



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594
Safety Recommendation

adopted 3/8/93

Date: May 28, 1993

In reply refer to: A-93-69

COMPLETED
all

Mr. David Z. Plavin
 Director of Aviation
 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
 Number 1 World Trade Center, Room 65W
 New York, New York 10048

On July 30, 1992, at 1741 eastern daylight time, Trans World Airlines (TWA) scheduled passenger flight 843, an L-1011, N11002, experienced an aborted takeoff shortly after liftoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, en route to San Francisco International Airport, California. The airplane came to rest, upright and on fire, on grass-covered soil, about 290 feet to the left of the departure end of runway 13R. There were no fatalities among the 280 passengers on board the airplane, but there were 10 reported injuries that occurred during the emergency evacuation. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121.¹

The National Transportation Safety Board has determined that the probable causes of this accident were design deficiencies in the stall warning system that permitted a defect to go undetected, the failure of TWA's maintenance program to correct a repetitive malfunction of the stall warning system, and inadequate crew coordination between the captain and first officer that resulted in their inappropriate response to a false stall warning.

¹For more detailed information, read Aircraft Accident Report--"Aborted Takeoff Shortly After Liftoff, Trans World Airlines Flight 843, Lockheed L-1011, N11002, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, July 30, 1992" (NTSB/AAR-93/04)

During the investigation of this accident, it was found that when the L-1011 recontacted the runway after liftoff, the captain steered the airplane to the left and onto the soil in order to avoid the blast fence that was beyond the departure end of runway 13R. In doing so, the airplane apparently did not respond to braking as quickly as he had expected.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PNY & NJ) were unable to supply documentation to explain why the blast fence was built about 20 years ago. PNY & NJ personnel stated that they believed the fence was constructed to provide protection from the jet blast of airplanes taking off on runway 31L for airplanes that were operating on runway 4R. Noise abatement was also stated as a reason for the fence.

Because of safety concerns, the Safety Board believes that the PNY & NJ should remove this blast fence and find alternatives to it.


As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the PNY & NJ:

Remove the blast fence located near the approach end of runway 31L at John F. Kennedy International Airport, and implement alternative methods to protect airplane operations from jet blast on runway 4R/22L. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-69)

Also, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations A-93-49 through -54 to the FAA.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency with the statutory responsibility "...to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations" (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is vitally interested in any actions taken as a result of its safety recommendations and would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendation in this letter. Please refer to Safety Recommendation A-93-69 in your reply.

Chairman VOGT, Vice Chairman COUGHLIN, and Members LAUBER, HAMMERSCHMIDT and HART concurred in this recommendation.

By: 
Carl W. Vogt
Chairman