by Gladys Roth Kremen
In a special message to the Congress, on May 25, 1961, President John
F. Kennedy told the legislators that "Large scale unemployment during a
recession is bad enough, but large scale unemployment during a period of
prosperity would be intolerable." Four days later, he transmitted a bill to
Congress that dealt with just such a situation. The Manpower Development and
Training Act of 1962 endeavored to train and retrain thousands of workers
unemployed because of automation and technological change.
Hailed by the country as the first major piece of manpower legislation
since the Employment Act of 1946, MDTA did not spring full-grown into John
Kennedy's "New Frontier" era. Rather, the preoccupation with manpower
utilization since the end of the Second World War reflected the nation's
response to certain critical historical factors. The legacy of the depression
had served to heighten the country's sensitivity to the issues of unemployment
and economic growth. The dawn of the Atomic Age had witnessed the
implementation of a new technology that threatened to replace men with
machines. Furthermore, the imperatives of the Cold War, with its accent on
scientific preeminence, had revealed America's weakness in training skilled
technicians in sufficient numbers. The interaction of these components served
as a catalyst to propel the federal government into the vanguard of human
resource development as envisioned in MDTA.
Even while flushed with victory over Germany and Japan in 1945, few
Americans could escape the gnawing fear of a return of the depression. The new
war, not the New Deal, shattered the patterns of economic stagnation and
witnessed the restoration of prosperity. But whether that prosperity possessed
a stable foundation remained a serious question for individuals inside and
outside the government.
With one out of every four individuals out of work during the 1930's
the federal government created an arsenal of programs to deal with the manpower
crisis. Programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works Progress
Administration, the Public Works Administration, and the National Youth
Administration, while not necessarily so intended, were temporary measures
designed to put the unemployed back to work. In contrast, the initiation of
Social Security and the revival of the United States Employment Service became
permanent statements of the government's commitment to minimize the hardships
of the unemployed and to facilitate their return to work.
In his state of the union message to Congress in 1944, President
Roosevelt presented an "Economic Bill of Rights" to the American people. An
essential part of this doctrine was the right of every individual to a useful
and remunerative job in an atmosphere of economic security. To insure this
right, Roosevelt's advisors set as the nation's post-war economic goal, "full,
and stable national productivity, income and employment."1 President Truman's ascension to the
presidency upon Roosevelt's death produced little alteration in this goal.
Continuing the New Deal legacy and responding to the predictions of massive
post-war unemployment, the Employment Act of 1946 reaffirmed the nation's
commitment to full utilization of its material and human resources. Yet for
over a decade, the purposes of this Act were more symbolic than real.
The return to Republican rule in 1952 did not signal the end of social
welfare legislation. Rather, "dynamic conservatism," as defined by Eisenhower,
coupled a concern for human welfare with greater fiscal controls, through
reduced federal spending, deflation and a balanced budget. Anxious to limit the
growth of the governmental bureaucracy, Eisenhower attempted to turn certain
functions of the welfare system over to the states. But the problems engendered
by an increasingly urban and technologically changing society proved too
difficult a task for the states alone.
During the decade of the 1950's the ghost of the '29 crash remained as
both an economic and political presence that tested the limitations of fiscal
orthodoxy. In that period, unemployment increased more rapidly than the total
increase in the level of employment. In 1947, with employment at 60,168,000,
the proportion of unemployed was 3.9% of the work force. While employment
increased in 1960 to 64,520,000, unemployment had risen to 5.7%. The
experiences in the recessions of 1952-1953 and 1957-1958 pointed to serious
defects in the American economy. In both cases, despite general recovery
measured by increases in the Gross National Product, personal income, factory
production and manufacturing orders, unemployment failed to decline to
pre-recession levels.2 A further
indication of the problem was the increase in the duration of unemployment. In
1947, 7% of the unemployed remained out of work 27 weeks or more. By 1960, 11%
were unemployed 27 weeks or more.
The burdens of unemployment affected particular industries and types of
workers. According to figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the
period from 1948-1956 revealed a marked increase in the outlay of capital for
services in comparison to goods. At the same time, employment in goods-
producing industries dropped from 45.0% to 41.5% while employment for white
collar and service workers rose substantially. Industries involved in
machinery, primary metals and transportation declined the most severely. The
shift in emphasis from goods to services seriously affected semi-skilled and
unskilled laborers, those who could least afford prolonged periods of
unemployment.
Studying the characteristics of the unemployed in areas of substantial
labor surplus, the BLS found that the proportion of unemployment fell hardest
on white men 25-54 years of age, in particular the 25-34 age group.3
The majority were married men and heads of families. While unemployment was
high in all occupations, factory operators had the highest rate. In labor
surplus areas, skilled and semiskilled workers accounted for a higher
proportion of the unemployed than in other areas of the country. At the same
time these areas also had a greater proportion of working women. The large
number of unemployed older workers corresponded to the tendency of younger,
unattached workers to migrate. Faced with familial responsibilities and
community attachments, the majority of the unemployed failed to join the
migration to areas of greater job opportunity. Moreover, with the shift in
activity from goods to services, most unemployed workers did not have the
skills necessary to take advantage of expanding occupations.
Figures for unemployment taken from unemployment insurance (UI) rosters
actually minimized the dimensions of the problem. Not all of the unemployed
were eligible for unemployment benefits. Part-time employees, for example, were
not. No statistics would estimate the degree of underemployment, whereby a
worker might accept a job far below his (or her) level of training or even
outside his area of expertise, just to provide for his family. Neither did the
statistics reveal the level of underutilization of skills, as in the case of an
older individual who would seek employment if opportunities were available, but
instead kept himself off the market.
Labor experts diagnosed the situation as "frictional" or "structural"
unemployment, defined as "that level of joblessness that could not be reduced
significantly by increased aggregate spending."4 Frictional or structural unemployment,
while usually identified with short term unemployment due to seasonal changes,
also accounted for long term unemployment because of changes in tastes and
technology. While "aggregate" economists proposed to fight unemployment through
increased demand, "structural" economists believed that increased demand would
probably result in inflation, rather than higher employment.
The American people had always expressed a fascination for
technological innovation; yet during the 1950's they laid part of the blame for
the unemployment situation on the catch-all of "automation." Hearings before
the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of Congress in 1955 and 1960 revealed the
nation's concern and preoccupation with the influence of automation. The
testimony of industrial, governmental and technical representatives rejected
the notion that technological advance would have deleterious long range
effects. Yet some conceded the possibility of short run dislocations in the
labor force. Mass lay-offs would not occur, since the displacement process
operated at a much more subtle level. As Walter Buckingham, director of the
School of Industrial Management of the Georgia Institute of Technology,
indicated, "the worker displaced is not fired. He is the one who is not
hired."5 While it probably did
not calm the country's nerves, Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell pointed to
the historical record which showed that technological change upgraded the labor
force. The growing need for skilled labor meant that "unskilled workers have
decreased, semiskilled workers have moved up into skilled areas and skilled
workers have approached the status of technician."6
Still, organized labor in particular cast suspicious eyes on the new
technology. George Meany and Walter Reuther expressed concern for workers whose
skills might become obsolete, and also for the breakdown of skills leading to
underutilization of labor. Then too, labor leaders addressed themselves to the
structural changes in the economy which affected particular industries and
thus, particular workers. Meany noted that with increased technology,
employment in the railroad industry dropped 10% in 1960 while the same amount
of freight was carried as in 1957. In a similar vein, while steel production
dropped 3% from the 1959 level, employment plummeted 12% because of
technological changes.7
Furthermore, in converting to more automated processes, many industries found
it less costly to build a new plant in another area rather than converting
their older factories, thus leaving whole communities of employees
stranded.
Anxious to preserve the security of the worker threatened by the spread
of automation, union leaders proposed ameliorative action. Collective
bargaining over work contracts provided an opportunity to cushion the impact of
technological change. Suggestions included longer vacations, a shorter work
week, larger pensions, a lower retirement age, and interdepartmental and
intercompany transfers. Thus, unions called upon industry to assist their
employees in the adjustment to automation.
Industry did accept part of the responsibility for retraining the
workers to engage in the new automated process. In 1955 the president of
General Electric stated that his company had already spent nearly $40 million
to retrain its employees.8 In a
similar step, the Armour Meat Packing Company created a special "automation
fund" for retraining purposes. The company paid a 14-cent levy into the fund,
established in 1959, for every 100 tons of meat shipped, up to $500,000, to pay
for retraining operations.9 The
Oklahoma pipe industry cooperated with local unions in a comparable effort by
initiating a training trust fund whereby the unions and the companies
contributed a certain percentage of the wages and revenues. The program was so
successful that the national pipe trades union created a national training fund
to help local unions with their training projects.10
These projects served as examples of how industry and labor could
effectively minimize the transition to automation. But neither these efforts,
nor collective bargaining alone, could meet the challenge of the situation.
Labor leaders called for positive action from the federal government to improve
its programs, such as UI, public works, minimum wage, and the educational
system. The change in technology required a commensurate change in the
objectives of the public schools to equip new entrants in the labor force with
the proper skills. Only the federal government could provide the vocational
training facilities necessary to train and retrain workers in the new skills.
Since such changes were not forthcoming from vocational educators, the
government had to bring industry and education closer together for the sake of
national progress.
The adequacy of the American educational system in producing skilled
labor received critical attention due to the pressures of the Cold War. The new
technology had indeed increased the need for scientific and technical workers,
particularly in the field of defense. The "brinkmanship" diplomacy of Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles necessitated an ever-ready military structure which
depended upon trained personnel. In addition, the rivalry between the United
States and the Soviet Union, psychological as well as technological, served to
link scientific achievement with education. The launching of the Soviet
satellite Sputnik in 1957 jolted the country out of its complacent feelings of
superiority, and demanded a reappraisal of its manpower objectives.
The National Manpower Council, established by the Ford Foundation in
1951, stimulated and guided the nation in improving its human resources. Drawn
from a cross-section of professions, associations and geographic regions, the
members served as individuals to analyze present and future policy. The Council
concentrated a substantial part of its attention on the nation's supply of
skilled manpower. The problem was not, as they saw it, a shortage of manpower,
but rather a need to improve and utilize that manpower.
To highlight the substance of the issue, the Council held a conference
on "Improving the Work Skills of the Nation" in 1955. At that time, it became
clear that the country could not solely rely on private institutions to supply
skilled workers. While industry adequately fulfilled its own immediate needs,
its long range commitments to skill development were minimal. Few industries
made major investments in training and upgrading their labor force. Moreover,
to compensate for this, industry lured specialists from the armed forces,
severely handicapping the military's preparedness. Unless stopped, it could
lead to national disaster.11
To insure the country a supply of properly trained technicians, the
1955 conference recommended a program that included the participation of
educators, industry and government. For improving the educational training
process, the Council proposed some changes in the high schools. Interested
students needed to spend two years studying general courses and to concentrate
on technical subjects for their last two years. Guidance and placement
officials in secondary schools could take a more active role in skill
advancement by being more aware of vocational opportunities and by providing
more services to non-college-bound students. Furthermore, school officials had
to take the lead in fostering cooperation among business, industry, labor and
government groups in local communities.
Industry also had a responsibility to itself and to the nation in skill
development, the Council said. Full utilization of human resources necessitated
equal opportunity in hiring and training of all workers, regardless of race,
creed, sex and national origin. By investing more money in training and
upgrading programs, employers could meet their material and social obligations.
Both unions and employers on Joint Apprenticeship Councils needed to
continually review the apprenticeship operations for effectiveness, and to
increase the number of apprentices, possibly by raising their wages.
The Council believed that the most important area for improving and
expanding work skills was at the community level, since the community could
best estimate its own needs and resources.12 To do this effectively, state and
local government had to increase their expenditures for vocational education.
This responsibility also involved continual review of existing programs and
facilities to insure their contributions were sufficient for the task. The
federal government could meet its commitment by supplying statistical reports
and research that would serve as guidelines for future needs. Moreover, the
Council called upon Congress to scrutinize the existing legislation regarding
manpower, and ascertain whether it conformed to the demands or whether the
situation required new legislation. To satisfy national defense needs, the
government had to first satisfy its civilian needs.
The Department of Labor (DOL) recognized the intimate relationship
between preparedness and the utilization of human resources. Secretary Mitchell
expressed a commonly held belief when he stated that "The United States' margin
of advantage in the Cold War is slipping. To prevent this, we must develop and
use our skills."13 In keeping
with this concern, the DOL issued General Order No. 63 on August 25, 1954,
which established the Office of Manpower Administration. Headed by an Assistant
Secretary for Employment and Manpower, the new administration planned programs
and policies to meet the imperatives of mobilization and civil defense.14
The Department already had the fragments of a comprehensive manpower
program. The training program of the Bureau of Apprenticeship, the occupational
research of the BLS, and the labor exchange functions of the U.S. Employment
Service (USES) provided an established framework which the Labor Department
would expand and solidify. The Secretary's Program and Organization Committee
recommended that the Department gather together these components and develop a
centralized and comprehensive program for skill development.15 The objectives of this proposal
included: 1) encouraging labor and management to expand and adopt training
programs to meet the needs of peacetime employment and mobilization; 2)
developing and making available information on techniques for improving the
utilization of specialized personnel; 3) encouraging the extension and
improvement of educational activities that supported industrial training; 4)
broadening the participation of state governments in activities related to
occupational skills; and, 5) creating a public atmosphere supportive of
training programs. To implement these objectives, and to coordinate the
Department's work, Mitchell established a special Skills of the Work Force
Program in September 1955. He appointed Edwin R. Chappel, a Special Assistant
to the Secretary, to head the program.
The work of the Bureau of Apprenticeship was intimately related to the
area of skill development. Under the Federal Apprenticeship Act of 1937, the
DOL set standards for private apprenticeship programs. During World War II it
assisted in the expansion of training to meet shortages in critical
industries.16 In the 1950's the
Bureau cooperated with unions and industry to develop apprenticeship programs
and to provide technical assistance for expanding and improving existing ones.
The Bureau never itself participated in the courses once they were established,
but rather acted in an advisory capacity to the National Joint Committees on
Apprenticeship, composed of national employer associations and international
unions.
In 1954 the DOL rechristened the Bureau as the Bureau of Apprenticeship
and Training (BAT). The change in nomenclature, while indicating the
Department's concern with manpower, also manifested the possibility of
broadening the apprenticeship program to include less specialized
occupations.17 Yet the Bureau
refrained from making any substantial deviation from established apprenticeable
trades into less formalized skills that required limited training, particularly
on-the-job training (OJT).
Efforts to revise the apprenticeship program came from outside, as well
as inside, the Department. Eli Ginzburg, Director of Research for the National
Manpower Council, approached Secretary Mitchell with plans for a national
conference on improving human resources. Through soliciting recommendations
from business and union leaders, the conference might "breathe some fresh air
into what is a somewhat congealed apprenticeship structure."18 At that time, in 1955, Mitchell
promised aggressive action in strengthening the BAT, beginning with a
cost/return analysis of its activities and a discussion of its usefulness with
labor and employer groups.19
Yet using the BAT as the Department's major vehicle in solving the
shortage of skilled manpower ignored the Bureau's limitations. After speaking
with a group of business leaders, Chappel indicated to Mitchell that industry
did not fully accept the role of the BAT.20 Because the Bureau's own personnel
were not qualified to administer training courses, it would take several years
before a broadly based training operation could render effective service to
industry.21
Moreover, the structure of the law and the nature of apprenticeship
programs restricted the Bureau's influence. No laws bound either industries or
unions to seek BAT's assistance or even to register their apprenticeship
programs with the Bureau. The Bureau could only act when requested to do so,
and with the approval of all concerned groups. Neither could the Bureau perform
as an economic control. With most apprenticeship programs running two or four
years, the BAT could exercise little ameliorative influence on unemployment.
During periods of economic decline, such as in the middle and late 1950's, the
Bureau had little success in persuading employers and unions to take on new
apprentices from the ranks of the unemployed. Programs declined from the mid
1950's until 1961, since there was an inverse relationship between the number
of new apprentices and the number of unemployed.22 Thus, the BAT had limited potential
as an instrument for furthering technological progress or for expanding
employment opportunities.
Other agencies contributed their talents in dealing with the influence
of automation on employment and skill development. The BLS's work in
statistical analysis projected labor force needs in its "Occupational Outlook
Handbook," and in a special study of "Manpower Needs of the Sixties." The BLS
also initiated studies on the readjustment of industries and communities
affected by automation.
For its part, the USES endeavored to develop its counseling and
placement services to deal more effectively with professional and skilled
personnel. Emphasizing the importance of employment planning, the USES also
intensified its assistance to state employment agencies to make them more
competent in determining local needs and utilizing local resources.23
A major portion of the USES's energies focused on the impact of
technology on older workers. USES studies revealed that many industries
preferred to train younger workers in new processes rather than retrain their
older workers.24 Often older job
seekers had higher occupational qualifications than younger candidates, but
their skills were limited to industries suffering a decline.25 Moreover, older workers lacked the
benefits of extended compulsory education. In 1956, a period of general
prosperity, workers 45 years and older represented 40% of the job-seeking
unemployed during the months of January and February alone.26 At least half of the older unemployed
workers were jobless for 6 months or more from 1953 to 1956, while only
one-third of all younger workers experienced the same prolonged period of
unemployment.27
Changes in the educational structure to assure the future needs of the
country promised little relief for the worker already displaced or downgraded.
Nor was apprenticeship the answer to the problem of the older worker, since the
average age of an apprentice was 21. The USES did what it could to deal with
older workers through special testing, placement and guidance. Secretary
Mitchell appointed a special commission to deal with the issue and concern was
so widespread as to warrant a national conference on the older worker.
The recession of 1953-1954 dramatized the impact of technological
change on particular areas of the country. The use of alternate fuels condemned
to idleness many of the nation's coal areas, both anthracite and bituminous.
The movement of textile manufacturers to the South silenced the looms that were
the life line of New England. The geographic concentration of industries such
as these exacerbated the influences of automation and frictional unemployment.
While unemployment rose across the board in the 1950's, workers in areas of
substantial labor surplus accounted for nearly one-third of the unemployed,
even though they represented only one-fourth of the nation's labor
force.28
In the case of coal, when demand declined or when machines replaced the
miners, the effect was community-wide. Areas such as the mining towns of
Pennsylvania and West Virginia lacked the diversified economic environment that
afforded alternate opportunities for employment. Furthermore, most other
businesses in the towns were dependent upon the major industry. Thus, not only
workers but shopkeepers as well felt the impact of changes in the industrial
structure and faced the prospect of economic decline.
The initiative for a solution to the plight of depressed areas came
from Congress. While several legislators in the mid 1950's presented depressed
area legislation, the most important of these was offered by Senator Paul
Douglas (D-IL). Seeing the economic decay of the southern coal regions of his
own state, Douglas believed that only the federal government could confront and
conquer the problem. Dissatisfied with the inaction of the Eisenhower
Administration on the issue, Douglas gained the support of the Democratic
faction of the JEC, of which he was chairman.29 Working together, they recommended a
comprehensive program of assistance to depressed areas. Douglas submitted his
original bill on the matter on July 23, 1955. Realizing the necessity for some
action, the Administration submitted its own bill for area redevelopment
shortly thereafter. Yet, critical, almost irreconcilable differences prevented
the enactment of any legislation on the issue for the next six years.
The core of both the Douglas and Eisenhower programs was federal
assistance to industry. The Administration bill (S. 2892) manifested the
Eisenhower concern for limited federal participation in local affairs. It
called for the establishment of a $50 million revolving fund to provide loans
for new or expanding industries in depressed areas. In contrast, the Douglas
bill (S. 2663) exhibited a concern with other factors that contributed to
economic growth. It included: 1) a $100 million loan fund for new or expanding
industry; 2) another $100 million fund for the construction of public
facilities; 3) a program to retrain workers, with extended UI benefits; and, 4)
tax amortization for industries that settled in depressed areas.30
Douglas later revised his bill to include rural as well as urban areas,
and thus garnered important Southern support for the measure. The bill passed
the Senate with an impressive number of votes, but the Flood bill, the House
version, died in the Rules Committee. Neither did the Administration bill ever
come to a full floor vote, since the Administration's lukewarm support for its
own bill hampered the growth of a body of advocates.31 But the recession in 1957-1958
revived interest in area redevelopment legislation for both political and
economic purposes. At that time, Douglas gained important new support from
Republican Senator Payne of Maine. The Douglas-Payne bill differed little from
Douglas' original measure, and in 1958 it passed both the House and Senate,
with impressive bipartisan support.
Eisenhower was not convinced of the desirability of this legislation,
and vetoed the bill. He objected to those features that served to limit local
responsibility and to increase unwarranted government expenditures. He
specifically opposed the 100% grant for public facilities, the loosely-drawn
criteria for eligibility, the inclusion of rural districts, the inclusion of
long-term loans, the high loan limit, and the low interest rates.32 Eisenhower and his economic advisors
were not unsympathetic to the hardships of depressed areas and the country's
need for economic growth. But they believed that breaking the rules of
community responsibility and fiscal conservatism was too great a price to pay.
Moreover, the dominant thinking in the Administration emphasized aggregate
rather than structural considerations.
Despite the presidential veto, legislators continued to introduce bills
dealing with depressed areas. After the 1958 election, partisan lines had
solidified to the point where a compromise bill introduced by Senator Hugh
Scott (D-PA) and another Administration bill failed to make any headway.
Without the support of Payne, whom Edmund Muskie had unseated in Maine, Douglas
reintroduced his bill with minor changes. Despite political wranglings, the
bill passed both Houses, and in 1960 reached the President's desk. In spite of
the exhortations from Cabinet members, including Secretary Mitchell and Vice
President Richard Nixon, Eisenhower again vetoed the bill.33 The climax of the saga of area
redevelopment legislation awaited the outcome of the 1960 presidential
election.
The Labor Department had not waited for a successful conclusion of the
issue of aid to depressed areas to begin evaluating its own contribution. In
1955 a DOL study paper on "Community Economic Growth and Stability" outlined
possible courses of action. For the most part, the Department accepted the
Administration's dictum that leadership in any program to aid areas of
persistent and substantial unemployment had to come from state and local
authorities.34 Moreover, any
programs in which the Department participated applied to other areas as well.
With these considerations, the DOL approach proceeded along traditional and
institutional lines.
The USES emerged as a major component of the Department's program.
State and local employment offices were equipped to take the leadership in
identifying specific economic problems and bringing them to the attention of
local leaders. By continuing its work on analyzing local labor situations, the
USES could provide information to influence private and government interests in
choosing new sites for plants and factories. Also, the agency's studies on the
characteristics and potential of the workers in communities served as a guide
to potential employers.
In accordance with the national discussion on education, the Department
report recognized the relationship between occupational opportunities and
adequate training. While the federal government provided assistance to
vocational education under the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 and its extensions, the
type of training and the amount of aid were insufficient. Since vocational
education was not under the Department's jurisdiction, Secretary Mitchell's
advisors suggested that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW)
study the responsiveness of vocational education to the needs of depressed
areas.35 DOL staff members
understood the limited assistance of the OJT programs of the BAT in areas of
labor surplus, and proposed further action. The BAT could redirect and expand
its OJT into skills that corresponded to employer needs.36 Still, the Department continued to
search for additional sources of training, especially in depressed areas.
The Department also considered its role in areas of chronic
unemployment, pending the passage of either the Douglas or the Administration
bill. Should such legislation be passed, the DOL would be responsible for
developing criteria for defining an area of substantial and persistent
unemployment. The laws also called for the Department's involvement with state
and local authorities in conducting economic surveys prior to the formulation
of a rehabilitation program, including studies on manpower skills, training,
occupations and facilities.37 To
support local groups in developing their programs, the Department would act as
an exchange for information and technical assistance.
At the same time the DOL prepared a contingency plan in the event that
Congress passed no legislation for depressed areas. In such a situation the
Department recommended that the President appoint one of his assistants to deal
exclusively with unemployment in labor surplus areas, and establish an advisory
committee on the subject.38
Another proposal involved having the DOL's own Assistant Secretary for
Employment and Manpower coordinate, review and concentrate existing programs on
depressed areas. Regardless of any legislation, the Department expected to
continue and expand its own work.39
Some of Secretary Mitchell's advisors felt that neither the
Administration's nor the Department's program went far enough, since the
problems of chronic unemployment required new approaches and methods, rather
than mere extension and improvement of existing programs. While staff members
of the Department suggested the need for special training efforts in areas of
surplus labor, the Administration bill for area redevelopment made no mention
of it. Generally, the DOL accepted the training provision of the Douglas bill
and the desirability of compensation for those undergoing training. But it
considered those provisions of the bill that linked compensation with UI
unacceptable.40 This raised the
question of the proper relationship between income maintenance of trainees and
the UI program. An underlying principle of UI was that only unemployed
individuals seeking work and available for work were eligible for benefits.
Since individuals undergoing training were not available for work under the UI
program, they were not eligible for benefits. Most states prohibited payment of
UI to unemployed workers engaged in training programs.41
To deal with this conflict, the Secretary's Program, Planning and
Review Committee (PPRC) suggested that the Bureau of Employment Security (BES),
which handled the USES and UI, conduct studies on the necessity and feasibility
of income maintenance for trainees. These involved determining the number of
workers who found employment because of their training, the extent of available
training, and the number of individuals who could not participate in training
due to the lack of income. In ascertaining the characteristics of the
unemployed who exhausted their UI benefits, the Department could determine the
volume of potential trainees and the type of programs required.
While the need for training and retraining encompassed more than just
depressed areas, an adequately trained work force had implications for the
economic growth of depressed areas. Workers trained in modern techniques and in
occupations with a growing demand could serve as an attraction to an industry
in search of a new location. In cooperation with local groups, the USES
provided technical assistance and guidance for evaluating the training
potential of the labor market, hoping that such surveys of manpower and
institutional resources would act as a blueprint for revival of depressed
areas.42
The concept of training and retraining to deal with the problems
engendered by automation, skill development, and structural unemployment was
common in the 1950's. Several countries in Western Europe had already adopted
nationwide programs.43 Various
unions and industries in the United States maintained similar activities. The
first state-run program for training the unemployed began in Pennsylvania in
1952. In 1958 alone, 28,000 people received training in that state. The state
board of vocational education administered and organized the training, while
the initiative came from the Department of Commerce, the USES agencies, or
local interests. Several states followed the Pennsylvania model, but only
Michigan and the District of Columbia permitted individuals in retraining
programs to receive compensation from UI.44 While state training programs were
effective, the limited funds available to state governments lessened their
impact.
Both the Administration bill for area redevelopment and the Douglas
bill included some provision for vocational training. The Administration
proposal charged the DOL with determining local training needs and reporting
their findings to DHEW, which would then assist communities in setting up the
programs. In contrast, the Douglas bill provided not only for cooperation among
DOL, DHEW and state and local authorities to provide training services, but
also included a training allowance. Moreover, the Douglas bill allowed for the
federal funding of training. But training was a minor feature since the bill
earmarked most of the funds for assisting industries that settled in depressed
areas.
The Eisenhower Administration did not reject training for combating
unemployment. The experience of unions, industries and state governments
indicated its effectiveness. But the philosophy of limited governmental
intervention prevented the White House from usurping control of both state and
private programs or even competing with them. The fact that these activities
existed without federal assistance meant to some that the situation did not
require additional legislation.45 Eisenhower's economic advisers
believed that monetary policy and over-all economic growth was a better
approach to the unemployment problem than concentrating on specific areas or
industries. The White House's emphasis on tight fiscal policy promoted federal
reliance on existing labor market programs (e.g. UI, USES) to cushion the
hardships of unemployment rather than initiating new spending programs.
The Eisenhower policies came under severe attack. Reacting to the
increasing numbers of unemployed constituents, Democratic leaders attacked the
White House as the chief cause of the economic malaise. The JEC, composed of a
majority of Democrats, attacked the Administration's preoccupation with price
stability and inflation. Since the end of the Korean War, these critics
claimed, the restrictive monetary policy served to reduce employment in
manufacturing.46 Had the
government expanded its fiscal policy, the committee charged, the overall
growth rate could have been higher and unemployment lower. While Democrats
shared the Eisenhower-Burns concern with curbing inflation, they rejected the
sacrifice of growth to gain stability. Moreover, they believed that the neglect
of an active manpower policy limited the productive capacity of the
economy.
National dissatisfaction with the limitations of "fiscal orthodoxy"
became clear in the 1958 election, where unemployment was the chief issue. The
Democrats gained 12 seats in the Senate and 49 in the House, all previously
held by Republicans. But positive action from the Democratic leadership did not
immediately materialize. Labor leaders, especially, were disenchanted when the
new Congress failed to pass an emergency extension of UI benefits.47
The labor unions, strong supporters and allies of the Eastern
Democratic party, understandably felt thwarted. Throughout the 1950's labor
severely criticized the economic program of Eisenhower. Instead of relying on
monetary policy, labor leaders vociferously championed increased fiscal
expenditures.48 Their proposals
included extended UI benefits, public works, lower interest rates, long term
loans, federal housing, area redevelopment legislation, and a tax reduction. As
a measure of their frustration and their dissatisfaction with the Democratic
leadership, the AFL-CIO organized a march on Washington in 1959 to prod the new
Congress into action.
Bowing to the demands of labor and his own party members, Senate
majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) proposed the creation of a joint
committee to study unemployment which would include Senators, Representatives
and presidential appointees. Many Senators considered the proposal "too little,
too late." It passed the Senate but died in the House.49 Unable to let the issue fade, Johnson
inaugurated a special committee of the Senate to deal with unemployment
problems. Under the leadership of freshman Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN), the
committee conducted hearings in 12 states. The Senators heard testimony from
local officials, state authorities, educators, businessmen and the unemployed
themselves. The evidence pointed to an overwhelming demand for legislation
dealing with structural changes rather than with aggregate demand.
In its final report to the Senate in March 1960, the McCarthy Committee
made recommendations that became the basis for later programs of the "New
Frontier" and "Great Society." The report advocated the passage of area
redevelopment legislation, creation of a Youth Conservation Corps and a
nationwide training program, and the reform of UI.50 Although he possessed the authority,
McCarthy did not ask Johnson to extend the life of the committee. But the
committee had accomplished several goals by focusing the attention of the
legislators on the complexity of the unemployment problem and creating a
legislative blueprint for the next decade.
The election of 1960, coinciding with the beginning of another economic
downturn, endowed economic issues with a new urgency. Eisenhower's veto of the
depressed areas legislation just a few months earlier provided presidential
aspirant John Kennedy, then a Senator from Massachusetts, with a volatile issue
of which he took full advantage. Kennedy appreciated the problems of distressed
areas from the experience of his home state and from acting as floor manager
for the Douglas bill in 1956. During the 1960 campaign he spent almost a month
in West Virginia, reminding the unemployed that the Democrats had twice passed,
and the Republicans twice vetoed, legislation that endeavored to alleviate
their hardships.51 The issue
struck a responsive chord in all areas of the country, since unemployment had
few geographic boundaries.
With a Democratic presidential victory at hand, Douglas again prepared
his bill to present at the opening of the new Congress. He reasonably expected
little trouble in passing the measure. To dramatize the issue, and to bring it
into closer identification with himself, Kennedy appointed Douglas as the head
of a special task force on area development. On opening day of the 87th
Congress, Douglas introduced his bill, little different from the original one
introduced in 1955, but with the coveted S. 1 designation.
Surprisingly, Kennedy introduced his own depressed area bill shortly
after election. The most significant disparity between the two programs was the
delegation of authority. Whereas the Douglas bill assigned the coordination and
supervision of area redevelopment activities to an independent agency, the
Kennedy bill placed the authority in the Commerce Department. While Douglas had
consistently and vehemently opposed this when suggested by Eisenhower, he
accepted the Kennedy revision.52
With more Republican support than in 1960, the bill quickly passed both Houses
and the President signed it into law on May 1, 1961. Kennedy applauded the
Congress for its work and called the bill an "important step in making it
possible for everyone to find a job who wants to work and support their
families."53 The federal
government committed itself to work with private industry and state and local
governments to solve the nation's problems.
The passage of the Area Redevelopment Act climaxed nearly a decade of
debate, not merely on the feasibility of such activity, but on the government's
responsibility to deal with structural change. Yet the ARA emphasized
assistance to communities, not people. The act focused its attention on
providing financial inducements to attract industries to depressed areas and to
improve the institutional facilities of those communities. Limited to specific
areas, ARA was incapable of reaching vast numbers of the unemployed, who
totaled 5.4 million by February 1961. The search continued for a more
comprehensive solution to the problem.
One such solution resulted from a recommendation of the McCarthy
Special Committee on Unemployment. Senator Joseph F. Clark (D-PA), a former
member of that committee and representative of a state that suffered from 10%
unemployment, introduced a bill for retraining the unemployed. Late in 1959,
William L. Cooper, supervisor of trade and industrial education in
Pennsylvania's vocational education program, suggested to Clark that the
federal government sponsor a national training program based on his own state's
project. With a favorable response from Clark, Cooper drafted the bill in the
Washington headquarters of the American Vocational Association (AVA). Later, in
May 1960, Clark introduced another proposal to establish a Council of Manpower
Advisers to the President that would issue a manpower report. Not receiving
Kennedy's approval for that measure, Clark went ahead and introduced his
retraining bill on February 20, 1960, with Senators Randolph (D-WV), Hart
(D-MI) and Smith (D-MA) as co-sponsors. As the chairman of a special
Subcommittee on Unemployment and Manpower of the Senate's Labor and Public
Welfare Committee, Clark began hearings on what was to become the nation's
first and most sweeping federal manpower training program.54
The proposal, known as the Vocational Retraining Act of 1961
(S. 987), attempted to solve unemployment caused by automation or other
technological change, the relocation of industry, shifts in market demand, and
other changes in the structure of the economy.55 Following the Smith-Hughes formula of
federal aid to vocational education, the bill called for cooperation between
federal and state educational agencies to retrain unemployed workers.56 DHEW would be in charge of the
allocations and disperse the funds to the states according to their levels of
unemployment. State authorities would use these funds: 1) to conduct training
schools, pay teachers' salaries, and buy equipment; 2) to provide unemployment
compensation for those undergoing retraining; and, 3) to provide transportation
and subsistence payments for trainees. The proposal limited retraining to
unemployed workers over 30 years of age who were heads of families and had five
or more years of experience in the labor force.57
The debates of the decade had educated legislators, administrators and
the public to the need for such a program. Liberals and conservatives alike
could unite on the issue of retraining. To liberals it meant salvaging human
lives from the degradation of unemployment and re-equipping them with a
livelihood and self-respect. To conservatives retraining offered the prospects
of reducing the unemployment rosters and enlarging the nation's productive
labor force. Moreover, many individuals believed that despite the high rates of
unemployment, jobs went begging every year. Retraining offered the possibility
of relocating jobless workers to occupations that suffered from shortages.
During the transitional period from his nomination to be Secretary of
Labor until his assumption of office, Arthur Goldberg alerted the DOL to
consider training for the unemployed.58 To prepare for this work, Goldberg
requested several DOL reports that had already been prepared on the subject but
that had not been acted upon by the Eisenhower Administration.59 One was a task force report presented
by Robert Goodwin, head of BES, titled "Some Possible Measures to Combat
Persistent Unemployment."60 It
recognized training as a key in dealing with the persistently unemployed,
especially older workers and workers in areas of surplus labor. For these
workers, adult education, refresher courses, apprenticeship and other training
courses were invaluable. The report emphasized the importance of
industry-sponsored OJT for these workers, preferring this to traditional
vocational education. It recommended a program of federal assistance to augment
area skill surveys, improve existing training facilities, and continue
unemployment benefits for participants or provide subsistence allowances for
those ineligible for UI.
Another report, prepared by the DOL's Office of Research and
Development, outlined possible measures for combating technological
unemployment.61 The report noted
that mainly young people were served by vocational education and changes in the
educational structure, and that "not too much attention has been directed yet
to the potentialities for additional training or retraining of experienced
workers to improve their earning capacity or to make them less prone to
occupational obsolescence." Generally, it said, the government considered any
work done in this field a private concern. The study called upon the DOL to
re-examine this conclusion. To provide for these workers, the report urged that
guidance and placement services be provided to trainees and that trainees be
eligible for UI or subsistence allowances. Thus, it emphasized the role of DOL
facilities and services in retraining.
Goldberg, invited to testify before the Clark Subcommittee, asked for a
postponement until the Department could prepare its position. The members of
the Department's PPRC were divided on the Clark bill. One group faulted the
bill for its total reliance on vocational education. Vocational education was
under severe criticism for not meeting current economic needs and relying on
archaic methods, and President Kennedy had recently called for a study on that
subject. It appeared counterproductive to put money and resources into a
suspect structure. In any event, this group favored OJT as more suitable for
older workers than classroom training. Some members of the committee also
objected to the limited role of the DOL in the Clark bill and feared that
acceptance of such a limited program foreclosed the possibility of getting a
broader program in the near future.62
Other committee members, however, recommended accepting the bill with
only minor changes, doubting that the Clark bill would forestall other
legislation on retraining at a later date.63 To study the measure, Goldberg
created the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Training and Retraining, headed by Seymour
Wolfbein. Its report advocated a program with the individual at its core, i.e.
suiting the training to individual needs.64 It would strengthen the USES's
counseling facilities and skill surveys to determine re-employment prospects in
specific occupations.65 The
subcommittee warned that any federal training program had to guard against
discouraging employers and unions from maintaining their own OJT functions, and
might even encourage further OJT work by providing a federally subsidized
training allowance. No training program could function without at least a 52
week subsistence allowance, the subcommittee counseled. But it also raised the
possibility of allocating moving expenses for workers who migrated from labor
surplus areas to places of greater job opportunities.66
To act in accordance with these principles and suggestions, the members
of the subcommittee recommended the creation of a new unit within the DOL as a
part of a federal manpower training program. Rather than relying on the old
standby agencies whose responsibilities edged toward their legal limits, the
DOL could gain fresh perspective and thinking on the problem through a new
agency.67 It would establish
standards for training institutions and OJT where participants qualified for
training allowances, develop criteria of eligibility for the subsistence
payments, and institute an arrangement of reimbursement with federal and state
agencies to fund training operations prior to the establishment of such
standards. Moreover, it would act as the coordinator for manpower training
operations.
On April 20, 1961, Goldberg created the Office of Automation and
Manpower and named Deputy Assistant Secretary Seymour Wolfbein as its head. The
general function of the agency encompassed the examination of the influence of
automation and technological change on employment and unemployment.68
To fulfill this mandate, the DOL directed the office to improve the testing,
counseling and placement of workers displaced by automation, and of those about
to enter the work force. The order also directed it to serve as a clearinghouse
for information dealing with technological change and to promote dialogues
between employers and employees affected by such changes. The office could mold
itself to administer any new responsibilities devolving from new legislation on
training.
Even while the DOL and Congress labored over the question of a national
training scheme for the unemployed, the Bureau of the Budget (BoB) made a
singular contribution to the debate. Prior to Kennedy's inauguration, Michael
S. March, a staff analyst on the Bureau, suggested the possibility of a
training program to the new BoB director, David Bell.69 From his studies of the G.I. Bill,
March realized the defects in the country's vocational education structure and
objected to the Clark bill for entrusting so much power to an archaic and
outmoded institution. He realized the necessity for a more broadly based and
all-encompassing training program that catered to different types of workers
and offered a variety of training plans.
Rather than relying on DHEW and its Office of Education (OE), March
supported a program where the Labor Department held the reins of authority.
Such an arrangement would insure the coordination between training activities
and the work of the USES.70 He
also favored a totally federally financed operation and the utilization of
whatever facilities, either public or private, the DOL considered suitable for
training purposes. Accordingly, March exhorted Goldberg and the DOL staff to
prepare a bill embodying these principles that worked so successfully during
World War II training operations and the veterans' rehabilitation
experience.71
Significant pressure in opposition to the type of framework suggested
by March came from educational societies, particularly the AVA. A powerful
lobbying group, the AVA had a critical stake in the Clark bill, since it helped
compose it, and in any legislation that involved manpower training. National
and state representatives of the AVA appeared before the Clark Subcommittee on
manpower and testified on behalf of his proposal. But most expressed their fear
over the involvement of the DOL in what they essentially perceived as the
function of DHEW and the OE. Educational societies predicted the creation of a
dual school system in the United States if the Labor Department gained a
foothold in education.72 Another
lobby with similar objectives was the Council of Chief State School
Officers.73 A union of state
superintendents of public institutions, the Council jealously guarded its
authority against any federal encroachment. The Eisenhower program of giving
local authorities greater control over education greatly enhanced its
power.
Initially, DHEW took little part in the debate on the proposed
legislation. Secretary of HEW Abraham Ribicoff felt no great enthusiasm for the
measure, since his Department preferred to concentrate its attention on its
primary and secondary school programs. Groups such as the AVA, the Parent
Teachers Association, and the National Education Association took a dim view of
DHEW's and OE's disinterest and passivity. It was these groups, rather than the
Department, that led the battle for investing DHEW with almost sole authority
over manpower training.74
Rather than confronting these pressures and breaking the tradition of
limited federal intervention, the DOL prepared a bill that resembled the Clark
measure. Instead of federal financing, it retained the provision for cost
sharing between the states and the federal government. The proposed draft also
allowed the states to administer training through a grant-in-aid
formula.75 Fearful of divorcing
manpower training from the exclusive purview of state vocational educators, the
DOL bill relied heavily on the public school system rather than its own
resources in the USES.
March refused to accept what he saw as the Labor Department's
capitulation to the wishes of the AVA and Capitol Hill. He returned the bill to
the Department of Labor and prevailed upon Goldberg to again revamp the measure
according to the objectives of full federal financing, Labor Department
control, and use of vocational education facilities on an individual project
basis rather than on a wholesale basis.76 Acceding to BoB pressure, Goldberg
submitted a revised proposal to the President, and he in turn sent it to
Congress on May 29, 1961. Thus, the Manpower Development and Training Act
(S. 1991), in its original legislative form, adopted the BoB's commitment
to a strong, centralized federal program of training.
The Administration bill, introduced by Senators Clark, Hubert Humphrey
(D-MN), Patrick McNamara (D-MI), Hart and Claiborne Pell (D-RI), placed full
control in the hands of the Secretary of Labor.77 Title I, "The Statement of Finding
and Purpose," linked the goals of MDTA with its spiritual predecessor, the
Employment Act of 1946. The Secretary of Labor was responsible for conducting
research to appraise the nation's skill development, and for stimulating public
and private interest to accelerate that development. Title II, "Training and
Skill Development Programs," authorized the Secretary to plan, encourage and
coordinate OJT and other related training programs. The DOL's jurisdiction also
included the selection of participants in the training programs and the
determination of those skills and occupations in which to train them. Under
Title II the bill granted a federal training allowance to trainees for up to 52
weeks. It further stipulated that anyone could participate in the training, but
only those that met the specific criteria qualified for the allowance.
Title III, "On-the-Job Training and Related Training," directed the
Secretary of Labor to provide training through any appropriate and expeditious
agency, public or private. To insure the quality of these programs, the
Secretary was responsible for establishing standards of operation and content.
This mandate allowed the DOL to enter into negotiations with these groups for
the purpose of instituting a training schedule, but the Secretary retained
supervisory control.
Title IV, "Provision of Vocational Education," delineated the role of
DHEW. Under specific assignment by the Secretary of Labor, DHEW could enter
into agreements with states to furnish technical education. For these programs,
DHEW could utilize appropriate state vocational education agencies, using
either public or private facilities. If states did not provide the training,
DHEW had authority to enter into direct negotiations with the private
institutions. In either case, DHEW assumed 100% of the training costs. Whenever
possible, the bill directed the Secretary of HEW to cooperate with the
Secretary of Labor to coordinate vocational education programs with OJT and
other related training.
Title V, "Miscellaneous," cautioned the Secretary of Labor to avoid
undue expense by utilizing the facilities and instrumentalities of other
agencies in the federal government to carry out his functions. The proposed
draft set the bill's authority for four years, with an escalating appropriation
of funds.
There were several critical points of difference between the Clark bill
and the Administration bill. Whereas the Clark bill (S. 987) limited
eligibility to unemployed workers over 30 years of age with families and
working experience, the Administration bill (S. 1991) did not. It allowed
the Secretary of Labor to make such determinations depending on the imperatives
of the times. It thus took into account the growing problem of unemployed
youth. On the question of training allowances, the Clark plan for federal-state
matching perpetuated the already inequitable UI payment system that varied from
state to state. The Administration proposal expanded the number of workers
eligible for a training allowance to include the underemployed, part-time
employees, individuals who had exhausted their UI benefits, and those without
prior work experience.
Clark's reliance on state vocational agencies and institutions limited
the types of training offered, since the majority of vocational education
programs operated through public schools. An older worker in need of retraining
but with a limited, possibly distasteful, school experience might choose not to
participate in training rather than return to a classroom. Thus, by allowing
the Labor Department to utilize non-academic institutions, such as unions,
industries, trade associations, etc., the Administration bill insured wider
training opportunities and the participation of different types of people. It
also offered the possibility of training in a wider range of occupations where
practical application benefitted the worker more than textbook training. The
flexibility of S. 1991 in its projects and clientele elevated manpower
policy to a position nearly equal with fiscal and monetary policy, as both a
response to, and reflection of, changing economic conditions.
On June 5, 1961, the Senate Subcommittee on Unemployment and Manpower
began hearings on the Administration proposal while still considering the Clark
bill (S. 987). William B. Logan, president of the AVA, presented his
organization's reservations on S. 1991. While advocating training for the
unemployed, he questioned the DOL's authority and ability for organizing the
training. He agreed with the provisions that required the Department to
determine what skills to train for and who should participate, but as for
content and supervision, he said "Education has the administrative organization
and the resources in terms of qualified personnel and facilities around which
to build the actual training and the retraining of the persons thus selected
and referred."78 To insure DHEW
and the state vocational education agencies full responsibility for training,
the AVA presented 34 amendments to the Administration bill.79
In his testimony before the subcommittee, Goldberg acceded to the
pressure of the AVA. While he maintained the DOL's jurisdiction on OJT, since
it involved fragile negotiations between employers and unions, he considered it
desirable and feasible to invest DHEW with the full responsibility for
educational training.80 He
pointed to the long tradition of DHEW's cooperation with state agencies and
vocational education. Goldberg, preferring to act as his own legislative
liaison, took it upon himself to make the bill acceptable to important lobbying
groups and Congressional leaders.
Although concerned with the impact of automation and technology,
organized labor considered retraining a low priority. Labor lobbyists
concentrated their efforts on problems of aggregate demand, rather than
structural change.81 While
AFL-CIO leaders expressed little enthusiasm over MDTA when it first came to
their attention, the struggle for authority between DHEW and the DOL mobilized
the labor movement into action.82 Both George Meany and Stanley
Ruttenberg, Director of Research for the AFL-CIO, testified on behalf of a
training program with greater centralization and DOL control.83 Certain unions, particularly the
building trades, feared government training would interfere with their
apprenticeship program. To neutralize possible union opposition, the DOL agreed
to locate its OJT functions in the BAT.84
In accepting 20 of the AVA's amendments, with the approval of the DOL,
the manpower subcommittee transformed the Administration bill into a close
facsimile of the Clark bill.85
The bill, as reported out of committee, disposed of federal financing and
reinstated a 50-50 matching program of state and federal grants after the
second year of the program. While still responsible for choosing trainees and
the skills for which they would be trained, the DOL no longer had the authority
to design and administer the training. Rather, the amendments returned this
authority to the state boards of vocational education and DHEW. The committee
also limited training allowances to heads of families with work force
experience, but gave the Secretary of Labor some discretion in formulating
testing, placement and guidance programs for unemployed youths. In addition to
the DOL's responsibility for studying the nation's manpower supply, the
committee also authorized the President to submit an annual "Manpower Report"
to Congress, a veritable "Manpower State of the Union." To fulfill a compromise
worked out between Goldberg and Clark, Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) added a
National Advisory Committee to the bill, to advise the Secretary of Labor on
manpower matters. Furthermore, the committee dropped the
Administration-supported provision for paying relocation expenses and allowed
poor rural families to enter training programs.
Once on the Senate floor, the bill evoked little serious criticism as
amended. An attempt by Senator Winston Prouty (R-VT) to limit the bill's
jurisdiction to two years failed, while his amendment to limit the allocation
for 16-21-year-olds to no more than 5% of the total allowance fund did pass.
The bill, resembling Clark's measure rather than the BoB's, passed the Senate
on August 23, 1961, by a vote of 60 to 31, with half of the Republicans in
support.
On the House side, Elmer Holland (D-PA) introduced the Administration
bill as H.R. 7373 and conducted hearings on it in his Subcommittee on
Unemployment and the Impact of Automation. The subcommittee voted its approval
of the bill with amendments which included a two year limit on the bill's
authority, a ceiling on appropriations, and state funding of programs. While
the AVA submitted the same amendments to the House as it did to the Senate,
Representative Holland refused to drastically alter the context of the
Administrative measure. The House did not dilute the Labor Department's
responsibility for formulating training programs, nor did it stipulate any
criteria for eligibility.
Several Republican members of the subcommittee endorsed the principle
of retraining for the unemployed in H.R. 8399 (H.R. 7373 amended), but took
issue with the federal training allowance. They feared that such a precedent
would eventually lead to "federalizing the entire unemployment compensation
system."86 Nevertheless, they
gave conditional approval of the bill, provided that the House Ways and Means
Committee, which had jurisdiction over UI, closed the loophole. If the Ways and
Means Committee acted upon this suggestion, the Republicans would ask the Rules
Committee to bring the bill to the attention of the floor.87 But since the Ways and Means
Committee took no action to dovetail the training allowance with UI, and with
vocational education's limited enthusiasm for the Holland bill, H.R. 8399
remained in the Rules Committee when Congress adjourned, in September.
Even before Congress reconvened, a movement got under way to move the
bill out of the Rules Committee. Samuel Merrick, formerly Senator Clark's
counsel for the manpower subcommittee, and now Secretary Goldberg's legislative
assistant, attempted to reconcile the Holland bill with the reservations
expressed by several Republican representatives, particularly Charles Goodell
of New York. Goodell preferred the Senate version of the bill, and even
introduced it in the House, with some amendments of his own. Reluctantly,
Holland accepted the Goodell-Senate version of the bill, and the Rules
Committee voted its approval. All that was left of the original Administration
proposal was its number and Holland's name. On February 28, 1962, the House
voted on what was essentially the Goodell bill, and passed it 354 to 62 with
considerable Republican support.
President Kennedy signed the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962 into law on March 15, initiating a new era in federal manpower
programs.
Gladys Roth Kremen wrote this monograph in 1974 as a
summer intern in the Historical Office.
Footnotes
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