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Kelly v. Flav-O Rich, Inc., 1990-STA-14 (Sec'y May 22, 1991)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

SECRETARY OF LABOR
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DATE May 22, 1991
CASE NO. 90-STA-14

IN THE MATTER OF

RICHARD KELLY,
    COMPLAINANT,

    v.

FLAV-O-RICH, INC.,
    RESPONDENT.

BEFORE: THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

FINAL DECISION AND ORDER

   Before me for review is the Recommended Decision and order. (R.D. and O.) issued February 20, 1991, by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Theodor P. Von Brand in the captioned case, arising under Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305 (1988) (employee protection provision). Under the STAA, employees who believe that they have been subject to unlawful employment discrimination may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 180 days after the alleged discrimination. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305(c). Complainant alleges that on November 3, 1988, he was discharged in violation of the STAA. He filed his complaint with the Department of Labor on August 10, 1989, exceeding the statutory limitations period by 100 days. The ALJ found the complaint timely because Complainant purportedly had raised the claim at a December 1988 State Employment Security Commission hearing, within the STAA limitations period.1 R.D. and O. at 16. The ALJ viewed equitable tolling of the limitations period to be appropriate, reasoning that Complainant timely raised "the precise statutory claim in issue" but mistakenly did so "in the wrong forum." Id. at,15, citing School Dist. of City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1981).


[Page 2]

   The tenet relied upon by the ALJ applies in narrow circumstances such as those present in Burnett v. New York Central Railroad, 380 U.S. 424, 429 (1965), which uniformly is cited as its source. There, the plaintiff had commenced a timely Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action in a State court of competent jurisdiction, State courts having concurrent jurisdiction with Federal courts, and service of process was made. The action subsequently was dismissed, however, because venue was improper under State law. The plaintiff then commenced an action in Federal court outside the FELA limitations period, in which he reasserted his claim. The Court held that the original timely filing tolled the limitations period. In contrast, Complainant's claim before the State Employment Security Commission was not asserted under the STAA and, thus, is not the precise claim mistakenly raised in the wrong forum. Accordingly, Burnett does not apply here.

   Examination of other case law reveals that statutory limitations periods are not tolled during the pendency of grievance or arbitration proceedings under collective bargaining agreements, Intern. Union of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (Title VII, Civil Rights Act); Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 745 F.2d 407, 412 (7th Cir. 1984), and during the pendency of proceedings before local civil service or personnel boards. Greenwald v. City of North Miami Beach, 587 F.2d 779, 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979); Dyer v. Jefferson Parish, La., 619 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. La. 1985). See Smith v. American President Lines, 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978) (discrimination charge filed with State Division of Human Rights did not toll Title VII limitations period). The State Employment Security Commission proceeding at issue here more nearly resembles a form of collateral review, as in the cases cited above where tolling has been held inappropriate.

   Moreover, the regulations governing the instant STAA claim militate against tolling. While acknowledging the appropriateness of tolling "on the basis of recognized equitable principles or because of extenuating circumstances" such as employer misrepresentation or deception; the regulations state that "[t]he pendency of grievance-arbitration proceedings or filing with another agency are examples of circumstances which do not justify a tolling of the 180-day period." 29 C.F.R. § 1978.102(d)(3) (1990).2

    Upon consideration, I find no basis for disregarding the STAA limitations period. Complainant's complaint was not timely filed, and it IS DISMISSED.

   SO ORDERED.

      Lynn Martin
      Secretary of Labor

Washington, D.C.

[ENDNOTES]

1Complainant cited, in that State proceeding, factual grounds which could give rise to a STAA claim.

2This STAA regulation is patterned on 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(d)(3) (1990), which governs filing of complaints under the employee protection provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1988). While the OSHA regulations originally approved tolling the times limitations period where a complainant timely "filed a complaint regarding the same general subject with another agency", they were revised following the decisions in Robbins and Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980), as "no longer comport[ing] with relevant Supreme Court case law." 50 Fed. Reg. 32,845-32,846 (August 15, 1985). In particular, statutory antidiscrimination rights and remedies are legally independent of contractual or other rights and remedies. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974). Cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).



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