workforce. Our contractors are also concerned about things like competing contracts, which may very

significantly distract them from the work at hand.

The age of our workforce has brought up issues related to how you judge the ability of workers to do a job. After you have assessed the hazards and determined the appropriate controls, can our workforce actually work within those controls? These are only some of the day-to-day issues that must be addressed. Failure to be mindful of these issues can also have serious complications and consequences on a daily basis.

I expect that the Board will come to conclusions and have ideas for the Department on how to better use both independent and line oversight as methods for assuring and improving performance on the part of the Department. I hope that your suggestions include some ideas on the human factors issues that we are currently facing today, and how oversight can help us better focus in on those issues also. I look forward to your conclusions at the end of your hearings, and I thank you for this opportunity today. I would be happy to take any questions that you have at this time.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Eggenberger?

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VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Mr. Chairman, I will try to get this started, I guess. You made a statement about change. In my view, change is very important. That's the way we get things done. It's also important to manage change, as you have stated.

The Board back in its formative years in 1989 came upon a change that had taken place in the Department, namely in that orders, directives, and whatever that was used to manage the Department was changing very fast, and there was a lot of conflict and unknowns that existed in the daily operations of the Department because of this conflict.

One of the first things that the Board did to attempt to help the Department stabilize this was to examine the orders and directives that the Board thought were important to safety. And basically, we came up with a list of 20-some orders that we believed were important to safety, and these were examined by our staff, ourselves, also by the Department, and they were improved.

Now, this was about 1990, and time went on, and in the mid '90s, change had occurred, and new people had come into the Department, and they believed that these orders and the way that we do work need to be changed again. So they were examined again. The

Board found that somewhat upsetting in that we believed that we had a fairly stable base at that time. Nevertheless, the Board agreed that if you want to examine these orders, let's do it rationally and preserve the things that are necessary for our operations to continue.

That then leads into my second point. People. How did these orders and directives come about? Well, we learned. We learned from the beginning. The first generation of nuclear engineers and scientists put together a way of operating and conducting their business, and this resulted in the order system that we now have. And I consider myself a second generation "Nuke" [Nuclear Engineer]. We're now on the third and fourth generations of people.

And as you indicated, you are worried about the people problem in that a lot of people are getting ready to retire and leave the Department, and hence, this should probably create a flag. Well, yes, it does. Also, with the orders and directives in which we manage our nuclear business. So we're convinced that we have to preserve these. There is a lot of work that has been put into those since the early 1950s, late '40s, and we do not want to lose those.

So again, I know you understand this, and I

am sure that you will help with the other parts of the Department that don't quite understand it so clearly. And let me give you an example. The area of cleanup and remediation is a new thing. It only began in the '80s. So we have people that have not been involved in the business from the beginnings, and we need to be able to preserve the knowledge and the way of doing business in their activities. So you can use other examples also.

So we do have a way of accommodating new

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So we do have a way of accommodating new operations where certain orders really aren't necessary, directives aren't necessary, and that's the S/RID [Standards/Requirements Identification Document] process. It's a rational process, and it has worked well, and some of the better contractors in the complex have used it to do their work in a safe and cost effective business.

So now that I have pontificated, could you give me some of your thoughts on the preservation of the nuclear safety orders and standards and directives that we have?

MS. COOK: A couple of points. One is, I agree there is a long history behind how these orders have been developed, these directives, and it's a very good history. And we have taken advantage of what we

learned over the years, and we've come up with a good step. However, I think that all of us have been at this for quite some time. Even when we write documents that provide interpretation orders, when EH does that, we're still at times preaching to the choir.

I believe that there are things that we may believe are implicit in those orders that someone new coming in, if all of us disappeared, they wouldn't have a clue what was intended. Therefore, I want to continue to look to make sure that what is defined in those orders and directives is clear and concise and can be well understood by somebody new coming in. Whether it is a new workforce, whether it's a new contractor, I think there is still room for clarification, and I think there is still areas where we may be sending conflicting messages.

The other issue is, you know, how we set those requirements in a contract. We sit down and we define the List, the List B, which things should be included in a contract, and those are negotiated at the time of the contract. We have been in a habit in the past of sort of throwing in the kitchen sink, so you do end up with things in the list that may not be appropriate, and then we have ended up in a situation where the contracting officer and the contractor are

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playing around the fringes of that. They are not 1 holding a contractor fully accountable for all of the 2 things that are there. 3 That is an issue that has to be fixed, 4 As I said earlier, requirements should be set. also. 5 We should agree on that set, and then we should 6 absolutely hold people accountable to the set that we 7 agreed to. VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: The Board has 9 done that in that we have said that there are 20-some 10 orders of interest that one must be cognizant of and 11 use in conducting nuclear operations. 12 MS. COOK: Yes. 13 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: So we have done 14 a broad S/RID look at all of the orders, and that 15 doesn't mean that they cannot be improved. We agree 16 that they should constantly be improved for clarity, 17 but we don't want substance to be removed from them. 18 So I, generally, agree with your observation. 19 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Dr. Matthews? 20 21 DR. MATTHEWS: Yes, I have a couple of questions I would like to ask. You talked about 22 performance indicators. 2.3 MS. COOK: Yes. 24 25 DR. MATTHEWS: You talked about total

recordable case rates and loss work rates and near misses, and I want to commend your office for improving the current reporting system. I think it's clear and more crisp. My interest is in nuclear safety. In fact, you said we're not overlooking nuclear safety. My thesis is that we don't want a criticality accident. We don't want a dispersal of nuclear material. We don't want an inadvertent nuclear explosion.

And so my question to you is, say you've got a high consequence system failure, usually, only predictable with hindsight, because they are rare events, thank goodness. And so my question to you is how is EH dealing with those accidents that we just don't want to happen, because I have a hard time connecting lost work time toward that.

MS. COOK: Yes.

DR. MATTHEWS: The big nuclear safety issue. Could you discuss that a little bit?

MS. COOK: Yes. A couple of things along those lines. As you know, the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement is in my office, and when they move forward with the nuclear safety enforcement actions, it usually is because there has been incidents, and that's pretty serious, whether it is a series of contaminations or some kind of an incident in a nuclear operation. We

have got to come to a set of indicators that are precursors to that and include that in our normal reporting.

If that means a breakdown of processes, that's why in these quarterly safety meetings we discussed things like safety basis documents, and where people are in getting their safety basis implies which contractors we have had to regroup and tell them that what they had submitted was not sufficient and it needs to be redone, that sort of thing. That's why I asked for assistance. We are not comfortable with setting that precursor list of nuclear safety incidents, so that we feel like we can measure performance in nuclear safety in the way that will prevent us to getting even to, of course, the more serious incidents, but even into the Price-Anderson space. We want to get before that.

DR. MATTHEWS: Okay. Well, there is some who -- and I'm glad to hear you say that. But there are some who say that some of the changes in oversight, some of the changes in the directives that we've been talking about, could be bringing us a little closer to the potential, the probability, the likelihood of a nuclear safety accident. If you read Captain Hicks' testimony, that was one of his theses. Do you have any

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comments on how the reengineering and the contract management changes that are ongoing could affect that?

MS. COOK: If, in fact, in our evaluation with the Program Office of what those indicators are for nuclear safety, we end up saying that we really do have to monitor the processes that the contractors use, I think that there will be a change in how the Program Offices define their oversight and nuclear safety. I think that the topic is not done.

I still believe, though, that we need to hold our contractors accountable for doing their own self-assessments and assuring they are getting the outcomes that we expect of them and quit doing their jobs for them and raise our expectations. But we are going to have to figure out ways, so I think that there is going to be room for negotiation here in some of the reengineering efforts.

DR. MATTHEWS: Okay. Well, I look forward to working with you, especially, on these indicators for nuclear safety. I think it's a key issue. A different question. I've heard you and a number of other people testify about the importance of line management responsibility for safety, a key ISM Guiding Principle. Would you help me identify who line management really is? And the way I could do it is

start with disassembly operations at Pantex from the people who are doing the work, and trace that line management responsibility through the contractor, through the Site Office, through the Program Office, up to the Secretary of Energy. Is that something that could be done? Because, frankly, I'm never clear who line management really is in that chain.

MS. COOK: When I look at all of the reorganizations, whether it is sitting through the Office of Science's reorganization or EM's or NNSA's or anyone else's and I have sat through those discussions, that's the question I ask. My definition of line management is follow the money. You know, the person that's paying is the person that is your line organization.

Sometimes that gets confused. But I believe ultimately the organization that is responsible accomplishing is the line for that mission organization, and that moves all the way up and through the Secretary. I am a line management organization for a facility that I operate. I have the money for the Russell Facility in Idaho. I am not line management for other operations. But that is a facility that I personally am responsible for the operations, and I am the one that funds them, and I am the one that assures

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that the work that is done there is of high quality and 1 environmentally is done safely in an it 2 responsible way. 3 But I do believe that in some of the 4 reorganizations, those chain of line management is 5 still somewhat vaque, and I get that same feedback from 6 They are not quite sure how that field organizations. 7 And so I think that it is yet to function is to work. 8 those roles and settle on seen if we 9 responsibilities in that line management chain. 10 DR. MATTHEWS: Well, okay. Since you don't 11 know the answer either, because I have a different 12 definition than you just gave, I would like to request, 13 maybe later on, to see some real examples, not just 14 15 vague. MS. COOK: Okay. 16 DR. MATTHEWS: From an operation from an EM 17 operation, from an NNSA operation, from the area where 18 the work hazard is being handled up to the Secretary of 19 I would be very interested in seeing that 20 defined clearly. 21 Okay. And one of the examples I MS. COOK: 22 can give you is, from my perspective, on how we want to 23 have certain things implemented. Like it's, you know, 24 Suspect and Counterfeit Items Program, 2.5 the

instance, or some of the QA issues. What I do in EH 1 when there is something that we need implemented in the 2 complex is I send a letter to Under Secretary Card and 3 Ambassador Brooks, and we can show you then the chain 4 of events that happens from there and the chain backup. 5 And I think that that has helped us define 6 what line management is, and it has helped them define 7 what line management is. But I try whenever possible 8 things that I want implemented within the complex to go 9 to those two gentlemen and then watch how that goes 10 11 down through the complex and the information comes back So we can give some examples for that. 1.2 up. DR. MATTHEWS: Thank you. 13 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Bev, on December 14 8th, a proposed new Rule 851 [Worker Safety and Health] 15 was issued over your signature. 16 MS. COOK: Yes. 17 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And as I read through the 18 proposed rule, practically every current order and 19 directive on safety that's been issued the 20 Department of Energy would now become guidance. Am I 21 correct in my interpretation? 22 I understand that you have 23 MS. COOK: concerns about this. 24 25 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Yes, very much so.

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MS. COOK: Yes. Let me step back to the intent of that rule and what Congress asked us to do. The intent was to take what we do now in contracting space and have it enforceable under fines and penalties also. What we do right now is every rule, not every rule, but every directive is, in fact, negotiable in the contract. They are not required. You've asked me the question is it -- are the, for instance, the 440 [DOE Order 440.1A Worker Protection Management for DOE and Contractor Employees] --

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: I understand.

MS. COOK: -- included in all the contracts that are of interest to you, and my answer to you is yes, it is. However, I will also tell you that they aren't fully implemented in each of those contracts nor are the contractors.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Could you tell me on 440, which we worked very closely over the years to develop with the Department of Energy, and with many of the experienced people in your Department that you now worry about losing and having new people, who are not as experienced, and we've lost all these or are losing the experienced personnel, who helped develop those orders, and now they are no longer going to be orders, but they are going to be guidance. And then the

contractors, as I read your proposed rule, will be the 1 ones that will come up with what particular safety 2 requirements that they will accept, and then the less 3 experienced people, who now will be reviewing those, 4 will be making the determination whether it is adequate 5 or not. 6 Now, the concern you have of losing all 7 these experienced people, who helped develop all these 8 orders, and now you're going to let contractors water 9 them down and then less experienced people decide 10 11 whether that is satisfactory. 12 MS. COOK: Yes. CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Now, let's take 440. 13 14 are concerned that we are having to give too many 15 waivers on these orders. Can you tell me what waivers you have been giving on 440 with those sites that we 16 have particular interest in? That the Board has 17 interest in. 18 MS. COOK: I'm sorry, I can't give you that 19 list right now, but I will go back and generate that 20 for you. 21 22 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Well, your concern is 23 waivers. 24 MS. COOK: I am very concerned. 25 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And I'm asking you what

1	waivers in that 440 one that is now going to be a
2	guidance.
3	MS. COOK: Let me go back to the 440.
4	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Yes.
5	MS. COOK: And the guidance issue. As I
6	said, what we're trying to do is get to what we do
7	right now in contracting. We sit down with the
8	contractor. The Program Offices sit down with the
9	contractor, and they decide which things are applicable
10	or not. And any one of those requirements could be out
11	at a contracting point.
12	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: You mean a Fire
13	Protection Order could be waived out?
14	MS. COOK: The Fire Protection Order is not
15	likely to be nor is it likely to be under this
16	rulemaking, either.
17	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: But it's a guidance now.
18	It will be a guidance. Not necessarily to be
19	enforced. Explosive safety is that another one that
20	you are giving waivers on?
21	MS. COOK: Once
22	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: As I go down through 440,
23	each and every one of these that no longer is going to
24	be mandated.

It is not mandated now, unless it goes mandated now. 1 into the contract. 2 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And I asked you what one 3 of those orders that are not in a contract. 4 MS. COOK: If it goes into the --5 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: But now you are going to 6 let the contractors come in and decide which ones they 7 want, rather than the DOE? 8 MS. COOK: DOE will decide which ones are 9 appropriate. DOE will approve it. I would like to 10 cover this in more detail in our other briefing. What 11 we are looking for is something very similar to, for 12 instance, the NRC's [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] 13 Standard Review Plan. When the NRC licenses a reactor, 14 they have a list of things that are acceptable. 15 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Or essential. Actually, 16 are essential. 17 COOK: And that is what we were MS. 18 intending to get to on this. A listing of those things 19 that are essential that are generally acceptable, and 20 maybe the way that we have stated it is not going to 21 preserve what you're looking for and what, in fact, I 22 am looking for. 23 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. 24 25 MS. COOK: And so we very much --

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CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And we're talking -- is there going to be guidance documents now rather than "orders?" Let me read something. I'm going to read from the Rule. "Proposed 851.8 would broadly define the term guidance document to include any document that sets forth information relating to implementing or otherwise complying with a requirement set forth in the proposed regulations, and that DOE has not adopted as a legally binding requirement through notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act."

MS. COOK: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Now, the Board has made in the past recommendations to the Department of Energy, to the Secretary, and they have been accepted Secretary. Now, and they by the go out as implementations in an Implementation Plan. Now, if I they are not under the Administrative read this. Procedures Act. They did not go through rule making. So all of that now is not legally required?

MS. COOK: What we are referring to there is those things that are referred to as -- under the Administrative Procedures Act -- are those things that are rules now. Those things are required by law and they will continue to be required by law.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Well, those have already

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1	gone through rulemaking?
2	MS. COOK: That's right.
3	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: But this goes back to:
4	that's not what this says. This says that nothing will
5	be legally binding unless it has gone through
6	rulemaking. The exception is the Beryllium Order.
. 7	MS. COOK: Which has gone through which
8	we are going to include verbatim.
9	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Yes.
10	MS. COOK: Those things are not legally
11	binding now.
12	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: But you're not no.
13	MS. COOK: DOE Orders are not legally
14	binding now. They are contractually binding.
15	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Are the recommendations
16	that this Committee made - this Board made - and the
17	Secretary accepted in setting specific standards that
18	were to be committed to, and which we understood were
19	committed to, but are no longer going to be binding
20	unless they go through the Administrative Procedure
21	[Act] under rulemaking? That's what this you have
22	to understand there is a history in this.
23	MS. COOK: I understand. I do understand
24	that there is a history in this. What we are trying to
25	get to is to take those things that are now orders,

1	that are not legally binding, put them in a plan that
2	then is legally binding.
3	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: By rulemaking?
4	MS. COOK: By putting them in the process
5	that we are talking about in this order, in this
6	rulemaking, by putting them into the plan or that
7	contract.
8	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: That's not what this is.
9	This is not what it says.
10	MS. COOK: So it is now legally binding.
11	When it gets put in once the set of requirements is
12	put in the contractor's plan, and it is agreed to by
13	DOE and the contractor, just like we negotiate in the
14	contract, we negotiate on this plan. We decide this is
15	the setting.
16	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: That's not what this
17	says.
18	MS. COOK: Then, in fact, that is legally
19	required.
20	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: That's not what this
21	says. It says
22	MS. COOK: Then we need to clarify the
23	statements.
24	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: You have to you better
25	get your lawyers to go back over that language in

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MS. COOK: Okay. We will do that.

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CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And you'll understand, this Committee first started to back when the Secretary, 90-2 [DOE Recommendations to Defense Nuclear Facilities: Design, Priority Construction, Operation and Decommissioning Standards], specifically back in 1990, there was an effort put by some contractor to -- that our recommendations and the Secretary's adopting of them would not be binding unless it went through rulemaking.

MS. COOK: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: The DOE rejected that, and we rejected that. Now, as I read this, you are back in the same place again, where they are going to require - legally binding - they'll have to go through rulemaking, which is a very laborious, slow moving process. And it would seem to me the wording you have here would make all of the Recommendations made to date and decisions by the Secretary to implement the specific Recommendations no longer going to be binding unless they go back through rulemaking. That's what I'm reading here.

MS. COOK: Okay. Well, we need to have a much longer conversation on this, but that's -- what we

1	are trying to do is put those things that have not gone
2	through rulemaking into their plan, get it agreed to
3	and then it does become legally binding. So you don't
4	have to go through rulemaking on every one of those.
5	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: You've got that today.
6	You have that today. You have that today.
7	MS. COOK: 440 is not legally binding.
8	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: 440. It certainly is.
9	If you get it into your contract and accept it.
10	MS. COOK: It is.
11	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And I
12	MS. COOK: Contracting space is different
13	than legal.
14	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: The same thing applies
15	today then. What you are trying to do is minimize the
16	particular requirements that can be contracted to be
17	fined on. That's what you're attempting to do through
18	this rulemaking.
19	MS. COOK: That's not what I'm attempting
20	to do.
21	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: That's what is happening
22	here. You're trying to say the 440 Rule, 440 Order,
23	is specifically pointed out to be only a guidance
24	document now, and that your staff has even told our
25	staff that they intend to get rid of it completely.

1	And I think you are watering it down significantly, and
2	it's not in the best interest of safety.
3	MS. COOK: Well, as you know, we are
4	continuing discussions with your staff, and we're also
5	looking at all the publications that we have received.
6	We are in rulemaking on this and we're certainly open
7	to discussions.
8	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And we've located
9	MS. COOK: And we will continue these
10	discussions.
11	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Well, you're open to
12	discussions. But I'm telling you, I'm going to take a
13	strong position against the way the language is
14	currently written.
15	MS. COOK: Okay.
16	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Because I think you are
17	very seriously watering it down. You talk about your
18	job being the leader leading in this area. You are
19	turning the leadership over to the contractors, that's
20	what you're doing in this proposed rule.
21	MS. COOK: I appreciate your opinions and I
22	appreciate your input on this.
23	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay.
24	MS. COOK: Thank you.

Eggenberger?

VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Yes. You talked about the Contractor Self-Assessment Program.

My view is that this is nothing new. They should have been doing this all the time.

MS. COOK: I agree.

VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: I don't believe it needs to be talked about, other than to make sure that they are doing it. I mean, that's the standard practice. I guess as all this weaves together, and we talk about oversight, DOE is going to oversee the self-assessments in that they will evaluate those, I would hope. But on the other hand, I would assume that DOE is going to oversee what the contractor is doing also and with some type of organization that will eventually feedback up to the Assistant Secretary of interest and so on.

Can you give me some thoughts on what you believe is the appropriate oversight model for EM and NNSA, from your perspective?

MS. COOK: Sure. Let me just say a couple of things. I agree that Self-Assessment Programs should have been ongoing all the time. We are really in the position of correcting some poor habits. Okay. Let me just put it that way. What do I see as the

right model for oversight? I think it best is described as "Trust, but verify." Expecting your contractors to do the things to assure that the work they are doing is being done safely in an environmentally responsible way. But making sure that we then verify that that is happening.

I believe it can be an evolutionary process with any contractor. You want to get to the point where you know that their performance is not just because they are lucky that they are doing the right things to make sure that the performance is good. And as you move forward with the contractor and you develop that competence in what they are doing, you can step back from maybe as much day-to-day oversight of what they are doing.

But I think that at first, even with the best contractor, you need to make sure that you are verifying that what they are doing is getting the performance that you want, and they know why it is happening. I often get contractors coming into my office, especially ones who have had problems in the past, and their performance has been falling down, with new statistics saying "See, aren't we great, aren't we great," pushing me very, very hard to take a stand that their performance has improved.

My question to them is always, "Why did it change? How do you know it happened?" I have been torturing a few of our contractors with that. If they can't tell me what it is they have done to improve their performance and what it is that they are doing to assure that it is happening, then as far as I'm concerned, they are just gamed numbers in a fixed report.

So it gets back to the "trust, but verify," absolutely verify, that you know that the performance that is occurring is happening for a very specific reason. Each of the Program Offices have different issues, a different workforce, different kinds of work that they do. What happens in an EM cleanup site with contractors that are, you know, laborers running heavy equipment is a much different oversight model, than that you would have for Office of Science Laboratories, than you would have for a nuclear operation.

There are different ways and different drivers for those different workforces, so I really believe that each contract office has to figure out what is the model that best fits the kind of work they do and the work fits they have. But we have to get away from the contractor depending on the Department of Energy to find their issues, to address their issues,

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and "If you don't get caught, it doesn't count," kind of attitude. We've got to get away from that.

VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Could you be more specific in regards to site oversight versus Headquarters oversight and Departmental oversight?

MS. COOK: Site oversight. Let's see, I don't know whether to start from the top down or the bottom up. Let's start from the bottom. Site oversight. I believe that having been in each of those situations, at a site oversight level, it is knowing in a day-to-day way that the operations that are being conducted by your contractor are being done in a rigorous manner, and again it depends on what kind of work that you're doing and how much that changes.

Understanding what they are accountable for and holding them accountable for that. Lots of issues with, for instance, flow down of associated requirements to subcontractors and daily workers that come in, and especially in a D&D [Deactivation and Decommissioning] environment is a big issue. The oversight that I believe should happen at a Field Office level is the kind of oversight that results in knowing what are the processes that your contractor has in place to assure safe work, to know that those processes are not something they just put on the shelf,

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are actively working those processes, they that measuring the performance and knowing what is causing what is undermining performance or that that performance, and then having people in the facilities, like the Facility Reps that watch how day-to-day operations happen in your more difficult situations, especially those that have high consequences and also those that have a variety of change, change going on It's especially of concern to me. every day.

The Headquarters Program Office, I believe, their oversight role is to assure that the Field Offices are accomplishing those goals, making sure that they understand what the contractor is doing. And also making sure that the resources are identified so that Field Office can do what they need to do. The Program Offices are acutely aware of that at Headquarters. They are trying to do both at bottoms up and tops down, sort of a definition of what should be at the Field Office. What kind of expertise should be there? What kind of information should be generated? And they are expecting the Field Offices to identify also what they need and make sure that the appropriate things are in place?

From an independent oversight level, I very much do count on Office of Independent Oversight [OA]

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and all of the other organizations including 1 Defense Board to make that independent look to see if 2 the system we put in place is working. And as I said 3 earlier, when you find something that we didn't find, 4 that we didn't even know, or we knew and didn't do 5 anything about, that is a significant statement on the 6 part of the Department that our processes are not 7 working, and we are not doing the right kind of 8 oversight at the other levels to make sure that we are 9 catching and fixing those things before someone else 10 has to come in and tell us what it is we're not doing. 11 It's hard to describe a model that is 12 generic to all of our operations. It is so different 13 operation to operation. 14 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: I would like to 15 correct something that I said previously. It isn't 20-16 It's 44 orders and guides that have our interest 17 18 in the nuclear safety issue. MS. COOK: Yes. 19 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Matthews? 2.0 DR. MATTHEWS: Yes, I want to just briefly 21 follow-up on the oversight conversation that just went 22 One of the apparent goals of the new oversight 23 policy is to take out redundancy, and we have heard 24 that in the name of efficiency, where I can understand 25

it would be efficient. The question I have is: how does taking out redundancy affect safety? Especially, in fact, you led right into my question. When the Board finds things that DOE hasn't themselves seen, which suggests to me that there isn't enough oversight internally at the Department of Energy, because that shouldn't happen.

So could you sort of balance those two conflicting things for me?

MS. COOK: Yes. First off, I will say that I believe some level of redundancy is important and critical, just as an overall statement. I think it is very important in our analysis of what is being found by oversight organizations to determine what the root cause is of the issue that is addressed. I have yet to find an issue identified by any oversight organization that wasn't known, at some level, by the line organization at some point.

However, why in the world they didn't do anything about it is always a question. Therefore, I'm not sure that it is an issue of redundancy in many of those cases so much as inappropriately defining what the requirements are of the Department and holding people accountable for fixing the issues as they occur, rather than waiting to get caught. So I think there is

1	a lot of ways to deal with that.
2	So although I believe redundancy is
3	important, I don't think that's the thing that is going
4	to fix some of these issues. I think it is some of the
5	other accountability things that need to be fixed.
6	DR. MATTHEWS: Okay.
7	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Thank you. Bev, when you
8	responded to that, you have the rule out for comment
9	from the public, and you will take our comments into
10	consideration at that time with them. The comments
11	from the Board and my comments personally are not part
12	of the
13	MS. COOK: I understand.
14	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Administrative
15	Procedure Act.
16	MS. COOK: I understand.
17	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: We're required by law to
18	review these posed changed in our orders.
19	MS. COOK: I understand that.
20	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And orders, regulations,
21	and requirements, we are required by law to do that.
22	MS. COOK: Yes.
23	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: So our comments to the
24	DOE, to you, and the others at the DOE is in
25	conjunction or connection with the law that requires us

to do it, and that's outside of the Administrative 1 Procedure Act. 2 MS. COOK: Yes, yes. 3 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: So I am going to put it 4 in the record, at this point, our letter of January 5 29th, which, in effect, summarized the long discussions 6 our staff had as these proposed rules were being 7 prepared by your people. So by this, I want to make 8 that clear for the public. 9 10 MS. COOK: Yes. That we're making our CHAIRMAN CONWAY: 11 comments in connection with the requirements of the 12 law, not the Administrative Procedures Act, in which 13 you were waiting for the public to comment on. 14 MS. COOK: Yes, and I may not have stated 15 that clearly. What I was trying to express is that we 16 very much want the Defense Board to be involved with 17 our resolution of public comments and how we --18 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Well, we try to do that. 19 We try to do that. In the past we have been very 20 successful under this section of the law. We've been 21 very successful. As the various other -- since, what 22 90-2, since 1990, we've been very successful in doing 23 24 that.

MS. COOK: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: In which case, had we been successful in working with you this time, the Board might have been in the position to come out and support what you're trying to do. But our comments under the law as we tried to get them to you were not picked up, were ignored, completely ignored. Now, you are out in the public, and we find ourselves, the Board finds our letter to not be supportive of you.

MS. COOK: I understand.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Do you have any?

MR. FORTENBERRY: Yes. Bev, I would like a little help on understanding one item here. You described the Secretary of Energy's safety goals, and you described your role as the corporate safety officer. And in further defining those roles, I got the sense you were speaking in terms of arriving at measurable goals that could then be implemented.

Can you explain or give me some opinion of how this idea is reconciled with the NNSA concept of the Site Office Manager being the risk acceptor? Do you see a conflict with that?

MS. COOK: No, I don't see a conflict, because, I think, there is a hierarchy of goals. I think that the Secretary's Statement of overall goals very appropriate for the entire Department and then as

we see through the Program Offices and ESE [Energy, Science and Environment], where the Office of Science has a different set of goals than EM has. NNSA is also moving along those lines. When they say that the Site Office is the risk taker, that doesn't mean that they are able to set aside the overall goals of the Department and take -- and make decisions that are outside of that overall goal. I think that they are very much aware of the overall goals of the Department and then have to decide on how best to do that at a Field Office level.

MR. FORTENBERRY: There was another statement that you made in your testimony that line management is responsible for implementing the rules and requirements in a manner such that the safety goals are met.

MS. COOK: Yes.

MR. FORTENBERRY: And that struck me when I heard that, because I think of the requirements and rules issued by the Department as being issued, driven from the safety goals, and the implication is that those requirements and rules, that they don't necessarily speak to the safety goals. And so there is a lot of flexibility in how you implement those such that the safety goals, which, I think, you pointed out

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are not very objective, at this point, can be met.

It kind of is the same issue as risk acceptance and determining how far do you want to go? When do you think the safety goal has been met? Does that give you the same sort of concern?

MS. COOK: Yes, let me -- what I was trying to allude to there is, in fact, the contract is between the contracting officer at the Field Office level and the contractor. And that contractor is where you decide those DOE orders and those things that are not rules that are applicable to that contract to meet those overall goals, and so that is what I was alluding to at an implementational level, at a contract level. They need to make sure that the things that are in that contract meet those overall goals.

MR. FORTENBERRY: Yes, this personally becomes quite confusing. I know the Chairman raised the issue of requirements, and we had the discussion about it being in the contract or not being in the contract. The contract is between the Field Office Manager and the contractor, so they decide what is in the contract and what isn't, and so what is the requirement, and what is not? There is also a discussion in your testimony about EH as the Corporate Safety Officer ensuring what is or isn't in the

contract, ensuring that requirements are -- you know,
the appropriate requirements are in there.

It gets pretty confusing as to who is really responsible for defining the requirements. Ιt simpler if the like it would be a lot seems requirements were not so negotiable at all levels. do get the impression, and just from listening, that it is quite confusing, not very straightforward in terms of who is really making the call on it. I really was surprised at the statement you made that there was some consideration of EH being the exemption authority as opposed to the Program Secretarial Office. pretty significant.

MS. COOK: It is.

MR. FORTENBERRY: And it speaks pretty directly to some of the discussions we heard in previous hearings from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, as well as NR [Naval Reactors] and the way they operate. They have all of the exemption authority resting in Headquarters. Can you give me a little more discussion on this idea that EH would be the exemption authority?

MS. COOK: I don't have all the information on that, but I believe that it is not just the safety orders, but other orders in addition where there is

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consideration of changing the exemption authority from the PSO to the Office of Primary Interest. And so that is under discussion within the Department right now and under review within the Department right now. And I can't tell you what the review cycle is on that right now, but the EH staff is actively involved in that discussion.

Right now, exemptions to safety orders, when a Program Office -- how it's working right now for us, when a Program Office is considering an exemption, they contact EH and ask us for our opinion. Okay. I was getting copies of exemption approvals from Program Offices, and I would get a copy of them for specific issues, whether it was exemption for use, for something that someone was approving, that kind of thing.

And I started asking my staff, you know, are we okay with this? And then they started giving me that feedback loop of yes, here is where we asked, and here is how we played in that decision, but it is not a formal process. So I am actually very interested in maybe considering how that might change and whether if it is not a complete change to the Office of Primary Interest in making the exemptions, that at least somehow we formalized the concurrence process of the Office of Primary Interest.

1	Right now, it says if you don't express
2	your exemption or your opinion on this within 30 days,
3	it's a done deal.
4	MR. FORTENBERRY: Speak now or
5	MS. COOK: Yes.
6	MR. FORTENBERRY: forever
7	MS. COOK: That's it. Exactly. I'm not
8	sure if that's formal or not.
9	MR. FORTENBERRY: And as I understand the
10	previous discussion, this would essentially be a
11	contract. This is a contract negotiation point, these
12	exemptions, and so EH would be, in a sense, involved
13	more directly in contract terms.
1.4	MS. COOK: And at this point that we have
15	some concurrence level within these contracts, but this
16	actually is speaking two things: after the contracts
17	are in place and then exemptions are asked for.
18	MR. FORTENBERRY: Yes, okay. And a couple
19	more, John, if you don't mind. I did there was some
20	discussion about the EH role in evaluating performance
21	and crosscutting trends.
22	MS. COOK: Yes.
23	MR. FORTENBERRY: And listing all the
24	Program Offices that you are involved in doing that.
25	And, of course, the exception is NNSA. Can you help me

a little bit with that relationship as to why NNSA 1 stands alone or apart from your ability to provide 2 crosscutting evaluation and identifying concerns? 3 MS. COOK: It does not stand apart. 4 However, we have a formal relationship with the Under 5 Secretary for ESE, with Under Secretary Card, in how we 6 go about doing that and how we provide information to 7 him and back to his Program Offices. We also do that 8 crosscutting review of NNSA's performance, and we 9 document that. We are formalizing those relationships 10 with Ambassador Brooks, and he is very interested in 11 that information and wants to become more familiar with 12 it and get more of that. 13 We also provide information between the two 14 15 sides of DOE. They both, Mr. Card and Ambassador Brooks, are very interested in what the other one has 16 17 got going, too. And we are trying to more facilitate 18 lessons learned between those two organizations. 19 use an example that we have got going right now, and 20 that is the incident that happened at NRF 21 Reactors Facility] out in Idaho with the container in the storage pool that exploded. 22 23 MR. FORTENBERRY: Yes. 24 MS. COOK: Okav. You had a container that 25 been stored much longer than it had been

anticipated. It leaked. Degradation of seals. It leaked. It resealed itself. Built up hydrogen, and it exploded. When we started looking into that, we suggested to NNSA that that was an important lesson learned for the entire complex, not just on storage containers or even just degradation of organic seals, which are both important issues, and we ought to address that around the complex.

But also the issue of the performance of

materials long beyond the life they were originally intended for, and so we are pursuing the lessons learned on that to distribute across the complex. So things that are happening in the NNSA world are very important to the ESE, and we're facilitating that, too.

MR. FORTENBERRY: And EH's role in regards to NNSA, at this point, is sort of a negotiated role? It's one that you don't have. For example, I sense from your testimony that you actually require that issues be addressed. You point out deficiencies and performance, etcetera. And that's not the case with NNSA. It's more of communication.

MS. COOK: Some of it is communication, but when there are systems to be implemented complex-wide, for instance, suspect and counterfeit items, we send letters both to NNSA and to ESE, that say, "This is the

system that is being implemented. Please, implement this within your organization."

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MR. FORTENBERRY: One final point. was a discussion about a desire to minimize separate budget efforts between, presumably, NNSA and EM: this is probably the frequent example, because that hasn't We can do -- I think that's the worked very well. issues or actions that we generally refer to crosscutting activities. And clearly, what we see currently is that those separations, those separate budget issues, are alive and well, and we see them in Software Quality Assurance actions and in the response to the Board's Administrative Control Recommendation Quality Assurance Improvement. We see very distinct activities between the two as opposed to a combined crosscutting Department effort. Do I take in your testimony you to say that you are trying to address that and eliminate those differences, such that it is a common effort?

MS. COOK: We are trying to coordinate those differences to make sure that, you know, things can be done differently for different applications, but we need to make sure that we get to the right outcomes at the end of the day.

MR. FORTENBERRY: Yes.

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MS. COOK: And we are working very hard to 1 get to that, but I realize we are not there yet. 2 MR. FORTENBERRY: And as corporate safety 3 officer, you are responsible for these crosscutting 4 issues? 5 MS. COOK: Yes, yes. But I will say where 6 we're seeing specifically funding issues is, for 7 instance, in both '04 and also in the '05 budget 8 submittal, we have increased funding within the Office 9 of EH for Quality Assurance, for instance, and Software 10 QA, those sorts of things. Things that in the past 11 have been funded by the Separate Program Offices, and 12 people like the QA working group went around with their 13 hat out trying to make sure they got enough money for 14 We have located that within the Office of EH and 15 that. adjusted funding accordingly. 16 17 MR. FORTENBERRY: Okay. Thanks. CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Bev, one of the lessons 18 learned you didn't mention from the Columbia Accident 19 was the loss of technical competence within the feds. 20 MS. COOK: Yes. 21 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Federal force. And then 22 23 the turning over to contractors more of the responsibilities 24 than the feds turning their responsibilities over to the contractor. Now, that is 25

a lesson learned that I would suggest DOE keep in mind 1 as they move ahead with this rulemaking. 2 MS. COOK: I understand. 3 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Eggenberger? 4 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: That's all I 5 have. 6 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Matthews? 7 DR. One last question or MATTHEWS: 8 9 We sent over to you a letter, a data request, which you had reviewed, and it was really to give you 10 the opportunity to make sure the record was complete on 11 the set of public hearings on DOE and NNSA's current 12 oversight and contract management models. 13 And I just 14 wanted to give you one last opportunity to say, "Yes, 15 you've got the full story," or are there other things 16 that we should be hearing? 17 MS. COOK: I think that there is several 18 things. We discussed that before the meeting started 19 today with some of the staff. There are some things that we would like to submit into that record, and I 20 21 know we have a few days to do that. For instance, the 22 subject that we discussed about line management and the 23 examples that we have on that. I would like to make 24 sure that that gets into the record, so you see some 25 examples of that on how EH's direction flows down and

back up through the line organization, so we will 1 submit that. 2 DR. MATTHEWS: Okay. 3 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: There may be some more 4 questions coming to you. We'll keep the record open 5 until March 9th. 6 MS. COOK: Okay. 7 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: So the record will be 8 maintained and there may be some additional questions 9 we will supply to you. And I thank you for your time 10 here today. Is there anyone in the audience that would 11 12 like to speak? If not then, we will recess subject to the call of the Chair. Thank you all. 13 MS. COOK: 14 Thank you. 15 (Whereupon, the Public Meeting was 16 concluded at 10:44 a.m.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25