

**Testimony of New York City Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly  
Hearing of the House Committee on Homeland Security  
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection  
“The Mumbai Attacks: A Wake-Up Call for America’s Private Sector”  
311 Cannon House Office Building  
Wednesday, March 11, 2009 – 2 p.m.**

**Chairman Thompson; Chairwoman Jackson Lee; Congressman King;  
Congressman Dent; members of the subcommittee.**

**Thank you for this opportunity to testify about the New York City Police Department’s response to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. I want to begin my remarks by saying that partnership with the private sector has been a hallmark of the NYPD’s counterterrorism program since 2002. It is our collective responsibility to learn from events like those that took place in Mumbai, and adapt our programs to prevent them. That is exactly what we’ve endeavored to do in New York.**

**We have a program called NYPD Shield that includes over 6000 private security personnel who train with us and function as additional eyes and ears. We held a briefing with 400 members of this group immediately after the attacks in Mumbai. At that meeting, we had the lead officer in a three-man team we sent to Mumbai call in from overseas and share the lessons we learned with the audience.**

**I will update you on our response to those lessons shortly. Before I do that, I want to make you aware of a more recent study conducted by our Intelligence Division analyzing the similarities between the Mumbai assault and the attack in Lahore, Pakistan on March 3<sup>rd</sup> targeting the Sri Lankan national cricket team. Eight people were killed in that incident, including six Pakistani police officers.**

**That terrorists would attack a cricket team to attract maximum attention should not come as a surprise considering the sport’s immense popularity in South Asia.**

**Last year, when the NYPD formed a cricket league as part of our outreach efforts with the South Asian community in New York City, it received scant attention in the New York media but was widely covered in India, Pakistan and other countries in South Asia and Europe.**

**The attacks in Mumbai and Lahore are evidence of a shift in tactics from suicide bombs to a commando-style military assault with small teams of highly trained, heavily armed operatives launching simultaneous, sustained attacks. We're paying very close attention to this trend.**

**Other similarities we identified included the choice of locations: dense, relatively unprotected urban areas where the terrorists could establish strategic choke points to impede the response of authorities. We also know that some form of detailed, pre-attack surveillance was carried out in both cases, as evidenced by the terrorists' thorough familiarity with their targets. Likewise, both sets of attackers coordinated their movements closely through the use of basic technology: cell phones in Mumbai and small, battery powered two-way radios in Lahore.**

**The assault teams themselves were composed of physically fit males between the ages of 20 and 30. They were similar in composition and in size, with ten people involved in the Mumbai attack and an estimated twelve in Lahore. In each instance, the teams appeared to break down into smaller, two-man operating units once the attack was launched.**

**In both Mumbai and Lahore the attackers were armed with assault rifles, semi-automatic pistols and grenades. They carried backpacks with additional ammunition and explosives, more than enough to sustain a prolonged siege. The attackers were casually attired in western clothing, with oversized jackets, button down shirts and cargo style pants that could conceal contraband.**

**Both groups were calm, unhurried and methodical. They also carried food and drugs to enhance their performance and stamina. In Mumbai, the terrorists reportedly used cocaine and amphetamines to stay awake. In Lahore, remnants of unspecified high energy foods were recovered from the scene.**

**It appears both attacks were not initially designed to be suicidal. The goals of the terrorists included hostage-taking, extending the violence and the resulting media coverage, and escaping. In Mumbai, the terrorists were able to take captives. However, they were captured or killed before they issued demands or escaped. In Lahore, they were unsuccessful in taking hostages but they did manage to evade capture.**

**Both operations focused on highly symbolic targets. By impacting tourism and international sports they were intended to instill fear and cause economic damage. They were also aimed at attacking the global reputations of India and Pakistan and heightening regional tensions between the two.**

**While the political root causes of these attacks appear to be local, the terrorist networks behind them are global, well-funded, and interconnected. The militant Islamic groups suspected in these cases – mainly Lashkar-e-Taiba – have deep and longstanding ties to Al Qaeda.**

**In fact, L.E.T. has trained such terrorists as convicted shoe-bomber, Richard Reid, and Essa Al Hindi who surveilled buildings in New York's financial district prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>. They are also believed to have trained militant Islamic fighters for conflicts around the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. As far as we know, they have not directly targeted a western country but they specifically sought out locations in Mumbai with western and Jewish clientele. Hopefully, we won't see their tactics migrate to the U.S., but if they do we intend to be prepared.**

**Within hours of the end of the attacks in Mumbai, the NYPD began making arrangements to send personnel there. This is in keeping with a practice we have followed for several years. In all cases, our officers do not take part in investigative activity. In Mumbai, our officers toured crime scenes, took photographs, and asked questions of police officials. They relayed what they learned back to New York.**

**These officers are part of the Police Department's overseas liaison program in which we post experienced personnel to 11 cities around the world. They partner with local police and intelligence agencies and respond when terrorist incidents occur. In this case, the most senior officer in the group had served as a liaison in Amman, Jordan. In July 2006, when seven bombs exploded in Mumbai trains and railway stations, he flew to the city on a similar mission. The relationships he forged during that trip proved helpful in December.**

**Our liaisons arrived in Mumbai on December 2nd, three days after the attacks ended. By December 5th, our Intelligence Division had produced an analysis, which we shared with the FBI. As I noted, that morning we convened a special meeting with the members of NYPD Shield. During the live conference call with our team leader in Mumbai, we posted photographs and maps to help the audience visualize the locations he was describing.**

**We also conducted two exercises, one a tactical drill for Emergency Service Unit officers, the other a tabletop exercise for commanders. Both scenarios mirrored the attacks in Mumbai.**

**Based on our analysis of what took place in Mumbai, we've been training additional officers in the use of heavy weapons and close quarters battle tactics. In the event of a sustained attack, such as we saw in India, these officers will be able to support and relieve the more than 400 members of our Emergency Service Unit who already have these skills. Last month, 134 officers from our Organized**

**Crime Control Bureau became the first to complete this new course of heavy weapons and tactics training. We're continuing this month with another group of 135. Our goal is to qualify up to 1,500 officers in these special skills. We've also provided basic heavy weapons instruction for our most recent class of over 1,000 police recruits. We will do the same with our current class. In Mumbai, the local police were simply outgunned by the terrorists. We don't want that to happen in New York.**

**We are also meeting with service providers to see if a means can be developed to pinpoint disruption of cell or satellite phones used by terrorists during an attack, without the wholesale disruption of communications in the immediate vicinity.**

**We also saw that in Mumbai, the local authorities had insufficient knowledge of the layouts of the targets. In light of this observation, we've assigned our Emergency Service Unit supervisors to tour major hotels and other landmarks. Out of each visit they develop a briefing book with a description of the location and detailed diagrams, as well a video that can be used for training purposes. We've conducted eleven, in-depth tours of major hotels so far and we are continuing to select new locations.**

**At our December 5<sup>th</sup> Shield meeting we also reviewed a list of best practices in hotel security. This is a set of items we routinely share when our counterterrorism officers conduct trainings with hotel security personnel.**

**Through another partnership, Operation Nexus, NYPD detectives have made thousands of visits to the kind of companies terrorists might seek to exploit: truck rental businesses, scuba diving schools, or hotels. We let them know what to look for and what to do if they observe suspicious behavior.**

**As part of this initiative, we've assigned a senior officer to work exclusively with hotels. After Mumbai, he and his team visited numerous hotels where they met**

**with security directors and developed emergency procedures to use in the event of a Mumbai-style attack.**

**As part of our training, we also emphasize with hotel staff the importance of knowing who's inside and recognizing that the attack may be initiated from within the facility. We talk about how to identify hostile surveillance or the stockpiling of materials, controlling points of entry and having a thorough knowledge of the building's layout and a widely distributed emergency action plan.**

**We also ask hotel personnel to be acutely aware of suspicious behavior on the part of visitors, such as: denying staff access to rooms for extended periods; loitering on guest floors or in the lobby; requesting specific rooms; receiving unusual parcels; and inquiring about hotel security.**

**Along with an array of other sensitive landmarks, major hotels are also the sites of visits by our Hercules teams and Critical Response Vehicle Surges. The former consist of heavily armed members of our Emergency Service Unit, who appear unannounced at key locations in a show of force designed to disrupt terrorist surveillance. This is also the goal of our daily CRV surges, in which large convoys of patrol cars proceed with emergency lights and sirens to a pre-arranged site based on intelligence. In addition to hotels these locations include hospitals, houses of worship, critical infrastructure, and tourist attractions like Times Square.**

**All of the measures I have discussed are part of a robust counterterrorism program we built from the ground up in 2002, when we realized that it in addition to our focus on crime-fighting, the Police Department needed to build the intelligence collection, analysis, and infrastructure protection capabilities to defend New York City from another terrorist attack.**

**We established the nation's first municipal counterterrorism bureau, and we restructured our Intelligence Division. We recruited the best that the federal government had to offer to head those two operations. We created a new civilian intelligence program to support our field commanders with timely information and analysis. We tapped the incredible linguistic diversity of the police department. We assigned native speakers of languages such as Arabic, Urdu, and Pashto to counterterrorism duties. We strengthened our patrols of key infrastructure in the city, including bridges, tunnels, and a host of landmarks and other sensitive locations. We forged collaborative relationships with the private sector, with law enforcement organizations up and down the east coast, and with federal agencies, especially the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.**

**In the last seven years, working with the FBI through the Joint Terrorism Task Force, we've stopped multiple plots against New York City. I know that this productive collaboration will continue to thrive.**

**The Police Department's strongest and most innovative regional partnership is the one supported by the Department of Homeland Security, our Securing the Cities program. This is an unprecedented initiative to protect New York with advanced radiation detection devices installed at all points of access to the five boroughs, including roads, bridges, tunnels, and waterways. We now train and share information with dozens of neighboring jurisdictions.**

**Our collaboration with the federal government has been essential. Through the Homeland Security, Transit Security, and Port Security Grant Programs, among others, we have instituted effective and innovative programs. In the past, the NYPD worked directly with the Transportation Security Administration to obtain grants and steer federal funds to the most effective programs. We believe it is vitally important to maintain this direct connection and to ensure that DHS's transit security program preserve its distinct mission, purpose, and management, without undue bureaucratic layers. It is our hope the Congress will work with the**

**new leadership at DHS to ensure that the agencies with the shared mission of protecting the transit system be allowed to work together.**

**While we have to learn from Mumbai and Lahore and prepare to defend ourselves against similar attacks, we cannot focus too narrowly on any one preventive method. We need to strengthen our defense on every front, stay sharp, well-trained, well-equipped, and constantly vigilant. And we must continue to work together at every level of government and with the private sector to defeat those would harm us.**

**I want to thank the committee members for your crucial support in making this possible, and for this opportunity to update you on our initiatives.**