families and children in the State or locality on each indicator at one or two points in time, usually the most recent data compared with data from some prior period. An annual point-in-time report may present status of well-being through crime rates, demographic or economic situations, cultural context, or any number of other representations.
- **Annual reports with baseline and forecast** data are the next stage of development for indicators reports. They provide not just point-in-time data, but a true baseline for each indicator. However, forecasts must include some recognition that forecasting is an inexact art. Some reports attempt to shortcut the baseline picture by offering two points in time and comparing performance between these two points. A crude two-point trend is inferred. This kind of analysis can answer simple questions like, Are things better or worse than 10 years ago? But point-to-point comparisons, particularly over such a long period as 10 years, can mask the real trends. You cannot tell from such analyses, for example, whether the problem peaked in that 10-year period and is now declining or whether it bottomed out and is now getting better, or whether some other more complex picture exists. In fact, these last questions are the most important for policy purposes. So it is necessary to move beyond reports with two-point comparisons, to a next stage of development with real baselines, including forecasts.
- **Progress-against-baseline** reports are arguably the last stage of development on the indicators report track. They are a structure that provides

[15]See The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 1998:21.

monthly or quarterly reporting against the baseline forecasts. This structure provides the basis for the "continuous improvement" feedback loop that is central to the ultimate success of strategic planning and results-based decisionmaking systems. Comparison of actual data to baselines allows decisionmakers, planners, practitioners, and managers to judge whether or not the strategies they have adopted to turn the curve from negative to positive results are working. There are few, if any, examples of this type of report in public services at this time.

Cost-of-bad-results (COBR) baseline

The second baseline is the cost baseline. In this case the cost that needs to be considered is the "cost of bad results." The idea of costing "bad results" starts with the idea of "good" results, the conditions of well-being the country hopes to achieve for children, families, and communities. Much, if not most, government spending for juvenile justice and, more broadly, for children and families (other than elementary and secondary education) is spent in response to bad results: children not staying out of trouble, not being ready for school, not succeeding in school. The costs of these bad results show up in both governmental and nongovernmental expenditures. It is possible to measure and track these expenditures and to begin to frame policies in terms of reducing these costs. Such analyses will certainly show the enormous stake the Nation has in improving results and may set the stage for discussing alternatives.

If government were a business, the money spent on repairs would be tracked. If repair costs began to consume unreasonable amounts of corporate resources, businesses would do something about it. The first step would be to determine how much was spent by tracking repair costs over time. This tracking system would be used to see whether preventive efforts to control repair costs were working. Society's spending on bad results is roughly equivalent to business repair costs. It is clear that preventive maintenance is less expensive than repair. There is good reason to believe (though hard evidence is harder to come by) that preventing children's problems is less expensive than remediating problems later.[16] The only way to reduce the high cost of bad results, over the long term, is prevention,[17] and the starting point for controlling these costs is to know what they are.

The question to be answered in this work is, What costs exist today because we are not getting the results we want? To put it another way, What costs would go away if we achieved good results for all children? When the question is posed this way, whole programs become part of the "cost-of-bad-results" answer. For instance, juvenile detention programs and all their attendant costs are part of the cost of bad results.

There are two principal uses for this work: First, as a tool to measure success or failure in strictly fiscal terms. It is necessary to track whether the strategies developed to produce desired results are working to slow the growth and eventually to reduce the cost of bad results. Second, policymakers and concerned citizens can begin to think about the long-term financial benefits of improving the

What costs would go away if we achieved good results for all children?

[16]See the studies of the Perry Preschool; Women, Infants, and Children nutritional program; or Head Start as examples.

[17]It is important to note that not all prevention efforts are created equal. Poorly conceived or poorly delivered preventive programs may not be less expensive than repair.

Without baselines, decisionmakers are blinded to the reality of complex problems and complex service delivery systems.

well-being of children and families and communities in real-dollar terms. This could lead to new ways of thinking about financing the investments in prevention necessary to make this happen. The essential second question then becomes, What expenditures are embedded in the total cost of bad results that are now devoted to turning the bad-result curve? The answer to this question will help identify the elements of an agenda that could turn the COBR curve.

Each of these baselines—the indicators or COBR baseline—has two components: a historical component and a forecast component. Although forecasting can be difficult and even risky, the forecast component is very important. First, it communicates a powerful message about what can be expected to happen if the current course is maintained, and it can be used to frame the fundamental question about whether that expected course is an acceptable one. Second, it provides a reference against which to look at data as they come in and make judgments about progress being made month to month, quarter to quarter, and year to year. These kinds of processes can and should be dynamic.[18] Data should be used to test the strategies on a regular basis.[19]

Two other uses are worth a brief mention. The COBR baseline can help set up a different way of approaching financing the investments necessary to turn the curve. When COBR analyses are completed, they are certain to show the high cost of bad results and the relatively meager amounts embedded in the total cost now devoted to turning the curve. This picture is a first step in discussing the tangible financial benefits of an effective investment strategy to turn the cost curve and may open the door to some nontraditional ways to finance that investment.

The second use will be controversial with the research community, but a well-established baseline is a kind of substitute for a control group in very complex environments. If it can be shown that success at turning the curve had some timely relationship to a set of strategies at scale (not just a fortuitous change in economic or demographic conditions), then credible, circumstantial evidence exists that these efforts are paying off. Cause-and-effect questions at the systemic level will never be answered in the way most interested parties would like, but baselines and the performance against baselines can be a powerful, if still not fully satisfying, substitute.

Baselines are therefore an essential component of results-based planning and decisionmaking. Without baselines, decisionmakers are blinded to the reality of complex problems and complex service delivery systems. They are limited by systems that inaccurately measure progress and that skew decisionmaking away from preventive investments. Baselines make it possible to think about problems in multiyear terms and to avoid the oversimplifications that accompany year-to-year or point-to-point comparisons.

[18]What if the media anxiously awaited the release of monthly juvenile recidivism data as they now wait for the latest unemployment statistics?

[19]There is significant and growing literature on self-evaluation. See Usher, 1995:59–68 or Fetterman, Kaftarian, and Wandersman, 1996.

Once the current situation is known, it becomes important to identify which of the components of the present circumstance should be targeted for improvement. This is not to say that it is appropriate to identify new results or indicators—the baselines are built from decisions that have already been made. However, this is an opportunity to identify which of the indicators are the most in need of attention to get to where they want to go. With limited resources and time, not all indicators can be fully and simultaneously addressed—precisely the reason that strategic planning is proposed to guide decisions.

Investing in a successful environment

It is important to note that not all trend lines are going in the wrong direction, and results-based decisionmaking is not solely applicable to systems or communities that must first stem the tide of worsening conditions. The concept of turning the curve applies equally well to situations where the trend line is already going in the *right* direction. The phrasing of the question then becomes, How can we turn the curve away from the baseline toward even better performance? In Maryland during the mid-1980's, the trend line for children in foster care was already declining. The State's efforts to improve permanency for children in out-of-home care created a faster decline than the State and national pattern of caseload decline at the time. The State's investments "worked" by accelerating the rate of decline. In communities that are making progress in juvenile justice, the results-based decisionmaking system can be used to ask how this success can be improved upon.

Equally important is the environment where there is a record of success to be sustained. It is not uncommon for systems to "rebound." For example, in Tillamook County, OR, the success of efforts to reduce teen pregnancy has created a new challenge: to keep the pregnancy rate from turning back up. Because results and indicators have some staying power, results-based systems with regular reporting components can help to avoid shifting attention from successful areas and allowing problems to rebound. These systems can highlight current performance in relation to the current baseline forecast and then quickly identify any rebound.

Determining "what works"

The strategic planning process calls for systematic thinking about what works to turn the cost and indicator curves. The answer to this type of question is not something that can be extracted from a review of the research literature. The reason, in part, is that decisionmakers do not have, and never will have, all the research information they want or need. The answer to this type of question can and should draw on lessons from the broadest base of experience, including research.

There is a wealth of information on social experimentation that can be of tremendous value in this work. Much of this work is pointing in the direction of comprehensive, cross-system, community-based strategies that combine effective governmental and nongovernmental efforts. The National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA), based in Washington, D.C., recently took a look at

It is not uncommon for systems to "rebound."

Idaho's law enforcement training scholarship program: Using data to assess needs

Like JAIBG, the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) program, administered by another Office of Justice Programs component, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, charges States with managing program development for and distributing funds on behalf of units of local government that decline to participate in the Federal grant program or that would receive allocations in amounts less than a minimum cutoff allotment.

In 1997, the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement assumed responsibility for distributing some $26,000 in FY 1996 LLEBG program funds on behalf of several rural communities whose program funds had reverted to the State for administration. In order to use this small amount of grant funds in a manner that would be most meaningful to intended recipients, the department entered into a partnership with the Idaho Peace Officers Standards and Training Academy to conduct a needs assessment of the areas of greatest need among rural law enforcement agencies that were not receiving direct awards under the LLEBG program. Survey findings indicated a substantial need for financial assistance to subsidize rural police administrators' and line officers' participation in various law enforcement training curriculums.

In response to the survey findings, the department established a law enforcement scholarship program that has provided rural police officials access to both basic and inservice training courses covering police administration for new police chiefs, leadership and command skills, crime scene investigation, and operation of specialized police equipment. To further enhance rural law enforcement agencies' access to training under the scholarship program, the department also assumed responsibility for providing funds to meet the 10-percent recipient matching contribution required under the LLEBG program.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program Division.

community-based planning in the States. In the first issue of its new quarterly publication, *Policy and Practice*, NCJA described the efforts of four States to implement strategic planning models that promote collaboration between State and local agencies (NCJA, 1998). In addition, OJJDP's October 1997 publication *Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 1994–1996* contains case studies that examine four States' strategies for addressing the problem of serious and violent juvenile crime (NCJA, 1997). The challenge is making this information accessible and relevant to the task of crafting strategies to improve results.

While best judgment on deciding "what works" does not mean blind guesswork but rather building from experience and research, it also does not mean blind copying. Every State or locality faces unique challenges—economic, political, and social. Ultimately, the answer for any State, county, or community involves people making their best judgments about what they think will work and what they are willing to stand up and defend in the public square.

The process of determining what works can start as a bibliography for selected results, including existing publications that summarize documentation on the effectiveness of programs. For example, OJJDP's Juvenile Justice Bulletin series routinely contains information on State and local initiatives in the juvenile justice and delinquency prevention field and presents the highlights of relevant statistical reports and research findings on program performance and accomplishments. Likewise, OJJDP's Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse, a component of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), is an excellent source for information to guide States and units of local government in exploring program options for incorporation in juvenile crime reduction strategies. The Clearinghouse and the broader NCJRS can be particularly helpful in identifying and locating studies and reports produced by State and local jurisdictions on their experiences in strategy development and program implementation.

At each stage of this process of determining what works, partnerships can and should be developed with the research community to help get answers to the most pressing questions about the effectiveness, and in particular the cost effectiveness, of strategies to improve well-being.

Key questions that have to be answered when discovering what works are:

- What works to turn the indicator and cost curves in the right direction (e.g., strategies, collections of programs, and approaches that span governmental and nongovernmental sectors)?
- Do initiatives or programs contribute to the overall "what works" strategy? Should they be part of the effort to turn the curve? Is there evidence that, in concert with other elements of the strategy, they contribute to turning the curve?
- Are these initiatives and programs working on their own terms? Are they well designed and well run?

The last question is the subject of performance measurement and accountability. Performance measures can be used to manage programs better and to get them to work properly. It is possible, however, to have a perfectly working program (from a performance measurement perspective) that contributes nothing to turning the indicator and cost curves. Among the best examples is the often-cited case of the school-based drug education program that increased knowledge of drugs and the subsequent incidence of drug use among students receiving the training. No doubt the program could show that it increased knowledge of drugs (a performance measure), but it did not work in turning the curve on drug use (an indicator).

This framework for determining what works has no hidden agenda. It is about a simple process of being honest about trying things that can possibly make a

At each stage of this process of determining what works, partnerships can and should be developed with the research community.

Everyone has convictions about what will work and what can and should be done.

difference. It is not liberal or conservative. It is not about any particular ideology or program. Everyone has convictions about what will work and what can and should be done. This process is a framework within which that debate can take place—but the content of the debate is not dictated by the framework itself. It is expected that those who prevail will help craft strategies that make the lives of youth and communities demonstrably better and will have the wisdom and skill to see their strategies implemented and sustained. However, nothing about this framework predetermines what strategies will emerge or whether they will or will not work.

The "RECLAIM Ohio" initiative: Developing and applying alternative juvenile justice sanctions

RECLAIM (Reasonable and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors) Ohio is a statewide initiative to encourage local jurisdictions to expand the availability and use of community-based services in managing juvenile offenders. A principal objective of the initiative is to enhance the availability of services for juvenile offenders who can be handled safely within the community, while reserving "public safety" beds in State juvenile institutions and programs for those juveniles who commit serious and violent crimes. RECLAIM Ohio likewise seeks to reduce both the costs of juvenile corrections and crowding in juvenile institutions.

The RECLAIM Ohio program provides counties with financial incentives to reduce the commitment of first-time and nonviolent offenders to Ohio's State-run juvenile institutions and community corrections facilities. Administered by the Ohio Department of Youth Services, the program provides counties with monthly allotments of funds from the State, which are debited for each commitment of a juvenile to a State correctional facility or program. At the end of the month, any funds remaining in a county's allotment are distributed to that jurisdiction. The program requires that each county direct the funds it receives after all juvenile corrections commitments are accounted for to the juvenile courts. The courts, in turn, may use these funds to develop or purchase community-based services for youth who otherwise might have been committed to State juvenile institutions and programs.

Created by the State legislature in 1993 as a component of Ohio Governor George V. Voinovich's Family and Children First Initiative, RECLAIM Ohio was implemented first in 1994 as a nine-county pilot program and expanded statewide 1 year later. In 1995, the program's first full year of operation, juvenile court judges received nearly $18 million in RECLAIM Ohio incentive funds to support services and programs for 8,600 juvenile offenders in community-based programs.

Source: Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services.

Translating "what works" into a plan for employing the 12 program purpose areas to achieve intended results

In this strategic decisionmaking process, it is only after reaching the point of determining "what works" that it makes sense to identify spending priorities within the 12 JAIBG program purpose areas. To maintain control of their plans—and implement them effectively—States and units of local government must fit the program purpose areas into a well-crafted scheme, rather than the other way around. Arbitrarily deciding on methods to improve accountability for juvenile offenders—without identifying specific results, correlating indicators, and effective strategies to improve those results or turn the curve on positive indicators—would be putting the proverbial cart before the horse.

Ensuring That Investments Reap Their Intended Results: Measuring Performance

After a results-and-indicators system is in place and a strategic plan that draws from data and knowledge of "what works" has been established, it is important to measure performance to ensure that progress is being made and to inform future program and allocation decisions.

The relationship between results and performance measures

One of the most important concepts gleaned from recent work on results-based decisionmaking is a fuller understanding of the difference between results and performance accountability. Performance accountability involves the use of performance measures to address whether agencies and programs are working properly. This performance measurement process lies within a larger process that addresses whether the strategies, taken together, are working to turn the indicator and cost curves. This process-within-a-process perspective on the relationship between results and performance-based processes may be as important as the initial distinction between results, indicators, and performance measures.

Still another way to think about this difference is to consider the interrelated set of questions that frame result and performance accountability:

1. **Results.** What do we want for our children, families, and communities?
2. **Indicators.** How do we know (how will we know) if we have achieved the results we want?
3. **"What works" strategies.** What (do we think) works to achieve the results we want?
4. **Performance measures.** How do we know that the elements of our strategy ("what works") are performing as well as possible?

How do we know that the elements of our strategy are performing as well as possible?

Results and performance accountability often are confused in practice.

Results accountability addresses questions 1, 2, and 3. Performance accountability addresses questions 3 and 4. The two sets of questions are linked by the strategies developed to turn the indicator and cost curves. Each set of questions involves a feedback process that uses information on actual achievement to make strategy decisions (in the case of results and indicators) and management decisions (in the case of performance measures).

Results and performance accountability often are confused in practice, and this can be a debilitating confusion. When performance systems require agency directors to report on indicators, this creates the impression that agencies are accountable for indicators that are beyond their control. Agencies can be held accountable for their standing on agency and program performance measures. Improvements on results and indicators, however, require that agencies act in partnership with other organizations and individuals inside and outside government, and this means that improvements cannot be the sole responsibility of a single agency.

Consider, for example, the rate of child abuse as an indicator of child health and safety, and the performance-measure percentage of child-abuse reports that are investigated within 24 hours. A State or local director of child welfare can be held accountable for the agency performance on response time. But affecting the incidence of child abuse is a "turn-the-curve" matter for the entire community. Unless a clear distinction is established between results and performance accountability, these differences are easily lost and the chances of making progress on either results or performance accountability are diminished.

The accounting trap

The distinction between results accountability and performance accountability helps explain one of the classic difficulties in reform efforts: the inability to make a one-to-one correspondence between results and departments. Most past approaches to budget reform put forward an uneasy compromise. Safety clearly depends on more than an effective police department, but all safety indicators are listed only in the police budget. Success of children in school clearly depends on more than an effective school system, but education indicators are listed only in the education department.

The desire to create a single straightline progression from result to department to program to performance measure is the necessary challenge of these systems. Departments can and should be held accountable for initiating and sustaining planning processes that direct resource and program investments toward agreed-upon results. However, performance measures are the mechanisms that then hold the departments accountable for their performance. No department is, can be, or should be the sole owner of any result. Measuring success on results and measuring success on performance are two different (though interrelated) things. Departments can be principal owners, but they are not ever sole owners. This sounds like common sense, but it is rarely, if ever, seen in practice. People have been trying to reinvent the "straight progression" system for the past 50 years. It is a failure. It does not and cannot work.

Characteristics of effective performance measures

It will be helpful to review some of the characteristics of an effective system before addressing how to implement a performance measurement system. These characteristics are not prerequisites, but rather qualities of a fully developed system, which may help guide the development process. Effective performance measures must be credible, fair, clear, practical, adaptable, and connected.

The foremost requirement for a performance measurement system is credibility.

- **Credible.** The foremost requirement for a performance measurement system is credibility. Policymakers and citizens must have confidence that performance measures are accurate and relevant representations of the quantity and quality of the services provided by an agency or program. Performance measures that reflect only inputs or the quantity of goods and services provided by an agency will usually fall short on this criterion.

  States such as Florida and Minnesota have bolstered the credibility of their indicator and performance measurement systems by documenting the design and data development systems in considerable detail. Both States describe why each measure is important, what is being measured, and what the data source is. External review of performance measures by an independent body is another important strategy for making data credible and powerful. In Texas, the State Auditor's Office reviews performance measures for accuracy, selecting agencies for audits based on criteria such as agency funding levels, problems found in prior audits, complaints received, or large swings in the data. The Texas State Auditor's Office also issues guidelines for agencies about how to establish controls over data entry. The State agencies must explain how they calculated performance measures and retain documentation to support the calculations.

- **Fair.** Performance systems should, to the greatest extent possible, provide fair gauges of agency and program performance. This means that measures should generally reflect factors and products that agency and program managers can influence or control. However, there is an important qualification (perhaps trap) here. There is arguably no program effect that is totally within the control of program managers. Justice programs operate in complex environments where performance is affected by economic, demographic, and other forces outside the program's control. This should not serve as an excuse to avoid performance measurement and accountability, but should help in both choosing and interpreting performance data. If control (fairness) were an overriding prerequisite for performance measures, there would be no performance measures.

  While no manager controls all the factors that affect program performance, it is legitimate for measurement systems to concentrate on bottom-line quality measures and stretch people to think of ways in which they can partner with others to leverage resources that they do not control to improve performance. Juvenile justice managers can partner with education and social service providers to prevent and respond to juvenile delinquency. Child welfare managers can partner with police and court officials to improve the response to child abuse reports. Education managers can partner with health and

A common mistake by many States and communities is to use indicators and performance measures interchangeably.

human service providers to improve school achievement for children in troubled families. Performance measurement can be used to account for both what people do with what they have and how well they collaborate with others who control resources vital to the program's success.

Fairness is as much a matter of how data are used as how they are selected. As discussed below, performance measurement should not be used as a blunt instrument to punish poor performance, but as a tool to improve performance. However, performance measures that attempt to hold public officials accountable for matters wholly beyond their control fail the fairness test and will usually fail the utility and credibility tests as well.

A common mistake by many States and communities is to use indicators and performance measures interchangeably, holding public agencies accountable for both. When performance measures appear to be unfair, they often turn out to be broad indicators of community well-being, rather than measures of program performance.

- **Clear.** Performance measures should be clear and easy to understand and use. If performance measures are too complicated, they will be of little use in helping decisionmakers and citizens understand agency or program performance or pointing out where improvements are needed. For example, decisionmakers and the public may be able to understand data on the percent of juvenile offenders who commit recurring crimes, but they will be much less able to understand or use a regression-based eight-part composite index that compares actual rates of recidivism to projected rates.
- **Practical.** A performance measurement system should be practical to administer and implement. How data are collected is a major factor in practicality. A good performance measurement system requires a significant and sustained investment in data collection. Since data collection is expensive (in terms of both dollars and agency time), agencies must carefully weigh the value of performance measures and consider alternative ways to collect these data (e.g., 100-percent reporting versus samples and surveys).

  Another critical issue is cooperation in the development, operation, and linkage of data systems. Different agencies often collect information on the same people. While it is difficult to do, it makes sense for agencies to coordinate and, where possible, share data collection strategies and instruments. Presentation of performance data at the county, city, and community levels also makes the information more useful. Overall data on educational performance, for example, may be relevant to county policymakers—but data on educational performance by school will more directly help principals and parents attempting to increase student learning.
- **Adaptable.** As public goals and policies change, performance measurement systems must adapt to reflect these changes. This is partly a technical matter of data collection. When programs change, data requirements often change as well, and performance systems need to keep pace with these changes. Changes in data collection create problems of comparability with prior period data. This requires an increased measure of analytic sophistication in tracking performance across discontinuities in policy.

The most important "adaptability" challenge may be the progressive development of less categorical cross-agency service systems for children and families. These changes hold real promise for more effective and more responsive services. But less categorical does not mean, and cannot mean, less accountable. New cross-agency and cross-community service structures will create demands for improved tracking of service effects, even as the categories that underlie traditional reporting are phased out. Performance systems must develop parallel to service systems, so that the tools are available to manage and account for performance in this new environment.

- **Connected.** Finally, performance measures must be connected to and integrated with public planning, budgeting, and management systems. Performance measures are designed to provide feedback about the effectiveness of public programs and policies. In order for that feedback to make a difference, it must be integrated into management systems (so that policies and programs can be modified to perform better), budgeting systems (so that dollars and other resources can be focused on programs and initiatives that work), and accountability systems (so that public officials can be rewarded for outstanding performance and helped to improve or, in some cases, sanctioned when performance is poor).

In building performance measurement systems, it is all too easy to become so focused on the many details that the big picture is lost.

Defining and agreeing on performance measures

The principal purpose of performance measurement is, not surprisingly, to improve performance. So far this *Guide* has dealt only with how to select data and the principles of good performance measures, not with how to define, agree upon, and build effective and useful performance measurement systems to improve performance.

Building a performance measurement system from the bottom up

Whatever else may be true of performance measurement systems, they almost always display too much—not too little—data.[20] Typically, for each program or subprogram, 10 or more performance measures are selected. From program to agency levels, the number of performance measures grows exponentially. Executive and legislative branch decisionmakers receive a sea of data and no particular way to sort out what is important from what is not.

Although it makes sense to build performance measurement systems from the bottom up, this does not mean adopting the undisciplined practice of using unlimited numbers of performance measures. In building performance measurement systems, it is all too easy to become so focused on the many details that the big picture is lost. The first and most important feature of a good performance measurement system is a commonsense approach when looking at the big picture.

[20]This does not mean there is an excessive amount of data from which to choose, only that too much of what is available is displayed.

Most agency data systems count quantity, not quality.

The first task is to contain the data explosion at each step in the construction process. For each level of performance, identify the two, three, or four most important performance measures. Using this approach, each level of the performance document has the same amount of performance information organized in roughly the same way. Agency X monitors its performance on three or four primary measures. Program X monitors its performance on three or four primary measures. And so forth. If you want more detail, go to the level below (or to the data identified, but not selected). In an agency with three levels (agency, program, subprogram), it works like this:

For each subprogram:

- Identify all the "candidate list" performance measures available.
- Pick the most important two, three, or four primary measures.
- Create baselines with forecasts for these measures.

For each program, repeat this process using the performance measures of the program's subprograms as the candidate measurement list. For the agency as a whole, repeat this process using the agency's program-level performance measures as the candidate list.

In the course of this work, it is not uncommon to find programs, and even whole agencies, for which there are very few good data sources. When this is the case, the data selection process is not about picking the best of good data candidates, but finding any good data candidates. There are rarely any easy answers to this problem. However, it is important to proceed with development of performance measures with what you have and work to improve the system over time. It is sometimes possible to create data based on sampling techniques (by reading a limited number of case records, for example) as a short-term substitute for later data system development.

A related problem has to do with the relative scarcity of quality measures in data system reports. Most agency data systems count quantity, not quality. Here, one relatively simple suggestion might help. Consider the role of "composite" performance measures, that is, performance measures that are created by calculating the ratio of two existing quantity measures. For example, many agencies count the number of safety or compliance violations among the programs they supervise. In isolation, the raw count of violation totals does not mean much. But by calculating the ratio of program components with reported violations to total program components, a useful measure of quality can be created. Most good quality measures, whether currently reported or proposed, take the form of composite measures.

Building a performance measurement system from the top down

One of the most common mistakes in the use of performance measurement in management and budgeting is the tendency to implement performance measurement all at once on a grand scale. "Starting next week, every manager of every program and subprogram must begin reporting on performance." Mountains of

paper are produced. Little of it is used for anything. People come quickly to resent the intrusion of these new time-consuming and largely useless tasks, and the system is eventually abandoned.

Instead, performance measures should come to be the basis for agreeing on agency or even personal goals for performance over time. These measures should allow, even encourage, senior management to use this same process with the people who report to them and to build down through the organization.

Still another reason why working from the top down makes sense is that the performance measures of individual programs and subprograms should be tied to the most important performance measures for the agency as a whole. If it is done correctly, working top down will give people a sense of what top management sees as important, without making this an inflexible and domineering perspective.

The best work on performance measurement will be iterative, top down and bottom up. However, top-down work of any sort has received so much criticism in the management literature that sometimes no one recognizes when it has a legitimate and important place. This is one of those times.

Selecting performance measures

As discussed previously, not all performance measures are created equal, and very few performance systems provide a disciplined focus on a small number of the most important measures. A system is needed in which each program (and each agency) is required to select the most important measures of performance and use these as the focus of performance reporting and accountability.

Quality should be of far more interest than quantity to those choosing performance measures. It is not enough to count effort. It is essential to also measure effect. Many performance measures deal exclusively with how many clients were served, how many juveniles were processed, etc. In some cases, these systems put forward even less appropriate industrial-model quantity measures, such as “how many workers are employed, how much space is available, how much money, and so forth”—not how much was produced and how well.

Performance measurement should focus on quality measures and, in particular, on the quality of output measures. Managers can assign an order of importance to performance measures as they cross quantity with quality and efforts with effects. “Primary” performance measures should be selected and given priority as follows:

1. **Quality of effects.** How good were our products? What percentage of our clients or customers showed improvement? In what ways are our clients better off as a consequence of our service?
2. **Quality of efforts.** How well did we deliver service? How well did we treat our clients? Was service courteous, timely, accessible, consistent, etc.?
3. **Quantity of outputs.** How much did we produce? How many clients or customers showed an improvement in well-being? How much do we have to show for our service?

It is not enough to count effort. It is essential to also measure effect.

The technology of accountability will always be developmental and controversial.

4. **Quantity of inputs.** How much service did we deliver? How much effort did we put into service delivery? How hard did we try?

Primary performance measures should also meet the same three tests applied to indicators:

- **Communication power.** Does the performance measure communicate with both internal and external/public constituencies about "how we're doing"? Would this performance measure pass the "public square" test?
- **Proxy power.** Performance measures, like indicators, tend to run in herds. If one is going in the right direction, chances are many of the rest are as well. You do not need 20 performance measures telling you the same thing. Pick the ones that have the greatest proxy power (i.e., those that are most likely to match the direction of the other indicators in the herd).
- **Data power.** Last, but not least, it is important that the performance measures chosen are ones for which high-quality data are available and that demonstrate progress—or the lack thereof—on a regular and frequent basis. Performance measures should be available on at least a monthly basis. This allows managers and others to plot the new point on the curve and assess progress in relation to the baseline.

Performance measures that are not selected as one of the primary measures become part of the secondary list of performance measures, which can be used in agency management and operations processes. The tertiary list consists of performance measures to be developed or improved. It includes the data agenda for future development.

Using accountability systems

Results accountability, which relies on having developed a working list of results and indicators, demonstrates whether a program should exist as part of a larger strategy to improve the well-being of juveniles, families, and communities. Performance measurement picks up at this point, taking as a given that a program needs to exist, and moving on to the next step of answering whether it is working or not. Once decisionmakers, planners, practitioners, and managers know how they are doing, they can use that information to assess progress toward achieving the intended results and can restructure resource allocations aimed at reaching those results.

Accountability systems—whether results or performance—are not ends in themselves, but means to the ends of improved conditions of well-being for children, families, and communities. The technology of accountability will always be developmental and controversial. If accountability is real, it affects things that matter. It provides consequences for success and failure. Without such systems, public and private entities will fuel cynicism about performance and, worse, deserve such cynicism. Results-based accountability systems can help build public confidence in government and community institutions and, more importantly, help create improved results for children, families, and communities.

The Oregon governor's juvenile crime prevention strategy: A comprehensive approach to planning

The Oregon State Police, which administers Federal criminal and juvenile justice grant-in-aid programs in the State, expects to integrate the JAIBG program into the State's comprehensive, statewide Governor's Juvenile Crime Prevention Strategy. The strategy, for which the State began planning in 1996, has four primary components: (1) a coordinated community planning process that will develop local strategies and direct the use of coordinated State resources, (2) a team of State agencies working to coordinate policies, planning, use of State dollars, and support of community decisions, (3) increased accountability through shared statewide outcomes and a common method of measuring progress toward reducing juvenile crime, and (4) reinvestment of savings and avoided costs in community-based prevention efforts.

Development of the strategy was prompted by passage of Measure 11, a citizens' crime initiative that called for the incarceration of first-time juvenile offenders ages 15 years and older who commit serious and violent crimes. Fearing that Measure 11 would promote a marked increase in commitments to the Oregon Youth Authority and a corresponding rise in the costs of institutional-based programming, State officials hope through the strategy to intervene in juvenile criminal activity before it rises to the level of the "one-strike" commitment standard imposed by the citizens' initiative.

The strategy seeks to streamline the State's youth services delivery system, eliminate overlapping and duplicative services, increase coordination among youth-serving agencies and organizations, consolidate funding streams, and reduce commitments to the Oregon Youth Authority. Implementation of the strategy, which is receiving technical assistance under OJJDP's Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders initiative, will be centered at the county level with the State's 36 counties challenged to develop local plans for reducing juvenile crime. Savings realized from lower crime and incarceration rates would be returned by the State to the counties for reinvestment in further community-based efforts to reduce juvenile crime.

Source: Oregon State Police, Criminal Justice Services Division.

Conclusion: The Myth of Sisyphus

Most strategic planning systems use circular charts to depict the planning process. Just when you think you are finished, it seems that you are beginning all over again, like Sisyphus, condemned to an eternity of pushing a boulder up a steep hill only to have it roll back down as it neared the top of the hill. This is

not the intent of strategic planning. Rather, it is intended to offer a sense of ownership and a method for accomplishment. Nevertheless, promoting continuous improvement through the use of results, indicators, and performance measures is necessarily iterative. As you translate this work into your own environment, understand that although it is difficult—and seems endless—progress is always a continuous exercise.

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Appendix A: Administrative Requirements Relating to Explanations of Departures From Requirements Covering Distribution of JAIBG Funds Among the 12 Program Purpose Areas

Introduction

On November 26, 1997, the U.S. Congress enacted and the President signed into law the FY 1998 Appropriations Act covering funding for several Federal agencies and programs, including the U.S. Department of Justice.[1] It established a new Federal grant-in-aid program, the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) program, to provide States and units of local government financial assistance to promote greater accountability in the juvenile justice system.

In providing for the allocation of funding for the JAIBG program, which is administered by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), Congress permitted States to depart from a prescribed formula for distribution of nonadministrative program funds among 12 program purpose areas. In administering this provision, OJJDP is requiring that States and units of local government that choose to distribute program funds among the purpose areas in an alternative manner provide a written explanation in support of their decision as part of the certification process.

Background

The JAIBG program provides that nonadministrative program funds made available to States and units of local government for the JAIBG program must be allotted by those jurisdictions for activities falling within the parameters of 11 program purpose areas prescribed in H.R. 3. In addition, the congressional conference committee for the Appropriations Act added a 12th program purpose area to the list of activities for which JAIBG funds may be used.[2]

The JAIBG program also provides that 45 percent of the JAIBG program funds must be distributed among program purpose areas 3 through 9 and 35 percent among purposes 1, 2, and 10. The remaining funds (20 percent) would be available for the range of purpose areas 1–12.

However, the conference committee report provided further that JAIBG recipients could depart from the prescribed distribution of program funds among program purpose areas if:

[1]Public Law 105–119 (Nov. 26, 1997).
[2]House Report No. 105–405 (Nov. 13, 1997).

> . . . the State or unit of local government certifies to the Attorney General or the State, whichever is appropriate, that the interests of public safety and juvenile crime control would be better served by expending its grant for other purposes set forth under section 1801(b) of H.R. 3 . . .

In the Department of Justice's guidelines for implementing the JAIBG program, OJJDP requires that States and units of local government that decide to allot JAIBG program funds among the eligible program purposes in proportions other than those set out by Congress include with their applications ". . . information concerning the availability of existing structures or initiatives within the intended areas of expenditure (or the availability of alternative funding sources for those areas), and the reasons for the State or unit of local government's alternative use" (OJJDP, 1998). For example, a State or unit of local government that is under court order to reduce crowding in juvenile correctional facilities may wish to invest all or a significant portion of its JAIBG funds in developing community-based residential programs for juvenile offenders. In explaining its intended use of the JAIBG funds, that State or unit of local government should briefly describe the scope of the court order and the elements of that jurisdiction's plan for using JAIBG funds in developing alternative placements for adjudicated juveniles.

A State or unit of local government that has adopted a plan for increasing the number of juvenile court judges may wish to use JAIBG funds in conjunction with implementing that plan. That State's or unit of local government's explanation of its approach to distributing JAIBG funds among program purpose areas should include a description of that plan and the potential impact of its implementation on other parts of the juvenile justice system. Likewise, a State or unit of local government that decides to devote all of its JAIBG program dollars to initiatives related to information systems should be prepared to describe how needs contemplated by Congress in other eligible program purposes are being addressed by other funding sources in that jurisdiction.

OJJDP action

Explanations of States and units of local government in support of their respective decisions to employ alternative strategies for allotting JAIBG funds among the eligible program purposes will not be subject to OJJDP approval.

Explanations provided by units of local government to States and, in turn, by States to OJJDP concerning their departures from the congressionally mandated formula for distributing JAIBG funds among program purpose areas will augment information available to OJJDP for monitoring and reporting on the distribution of these funds.

Appendix B: Sample Schedule of Program Implementation Activities

Implementation of the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) program involves close collaboration among the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and participating States and units of local government in completing a number of administrative and program development activities. These implementation activities begin with OJJDP's distribution of the JAIBG program application kit and continue through the distribution of JAIBG program funds by Designated State Agencies (DSA's).

In February 1998, OJJDP forwarded copies of its JAIBG program guideline manual, *Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) Program: Guidance Manual FY 1998,* to the DSA's. Under those guidelines, the DSA's were required to submit their applications for JAIBG funds to OJJDP by June 30, 1998. Subsequent to approval of State JAIBG applications, the DSA's will proceed in concert with State and local officials to develop plans for expenditure of the JAIBG program funds. Subject to reporting to OJJDP completion of these plans, DSA's will distribute JAIBG program funds in accordance with allotments contemplated in the plans.

The amount of time that will be consumed in completing all administrative and program development activities that follow OJJDP's approval of initial JAIBG applications will be determined in large part by factors and conditions that will be unique to each participating State and unit of local government. For example, one jurisdiction may require more time than another to convene a Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition and to engage that body in formulating the required coordinated enforcement plan. However, OJJDP encouraged States and units of local government to adopt implementation schedules that anticipated the award of all JAIBG program funds to States by September 30, 1998, and that expedited subawards to units of local government.

The principal JAIBG program implementation activities are enumerated below:

- OJJDP distributes JAIBG program guidelines to DSA's.
- DSA's submit completed JAIBG applications to OJJDP for review.
- OJJDP approves applications submitted by DSA's.
- DSA's and units of local government that are eligible to receive JAIBG program funds establish Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalitions to develop JAIBG coordinated enforcement plans.
- Each DSA establishes an interest-bearing trust fund for JAIBG funds.
- OJJDP authorizes the deposit of State JAIBG funds in the interest-bearing trust funds.
- DSA's draw down the administrative share of their respective JAIBG allocations.

- DSA's and eligible units of local government develop coordinated enforcement plans.
- Units of local government that are eligible to receive JAIBG program funds submit their coordinated enforcement plans to the DSA.
- DSA's submit documentation to OJJDP that demonstrates that the State and eligible units of local government have completed the required coordinated enforcement plans.
- OJJDP authorizes DSA's to draw down JAIBG program funds.
- DSA's distribute JAIBG program funds to eligible units of local government and other intended recipients in accordance with provisions of the State and local coordinated enforcement plans.

Appendix C: Selected Resource List

National organizations

American Correctional Association
4380 Forbes Boulevard
Lanham, MD 20706
301–918–1800
301–918–1900 (Fax)

American Prosecutors Research Institute
National District Attorneys Association
99 Canal Center Plaza, #510
Alexandria, VA 22314
703–549–9222
703–836–3195 (Fax)

Commission on Accreditation of
Law Enforcement Agencies
10306 Eaton Place, Suite 320
Fairfax, VA 22030
703–352–4225
703–591–2206 (Fax)

International Association of Chiefs of Police
515 North Washington Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
703–836–6767
703–836–4543 (Fax)

Justice Research and Statistics Association
777 North Capitol Street NE., Suite 801
Washington, DC 20002
202–842–9330
202–842–9329 (Fax)

Juvenile Justice Center
American Bar Association
740 15th Street NW., 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
202–662–1506
202–662–1501 (Fax)

Resource List continues on next page

Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Program
State and Local Assistance Division
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street NW., Room 4336
Washington, DC 20531
202–514–6638
202–305–2543 (Fax)
Contacts:
Jeffrey Allison, Acting Division Director
Lluana McCann, Operations Chief

National Center for Juvenile Justice
710 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
412–227–6950
412–227–6955 (Fax)
Contact:
Douglas W. Thomas, Research Associate

National Center for State Courts
300 Newport Avenue
Williamsburg, VA 23185
757–253–2000
757–220–0449 (Fax)

National Council on Crime and Delinquency
685 Market Street, Suite 620
San Francisco, CA 94105
415–896–6223
415–896–5109 (Fax)

National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
1041 North Virginia Street
Reno, NV 89557
702–784–6012
702–784–6628 (Fax)

National Criminal Justice Association
444 North Capitol Street NW., Suite 618
Washington, DC 20001
202–624–1440
202–508–3859 (Fax)
Contact:
Macie L. Eng, Staff Associate/Editor
202–624–1446

National Legal Aid and Defender Association
1625 K Street NW., Eighth Floor
Washington, DC 20006
202–452–0620
202–872–1031 (Fax)

Police Executive Research Forum
1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036
202–466–7820
202–466–7826 (Fax)

State Justice Institute
1650 King Street, #600
Alexandria, VA 22314
703–684–6100
703–684–7618 (Fax)

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
800 K Street NW., Third Floor
Washington, DC 20531
202–307–5911
202–307–2093 (Fax)

Local organizations

Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services
400 East Town Street, Suite 300
Columbus, OH 43215
614–466–7782
614–466–0308 (Fax)

Criminal Justice Services Division
Oregon State Police
400 Public Service Building
Salem, OR 97310
503–378–3720
503–378–6993 (Fax)
Contact:
Beverlee E. Venell, Director
503–378–3725, ext. 4142

Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency
P.O. Box 1167
Harrisburg, PA 17108–1167
717–787–2040
717–783–7713 (Fax)
Contact:
James Thomas, Executive Director

Publications From OJJDP

OJJDP produces a variety of publications—Fact Sheets, Bulletins, Summaries, Reports, and the *Juvenile Justice* journal—along with videotapes, including broadcasts from the juvenile justice telecommunications initiative. Through OJJDP's Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse (JJC), these publications and other resources are as close as your phone, fax, computer, or mailbox.

Phone:

800–638–8736
(Monday–Friday, 8:30 a.m.–7:00 p.m. ET)

Fax:

301–519–5212

Online:

OJJDP Home Page:

www.ncjrs.org/ojjhome.htm

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puborder@ncjrs.org (to order materials)
askncjrs@ncjrs.org (to ask questions about materials)

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Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse/NCJRS
P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000

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The following list highlights popular and recently published OJJDP documents and videotapes, grouped by topical areas.

The *Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Brochure* (1996, NCJ 144527 (23 pp.)) offers more information about the agency.

The *OJJDP Publications List* (BC000115) offers a complete list of OJJDP publications and is also available online.

Corrections and Detention

Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions of Confinement for Youth in Custody. 1998, NCJ 164727 (116 pp.).

Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders. 1997, NCJ 164258 (42 pp.).

Conditions of Confinement Teleconference (Video). 1993, NCJ 147531 (90 min.), $14.00.

Effective Programs for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 160947 (120 min.), $17.00.

Juvenile Arrests 1996. 1997, NCJ 167578 (12 pp.).

Juvenile Boot Camps Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 160949 (120 min.), $17.00.

Juvenile Court Statistics 1995. 1998, NCJ 170607 (112 pp.).

Courts

Has the Juvenile Court Outlived Its Usefulness? Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 163929 (120 min.), $17.00.

Offenders in Juvenile Court, 1995. 1997, NCJ 167885 (12 pp.).

RESTTA National Directory of Restitution and Community Service Programs. 1998, NCJ 166365 (500 pp.), $33.50.

Delinquency Prevention

1997 Report to Congress: Title V Incentive Grants for Local Delinquency Prevention Programs. 1998, NCJ 170605 (71 pp.).

Allegheny County, PA: Mobilizing To Reduce Juvenile Crime. 1997, NCJ 165693 (12 pp.).

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan (Report). 1996, NCJ 157106 (200 pp.).

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan (Summary). 1996, NCJ 157105 (36 pp.).

Communities Working Together Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 160946 (120 min.), $17.00.

Mentoring—A Proven Delinquency Prevention Strategy. 1997, NCJ 164834 (8 pp.).

Mentoring for Youth in Schools and Communities Teleconference (Video). 1997, NCJ 166376 (120 min.), $17.00

Mobilizing Communities To Prevent Juvenile Crime. 1997, NCJ 165928 (8 pp.).

Reaching Out to Youth Out of the Education Mainstream. 1997, NCJ 163920 (12 pp.).

Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders. 1998, NCJ 170027 (8 pp.).

Treating Serious Anti-Social Behavior in Youth: The MST Approach. 1997, NCJ 165151 (8 pp.).

The Youngest Delinquents: Offenders Under Age 15. 1997, NCJ 165256 (12 pp.).

Youth-Oriented Community Policing Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 160947 (120 min.), $17.00.

Youth Out of the Education Mainstream Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 163386 (120 min.), $17.00.

Gangs

1995 National Youth Gang Survey. 1997, NCJ 164728 (41 pp.).

Gang Members and Delinquent Behavior. 1997, NCJ 165154 (6 pp.).

Youth Gangs: An Overview. 1998, NCJ 167249 (20 pp.).

Youth Gangs in America Teleconference (Video). 1997, NCJ 164937 (120 min.), $17.00.

General Juvenile Justice

Comprehensive Juvenile Justice in State Legislatures Teleconference (Video). 1998, NCJ 169593 (120 min.), $17.00.

Developmental Pathways in Boys' Disruptive and Delinquent Behavior. 1997, NCJ 165692 (20 pp.).

Guidelines for the Screening of Persons Working With Children, the Elderly, and Individuals With Disabilities in Need of Support. 1998, NCJ 167248 (52 pp.).

Juvenile Justice, Volume III, Number 2. 1997, NCJ 165925 (32 pp.).

Juvenile Justice, Volume IV, Number 2. 1997, NCJ 166823 (28 pp.).

Juvenile Justice, Volume V, Number 1. 1998, NCJ 170025 (32 pp.).

Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 1994–1996. 1997, NCJ 165697 (81 pp.).

A Juvenile Justice System for the 21st Century. 1998, NCJ 169726 (8 pp.).

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1997 Update on Violence. 1997, NCJ 165703 (32 pp.).

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report. 1995, NCJ 153569 (188 pp.).

Keeping Young People in School: Community Programs That Work. 1997, NCJ 162783 (12 pp.).

Sharing Information: A Guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and Participation in Juvenile Justice Programs. 1997, NCJ 163705 (52 pp.).

Missing and Exploited Children

Court Appointed Special Advocates: A Voice for Abused and Neglected Children in Court. 1997, NCJ 164512 (4 pp.).

Federal Resources on Missing and Exploited Children: A Directory for Law Enforcement and Other Public and Private Agencies. 1997, NCJ 168962 (156 pp.).

In the Wake of Childhood Maltreatment. 1997, NCJ 165257 (16 pp.).

Portable Guides to Investigating Child Abuse: An Overview. 1997, NCJ 165153 (8 pp.).

When Your Child Is Missing: A Family Survival Guide. 1998, NCJ 170022 (96 pp.).

Substance Abuse

Beyond the Bench: How Judges Can Help Reduce Juvenile DUI and Alcohol and Other Drug Violations (Video and discussion guide). 1996, NCJ 162357 (16 min.), $17.00.

Capacity Building for Juvenile Substance Abuse Treatment. 1997, NCJ 167251 (12 pp.).

Drug Identification and Testing in the Juvenile Justice System. 1998, NCJ 167889 (92 pp.).

Juvenile Offenders and Drug Treatment: Promising Approaches Teleconference (Video). 1997, NCJ 168617 (120 min.), $17.00.

Preventing Drug Abuse Among Youth Teleconference (Video). 1997, NCJ 165583 (120 min.), $17.00.

Violence and Victimization

Child Development–Community Policing: Partnership in a Climate of Violence. 1997, NCJ 164380 (8 pp.).

Combating Fear and Restoring Safety in Schools. 1998, NCJ 167888 (16 pp.).

Conflict Resolution for Youth Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 161416 (150 min.), $17.00.

Epidemiology of Serious Violence. 1997, NCJ 165152 (12 pp.).

Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders. 1995, NCJ 153571 (6 pp.).

Reducing Youth Gun Violence Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 162421 (120 min.), $17.00.

Youth in Action

Planning a Successful Crime Prevention Project. 1998, NCJ 170024 (28 pp.).

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

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