Aircraft Accident Brief
Departure From
Controlled Flight
Learjet 24B, N600XJ
Helendale, California
December 23, 2003
NTSB/AAB-06/04
PDF Document [100K]
| Accident
Number: |
LAX04FA075 |
| Aircraft
and Registration: |
Learjet
24B, N600XJ |
| Location: |
Helendale,
California |
| Date: |
December
23, 2003 |
| Adopted
On: |
May
23, 2006 |
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On December 23, 2003, about 0913
Pacific standard time, 1 a Learjet 24B, N600XJ, registered
to and operated by Pavair, Inc., of Santa Monica, California, departed controlled
flight and crashed near Helendale, California. The captain and the first officer
were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. The flight was operating under
the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 2
from San Bernardino County Airport (CNO), Chino, California, to Friedman
Memorial Airport, Hailey, Idaho. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed
for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
A review of radar data
3 and air traffic control (ATC) transcripts revealed
that the flight departed CNO about 0858 and was cleared to climb to an altitude
of 29,000 feet mean sea level (msl). 4 About 0909:55, as
the airplane was climbing through an altitude of 26,000 feet, the first officer
requested a return to CNO. About 0910:01, the controller asked the first officer
if he needed to declare an emergency, and the first officer replied that he
did not. 5 The controller
then directed the flight crew to maintain an altitude of 24,000 feet.
Mode C information 6
for the flight showed that, from about 0910:12 to about 0910:59, the
airplane descended from 26,500 to 24,000 feet at a rate of about 2,000 feet
per minute (fpm). About 0911:08, the controller cleared the flight directly
to HECTOR (a navigation fix) and asked the first officer to confirm that the
airplane was in level flight at an altitude of 24,000 feet. The first officer
did not respond. Radar data showed the airplane descending through 23,000
feet at a rate of about 6,500 fpm about that time. About 0911:24, while the
airplane was descending at a rate of about 10,000 fpm, the first officer
stated, “we’re declaring an emergency now.” 7 No further
transmissions were received from the airplane. No radar data were available
after about 0911:35. Starting about 0911:47, mode C information was invalid.
The airplane impacted high desert terrain (an elevation of 3,350 feet) about
3 miles southeast of Helendale. The accident site was located about
46 nautical miles (nm) north of CNO.
A witness to the accident, who
was located about 4.5 miles northwest of the accident site, stated that, after
hearing the sound of a jet flying high overhead, he looked up and observed
the accident airplane flying straight and level below a high, overcast cloud
layer. He stated that the airplane then pitched “nose down a little” and “straightened
again.” He also stated that, shortly thereafter, he observed the airplane’s
nose pitch “straight down” until it impacted terrain. The witness reported
that he did not notice whether the airplane was rotating about its longitudinal
axis during the descent, but he did indicate that the airplane appeared to
be intact without any components separating from the airplane during the descent.
The witness added that he did not observe any smoke or fire before the airplane
impacted terrain and that the airplane exploded into a “mushroom cloud” when
it impacted terrain.
San Bernardino County firefighters,
who were performing controlled burns near the accident site, reported hearing
an explosion about the time of the accident. The firefighters reported that
they looked toward the direction of the explosion and saw a rising smoke cloud.
None of the firefighters observed the airplane before the sound of the explosion.
The firefighters drove to the accident site and were the first to arrive there.
The firefighters extinguished small fires that had erupted as a result of the
crash.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The
Captain
The captain, age 51, held an airline
transport pilot (ATP) certificate (issued on October 13, 1987)
8 with a multiengine land rating and type ratings
in the Cessna 500 (Citation) and the Learjet.
9 The captain also held a commercial certificate
with a single-engine land rating and a flight instructor certificate with
single- and multiengine land and instrument ratings. The captain’s most recent
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class airman medical certificate
was issued on October 1, 2003, with the limitation that he must wear corrective
lenses to correct his near vision.
The captain’s résumé indicated
that he had been a Learjet and Cessna 500 captain, a flight instructor, and
director of operations for an aircraft charter company from October 1985 to
2000. The captain occasionally worked for the owner of XtraJet, Inc.,
10 as a pilot but did not appear to be an employee
(no hiring record could be found). During the course of the investigation,
the National Transportation Safety Board was unable to locate any logbooks
for the captain.
The Safety Board obtained information
about the captain’s flight hours from American Air Network (AAN), where he
received training. 11 A
pilot summary, which was signed by the captain and dated October 6, 2003,
indicated that, at that time, he had accumulated 11,783 total flight hours,
about 7,900 hours of which were as pilot-in-command of Learjet airplanes.
According to XtraJet’s former director of operations, the captain completed
initial Learjet 24 training at AAN because Pavair did not have an approved
Learjet 24 training program. Further, the captain began recurrent Learjet
24 training at AAN but did not complete the training because the Learjet 24
was removed from AAN’s operating certificate in November 2003.
The
First Officer
The first officer, age 23, held
a commercial pilot certificate (issued on November 8, 2002) with single-engine
and multiengine land and instrument ratings. He also held a flight instructor
certificate for single-engine land and instrument airplanes. His most recent
FAA first-class airman medical certificate was issued on September 5, 2003,
with no limitations.
According to the first officer’s
September 4, 2003, pilot summary for AAN, he had accumulated 250 total flight
hours. On October 25, 2003, the first officer completed AAN’s basic indoctrination
and emergency situation and procedures training for the Learjet 25 and 35.
From November 3 to 17, 2003, he completed Learjet 35/36 training at FlightSafety
International. This training consisted of 50 hours of ground training, 15 hours
of briefing/debriefing training, and 24 hours of simulator training. On November 17,
2003, the first officer completed 4 hours of ground training and 2 hours of
simulator differences training in Learjet 20 series airplanes. According to
AAN personnel, the first officer received Learjet 20 series differences training
so that he could fly those airplanes as second-in-command to build his flight
time experience.
The first officer was listed as an
approved pilot on AAN’s Part 135 operating certificate on November 7, 2003,
and, on the same day, he was given an airmen proficiency check in a Learjet
35A simulator in accordance with 14 CFR 135.293, “Initial and Recurrent Pilot
Testing Requirements.” A review of AAN’s duty and flight time records revealed
that the first officer flew 4.3 and 19.9 hours in a Learjet 35A in November and
December 2003, respectively.
AIRPLANE INFORMATION
General
Information
The
accident airplane, serial number 190, was manufactured in April 1969, in Wichita,
Kansas. The airplane was equipped with two General Electric CJ-610-6 turbine
engines and was operated and maintained in the United States until 1977. From
1977 to 1981, the airplane was in Europe. In 1981, the airplane returned to
the United States, where it was operated and maintained until the time of
the accident.
At
the time of the accident, the airplane was registered to and operated by Pavair.
The airplane was listed on AAN’s 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate from
March 9, 2001, to November 17, 2003; at which time, the airplane was removed
from the company’s operating certificate. According to AAN, the airplane was
removed from its operating certificate because Pavair had provided inadequate
maintenance records.
The
Safety Board requested a copy of all maintenance records for the accident
airplane from Pavair and XtraJet. The airframe logbook from 1969 to October
1973 and the left engine logbook from 1981 to December 1998 were not provided
to the Board. Further, no maintenance logbooks from April 1999 to the time
of the accident were provided to the Board.
Maintenance
Actions
The accident airplane was maintained
by Jet Executive Transport Technologies (JETT) in Chino. 12
JETT provided the Safety Board with copies of its invoices and endorsements
for the accident airplane from October 15, 2000, to December 19, 2003. According
to JETT’s maintenance records, on November 23, 2002, the accident airplane
underwent 300- and 600-hour inspections in accordance with AAN’s approved
airworthiness inspection program. At the time of these inspections, the airplane
had accumulated 9,439 total flight hours. The records also indicated that,
on October 17, 2003, the left engine underwent a hot-section inspection. At
the time of the inspection, the engine had accumulated 7,675 total flight
hours (6,702 cycles), 13
and the airplane had accumulated 9,507 total flight hours.
XtraJet provided copies of the
aircraft flight logs, flight manifests, and discrepancy logs to the Safety
Board. The records were dated from February 27 to April 17, 2003. No
discrepancies were noted. According to JETT maintenance personnel, the accident
airplane was out of service from July to mid-October 2003 because the airplane’s
avionics were being replaced.
JETT also provided a major repair
and alteration form (FAA Form 337), dated October 29, 2003, which revealed
that all installed communication, navigation, and transponder equipment was
removed and replaced with new components. The newly installed equipment included
a global navigation system, communication radios, transponders, radio magnetic
indicators, distance measuring equipment, a horizontal situational indicator,
a computer, and a control panel. According to JETT maintenance personnel,
the new navigation system was coupled to the autopilot. The form was not signed,
but a review of the form revealed that the airplane was inspected in a manner
prescribed by the FAA and was approved by Xtrajet’s FAA‑approved inspector.
The form had not been submitted to the FAA, as required by 14 CFR Part 43,
Appendix B.
According to JETT, on the morning
of the accident, the airplane’s left battery was inoperative. JETT maintenance
personnel took the left battery from a Learjet 25B and used it to replace
the accident airplane’s inoperative battery. No maintenance endorsement was
provided for this work.
Right
Engine Discrepancy History
According to XtraJet, JETT, and
FAA personnel, on November 26, 2003, during a flight from Las Vegas, Nevada,
to Mesa, Arizona, the accident airplane’s right engine flamed out. The pilot
was able to relight the engine during the descent to Mesa, and the airplane
landed without incident. A JETT mechanic was flown to Mesa to examine the
airplane. The cause of the flameout could not be determined, and the airplane
was flown to CNO on November 29, 2003. During the flight, the right engine
flamed out again. The pilot of the flight diverted the airplane to Palm Springs,
California, and made an uneventful landing. The engine was examined by another
maintenance facility, and the cause of the flameout once again could not be
determined.
According to the Riverside Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO), an airworthiness inspector followed up on
the airplane’s engine issue and asked Pavair to provide him with the airplane’s
maintenance records. Because Pavair did not provide the inspector with the
accident airplane’s maintenance records, he placed an aircraft condition notice
on the airplane on December 12, 2003, that indicated the following:
On December 22,
2003 (the day before the accident), JETT maintenance personnel tried to contact
the airworthiness inspector who had placed the condition notice on the airplane.
He was not in the office, so they spoke with another Riverside FSDO airworthiness
inspector. According to this inspector, JETT reported (on behalf of Pavair)
that it had complied with the limitations of the condition notice; therefore,
he verbally released the airplane for operations. 14 However,
the investigation revealed that Pavair’s maintenance records for the accident
airplane were never received by the Riverside FSDO.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
Meteorological data were obtained
from the Daggett and Palmdale, California, Automated Surface Observing Systems
(ASOS). About 0853, the Daggett ASOS reported that winds were calm, visibility
was 10 statute miles, clouds were few at 10,000 feet above the ground, the
temperature was 7º Celsius (C), the dew point was -3º C, and the
altimeter setting was 30.10 inches of mercury (Hg). About 0854, the Palmdale
ASOS reported that winds were from 100º at 4 knots, visibility was 10
statute miles, skies were clear, the temperature was 7º C, the dew point
was -2º C, and the altimeter setting was 30.11 inches of Hg.
The closest upper air sounding
(that is, a vertical profile of atmospheric conditions) was from San Diego,
California (110 nm south of the accident site). According to the 0400 sounding,
at an altitude of 24,000 feet, winds were from 235º at 35 knots.
Weather Surveillance Radar depicted
no precipitation radar returns near the accident site. No in-flight weather
advisories were in effect surrounding the time of the accident.
At the time of the accident, two
AIRMETs (Airman’s Meteorological Information) were in effect for the accident
area. One AIRMET indicated moderate turbulence between 18,000 and 38,000 feet.
The other AIRMET indicated occasional moderate rime or mixed ice in clouds
and precipitation between the freezing level, which sloped between 10,000
feet in the north and 12,000 feet in the south.
FLIGHT
RECORDERS
The airplane was not equipped with
a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder and was not required by Federal
regulations to be so equipped.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The accident site was located
in high desert terrain (an elevation of 3,350 feet) about 3 miles southeast
of Helendale.
The accident airplane was severely
fragmented. The accident site consisted of an impact crater located on the
top of a ridgeline with a circular debris field measuring about 0.3 mile in
diameter. The impact crater measured 43 feet long by 17 feet wide and was
between 24 and 30 inches deep. The Safety Board accounted for all flight
controls at the accident site. Because the flight controls were severely fragmented
and deformed, flight control continuity could not be established. The engines
were found fractured into numerous sections, which were scattered throughout
the debris field.
The only cockpit and cabin components
that could be positively identified were an oxygen mask, seat components, window
frames, Plexiglas pieces, main entry door components, excerpts from flight logs,
weight and balance calculation sheets, and a binder containing Jeppesen charts.
No remnants of flight instruments could be located.
Wreckage
Examinations
The wreckage was collected and
transported to Aircraft Recovery Services, Littlerock, California, where it
was laid out and examined by a Safety Board investigator and Bombardier Learjet
representatives. No evidence of in-flight fire damage or soot patterns was
found. Components that would normally be positioned adjacent to each other
in the airplane displayed contradictory soot and heat signatures.
The flight control actuating components
were destroyed. All systems (including atmospheric, oxygen, electrical, flight
control, navigation, communications, hydraulic, fire suppression, fuel, and
engine) were destroyed, and no system continuity or functionality could be
confirmed.
The left and right engines sustained
severe accordion crushing along the longitudinal axis. Numerous rotor and
stator blades were separated from their roots. The blades were flattened against
each other and were mated to other stator and rotor blades along the engine’s
airflow path.
An examination of the electrical
wire components revealed that some of the wire bundles sustained fire damage
but that none displayed molten metal or fused components, which would have
indicated a shorted condition. The fracture ends of various wire bundles were
examined. The separated wire areas displayed necking deformation in a rounded
manner that was indicative of a tensile failure. The external surfaces of
the wire strands contained soot, but, after removing the soot, the wire strands
were shiny.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s
Office, Coroner Division, could not perform a complete autopsy examination
for either pilot because of the condition of their remains. The coroner determined
that the cause of death for the pilots was massive blunt force trauma.
The Civil Aerospace Medical Institute,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, conducted a toxicological examination on a tissue
specimen from the captain. The tissue tested negative for alcohol and other
performance-impairing drugs. A tissue specimen from the first officer could
not be obtained.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
Actuator
Examinations
Two flap actuators, one spoiler
actuator, one rudder trim actuator, one landing gear door actuator, and the
horizontal stabilizer actuator were recovered from the wreckage and shipped
to Learjet’s facility in Wichita, Kansas, for further examination under the
FAA’s supervision.
According to Learjet, at the time
of impact, the flap actuators were in the retracted position. The damage to
the spoiler actuator prevented the determination of a definitive impact position,
but Learjet stated that the actuator was either deployed to 1.5º or stowed.
The rudder trim was found in the near-neutral position. Impact damage prevented
the determination of the position of the landing gear door actuator.
The horizontal stabilizer actuator’s
upper attachment rod end, which attaches to the horizontal stabilizer, was
detached from the actuator. The U-bolt, which is installed over the rod end,
was still attached to the actuator at one end. The lower attachment lug, which
attaches to the vertical stabilizer, was also detached from the actuator.
Examination of the fracture surfaces revealed 45º shear lips and irregular
fracture features. No evidence of fatigue or cracking was noted during a microscopic
examination.
The horizontal stabilizer’s actuator
jackscrew dustcover was pressed into the jackscrew threads. A 3.2-inch portion
of the jackscrew extended from the nut. The extended portion of the screw
was bent and fractured at the screw and nut interface. A measurement of the
nut showed that the overall length of the actuator was stretched by 0.30 inch
(the original overall length of the actuator was 9.89 inches). The screw and
nut were examined for evidence of galling or abnormal wear, but none was found.
The screw and stop were installed in accordance with Learjet’s recommended
positions.
A slot and small window were milled
into the body of the cylindrical nut to view the location of the screw stop
in relation to the nut threads. The distance from the mechanical stop to the
fully extended position was 0.812 inch, which corresponded to a horizontal stabilizer
position of -1.8º nose down. According to Learjet, with this trim setting and
the airplane’s estimated weight and balance at the time of departure, the airplane
would have been trimmed for a calibrated airspeed of 285 knots (± 25 knots calibrated
airspeed).
Air
Traffic Control Sound Spectrum Study
The Safety Board conducted an ATC
sound spectrum study on all of the radio transmissions from the accident airplane.
The frequency response of the first officer’s headset, the accident airplane’s
radios, and the Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center’s recording system
prevented background sound signatures associated with the airplane’s systems
and engines from being recorded during any of the transmissions associated with
the accident flight.
Aircraft
Performance Study
The Safety Board examined the FAA’s
radar data and computed the accident airplane’s calibrated airspeed and Mach
number throughout the flight. Review of the radar data revealed that the airplane’s
airspeed continued to increase after the pilots initiated the descent and declared
an emergency.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
At the time of the accident, XtraJet
employed eight pilots and four dispatchers and operated two Gulfstream 1159
airplanes and one Learjet 36 airplane. The captain and first officer were
employees of AAN and were not listed on XtraJet’s Part 135 operating certificate.
15 The accident airplane was not listed on XtraJet’s or
any other Part 135 certificate. XtraJet representatives stated that the company
had intended to add the captain, first officer, and airplane to its Part 135
certificate before the accident but had not done so. According to XtraJet’s
former director of operations, the accident airplane had maintenance-related
issues that needed to be resolved before it could be inspected for Part 135
conformity and then added to the certificate. Xtrajet’s former director of
operations believed placement on the company’s certificate would not have
happened until spring 2004.
During initial postaccident interviews,
XtraJet personnel told a Safety Board investigator that the flight was operated
as a personal flight to pick up a family member of the companies’ owner. During
subsequent interviews, XtraJet’s former director of operations stated that
he had reason to believe that the intended passenger was not a family member
but was instead “a loyal paying customer.”
ANALYSIS
About 0913, a Learjet 24B, N600XJ,
registered to and operated by Pavair, Inc., departed controlled flight, entered
a near-vertical descent, and crashed into high desert terrain near Helendale,
California. Review of ATC communications and airplane radar data revealed
that the flight crew requested a return to the departure airport about 12
minutes after takeoff as the flight was climbing through 26,000 feet. The
controller asked the pilots if they were declaring an emergency, and the first
officer replied that they were not. During this transmission, the first officer’s
voice sounded similar to the voice he used during his transmissions earlier
in the flight, indicating that he was not under any increased stress at that
time. The flight crew was instructed to descend to and maintain 24,000 feet.
As the controller was issuing additional route clearance information, he asked
the flight crew to confirm that the airplane was level at 24,000 feet. At
that time, the radar data showed that the airplane had descended through 23,000
feet. About 15 seconds later, the first officer declared an emergency.
The first officer’s voice sounded agitated and highly distressed during this
transmission compared with his earlier transmissions. Transcripts of recorded
air-to-ground communications showed that about 2.5 minutes had elapsed from
the flight crew’s request to return to the departure airport and the declaration
of the emergency.
A review of the radar data showed
that the flight had a normal descent rate from 26,000 to 24,000 feet (less
than 2,000 fpm [feet per minute]). The descent rate then rapidly increased
to 6,500 fpm and then to 10,000 fpm. Integration of the communications times
and the radar data revealed that the first officer’s declaration of an emergency
occurred about the time of the increase in the descent rate to 10,000 fpm.
A witness on the ground saw the airplane in level flight before it pitched
nose down slightly, returned to level flight, and then pitched nose down in
a near-vertical descent. He stated that the airplane remained in a nose-down
attitude until it impacted terrain and exploded. The witness added that he
did not observe any components separate from the airplane or any smoke or
fire before the airplane impacted terrain.
All airplane system components were
destroyed and thus could not be examined. All primary and secondary flight control
surfaces were identified; however, impact damage precluded any determination
of preimpact control system continuity. The horizontal stabilizer was trimmed
for 285 knots calibrated airspeed. No useful remnants remained from the cockpit
instrument panel. No evidence of an in-flight fire was found. Impact damage
precluded a determination of whether the engines were operating at impact. An
aircraft performance study for this accident revealed that the accident airplane
did not approach its maximum operating airspeeds until after the pilots initiated
the descent and declared an emergency. No unusual or hazardous meteorological
phenomena were near the airplane at the time of the loss of control.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety
Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of airplane
control for undetermined reasons.
Member Kathryn O’Leary Higgins,
concurring:
I have concurred in the probable cause in this aircraft accident brief addressing
the circumstances surrounding controlled flight into terrain by a Learjet
24B on December 23, 2003, near Helendale, California. The investigation disclosed
a loss of airplane control for undetermined reasons. I appreciate the detailed
and difficult work done by NTSB staff in this investigation as they attempted
to determine the probable cause of this accident, given that there was no
information from a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder.
While I concurred with the report and the probable cause determination, I
have several concerns with the information disclosed by our investigation.
I continue to be concerned about the criteria used to grant, oversee, and
revoke a part 135 operating certificate and the criteria used to determine
which entity then operates under a new certificate. In this case, there were
several entities involved in ownership, operation, maintenance, and control
of the accident aircraft: Pavair Inc.; XtraJet, Inc.; American Air Network
(AAN); and Jet Executive Transport Technologies (JETT). According to information
in the docket, these various entities in some manner had responsibility for
the aircraft; the pilots; pilot training; maintenance and maintenance records;
and scheduling of aircraft, aircraft maintenance, and crew.
An informal search of internet news sources disclosed several articles stating
that the registered owner and operator of the Learjet 24B aircraft and the
principle of two of the companies involved in this accident was implicated
in criminal activity and served time in prison. This history seems to have
predated the formation of the companies he owned that were involved with the
accident aircraft.
I am concerned that there is no requirement for a criminal background check
of individuals who would provide the management and first line safety oversight
of commercial aviation operations. Docket information suggests that a limited
criminal history records check was done on the pilots of the accident aircraft
in preparation for adding these pilots to the part 135 certificate of another
company owned and operated by the Learjet 24B owner and operator. Yet, there
is no similar requirement that the owner and operator of a commercial aviation
company providing air transportation undergo either a basic pre-employment
background investigation or a criminal history or other background check as
part of the part 135 certification process. It is not clear that such a requirement
would have prevented this accident, but it might have raised questions about
the qualifications of such an individual to operate under a part 135 certificate
and helped to focus oversight resources. Apparently this same individual was
granted permission by the FAA to operate under the name AFTA, Inc. after the
accident, at the same time he was being investigated for other illegal activities
to which he subsequently pleaded guilty. In essence, I make an argument for
a “totality of the circumstances” approach by the FAA in granting such a certificate,
which by necessity requires a more extensive examination of a prospective
operator’s background.
Ultimately, the FAA revoked the part 135 operating certificate of AAN, a
self-described “part 135 management company” for failure to retain operational
control of the aircraft listed on its operations specifications. The accident
plane was owned by Pavair but operated by AAN until a few weeks before the
accident. Despite what seem to be serious regulatory violations of the operational
control requirements, a settlement agreement executed after appeal of the
revocation action would allow the same management personnel to hold similar
management positions under a new air carrier operating certificate. If the
inability to exercise sufficient operational control is significant enough
to warrant emergency revocation of an operating certificate, I question why
and how the same people, without additional training or demonstration of competence,
would be able to exercise appropriate operational control of a company under
a new part 135 certificate.
According to the information in the NTSB docket, there were at least four
seemingly independent entities, but more accurately intertwined operations,
touching the airplane and its day-to-day operations. And, unfortunately, it
is still not clear to me how the FAA screens and subsequently oversees these
types of enterprises.
Another issue of concern is the release of the accident airplane on the morning
of the accident. A conscientious FAA airworthiness inspector from the Riverside
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) grounded the accident aircraft when
he became concerned about two separate in-flight right engine flameout reports
for the accident airplane. In both reports, the cause of the flameout could
not be determined after examination. The inspector followed up and asked Pavair
to provide the accident airplane maintenance records for review. When Pavair
did not provide the records, the airworthiness inspector placed an aircraft
condition notice on the aircraft, effectively grounding the aircraft. The
condition notice required the owner to provide the records for review within
17 days. (Emphasis added.) There were only two simple requirements: the owner
must provide the records, and the FAA must review them. Based only on the
verbal assertions of the third party that maintained the airplane claiming
that the conditions had been satisfied, a different inspector from the Riverside
FSDO released the airplane for operations on the morning of the accident.
Not only were the records never reviewed by the FAA, they were never provided
for review.
While there are written procedures for issuing a condition notice, there
is little guidance for inspectors to follow in releasing the condition notice
and returning a grounded aircraft to service. The condition notice is intended
to ensure that the aircraft is in a safe condition for safe operation – or
it does not fly. Without review of the records, the second inspector could
not make that determination and the good work of the first inspector was negated.
Additional guidance within the FAA governing the release of planes grounded
with a condition notice is clearly needed.
Member Hersman joined Member Higgins in this concurring statement.
Kathryn O’Leary Higgins
May 31, 2006