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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Summary Report

Public Diplomacy at the Department of State

Report Number ISP-I-05-54, March 2005

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KEY JUDGMENTS

- Following the merger of the United States Information Agency (USIA) with the Department of State (Department) in 1999, consolidation of public diplomacy within the Department is not complete. At best, public diplomacy is meeting quantitative goals but fails to meet its maximum potential to achieve the qualitative standards required in a changed world where public opinion is as important as foreign policy.
- Consolidation has been more effective at embassies and their constituent posts than within the Department in Washington.
- The advancement of information technology has blurred the difference between foreign and domestic audiences for information dissemination that existed when the Smith-Mundt Act was written.
- The Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is structurally underpowered to coordinate both strategic and tactical public diplomacy within the Department.
- The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) is the most viable organization in the government for conducting international mutual understanding programs. Nevertheless, there is less appreciation within the Department, and the government as a whole, for the importance of this long-range strategic conduct of public diplomacy.
- The structure of the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) is incompatible with the traditional Department organization, resulting in diminished effectiveness to conduct tactical (short-range direct foreign policy support) public diplomacy.

- Public diplomacy organizational structures within regional bureaus suffer as a result of a lack of centralized guidance and responsibility.
- The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has taken timely actions to address operational improvements related to OIG and other recommendations. The establishment of the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources is an important step in addressing many of the issues identified during the inspections.

This memorandum report is based on a review of recent inspections in Washington, DC, and at U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, subsequent to the consolidation of public diplomacy into the Department of State in 1999. It is also based on the Reorganization Plan and Report submitted pursuant to Section 1601 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, as contained in Public Law 105-277. Senior Inspector James Dandridge, II, prepared this report.

INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the results of Office of Inspector General's (OIG) inspections and observations on the conduct of public diplomacy since the consolidation of that function into the Department in 1999 through December 2004. It assesses the effectiveness of the Department's structure to conduct public diplomacy and makes recommendations on the structure and resources for the effective execution of public diplomacy. To understand the chronological basis of the conduct of public diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy, a brief history is included in the appendix.

Purpose

USIA was abolished on October 1, 1999,¹ when the conduct of public diplomacy was consolidated within the Department at that time. OIG assumed its oversight responsibilities of the conduct of public diplomacy with special emphasis on evaluating the status of the consolidation and the conduct of public diplomacy. This summary report focuses on the current status of the consolidation of public diplomacy within the Department in Washington and was prepared after inspecting ECA, IIP, and the regional bureaus.

Background

Traditional diplomacy is defined as government-to-government relations, and public diplomacy is government-to-people and people-to-people relations in an international environment. The Department is responsible for conducting traditional and public diplomacy in support of U.S. policy and international operations. In addition to the Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors is responsible for coordinating informational international broadcasting on behalf of the U.S. government.

¹Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-277).

Interest in public diplomacy has increased in response to outside polls that show favorable attitudes toward the United States sharply declining, not only in the Arab and Muslim world, but globally. Although studies acknowledge that the decline stems principally from disagreement with U.S. policies in the Middle East and other U.S. policies, they conclude that the United States could and should be doing a far better job of understanding, informing, engaging, and influencing foreign publics.

SMITH-MUNDT ACT

In legislation over the years, Congress restricted USIA's public diplomacy apparatus from being used to influence U.S. public opinion. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 amended the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 to include a ban on disseminating within the United States any "information about the United States, its people, and its policies" prepared for dissemination abroad. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 addresses the application of these restrictions to the Department, giving it the flexibility to allocate personnel and other resources effectively and efficiently. In integrating USIA, the Department has been required to observe all applicable legal restrictions.

In recent years, the advancement of information technology - largely through the Internet - has made it virtually impossible to distinguish between foreign and domestic dissemination of information in any meaningful way. For instance, much of the information developed by the Department for foreign dissemination may be accessed via the web pages from anywhere in the world. Furthermore, in light of consolidation, it has become increasingly inefficient, in terms of economies of scale, to draw these distinctions. A review of the Smith-Mundt Act, and its ban on domestic dissemination in particular, would be useful.

Recommendation 1: The Department should request that Congress review the Smith-Mundt Act's continued relevance, particularly its restrictions on domestic dissemination of public diplomacy information, given the ready availability of this information via the Internet. (Action: R, in coordination with L and H)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRUCTURE (CONSOLIDATION)

Concept

The original proposal to Congress to dissolve USIA envisioned structural transfer of public diplomacy functions to the Department intact under the policy guidance of an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. After Congressional review, the Department mirrored the structure of USIA and placed an additional 25 public diplomacy officers in the Department's regional and functional bureaus to strengthen the public affairs functions of those offices. The Department decided that its Bureau of Public Affairs would come under the policy guidance of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The Department established a public diplomacy career cone, and all USIA Foreign Service officers were transferred to this cone. Entry-level officers are offered this cone as an option, along with the traditional career track options.

United States Information Service functions abroad remained the same except in those individual cases where posts reconfigured to meet local needs better. Congress has earmarked public diplomacy funds within the Diplomatic and Consular account for public diplomacy functions. There is also a separate allocation for educational and cultural exchanges. Expenditure of those funds for nonpublic diplomacy purposes would be in violation of the intent of Congress.

State Organization for Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy and public affairs operations for the Department of State are under the policy guidance of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public Affairs report to the Under Secretary. Public diplomacy offices also exist in the Department's regional and functional bureaus; in those instances, the offices are under the authority of the relevant assistant secretary. While the Under Secretary has policy guidance responsibility to the three major public diplomacy functional bureaus in the Department, there is no line authority

over public diplomacy operations in the regional and functional bureaus. In overseas missions the public affairs sections, under the authority of the chief of mission, conduct public diplomacy operations in the countries where they are accredited.

Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs advises the Secretary on public diplomacy and public affairs and provides oversight for the Bureau of Public Affairs, ECA, and IIP. The Under Secretary or his or her designee also chairs the interagency Core Group on international public information, which develops and coordinates U.S. public information strategies and activities to address regional and transnational threats and crises. The Office of the Under Secretary can best be described as providing *strategic* public diplomacy guidance.

The Office of the Under Secretary suffers from lack of continuity in leadership. The Assistant Secretary for ECA has ably filled the position in the absence of a confirmed under secretary twice over the past three years, most notably during the period July 2004 - January 2005.

Several reports released by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)² recount that the Department does not have a strategy that integrates its diverse public diplomacy and directs them toward common objectives. In July 2004, the Acting Under Secretary established an Office of Policy, Planning and Resources, to solidify and institutionalize the very real benefits of integrating public diplomacy into the Department, and to bring a strategic focus, coherence, and accountability to the conduct of public diplomacy. This is a commendable response to the challenge of integrating the Department's public diplomacy resources. However, this office and its mandate have not yet been reflected in the Foreign Affairs Manual.

²U.S. *Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges*. GAO-03-951. Washington, DC: September 4, 2003.

U.S. *Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges*. GAO-04-435T. Washington, DC: February 10, 2004.

U.S. *Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain*. GAO-04-1061T. Washington, DC: August 23, 2004.

Recommendation 2: The Department should revise the Foreign Affairs Manual to designate authority to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for coordinating policy guidance to the regional and functional bureaus on the conduct of public diplomacy. (Action: M/P, in coordination with R)

The Department is responsible for coordinating the government's public diplomacy efforts abroad. There are many public diplomacy programs conducted by other government agencies but only a minimum of coordination mechanisms. There is no institutionalized process that guarantees representation within the National Security Council. One of the stated goals of integration of public diplomacy into the Department was to facilitate public diplomacy strategies from the outset as policy is formulated. The argument asserted that policy and its articulation through appropriate public diplomacy strategies will improve and be more persuasive to foreign publics and policymakers. This is not a new or unique argument. During the 1978 reorganization for the conduct of public diplomacy, Leonard H. Marks, then Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs and a former USIA Director, stated during Congressional hearings "...the Director should sit with the National Security Council...Although I was not a statutory member of the National Security Council [when I was Director], I was invited to every session, so I could know what was going on...now if you do that, then it really isn't too important where the Agency is. It doesn't make any difference to me what the name on the door is: USIA or Department of State." ³

The Djerejian Report⁴ of October 2003 urged greater interagency coordination of public diplomacy, under the leadership of a strong Under Secretary of State, backed by the White House. Again, the Under Secretary responded to this challenge and served as the co-chair of the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council. That committee has achieved interagency consensus on a strategy for reaching out to Muslim majority populations and is at work on a tactics paper to implement that strategy. Such initiatives should not be on an ad hoc basis in response to the challenge of the day but rather

³Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, ninety-fifth Congress - First Session - June 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1977.

⁴*Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World.* Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. October 1, 2003.

an institutionalized process as recommended in the Djerejian Report in order to ensure continued attention to long term problems of public diplomacy.

Recommendation 3: The Department should seek greater representation at the National Security Council in order to ensure better and continuing coordination of interagency public diplomacy activities. (Action: S/ES, in coordination with R)

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

ECA has the responsibility for broad long-term dialogue with foreign publics through a variety of person-to-person exchanges, including the Fulbright program for scholars, teachers, and students; the International Visitors program to bring foreign leaders to the United States; Citizen Exchanges efforts to develop international exchange programs through nonprofit American institutions; and programs to affiliate American institutions, advise foreign students about American colleges and universities, foster the teaching abroad of American studies and the English language, and strengthen educational institutions abroad.

ECA has been a key element of the overall government's priority *strategic mutual understanding* programs. While being of high importance, it is also protected by Congress from the efforts of State's bureaucracies to downgrade or dilute its capabilities. Exchanges, which is what ECA is all about, is one of the most important tools employed in conducting public diplomacy.

Ever since the enactment of the Fulbright-Hays Act in 1961, Congress and succeeding administrations have considered exchanges to be the most effective way of promoting mutual understanding. The U.S. government spends approximately \$1.3 billion annually on international exchanges and training. Foreign governments and private organizations, in turn, contribute another half billion dollars annually. ECA's staff of almost 400 managed some 90 discrete exchange programs valued at about a half billion dollars a year.

Educational exchange programs such as the Fulbright program have been some of the most successful leadership development and communications tools. They have helped to expand tolerance within societies whose governments disagree with U.S. policies. ECA's Humphrey Fellowship Program provides the basis for establishing long-lasting productive partnerships between U.S. citizens and their professional counterparts fostering an exchange of knowledge and mutual understanding

throughout the world. Regional bureaus are aware of the value of academic exchange programs but often do not fully understand their important long-term benefits.

Exchanges can contribute to current (tactical) foreign policy priorities as well. For example, ECA's Assistant Secretary directed that the bureau shift five percent (\$12 million) of its global resources to the war on terrorism.

The tightening of visa procedures since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has adversely affected foreign student visa applications and some exchange programs. Since this time, student visa issuance has dropped by more than 30 percent in the Muslim world and 50 percent in the Arab world.

The Office of International Visitors brings approximately 5,000 foreign nationals, all current or potential leaders in their field, each year to the United States. Two hundred and thirty current and former heads of state and 1,500 cabinet-level ministers are among the many other distinguished participants in this program.

ECA performed well in developing a Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) as part of the Department's Strategic and Performance Planning process. As a part of this process, the Office of Management and Budget recently awarded ECA the highest score in the Department using the Program Assessment Rating Tool.

ECA has suffered from not being fully integrated into the Department due to its physical location and its different culture. This is one of several factors that have contributed to a lowering of morale throughout the bureau. Since consolidation, except for Secretary Powell, who made a much-appreciated walk-through visit of SA-44, no other senior Department official had visited ECA offices up to the time that OIG conducted its first-ever ECA inspection in fall 2003. Communication between ECA and embassies is good but spotty with the Department's regional bureaus. Program coordination within ECA and between offices is weak.

Like IIP, as discussed below, ECA does not have the appropriate balance of Civil Service and Foreign Service staff; i.e., roughly one-third Foreign Service and two-thirds Civil Service. This is yet another factor that contributes to the perception of a bureau with a "different culture" in a government agency that, throughout its history, has been charged to conduct traditional diplomacy.

The Office of English Language Programs is described by many as an important American institutional presence worldwide because it conveys substantial information on American culture and values in the context of language training sought by millions overseas. English Teaching Programs reach across more academic exchange programs than any other program. There are only 16 English language officers worldwide and two of these are supported by regional bureaus (Europe and Africa) due to a lack of funding support in ECA. There is a clamor among world publics to learn American English, yet the Department is underfunded to take advantage of this golden opportunity to interact in a meaningful way with foreign educational institutions countering the pop cultural images abroad.

Bureau of International Information Programs

IIP activities emphasize rapid multimedia response, cross-functional teamwork, and field orientation. The bureau can best be understood in the context of its tactical public diplomacy program response role. Its products are available to all bureaus and overseas posts to provide them with the assistance that they need to advance U.S. interests abroad. The programs are more closely shaped in direct support of immediate foreign policy goals. However, IIP's many important public diplomacy tools are unknown to most of the Department's functional and regional bureaus. IIP's structure is a leftover from the days of USIA's Reinvention Laboratory based on the National Performance Review and the best practices of private industry. The "reinvention of government" efforts to convert the core element of the former USIA were designed to work in a nontraditional bureaucracy, and it was not envisioned that it would be within the traditional bureaucracy of the Department. Ultimately this reinvention effort took second-place to massive budget cuts in agency programs, especially in FY 1996, that particularly affected the USIA Bureau of Information. (Most of the ECA programs were Congressionally earmarked.) Although the quality of the bureau's product did not suffer during this period, the quantity and variety of production did diminish as programs drew down and IIP's nontraditional structure hampered its ability to work within the traditional Department bureaucracy. IIP is now working with HR to implement OIG's recommendations to adopt a more traditional State organizational structure.

Lack of strong sustained leadership over time and lack of clear status of the bureau, including failure to designate the Coordinator and the deputy coordinators positions as Assistant Secretary and deputy assistant secretaries, have contributed to less than optimal staff effectiveness and lowered morale. Such an organizational structure places a bureau perceived as being in a different culture, further outside

of the mainstream of the Department's activities. OIG recommended in its report on IIP that the Department replace the position designations of Coordinator and deputy coordinators for IIP with Assistant Secretary and deputy assistant secretary titles. The Department has not yet agreed to this recommendation.

IIP's programs are extremely important in meeting the tactical public diplomacy needs in the field and, most important, to be at the forefront of counterterrorism activities to explain the rationale for U.S. foreign policy to foreign publics. This bureau has performed exceptionally well in responding to the tactical needs of the field over the last five years. Nevertheless, OIG's recent inspection revealed several areas that need attention as well as areas that are functioning quite well within the constraints of the organizational problems.

Unlike its sister bureau, ECA, IIP's programs are not Congressionally earmarked nor protected from budget cuts. Programs are driven by Mission Performance Plan (MPP) and BPP objectives from all regions. There is not in Washington a high level of familiarity with IIP's programs and services, something that can be addressed through ongoing efforts at outreach from both SA-44 and the Harry S Truman building (HST). Surely collocation of the IIP staff with their colleagues in HST would increase familiarity in both directions. OIG understands that plans are under discussion to bring IIP and ECA staffs physically closer to HST in the next few years. This is a step that will help everyone.

Due to budget cuts in the 1990s, many time-tested positive programs such as open-shelf, public access libraries were abandoned. Recognizing the need for continued outreach to target audiences, USIA created a new high-tech model of information services, the Information Resource Centers (IRC), to capitalize on the benefits of the Internet and other developments that use computer technology. Many reports on public diplomacy published since September 11, 2001, have called for the reestablishment of publicly accessible sites where audiences can "experience" or get information about the United States.

The Department has moved to create dozens of American Corners, or information and program venues in non-U.S. government sites at partner institutions, like universities and public access libraries. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) have proven popular around the world. American Corners complement the mission-based IRCs, and the Department is looking into how and where to create and reestablish more publicly accessible venues for cultural and informational programming. In some instances,

missions have reestablished links with former American Cultural Centers to expand their outreach public diplomacy programs. IIP plays an integral role in supporting both American Corners and the IRCs.

Despite the deep budget cuts, the bureau has continued to manage very valuable programs to support missions abroad in a highly effective manner. The Washington File (WF) originated as the Wireless File in 1935 with the purpose of providing a daily collection of formal texts of the Administration's major foreign policy pronouncements to American ambassadors. This continues as an important tool to assist Foreign Service officers overseas in explaining and gaining support for U.S. policies as well as to foreign audiences in their own languages. The WF is produced in English, French, Spanish, Chinese, Russian, Persian and Arabic.

IIP's Speaker and Specialist Program makes a positive impact on foreign audiences, which results from the personal contacts between speakers, host country nationals, and embassy officers. Since consolidation it has been largely reactive rather than proactive. It is required to respond to MPP and BPP policy objectives, and programs accordingly. During FY 2003, approximately 900 American speakers traveled abroad. During the same period, the program conducted about 300 digital videoconferences - a cost effective way of augmenting personal travel and acting as a multiplier of scarce funds. Like other public diplomacy programs, the program increasingly targets Muslim majority nations and youth. In response to OIG's inspection recommendation, IIP is working on making more proactive speaker offerings to posts, based on their MPPs.

IIP's Office of Strategic Communications serves as the secretariat for the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee. It also sponsors the working-level interagency Fusion Team, which is a valuable interagency coordination effort for public diplomacy in the U.S. government.

Regional Bureaus

There is no single pattern of public diplomacy staff integration among the regional bureaus. Initially some bureaus organized public diplomacy staffs as separate offices within the bureau. As there have been uneven patterns of integration of the public diplomacy staffs, there have also been uneven communication and coordination between the public diplomacy staffs and the rest of the bureau. There is no institutionalized form of coordination between the public diplomacy

regional bureau staffs and the public diplomacy functional bureau staffs (ECA and IIP). Coordination is accomplished on an ad hoc basis, in some cases, by mutual agreement. OIG attributes this uneven structural arrangement to the absence of central authority residing with the Under Secretary. Although there have been some attempts to meld public diplomacy offices with country affairs offices to enhance coordination, the effectiveness of such measures has yet to be determined.

There is confusion among the public diplomacy regional bureau staffs on overall public diplomacy policy guidance in the absence of designated direct lines of communication with the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Functional Bureaus

Public diplomacy staff integration tends to be less cumbersome in functional bureaus since the public diplomacy staff usually is limited to one officer who acts in an advisory role. The effectiveness of the conduct of public diplomacy normally depends on the initiative of the public diplomacy officer and professional chemistry between the officer and the front office.

The only bureau with substantive public diplomacy support resources that has not yet been inspected by OIG subsequent to consolidation is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The USIA Office of Research was merged into INR. Prior and subsequent to the merger, this office's responsibility was to advise the President, Secretary of State, members of the National Security Council and other key officials on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies. Principal types of research included public opinion surveys and attitudinal research of foreign audiences, and foreign media analysis. Field inspections of embassies and constituent posts thus far have indicated a lack of consistent attitudinal surveys to support the preparation of MPPs and input to Washington, on a scientific basis, to assess the impact of U.S. policy on host country audiences. OIG will review the effectiveness of global attitudinal research to support timely planning and conduct of public diplomacy in support of U.S. policies during the upcoming inspection of INR.

Overseas Embassies and Posts

Consolidation of public diplomacy staffs and programs overseas has taken place with little fanfare. Consolidation plans were usually executed on schedule. Nevertheless, public diplomacy staffs have not been completely free of complex and burdensome lines of coordination. This is particularly true in the case of constituent posts where the principal officer rates the public affairs officer, but the embassy public affairs officer controls the budget.

Public diplomacy programming has been hard hit in some countries where security restrictions make public outreach by mission officers impossible and public access to program and information venues difficult. OIG has noted significant local initiatives with strong support from the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and from Congress to amplify outreach to larger publics by establishing American Corners in partnership with host country institutions in locations that are more accessible to the public. Such activities bring information on American culture and society to "wider and deeper" audiences within the settings of host countries' academic institutions or other mutually agreed-upon venues.

OIG also noted instances in which the chiefs of missions advanced the integrated employment of public diplomacy initiatives to complement MPP goals. In an embassy inspection report, OIG noted as a Best Practice the inclusion of one speaking event a year into the work requirements of each Department officer at post.

Unreasonable constraints on the use of public diplomacy contact management databases also have a deleterious impact on the effectiveness of the conduct of public diplomacy programs. In many cases, public affairs sections have used contact management database programs (such as Goldmine) that are highly effective, mission-wide in the conduct of public diplomacy as well as in support of other mission requirements. In some cases, there have been bureaucratic restrictions on the use of other than "locally sanctioned" contact management databases. This has resulted in less than productive program support for some long-term public diplomacy programs at some missions. IIP is currently working with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Foreign Service Institute to enhance the training of new information management officers so that unique public diplomacy tools such as content management system, contact management system (Goldmine), and other ECA applications are a part of their understanding of the

Department's business needs. IIP has been asked by the Under Secretary for Management to take the lead in a Department-wide study of contact management requirements toward the goal of standardization of all such programs in the Department at home or at missions abroad. In this regard, OIG has made post inspection observations on the effective post-wide use of Goldmine at Consulate General Istanbul and mission-wide use of Goldmine at Embassy London.

Public affairs staffs and consular staffs generally work very closely on minimizing the effect of increased security requirements on the issuance of exchange participant's visas without compromising security. Nevertheless, they have had to modify the procedures for some educational exchange programs in compliance with Homeland Security requirements. Most of these changes have been accomplished without compromising increased security requirements although some have been seriously affected.

Conclusion

The Department continues to address OIG and other recommendations on the conduct and structure of public diplomacy. It is faced with the challenge of consolidating the conclusions of several studies and reports⁵ as the basis to obtain adequate resources to restructure and to conduct more effective public diplomacy.

⁵*Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World*, Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. (Chairman, Amb. Edward Djerejian, October 1, 2003)

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, Report of the General Accounting Office to the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, September 2003.

Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Peter G. Peterson, Chairman, June 2003.

FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The Department should request that Congress review the Smith-Mundt Act's continued relevance, particularly its restrictions on domestic dissemination of public diplomacy information, given the ready availability of this information via the Internet. (Action: R, in coordination with L and H)

Recommendation 2: The Department should revise the Foreign Affairs Manual to designate authority to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for coordinating policy guidance to the regional and functional bureaus on the conduct of public diplomacy. (Action: M/P, in coordination with R)

Recommendation 3: The Department should seek greater representation at the National Security Council in order to ensure better and continuing coordination of interagency public diplomacy activities. (Action: S/ES, in coordination with R)

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APPENDIX

History

Public diplomacy traces its roots to the Committee on Public Information (Creel Committee) of World War I, which represented the U.S. Government's first large-scale entry into information activities abroad. After World War I, U.S. government-sponsored information activities dwindled to almost nothing until 1938, when the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific Cooperation was formed in response to German and Italian propaganda aimed at Latin America. In 1940, Nelson Rockefeller was named Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs Relations between the United States and other American Republics. Exchange of persons and the establishment of libraries and binational centers were among the programs Rockefeller initiated.

In February of 1942, the Voice of America (VOA) was created to counter adverse foreign propaganda. During the post-war period, Congress began to advocate that Europe had become a battleground of ideology and that words had to replace arms. Responding to the need for more systematic American information and cultural programs overseas, two pieces of legislation were passed:

- *The Fulbright Act of 1946*, which mandated a peacetime international exchange program, and
- *The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948*, which served as the charter for a peacetime overseas information program.⁶

⁶22 USC 1461 (Section 202 of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948) "The Director is authorized, when he finds it appropriate, to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any such information (other than *Problems of Communism and English Teaching Forum*, which may be sold by the Government Printing Office) shall not be disseminated within the United States, its territories, or possessions, but on request, shall be available in the English language at the Agency, at all reasonable times following its release as information abroad, for examination only by representatives of United States press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and stations, and by research students and scholars, and, on request, shall be made available for examination only to Members of Congress."

In 1949, the Hoover Commission recommended the transfer of the foreign information program from the Department. A year later, President Harry Truman reemphasized an earlier directive to the Department to devise permanent guidelines for U.S. public diplomacy saying, "We must make ourselves heard round the world in a great campaign of truth." VOA was the institution that began this campaign.

USIA was created in 1953 as an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch of the U.S. government with the intent to streamline the U.S. government's overseas information programs to make them more effective. When USIA was created, educational exchange programs were left in the Department, and VOA was incorporated into USIA, moving its headquarters from New York to Washington by the end of 1954. USIA's mandate was to present abroad a true picture of the United States, to promote mutual understanding between the United States and other countries and to counter attempts to distort U.S. policies and objectives.

In 1961, Congress passed the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, known as the *Fulbright-Hays Act*.⁷

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter expanded the mission of USIA, "to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the United States and other nations."⁸ This resulted in the first major reorganization of USIA, which took effect in 1978. The Department's ECA and USIA were combined as the United States International Communication Agency (USICA).

⁷The Act consolidated various U.S. international educational and cultural exchange activities. It expanded other cultural and athletic exchanges, translation of books and periodicals, and U.S. representation in international fairs and expositions. The Act also established government operation of cultural and educational centers.

⁸"It is also in our interest - and in the interest of other nations - that Americans have the opportunity to understand the histories, cultures, and problems of others, so that we can come to understand their hopes, perceptions and aspirations."

President Ronald Reagan restored the agency's original name to the United States Information Agency in 1982.

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 was expanded in the Appropriations Act of 1985.⁹

Pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, USIA was abolished on October 1, 1999, and its functions were merged into the Department. Its international broadcast activities became the responsibility of a separate executive government entity under the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

⁹Public Law 99-93 Title II Sec. 208 "Except as provided in section 1461 of this title and this section, no funds authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States, and no program material prepared by the United States Information Agency shall be distributed within the United States. This section shall not apply to programs carried out pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2451 et seq)."