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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Embassy Abuja and
Consulate General Lagos, Nigeria

Report Number ISP-I-02-33, September 2002

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KEY JUDGMENTS


- The Ambassador and his country team have a clear understanding of U.S. interests in Nigeria and have had singular success in advancing that agenda. He and the deputy chief of mission (DCM) have effective, ready access to the highest levels of the Nigerian government.
- The major problem for the U.S. mission to Nigeria is staffing shortfalls in Abuja and Lagos, particularly the inability to fill midlevel positions. The same key judgment was cited in the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) last two inspection reports, issued in 1993 and 1997. There can be no substantial progress on other vital issues as long as the mission has to contend with long staffing gaps and must rely on junior officers, temporary duty (TDY) retirees, Civil Service employees on excursion tours, and contract employees to fill key positions. The Department of State (Department) must begin to exercise discipline in enforcing worldwide availability and a genuine fair-share bidding process to ensure adequate staffing at hard-to-fill embassies and consulates such as these.
- Lack of mission structure and clear lines of authority have created confusion and allowed antagonisms between Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos to fester. Further, inadequate communication from the embassy's front office gives an impression of disengagement. This situation contributes significantly to inefficient operations, weaknesses in management controls, misunderstandings, frustration, and low morale. The Ambassador must outline his vision for the mission's internal operations and devote energy to its implementation. This includes clearly defining the roles and authorities of the DCM and the consul general in Lagos and working to eliminate tensions between the administrative offices in Abuja and Lagos.
- Consular operations, almost entirely based in Lagos, are in serious trouble. Steadily increasing visa and American citizens services (ACS) workloads threaten to overwhelm a severely short-staffed section. First-tour officers are expected to fill midlevel positions in a fraud-ridden, high-volume environment. In both the Mission Performance Plan (MPP) and the consular package, the mission has failed to convey to the Department either the scope or seriousness of the problem. The worsening situation in the Lagos consular section requires immediate attention.

- There are serious issues surrounding the impending construction of the new chancery in Abuja that require prompt resolution. These issues include the limited administrative resources available to the mission to support this project and confusing signals from the Department on a start date for the project and the chancery's proposed size, which may be insufficient to accommodate projected staff increases. Senior Department officials should promptly travel to Abuja to review and determine arrangements for this approaching major project.
- Mission management must give higher and sustained priority to addressing community welfare concerns in order to improve morale and help secure and retain staff. This would include, for example, establishing a cafeteria at Embassy Abuja, eliminating excessive overtime, and addressing the salary and housing concerns of the Foreign Service national (FSN) staff.
- The MPP should be scaled back to conform more to the mission's resources and to ensure that it contains realistic, attainable policy goals. Care should be exercised to ensure that International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) resources, including office space, are used for agreed upon priorities and that new programs are not started at the expense of required administrative services.
- The mission's public diplomacy programs and activities are closely aligned to the MPP goals and objectives. Heavy emphasis is placed on promoting the war against terrorism, Muslims in America, HIV/AIDS prevention, counternarcotics programs, law enforcement, and visa eligibility.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 3 and February 1, 2002, and in Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria, between February 4 and March 8, 2002. Larry Colbert (team leader), Iris Rosenfeld (deputy team leader), Charles Anderson, David Bonine, John Clark, Joyce Johnson, Robert Jordan, Allen Kepchar, and Paul Tyson conducted the inspection.

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria has an area of 924,000 square kilometers, which is as large as California, Nevada, and Utah combined. Modern Nigeria is a colonial creation of the British, who cobbled together a number of disparate territories in the scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. Nigeria achieved independence in 1960 and depended heavily on agricultural exports. The agricultural sector is in ruins today.



For most of the period since independence, Nigeria has been under military rule. Many of the military regimes were noted for human rights abuses and massive corruption. In 1993, General Sani Abacha seized power. In 1995, nine activists from the Ogoni ethnic group, including the author Ken Saro-Wiwa, were executed by Abacha's regime. As a result, Nigeria was suspended from the British Commonwealth. The United States imposed limited sanctions on

Nigeria, but the policy was plagued by inconsistencies. In 1995, Nigeria's current president, Olusegun Obasanjo, who had been a military ruler from 1976 to 1979, was imprisoned.

In 1998, Abacha died under questionable circumstances. He was replaced by General Abdulsalam Abubakar, who oversaw the transition to democratic governance. Olusegun Obasanjo was released in 1998, ran in the presidential election, and was confirmed as the winner in early 1999. President Obasanjo appreciates

U.S. support for him during his period as a political prisoner. U.S. officials enjoy good access to him both because of shared views on many issues and now democratic Nigeria's perception that, as a regional superpower, the United States is its natural partner. National and local elections are scheduled for early 2003.

Today, Nigeria's population is estimated at 120 million, making it the most populous nation in Africa. The major ethnic groups are Hausa/Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the southwest, and Ibo in the southeast. The Ibo attempted to form the independent state of Biafra in 1967, but were forced to capitulate to federal forces in 1970. Approximately 50 percent of Nigeria's population is Muslim, 40 percent is Christian, and about 10 percent practice indigenous beliefs. Nigeria has the largest Muslim population in Africa, at approximately 60 million. English is the official language.

Nigeria, a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, has huge hydrocarbon reserves, which began to be developed in the late 1960s. It produces about two million barrels of oil per day. Due largely to the geographic and quality advantages of Nigerian oil in the U.S. market, Nigeria is a major oil supplier to the United States, accounting for about nine percent of imports. U.S. oil companies account for 45 percent of Nigeria's oil production, and U.S. oil company investment in Nigeria is about \$10 billion. Eighty-five to 90 percent of the Nigerian government's budget comes from oil revenues. In spite of its oil wealth, however, poverty is endemic. Annual per capita income is approximately \$250.

Nigerians consider cheap oil products to be their birthright. Internal demand for gasoline is expected to exceed 30 million liters a day in 2002, while the country's refineries are producing a maximum of 16 million liters. The government imports fuel to make up the shortfall and sells it at a loss, costing more than \$2 billion in subsidies annually. In spite of national strikes called in January 2002 to protest proposed price increases, the government did manage to impose increases that will reduce but not eliminate the subsidies.

POLICY OVERVIEW

Nigeria has been variously described as a “linchpin,” an essential country of our African policy, and a “must succeed” effort. The United States depends upon Nigeria for oil imports, for support in the fight against terrorism, for assistance in promoting regional stability, and as a major market with growth potential for U.S. exporters.

Nigeria is the regional power in West Africa and a major power in Africa generally. Nigeria has one of the largest armies in Africa and has been involved in peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nigeria also has a strong leadership role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), headquartered in Abuja.

Nigeria’s commitment to democracy must be supported by U.S. diplomatic and economic efforts. Regional, tribal, and religious differences within Nigeria work against the evolution of a modern and unified nation state.

The MPP has ambitious goals, perhaps too ambitious. The major impediment to meeting these goals is a lack of adequate numbers of experienced staff. The mission’s principal strategic goals are regional stability, economic development, democracy, health (particularly HIV/AIDs), open markets, American citizen protection, combating international crime (including drugs), U.S. exports, travel and migration, and international population control. The MPP sets forth an ambitious agenda for assisting Nigerians in resolving the issues they face while building a bilateral relationship that advances U.S. national interests in Nigeria and Africa.

U.S. security assistance and aid programs to Nigeria are the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Military cooperation and exchange programs with Nigeria have grown since the country’s return to democracy in 1999. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has a \$100 million program in Nigeria focused on democracy in government, economic growth, education, health, and energy infrastructure.

The United States is committed to supporting Nigeria's privatization program politically and materially. Efforts will be made to help Nigerian entrepreneurs take advantage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Nigerian desires for international debt relief will be contingent on acceptance of International Monetary Fund programs and acceptance of international norms and standards.

An Education for Democracy and Development Initiative (EDDI) program is also underway in Nigeria. This is a multiagency project coordinated by the Department, USAID, and the Peace Corps. The objective of the EDDI program is to strengthen the educational systems and the democratization process of sub-Saharan Africa through links with the United States.

Embassy Abuja also serves as the U.S. contact point to the ECOWAS Secretariat. The United States does not have an ambassador accredited to the ECOWAS Secretariat at the present time.

Violent crime, unsafe conditions, poor infrastructure, and major incidents such as the Ikeja cantonment munitions explosion in January 2002 have been a feature of large urban areas in Nigeria for years. The Lagos area is particularly prone to bouts of violence directed at Nigerians and foreigners alike. In addition, Nigeria has national and local elections scheduled early in 2003. The elections are likely to be hotly contested and may spark political violence and dangerous ethnic disputes that could affect Americans and others who happen to be in areas where unrest flares up. The mission will need to monitor this closely and consider issuing an updated travel advisory if Americans are likely to be in danger. The Department issued a travel warning in April 2000 that is still in effect.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

The Ambassador and his country team demonstrate an impressive grasp of the issues and are successfully advancing vital U.S. goals and objectives: sustaining democracy, securing oil supplies, aiding Nigerian efforts in regional stability, combating narcotics trafficking and other criminal activity, and improving public health, to name a few. Given the ambitious agenda outlined in the MPP, when compared with personnel shortfalls and other major resource constraints, this has been a remarkable achievement. This success can be credited to the Ambassador's impressive policy sense, his extensive Nigerian contacts, including immediate access to the highest levels of the Nigerian government, and the mission's visible, activist presence throughout the country.

Recommendation 1: The Ambassador should schedule weekly meetings with key section and agency heads assigned to Abuja. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

The Ambassador must outline his vision for the mission's internal operation and devote energy to its implementation. Lines of authority have not been clear and necessary delegation of authority is lacking. For example, until recently, the principal officer at Consulate General Lagos believed that she reported directly to the Ambassador, not the DCM. The DCM, in turn, appeared to lack authority in general, feeling compelled to refer most decisions to the Ambassador even when the Ambassador was out of the country. The role and authority of the DCM, as the mission's de facto executive officer, must be clearly defined if that person is to operate confidently and effectively. This action is particularly urgent as much of the embassy's administrative section and most other agencies remain in Lagos. The

Junior officers in both Abuja and Lagos had a positive outlook despite often having midlevel responsibilities, heavy workloads, and inconsistent supervision due to lengthy staffing gaps and inexperienced midlevel supervisors, particularly in the consular section in Lagos.

CORE FUNCTIONS

The effects of staffing problems are evident in all aspects of the mission's programs and operations. There is no cadre of experienced midlevel and senior Foreign Service officers in Abuja or Lagos to do the necessary work and to provide guidance to junior officers and other American employees. Staffing gaps are common. The hard work and enthusiasm of the junior officers cannot make up for their lack of experience. Within these constraints, the mission performs well in many areas. The mission's reporting and public diplomacy efforts to support Nigeria's commitment to democracy are good, given resource limitations. With regard to consular operations, however, Consulate General Lagos is consistently ranked among the most troubled in the world. The Department's constant inability to staff fully American consular positions in Lagos has reduced consular supervision to a daily exercise in crisis management.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The public affairs section, which is the mission's lead for coordinating public diplomacy activities, has offices in Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos. An experienced senior public affairs officer (PAO) heads the section in Abuja. There are two additional officers: a seasoned information officer and a cultural affairs officer. The latter, a Civil Service employee on a first-tour excursion, has considerable Washington experience in cultural affairs.

In contrast, the Consulate General Lagos public affairs section, which is a much larger operation in an extremely important environment for U.S. interests, is managed by an acting PAO who is a first-tour rotational information officer with only five months of public diplomacy experience. The two other public diplomacy officers in Lagos are also first-tour officers. The cultural affairs officer has been in place a few months. The information resource officer (IRO) has regional responsibilities. The Ambassador, consul general, and Abuja PAO all praise the acting PAO's performance, her lack of experience notwithstanding, and the inspectors share that view. There is no doubt, however, that the Department's inability for the last ten months to staff the public affairs section in Lagos with even one experienced officer represents a serious managerial failure. The PAO Lagos position

alone has been vacant for almost one year. In 2001 there were large gaps in American officer presence in Lagos, including two months with no public diplomacy line officer at all.

The Department needs to assign an experienced public diplomacy line officer to Lagos immediately, either a direct-hire employee or a recently retired officer, on a temporary basis until a direct hire is identified. As a stopgap measure, Abuja is willing to send its experienced officers on TDY for short periods to Lagos to assist operations. Although such action would be helpful, it is still far from an adequate solution.

The Abuja PAO, as the senior public diplomacy officer in the country, has kept an understandably close watch on the public affairs section in Lagos. Abuja approves all Lagos programs and activities, a time-consuming effort for both offices given Nigeria's poor communications system. The Lagos consul general is also taking an active role in the section's operations, which is well appreciated by the Lagos acting PAO. Now, with the consul general's steady guidance and the acting PAO's continuing on-the-job experience and willingness to seek advice, the Abuja PAO can begin to allow the public affairs section in Lagos more autonomy, starting with routine administrative matters. In doing so, the consultation process can focus mainly on policy and program aspects. For example, the section in Abuja controls the representational fund account for public diplomacy in Nigeria. The public affairs section in Lagos must obtain approval from Abuja for any expenditure. This is an unnecessary step. OIG told the Abuja PAO that the Lagos public affairs section should be given its own allotment.

The Department should also remove the Lagos information officer position from the rotational officer category and add it to the open assignments list, beginning with the upcoming winter cycle. The position is too important not to have continuity of American officer contact with Nigerian journalists. The Lagos press, following years of government repression, is now in need of some self-checking. During the inspection, there were instances of blatant inaccuracies in reporting of U.S. activities. For example, a news item on the turnover of surplus U.S. military equipment, which consisted entirely of nonlethal supplies, appeared under the headline "U.S. Gives Weapons to Nigeria."

Recommendation 4: The Department of State should transfer the Lagos information officer position from the rotational officer list to the open assignments list, beginning with the upcoming winter cycle. (Action: M/DGHR)

Washington coordinators and end users praised the public affairs sections in Abuja and Lagos, citing submissions and responses as timely and complete. This was in spite of the many hurdles, which include poor Internet and phone service, long staffing gaps, inexperienced officers, and the move to Abuja.

The Ambassador, keenly aware of the importance of public diplomacy, supports the public affairs sections' activities personally and takes a strong interest in their programs. There is a perception, widely believed by the mostly Muslim northern Nigerians, that the United States is "anti-north." The Ambassador travels widely in the north and uses every occasion in his meetings with Nigerian officials and target audience groups to correct that perception. In his public remarks, the Ambassador emphasizes U.S. appreciation for Nigeria's strong support for the war against terrorism. Likewise, he strongly supports activities carried out by other U.S. government agencies. Contact between the Ambassador and public affairs sections, however, tends to focus more on operational matters than on forward planning involving other sections of the mission. As noted in the Executive Direction section of this report, there should be regularly scheduled weekly meetings between the Ambassador and the Abuja PAO to discuss plans and activities involving the Ambassador's input and mission participation in public diplomacy activities.

International Visitor and Voluntary Visitor Programs

The International Visitor program operates as a mission-wide effort. Candidates selected seem to be highly qualified and clearly tied to MPP objectives. Additionally, the mission places proper emphasis on multiregional projects.

The Voluntary Visitor program, however, has been underused and the few projects conducted in the last two years were public affairs initiatives with little or no input from other mission sections. OIG instructed the Abuja and Lagos PAOs to conduct detailed briefings for all mission officers, some of whom were unaware of the program, on the advantages of promoting the Voluntary Visitor program with their respective contacts. The program, funded by Washington and not by the mission, covers up to ten days of per diem costs and internal U.S. travel. It is an ideal alternative for mission target audience contacts unable to spare the time for the lengthier International Visitor program.

Information Resource Center

Information Resource Centers (IRC), the heart of public diplomacy operations, are located in both Abuja and Lagos. The Abuja IRC is scheduled to relocate soon from the embassy compound to the more centrally located USAID building, where access will be more convenient for clients. The Educational Advising Center is already at the USAID facility. The IRCS in Nigeria are proactive and advance U.S. objectives by identifying and selectively disseminating information to target audiences on issues related to the MPP. The expertise of the highly qualified IRC librarians in Internet search and use of databases takes on additional meaning in Nigeria, a country that is slowly adapting to the computer age.

Immediately following the events of September 11, the public affairs section embarked on intensive, specific outreach efforts with several target audiences. The IRCS promote antiterrorism with professors and students at the Nigerian National War College. The contacts are supplied materials and invited to visit the IRC and receive training on using computers. Computer access in Nigeria is still very low. The IRCS work closely with professors and interfaith groups to provide programs and lectures on Muslim life in the United States. As noted above, this is especially important in Nigeria's Muslim north. The IRCS also furnish university medical doctors with the latest materials on anthrax. The IRCS carry out extensive programming on HIV/AIDS, including several lectures on the topic by the IRO. The press section works closely with the media on all of the above topics. Highlighting the effectiveness of the press office's work, a northern newspaper not known to be friendly to the United States, carried a front-page Washington File¹ item and headline "Muslim Life in America" during the inspection.

The public affairs section has begun publishing its low-cost monthly magazine in Hausa, the language of the north. The first edition carried items on Taliban atrocities against women, joint U.S.-Nigerian military peacekeeping operations, and U.S. assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

The Abuja PAO has proposed transferring the IRO position from Lagos to Abuja as soon as possible. OIG believes that the position should remain in Lagos for the foreseeable future. The IRO and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' Washington office director agree with OIG. The position is regional and

¹ The Washington File is the daily news summaries that the Office of International Information Programs sends to public affairs sections worldwide.

travel to the IRO's countries can be accomplished only from Lagos. Placing the position in Abuja would add considerable cost and wasted travel time as well as give short shrift to the large and important intellectual community in Lagos.

Lagos Print Shop

The public affairs section print shop in Lagos has two small presses in operation that break down but can be serviced locally. There are two other old, nonworking machines that should be surveyed. The shop urgently needs an assessment by an expert in small shop printing regarding the acquisition of needed new equipment. The expert should also consult with the public affairs section in Abuja on printing needs.

Recommendation 5: The Department of State should arrange for an expert from the Overseas Printing Division to visit Lagos and Abuja to evaluate printing operations and recommend acquisition of needed new equipment.
(Action: A)

POLITICAL/MILITARY/ECONOMIC

The interest in reporting from Nigeria is high. Even with a full complement of reporting officers working efficiently, there would be requests for more information from Washington. Washington end users know of the staffing problems, operational difficulties, and difficult working environment in Nigeria. They praise the efforts made under extremely difficult circumstances and appreciate the reporting they receive.

Crime and fraud have a massive influence on the business and investment climate. Countless Americans have been the victims of Nigerian frauds, commonly referred to as "419" schemes because of the reference to financial fraud in Nigeria's criminal code. Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos are very aware of the issue; unfortunately there are no short, consistent handouts to warn people about fraud. OIG made an informal recommendation that the mission produce such handouts and update them regularly.

The current MPP, an extremely ambitious document, is of little assistance in setting priorities. With less than a full complement of reporting officers, having clear priorities is key to the success of the mission in Nigeria. When everything is important, nothing is important. Mission management must set, maintain, and convey realistic reporting priorities.

Embassy Abuja should institute an internal tracking system for action and clearance items sent to the front office. Clearance and approval needs to be faster. One means of speeding the process is a greater use of computer technology, especially e-mail, to revise and clear documents. Walking handwritten changes between buildings is antiquated and time-consuming.

The transfer of the embassy to Abuja has changed the mission's reporting focus. This is not always reflected in job requirements. Mission management should reexamine, reallocate, and rewrite job requirements in Abuja's combined political and economic section. Workloads need to be balanced and lines of authority clarified. The front office should resist "quick fix" solutions to immediate problems that require section officers to devote considerable time and resources to projects, however worthy, that are not in their job requirements. This issue could become serious enough to bring into question Abuja's compliance with personnel rating regulations unless it is corrected immediately.

The reporting roles of Abuja and Lagos need definition. The shift of political power and national focus to Abuja is a reality that will accelerate in the future. The embassy requires a fully functional senior level country team in Abuja capable of handling complicated political and economic policy issues. At the same time, although Lagos is no longer the political capital of the country, it is the center of business and finance, and the media capital. Newspapers published in Lagos do not reach Abuja until noon. Consulate General Lagos should be the commentator on what the Nigerians and expatriates in their district think of decisions in Abuja.

The Ambassador has made an impressive beginning in his own reporting role by covering the north with a number of visits to state governors. He has visited 20 of the 36 states, to date, in both the northern and southern regions.

Political Reporting

Nigeria's progress as a democracy after years of military rule and the coming 2003 elections are of critical interest to the United States. The Ambassador and DCM, both experienced African specialists, have access to the senior levels of the Nigerian government that is the envy of other diplomatic missions in Nigeria. The

access is reflected in reports that consistently draw Washington's praise. The political officers in Abuja have good contacts with military officials, which results in high quality reporting on Nigerian peacekeeping operations and the growing military cooperation between the United States and Nigeria.

In spite of the general praise for reporting, there is a concern that overall political reporting may have veered into "clientism." In an attempt to tell the good news about Nigeria, less of the bad news may be reported. This tendency, which may be changing as the embassy is made aware of it, does a disservice to Washington policymakers and needs to be closely monitored. Nigeria is a very complex country of regional, tribal, and religious differences. By its very nature, reporting from different parts of the country will have differing viewpoints. This range of views is necessary and should be encouraged in reporting. In particular, more on Islam and the north of Nigeria is required.

Military Cooperation

The healthy development of the Nigerian military is critical to several of the MPP goals, including democracy building (rule of law, human rights, humanitarian support) and promoting regional stability. Since the return of democracy to Nigeria in 1999, the mission has worked hard to reestablish a trusting relationship with the Nigerian military, focusing on efforts to educate the military on its proper role in a democracy. Moreover, Nigeria's role as a force for stability and peacekeeping in Africa makes Nigeria vital to U.S. national security interests. Nigeria has one of the largest armies in Africa and is the recipient of the largest security assistance program in sub-Saharan Africa. Because of the pace and importance of these programs, the embassy, at all levels, has spent a significant amount of time focusing on the military-to-military relationship.

The Ambassador, DCM, political/military officer, and defense attaché have dedicated a great deal of time to reinvigorating the U.S. security assistance program to Nigeria. There are several such programs ongoing. In 2000, a Department of Defense (Defense) contractor began a program to help the Nigerian Ministry of Defense and Services professionalize and reprioritize the military. Without permanent staffing in the office of defense cooperation, the defense attaché was responsible for this program. Operation Focus Relief (OFR), a program to train and equip five Nigerian and two other West African battalions for peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, was a major focus of the embassy over the past year and a half. Due to the amount of work involved in initiating and maintaining this program, including many regular and ad hoc policy and program meetings and multiple visits from

Department and Defense officials, OFR consumed as much as 20 percent of the Ambassador's time and 90 percent of the defense attaché's and political/military officer's time. However, as a direct result of the success of OFR, the U.S. relationship with the Nigerian military and Ministry of Defense has vastly improved, allowing for better access and influence with these institutions on critical issues such as human rights, democratic practices, and peacekeeping.

Contacts with the Economic Community of West African States

The role of ECOWAS in the subregion has expanded greatly in the last ten years from one solely dedicated to economic integration into areas such as small arms proliferation, peace and security among member states, corruption, and democracy building. ECOWAS, with its Abuja-based secretariat, has played a significant role in the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone and has begun to work on the issues related to Liberian reconciliation. Moreover, the organization has taken a strong public stand against terrorism. As a result, the mission has broadened its contacts with ECOWAS on many levels. The USAID West Africa Regional Program, which is based in Bamako, has assigned two contractors to ECOWAS to focus on the West Africa Pipeline Program and to support conflict resolution programs. Defense's European Command (EUCOM), through the Nigeria-based defense attaché and the political office at the embassy, has begun a program to help develop the ECOWAS operations center. Moreover, due to increasing requests from the Department to coordinate with ECOWAS on policy matters, the mission has worked hard to develop both broader and deeper relationships with the secretariat.

Staffing Issues

Political reporting is affected by staffing shortages and gaps in Lagos and Abuja. The mission has used TDY employees, interns, and contract employees to further political reporting, some of which is very good. The critical issue in both Abuja and Lagos is the lack of midlevel officers. First- and second-tour junior officers are stretched into reporting positions. Most of the junior officers are praised for their energy, reporting, and performing above their rank and experience; however, the lack of a midlevel reporting layer shows. Senior officers spend a large amount of time editing junior officer drafts. This comes at the expense of travel and other projects by the senior officers. Experienced midlevel officers would normally do

the regional and provincial traveling and reporting before a national election. The lack of midlevel officers means that some of this is done by senior and junior officers, which is not an optimal use of limited reporting resources.

Economic Reporting

Washington end users praise most of the economic reporting from Nigeria, particularly energy reporting. Because open-source economic information about Nigeria is notoriously unreliable, embassy reporting adds a vital “reality check” for Washington readers. More information on the macroeconomic situation has been requested, and recent reporting from Lagos and Abuja has begun to address this need.

Although Lagos remains the commercial capital of Nigeria, most of the economic policy decisionmakers have moved to Abuja. The senior economic officer position needs to be reassigned to Abuja so that he or she can serve as an effective advisor to the Ambassador on economic policy issues. The presence of the senior economic officer in Abuja is necessary to convey U.S. views on complex economic issues in an effective manner to senior Nigerian government officials. The second-ranking economic position in Nigeria could then be assigned to Lagos. Since the chief of the section in Lagos will be required to supervise subordinate economic reporting officers, the second ranking position should be located there.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Abuja should move the economic counselor position from Consulate General Lagos to Embassy Abuja. The number two economic position in Nigeria should be assigned to Consulate General Lagos. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

The mission is working to restructure the formal bilateral engagement with Nigeria, which had been conducted through the Joint Economic Partnership Committee from 1999 until December 2000. In mid-2001, the government of Nigeria agreed to establish three committees, an Economic Committee, Defense Committee, and Law Enforcement Committee. Only the latter has met (in December 2001). Discussions have been ongoing among the mission, the Department, the government of Nigeria, and the Corporate Council on Africa about how to make the Economic Committee useful and relevant to both countries by identifying concrete objectives and focusing on achieving them. The Joint Economic Partnership Committee had provided a useful forum for high-level policymakers to discuss policy issues, but had become cumbersome and increasingly ineffective in resolving problems or effecting real change in Nigeria.

The Role of the United States Agency for International Development

USAID has a large program in Nigeria with strong economic, energy, and development programs. Cooperation and information exchange at the working level between USAID and the rest of the mission has improved recently. Further improvement is possible and necessary because USAID has insightful and extensive information about specific sectors of the Nigerian economy. Mission management needs to examine carefully the role and expectations it has for Department officers vis-à-vis USAID programs.

Education for Development and Democracy Initiative

EDDI is a U.S. government project stemming from the 1998 presidential visit to Nigeria. It has laudable but extremely ambitious goals that range from training unemployed Nigerian youth, to raising the level of literacy and computer prowess, to providing a voice for marginalized groups, especially women, in rural areas. This worthy initiative, although funded by USAID, is a multi-U.S. government agency endeavor. EDDI has several large educational programs already underway in Nigeria and many more on its agenda, including a large scholarship program for Nigerian girls. One of EDDI's programs, managed by USAID in Abuja, is directed towards public school curriculum development.

CONSULAR AFFAIRS

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The Lagos 2001 consular package reported that the consular section processed around 10,000 immigrant and diversity visa cases, 55,500 nonimmigrant visa (NIV) adjudications, and 1,500 U.S. passport applications. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) Nigerians are very actively involved in the Diversity Visa (DV) program. Public announcements indicate that approximately 6,000 Nigerians may be selected as candidates for the 2002 DV program.

Embassy Abuja has not prepared a consular package so workload statistics for Abuja are not available. The recent arrival of a full-time consular officer will ensure preparation of the consular package.

Consular Staffing

Embassy Abuja

The consular section in Abuja is staffed full-time by a first-tour junior officer in a rotational consular/staff aide position, with part-time assistance from a second officer. There is one American consular assistant who can be designated a consular associate now that the section has a full-time consular officer. Unfortunately, this employee transfers out in late summer 2002, and no EFM with the requisite training to qualify as a consular associate is available. There is one local employee. This staffing is sufficient for the section's ACS workload. It is also sufficient to start up, as mission management desires, a small NIV operation limited to diplomatic (A) and international organization (G) visas. OIG agrees with the Department, however, that the embassy should first concentrate on getting its ACS operation in place. This means establishing an effective warden system in those communities in northern Nigeria where American citizens reside. This task is about one-third completed.

Nevertheless, the mission will need to begin now to prepare the Abuja consular section for what promises to be a very large NIV operation once the new embassy compound (NEC) is completed. The growing demand for visitor visas since the restoration of democracy in Nigeria, and the continuing inability of Consulate General Lagos to handle adequately this demand, indicate a sizable NIV workload

at Abuja from the start. Current projections for consular staffing and office space for Abuja already appear to be short of future needs. (See the Consular Facilities section below.) Moreover, OIG believes that the final disposition of consular resources in Nigeria should include plans for a realignment of supervisory consular positions, including a consular country coordinator as recommended elsewhere in this report.

Consular Staffing

Consulate General Lagos

A senior consular officer, who encumbers the section chief position ranked at the FE-OC level, heads the consular section in Lagos. There are 19 American and 34 FSN positions. The American positions include ten general officers, one joint fraud officer, three consular associates, three consular assistants, and one office management specialist. During the inspection, three officer, two consular associate, and three consular assistant positions were vacant. Since consular associates can adjudicate visa and passport cases, this means that the section is lacking five adjudicators. Vacancies have been a perennial problem and this situation is expected to continue. For the near future, the Department reportedly will not have sufficient consular officers or Civil Service personnel willing to accept overseas tours to cover all vacancies worldwide. The assignment of more unmarried junior officers to Lagos has decreased the number of EFMs available to qualify as consular associates. Resident Americans and other English-speaking expatriates are difficult to hire and retain as consular assistants, because they are not willing to accept the proffered compensation, a situation discussed in more detail in the Human Resources section below.

Consulate General Lagos has not clearly identified the seriousness of the staffing problems in its reporting to the Department. The consular section needs all of its officer positions filled and at least three consular associates to keep pace with the current public demand for service. The lengthening delay in providing visa services is an increasingly serious bilateral issue, which has been raised by various levels of Nigerian officials. Despite this fact, there has been no mention in the MPP or other reporting that the Lagos consular section needs to have all of its adjudicating positions (Foreign Service officers and consular associates) filled in order to provide appropriate service to the general public and maintain necessary management controls.

The 2001 consular package report stated that the consulate expects an eight percent increase in NIV work. The report also states that the consular section can absorb this increase without any additional FSN positions. Interviews with consular personnel in Lagos confirmed that this might not be an accurate conclusion. Among other errors in reconciling work hours, the consulate mistakenly indicated that the section lost only 2,900 American work hours, approximately 1.6 work years, due to staffing gaps. As shown above, five officer positions are vacant, which should indicate a loss of officer work hours much greater than reported.

Consulate General Lagos has not reported to the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) that the delay in obtaining an NIV appointment has recently increased to 180 days and the delay for an IV appointment is at least 120 days. These additional delays are directly due to staffing gaps and problems associated with delayed mail as a result of extra security measures following the anthrax scares. Lagos-based consular personnel told OIG that some DV cases might not have been interviewed last year due to staff shortages. Such cases are time-sensitive, because potential DV winners who are not issued a visa within the appropriate fiscal year lose the chance to immigrate. Furthermore, the consulate has not been able to keep track of how many IV and DV cases are outstanding, because the section barely has the resources to handle scheduled cases. There is not enough time to follow up on individual cases or to track properly previously refused cases for termination.

If the Department is not able to assign sufficient officers to Lagos, Consulate General Lagos should ask that CA arrange and fund TDY assistance. Since the consulate suffers from long-term gaps and a lack of managerial and professional experience, when-actually-employed (WAE) personnel may be the only feasible short-term solution to address its special needs. CA should consider various inducements to persuade WAE personnel to spend long periods in Lagos, even TDY assignments up to a full year. Such inducements may need to include hiring WAE personnel on a special basis to overcome the work hour and salary caps inherent in the WAE program. The decreasing number of EFMs available for consular associate positions must be taken into account.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to review the consular section's workload and staffing, and ask the Department of State to convert, if deemed appropriate, the three consular associate positions presently authorized for Lagos to visa officer positions. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with CA, AF, and M/DGHR)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Abuja should ensure that Consulate General Lagos clearly and accurately documents its workload and staffing needs so that the Department of State either fills all of the authorized direct-hire American consular positions in Lagos or arranges for relief of staffing gaps through the assignment of experienced temporary duty or when-actually-employed consular officers. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with M/DGHR, CA, and AF)

In the near future, the mission must decide where best to station the senior consular officer in Nigeria. OIG believes there are valid reasons to designate a country coordinator for consular issues and to have that officer be an integral part of the mission's country team in Abuja. Presently there is no one at Embassy Abuja to provide the Ambassador and other members of the country team with an informed and experienced consular perspective. The consular section chief, 450 miles away in Lagos, cannot easily participate in meetings in Abuja to discuss consular issues. A consular coordinator based in the embassy could also ensure that consular issues are adequately covered in the MPP and other mission reporting documents, which is not always the case at present.

There is no need, however, to have two Senior Foreign Service consular positions in Nigeria. Therefore, if the consular country coordinator were to be located in Abuja, it would also be necessary to downgrade the section chief position in Lagos. Managing the Lagos consular section could be an attractive position for an FS-01 officer vying for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service, and it would be appropriate for such an officer to look to a more senior consular officer in the embassy for guidance and direction.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Abuja should analyze the future needs of the consular function in Nigeria and propose to the Department of State the establishment and realignment of consular positions to ensure that consular managerial issues are sufficiently addressed at the embassy and the consulate. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with CA, AF, and M/DGHR)

One function needing urgent attention in the consular section is the handling of correspondence. Responses to public inquiries are not timely or consistent. The Visa Office in CA has expressed serious concern about the situation, especially in regard to congressional inquiries. Not answering such correspondence creates frustration, ill will, and needless follow-up requests for information. The consul

general and the chief of the consular section in Lagos are aware of the problem but do not have the resources to effect change. The Lagos consular section should establish a correspondence unit to organize, track, and answer incoming correspondence. Ideally, this unit would be staffed with English-speaking expatriates and experienced local employees, managed by a junior officer. Consular personnel could be rotated into the unit every three or six months to provide a different experience and a welcome break from the stress of working at the interview window. This unit could also provide a quality control mechanism for line personnel, catching processing mistakes revealed by complaints and other inquiries. Eventually this unit could also take over walk-in and telephone inquiries.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to prepare and transmit to the Bureau of Consular Affairs a detailed plan with a funding request to establish a correspondence unit for the Lagos consular section. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Consular Facilities

Embassy Abuja

The consular section at Embassy Abuja presently consists of one small room with two teller windows located in one of the three small buildings on the embassy compound. The vice consul, consular associate, and FSN are jammed into space that is barely adequate for three desks and three filing cabinets. Persons seeking consular services must be escorted about 100 yards to and from the main gate by one of the consular staff. Mission management has proposed that Abuja also perform limited NIV work once the ACS workload is established. When the new chancery is completed, the mission hopes to expand consular operations to include the issuance of all types of NIVs.

If the Department plans to provide consular section space in the Abuja NEC for a full-service NIV function, it should look to the British High Commission's (BHC) experience as an indication of future visa demand in Nigeria. Both the BHC in Abuja and the deputy BHC in Lagos have experienced a phenomenal growth in visa demand since the restoration of democracy in 1999. The Lagos office processed 85,000 visas in FY 2001, almost double the demand for the previous year. BHC Abuja processed 23,000 visitor visas last year and estimates that its NIV demand will be over 35,000 applicants in 2003. Deputy BHC Lagos is now running a four-month backlog in NIV appointments. British immigration

officials claim that the backlog causes many applicants to apply in Abuja. The BHC reports that the strong prospect of three more airlines expanding service to Abuja will further add to the visa workload. On the basis of these projections, BHC Abuja is doubling the size of its consular waiting room, increasing the number of interview windows from four to eight, and requesting two more visa officer positions, for a total of six. OIG believes these developments should cause the Department to reconsider the consular resource levels it currently plans for the Abuja NEC. Embassy Abuja was advised to keep CA informed of BHC visa workloads and any analysis of the cause for the sudden increased demand.

Consulate General Lagos

The consular section presently occupies about half of the ground floor of the main building as well as several offices on the third floor that make up the antifraud unit. The consular area has grown over the years in a haphazard manner. This has not been the result of a long-term plan, but rather a series of ad hoc fixes. The section is again bursting at the seams and must either expand or better use its existing space.

There are various areas of concern including:

- The ACS waiting room and the overflow area in front of the Marine guard post are inadequate for the ACS workload. Americans citizens must queue street-side for hours without benches or overhead fans.
- The four ACS teller windows do not comply with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) standards.
- The security area at the consular visa gate was not designed with appropriate teller windows to allow an initial check without keeping the security door open.
- The visa prescreening room needs additional windows so that all NIV, IV, and DV document checking can be finished there.
- Signage near the consular gate and throughout the visa section is inadequate.

- The work areas behind the visa interview windows are cramped and uncomfortable. File cabinets have narrowed walk spaces. Shorter FSN personnel have to stand on overturned “in” boxes in order to deal face-to-face with applicants. In the main work area, modular furniture has been installed in long rows with little thought given to grouping work stations according to function. The furniture does not have storage spaces so employees have nowhere to store personal items or office supplies. Lack of workspace forces employees to stack files on the floor.
- There are only two offices for consular officers. Others have cubicles alongside local employees.

The consulate cannot address all of these problems in a comprehensive way without professional assistance. It may be necessary to alter the physical plant and to expend additional funds for furnishings.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Abuja should request that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations send a team of experts to Lagos to perform a space utilization survey and produce a plan for reconfiguring and renovating the consular section. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with OBO)

Consular Operations

Embassy Abuja

The embassy’s consular section was reopened in January 2001 and authorized to conduct ACS operations only. The ACS function is still developing. The well-trained and experienced consular assistant has done excellent work in assembling a workable warden system, updating the duty officer book, and reorganizing the consular filing system. Much remains to be done with the warden system, however. Only 280 citizen registration records have been downloaded into the new ACS database. Six hundred registrations remain to be vetted and entered into the system. Meanwhile, recruitment of wardens continues. Mission officers have conducted several trips into the northern states as part of an outreach program with the resident American community. Warden systems for Abuja and Kano are now organized, and a new warden list for Jos, which has a large American community, is nearing completion. The embassy has given top priority to completing the warden system, and OIG made some suggestions to speed up this process, including the hiring of an EFM to work on vetting and downloading the registration files.

As mentioned above, the Department has thus far refused to authorize the issuance of NIVs at Embassy Abuja until the embassy's ACS operation is fully functional. Once that is accomplished, the embassy will be in a position to request authorization from the Department to issue diplomatic and international organization NIVs. In preparation for this, the Abuja consular officer will need to make introductory calls on Nigerian government officials in the office of protocol and the consular affairs division. The embassy's file of specimen signatures of all appropriate Nigerian officials will need to be updated. Most importantly, the embassy's new consular officer will need to be assigned TDY to Consulate General Lagos for at least two weeks to learn NIV processing in Nigeria. In particular, the officer will need extensive consultations with the DS special agent in charge of the Lagos fraud prevention unit, as well as the consular section chief, to discuss current screening procedures to detect fraudulent applications. (See Consular Management Controls below.) Once all of the above actions have been completed, OIG believes the embassy will be ready to take on the responsibility for processing diplomatic and international organization NIVs.

Recommendation 12: The Department should authorize the embassy to issue diplomatic and international organization nonimmigrant visas once the warden system is in place for the embassy's entire consular district and necessary training of the consular officer is completed. (Action: CA)

Consulate General Lagos

The Lagos ACS unit has good relations with the resident nonofficial American community, especially following several meetings the ACS officer conducted in different cities. There is an extensive warden system that passes emergency messages in less than two hours via e-mail, fax, and telephone. OIG found that public service is good.

The consular section is swamped with paper. Considerable resources are expended to maintain and locate files. The ACS unit has not moved to electronic registrations, and ACS files include many outdated registration cards. NIV refusal files are kept alphabetically rather than chronologically to correspond with computer records. Visa clerks estimated that it takes three to four hours daily to file refusals. The section keeps these files years longer than stated in the Records Management Handbook, partially because it is so labor intensive to cull them. There is no record of obtaining permission from CA to keep visa refusal files longer than mandated.

IV/DV files are kept throughout the section in dilapidated cabinets with the overflow in cardboard boxes scattered everywhere. Finding an individual file is often difficult. As a result of special security measures following the 2001 anthrax scares, mail was delayed for months, and many IV/DV cases were lost and have not been found yet. During the inspection, the consular section hired extra help to sort through stacks of mailbags containing unopened correspondence.

A \$22,000 electric filing rack system broke down almost immediately upon installation. It is being replaced in March 2002 by less costly manual stacks that will store some, but not all, of the IV/DV files. A random check of IV files indicated that many of them have been inactive for years. There was no indication in the files that termination letters had been issued.

The consulate is not operating at an optimal level of efficiency in visa processing. As mentioned above, appointments for interviews must be arranged months in advance. This increases the pressure on other parts of the mission, as local contacts are forced to request Category "B" referrals for business, medical, and other unexpected travel.² Because the American officer generally does not know these persons, they must be interviewed. Such interviews are conducted each Wednesday, thus saving the referred applicant a wait of four to six months for an NIV appointment. The increasing number of Wednesday appointments has forced the consular section to limit "B" referrals to three per week from each mission section until further notice.

Nigerian officials have complained about delays in the issuance of visas to official travelers. The Lagos consular section issued 376 diplomatic and international organization NIVs to Nigerians in 2001. Priority is given to such cases, but fraud concerns remain. During the inspection, the section chief was struggling with 50 applications from the Nigerian Foreign Ministry that appeared to involve relationship fraud. The mission spends considerable effort responding to inquiries about "official" cases. Often it is found that the problem is a delay within the Foreign Ministry in transferring documents to its branch office in Lagos.

It is difficult for anyone to obtain information about a specific ACS or visa case. Incoming telephone lines are jammed. The consular section office management specialist and the two public inquiry clerks are swamped with inquiries. Many of the questions are very basic. The section has not yet launched a web site to

² Category "B" referrals are visa referrals from good Nigerian contacts who request officers in other elements of the mission for assistance in obtaining visas.

provide information about consular services, although initial work has started. Establishing an information menu on incoming telephone lines also could assist in providing information to the public.

Walk-in queries regarding immigrant and diversity visa cases are accepted one afternoon a week. The demand for information exceeds the section's ability to respond. As a result, applicants are often told to come back the following week. Upset American petitioners redirect their questions to the ACS unit. This is a significant workload factor for the ACS officer. The issue of walk-in public inquiries to the IV/DV section will increasingly become a public relations problem. As stated earlier, establishing a correspondence unit could eventually address this issue.

After waiting months for an appointment, visa applicants enter the consular section to find a very slow application process. It takes hours for an applicant to move through the prescreening area to the interview window. One problem is the absence of an officer to monitor the intake process. There simply are not enough officers available to spare someone for that task. OIG made an informal recommendation that senior local employees be given more supervisory responsibilities. Among other things, local employees could monitor the intake process and redirect resources to smooth the flow of applicants.

Another major bottleneck is the cashier operation. The consular sub-B cashier collects machine-readable visa (MRV) application fees as well as IV/DV application and issuance fees. Payment is in local and U.S. currency. In fact, IV/DV applicants are strongly urged to pay in U.S. currency, as this is the main source of dollars for the consulate. There is a very long line of applicants waiting to pay fees throughout the morning.

The consulate considered off-site MRV collections previously, but was not able to conclude an agreement. This was partially due to concerns about the management controls required to maintain the integrity of any off-site or third-party collection of fees in such a high-fraud environment. OIG concluded that the collection of MRV fees must be revisited to reduce the bottleneck at the cashier booth. The consulate could choose to have MRV off-site collection, on-site collection via a third party, or a consular employee in a separate cashier booth.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Abuja should direct Consulate General Lagos to move the collection of machine-readable visa application fees from the consular sub-B cashier to another source. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with Consulate General Lagos)

LAW ENFORCEMENT

The importance of the joint effort with Nigeria to combat narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities is indicated by the number of U.S. federal agencies represented in Nigeria and the increasing size of agency staff in country. The U.S. Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation all maintain offices at Consulate General Lagos, and the mission has proposed that the Immigration and Naturalization Service establish a presence as well. The Department of Justice will soon have a project manager in Abuja to oversee the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP). DS, jointly with CA, has an antifraud office based at the consulate. In addition, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a regional narcotics and law enforcement officer (RNLEO) currently located in Lagos. Nearly all agencies plan to expand operations and hire more personnel in the future. Most agencies expect to remain in Lagos to be near the majority of their Nigerian counterparts. OIG agrees that this is appropriate.

Law enforcement agencies reported that cooperation and coordination with each other and with the mission as a whole are good. Law enforcement group meetings, usually chaired by the DCM and held once a month, are collegial and effective exchanges of information. The RNLEO acts unofficially as a liaison between law enforcement agencies and mission management. On a day-to-day basis the Ambassador relies on the RNLEO to advise him of action items and developments, and the RNLEO has done much to encourage cooperative efforts among the agencies and to prevent redundant work. However, there is a need for better communication, particularly between the law enforcement groups in Lagos and post management in Abuja. The law enforcement group feels that they have not been able to adequately explain to the Ambassador the changing nature of their work and how this affects their procedures and mission policy. In light of the increasing importance of law enforcement issues and the growing presence of law enforcement personnel, it is crucial that all parties have a clear understanding of the precise scope of activities being undertaken.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureaus of African Affairs and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should organize a meeting of the Ambassador and heads of all law enforcement agencies, including Bureau of African Affairs and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs representatives, if possible, to discuss U.S. government objectives for law enforcement in Nigeria. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with AF and INL)

Endemic corruption, an inefficient legal system, and a poorly trained and underpaid police force hamper law enforcement efforts in Nigeria. Local criminal syndicates cost American citizens millions of dollars annually, mostly through financial fraud schemes that have proliferated in recent years. In addition, Nigerian organized crime syndicates are responsible for the movement of a substantial quantity of the heroin and cocaine consumed in the United States and elsewhere.

The number and variety of U.S. law enforcement programs in Nigeria reflects the importance of this issue to U.S. interests. In the first meeting of the U.S.-Nigerian Law Enforcement Committee in November 2001, the U.S. government pledged to provide assistance and training to Nigerian agencies in the areas of counternarcotics, money laundering, financial fraud, police modernization, trafficking in persons, immigration crimes, corruption, and extradition.

The mission's law enforcement plan addresses each of the major areas discussed in the November Law Enforcement Committee meeting. It includes technical assistance projects for asset forfeiture, investigative and prosecutorial training, and antifraud training. In addition, ICITAP will implement INL funds and Economic Support Funds to support police reform, specifically by improving forensic capabilities, strengthening cooperation between police and prosecutors, and providing civil disorder management training to special police units. Finally, INL resources have been used to provide the National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Nigerian government's sole counternarcotics force, with vehicles, communications equipment, and drug detection scanners, as well as to provide the NDLEA Academy in Jos with training-related equipment and U.S. government-provided training.

This assistance to the NDLEA is of particular importance because Nigeria is a hub of drug trafficking organizations that control narcotics markets throughout the world and is also a major drug money-laundering center. U.S. law enforcement agency heads believe that drug trafficking provides much of the financial support for international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Nigerians are being arrested for drug trafficking in large numbers on every continent and are appearing increasingly in countries that are known terrorist havens. Combating drug trafficking in Nigeria not only protects American lives and property but is also a crucial element of U.S. antiterrorism efforts.

BORDER SECURITY

Fraud Prevention Program

A 1996 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between CA and DS made Consulate General Lagos one of three missions chosen for an antifraud pilot program to reinforce cooperation and information sharing to strengthen U.S. border security. Because of problems encountered in Lagos and elsewhere, the program was restructured in January 2000. A new MOU laid out more detailed guidelines for achieving improved coordination in “detering and bringing to closure cases of possible overseas visa and passport fraud, as well as allegations of employee malfeasance.”

The proactive DS special agent who heads up the consular section’s fraud prevention unit (FPU) has performed very well in countering visa fraud. He has worked hard to build up antifraud training programs not only for U.S. consular officers but also consular and immigration officers at other foreign missions in Lagos. His liaison work with these officials, particularly the British, Germans, and Dutch, has become an important channel for intelligence gathering and sharing regarding fraudulent travel documents. Moreover, his training of airport immigration officials, airline security, and ticketing personnel in detecting bogus U.S. visas and passports has led to a significant increase in interceptions of ineligible travelers attempting to board U.S.-bound flights.

Although most of the objectives listed in the DS/CA MOU are being achieved at Consulate General Lagos, there is confusion about lines of authority and how the fraud prevention tasks within the section are to be organized and supervised. Some, but not all, of the problem can be traced to inexperience and a less-than-perfect chemistry between the officers involved. The DS special agent in charge of the FPU is listed in the consulate general phone book as a member of the consular section, yet official organization charts show the unit as an integral part of the consulate’s regional security office. The special agent reports to the RSO, who writes his rating report. A significant portion of the agent’s time is spent on security and other nonconsular work. The five FSN investigators, only one of whom is paid with CA’s MRV funds, reportedly see themselves as DS employees. As a result, the FPU has not been closely integrated into consular section operations. Physical separation does not help either, since the FPU is located on the third floor of the consulate. The RSO and the consular chief should develop a formal standard operating practice to create a better structure to integrate consular operational needs into the DS/CA program.

Because of the chronic shortage of American consular officers in Lagos, the section's fraud prevention manager (FPM) portfolio was assigned to the deputy chief of section. This officer's already busy schedule prevents her from managing the day-to-day antifraud work in the consular section and ensuring that all visa or passport fraud is handled appropriately; i.e., dealt with by the case officer or referred upstairs for formal investigation. Because of the high incidence of visa fraud, the section's FPM work at Lagos is a full-time job. When the consular section approaches full staffing, OIG suggested that the consulate rotate this responsibility among the junior officers so that the line officer with the most time in Lagos is in that job. Such an officer would be assigned the responsibility of reviewing suspect cases on the NIV line and be available for quick consultation with NIV officers. The officer would be acting as liaison between the consular section and the FPU. In fact this officer could be designated the deputy chief of the FPU to improve interaction between the consular section and the FPU.

Immigration and Naturalization Service Presence at Lagos

In February 2001, South African Airways began running direct Lagos-New York flights three times per week, raising concern about the potentially high risk of document fraud and contraband. The excellent work of the FPU chief, as indicated above, quickly confirmed the mission's worst fears. This prompted the embassy's urgent appeal to the Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Washington that the latter consider short-term assignments of INS officers to Lagos to assist in passenger screening. INS responded by sending an officer from the INS office in Accra, Ghana, for this purpose. This officer spent two weeks in Lagos, screening passengers until March 9, 2001.

During this period, the officer did not limit his screening activity to consulting and leaving airline personnel to make the final decision to permit or deny boarding. Instead, the officer's intensive grilling of passengers and seizure of their documents angered Nigerian passport holders, which led eventually to a confrontation at the Lagos International Airport in which the INS officer was manhandled by a Nigerian who refused to give up his apparently bogus passport. The INS officers involved in this altercation were distressed by the fact that Nigerian police and immigration officials failed to come to their aid. The INS officers left Nigeria the next day and have refused to return.

DS has issued specific instructions to the FPU chief not to conduct any prescreening of New York-bound passengers on South African Airways. Although FPU-trained contract document checkers, as well as British and German immigra-

DIPLOMATIC READINESS

Resource Chart

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff	U.S. Local-Hire Staff	Foreign National Staff	Total Staff	Total Funding (000s)
Abuja					
State Program	25	3	24	52	\$5,813.6
ICASS	8	2	70	80	\$12,323.4
USAID	19		53	72	\$5,000.0
Defense Attaché Office	2		1	3	\$405.6
Office of Def. Cooperation	2		1	3	N/A
Cntr. for Disease Control	1		2	3	\$1,450.0
U.S. Treasury	1		1	2	N/A
Totals	58	5	152	215	
Lagos					
State Program	51	11	70	132	(included in
ICASS	22	6	139	167	above totals)
Foreign Agricultural Office	2			2	\$196.6
Foreign Comm. Service	2			2	\$227.5
Defense Attache Office	2			2	(included above)
FBI	3			3	N/A
DEA	4			4	N/A
U.S. Secret Service	3			3	N/A
Totals	89	17	209	315	N/A

Following Nigeria's return to democratic government, U.S. government agencies are responding to the greater priority accorded to Nigeria by increasing their programs and operations. Policymakers believe this increased presence is essential to meeting U.S. strategic goals. However, the mission does not have the program staff, support staff, or infrastructure to support this expansion. Although the chronic staffing shortages and other staffing problems affect both Abuja and Lagos, the infrastructure problems are most acute in Abuja and require immediate attention. Groundbreaking for the new chancery project in Abuja has been delayed, and there are questions as to whether the new chancery, when completed, will be adequate to house the rapidly expanding embassy. The relationship between the embassy and the consulate general is confusing and often contentious and nonproductive. The mission and the Department urgently need to address these problems, which are significant impairments to the mission's ability to achieve U.S. goals and objectives in Nigeria.

STAFFING THE MISSION

The single, greatest challenge facing the mission is the Department's long-standing inability to staff adequately the mission, particularly with midlevel officers. The same conclusion was cited in OIG's last two inspection reports, issued in 1993 and 1997, respectively. Abuja and Lagos are two of the most difficult-to-staff missions in the world, and the effects of inadequate staffing are noted throughout this report. There can be no substantial progress on other vital issues as long as the mission is susceptible to long staffing gaps and makeshift arrangements of junior officers, TDY retirees, Civil Service employees on excursion tours, and contract employees filling key positions. There is a lack of the mentoring capacity, institutional knowledge, and continuity that can be provided by direct-hire midlevel Foreign Service officers. The Department must exercise discipline in enforcing worldwide availability and a genuine fair-share bidding process to ensure that adequate staffing exists at hard-to-fill embassies and consulates such as these.

Recommendation 15: The Department should exhaust all avenues, including direct assignment, contractors, or long-term, when-actually-employed personnel to ensure that qualified, experienced staff are placed in midlevel positions in Abuja and Lagos. (Action: M/DGHR in coordination with AF and CA)

Improving the quality of life is crucial to attract and keep qualified officers at Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos, and both the mission and the Department have made efforts in this area. In Abuja, the arrival of a contract American medical practitioner and the appointment of a community liaison office coordinator (CLO) have been important morale boosters. In addition, the mission is working to improve the quality of housing in both Abuja and Lagos. These are positive steps, and the mission must continue to give priority to quality of life issues in its attempt to address staffing problems.

GROWTH OF THE MISSION

From April 2001 to February 2002, Embassy Abuja grew from 36 Americans and 47 FSNs to 61 Americans and 134 FSNs, a growth of nearly 135 percent, all with only a skeletal administrative staff and support. Financial management, human resources, and general services support are still located in Lagos, although Abuja is in the process of developing an administrative structure. Lagos, meanwhile, is developing its own identity as a major consulate general, housing not only a huge consular operation, but also a growing presence of law enforcement and other agencies.

Much of the growth at the mission has been a result of added positions from other U.S. government agencies. With the transition from Lagos to Abuja, it was expected that the size of the consulate in Lagos would decrease; in fact, this did not occur, largely due to growth of other agencies. Similarly in Abuja, there are several new assistance programs planned that will require an increase in personnel from law enforcement and other agencies. Many of these new positions are temporary, often for periods of one year or more, and therefore not subject to the National Security Decision Directive 38 process, which was in part developed to help determine whether a mission has adequate infrastructure and administrative resources to support new positions. Using temporary positions effectively circumvents the process. Furthermore, mission management is often pressured by other agencies to accept these new positions, arguing that they are essential to achieving U.S. policy objectives. However, Embassy Abuja has reached the limits of its capacity to provide office space. In addition, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the mission to provide administrative support, and services will continue to deteriorate with this growth.

Growth has been explosive and chaotic; administrative personnel often learn of new arrivals from various elements of the mission requesting space, housing, equipment, and furniture in an ad hoc manner. Increases during the inspection

itself illuminate the crushing character of the problem. The Ambassador ordered the administrative section to find space for the EDDI program, and ICITAP requested space for a program to begin in April 2002. This means that eight officers will be housed in an office of approximately 400 square feet. There are two options: stop the growth or obtain additional office space and administrative staff. There can be no new net growth of program activity under current circumstances. DS is reluctant to approve any off-compound facilities due to security concerns. Although the embassy has proposed a staffing projection for the NEC, its construction will not be completed for several years, and an interim plan is needed to address the immediate problem.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should develop and implement a plan to rationalize program and staffing growth to be commensurate with the embassy's ability to provide administrative and other support services. In the meantime, mission management should consider a moratorium on new program activities and positions. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with AF)

FACILITIES AND REAL PROPERTY

The August 2000 opening of the U.S. embassy in Abuja signaled a significant shift of focus. Building very quickly on the small U.S. liaison office in Abuja, the mission added substantive, program, and other agency personnel. In less than two years, they transformed the small outpost into a complex political/military platform with only a skeletal administrative capability.

Embassy Abuja currently consists of three short-term leased properties and a motor pool area on a small compound stretched well past its functional limit. Vehicles are stacked up, and the motor pool area is too small for efficient maintenance. Consulate General Lagos is storing a carlift needed in the embassy's motor pool simply because there is nowhere else to put it. Because Embassy Abuja has been limited to short-term leases, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) support is limited. The facilities manager, who is located in Lagos and is also the post safety and health officer (POSHO), has visited Abuja for a safety survey but has not been able to spend substantial time there. Executive offices in Abuja are small and lack a suitable reception area. The rest of the embassy works in overcrowded, makeshift facilities.

As mentioned above, Embassy Abuja is awaiting the construction of the NEC. The embassy's ability to support the project is limited; even clearing containers of building materials and transporting them to Abuja will strain mission capabilities. In addition, there are indications that the NEC may not accommodate projected staffing. The embassy has received notice from the Department that the project is being downsized. Further, groundbreaking has been postponed twice and is now scheduled to take place in September 2002. This raises the prospect that current facilities may have to be permanently retained. In the absence of Department guidance, Embassy Abuja is enhancing them with that possibility in mind.

Recommendation 17: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should organize an administrative management planning session in Abuja to produce a firm transition plan. The plan should include projected staffing levels of Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos, plus clear timelines for a transition, including the size of the new embassy compound, interim office facilities, and housing necessary for arriving personnel in Abuja. The planning session should include mission administrative officers. (Action: AF/EX, in coordination with OBO, DS, and Embassy Abuja)

With OBO approval, Embassy Abuja has leased a warehouse in the final stages of construction. USAID leased a twin facility on the same property. This will support construction of the NEC and provide space for incoming shipments, allowing better-planned procurement. There is also space to store containers and vehicles that are currently an eyesore at one of the housing compounds. The general services office (GSO) is studying the feasibility of a maintenance contract that would house GSO operations off the compound and provide additional capability. Though it entails additional cost, this approach has worked well for USAID.

The work environment in Abuja is deplorable. Facilities are overcrowded and increasingly squalid, and Abuja's plan to reconfigure existing office space has not been funded. FSNs work in an average of less than 50 square feet of space, Americans in an average of 80 square feet. Some work out of shipping containers, and one works in a converted bathroom. There is already a shortage of bathrooms. The POSHO in Lagos expressed serious concerns about health and safety in his most recent survey of Abuja.

One of the biggest morale problems in Abuja is lack of a cafeteria. There are no nearby cafeterias or restaurants, carryout food is expensive, and the problem contributes to the perceived lack of concern for employee welfare. The administrative office in Abuja developed plans for a small snack bar/cafeteria, but the space was preempted to house a program officer, further aggravating the morale issue.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Abuja should immediately prepare an area for a cafeteria. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

With the exception of the consular section, office facilities in Consulate General Lagos are attractive and generally functional. Growth of the consulate has necessitated dividing existing offices to accommodate more people. That process is well planned and the results have been good. The portion of the plan that would use a small part of the executive suite has been put on hold, but the rest of the work is moving ahead.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Abuja should immediately review the work on the executive suite described in the March 2000 architectural plan, modify it if necessary, and promptly authorize completion of the work. (Action: Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos)

NEED FOR MISSION UNIFICATION

Many Americans and FSNs in both Abuja and Lagos noted that the embassy and consulate see themselves as separate entities, rather than as parts of a coherent and unified mission in Nigeria. The relationship tends to be more adversarial than cooperative. Embassy Abuja still relies on Consulate General Lagos for most of its support, and this has fueled the antagonism. Administrative personnel in Lagos see Abuja as haphazardly siphoning off mission resources, many of which are still needed in Lagos. Mission management in Abuja often sees Lagos as unsupportive, skimming resources intended by the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) for Abuja.

The Ambassador has been the only officer with mission-wide authority. Lack of leadership and clear lines of authority have allowed long-standing antagonisms between Lagos and Abuja to fester. Conflicts are greatest in the administrative areas where clear supervision and close cooperation are most needed. New work

requirements statements are being prepared for the DCM and principal officer in Lagos that would give the DCM normal authority for the entire mission, but mission administration is still managed in Lagos. Substantive responsibilities are split awkwardly between the embassy and the consulate.

The administrative counselor was moved from Lagos to Abuja without the budget and fiscal or GSO capabilities he would have needed to be effective. He curtailed, and the new administrative counselor's arrival is expected soon. AF has supplied Abuja with skilled, experienced TDY personnel, but has been reluctant to take on the issue of pulling the administrative section together. This leaves the Ambassador without key capabilities required to manage mission resources or plan for the future.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Abuja should immediately define and regularize roles and responsibilities of senior mission officers, including reporting relationships. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 21: Embassy Abuja should immediately revitalize the mission administrative section under the administrative counselor. Parts of the administrative section still in Lagos, including financial management, human resources, information management, and elements of general services, should report to the administrative counselor in Abuja and be moved to Abuja as soon as possible. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

In Nigeria, administrative personnel work in an extremely challenging environment. Embassy Abuja is largely reliant on elements of the administrative section still in Lagos. Lagos is handicapped in its own development by carrying much of the workload of administration for the mission as a whole, in effect hosting elements of what should be sections of Embassy Abuja. Abuja desperately needs that administrative capability, but simply has no office space for them. If Lagos continues to grow, it will also need administrative positions, either keeping those it currently has, instead of transferring them to Abuja, or adding new ones.

In spite of the challenges, skilled administrative officers have resolved many major issues. The mission has written work requirements statements for the DCM and the principal officer in Lagos, as well as other mission officers. Embassy Abuja has issued internal procedures and a designation of responsibilities memo, and

initiated work on an update of the FSN compensation plan. The embassy has hired a CLO and set up a medical unit in Abuja, thereby addressing major morale issues. The embassy developed plans and funded a renovation project that will provide additional office space. Consulate General Lagos issued a safety policy, spelling out the roles and responsibilities of the consulate's safety committee and individual officers, and conducted a safety inspection of the embassy. With OBO approval, the embassy has leased a warehouse in Abuja. The mission determined that the ambassadorial residence in Lagos would no longer be used by the Ambassador and asked for help from AF in assigning it to the principal officer in Lagos. The principal officer intends to allow mission personnel to make greater use of the grounds, which would be a major boost for morale. The embassy has identified a suitable residence for the Ambassador in Abuja and is working with OBO on a lease.

General Services Operations

The GSO in Lagos provides much of the support for the entire mission. It is staffed by an American supervisory GSO, an assistant GSO for contracting and procurement, a facilities maintenance specialist, an EFM responsible for procurement assistance, and locally hired Americans serving as property managers in the warehouse. Consulate General Lagos is still working out the details of how the facilities maintenance specialist dovetails with the GSO operation, but all of the officers involved think that the division of responsibilities is understood and working well. The administrative section has worked hard at improving services, establishing tighter property management procedures, implementing internal controls, and gaining respect for administrative operations and staff. Nonexpendable property application (NEPA) procedures are effective. Customer relations could still be improved, but there is a general perception that services are getting better.

GSO Abuja has two direct-hire positions. An EFM has reorganized and revitalized maintenance operations. An OBO construction engineer is expected to arrive in the fall of 2002. The section faces major challenges: construction of the NEC, setting up warehouse operations and inventory procedures, locating a residence for the Ambassador and preparing it for occupancy, and finding office space and housing for a continuing influx of American staff.

Consulate General Lagos has given high priority to acquisition planning and is very well organized. Embassy Abuja is developing requirements, but personnel are stretched so thin dealing with current crises that planning is not as fully developed, and the embassy will continue to need support from Lagos.

Maintenance and Safety

Reaction time to service requests has been a problem at the embassy and the consulate. In Lagos, difficult travel and communication between warehouse and maintenance facilities slows the response time on service requests. It can take two hours to drive from the maintenance facility to the warehouse for parts. Phone calls can be unintelligible or cut off altogether, and cell phone capability is limited.

Maintenance is also slowed by controls on expendable supplies. Although the delays are regrettable, the controls are essential, making improved communications the most likely avenue to achieve quick improvement. Receiving and responding to requests could be facilitated by adding the maintenance facility to the unclassified network. This would require a wireless connection, at a cost estimated at \$60,000. Because of the physical distance, any solution at the warehouse will be more complicated, but Internet access would simplify communications, improving reaction times.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to give priority to adding the maintenance facility to the unclassified network. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Until October 2000, Consulate General Lagos handled the safety program for Abuja. It supplied fire extinguishers and smoke detectors, inspected equipment and serviced extinguishers, and provided smoke detectors for residences. The consulate informed the embassy that responsibility for the safety program was being given to them, even though the embassy was not staffed or equipped to deal with it. The POSHO noted in his January 17, 2002, report on Abuja that there has been no safety program in Abuja since October 2000. Fire extinguishers have not been checked or serviced, new equipment has not been installed as new residences have been acquired, swimming pool safety procedures have not been established, and vehicle safety has been neglected. Work areas are so overcrowded as to be dysfunctional and unsafe. The POSHO noted that Abuja lacks resources to set up its own program, and he does not believe Lagos can effectively support a safety program.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to direct the post safety and health officer to update the most recent safety survey for Abuja, make available support to help the Abuja general services office correct the most glaring and dangerous deficiencies in fire safety and other critical areas, and to establish Safety/Health and Environmental Management procedures. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Housing

Housing in Lagos is a major challenge. The mission provides security, building maintenance, water, furniture and furnishings, emergency electricity, common grounds maintenance, and, in some cases, sewerage. Widespread problems with housing have lowered morale and are generally regarded as a negative factor in attracting Foreign Service bidders. The consulate has improved the quality of the housing pool, maintenance, and responsiveness to personnel, but the housing inventory still contains deteriorating single-family units requiring increasing maintenance.

Consolidating employees into an attractive high-rise building has worked well. Authorized by OBO, the consulate leased units in a high-rise condominium on a compound with pleasant common grounds, a pool, and a small fitness facility. This has improved morale. For the consulate, housing people together has simplified providing security and other services.

The mission determined that the ambassadorial residence in Lagos will no longer be used by the Ambassador and is coordinating with OBO to transfer it to the principal officer in Lagos. Embassy Abuja identified a suitable residence in Abuja and is working with OBO on a lease. Resolving these issues will ease significant strains within the mission and should be given the highest priority.

Customs and Shipping

Delays in the arrival of personal effects and privately owned vehicles have been a morale issue, and delays in official shipments have been a significant operational problem. The port of Lagos is notoriously difficult, with a troubled history of expensive, inefficient shipping and receiving services. The port has recently instituted a 100 percent inspection policy, so delays in unloading containers are likely to become more serious. In these circumstances, it is important to find appropriate

opportunities for the Ambassador and consul general to stress to Nigerian officials the importance the mission attaches to speedy port clearances and to ensure that mission personnel are aware of their efforts.

Consulate General Lagos posts a spreadsheet showing the status of all personal shipments, but employees continue to call the GSO about the status of their effects, and it remains a major morale issue. The consulate needs to get out more information to arriving staff about the port delays and mission efforts to facilitate shipments. The spreadsheets can be added to the consulate's web site for easier access. Senior embassy management should include port officials in calls and representation plans, and communicate those efforts to mission personnel.

Contracting and Procurement

Contracting and procurement have been steadily strengthened. The officers involved work very well together, particularly on the local guard contract and generator contract, which have the highest profile and are most critical to operations. The current local guard contract covers both Lagos and Abuja. This approach is periodically reviewed, but given the workload and stress in Embassy Abuja's over-worked administrative section, it seems appropriate for Consulate General Lagos to continue to oversee the contract. The GSO has tightened procedures and streamlined modifications to the contract so that guard positions can be changed or moved, and new positions established, on very short notice. The contract is being modified to require that the contractor pay employees in a regular and timely way.

GSO Abuja has procurement authority, but obligation of funds is handled only in Lagos and is awkward. An additional complication is the lack of space to store materials received. There have been misunderstandings about who was responsible for ordering material for Abuja, and the roles of the players involved. This has exacerbated strains in relations between the embassy and the consulate, and similar problems will continue until there is sustained strong supervision and coordination. An experienced WAE has provided assistance and guidance and has helped ease the strained relationships, but this is a short-term solution.

Financial Management

In a fraud-ridden culture such as Nigeria's, it is critical to have strong financial management officers. Lagos is fortunate in having a highly motivated and well-trained American officer, albeit on his first tour as a Foreign Service financial management specialist. That officer moved up from the junior position when the

previous incumbent curtailed. The junior position is now unoccupied. A capable EFM has taken over part of the duties of the junior position, which includes cashier supervision, in addition to handling her EFM position. In Abuja, there is no American financial management officer; the financial management staff consists of four FSNs, an accountant, two voucher examiners, and a cashier under the supervision of the administrative officer. The latter has no experience or training in financial management. The cashier is experienced, has taken the one-week cashier training course in Paris, and is in regular contact with the EFM cashier supervisor in Lagos. Filling the second position in the financial management office in Lagos would help provide more back-up service to Abuja.

The financial management officer in Lagos has good control of operations and is proactive in instituting positive changes. For example, he is exploring use of a "Smart Card" promoted by a U.S. bank in Nigeria, which would help minimize the extensive use of cash. Credit card use is strongly discouraged in Nigeria due to fraud. However, despite the financial management officer's apparent skills, significant dissatisfaction has been expressed about accounting support. A perception exists, unfounded in OIG's view, that funds are not well tracked. The fact that the perception exists points to a serious failure in communication.

A long-standing feud between Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos revolves around the use of approximately \$2.7 million dollars provided by the Department in FY 2000 for Abuja start-up costs, \$1.2 million in ICASS funding, and \$1.5 million in program funding. The program funds were not received until late in the fiscal year. Embassy Abuja has claimed that many of the orders were for items not needed in Abuja and clearly meant for Lagos. Further, the embassy claims that it never received much of what was theoretically ordered on its behalf. Officials at the consulate have countered that Embassy Abuja officials never, despite repeated requests, spelled out exactly what they wanted. Thus, Lagos ordered to the best of its ability within an abbreviated timeframe. The situation was complicated by weaknesses in property management controls, which have been strengthened over the past year. The mission appears to be finally moving on from this divisive issue.

The financial management officer now places a location code on all obligations for Embassy Abuja, making it easier to track them. It would be useful for that office to have the capability to determine whether a particular purchase order was received. Although the office gets the receiving documents along with invoices to be paid, it has no way of knowing whether something has been received, if payment has not yet been requested. This question arises particularly with regard to General Services Administration orders, which are frequently charged well after shipment.

The RSO in Lagos questioned the handling of almost \$160,000 meant for assistant RSO start-up costs that were provided by DS through AF program funding in FY 2000. Documents indicate that the funds were properly handled and accounted for; however, the RSO has not received many of the items. The consulate is working to resolve this issue. Much of the dispute that developed about these funds might have been forestalled if the financial management office had provided the RSO with regular accountings of that allotment. With regard to the whereabouts of the goods, it is unclear whether all the orders have yet been received and whether items received were properly marked for the assistant RSO. Greater coordination of information between the financial management office and the various sections of GSO, and improvements in property management at Consulate General Lagos should prevent such problems from recurring.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to develop a spreadsheet that tracks all purchase orders from request through obligation through receiving. The spreadsheet should be shared electronically between the general services and financial management offices. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with Consulate General Lagos)

Some agencies stated that it was difficult to reconcile accounting reports received from the financial management office with those generated by the agencies themselves. The official accounting reports are generated by the Regional Service Center in Paris, which does not provide any sorting capabilities to the user. This problem, as well as some of the perceptions discussed above, points to the need for the financial management office to provide easily understandable accounting reports for all accounts. Although this takes up scarce staff time, it is likely to be much less time consuming than trying to reconstruct account records several years after the fact. The office has just received authorization for an additional FSN position and is presently recruiting for it. The new employee will be able to undertake this kind of service.

Recommendation 25: Embassy Abuja should ensure that Consulate General Lagos provides clear, concise reports indicating allotment, obligation, and liquidation of funds information for other agencies and all special accounts on a quarterly basis, and more frequently during the fourth quarter. (Action: Embassy Abuja in coordination with Consulate General Lagos)

A review of Status of Obligations reports for the last few years indicates a need to pay more attention to ensuring, particularly in the program allotment, that all obligations are valid. The fact that all funds are obligated at the end of the year is not sufficient to ensure that funds will not be wasted. For example, an order placed in FY 2000 for \$473,000 of office furniture from OBO was still unliquidated and it was unclear whether the order was still pending. Obligations must be checked to ensure their continuing validity. An informal recommendation was left to that effect. Having receiving information directly available in the financial management office, as recommended above, would facilitate that task. The office also needs to encourage mission staff to file their travel vouchers in a more timely manner. This would contribute to the expedient review of end-of-year open obligations.

The mission needs to prioritize its funding needs. Most of the budget goes for mandatory and recurring items. Funding for discretionary expenditures such as new local-hire positions, travel, training, and supplies is limited. Therefore, there needs to be clear guidance regarding priorities as well as a mechanism for vetting funding requests. When funding requests are sent on an ad hoc basis, funding decisions are also made on an ad hoc basis. The financial management officer requested input from both Lagos and Abuja prior to preparing the FY 2002 budget with respect to their major priorities and included those in the budget request. However, the mechanism for actually allocating the discretionary part of the program and ICASS budgets is unclear. Unfortunately, this leads to continuing perceptions in Abuja that Abuja has no control over the budget and is not getting its fair share. Clearer lines of authority and better planning will improve this situation. Also, the mission should establish a procedure for vetting new requests that were not foreseen during the planning sessions.

Human Resources

The mission's human resources (HR) capability is severely strained. In Abuja, the HR office consists of one inexperienced FSN who transferred from a very junior position at Consulate General Lagos. Her supervisor is the administrative officer, a Civil Service employee on an excursion tour, who has no HR training. In Lagos, the HR officer is also on an excursion tour. An inexperienced HR officer needs to be backed up by an experienced and responsible FSN staff, especially in a difficult environment such as Lagos. However, just prior to the HR officer's arrival, the section's two most senior FSNs left consulate employment. This left the new HR officer with the task of hiring and training new FSNs and without the guidance of a knowledgeable staff. The HR staff strains to keep up with the workload imposed by Consulate General Lagos while simultaneously supporting Embassy Abuja.

vided ICASS training to administrative staff, OIG suggested that the mission's administrative officers continue to ensure that all administrative staff are familiar with service standards and understand the importance of providing high-level customer service.

Information Management

Information resource management (IRM) personnel are critical at this bifurcated mission. Communications between Abuja and Lagos are unreliable. Wireless communication is a positive development that is growing very quickly, but the system still relies on the failing copper infrastructure for links between cities. Reporting officers in Lagos, with no classified e-mail, complain that it is difficult to clear cables with their counterparts in Abuja. Administrative officers in Abuja need to be in frequent communication with their financial management, HR, and contracting capabilities in Lagos. IRM personnel also support residential telephone service. Most personnel in Lagos are on the security radio net.

Embassy Abuja has two American IRM employees (one transferred from Lagos) and two unclassified systems specialists. They are stretched thin, and FSNs work in deplorable conditions. Equipment, installed last year, is relatively new. The C-NTLAN installed in May 2001 includes three servers and seven clients. CableXpress provides desktop access to cable traffic and MS Exchange is used for classified e-mail. The unclassified network consists of 62 client personal computers, three servers, and 37 printers. The embassy runs all standard ALMA³ applications. Systems staff appreciates visits from Consulate General Lagos and should be cross-trained with Lagos personnel. Internet access for Embassy Abuja personnel is extremely limited.

The Consulate General Lagos information office is well staffed but stretched thin. The office is staffed by an experienced information management officer (IMO) and by an American information programs officer, information management specialist, and information systems officer (ISO). There is a systems staff of six, plus radio and telephone technical staff. The Classified Connectivity Program will enhance efficiency, but it will be difficult to make further staffing reductions in Lagos to enhance Abuja.

³ ALMA is A Logical Modernization Approach, the Department's project to install new servers and desktop computers for sensitive but unclassified processing at overseas missions.

The IMO and ISO have regional responsibility for Abuja. Both have visited the embassy and should continue to do so as these visits are important to the staff in Abuja. Like other administrative functions in the mission, IRM has been plagued with misunderstandings caused by unclear roles and relationships. With the turnover in Abuja in this assignment cycle, the IMO needs to be available to provide guidance and support to the new information programs officer. The IMO position should eventually be established in Abuja. AF and IRM should jointly consider rightsizing the IRM capabilities of the embassy and consulate.

Lagos relies on older Banyan C-LAN equipment for 15 clients to handle classified information and has no classified e-mail. The situation should greatly improve with the Classified Connectivity Program installation scheduled for April 2002. This provides CableXpress for desktop delivery of cables and classified e-mail.

The unclassified network in Lagos is impressive with NT 4.0, 160 client PCs, nine servers, and 54 printers, and the network runs all ALMA applications. The network will be upgraded as quickly as possible to include the maintenance facility. The ISO has regional responsibilities and has improved the relationship with Abuja. This will permit enhanced service at lower cost. Internet access is readily available to most personnel. Internet capability should be established at the warehouse, which has poor communications.

The consulate maintains a functional, attractive web site thought by the Bureau of Information Resource Management in Washington to be very good. It should become the core of a mission web site designed to enhance a sense of purpose and mission unity. The IMO should logically take the lead and manage the project at the opportune time, getting the input of all of the interested parties in that process.

The IMO Lagos is establishing user-training classes. In Abuja, IM training is one-on-one due to a lack of suitable training space.

Security

Embassy Abuja's security program is well managed and provides a physical security posture at the chancery that effectively mitigates the lack of structures designed to meet physical security standards. Embassy personnel are generally aware of risks to themselves and the mission and recognize the necessity for security procedures. Relations between the RSO and senior embassy management are good. The RSO reports directly to the DCM but has the full support of the Ambassador and DCM. For example, the RSO has been supported in instituting prudent security procedures, such as limiting one visitor at a time in the Compound Access Control

building during vetting. Although that procedure was inconvenient, the security policy was possible and effective because of the active backing provided by the Ambassador. The embassy has an active emergency action committee, which meets as required to discuss security threats and vulnerabilities.

Consulate General Lagos's security program is also well managed and provides a physical security posture at the consulate to prevent unauthorized access. Consulate personnel are generally aware of risks to themselves and the mission and recognize the necessity for security procedures. Relations between the senior RSO, stationed in Lagos, and senior mission management at both Abuja and Lagos, including the consul general in Lagos and the Ambassador in Abuja, are excellent. The RSO has their full support and reports directly to the consul general in Lagos and the DCM in Abuja. The Ambassador, to gain increased cooperation from the government of Nigeria for protection of the mission, has greatly supported the RSO. For example, following a November 2001 incident, the Ambassador directly intervened in Abuja with the Inspector General of Police, Federal Republic of Nigeria, to improve the protection of the mission's vehicles and personnel at vehicle checkpoints run by the Nigerian Police Force in Lagos. That level of cooperation with the Nigerian police was possible only with the active backing provided by the Ambassador.

A limited scope security inspection by OIG's Office of Security and Intelligence Oversight was performed concurrently with the OIG's management review of Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos. The security inspection was limited to a review of physical and procedural security, including perimeter security, access controls, and emergency preparedness. In addition, the limited inquiry included communications security. Other aspects of information security, as well as crime, residential, and personnel security were not evaluated. Senior officials of the mission were briefed on the findings and recommendations. The results of the security inspection are in a classified report published separately from this report.

Community Liaison Office

The Lagos CLO received very high marks from American personnel for her initiative and imagination in organizing a series of diverse outings and events, which were well attended by the staff. All activities are coordinated closely with the RSO. The CLO said that the public affairs section is very helpful in printing materials needed for programs and the 20 copies of the CLO weekly newsletter needed for external distribution. Internal distribution is electronic.

Mission management in Abuja, realizing the need for a CLO as the embassy began to grow, took the initiative to set up an office and completed the hiring process during the inspection. The action was a definite morale booster. There is an important role for the CLO to play in Abuja in organizing activities and events for mission personnel since the city, still in the developing stage, offers few outside attractions or venues for recreation. Also, for security reasons, embassy employees are limited to travel within the city limits. OIG suggested that the front office send the newly hired CLO to Lagos to consult with the consulate CLO. OIG also suggested that both offices exchange program calendars.

Medical

An American citizen, who is a certified practitioner assistant, runs the medical unit in Abuja. Because the embassy has no health unit, the practitioner works out of the British High Commission, which has a small facility but no technician. The practitioner has a fully equipped ambulance, supplied by the Department, but no staff and no office. His records and controlled drugs are kept in an embassy safe. The regional medical officer, who is based in Lagos, visits Abuja frequently. Mission personnel rated the Abuja health section very highly.

Because the Department does not approve of local medical facilities, Embassy Abuja has begun renovating leased quarters for a health unit. The location is ideal, next door to the practitioner's residence. Ninety percent of the needed equipment has arrived. One-fourth of the unit's estimated total cost of \$280,000 has already been provided; the remaining amount depends on a successful review, in late March, of the final FY 2002 ICASS submission. Construction of the health unit is the mission's main unfunded priority. The practitioner believes the new laboratory will be the best in Abuja.

The practitioner offers emergency, first-response training courses to American and British personnel. The practitioner continues to emphasize to mission personnel the importance of malaria prevention. There have been seventeen cases of malaria in the Abuja international community in the last three months. Four of the cases were embassy personnel.

Consulate General Lagos' medical unit is run by a regional medical officer who is also responsible for making quarterly visits to four other U.S. embassies in the region. During his absence from Lagos, a western-trained Nigerian doctor fills in. The Lagos unit has a direct-hire American medical technologist, an American-trained FSN nurse, a part-time nurse trained in England, and two FSN office

Commissary and Recreation Associations

The commissary and recreation association in Lagos operates commissary, food service, and temporary lodging facilities that are central to effective mission operations but require tight oversight. The association in Abuja currently operates only a school bus service, but the embassy has already grown to a point where it could support other services, which would provide a needed boost for morale. There is a demand for ordering services, and the GSO is currently looking at possible locations. Lagos, in coordination with the Office of Commissary and Recreation Associations, should support these expanding services.

Recommendation 28: The Office of Commissary and Recreation Staff should schedule a visit to Lagos, with meetings to include the administrative counselor from Abuja. (Action: A/OPR/CR)

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

Chronic staffing problems adversely affect the mission's ability to institute and sustain management controls. There is not a critical mass of American officers to ensure that controls are in place and functioning properly and to ensure adequate supervision of FSNs. Many of the mission's operations are managed by junior officers or other American employees who lack the necessary training and experience. This would be a challenge anywhere; however, in Nigeria's environment of pervasive fraud and corruption, it represents a real vulnerability for the mission. Still, progress is being made. Consulate General Lagos has worked to correct many management control weaknesses, mostly in GSO, that were noted in OIG's 1997 inspection report. As described below, the Lagos consular section took some corrective actions during the course of the inspection. The majority of the problems are now at Embassy Abuja, especially in the area of property management. Embassy Abuja has started to address some of these problems. It recently issued internal procedures and a designation of responsibilities memo. With OBO approval, the embassy leased a warehouse in Abuja. However, much remains to be done.

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

Embassy Abuja property records are disorganized and incomplete, and inventories are out of date. Abuja has requested an extension for submitting the annual property management report, which will be its first submission. The acting administrative counselor is designing a system of property controls, particularly separating the ordering, receiving, and stock control functions. He is constrained by a lack of appropriate, trained personnel, because there are not enough trained FSNs to assign to each discrete function. The acting administrative counselor is also finalizing a list of designations and responsibilities appropriately separating these functions among American officers. The new administrative counselor should build on the work done on designing a property control system and relieve the responsible FSN of other duties.

One FSN handles receiving and management of nonexpendable property; he is also responsible for supporting visits and preparing residences for occupancy. He just received property management and NEPA training in Washington. He worked

with the warehouse in Lagos to install NEPA software and download existing NEPA records of stocks held in Abuja. Embassy Abuja had problems with NEPA from the outset and experienced serious system crashes. The inventories that were recovered after the crashes were incomplete and badly out of date. The embassy has resumed using and updating the system and is also putting bar codes on furniture and equipment. They have no bar code reader, and the manual process is tedious and extremely time consuming.

Developing a base inventory is complicated by the unplanned, ad hoc manner in which furniture, equipment, and vehicles were procured for Abuja and/or moved there from Lagos. Tracking procurements has been confused enough to spark serious recriminations between Abuja and Lagos management. Acrimonious exchanges have worsened relationships between the embassy and the consulate without improving controls.

Recommendation 29: Embassy Abuja should request and Consulate General Lagos should provide the support needed by the embassy to develop a property management system, establish baseline inventories, set up the nonexpendable property application, and prepare the annual property management report for Abuja. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with Consulate General Lagos)

Handling expendable supplies is extremely difficult because of space constraints. Procedures for receiving, stocking, inventory, and issuance are good, but are all handled by the same FSN. The FSN manager, trained in Lagos, is comfortable with stock control software, produces timely usage and ICASS reports, and is justifiably proud of his meticulously kept supplies and effective access controls. His job continues to expand with the burgeoning growth of the embassy. The situation is similar with regard to controls on fuel supplies, with a dedicated, experienced FSN working as much as 50 hours of overtime per pay period.

The GSO in Abuja has procurement authority, but obligation of funds, which is handled only in Lagos, is awkward, and there will be nowhere to store materials received until the new warehouse is set up later this spring. This results in very large numbers of emergency procurements.

Property disposal procedures are being strengthened and a separate property disposal officer designated. In the past, Consulate General Lagos had used a sealed bid system that gave rise to concerns about fairness. The new facilities maintenance specialist in Lagos has instituted scheduled, open auctions that are more

The petty cash system has been improperly used. Petty cash disbursements are normally limited to \$500. Up to \$3,000 may be granted for emergencies against a certified voucher and over \$3,000 with approval from Washington. Abuja has stayed under the \$500 limitation by requesting separate petty cash advances to the same person on the same day. For example, a sum equivalent to \$5,326 was advanced to one person on a single day in the form of sixteen different interim advances. Furthermore, they were advanced to someone who had not yet cleared interim receipts amounting to \$2,267 from the prior week. Interim payments have also been used to provide travel advances, which is in violation of the regulations.

All of these advances have been approved by administrative staff, who argue that Embassy Abuja has not been able to place any orders for expendable supplies from the Lagos warehouse inventory and that local vendors demand cash at the time of purchase. With the leasing of a warehouse, an order for expendable supplies from the United States has been placed, which should help mitigate the need for local purchases. If petty cash purchases in excess of \$500 must be made in response to an emergency, they need to be made against a certified voucher. Several American officers in Abuja possess certifying authority.

Recommendation 31: In accordance with 4 FAH-3 394.2, Embassy Abuja should exercise tighter controls to ensure that the \$500 limit on petty cash expenditures is not routinely exceeded or circumvented. Interim advances must be canceled by the end of the day after they are received, and they must not be used for travel advances except in an emergency. If used for travel advances, they must be replaced by an official travel advance with a fund site within 24 hours. The embassy should establish a schedule of quarterly orders for expendable supplies. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

TRAVEL

The mission has been somewhat lax in ensuring that travel vouchers are turned in on time and that travel advances are promptly repaid, particularly with regard to travel by FSNs. Travel advances have been given when advances are still outstanding, in violation of regulations. OIG made an informal recommendation on this.

CONSULAR OPERATIONS

Management controls in the consular section have deteriorated since the last OIG inspection. This was not due to misfeasance or malfeasance, but to staffing shortages and the filling of supervisory positions with inexperienced officers. The last inventory on record was from 1997. During the inspection, the consular section conducted inventories of all controlled consular supplies, seals, and equipment. The new inventories will serve as a baseline for future periodic checks of controlled supplies and written transfers of accountability.

OIG consulted with the accountable consular officer and individual consular officers to explain the purpose and necessity of tight management controls in a high fraud environment such as Lagos. Consular officers changed procedures to restrict access to consular computer systems and controlled materials, tightened the handling of consular fee collections, and began securing visaed passports and name sensitive files overnight. All officers willingly took action to institute procedures in accordance with the Consular Management Handbook when shortcomings were outlined. OIG left a list of informal recommendations to emphasize specific points, including the need for a strict review of consular management controls before the consul general submits the annual certification of management controls statement.

In October 2001, the Lagos consular chief drafted a new visa referral policy memorandum, which was approved by management in February 2002. A review of the visa referral procedures indicated that there are unresolved problems in the program at Abuja. The Lagos consular section is so short-staffed that it has not been able to conduct any verification studies to determine whether referred visa cases return to Nigeria in accordance with the law. Now that the embassy consular section is fully staffed, such verifications can and should be initiated at Abuja.

Because Embassy Abuja is not authorized to issue visas, all of its visa referrals must go to Lagos for processing. Passports are transferred via various travelers or via pouch. So far there has not been any problem with lost passports. OIG found several vulnerabilities in the Embassy Abuja referral program, however, which must be corrected. For example, some mission officers were sending referrals directly to Lagos and not through the Abuja consular section for recording and screening. This and other vulnerabilities in referral procedures were pointed out to the post and to

the consular section chief in Lagos. OIG suggested that the Ambassador issue a mission-wide administrative notice about these vulnerabilities and amend the above-mentioned referral policy. A review of the Abuja referral files uncovered a number of suspect applications. These cases, and how to deal with them, were discussed with the consular officer. OIG recommended that such cases be used to form the basis for preparing a written standard operating procedure for processing referrals for diplomatic NIVs.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Abuja should ensure that Consulate General Lagos clearly and accurately documents its workload and staffing needs so that the Department of State either fills all of the authorized direct-hire American consular positions in Lagos or arranges for relief of staffing gaps through the assignment of experienced temporary duty or when-actually-employed consular officers. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with M/DGHR, CA, and AF)

Recommendation 9: Embassy Abuja should analyze the future needs of the consular function in Nigeria and propose to the Department of State the establishment and realignment of consular positions to ensure that consular managerial issues are sufficiently addressed at the embassy and the consulate. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with CA, AF, and M/DGHR)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to prepare and transmit to the Bureau of Consular Affairs a detailed plan with a funding request to establish a correspondence unit for the Lagos consular section. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 11: Embassy Abuja should request that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations send a team of experts to Lagos to perform a space utilization survey and produce a plan for reconfiguring and renovating the consular section. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with OBO)

Recommendation 12: The Department should authorize the embassy to issue diplomatic and international organization nonimmigrant visas once the warden system is in place for the embassy's entire consular district and necessary training of the consular officer is completed. (Action: CA)

Recommendation 13: Embassy Abuja should direct Consulate General Lagos to move the collection of machine-readable visa application fees from the consular sub-B cashier to another source. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with Consulate General Lagos)

Recommendation 14: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureaus of African Affairs and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should organize a meeting of the Ambassador and heads of all law enforcement agencies, including Bureau of African Affairs and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs representatives, if possible, to discuss U.S. government objectives for law enforcement in Nigeria. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with AF and INL)

Recommendation 15: The Department should exhaust all avenues, including direct assignment, contractors, or long-term, when-actually-employed personnel to ensure that qualified, experienced staff are placed in midlevel positions in Abuja and Lagos. (Action: M/DGHR in coordination with AF and CA)

Recommendation 16: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should develop and implement a plan to rationalize program and staffing growth to be commensurate with the embassy's ability to provide administrative and other support services. In the meantime, mission management should consider a moratorium on new program activities and positions. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 17: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should organize an administrative management planning session in Abuja to produce a firm transition plan. The plan should include projected staffing levels of Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos, plus clear timelines for a transition, including the size of the new embassy compound, interim office facilities, and housing necessary for arriving personnel in Abuja. The planning session should include mission administrative officers. (Action: AF/EX, in coordination with OBO, DS, and Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 18: Embassy Abuja should immediately prepare an area for a cafeteria. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 19: Embassy Abuja should immediately review the work on the executive suite described in the March 2000 architectural plan, modify it if necessary, and promptly authorize completion of the work. (Action: Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos)

Recommendation 20: Embassy Abuja should immediately define and regularize roles and responsibilities of senior mission officers, including reporting relationships. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 21: Embassy Abuja should immediately revitalize the mission administrative section under the administrative counselor. Parts of the administrative section still in Lagos, including financial management, human resources, information management, and elements of general services, should report to the administrative counselor in Abuja and be moved to Abuja as soon as possible. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 29: Embassy Abuja should request and Consulate General Lagos should provide the support needed by the embassy to develop a property management system, establish baseline inventories, set up the nonexpendable property application, and prepare the annual property management report for Abuja. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with Consulate General Lagos)

Recommendation 30: Embassy Abuja should establish an eligible family member or exception rate position for a cashier supervisor in Abuja. The person hired should be sent to the one-week cashier supervisor course in Paris. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 31: In accordance with 4 FAH-3 394.2, Embassy Abuja should exercise tighter controls to ensure that the \$500 limit on petty cash expenditures is not routinely exceeded or circumvented. Interim advances must be cancelled by the end of the day after they are received, and they must not be used for travel advances except in an emergency. If used for travel advances, they must be replaced by an official travel advance with a fund site within 24 hours. The embassy should establish a schedule of quarterly orders for expendable supplies. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Office	Name	Arrival Date
Embassy Abuja:		
Ambassador	Howard F. Jeter	02/24/01
Deputy Chief of Mission	Timothy D. Andrews	07/22/00
Chiefs of Section:		
Political (IROG)	Brian L. Browne	09/26/01
Political/Military Officer	Dean M. Kaplan	08/07/00
Administrative Counselor		TDY
Administrative Officer	Monica Sangbong	09/14/01
Consular Officer	Jason W. Miller	01/02/02
Regional Affairs Officer	Michael R. Pastirik	07/02/01
Public Affairs Officer	Donald M. Bishop	03/23/01
Other Agencies:		
Agency for Int'l. Development	Thomas D. Hobgood	07/13/99
Center for Disease Control	Cardiff W. Duncan	02/21/01
Department of Defense:		
Defense Attaché	Col. Victor L. Nelson	04/27/99
Consulate General Lagos:		
Consul General	Robyn E. Hinson-Jones	08/09/01
Chiefs of Sections:		
Political/Economics Officer	Lawrence Cohen	09/12/00
Int'l. Narcotics Law Enforc.	Mark B. Taylor	01/21/01
Regional Affairs Officer	Alan L. Patterson	08/11/99

Consular Officer	Ronald S. Robinson	10/07/00
Administrative Officer	Gustavo A. Mejia	08/25/00
Regional Security Officer	Gary Gibson	10/05/00
Public Affairs	Stephanie A. Wickes (APAO)	12/15/00
Other Agencies:		
Foreign Agricultural Service	David Rosenbloom	08/13/99
Foreign Commercial Service	Miguel Pardo-de-Zela	09/21/99
Department of Defense:		
Operations Coordinator	Raymond Moore	10/11/01
U.S. Secret Service	Robert Stano	10/20/01
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Michael Bonner	04/11/01
Drug Enforcement Administration	Andre W. Kellum	01/28/01

ABBREVIATIONS

AISA	American International School of Abuja
ACS	American citizens services
AF	Bureau of African Affairs
BHC	British High Commission
CA	Bureau of Consular Affairs
CLO	Community liaison office
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Defense	Department of Defense
Department	Department of State
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DV	Diversity visa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDDI	Education for Democracy and Development Initiative
EFM	Eligible family member
FPM	Fraud prevention manager
FPU	Fraud prevention unit
FSN	Foreign Service national
GSO	General services office(r)
HR	Human resources
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRC	Information Resource Center
IRM	Information resource management
IRO	Information resource officer
ISO	Information systems officer
IV	Immigrant visa
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MPP	Mission Performance Plan
MRV	Machine-readable visa
NEC	New embassy compound
NEPA	Nonexpendable property application
NDLEA	National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency
NIV	Nonimmigrant visa
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OFR	Operation Focus Relief
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PAO	Public affairs officer
POSHO	Post safety and health officer
RNLEO	Regional narcotics and law enforcement officer
RSO	Regional security officer
TDY	Temporary duty
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WAE	When actually employed