DATE: February 22, 1994
CASE NO. 90-ERA-00061
IN THE MATTER OF
LINDA D. PATTON-DAVIS,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
Before me for review is the Recommended Order on
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (R.O.) of
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in this case arising under the
employee protection provision of the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, as amended (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988). The ALJ
recommended granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment
finding that the complaint of retaliatory discharge was untimely
filed. Alternatively, the ALJ concluded that even if the
complaint was timely, the issues raised have been fully litigated
in another forum and are barred from relitigation under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Respondent filed a brief before
me.
Upon careful review of the complete record before me, I
adopt and append the ALJ's factual findings, discussion and
reasoning on the issues of timeliness and equitable tolling.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 24.3(b),
Complainant had thirty days from the date of the alleged
violation in which to file a complaint. The ALJ correctly found
that Complainant's receipt of her notice of termination by
reduction in force on
[PAGE 2]
March 6, 1990, triggered commencement of the thirty day filing
period under the ERA. The case law and the prior decisions of
the Secretary support the conclusion that the April 30 effective
date of termination is not the date the alleged violation
occurred by rather the date the consequences of the adverse
action are ultimately felt. SeeDelaware State College
v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258-261 (1980);
Ballentine v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Case No. 91-ERA-
23, Final Dec. and Order, Sept. 23, 1992, slip op. at 2;
Howard v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Case No. 90-ERA-24,
Sec. Final Dec. and Order of Dismissal, July 3, 1991, slip op. at
2-3, aff'dsubnom. Howard v. U.S.
Department of Labor, 959 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, the complaint of retaliatory discharge filed on May
25, 1990, is barred as untimely filed.
The record does not contain any evidence sufficient to
establish that equitable tolling of the limitations period is
warranted in this case. SeeSchool District of the
City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 16-19 (3d Cir.
1981); Ballentine at 3.
Additionally, the record supports and I accept, the ALJ's
conclusion that neither Complainant nor her counsel raised any
other specific allegations of discriminatory acts by Respondent
nor presented any evidence to support the general statement in
her complaint letter, that "other acts of discrimination"
occurred within thirty days of filing the complaint. See
R.O. at 5-6; Rodolico v. Venturi, Rauch and Scott Brown,
Case No. 89-CAA-4, Sec. Final Dec. and Order, Feb. 21, 1992, slip op. at
3-4.
Finally, summary judgment is appropriate in these
circumstances, as Complainant has not raised any genuine issue of
material fact on the issues of timeliness and equitable tolling.
Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (1989). [1]
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted and
the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERT B. REICH
Secretary of Labor
Washington, D.C.
[ENDNOTES]
[1] In light of the outcome of this case, I need not address the
issue of res judicata and collateral estoppel.