



## Turning the Tide in Europe, 1942-1944

Student Name \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Germany-First or Japan-First?

1. Telegram from U.S. Naval Attaché in Chungking, China, to Secretary of the Navy, December 19, 1941: <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/t16b02.html>

THE FOLLOWING IS MY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTS AT PRESENT.

MY OWN OBSERVATIONS PLUS "INSIDE INFORMATION" INDICATE THAT THERE IS NO TIME TO LOSE. WE MUST AT ALL COSTS HOLD SINGAPORE; AND TO GAIN THIS END WE CANNOT DEPEND UPON THE BRITISH FACILITIES, THEIR ABILITY, OR THEIR INITIATIVE TO ACT PROMPTLY. FOR THE DEFENSE OF BURMA THEY HAVE BEEN SEEKING AMERICAN VOLUNTEER AIR FORCE AND CHINESE TROOPS. OUR FIGHTER PLANES AND LIGHT BOMBERS WITH ADEQUATE SPARE PARTS AND GROUND STAFF ACCOMPANYING THEM MUST BE SENT IMMEDIATELY BY CARRIERS CONVOYED IF NECESSARY BY OUR ENTIRE FLEET.

WITH THEM SHOULD COME AT LEAST FOUR DIVISIONS OF TROOPS INCLUDING ARMoured UNITS. THESE ARE FOR ASSIGNMENT AFTER ARRIVAL TO THE FAR EAST THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

FOR THE CHINESE GROUND FORCES LIGHTER ARMAMENT MUST ALSO COME QUICKLY FROM EXISTING SUPPLIES AND THE CHINESE NOTIFIED FOR THE ONLY POSSIBLE FIELD FOR FINAL DEFEAT OF JAPANESE ARMY IS IN CHINA. THE PRESENT EXPECTATIONS OF USEFUL ACTIVITY BY THE CHINESE ARE ILL-CONCEIVED DUE TO THEIR SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT, POOR CONDITION OF THEIR TROOPS, AND THEIR FEAR OF LOSING WHAT EQUIPMENT REMAINS TO THEM.

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI CHEK'S [the leader of China] ORDERS FOR COUNTER-ATTACKS CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY EXECUTED, AND THE OPERATIONS WHICH ARE BEING SO WIDELY HAILED IN THE PRESS ARE LARGELY ILLUSORY. DUE TO THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK THERE IS A DANGEROUS UNDER-CURRENT IN CERTAIN POWERFUL OFFICIAL CIRCLES WHICH DEPRECATES AMERICAN AND ENGLISH PRESTIGE AND OUR ABILITY TO WIN THIS WAR. THAT IT IS ALREADY TOO LATE IS EVEN BEING SAID BY SOME.

THERE IS ALSO OCCURRING A RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH MAY BECOME ACUTE AND BREAK THE GENERALISSIMO'S CONTROL IF SINGAPORE FALLS. THERE ARE OTHER INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN CHINA WHICH HAVE LONG OPPOSED CHIANG KAI CHEK'S FAITH IN US AND SUCH A SITUATION WOULD PERMIT THESE TO ATTAIN CONTROL AND ABANDON THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND UTILIZE THE PRESENT JAP DESIRE TO SETTLE THE CHINA WAR TO OBTAIN A

TOLERABLE PEACE, THEREBY GIVING THE JAPS FREE ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF CHINA AND THE MANPOWER OF CHINA, THUS FULLY DEVELOPING THE LONG PREDICTED "YELLOW PERIL." INDIA IS AT LEAST AS VULNERABLE TO OUR REVERSES AS IS CHINA. GERMAN AND JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IS VERY STRONG THERE, AND OURS IS CONSPICUOUS BY ITS ABSENCE. A CRYING NECESSITY IS A STRONG (PREDOMINATELY SO) BROADCASTING STATION TO THE FAR EAST; PREFERABLY LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.

UNLESS WE BREAK JAPAN QUICKLY WE SHALL LOSE FUTURE CHINESE AND INDIAN COOPERATION AND HAVE NO POINT IN FAR EAST FROM WHICH TO OPERATE. WE MUST ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT RUSSIAN ASCENDANCY WHICH MAY NOT LAST LONG. GERMANY UNDOUBTEDLY WILL LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK ELSEWHERE SOON TO PREVENT BRITISH HELP TO FAR EAST THEN STRIKE AGAIN AT RUSSIA IN SPIRING WITH JAPAN ALSO INVADING SIBERIA. WE MUST EMPLOY ALL POSSIBLE FORCE WITH SAME DARING THAT ENEMY HAS STRUCK AND WITHOUT THOUGHT OF LOSSES TO MEET THIS CRISIS. OTHERWISE WE SHALL FIND OURSELVES FACING A CONTROLLED AND HOSTILE FAR EAST AS WELL AS EUROPE WITH NO POSSIBLE FOOTHOLD FOR COMEBACK.

Question	Answer
How does the Naval Attaché portray the British troops in the Pacific?	
How does he characterize the situation in China? What would be the outcome if Japan took China?	
What would be the benefit of an American Broadcasting Station in the Far East?	
Why does he feel that an immediate attack in the Pacific is necessary?	

2. Memorandum by the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff, American-British Grand Strategy, December 31, 1941: <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box1/t05uu01.html>

“I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A[merican] – B[ritish] Staff conversations in February 1941 it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the war, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A[merican] – B[ritish] strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.”

**II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY**

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows...

- a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.
- b. The maintenance of essential communications.
- c. Closing and tightening the ring around Germany.
- d. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.
- e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.
- f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests...and denying to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.”

Question	Answer
What is the overall grand strategy of the Allied forces? Why?	
Why, in the grand strategy, are only minimal supplies/support provided to the Pacific theater?	
By what means did the allied powers plan to “wear down” Germany?	

3. “Probable Maximum Scale of Enemy Attack on West Coast of North America”:

<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box1/a05f01.html>

“So long as a United States capital ship force is retained in the Pacific, it is extremely improbable that the Japanese would venture to launch a large-scale expedition against a North American objective without battleship cover. It must also be assumed that apart from the destroyer escorts for the convoys destroyers would be essential for A/A [anti-aircraft] and A/S [anti-submarine] protection for the battleships.

“The diagram attached to this Annex illustrates the large distances to be covered and shows that even if the enemy secured Dutch Harbour and Hawaii, it would be necessary to carry out the refueling of destroyers at sea.

“While the refueling of an expedition at sea in hostile waters cannot be ruled out positively, the complications and risks of such an operation on a large scale are sufficiently great to make it extremely unlikely. Added to this factor is the problem of maintaining a large-scale expedition over 4,000 miles from its base....

### CONCLUSIONS

“So long as the United States maintains a battle fleet in the Pacific, large-scale seaborne expeditions against the western seaboard of North America and the employment of capital ship forces in this area are considered impracticable. The most probable enemy threat is carrier-borne air attacks and sporadic naval bombardment, but a small-scale destructive raid cannot be ignored. In view of the great distances over which these operations would have to be undertaken, it is probably not necessary to provide a strong scale of defense except at selected points of great importance, which can be covered by the normal form of coast and air defense supplemented by mobile land and air striking forces.”

Question	Answer
According to the military planners, how likely is it that the Japanese might attack the West Coast?	
If such an attack were to occur, what might be consequences be?	

4. General Douglas MacArthur to General George C. Marshall, February 4, 1942:

<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box5/a60f01.html>

“In compliance with your previous directive that from time to time I present my strategic conception of the situation I take this opportunity of presenting what I believe is a fatal mistake on the part of the Democratic Allies. The Japanese are sweeping southward in a great offensive and the Allies are

attempting merely to stop them by building up forces in their front. This method, as has almost universally been the case in war, will fail. Such movements can only be negated by thrusts not at the enemy's strength but at his weakness. The lines of weakness from time immemorial have been the lines of communication. In this case they are stretched out over two thousand miles of sea with the whole line subject to American sea thrust. This line is not held by enemy bombers but is held by scattered Naval elements.

“A sea threat would immediately relieve the pressure on the South and is the only way that pressure can be relieved. A great naval victory on our part is not necessary to accomplish this mission; the threat alone would go far toward the desired end. The enemy would probably not engage his entire Fleet in actual combat. If he did and lost, the war would be over. If he did and won, the losses he would sustain would still cripple his advance and take from him the initiative. You must be prepared to take heavy losses, just so heavy losses are inflicted in return. I wish to reiterate that his bomber strength is practically entirely engaged on his southern front and represents little menace to such a naval thrust. With only minor threat from the fleets of Germany and Italy, the American and British navies can assemble without serious jeopardy the force to make this thrust.

“I unhesitatingly predict that if this is not done the plan upon which we are now working, based upon the building up of air supremacy in the Southwest Pacific, will fail, the war will be indefinitely prolonged and its final outcome will be jeopardized. Counsels of timidity based on upon theories of safety first will not win against such an aggressive and audacious adversary as Japan. No building program, no matter of what proportions, will be able to overtake the initial advantages the enemy with every chance of success is trying to gain. The only way to beat him is to fight him incessantly. Combat must not be avoided but must be sought so that the ultimate policy of attrition can at once become effective. No matter what the theoretical odds may be against us, if we fight him we will beat him. We have shown that here [in the Philippines].

“In submitting these views I may be exceeding the proper scope of my office and therefore do so with great hesitancy. My excuse, if excuse is necessary, is that from my present point of vantage I can see the whole strategy of the Pacific perhaps clearer than anyone else. If agreeable to you I would appreciate greatly the presentation of this view to the highest authority.”

Question	Answer
What, according to MacArthur, is Japan's main weakness?	
Why does he believe that a naval threat is the best way to "relieve pressure" on the Philippines?	
What does MacArthur mean by a "war of attrition," and why does he advocate it?	

5. General Douglas MacArthur to General George C. Marshall, February 16, 1942:

<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box5/a60t01.html>

“The unexpectedly early capitulation of Singapore emphasizes the fact that the opportunity for a successful attack upon the hostile lines of communication is rapidly vanishing. If this enemy victory is followed by further success in the NEI [Netherlands East Indies] the sensitiveness of his lines of communication will largely disappear due to consolidation of his positions in the south. A determined effort in force made now would probably attract the assistance of Russia who will unquestionably not move in this area until some evidence is given of concrete effort by the Allies. The opportunities still exist for a complete reversal of the situation. It will soon, however, be too late for such a movement.”

Question	Answer
What result does MacArthur believe would come from a determined effort against Japan?	

6. Memorandum from Admiral Ernest J. King to Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff:

<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a44f02.html>

“The Pacific Theater is an area for which the United States bears full strategic responsibility. The recent Japanese successes in Burma, added to previous successes, leaves the Japanese free to choose any new line of action they see fit, including an attack in force on Australia, on the Australia-Hawaii line of communications, on Hawaii, or on Alaska. Even now they are massing strong land, sea, and air forces in the Mandate Area beyond our range of observation.

“The basic strategic plan on which we are now operating is to hold in the Pacific. I am not convinced that the forces now there or allocated to that theater are sufficient to ‘hold’ against a determined attack in force by the Japanese, an attack which they can initiate very soon. The mounting of BOLERO [the concentration of forces in Great Britain for an eventual invasion of Europe] must not be permitted to interfere with our vital needs in the Pacific. I am convinced that the Japanese are not going to allow us to ‘hold’ but are going to drive and drive hard.

“The disastrous consequences which would result if we are unable to hold the present position in the Pacific Areas are self-evident. We have already seen, in the Far East and Burma, the results of being ‘spread out too thin’; we must not commit the same error in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

“Important as the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific problem is no less so, and is certainly the more urgent—it must be faced now. Quite apart from any idea of future advance in this theater, we must see to it that we are actually able to maintain our present positions. We must not permit diversion of our forces to any proposed operation in any other theater to the extent that we find ourselves unable to fulfill our obligation to implement our basic strategic plan in the Pacific Theater, which is to hold what we have against any attack that the Japanese are capable of launching against us.”

Question	Answer
Why does King believe that the Pacific Theater is so important?	
What, according to Admiral King, was the initial U.S. strategy in the Pacific? What was wrong with that Strategy?	

7. General George C. Marshall to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 6, 1942:  
<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a44f03.html>

“While I agree that we must hold in the Pacific, I do not concur that this is our ‘basic strategic plan.’ My view, and I understood it to be your decision prior to my visit to England, was that our major effort would be to concentrate immediately for offensive action against Germany from the British Islands. The most pressing need, in the opinion of the Army General Staff, is to sustain Russia as an active, effective participant in the war.... Every possible effort, we think, must be made to draw off German forces from the Russian front. We believe that this may be done by combined British and American operations in Western Europe. Hence, the urgency of ‘Bolero’ [the buildup of U.S. forces in Britain]. Only by a complete and whole-hearted acceptance by all concerned, British and American, and by the exertion of every practicable effort on the part of all, can ‘Bolero’ have any chance of success. The increases in U.S. Army Air Force suggested [by Admiral King] for Australia and the South Pacific Islands, if executed this summer, would have the effect of postponing, by more than two months, the initiation of an American air offensive in Western Europe. The increase of U.S. ground forces to Australia would, in effect, eliminate the U.S. from participation in the most difficult and vital phase of ‘Bolero’....

“As far as Australia and the South Pacific are concerned, it is impossible to make every point in the island chain impregnable to ‘any attack the Japanese are capable of launching.’ The enemy still retains the initiative and, because of his freedom of movement, is able to concentrate the bulk of his strength at any point of his own choosing. Moreover, our forces in the island garrisons throughout that region have no positive effect on the enemy, unless he chooses to attack them, except for heavy and medium bombers. Additional forces allotted there must come from those set up for ‘Bolero.’ All over the world we are striving now to meet our firm commitments in air equipment. Beyond this, new and urgent requests are constantly received for our air forces for the Middle East, India and Burma, and for additional strength in the British Isles. There is no reserve to draw on. The initial air forces set up for ‘Bolero’ are still undergoing organization and training.”

Question	Answer
How does Marshall’s assessment differ from that of King?	

8. Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to General George C. Marshall, Admiral Ernest J. King, and the Hon. Harry L. Hopkins, July 15, 1942:  
<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box3/t39e01.html>

“It is my present view of the world picture that:

- a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP [an invasion of Europe across the English Channel] becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.
- b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

“The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

- 1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
- 2) Loss of Syria.
- 3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.
- 4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.
- 5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.
- 6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.
- 7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.

“I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible.... It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is serious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.”



Question	Answer
What, according to Roosevelt, is the common aim of the United Nations?	
Why does FDR believe that it is so important to prevent the Axis from conquering the Middle East?	
Why does FDR believe that the defeat of Germany is more important than the defeat of Japan?	



## Turning the Tide in Europe, 1942-1944

Student Name \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

### Strategy in Europe

1. Study of European Operations, 1942: <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a44y05.html>

### “Russian-German Situation

There is no doubt that in the nearest future Soviet Russia will have to face a new German offensive. The concentration of the German land forces seems to be drawing to its close. Divisions which had been transferred to western Europe for the winter months of 1941-1942 as well as the newly organized units have either already arrived or are on their way to the eastern front. The Germans will endeavor to crush the Soviet Union by means of operations carried out on a vast scale. It will most probably be their supreme offensive effort, and its result will bear upon the ultimate issue of the world conflict.

The Soviet Government are applying special tactics towards their Allies, whom they maintain in ignorance of their forces and possibilities. It, nevertheless, seems certain that, notwithstanding the great power of resistance of their peoples, the Soviet Government are considering not so much the prospect of a compromise with the Third Reich, as the possibility of a war crisis, if they were left to themselves in complete isolation at the approach of the spring campaign.

### Alternative Results of Russian-German Situation

Under the above circumstances, it would appear correct to anticipate one of the following alternatives with regard to the final issue of the imminent developments on the eastern front:

1. Either Russia will successfully resist the German offensive, and, even in spite of further loss of territory, will occasion the further considerable wastage and exhaustion of the potential of the German armed forces. In this case, no matter how far the Red Armies would be pushed back, the final issue would be evident: Germany would be defeated.
2. Or the German offensive will be sufficiently powerful to threaten the complete destruction of the Soviet Army. In that case, Great Britain with the United States and their cooperating Allies would find themselves in 1943, or perhaps in the late autumn of 1942, in the face of German forces sufficiently powerful to eliminate any possibility of an allied offensive action on the continent. A similar course of events would completely reverse the present dislocation of the German armed forces in Europe. The armored and motorized divisions from the eastern front as well as the major part of the Luftwaffe [the German air force] would take the place of the inferior divisions...which are at the moment stationed in western Europe, and the second-rate units would be sent to occupy the conquered areas of Russia.

### Conclusions as to the Effect of the Above on Allied Operations

The conclusions are easily drawn and clear.

Should the first alternative arise, it would be necessary to take advantage, even at a great price, of the engagement of the whole German forces on the Russian front and the almost complete exposure in western Europe, in order to obtain a decisive issue by an offensive on the continent and by striking at the heart of Germany.

It would be necessary to commence the immediate realization of the conditions preliminary to this action, which would be started by the attainment of mastery in the air over western Europe and the detailed preparation of a landing.

The second alternative should be avoided at all costs. The defeat of Russia would put in doubt the final issue of the war, or at any rate prolong for many years the armed struggle, which would have to be calculated to exhaust the enemy and leave no possibility to seek an issue by an open battle on the continent. Even in the anticipation of a successful German offensive in the East, the only sure and effective assistance to the Russian effort would be the establishment of a second front. The estimate of the forces left by the Germans in western and central Europe at the time of their first offensive against Russia in 1941, is commonly known. The principle of economy of effort is a canon of German strategy and during the current year will undoubtedly be applied to a similar extent. It should be expected that Hitler will concentrate to the maximum his forces in the East for the offensive of 1942 and only leave the remnants of inferior units for defense in the West....

#### Allied Landing on the European Continent

There can be no doubt that independently of the date at which the Allied Forces will be capable of landing on the European continent and regardless of what area is chosen for that purpose, it will be a united and common operation of the land, naval, and air forces.

This operation should be directed by one man in command of the whole armed forces and disposing of one General Staff for the whole of the forces.

Such a Staff should be established without delay, in order to commence the study and preparation of the future, undoubtedly difficult and complex, operations. It would consist of officers from the General Staffs of those Allied countries whose forces will be employed, and of the countries upon whose territory the landing operations will take place.”

Question	Answer
Describe the situation on the Eastern Front (that is, the war between Germany and Soviet Russia).	
What are the implications of this situation for Allied strategy in Europe?	

2. Combined Intelligence Committee, German Strategy in 1943:

<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/a18i01.html>

“Military Situation as of March 24, 1943. There is good reason to believe that the strength and speed of the Russian assaults surprised and worried the German High Command....

Desperate efforts by the Germans are making good, to some degree, the decline in manpower in the Army; and to this extent the German position has for the moment improved, though the quality of recruits is probably lower than normal.

However, Germany did suffer a series of major defeats in Russia and has lost the equivalent of more than 40 divisions.... The net German loss on this front, taking into account some 17 divisions moved from France to Russia since November, is approximately 23 divisions.

In her retreat Germany’s losses of heavy equipment have been serious, particularly with respect to aircraft and motor transport. Those losses and the decline in industrial output, due mainly to the extensive comb-out of manpower from industry, which is being replaced by less efficient foreign labor, women, youths or prisoners of war, and the effect of air bombing present a calculated risk of reduced output of war materials which Germany appears to be assuming in the light of the results she hopes to accomplish this year....

The number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries has been reduced to the very low level of 33, of which only 9 are offensive.... There are clear indications that the German divisions arriving in Russia from France have, in some cases, gone straight into action and have been allowed no period either for acclimatization or training.

It is unlikely that during 1943 there will be such a change in the course of events in Russia as would enable the Germans to withdraw divisions from there sufficient both to meet their existing commitments and at the same time to mount any major offensive operations elsewhere.

In the Mediterranean area Germany was strategically surprised by the Allied landing in North Africa. She has sustained reverses and is meeting with difficulties in finding the necessary means to counter this situation and its possible repercussions in Italy and the Balkans...”

Question	Answer
How, according to this document, has the situation in Europe changed since early 1942 (as laid out in the previous document)?	

**3. Conduct of War in 1943-1944:** <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/a17d02.html>

**“3. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN AFRICAN AREAS**

a. Secure the lines of communications in the ATLANTIC by defeating the U-Boat and removing other threats to these sea communications.

b. European area

(1) Conduct a full scale assault from the UNITED KINGDOM against the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing GERMANY'S war potential and to making feasible a cross-channel operation and exploitation from lodgments on the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the UNITED KINGDOM for tasks (1) and (2).

(4) Prepare for and return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. African area

(1) Accomplish HUSKY [the Allied invasion of Sicily].

(2) After the completion of HUSKY, or in the event that HUSKY is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area. These operations will be designed:

(a) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from MEDITERRANEAN bases;

(b) To continue support to RUSSIA by the diversion of AXIS forces and materials;

(c) To force dispersion of AXIS forces in order to facilitate a cross-channel operation; and

(d) To maintain the security of our positions and communications in the MEDITERRANEAN area.

The strength of the forces to be employed in the MEDITERRAN will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-channel operation in 1944. U.S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the MEDITERRANEAN east of SICILY.”

Question	Answer
What do the Allies hope to accomplish by the end of 1944?	
Which takes priority, the cross-channel invasion or Mediterranean operations?	



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**Scavenger Hunt:** Using the interactive map ([http://development.vbcomm.net/15332\\_NEH/#](http://development.vbcomm.net/15332_NEH/#); click on World War II Lesson Plan 2), answer the following questions:

Question	Answer
This discovery allowed the United States to locate and destroy U-Boats.	
On what date did Germany withdraw its U-Boats from the North Atlantic?	
What did the Allies fear that Rommel's forces might capture late in 1942?	
Which battle stopped Rommel's advance in North Africa?	
In what country did Allied forces land in November 1942?	
What country's military forces resisted this landing?	
By the middle of November 1942, this country was firmly in allied hands.	
When Hitler informed Rommel that his troops could not evacuate Africa, Rommel retreated to this country to make a last desperate stand.	
This battle, on February 19, 1943, showed the inexperience of the American troops.	
This country was considered the "soft underbelly" of the Axis.	
The successful Allied conquest of this island led the Italian government to initiate peace negotiations.	
When Italy intended to surrender, how did Germany respond?	
Germany, expecting an Allied landing on this Italian beach, put up a fierce resistance.	

German troops “dug in” for the winter of 1943/44 here.	
Why did Allied military planners begin to focus on “Operation Overlord” rather than the Italian campaign?	
Where did Allied troops land on January 22, 1944?	
This was the focus of the main assault on the Gustav Line in early 1944.	
US forces entered this capital city on June 5, 1944.	
By the end of August 1944, all of the southern portions of this country were firmly under Allied control.	
While this line did not break by the end of December 1944, allied forces were able to divert numerous German soldiers from the fighting in France.	



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### The War against the U-Boats: A Document-Based Question

Using the following documents, answer the following DBQ in the proper format.

Question: Analyze the effectiveness of the German U-Boat Campaign during World War II.

**Document A: Admiral Ernest J. King, First Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 23 April 1944, pp. 79-82:**

[http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/wwii/CNO.reports/report\\_1.txt](http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/wwii/CNO.reports/report_1.txt)

“The submarine war--particularly the Atlantic phase of it--has been a matter of primary concern since the outbreak of hostilities. Maintenance of the flow of ocean traffic has been, and continues to be, a vital element of all war plans.

“Operating on exterior lines of communication on almost every front, the United Nations have been dependent largely upon maritime transportation. The success of overseas operations, landing attacks, the maintenance of troops abroad and the delivery of war materials to Russia and other Allies concerned primarily with land operations has depended to a large extent upon the availability of shipping and the ability to keep it moving. Shipping potentialities have been the major factor--often the controlling factor--in most of the problems with which the Allied High Command has had to deal.

“The principal menace to shipping has been the large fleet of submarines maintained by Germany. Our enemies have employed the submarine on a world-wide scale, but the area of greatest intensity has always been the Atlantic Ocean where the bulk of German U-Boats have operated.

... “The primary mission of this underwater navy was to cut the sea routes to the British Isles, and the enemy undersea forces went to work on this task promptly and vigorously.

... “It was not until more than a month after the declaration of war that U-Boats began to expand their areas of operation. The first move took the form of an incursion into our coastal waters in January 1942. We had prepared for this by gathering on our eastern seaboard our scant resources in coastal antisubmarine vessels and aircraft consisting chiefly of a number of yachts and miscellaneous small craft taken over by the Navy in 1940 and 1941. To reinforce this group the Navy accelerated its program of acquiring such fishing boats and pleasure craft as could be used and supplied them with such armaments as they could carry. For patrol purposes we employed all available aircraft--Army as well as Navy. The help of the Civil Air Patrol was gratefully accepted. This heterogeneous force was useful in keeping lookout and in rescuing survivors of sunken ships. It may have interfered, too, to some extent with the freedom of U-boat movement, but the heavy losses we suffered in coastal waters during the early months of 1942 gave abundant proof of the already well known fact that stout hearts in little boats can not handle an opponent as tough as the submarine.”



**Document B: U.S. Senate, Report on the Navy and the War, 78<sup>th</sup> Cong, 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., October 18, 1943:**  
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/USN/77-1s107.html>

“The United States is shipping food and equipment to at least 32 different fronts, some of them 17,000 miles from the point of origin...After supplies and equipment have run the gantlet of German submarines, mines, and aircraft, most of it has to be hauled in trucks 300-1,200 miles to the front itself. Dozens of locomotives and thousands of tons of coal have to be shipped from England to operate the North African railroads. In contrast, the enemy has only to send his supplies across between 50 and 150 miles of water, and fly any type of plane direct to the front. Supply routes of the United States and Britain to north Africa are never less than 1,400 miles and often several thousand miles.”

**Document C: “Battle of the Atlantic: Allied Communication Intelligence”, Chapter I: Brief Review of the War in the Atlantic up to December 1942:**  
<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/Ultra/SRH-009/SRH009-1.html>

...”When Germany declared war on the United States, a routine shift to the West brought the U-boat into the greenest pasture the war was ever to offer. With the assistance of refueling stations at sea, U-boats pressed the war into harbors and river mouths of our own shores.... the rapid depletion of the Allied merchant fleet at the source of Allied supplies constituted the greatest single threat of defeat ever encountered in our war with Germany. Going on the high tide of Japanese conquests in the East and German conquests in Europe, Russia, and North Africa, 1942's appalling loss of shipping was a major factor in the tense gloom which awakened the US to the prospect of a long and costly struggle. It is in the province of this history, however, to point out that the German Navy was achieving this victory with an operational fleet still small when compared with the fleet that launched the North Atlantic offensive of the winter of 1942-43. The sinkings of June 1942 (626,158 tons) were achieved by the efforts of 60 to 65 U-boats in operation. The following winter the German Navy could put 180 U-boats into the Atlantic, 120 of which were operating while 60 were outbound or returning.

... “The invasion of North Africa served to emphasize the principle U-boat task, namely, the destruction of the convoys bound for England and Russia, by adding still another major convoy lane—still another artery of final defeat. The enlarged U-boat fleet was forced to undertake an intensive campaign against major convoys in the winter of 1942-1943...It was equally clear to the Allies that the one thing needed at this stage of the war was victory over the U-boat. Everything depended on maintaining our sea lanes. Could this be done, it was but a matter of time until the accumulation of materials would overwhelm the Axis. Hopeful as November may have been in view of the North African landing, Rommel's retreat, and Stalingrad, the U-boat had met the threat by its greatest single month of overall success.”

**Document D: “Battle of the Atlantic: Allied Communication Intelligence”, Chapter II: The U-Boat and Allied Naval Communications Intelligence:**  
<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/Ultra/SRH-009/SRH009-2.html>

“In stressing the strategic significance of the U-boat weapon itself, namely, to destroy the sea communications of an enemy dependent on merchant shipping, the U-boat Commander's Handbook stressed the following basic principles:

- i. “...the characteristic property and greatest strength of the U-boat is its invisibility.” This comes from its ability to submerge. “Invisibility” gives the U-boat its own advantage in combat: surprise.

"invisibility" determines the entire theory of U-boat tactics, even in defense, which depends on escape underwater.

- ii. To keep its secret strength, the U-boat must "not be seen, not heard, not be located (*geortet*)" before or during an attack. If the U-boat is located by the enemy, "...it loses almost all prospect of success."

**Document E: “Battle of the Atlantic: Allied Communication Intelligence”, Chapter II: The U-Boat and Allied Naval Communications Intelligence:**

<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/Ultra/SRH-009/SRH009-2.html>

... “The U-boat was at a distinct disadvantage throughout this period [1943] because it had lost its "invisibility." Its movements, were known, whether by decryption intelligence or D/F, or radar, or sonic devices--or by a combination of all these Allied location devices. It was the U-boat that was more and more "surprised."...

...Every kind of U-boat radiation was studied: heat and electronic which might be picked up in special allied receivers, U-boat transmitter radiations in tuning, U-boat receiver radiations, and their, own radio transmissions D/F'd by Allied intercept net. In truth, the critical radiations were the radio transmissions and the receiver was the Allied intercept net. But the Allies were not simply D/F'ing the unit transmissions, they were reading the messages--U-boat Command's as well as those from units. U-boat Command's messages were more revealing than those from individual U-boats..."

**Document F: “Battle of the Atlantic: Allied Communication Intelligence”, Chapter III: Winter/Spring U-Boat Offensive and the U-Boats’ Defeat:**

<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/Ultra/SRH-009/SRH009-3.html>

		U-boats lost	
	Merchant Vessels sunk by U-boat	by direct Allied action at sea	by other causes
Sep 1939-Dec 1942	11,422,350 GRT	139	14
Jan 1943-May 1945	3,493,571 GRT	556	73
Total	14,915,921 GRT	695	87

**Document G: Harold Bradshaw interview in box 3 of World War II Interviews, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq87-3k.htm>**

“...The way we tracked this thing was we used sonic buoys to locate his [the German submarine's] position and then vectored the destroyers in between the sonic buoys and after hammering on him for quite awhile he began to leave an oil trail and then with a combination of the sonic buoys and the oil trail, well, it was pretty easy to keep the destroyers on them. When it got dark, due to the fact that the weather was pretty rough, why the destroyers were going to maintain contact at night and the planes were going to join them fueling at daybreak and they were going to continue the attack...”

**Document H: Dudley S. Knox interview in box 18 of World War II Interviews, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center** <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq87-3n.htm>

“Our mission was to sink submarines and we attempted to stay at sea in the areas where the submarines were concentrating...Finally the *Pope* lost contact and at the same time the *Chatelain* lost contact, and we commenced a search in the immediate area, with the rest of the escorts laying off perhaps three to six thousand yards. After sweeping the area for some time, the *Chatelain* regained contact and commenced her run. I happened to be on the flying bridge and the ASW [antisubmarine warfare] Officer had passed the word to stand by to fire depth charges when I saw a bow out of the water broad on our starboard beam, approximately 400 yards away, perhaps less. ...Our momentum was such that we circled across her bow and lay off about a thousand yards or less and fired all our guns. There was an attempt from the submarines' crew as they came out of the conning tower to man the 20 mm. [antiaircraft] guns right in the conning tower, but such a concentration of fire was made that they were soon cleaned off the conning tower.

”We then noticed men spilling out of a hatch aft and diving into the water. We ceased firing and there was a period when we waited for them to abandon ship but nothing seemed to happen when four men, either four or five men ran forward to man her forward gun. Our 20 mm [antiaircraft guns] cut them down before they could get to the gun and we commenced firing with all the guns for the second time and she exploded. There seems to be some question of whether or not it was ready box ammunition that exploded. The fire seemed to come out of the hatch forward near the gun. We then ceased fire for the second time and the submarine sank, stern first.”

**Document I: Daniel V. Gallery interview, recorded 26 May 1945, that is in box 11 of World War II Interviews, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center** <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq87-3s.htm>

“...We left on our first ASW [anti-submarine warfare] cruise in January 1944 and operated in the vicinity of the Azores on January 19. We got our first two U-boat [German submarine, or *unterseeboot*] kills when we surprised a refueling operation and depth charged and sank a big refueler [a German submarine equipped with extra fuel tanks and responsible for resupplying attack U-boats to permit them to remain on patrol longer] and a small [attack] U-boat alongside of it [*U-544* was sunk on 16 Jan.; apparently the second submarine survived the action]. On our second cruise which began late in March, we got two more kills. We sank the *U-515* and picked up 40-some prisoners, including the captain, and sank the *U-68* the next day, getting one survivor and one dead man and a great deal of wreckage...”