

**AVIATION SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FREIGHT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (FAS) WORKING GROUP
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP
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TSA-ASAC – Cargo Working Groups
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INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 2004, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) voted unanimously to create an industry Working Group to advise TSA on the establishment of a Freight Assessment System (FAS) designed to identify air cargo posing an elevated security risk.¹ This concept of identifying suspect freight (and screening/inspecting that freight found to possess an elevated risk) is a major element of TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan and has been supported by a broad spectrum of the aviation industry. That support continues, and the industry pledges both resources and personnel to ensure the success of this effort.

Four meetings of the Working Group were held in the last quarter of 2004. The first meeting was designed to define the scope of the Working Group process and resulted in the unanimous adoption of a Working Group Charter. That Charter is attached hereto as Appendix A.² Subsequent meetings focused on answering specific questions presented by TSA and its consultant, Deloitte and no formal industry sub-groups met between Working Group sessions to address specific policy and/or technical issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations contained herein are the result of discussions at the Working Group sessions and several *ad hoc* discussions among individual Working Group members. It should be noted that it is the sense of the participants that the Working Group process, which is being terminated by TSA against the recommendation of many Working Group members, has not been given sufficient time to adequately address the important and difficult issues presented in attempting to develop an effective FAS. It is the strong feeling of the Working Group that a rush to meet artificial deadlines compromises the

¹ The Working Group has been informed that the carriage of mail will **not** be included in the FAS. Rather, mail security is the subject of a separate agreement between TSA and the United States Postal Service.

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integrity of the process and jeopardizes the final outcome. Therefore, the first recommendation of the Working Group is:

WORKING GROUP TIMELINE

- 1. The life of the Working Group should be extended to enable the industry to have adequate input into the FAS process as it evolves over the coming months. This industry involvement should include both policy and technical expertise in the development and implementation of the FAS. As part of this continuing process, sub-groups, populated with industry subject matter experts, should be formed to provide specific input into the development of recommendations 2a, b, d, and e, below. Such a process will facilitate Working Group endorsement of the final product.**

As examples (but not the universe) of the subject-matter areas **not** addressed in these recommendations because of the limitations placed on the Working Group are:

- the establishment of Pilot Programs to “stress test” the system developed;
- an analysis of an FAS for all-cargo transportation which has already been deferred by TSA and the Working Group to a secondary phase of the FAS project; and
- a more complete consideration of how existing data elements currently being used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in its international cargo targeting efforts can be used both domestically and internationally as part of the FAS.

SYSTEM STRUCTURE

² The Working Group Charter also lists its membership.

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In spite of the limitations placed on the Working Group, consensus was reached on the elements that should be included in any final FAS. These elements comprise the second recommendation of the Working Group³:

2. The basic elements of an FAS should be:

a. An input process designed to provide the government with the data elements necessary to conduct an effective threat assessment of air cargo;

- The Working Group strongly believes that, before establishing the required data elements (and their relationship to each other), a complete study of existing CBP targeting data be conducted. We recognize that such elements are currently used solely for international transactions (and for purposes other than freight assessment), but they will provide a baseline from which an FAS can be developed.⁴ Moreover, in the opinion of the Working Group, creating an entirely new system of data elements is a waste of money and resources, and is totally unnecessary.
- A cursory review of such existing elements leads the Working Group to believe that careful consideration be given to using the current Shipper Export Declaration (SED) as a model. The data elements of this program seem to fit the needs of an FAS and the information is obtained from the party with the most direct knowledge of the shipment. Moreover, by relying on the shipper for the initial input, the information is captured at the earliest

³ The recommendations under each element represent the current industry consensus relating to that element.

⁴ The FAS, from the outset, has been defined by TSA and Deloitte, at least initially, as a “domestic-to-domestic” product. The Working Group disagrees with this approach and urges TSA to concentrate on existing elements already resident at CBP in the international arena. To a very large extent, we believe that the ACE program should be the basic model for the proposed FAS.

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possible point in the supply chain (see further discussion directly below). An explanation of the SED process is attached as Appendix B.

- b. **A commercial-government interface providing the mechanism to be used in communicating the data elements to the government. This segment of the process must include not only the data elements to be considered, but also where and when in the supply chain the data is submitted;**
- The data should be captured as early as possible in the supply chain. First, as noted above, it is the shipper who has the most intimate knowledge of the contents of the shipment. Second, by capturing the shipment information “upstream”, it can then be checked against inputs from the Indirect Air Carrier or Direct Air Carrier later in the process. And third, by capturing the data early, there is less chance of significant delays in the distribution chain.
 - At the direct air carrier level, a limited number of data elements (shipper, consignee, commodity description, weight) should be required and used to verify previously submitted data.
- c. **An assessment process that takes the input and assesses the cargo risk. This process should include, not only an analysis of the various data elements by themselves, but also the interrelationship among elements⁵. While the Working group is not recommending that a sub-group be formed to work on this topic, the industry does expect TSA to maintain a dialogue on this issue and to consult with industry experts where appropriate ;**

d. **A system of “outbound communication” that provides for real-time government notification to the industry of any cargo found to possess an elevated risk;**

- This notification to the industry should consist of a “green light/red light” system. It should be provided almost instantaneously, much like the system used to approve credit card purchases.
- Once cleared by TSA, an Approval Code should be immediately transmitted to the entity providing the data.
- A mechanism should be established to require industry members to provide TSA with notification that it has actually received any “red light” notifications.

e. **A system of defined action to address any threats identified.**

- Freight found to possess an elevated security risk should be inspected⁶, in accordance with procedures developed jointly by TSA and the Working Group.
- A process should be developed to address and differentiate paperwork and/or computer anomalies from true risk situations.
- Such screening/inspecting should be performed by TSA employees in accordance with the provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).

Section 110 of ATSA specifically provides that:

The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall provide for the screening of all passengers **and property**, including United States mail, **cargo**, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation. In the case of flights and flight segments originating in the United States, the screening shall take place before boarding **and shall be carried out by a Federal Government**

⁵ The threat assessment and targeting pieces of the equation are the province of TSA and no recommendations are made in this area, other than to urge TSA to integrate information from enhanced Known Shipper programs and Indirect Air Carrier certifications into the targeting process.

⁶ “Inspected” used herein, is not limited to the physical opening of suspect freight, but also includes noninvasive means of assessing the actual contents of such shipments.

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employee. . . , except as otherwise provided. . .under. . . the known shipper program. . . (emphasis added).

It is the judgment of the Working Group that this section of ATSA **requires** screening to be done by TSA (or other government employee), since the FAS goes beyond the provisions contained in the known shipper program.

- The FAS should only be used to identify freight found to possess an elevated security risk. Only freight found to possess such a risk should be screened and/or inspected. **No** random inspections should be included in the FAS. At the same time, the Working Group recommends that after-the-fact random audits be established and conducted by TSA to provide a continuing assessment of the success of the system.
- The Working Group strongly recommends that implementation of any FAS be phased in to avoid possible chaos in the system. A geographic phase-in is suggested as the most effective way of accomplishing this objective.⁷

TESTING THE PROPOSED SYSTEM

Before final implementation of an FAS, it is the recommendation of the Working Group that:

- 3. After the Working Group has provided the necessary input and a proposed Freight Assessment System has been designed, a Pilot Program should be established to determine whether the proper system elements are in place, whether these elements provide effective threat assessments and whether the communication between government and industry allows for the screening/inspection of suspect freight without disruption of the air cargo supply chain.**

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

After an FAS is developed and tested, the question of how to implement the system remains. Recognizing the need to implement an FAS program as quickly as possible, but also recognizing the need to receive all possible industry input before finalization, the Working Group recommends that:

- 4. The FAS program should be released for public comment in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). Recognizing the need for relatively quick implementation, a relatively short (60 days) comment period should be established. After finalization of a “high-level” rule, implementation should be via an amendment to each regulated party’s Security Program.**

CONCLUSION

The members of the FAS Working Group continue to offer their unqualified support to the concept of a Freight Assessment System. At the same time, unless industry involvement in the development is expanded, it will be difficult to obtain true industry support for the final product. To be successful, the FAS must be a blend of policy and technical expertise, and terminating the Working Group process prematurely precludes a true government/industry partnership that can lead to an effective result. We therefore request that, as described herein, the scope of the FAS Working Group be reconsidered to allow for increased industry participation in the process and the time necessary to get the job done right the first time.

⁷ Again, any all-cargo FAS would be the subject of later development and deployment.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAAE	American Association of Airport Executives
ACCA	Air Courier Conference of America
ACE/ITDS	Automated Commercial Environment/International Trade Data System
ACE S&T	Automated Commercial Environment Screening & Targeting
ACI-NA	Airports Council International – North America
AES	Automated Export System
AF	Air France
AFA	Association of Flight Attendants
AfA	Airforwarders Association
ALEAN	Airport Law Enforcement Action Network
ALPA	Air Line Pilots Association
AMS	Advanced Manifest System
ATS	Advanced Targeting System
AWB	Air Waybill
AOA	Air Operations Area
AOSC	Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator
AOSSP	Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program
APA	Allied Pilots Association
ASAC	Aviation Security Advisory Committee
ATA	Air Transport Association
ATruckA	American Trucking Associations
ATSA	Aviation Transportation Security Act
BA	British Airways
BASC	Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition
BTS	Bureau of Transportation Statistics
CAA	Cargo Airline Association
CAPA	Coalition of Airline Pilots Association
CAPPS	Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
CBP	Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CHRC	Criminal History Record Check
C-TPAT	Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
CWG	Cargo Working Group
D&B	Dun & Bradstreet
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DS	Direct Shipper
DSIP	Domestic Security Integration Program
EDS	Explosives Detection System
ETD	Explosive Trace Detection
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAR	Federal Aviation Regulations

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FAS	Freight Assessment System
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
GA	General Aviation
GAO	General Accounting Office
GSC	Ground Security Coordinator
HAWB	House Air Waybill
HTS	Harmonized Tariff Schedule
IAC	Indirect Air Carrier
IACSSP	Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program
IAPA	International Air Passenger Association
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
ISC	In-flight Security Coordinator
ITN	Internal Transaction Number (sent from AES after SED transmission)
KS	Known Shipper
KSVN	Known Shipper Verification Number
LCAG	Lufthansa
LTL	Less Than Truckload
MAWB	Master Air Waybill
MGTOW	Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSP	Model Security Program
NACA	National Air Carrier Association
NATA	National Air Transportation Association
NCBFAA	National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America
NDA	Non-Disclosure Agreement
NITL	National Industrial Transportation League
NPRM	Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
ONRA	Office of National Risk Assessment
PCSSP	Private Charter Standard Security Program
RAA	Regional Airline Association
R&D	Research & Development
SD	Security Directive
SIC	Standard Industrial Classifications
SEA	Special Emphasis Assessment
SED	Shipper's Export Declaration
SEIPT	Security Equipment Integrated Product Team
SIDA	Security Identification Display Areas
SSI	Sensitive Security Information
STDO	Security Technology Deployment Office
TFSSP	Twelve-Five Standard Security Program
TIA	Transportation Intermediaries Association
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSA HQ	Transportation Security Administration Headquarters

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TSOC	Transportation Security Operations Center
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identification Credential (Program)
ULD	Unit Load Device
US	United States
USC	United States Code
USPS	United States Postal Service
VPAF103	Victims of Pan Am Flight 103
WG	Working Group

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: CHARTER

Transportation Security Administration Aviation Security Advisory Committee

FREIGHT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (FAS) WORKING GROUP

Authority:

The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) approved formation of the Freight Assessment System Working Group (the “Working Group”) on September 30, 2004.

Goal:

The Working Group will make recommendations to TSA for a mechanism that identifies elevated risk air cargo and enables 100% screening of that cargo. The Freight Assessment System (FAS) will minimize the reliance upon random inspections.

Issue Background:

Prior to FAS the air cargo security screening program incorporated a random inspection requirement. Additionally, with respect to cargo moving aboard passenger aircraft, current policy requires shippers to be “known” and participating Indirect Air Carriers (IACs) to be validated by TSA. FAS represents an additional layer of security to be built upon previous Transportation Security Administration (TSA) efforts to secure the transportation of air cargo. Risk assessment may be based upon information related to the cargo, the shipper of the cargo, or handlers of the cargo as it proceeds through the air cargo supply chain. Some of this information will be leveraged directly from the IACCS and Known Shipper Database programs. The initial phase of deployment of the Freight Assessment system addresses cargo that moves aboard passenger aircraft, with a subsequent phase addressing cargo that moves aboard all-cargo aircraft.

Scope of Task:

The Working Group will formulate a report for submission to ASAC. Upon approval of the Working Group’s report, ASAC will forward the report to TSA for review and consideration.

The Working Group will be tasked to assess processes and systems that may contribute to a risk assessment of cargo shipped via aircraft. In view of this expected focus, the Working Group would generate and validate recommendations based upon, but not limited to, the following issues:

1. Process Integration
 - a. Policies and Procedures used by stakeholders to process all cargo transactions on passenger and air cargo flights
 - b. Risk management policies and processes currently used by stakeholders and their relationship with FAS

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- c. FAS processes and potential policy changes
2. Technology Issues
 - a. Systems currently being used throughout the shipment life-cycle for all stakeholders (air carriers, indirect air carriers (IACs), consolidators, direct shippers)
 - b. Connectivity infrastructure capabilities and requirements for interface to the Freight Assessment System for all stakeholders
3. Data capture and management
 - a. Data currently available, sources, and how data is captured
 - b. Data validation and maintenance
 - c. Methodology for data sharing and the degree of sharing that is necessary and appropriate
4. Parameters that should be involved in the modeling of risk characteristics
5. Deployment of FAS
 - a. Tactics to develop acceptance throughout user community
 - b. Measures to ensure the most effective and efficient implementation
 - c. Feasible timeframe for implementation

The Working Group may not address issues that expand this Scope of Task without TSA's express authorization.

Structure & Organization:

The Working Group will be chaired by Rafael Ramos, Assistant Director of Air Cargo Programs, Transportation Security Administration. The duties of the Chairman shall be to:

1. Develop the agenda for each meeting of the Working Group
2. Schedule and convene each meeting
3. Control discussion at each meeting to assure thorough and orderly discussion, and to facilitate participation by working group members
4. Supervise record-keeping at meetings and preparation of minutes
5. Assure that Working Group consensus is adequately documented

The Working Group shall be composed of Members and Alternates. Working Group Members are designated by TSA. Each Member may designate one Alternate, who must be approved by TSA prior to participation in the Working Group.

TSA may designate Members, Alternates, or other persons, to assist in the performance of the duties of the Chair, or with any administrative or additional duties that may be necessary for the effective and efficient performance of Working Group tasks.

TSA will provide government participation as well as contractors engaged in ongoing FAS program management to facilitate and further support the working group efforts.

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Membership:

To assure that the Working Group is capable of performing its assigned tasks in an effective and efficient manner, Working Group Members and Alternates must: possess detailed knowledge of air cargo operations (inclusive of processes, data collection and dissemination related to air cargo supply chain, supporting technical infrastructure, and regulations governing air cargo service providers), be directly involved with air cargo operations (or represent organizations with direct involvement), or represent government agencies with direct involvement with air cargo operations.

The Working Group shall be composed of the following Members and Alternates:

Organization	Working Group Member Name & Contact Info	Working Group Alternate Name & Contact Info
Air Courier Conference of America (ACCA)	George Trapp	Joe Morris Donald Smith Sue Presti
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)	William McReynolds	Jim Andresakes
Air Transport Association (ATA)	Jack Boisen	Chris Bidwell Mike White
Airforwarders Association (AfA)	Dave Wirsing	Brandon Fried
Cargo Airline Association (CAA)	Steve Alterman	Paul Arnold
Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA)	Jay Norelius	Neil Frey
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)	Mark Pacheco	Tony Choi
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)	Johnson Brown	
National Air Carrier Association (NACA)	George Paul	Ron Priddy
National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association (NCBFA)	Scott Case	Charlie Brown
National Industrial Transportation League (NITL)	Richard Macomber	
Regional Airline Association (RAA)	Debby McElroy	
Victims of Pan Am Flight 103	Glenn Johnson	
BAX Global	Pete Cheviot	Charles Siriano
Continental Airlines	Frank Taylor	
DHL	Ken Hughes	

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Compensation:

Non-government employees who participate in the Working Group as a Member or an Alternate will not be compensated for their service on the Working Group nor reimbursed for any expenses incurred in connection with their service on the Working Group.

Decision-Making:

The Working Group shall reach decisions by consensus. Consensus means “the weight of judgment among the members.” It is not necessarily unanimity or majority vote, but rather is that judgment which represents the weight of opinion among the Members.

Dissenting opinions are discouraged but may be permitted to aid in resolution of issues.

Only Working Group Members may participate in Working Group discussion and indicate positions relative to a Working Group consensus decision. The Chair may permit Alternates or others to participate in discussions only. If a Member is unable to participate due to absence or other reasons, the Alternate may participate on behalf of the Member. If consensus is determined by “vote,” only a Member, or an Alternate serving on behalf of a Member, may “vote.”

The FAS-ACWG will develop its recommendations and document them in a report to the ASAC, to be presented to the full ASAC committee in January 2005.

Information Sharing:

Much of the information that arises from the discussions within the ASAC FAS Working Group will be sensitive security information (SSI), and needs to be protected in accordance with SSI guidelines established by the federal government. While TSA recognizes that Work Group members may need to share information with constituents and other staff members in order to develop positions on various issues, those discussions should be limited to those that have a need to know and have signed non-disclosure agreements.

Deliverables & Deadlines:

Deliverable	Due Date
Formal Recommendations	January, 2005

APPENDIX B: AIR FREIGHT RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM TRADE RECOMMENDATION

**Transportation Security Administration
Aviation Security Advisory Committee**

FREIGHT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (FAS) WORKING GROUP

STEP 1

Begin using Shipper Export Declaration (SED) information as filed by shippers and/or agents.

- Data owned by US Census
- Full mandatory electronic filing of the SED passed into law P.S. 107-228, the Security Assistance Act of 2002.
- 93.6% of all SED required shipments in September 2004 were filed electronically (all modes)
- Air mode is 97% compliant in filing.
- SED only required for international US export shipments with a single commodity or harmonized description value above \$2,500, or containing validated licensed materials, or destined for certain eastern European countries.
- For air cargo and air express shipments, must be filed electronically 2 hours before departure.

Data collected on SED:

- Principal party in interest (USPPI) – Complete name and address
- USPPI's EIN (IRS) or ID number
- Ultimate consignee – Complete name and address
- Intermediate consignee – Complete name and address
- Forwarding agent – Complete name and address
- Forwarding agents' EIN (IRS number)
- Point (State) of origin or FTZ number
- Country of ultimate destination
- Method of transport
- Exporting carrier
- Port of export
- Port of unloading
- Carrier ID code
- Shipment reference number
- Entry number
- Hazardous material indicator
- In bond code
- Schedule B description of commodities
 - Schedule B number
 - Quantity
 - Shipping weight (kilos)
 - VIN/Product Number/Vehicle Title Number
 - Value in US dollars
- License number for those required

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- ECCN (when required)
- Duly authorized officer of employee of shipper

Why start with the SED?

- Government data
- Submitted prior to carrier receiving cargo in most cases
- AES Direct computer number authenticating shipment filed
- Already in place
- Information is in a DHS maintained system (AES)
- Data could be vetted earlier in process by government
- Information is entered at first station of departure on flight and not just at international gateway departure
- Ready to go now!

Why start with international flights first?

- Mostly larger targeted wide-body aircraft
- Most flights over water, making recovery of evidence more difficult if incident occurs
- Largest percentage of air cargo shipments with data is international and available
- Covers more air carriers
- Air carriers have more electronic available information for international cargo

STEP 2

Begin using SED data in CBP targeting system for analysis purposes.

STEP 3

Begin working with air carriers on a way to advise of shipment status after risk targeting by CBP.

STEP 4

Have air carriers validate AES Direct number prior to boarding and give a red/yellow/green indication as to shipments status for departing.

STEP 5

Begin next phases of shipment status with expected CBP NPRM to require all international cargo manifest data to be sent prior to departure. NPRM expected in 2005.

STEP 6

Develop ways to improve CBP targeting system to include domestic, passenger aircraft cargo including merger of Known Shipper database into CBP targeting.

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STEP 7

Develop a real time green/red light system for cargo acceptance destined to fly on passenger carriers by IACs and air carriers for all-cargo (domestic/international).

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

99-G-030

99-G-030 is the final report from an Advanced Maintenance Systems, LTD. (AMS) study that contains information on architecture of the Known Shipper database, as well as issues to be evaluated in future systems related to cargo security.

1542

1542 refers to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14 Part 1542 that describes which United States (US) airport operators must adopt a security program and what that security program must contain.

1544

1544 refers to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14 Part 1544 that describes which United States (US) aircraft operators must adopt a security program and what that security program must contain. Also known as (AKA): US Flag Carrier; 1544 aircraft operator.

1546

1546 refers to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14 Part 1546 that describes which non-US air carriers must adopt a security program and what that security program must contain. AKA: (Country of Origin) Flag Carrier; non-US Flag Carrier; 1546 air carrier.

1548

1548 refers to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14 Part 1548 that describes which indirect air carriers must adopt a security program and what that security program must contain. AKA: freight forwarders; consolidators.

Acceptance Procedures

Acceptance procedures refer to the appropriate security program requirements that outline from whom, and how, a regulated party may accept cargo for transporting onboard an aircraft.

Agent

An agent is an entity (individual, sole proprietorship or corporation), which offers trucking, cartage, and/or warehousing or delivery services to an IAC, and may use one or more individuals in the course of executing its agreements with the IAC. An Agent may or may not be an Indirect Air Carrier. (For the purposes of Working Group 2 Recommendations)

Air Waybill

The air waybill contains detailed information about a shipment, including data objects such as: individual and company shipper names and address, stated shipment contents, destination address and consignee (receiver) personal and company name.

Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP)

AOSSP refers to the security program required by 14 CFR PART 1544.

All-cargo aircraft

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All-cargo aircraft are aircraft operated for compensation or hire that carries no passengers other than persons specified by FAR 121.583(a) or 135.85 such as crewmembers, employees, inspectors, or other persons necessary for the safety of the flight or handling of cargo.

Baseline Security Level

The baseline security level is the minimum level of security required by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Transportation Security Regulations, TSA approved security programs, and any Security Directives or Emergency Amendments issued by the TSA.

Clear

To determine by inspection that no unauthorized persons or prohibited items are onboard the aircraft.

Commercial Passenger Operations

Refers to all scheduled passenger operations, public charter passenger operations, private charter passenger operations and other aircraft operations governed by Parts 1544 or 1546.

Compliance

Compliance is meeting the requirements of the Transportation Security Regulations, including any official TSA interpretations.

Consolidator

A consolidator physically bundles freight for shipment aboard aircraft. Freight may be received from an IAC or directly from a shipper.

Contractor

A Contractor is an Independent Contractor within the IRS definition. The Contractor offers specific ground movement services (such as delivery services) to an IAC. Within the industry the Independent Contractor in the vast majority of cases serves the function of the company driver (pick-up, delivery, and tendering cargo and packages), but is treated as an Independent Contractor for purposes of employment law. The Independent Contractor, by definition, is outside of the immediate direction of the IAC. An Independent Contractor is never an Indirect Air Carrier. The Independent Contractor classification is available only under specific circumstances as defined by the Internal Revenue Service (see “The 20 Questions,” e.g.), but is broadly used throughout the industry. (For the purposes of Working Group 2 Recommendations)

Dun & Bradstreet

This company collects data (credit rating, business partners, length of time company have been in business, etc.) on many companies, domestic and international. They provide subsets of the information collected to clients.

Gates

These are the points of interdiction in the air cargo supply chain where information can be gathered and decisions about inspections and shipment of cargo can be made.

House Air Waybill (HAWB)

This is a document issued by the IAC that provides shipper information, IAC information, air carrier information (sometimes), contents of shipment, and IAC handling personnel. The invoice should be attached to this document.

Indirect Air Carrier

14 CFR section 296.3. "An indirect cargo air carrier is any U.S. citizen who undertakes to engage indirectly in air transportation of property, and uses for the whole or any part of such transportation the services of an air carrier or a foreign air carrier that directly engages in the operation of aircraft under a certificate, regulation, order, or permit issued by the Department of Transportation . . . or the services of its agent, or of another indirect cargo air carrier."

Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program (IACSSP)

IACSSP refers to the security program required by 14 CFR PART 1548.

Known Shipper

A known shipper is a shipper that meets TSA's known shipper requirements.

Known Shipper Database

This is a centralized, automated database comprised of shippers required to have: (1) a customer record/profile with at least one shipper, (2) a shipping contract executed no less than seven days before the first shipment, and (3) a satisfactory on-site inspection conducted by an air carrier or IAC.

Master Air Waybill

This represents the air waybill issued by the airline. Its contents are similar to, but at a higher level than, the house air waybill.

Model Security Program

The Model Security Program refers to the security program required by 14 CFR PART 1546.

Prohibited Activities

Prohibited activities are actions contrary to applicable criminal law or aviation security law and regulation.

Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes

SIC codes are a U.S. Department of Commerce system that organizes all industry types in the U.S. and are used by cargo custodians to classify goods.

Secured Area

Secured area means a portion of an airport, specified in the airport security program, in which certain security measures specified in part 1542 of this chapter are carried out. This area is where aircraft operators and foreign air carriers that have a security program under part 1544 or part 1546 of this chapter enplane and deplane passengers and sort and load baggage and any adjacent areas that are not separated by adequate security measures." [14 CFR 1540.5]

TSA Proposed Definition of Security Screening

Security screening means evaluating a person or property to determine whether either may pose a security threat. Screening, in the case of air cargo, includes TSA-recognized known shipper programs. Screening may include inspection of a percentage of cargo through EDS, ETD, TSA certified canine, manual inspection, or other method of evaluation. Any or all of these components may be part of a known shipper program.

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FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP

Unauthorized Access (to aircraft)

Unauthorized access occurs when entry is not approved or permitted by the aircraft operator.

Unsecured Aircraft

An aircraft is unsecured whenever undetected or unchallenged entry of unauthorized persons may occur.