by Chris Lundry

As reported yesterday by some Indonesian media outlets, a new group calling itself Tandzim  al-Qo’idah Indonesia has released an ”official” statement taking responsibility for the Jakarta bombings of 17 July. There are some interesting elements in the statement, although whether it is genuine remains in question.

If true, the statement represents not only an admission of responsibility for the bombings but it also announces a new extremist group in Indonesia.  If real, it is likely a splinter group of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The name “al-Qo’idah” also bears obvious phonetic similarity to “al-Qaeda.”  

A developing schism in JI concerns the use of violence, and specifically the targeting of civilians, including Indonesians. In an Asian Times report published 25 July, Nelson Rand detailed some information about these splits, and names Noordin Top’s splinter group, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, a name similar to the one on the statement. The statement on the web site is signed by Noordin (here Nur Din) Top, who has been suggested as the likely engineer of the Jakarta bombs.

In fiery language sprinkled with the appropriate Koranic quotes (in both Arabic and Indonesian), the statement names the United States and its “running dogs” as the targets of the attacks.  No Americans were killed, but six westerners did die in the blasts, and three Indonesians including the two suicide bombers. The statement also specifically names the Manchester United Football Club’s upcoming visit as a rationale for the bombing, claiming that the team is made up of “crusaders” and that it is wrong for Muslims to be fans of the team. Beside the anti-Western rhetoric, however, there are also statements about the economic exploitation of the West, appeals to the global community of Muslims, and a call to restore the Rosyidah Caliphate. Intriguingly, the letter ends by naming the suicide bombers as members of military companies (sariyah) named for Azhari and Jabir, two JI militants killed in police raids in 2005 and 2006, respectively, implying that the group has significant numbers.

The statement has generated tremendous buzz. At the time of writing, it had prompted over 700 comments and over 17,000 views in just over 24 hours (and remarkably–even stupidly–38 people had signed on as “friends”). The comments range from support of the bombings to condemnation, and seemingly every position in between (for example, terror as a tactic is OK, but not in Indonesia). Some call for Bashir’s execution. Some are suspicious of the site, and state that it might be a State Intelligence Department ploy. Others make accusations against other commenters, claiming that some might be spies for foreign interests.  Of course, one or more of these claims may be true.

As for the veracity of this statement, it is difficult to imagine this purported new group making such a bold public statement in its first communique.  On the other hand it seems more unlikely that someone with no ties to or sympathy with the group would fabricate it, inviting scrutiny by Indonesian intelligence.  Given the amount of buzz the post has generated, we can be sure they will be working overtime to get to the bottom of it.

All things considered, I suspect we haven’t heard the last from Tandzim al-Qo’idah Indonesia.

Update: 7-29, 20:10 MST.

Below is my translation of the statement.

Al Qo-idah Indonesia organization’s official explanation for the martyrdom jihad operation at the JW Marriot (sic) Hotel, Jakarta:

 

This is an official explanation from Al Qo’idah Indonesia for the ummat about the martyrdom jihad operation at the JW Marriot (sic) Hotel Jakarta, Friday morning, July 17, 2009 (M./24 Rojab 1430 H) by one of the mujahidin brothers against the American interests at that hotel. Truly there has been a perfect action of martyrdom with the favor of Allah and his blessings after doing a serious survey and the in depth spying against the kaffirs beforehand.

 

And the true commands of Allah:

(Arabic)

Then (the true one) is not you who kills them, but it will be Allah that kills them, and it is not you who throw stones when you throw stones, but Allah who throws stones.  (Allah does such as this to destroy them) and to give the victory to the faithful, with a victory that is good. Truly great Allah hears again and understands.” (QS Al Anfal : 17).

 

This also is consistent with the commands of exulted Allah:

(Arabic)

“Fight them, surely Allah will destroy them with (between) your hands and Allah will humiliate them and help you face them, to ease the hearts of those who have faith.” (QS Attaubah : 14).

 

So that the ummat indeed knows America, especially those who gather in that meeting, they are the leaders of business and intelligence in the economy of America. And they have great importance in the hoarding of the wealth of the Indonesian nation and the wages of the kaffir army (America) that attack Islam and Muslims. And we will tell the great news to those of Islam’s ummat, through Allah most high through the release of samples of film from these martyrs, Allah willing.

 

And we give the name of this martyrdom operation: “Military Company Dr. Azhari.”

 

We are giving good faith to Allah so that Allah will help us and help Muslims in the near future.

 

Amir Tandzim Al Qo’idah Indonesia

 

Abu Muawwidz Nur Din bin Muhammad Top Hafidzohullah

 

Al Qo-idah Indonesia organization’s official explanation for the martyrdom jihad operation at the Rizt Calrton (sic) Hotel, Jakarta:

 

This is an official explanation from Al Qo’idah Indonesia for the ummat about the martyrdom jihad operation at the Hotel Rizt Calrton (sic) Jakarta, Friday morning, July 17, 2009 (M./24 Rojab 1430 H) that was done by one of the mujahidin brothers against the running dogs of America that gathered at the hotel. Truly Allah has bestowed his blessings to us to attack the most arrogant hotel that is owned by America in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, namely the Rizt Calrton (sic). Where the control and security there that was truly very tight to attack like this as we did this time.

 

(Arabic)

“They make a strategy and even Allah makes a strategy. And Allah is the great maker of strategy.” (QS Ali Imron: 54)

 

The attack that we desired from the organization that is:

1. As an eye for an eye (revenge that is fair) for the deeds of America and its running dogs against our brothers those Muslims and Mujahadin through the corners of the world.
2. To destroy their strength in this nation, where they are the thieves and robbers of the valuable things of those Muslims in this nation.
3. Cast them out of Muslim nations, especially from the nation of Indonesia.
4. To be a lesson to the Ummat Islam that there will be divine truth in Wala’ (loyalty) and Baro’ (enmity), especially regarding the coming of the football Club Mancester (sic) United to this hotel. These players are crusaders. And further it is not appropriate that this ummat gives loyalty and respect to these enemies of Allah.
5. These martyrs as coolers and medicine for the hearts for those Muslims who are oppressed and abused through the corners of the world.

 

Finally, Truly these jihadi groups will be the spirited promoters of this ummat and to give life to the obligation of jihad that is one path to enforce the Rosyidah Caliphate that once was, God Willing.

 

And we give the name to the jihad operation: “Military Company Jabir.”

 

Amir Tandzim Al Qo’idah Indonesia

 

Abu Muawwidz Nur Din bin Muhammad Top Hafidzohullah

by Mark Woodward

On 17 July 17 2009, Indonesia and the world were shocked by another round of terrorist attacks. Two powerful bombs exploded in the J.W. Marriott and Ritz- Carlton hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia. Another was found and defused in a hotel room the bombers had rented. I am currently visiting Indonesia and have observed initial reactions by ordinary Indonesians as well as by various religious/political organizations.  Two different kinds of responses by the organizations are telling.

Since 2003 the Indonesian police and security forces have captured or killed numerous terrorist leaders and operatives, particularly those associated with the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) organization. Three men convicted of planning and carrying out the 2002 Bali Bombings were executed on 8 November 2008. The executions were covered extensively by the Indonesian press and television news. Islamist groups protested the executions and declared that the bombers died as martyrs. Mainstream Muslim organizations rejected this claim, but many feared that the executions would lead to revenge attacks and reinvigorate violent extremist organizations. 

Revenge attacks did not immediately materialize. This led many to believe that the threat of further violence had dissipated. Others were less optimistic and suggested that JI could not be silenced so easily.  They said members would bide their time and strike again when and where they chose. It is possible that the pessimists were correct.

Indonesian and foreign terrorism experts immediately suspected JI and especially Malaysian Noordin Top, one the few known JI leaders who remains at large. The facts that these were suicide attacks and that the explosives were nearly identical to those in the Bali bombings lends support to this position.

The Marriott Hotel was the target of a previous JI attack on 5 August 2003.  It is an obvious choice of targets, as is the Ritz-Carlton. These are very high profile American hotels frequented by foreign diplomats and business executives. The US embassy often uses them for meetings and public events.

How bombs or bomb making materials could have been smuggled into these hotels is unclear because they normally have very tight security. All vehicles are inspected before they can approach the entrance. Guests and visitors must pass through metal detectors and bags are checked for explosives residue. This suggests that the bombings may have benefitted from inside collaboration, like the attacks in Mumbai, India last year. It is also not clear why high profile people continue to stay in such obvious targets. There are numerous other five star hotels in Jakarta that are not “symbols of the US.”

There has been considerable speculation in the press and among people I have spoken with over the past three days about exactly what the motive for the attacks might be. Some see it simply as a part of the ongoing jihad waged by people referred to as “excessive fanatics,” “followers of Sayid Qtub” (i.e. like al Qaeda and JI) or of the Indonesian Islamist Abu Bakr Basyir, who has been implicated in previous attacks. Others described it as an attempt to discredit recently re-elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), or to “destroy” the economy, particularly the important tourist industry. Still others saw it as attempt to keep the enormously popular Manchester United football (soccer) club from playing a match in Jakarta (the team was scheduled to stay in the Marriott, but the match was cancelled). Many expressed concern that the attacks would promote negative images of both Indonesia and Islam. None of the people I spoke with expressed any support for the bombings.

Muslim organizations have reacted in ways that reflect their more general religious and political orientations. These range from the strongest possible Islamic condemnations of the attacks by mainstream organizations to strategically ambiguous statements by Islamist groups.

Mainstream Organization Responses

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a religiously conservative but politically progressive organization, and Muhammadiyah, a modernist movement with religiously fundamentalist leanings, are Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations. Both have played leading roles in the democratic transition of the past decade and resolutely oppose violence. Despite very considerable religious differences, the two organizations are united in their concern about the spread of radical Islamism in Indonesia. In a joint statement that aired on Indonesian TV One the two organizations declared that the attacks were “evil” and that terrorism is incompatible with Islamic and other religious values but that counter-terrorist efforts by security forces are in keeping with religious values. They also urged the public not to pay attention to conspiracy theories.

In a separate statement, NU’s leader Hasyim Muzadi explained that, “terrorism is not religion, so it is not the case that the Muslim community can be held responsible for these acts.” This statement requires some unpacking. Muzadi does not deny that the people responsible for the bombings claim to be Muslims. He is stating that those who commit such acts are not included in the community of people who submit to God’s will, which is the theological meaning of the phrase “Muslim Community.”

This is the strongest possible criticism of the bombers, because it suggests that they are not Muslims, but rather hypocrites (munafiq) who merely claim to be Muslims. Almost all schools of Muslim thought teach that munafiq will burn in the fires of hell. Rhoma Irama, a Muslim “pop star” closely associated with NU, made a similar statement: “Terrorism is not a religious problem. It is a political problem. So it is wrong to mix religion and politics.” He was also strongly critical of the view that the suicide bombers died as martyrs, which is likely to emerge among some radical Islamist groups.

Agus Handoko, one of the leaders of the NU community in Pakistan, which consists primarily of university students, described the attacks as “inhuman” and called on the Indonesian government to bring those responsible to justice. He stated that doing so is in keeping with the core NU values of moderation, tolerance, harmony and justice. He added that pursuing terrorists can be understood in terms of the Quranic legal principle of “Commanding the Good and Forbidding the Evil.”

Din Syamsuddin of Muhammadiyah spoke in similar terms. He called on the government to apprehend not only those directly involved but also the “intellectual actors” behind them. This reflects the widely held view in Indonesia that those who carry out these acts are figures of minor importance and that the Islamist ideologues who preach intolerance and hatred of those who do not share their religious views are ultimately responsible. He denied that there is a connection between Islam and terror, and stated that such acts “only sicken the Muslim Community.” He stated that Muhammadiyah opposes all forms of terror and that neither religion nor politics justifies such acts, concluding that “terror is terror and evil is evil.”

Islamist Organization Responses

The responses of Indonesian Islamist organizations were strikingly different. All but Jihadi web sites avoided using the word “terror.” There were no press reports or statements supporting or even justifying the bombings. Several Islamist organizations did, however, suggest that unnamed sinister elements were involved. Most avoided making religiously based condemnations of the bombings.

The most significant of these organizations is Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, the Justice and Prosperity Party), which was the subject of an earlier post in this blog. PKS can be best understood as the Indonesian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its organizational base is located in the urban middle class, especially students in engineering and other technical fields at secular universities. P

KS publicly portrays itself as being tolerant, clean (non-corrupt), caring and professional. It is exceptionally well funded and receives considerable financial assistance from wealthy foundations and individuals in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East. As a political party it has not been particularly successful, despite massive media campaigns it has sponsored.

PKS is also a social movement. It attempts to infiltrate and take over mosques, schools, clinics and other social service agencies run by other Muslim organizations, especially NU and Muhammadiyah. Its cadre structure now reaches into middle schools. Cadres are subjected to intense indoctrination during which they are taught to hate other religions and that “their Islam is the true Islam and that other Muslims are non-believers.”

PKS leaders were circumspect in their comments on the bombings. An official statement strongly condemned them and stated that they would have a negative impact on Indonesia’s image abroad and on investors. PKS president Tifatul Sembiring condemned the bombings but did not mention the possible involvement of Islamist groups except in indirect terms.  He suggested–again indirectly–that there might be other culprits. He urged that people refrain implicating “certain individuals or groups” until an investigation was completed.

Other PKS communication echoed this theme. This article on the PKS web page is entitled “Don’t Play Around with Blame for the Bomb.” Soepripto, another PKS leader, urged that the bombings be viewed from a “comprehensive perspective.” PKS parliamentary leader Muhfudz Siddiq stated that the purpose of the bombing was to undermine the credibility of the recent presidential election and that the case had to be resolved before the inauguration scheduled for October. If not, the people’s belief in the government would be shaken.

None of these statements has any religious content. This might be considered strange coming from an explicitly Islamic organization, but it can be understood in the context of PKS’s attempts to discredit or coopt SBY. Despite polling less than eight percent in the May parliamentary elections, PKS demanded that it receive the Ministries of Religion and Education from SBY in return for continuing to support his government. This would have given them the ability to implement the Islamist agenda that the voters had overwhelmingly rejected. It would also have enormously reduced the influence of Muhammadiyah, which generally controls the Ministry of Education,  and of NU, which generally controls the Ministry of Religion. SBY was not interested, nor were the other presidential candidates. The probable result is that PKS will not be represented in the next governing coalition in a significant way. It would appear that PKS is attempting to use the bombings to destabilize the newly elected secularist government while placating some of its more extremist supporters by failing to mention the probability of involvement by Islamist groups.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Jerusalem in 1953. Its primary goal is the re-establishment of the caliphate which it sees as the only solution to all of the problems facing the Muslim world. It does not advocate violence but is virulently anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and anti-Western. It is also opposed to the governments of all Muslim countries. The party operates openly in Europe, North America and Australia but is outlawed almost everywhere in the Muslim world except Indonesia. Like PKS its primary support comes from students in secular universities. It rejects democracy as un-Islamic and does not participate in elections.

Most Indonesian Islamists consider Hizb ut-Tahrir to be utopian and naive. Party spokesmen denounced the Jakarta bombings stating that Islam does not allow the destruction of private property or public facilities and killing people except for just cause. They also stated that people seeking to destroy the security of the country and society and to discredit Islam carried out the bombings. They warned authorities against holding Islamic groups responsible.  Hasyim Muzadi’s statement that the Muslim community is not responsible for these acts of terrorism could be easily associated with suggestions by radical Islamists that “certain groups” were actually responsible. To differentiate between the two it is necessary for analysts to understand not only Islam, but local, culturally specific modes of discourse. Given the cultural diversity of the Muslim World, this is not an easy task.

Forum Ummat Islam (FUI, the Islamic Community Forum) is one of the most extreme Islamist groups operating legally Indonesia. It frequently references ”conspiracies of Crusaders and Jews” and publicly preaches the message of hate that PKS mentions only in private. FUI General Secretary Muhammad al-Khaththath condemned the bombings but stated that the Indonesian Muslim community could not have been involved because it lacks the financial resources to build the bombs or rent the hotel rooms used by the bombers. He suggested that the attacks were carried out by the intelligence organizations of “certain countries.” In Indonesian Islamist rhetoric the phrase “certain countries” almost always refers to some combination of the US, Israel and Australia. The absurdity of these claims is obvious to almost all Indonesians.

Even Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) denounced the bombings and stated that some young people might “follow the bombers like sheep,” which could lead to civil war. FPI is a radical Islamist group that has often engaged in acts of domestic terrorism which they refer to as “sweepings.” These target hotels, nightclubs, bars and religious organizations that hold views they do not agree with and that are frequented by foreigners.

Implications

Three implications can be drawn from the Jakarta bombings and the discourse surrounding them. Two are obvious, and the third is more complex.

1. If JI proves to have been responsible for the attacks, Indonesia’s anti-terrorist efforts have not been as successful as some observers have assumed. There are at least three reasons for this. One is that JI and other terrorist organizations strike when and where they are able. Their agenda is long-term. Many fully expect that it will take generations to achieve results. Another is that they have hidden resources, people who have a commitment to a violent agenda who have escaped the attention of authorities and who for the time being live peacefully and wait until the “time is right.” And a third is that organizations that are not involved in violent action promulgate teachings of hatred and bigotry that contribute to and are used to justify violence. There is little that law enforcement can do to stop the social reproduction of this ideology. That can only be accomplished by progressive, mainstream Muslim organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah.
2. It does not make sense to place oneself at risk by staying at or conducting business in buildings that are high profile, symbolic targets. The sad fact is that sooner or later they are probably going to be hit. I am often in Jakarta and would not dream of staying at one of these hotels (even if I could afford it). My Indonesian friends think I’m being smart. In this case, they are right.
3. The more complex conclusion is that it is not whether but how groups criticize attacks like these that is important. It is, after all, highly unlikely that anyone would publicly support them. The differences between the strategic communication of mainstream Muslim organizations including NU and Muhammadiyah and those of (perfectly legal) Islamist groups such as PKS, Hizbut Tahrir, FUI and FPI are striking. Muhammadiyah and NU have taken very strong religious positions against these attacks and against terrorism in general, to the point of implying that the people involved will burn in hell. Criticisms by Islamist groups, on the other hand, are not nearly so strong. They often use the concept of an “objective” investigation to deflect attention from the almost certain involvement of groups that consider themselves to be fighting the long jihad. The distinctions between these two kinds of critique are subtle and depend on cultural context, but they are nonetheless crucial to draw.

UPDATE  7/24/09 6:30 MST

Indonesian authorities recently announced that a man known only as “Ibrahim” (many Indonesians have only one name), who worked as a florist in a basement room of the Ritz Carlton, is suspected to have been an accompice in planning and carrying out the bombings. He vanished shortly before the blasts and has not been seen since. An increasing body of evidence points to the conclusion that Noordin Top and JI associates with links to Malaysia and Singapore were involved. If correct, this indicates that years of seemingly sucessful counter-terrorism efforts have not diminished the ability of the trans-national JI network to plan and carry out increasingly complex attacks. The network is clearly more resiliant and sustainable than many analysts believed.  In statements in print editions of the Jawa Pos and The Jakarta Post, PKS continues to urge Indonesian authorities to be cautious and warning against blaming a “certain religious group” without sufficient proof.

by Chris Lundry

Before last week’s bombings, Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, completed a presidential election.  Similar to the 2004 election (which I monitored with the Carter Center), there was the requisite hand wringing in the Western media about the influence of Islamist parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). Some of it focused on the supposed emergence of the headscarf (jilbab in Indonesian, hijab in Arabic) as a political symbol.

Attempts by the Western media to explain the complicated nature of Indonesian politics usually fell short, and the headscarf “controversy” is no exception. Writing in the New York Times, Norimitsu Oshimi (”Head Scarf Emerges as Indonesia Political Symbol”) doesn’t just overstate the importance of the headscarf  as a political symbol. He also incorrectly asserts that the increase in wearing of jilbab began three years ago, and ignores the party affiliations that were a factor in the candidates’ decisions to emphasize their wives’ choices. He fails to inform us of recent backlashes against wearing jilbab, for example among Muslim and non-Muslim schoolgirls now required to wear the jilbab in some areas.

Although he correctly points out that Indonesian women wear jilbab for many reasons, Onishi seemed caught up in the electoral politics of the moment. Jilbab were once rare in Indonesia, but in the 1980s they became increasingly fashionable in Indonesia (and Malaysia) for a plethora of reasons, and even more so following the abdication of Suharto in 1998. Onishi isn’t the first to read more into the wearing of jilbab; Christopher Hitchens wrote of the implied subversion of a young Indonesian girl not wearing one (as well as smiling) in a January 2004 Vanity Fair article (the article is no longer available, but my response in Indonesia Alert is still up).

Onishi’s sigh of relief came just six days later, after the election:

For the United States, which is seeking to re-engage with the Muslim world, Indonesia increasingly presents tantalizing possibilities: a democracy that is the world’s most populous Muslim nation, where more people are continuing to turn to Islam in their private lives even as they reject political Islam in favor of secular democracy.

Perhaps most remarkably absent from the jilbab story is the fact that the Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto ticket, which used ads of the candidates’ wives in jilbab, was supported by secularist parties. Appealing to the Islamic vote was simply an attempt to broaden the pair’s support base. Despite their secular leanings, the SBY-Boediono ticket was supported by the leading Islamic parties, including PAN and PKS. (PKS also played the base-broadening game in the parliamentary elections by featuring ads of women without jilbab.) It is this fact that leads to speculation as to how much influence these small parties will have over SBY when he continues into his second term; the party asked SBY to appoint PKS cadidates as ministers of religion and education, but SBY demurred. Despite this support for the SBY-Boediono ticket, Kalla supporters spread untrue rumors that Boediono’s wife is Catholic . This, of course, echoes doubts about Megawati’s faith in Islam expressed in prior campaigns, as well as the false rumors in the United States (and elsewhere) that Barack Obama is or was a Muslim. Some elements of politics are universal, I suppose.

So despite the lack of jilbab for SBY’s and Boediono’s wives, the country re-elected Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono by a sizable margin (around 62 percent, precluding a run-off between the top two vote getters). Political Islam rejected, we can breathe easy now (at least until the 2014 election cycle when the handwringing will commence anew). Although there is no doubt that these parties have affected the political climate — coalition building between parties is important and small parties can have outsized influence — most forget that the influence works both ways, and that to find electoral success Islamist parties need to appeal to broad bases for support.

We must remember that Islam has been an important factor in politics since the conceptualization of Indonesia in the early 20th century by emerging nationalists, and it will continue to be so in the future. Islamic parties may promote policies that non-Muslim western liberals might find unappealing, such as the implementation of shariah or mandating the wearing of jilbab. We cannot conflate, however, these positions with Islamist terrorism, or even assume that sliding toward Islamic policies is cause for concern. Rather, we should keep in mind that in an emerging, consolidating democracy there will be many voices and sides jostling for influence, and that ultimately it is the Indonesian people who will decide (and live with their decisions). In this context, using jilbab in campaign ads isn’t all that interesting, but it may take focus away from more substantive issues.

Politics in Indonesia can be complicated, but most consumers of mass media want a simple to understand story, which eliminates nuance. Further complicating matters is the general lack of substance in the 2004 and 2009 presidential campaigns. Candidates’ policy platforms tended to be vague; fear of alienating potential voters outweighed the desire to attract voters with bold position statements. As a result, charisma and coalition building seem to be two chief elements of electoral victory in Indonesia, outweighing even party support. SBY’s Democratic Party is small, but the candidate steamrolled both Megawati Sukarnoputri (despite her somewhat bizarre claims about voting irregularities and her unwillingness to concede) and Jusuf Kalla (his current vice-president). These candidates were supported by the huge secularist party machines of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan) and Golkar (Golongan Karya, Suharto’s former party), respectively. SBY proved capable in his first term — much more so than Megawati during her 2001-04 term — and he was rewarded with reelection.

Buried deep in these stories is another, perhaps more significant element of the election results: the losing candidate’s running mates, Prabowo Subianto and Wiranto, are both former generals accused of grave human rights violations during and after the Suharto period. Ironically, Megawati’s running mate Prabowo led the movement to crush her rising opposition to Suharto in 1996. Although SBY is a former Suharto-era general as well, he remains relatively untarnished by accusations such as these.

Indonesia is now regarded the most democratic country in Southeast Asia, something unfathomable a mere 12 years ago. It remains a complicated country worthy of analysis but also, unfortunately, one susceptible to error-producing oversimplification, especially in the context of mass media that require a catchy headline and quick turnaround in news cycles. There are still many areas in which Indonesia can improve, including in the areas of military influence in politics, human rights (especially the ongoing trouble in West Papua), poverty reduction, and disease prevention. 

As last week’s bombings at the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels show, threats of terrorism remain.  But it’s not because of women’s headwear.  Indonesia has been consistently traveling down the path of democracy since SBY’s first term. Let us hope it continues to do so, but continue to recognize that it is ultimately the Indonesian people who will decide what Indonesian democracy looks like.

by Steven R. Corman

At last, the AP is reporting, someone is finally going to review our moronic “terror alert system” (TAS).

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano is expected to appoint a panel to reevaluate the system and determine whether it should be changed, or possibly eliminated.

Good for her.  The existing system, put in place shortly after the 9/11 attacks, have five levels of “threat” of terrorist attacks.  The AP story reports:

Currently, the alert level is at orange for the aviation sector, and yellow for the rest of the country. The nation has never been below yellow since 2001, although Hawaii put itself at blue for a year after the national system was adopted. It has since raised the level to yellow.

I believe the aviation sector has been at orange since the beginning, also.

The problem with the current system is that it runs afoul of something called the “information model of variance,”  developed by astronomers in the late 1800s and generalized by Shannon and Weaver in their 1949 Mathematical Theory of Communication.  The principle is simple:  Variability in a measure carries information about the thing being measured.  A correlary is that no variance in a measure means it carries no information.  Since the Terror Alert System never varies, it carries no information.  And because information conveys meaning, the system is– literally– meaningless.

Besides the fact that the TAS carries no information, there is an issue of what  people would do with the information, if it did carry any.   From the outset, it has never been clear how anyone was supposed to react if the alert went from one level to another.

Compare this to other common altert systems.  I live in Phoenix, where we occasionally have air polution alterts.   When we have a high particulate polution day, particular restrictions go into effect.  Leaf blowers can’t be used on commercial property.  People can’t burn wood in fireplaces or have open fires outside.  Use of off-road vehicles is banned.   Or take the place I used to live, central Illinois.  When we had a tornado warning, people were supposed to go to the basement.

So my humble advice to Secretary Napolitano comes in two parts.  First, if we are going to have an alert system that presumes to measure a level of risk, design it so the risk level does in fact vary.  This may just be a matter of making it more fine grained, so as to take into account “smaller” events and conditions that come and go.  Without variance, the system carries no information and has no communication value.

Second, make sure that the changes in level correspond to definite courses of action.  Like a pollution advisory system or tornado warning, when the level increases people should be expected to do things, and when it goes down they should be expected to stop doing them. Those who are expected to respond should know what the courses of action are, and they should be reminded when the changes occur.

The most ideal situation would be if the actions people take when the levels go up would have an impact on bringing the levels back down.   This creates a deviation-counteracting control system (the intent behind the pollution warning system), and would give the people using the alert a sense of efficacy.

If these two goals can’t be accomplished, then just scrap TAS.  Rely on ad hoc government advisories through the news media, etc., to inform people when there are terrorism problems and what they should do.

By Jeffry Halverson

The latest book by Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fiqh al-Jihad, has received considerable attention of late in the press and blogosphere.  For those of you who may not know him, Qaradawi is arguably the most influential Sunni cleric (alim) in the Muslim world today, widely known for his many writings, rulings (fatawa), and Arabic satellite television show Shariah and Life on al-Jazeera.  Although an Egyptian graduate of the (once) venerable al-Azhar and associate of Egypt’s ostensibly banned Muslim Brotherhood, Qaradawi has been in self-imposed exile in the small Persian Gulf state of Qatar for over thirty years. Life in Qatar has given Qaradawi the opportunity to speak and think independently of the state-run al-Azhar University and escape the almost routine periodic imprisonments he would face back in Mubarak’s Arab Republic of Egypt. As you may have guessed, Qaradawi is also no stranger to controversy and scandal.

Of all the arguments put forth in the new book, it’s Qaradawi’s discussion of the appropriate levels of violence in jihad that will likely receive the most attention, both in the Arab media and among Middle East and terrorism analysts, pundits, and political opportunists.  Qaradawi’s refuses to denounce military struggle (jihad) and resistance (muqawama) as a whole.  Instead he places them within the framework of what he calls Islam al-Wasati, or “centrist Islam” (as opposed to the extremist radicalism of al-Qaeda and its franchise proxies).

This concept is not at all new. It was articulated by the third Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Umar al-Tilmisani (d. 1986), the chief architect of the “Neo-Brotherhood” that took shape in the 1970s after the death of ‘President’ Gamal Abdel-Nasser (d. 1970). Tilmisani’s understanding of “centrist Islam” was probably more pacifistic than Qaradawi’s though.  He always preferred courtroom battles to those waged with a gun or a bomb.  In fact, Qaradawi’s call for al-Qaeda to revise their thinking on jihad is reminiscent of the way Tilmisani attempted to intervene with the radical Islamist students of the Gama’a in Egypt in the 1970s. Some of them responded to Tilmisani, like Dr. Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Qudus, while others, like al-Zawahiri and the assassins of Sadat, did not.  It may well be that Qaradawi’s efforts will find similar successes (and failures).

The contribution to contemporary Islamic thought that I find most interesting and original in Qaradawi’s book is the concept of the “jihad of the new age.” This is the notion that jihad should move away from violence to “to the realm of ideas, media, and communication,” such as the internet, video, and satellite television.  Proponents of dialogue with the Muslim world should welcome this notion (or so I think).  And getting Islamists to stop and actually think about their ideas and positions is always a good thing. It doesn’t happen nearly as often as you would think.

One of the problems faced by “centrists” in their efforts to curb the rampant violence of groups like al-Qaeda is that–despite the validity of their ideas–the channels for centrist action are limited, most notably by repressive state regimes like Egypt, Syria, Algeria, or Saudi Arabia (need I go on?). In contrast, the “radical” extremists, despite their tenuous and rudimentary (sometimes laughable) ideas, offer an immediate and tangible plan of action.  This appeals not only to frustrated youth (many of whom are boys, who like to play with guns and set things on fire anyway), but also to elders with no hope of social mobility.  When state regimes eliminate the ability of Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood, to fully participate in civil society, they embolden the extremists who argue that violent revolution is the only way.

Lastly, Rob at Arab Media Shack believes the book will not be read by average Arabs, and will probably have little influence outside of “the few hundred or so Jihadis still technically at war with the Algerian government.”  But a similar comment might have been made fifty-odd years ago about Sayyid Qutb. He was thoroughly a man of the pen. He never fought on a battlefield or fired a Kalashnikov in his entire life.  In fact, almost his entire career as an Islamist thinker was spent in Nasser’s prisons in Egypt (often in the infirmary), and his most famous book, Milestones, didn’t become the alleged manifesto of “radical” Islamism until after his execution in 1966 (perhaps in part because of his execution).  If Milestones is (as many assert) the inspiration for Islamist extremism, then Qaradawi, with all the ‘weapons’ of mass media at his disposal, could have a similar, or even greater, impact.

This is not to mention Qaradawi’s stature in the Muslim world.  As Marc Lynch points out, Qaradawi is different because of “his vast influence and his long track record as an accurate barometer of mainstream Arab views.”  My colleague Mark Woodward, writing from Indonesia, confirms that he is regarded as a significant authority there, as well. Furthermore, Qaradawi’s credentials as an al-Azhar trained scholar are important. Islamist thought tends to be dominated by laymen trained in fields like engineering, education, or medicine, rather than ulama trained in Islamic law.

We won’t know the full impact of Fiqh al-Jihad for years to come (perhaps decades).  In fact, given Qaradawi’s advanced age (he’s 82), he himself may never know the significance of his book. But it’s certainly tantalizing to think that we could be witnessing a new milestone in Islamist thought (pun intended). The difficult task then left to us, those in the West, is to respond by fully engaging Qaradawi and other like-minded individuals and groups in this “jihad of the age” where ideas can take the place of bullets.  It’s most certainly an exchange worth having.

by Steven R. Corman

Yesterday, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale gave her first major speech outlining priorities in her new job.  My reaction to her remarks is mixed.  On the one hand there were some confusing definitions a key missing element.  On the other hand it contained some very promising themes, which on balance leave me optimistic about her tenure.

One thing that really puzzled me was a definitional exercise near the beginning of the address.  McHale said public diplomacy operates on two levels:

First, communication.  This is the air game, the radio and TV broadcasts, the websites and media outreach that seek to explain and provide context for U.S. policies and actions; and

Second, engagement, the ground game of direct people-to-people exchanges, speakers, and embassy-sponsored culture events that build personal relationships. (emphasis original)

This is an odd distinction for two reasons.  First, person-to-person engagement is just as much communication as is the “air game.”  In fact it is even more so, if we adopt a modern view that communication is not just the transmission of messages but a process of dialogue.

Second, it implies that person-to-person relationships cannot be developed through electronic media.  That may be true for mass media like radio and television, though what is said through those channels does impact the ability to establish personal relationships.  But it is surely not true for web-based interactive media like mobile messaging, web-based fora, and mobile messaging.  These can be used for engagement too, as examples later in the speech show.

I would not make so much of this were it not for the fact that it was emphasized so much in the speech.  It was flagged as a main organizing principle, with the two elements set off in boldface in the transcript (the only things that got such treatment).  This signals that it is a major conceptual distinction in the speech, that McHale sees these two aspects of public diplomacy as having different functions and calling for different strategies. On the contrary New Media are breaking down these kinds of distinctions.  And indeed in the remainder of the speech McHale seems to abandon the distinction, using communication and engagement interchangeably.

Another conceptual head-scratcher was McHale’s statement that

The national security implications of engagement have not been lost on our colleagues at the Department of Defense, which has become heavily involved in what we call public diplomacy and they call strategic communications. (emphasis mine)

That’s not exactly right.  What the DoD calls strategic communication is not just public diplomacy.  It also includes public affairs and (most importantly) information operations.  It is important to recognize this because information operations can involve deception operations–so called black propaganda.  If discovered these operations can have negative impacts on person-to-person relationship building, as can normal overt actions of military operations.  They can also cause domestic public affairs problems, as they did in the Lincoln Group scandal of  a few years back.  Speaking of public affairs, McHale did not take this opportunity to unpack apparent recent changes in that function at State.

The missing element in the speech was the emphasis that McHale’s predecessor Jim Glassman placed on communicating about the Bad Guys.  Glassman declared that–in contrast to previous Under Secretaries–he was going to make public diplomacy less about selling brand America and more about de-branding our extremist opponents.  If anything McHale’s speech moves back in the other direction, placing emphasis on winning friends and influencing people.  This is undoubtedly important, but so is capitalizing on the growing ill sentiment toward extremists in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan.  It would have been nice to have this affirmed.

All that said, there were a lot of things to like in McHale’s speech, and for me they outweigh the shortcomings just discussed.  She echoed a large number of themes we here at CSC have been advocating in recent years.  Among them:

• “We need to listen more and lecture less.  We have to learn how people listen to us, how are words and deeds are actually heard and seen.”  Hooray!  Our Under Secretary thinks of communication as dialogue, not transmission.
• “We need to explain our position and policies upfront and not after the fact when opinions have already been formed.”  This is further evidence of a move away from spin-meistering and toward dialogue.
• Throughout the speech McHale emphasized the importance of communicating in the languages of our PD audiences.  As anyone who has traveled abroad knows, speaking someone else’s language can open doors,  even it’s just a few words pronounced improperly.  Moving to fluent foreign language engagement in PD will have important benefits.
• She repeatedly emphasized the importance of New Media in public diplomacy efforts.  Though just using different channels will not change things, using them properly and in combination with the dialogic approach McHale is advocating is critical.
• She also discussed the importance of creating a culture of risk-taking and innovation.  This is of the utmost importance because public diplomacy operates on a rugged landscape.

Finally, for my money the most important thing McHale said in her speech is this:

At the top of my list is integrating public diplomacy into the policy process at every level, from formulation and implementation.  Our policy decisions must be informed upfront by sound research and perspectives on possible impacts.

Amen!  What a great thing to have on the top of the list.  If McHale can really accomplish this goal, it alone will be enough to secure her legacy (in my humble opinion).  She will have solved the number one problem of U.S. public diplomacy in this decade, that it has been treated as an after-the-fact effort to put lipstick on pigs.  Given institutional inertia that will work against this change, she has her work cut out for her.

by Bud Goodall, Angela Trethewey, & Steven R. Corman

President Barack Obama’s historic speech in Cairo yeserday represents a welcome break from the former President George W. Bush administration’s approach to strategic communication.  Bush’s rhetorical strategy was to divide the world into opposing forces of Good and Evil, and then demand that Muslims choose sides. By contrast, Obama tried to reframe the challenges facing America and the Muslim world as one of rejecting that division in favor of a story of shared progress.

Other commentators have already analyzed the political details of the speech.  In this post we look beneath the surface of what Obama said to comment on his message strategy.  We observe that while Obama’s policies are not so different from those espoused by Bush, there is significant shift in the  narrative framing of those policies.  In effect, his speech offered the Muslim world a new way of narrating a common U.S. and Muslim history centered on the idea of joint progress.

Acknowledging “tensions” in the world, Obama established tribal conflict as a backward way of dealing with cultural, political, and religious differences.  He said:

For human history has often been a record of nations and tribes subjugating one another to serve their own interests.  Yet in this new age, such attitudes are self defeating.  Given our interdependence, any world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail.  So whatever we think of the past, we must not be prisoners of it. Our problems must be dealt with through partnership; progress must be shared.

As this quote indicates, Obama’s alternative storyline draws upon a theme of progress that operates as a narrative archetype.  He proposes  a progressive, forward-looking, historical scenario grounded in the Enlightenment.  It emphasizes a theme of continual improvement and development. This progress archetype manifests itself repeatedly in several themes in Obama’s speech.

He grounded “progress” in the very existence of the university setting from which he speaks:  ”As a student of history, I also know civilization’s debt to Islam.  It was Islam–at places like Al-Azhar University–that carried the light of learning through so many centuries, paving the way for Europe’s Renaissance and Enlightenment.”  As Laila Abdel Meguid, Dean of the Faculty of Mass Communication at the University of Cairo expresses it, “The choice of Cairo University is also very significant; it represents a major hub for culture and science in Egypt and the Middle East and has always been a forum of dialogue between cultures and civilizations.”

Obama made progressive use of culture specific language.  He greeted Muslims in their own language with the  expression “assalaamu alaykum” (peace be upon you).  By using Arabic he establishes common ground through shared language, which undoubtedly was read as a sign of progress.  He also used three specific Koranic references throughout the speech, each one designed as an authoritative referent for his views.  This pattern of invoking the Koran for just such purposes is a widely understood rhetorical technique throughout the Muslim.  Again this represents “progress” through evolution of sacred authoritative texts used by American presidents.

Obama also tied his personal story to the progress archetype by emphasizing his Muslim roots, Kenyan father, years in Indonesia, and work with Muslims in Chicago.  This connection of the personal history to the shared culture and history of Muslims creates a sense of identification between speaker and audience that is amplified, no doubt, by his appearance as a Black man serving as President of the U.S.  Hence, he stands before the Muslim world as the literal embodiment of progress.

Obama announced a

new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition.  Instead, they overlap, and share common principles–principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.

By focusing his address on what we share rather than on what divides us, Obama makes clear his progressive view that our nations and peoples work toward similar goals and hold the same values.

Obama also emphasized the relationship of Muslim history to American history, noting that Morocco was the first nation to recognize the United States, that the Founding Fathers recognized the importance of Islam in his country, and that individual Muslims have played important roles in America’s story.    By linking our history to the inclusion and contributions of Muslims, Obama incorporates all Muslims into the progress archetype, not as an invitation or an afterthought, but instead as a natural part of our historical progression.

Obama distinguished between “violent extremists” and Muslims, and accused the former of “exploit[ing] … tensions in  a small but potent minority of Muslims.”  From a Muslim world perspective, his ability to distinguish between all Muslims and those who choose violent extremism affords a progressive view of the complexities of identity associated with religious faith and cultural traditions.

In other parts of the speech Obama also invoked the progress archetype.  He focused  on the Palestine-Israel conflict as a nexus of tribal divisions that marks an outmoded way of thinking, and linked progress in resolving that conflict to support for two states.  In briefer segments dealing with nuclear proliferation, democracy, women’s rights, and economic development, there were less explicit but still clear appeals to progressive ideals.

What is strategic about these rhetorical choices is that Obama attempts to reframe Western and Muslim relations outside of the tribal conflict narrative and instead recapture the joint historical progress of Muslims and the Western world.  In practical terms, Obama uses this opportunity not to create an entirely new narrative but instead to remind listeners of an older and more powerful story that includes, rather than excludes, Muslims.

What remains to be seen is whether the target audience for this speech will embrace his storyline.  Obama’s progress archetype automatically resonates with Western audiences.  But it is  not necessarily embraced by everyone he was addressing.  Many Muslims feel threatened by modernity and its indifference to tradition.  Violent extremists and radical clerics play on this fear with stories like Sayyid Qutb’s New Jihiliyya, which portrays the West a a source of Islam’s gradual decay–not its partner in progress.

Such storylines are rooted in a picture of decline that “emphasizes deterioration … often coupled with a deep sentimental attachment to the ‘good old days’” (Zerubavel, 2003, p. 16).  Obama’s speech can be considered a strategic success if we begin to see evidence that his counter-narrative of progress is being embraced by the ordinary Muslims who were his primary audience.

UPDATE 12:30 MST

Here are some other notable comments on Obama’s speech:

• Obama’s New Beginning in Cairo: Now He Needs One in Washington (Jennifer Bryson)
  
• Jihadi Reactions to Obama (Jihadica)
  
• The Chicago View (Devid Brooks NYT)
• My First Take on the Speech (Marc Lynch)

by Steven R. Corman

Last week, while I was recovering from a long stretch of foreign travel, GAO released its latest report on public diplomacy.  Matt thinks it is “interesting and worth reading,”  while Kim says not so much. My own view is that the report is interesting (in a disturbing way) because it clings to a failed model of strategic communication effectiveness.  Like past GAO reports, it insists that if we only apply that model more diligently, then everything will be alright.

The main conclusion of the report is that the State Department has not been paying enough attention to earlier GAO reports and that it has failed to clearly enough define its purposes/goals, assess and manage risks, measure outcomes, and coordinate activities.

In particular it faults State for lacking country-level plans that implement best practices from the “campaign-style approach” to strategic communication.  The ideal process as diagrammed in their report is shown in the figure at right.  Among the  assumptions underlying the diagram are:

• It presumes you can define your core messages independent of the people you will be communicating with, then launch the messages at them, like so many artillery shells.
• It assumes you can target particular audiences and deliver messages narrowly to them, without those messages leaking to other audiences.
• It assumes you can pre-plan your communication efforts and that if you do a good job things will probably go more or less according to plan.
• It assumes you can unambiguously assess the results of communication efforts in a short time frame and use this information to make minor adjustments that “fine tune” your communication efforts.

However, as we have argued, repeatedly, the diagram and its assumptions are derived from an outdated model of communication, and following it better will only make matters worse.  Communication is not a process of transmission of messages but of dialogue with an audience.  Modern media systems make exclusively targeting narrow audiences difficult or impossible.  Communication systems are so complex that planning is of limited use.  You can’t straightforwardly assess results and tweak your tactics, as if you were a strategic communication version of a forward artillery spotter.

The fourth section of the report says our problem is that U.S. strategic communication efforts are not coordinated enough.  This is a theme that has been repeated ad nauseum in reports over the last eight or nine years, and was the subject of multiple abortive attempts by the Bush administration to create coordinating offices at the executive level.

There is little doubt that presenting incoherent and contradictory messages is a bad idea. But on the other hand having everyone hammering on a few talking points in a “campaign style” effort is a bad idea too, and this is what I think the GAO has in mind.  The problem with that approach is that it presumes you already have the right messages and you can predict how your audience is going to react.  In other words, it presumes a simple strategic communication landscape.

In reality, the United States operates on a rugged landscape where things extremely complex and unpredictable.  In that situation we a more evolutionary approach, based on variation, selection, and retention.  Trying too hard to coordinate things only works against that goal by inhibiting variation.

The GAO also faults the State Department for not engaging the private sector more effectively.  This is another recurring theme in their reports (as they themselves note).  The presumption is that we have the best marketing and advertising minds in the world, and if we can only get them involved in public diplomacy things will improve.

But there is reason to question whether the knowledge of our admittedly first-rate marketing and advertising minds maps straightforwardly to public diplomacy.  Charlotte Beers was regarded as one of the brightest stars in the advertising business, but failed in applying her ideas to public diplomacy.  Karen Hughes made use of Disney’s production savvy in developing a video to be shown in embassies, customs control points, etc., but it’s not clear this had any impact on views of the U.S.  While the private sector has ideas to contribute, it is possible to take the analogy between business and public diplomacy too far.

There are some things to agree with in the report:  State is underfunded and understaffed with respect to its responsibilities, security concerns at its outposts has limited engagement with foreign publics, and efforts have begun to engage new media.  But on the whole, if you took the dates and references to the Obama admininstration out of this report, it would be pretty hard to distinguish from those from 2003 and 2005.

This leads me to suggest that maybe the GAO should reconsider its own communication strategy in preparing these reports.  The recommendations they are making are not sticking; they document this themselves.  Maybe this is because they are not really offering anything fresh or compelling in terms of perspective and recommendations.

The GAO would have more interesting things to say if they abandoned the old “command and control” framework for criticism that they have been applying all these years, and made recommendations that are better suited to the complex systems in which public diplomacy actually operates.

by Steven R. Corman

Judith McHale was sworn-in yesterday as Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.  Accordingly the Countup Clock that has graced these pages for the last several weeks has been retired.

The final reading was 129 days between President Obama’s inauguration and swearing in the new PD Chief.  As others have noted as well, that’s not much haste relative to the importance of the job, and it does not bode well for the priority that the Obama administration plans to give public diplomacy…at least via State.  As Alvin Snyder points out,  there may be a move afoot to duplicate DoS PD functions in the White House staff.  That would be a bad idea as it would create more complex interdependencies between those responsible for PD, making the strategic communication landscape even more rugged.

Matt says we now need a clock for “when the deeply problematic bureaucratic and functional division between public affairs and public diplomacy within the Under Secretary’s office will be eliminated.”  I would be happy to adapt the old one for that purpose, but I’m not completely sure when we would set the start date, nor what the exit condition would be.  So I think I’ll let Matt handle that one.

by Steven R. Corman

This weekend the mainstream media reported that Joint Chiefs Chairman Michael Mullen and former Secretary of State Colin Powell had come to the defense of the Obama administration’s plans to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay.  They were reacting to recent statements by Republican political leaders opposing Obama’s plans.

I want to comment on one element of this:  Whether the existence of the prison has served as a strategic communication tool for al Qaeda, especially in support of recruiting. This weekend Mullen and Powell said that it had. Mullen said Gitmo “has been a recruiting symbol for those extremists and jihadists who would fight us,” and continued “It’s my judgment that (Guantanamo) has had an impact (on recruiting). And it’s time to move on.” For his part, Powell said “Guantanamo has become a major, major problem … in the way the world perceives America.”

They were reacting to recent statements by Republican leaders who oppose Obama’s plans.  One is former Vice President Dick Cheney, who in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute on May 21 said:

Another term out there that slipped into the discussion is the notion that American interrogation practices were a “recruitment tool” for the enemy. … This recruitment-tool theory has become something of a mantra lately, including from the President himself. And after a familiar fashion, it excuses the violent and blames America for the evil that others do. It’s another version of that same old refrain from the Left, “We brought it on ourselves.”

Arizona Senator John Kyl, appearing on a Sunday talk show, concurred with Cheney, saying he doesn’t believe people sit around in coffee shops saying that because of Guantanamo they will become terrorists, and that Obama had failed to provide any evidence of this.  He asserted:

I mean, it’s palpably false to suggest that the existence of Gitmo created terrorism, and yet the president gets away with that.

Perhaps there is no evidence about coffee shop conversations (in open source, anyway).   Perhaps, as some sources claim, Cheney and Kyl are saying these things not because they think they’re true but because they see Guantanamo as am effective political wedge issue.

But palpably false?  It’s hard to understand how Cheney and Kyl could make statements like this with a straight face given that Gitmo is such a repeated and strong theme in al Qaeda’s strategic communication.   And as we know their communication efforts are all about creating converts and sympathizers to their cause.

Since there has been a call for evidence, I present here, for their and your reading enjoyment, a handy compendium of quotes from al Qaeda’s chief ideologues on the subject of Guantanamo (through January 2008).  Note that in many cases Guantanamo is mentioned in the same breath with Abu Ghraib, which as far as I know nobody is defending:

• “The entire world testifies to the Guantanamo farce and the unlawful detention of hundreds in the United States without trials.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, October 2002)
• “God both privately and publicly, and to implore Allah and beseech him to accept our repentance and relieve us of our distress. O Lord, give us your blessing in this world and in the next, and protect us from the fires of Hell. We beseech Allah to free our captives from the hands of the Americans and their accomplices – foremost among them Sheikh ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Sheikh Sa’id ibn Zu’eyr and our brethren in Guantanamo – and to strengthen the Mujahideen in Palestine and other Muslim lands.” (Osama bin Laden, February 2003)
• “The tape also tells those ‘working or cooperating’ with the United States that America is too weak to protect either itself or its allies. If the United States should prosecute those being held at Guantanamo, the speaker says, ‘it is sentencing its own people.  We don’t expect any justice from America,’ the voice says. (report on statement by Ayman al Zawahiri, August 2003)
• “O God, help release our brother prisoners in the prisons of tyrants in America, Guantanamo, occupied Palestine, Al-Riyadh, and everywhere.” (Osama bin Laden, October 2003)
• “It is consistent with tormenting prisoners in the cages of Guantanamo and torturing Muslims in the prisons of our leaders, the friends of the United States.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, commenting on the French hijab ban in February 2004)
• “The fathers and mothers of the US soldiers should remember the crimes of America in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Guantanamo, and in the prisons of the US friends each time they receive a coffin returning to the homeland.”  (Ayman al Zawahiri, February 2004)
• “When the crusader US campaign was launched, the traitor Musharraf surrendered to the FBI and evicted hundreds of them to Guantanamo and US prisons to be imprisoned, tortured, or killed.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, March 2004).
• “Did not Bush say that Iraq is one of the states of the axis of evil? To the Christians, this description means that we are infidels and useless. This explains their occupation of our land and their killing of us. This also explains the atrocities that their soldiers committed in Abu-Ghurayb prison, Guantanamo, and elsewhere against our brother prisoners; atrocities which moved the whole of mankind.” (Osama bin Laden, December 2004).
• “Three years have passed since the first batch of Muslim prisoners was sent to the Guantanamo detention center after thousands were betrayed in Mazar Sharif after an agreement was reached with them. They were later bombed by planes in Qala-e Janghi after they refused to surrender. One might ask: Why all this interest in Guantanamo while there are thousands of Guantanamos in our countries under US supervision and control? In my opinion, and God knows best, the answer is that it [Guantanamo] reveals the reality of reform and democracy which America claims that it seeks to spread in our countries. This reform will be based on US detention centers — like Bagram, Kandahar, Guantanamo, and Abu Ghuryab — bombing with cluster bombs and missiles, and installing people like Karzai and Allawi.”  (Ayman al Zawahiri, February 2005)
• “It [the U.N.]  also remains silent about its full collusion on what is happening in Abu-Ghrayb, Guantanamo and Bagram and the treatment of Al-Qa’ida and Taliban prisoners, where they disappear from the face of the earth and no one knows anything about them.” (ayman al Zawahiri, September 2005)
• “The torturing of men has reached the point of using chemical acids and electric drills [to pierce] their joints. If they [those who torture them] become desperate with them, they drill their heads to death. If you like, read the humanitarian reports on the atrocities and crimes in the prisons of Abu Ghurayb, Guantanamo, and Bagram.” (Osama bin Laden, January 2006).
• “The video entitled: ‘Interviews with the Escapees from Bagram Prison,’ began by announcing that the interview in this video was with the ‘mujahid Faruq al-Iraqi.’ This was followed by an excerpt from an old video message by Ayman al-Zawahiri talking about ‘the hypocrisy of the Crusaders,’ and the conditions in their prisons. While footage of Guantanamo Bay prison appeared on the screen, a voiceover spoke off-camera about the conditions of the mujahidin in such prisons.”  (report on an as Sahab video released in February 2006)
• “Bush called on us to respect human rights while he is establishing secret prisons everywhere, exercising dirty torture in Bagram, Abu Ghurayb, and Guantanamo, and sending Muslims to be tortured in the prisons of his friends.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, March 2006)
• “And then I call to memory my brothers the prisoners in Guantanamo — may Allah free them all — and I state the fact, about which I also am certain, that all the prisoners of Guantanamo, who were captured in 2001 and the first half of 2002 and who number in the hundreds, have no connection whatsoever to the events of September 11th, and even stranger is that many of them have no connection with al-Qaida in the first place, and even more amazing is that some of them oppose al­Qaida’s methodology of calling for war with America.” (Osama bin Laden, May 2006)
• “I call on every Muslim in Palestine to stand by the causes of his nation in Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Guantanamo even if it be with words, calls, or encouragement.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, June 2006)
• “My Muslim brothers in Kabul, the latest US aggression against you was preceded by a long series of the killing of innocent people in Kabul, Khost, Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, and Konar. This aggression was also preceded by torturing Muslims in Kandahar and Bagram and at the prison of darkness in Kabul. This was also preceded by insulting the holy Koran in Bagram and Guantanamo and by the Danish, French, and Italian mocking of the noblest prophet, God’s peace and blessings be upon him.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, June 2006)
• “The invasion of Iraq and the Guantanamo prison provide a clear example here. They terrorized people, humiliated them by the power of fire and iron, and treated presidents the way slaves are treated.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, June 2006)
• “This ignorance, which causes the people of the West to rapturously applaud when Israel perpetrates wholesale slaughter of Muslims in Lebanon and Palestine and leads them to give their assent to the atrocities their governments commit in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, and makes them voice their approval when their armies desecrate copies of the Koran in Guantanamo, and their yellow press and televangelists insult our Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon Him.” (Azzam al Amriki, September 2006)
• “I also congratulate my captive brothers everywhere: in Guantanamo and the secret and open prisons of America; in Bagram, Abu Ghrayb, al-Ha’ir, and al-Ruways; in Tura, Abu Za’bal, and the desert prisons of Algeria; and in Shatanuf, bin Aknun, and all the prisons of the Crusaders, Jews and their agents, the traitorous rulers of the lands of Islam.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, December 2006)
• “And we reaffirm to the families of the Guantanamo captives, who are demonstrating these days in Cuba, that we - with Allah’s permission - have not and will not forget our captives, and that their liberation is a debt on our necks, and that the Americans must expect to pay the price for everything they have done to them.” (ayman al Zawahiri, January 2007)
• “I also greet my brothers in shackles everywhere, chief among them our perseverant reward-seeking Shaykh Umar Abd-al-Rahman and all our patient brothers in Guantanamo, America’s secret prisons and the dungeons of its agents in our countries.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, February 2007)
• “It is the Jihad of the confined captive who has swallowed lump after lump of humiliation, insult, suppression and severity at the hands of the worshipers of the Cross and their hirelings, in Abu Ghrayb [Abu-Ghurayb], Guantanamo, Bagram, Jordan, the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere, all the while patient, seeking his reward, and awaiting the day of your victory and hour of your success to receive the reward of his sacrifice in safety and jubilation, not in worry and fear.” (Abu-Yahya al-Libi, March 2007)
• “And the entire world has seen those disgraceful acts which make the brow sweat and which are perpetrated inside their jails and in the middle of their prisons against the pure and good, and the pictures of our captives in Abu Ghurayb, Guantanamo and Bagram continue to be present in the mind of every Muslim in whose limbs the spirit of faith creeps, and what was hidden was even bitterer.” (Abu-al-Layth al-Libi, May 2007)
• “They are the ones who test the latest achievement of the American diabolic mind in weapons of mass destruction against us, and they are the ones who continue to incite their allied regimes to pursue and eliminate our Muslim youth, and they are the ones who fight Muslims in their daily struggle to survive, and they are the ones who plunder Muslims’ resources and show creativity in their humiliation of Muslims even on their television screens as they did in the Nazi-Zionist detention in Guantanamo and as they are doing today in Iraq.” (Ayman al Zawahiri, July 2007)
• “The diplomatic immunity and freedom from arrest and prosecution behind which you hide and which international law theoretically sanctifies apparently did not apply to Mullah Abdul-Salam, ambassador of the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan, in Islamabad, whom you forced out of Pakistan so you could arrest him and send him off for torture and humiliation in the dungeons of Guantanamo Bay.”  (Azzam al Amriki, August 2007)
• “And today, more than ever before, America’s military and intelligence services are guilty of the most atrocious forms of torture and arbitrary and unlawful detention of innocents in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and elsewhere, including on American soil.” (Azzam al Amriki, January 2008)