But none of the information he provides in support of these statements relates to ReedHycalog UK's two grounds for
[Page 9]
summary decision. Salian has raised no genuine issue of material fact regarding either the timeliness of his complaint or the application of the SOX to his employment as a foreign national employed by a foreign company. Therefore, all other facts alleged by Salian are immaterial, and ReedHycalog UK is entitled to summary decision.
Conclusion
Salian's complaint is time-barred. He has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, as a foreign national employed by a foreign company, the SOX's whistleblower protection provision covers his employment. We therefore concur with the ALJ's conclusion that ReedHycalog UK is entitled to summary decision. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the ALJ's R. D. & O. and DENY Salian's complaint.
SO ORDERED.
WAYNE C. BEYER
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2006).
2 29 C.F.R. Part 1980 (2007).
3 Complainant's Brief at 2; ReedHycalog UK's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion), Affidavit of Mark Tooley.
4 Complaint at 1, Complainant's Brief at 28.
5 Motion, Affidavit of Mike Critchley; ReedHycalog UK's Reply to Complainant's Response to ReedHycalog UK's Motion for Summary Judgment (Reply to Response to the Motion), Exhibit (Ex.) 2 (Declaration of Mike Critchley).
6 Reply to Response to the Motion, Ex. 1 (Affidavit of Philip A. Choyce).
7 Reply to Response to the Motion, Ex. 3 (Declaration of Chris Starkie), 3A (Salian Haridas Redundancy Meeting Minutes).
8 Reply to Response to the Motion, Ex. 2D.
9 Motion, Affidavit of Mike Critchley.
10 Complaint at 3.
11 Secretary's Findings at 1.
12 R. D. & O. at 2.
13 Complainant's Response Showing Causes and Evidences on Why Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment Should Not Be Granted (Response to the Motion) at 5-9.
14 Id. at 4.
15 Id.
16 Secretary's Order No. 1-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.110(a).
17 29 C.F.R. § 18.40 (2006).
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(d); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
20 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
21 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
22 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(c); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
23 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a); 68 Fed. Reg. 31,864 (May 28, 2003).
24 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) ("An action … shall be commenced not later than 90 days after the date on which the violation occurs."); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(d) ("Within 90 days after an alleged violation of the Act occurs (i.e., when the discriminatory decision has been both made and communicated to the complainant), an employee who believes that he or she has been discriminated against in violation of the Act may file, or have filed by any person on the employee's behalf, a complaint alleging such discrimination.").
25 See, e.g., Rollins, v. American Airlines, ARB No. 04-140, ALJ No. 2004-AIR-009, slip op. at 2 (ARB Apr. 3, 2007 (re-issued)); Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., ARB No. 04-120, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-054, slip op. at 3 (ARB Aug. 31, 2005); Jenkins v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-002, slip op. at 14 (ARB Feb. 28, 2003).
26 Larry v. The Detroit Edison Co., 1986-ERA-032, slip op. at 14 (Sec'y June 28, 1991). Cf. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich, 27 F.3d 1133, 1141 (6th Cir. 1994) (three letters warning of further discipline did not constitute final notice of employer's intent to discharge complainant).
27 Motion at 3-4.
28 Motion, Affidavit of Mike Critchley; Reply to Response to the Motion, Ex. 2.
29 Reply to Response to the Motion, Ex. 1.
30 Response to the Motion at 7-8.
31 Id. at 1.
32 Id. at 7-8; Reply to Response to the Motion, Ex. 1.
33 Cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-807 (1999) ("[A] party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement … without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity."); see, e.g., Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.").
34 See, e.g., Carter v. Champion Bus, Inc., ARB No. 05-076, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-023, slip op. at 6-7 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006), citing School Dist. of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 19-21 (3d Cir. 1981).
35 Response to the Motion at 8-9.
36 Id., Ex. F1.
37 Motion at 4.
38 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 20060.
39 Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. CIV.A.04-10031-RWZ, 2004 WL 1922132, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 92,910 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2004).
40 433 F.3d at 18.
41 Id.
42 Motion at 3.
43 Affidavit of Mark Tooley; Motion, Affidavit of Philip A. Choyce.
44 Response to the Motion at 3.
45 Id. at 6.
46 Id., Ex. A-C, E.
47 Response to the Motion at 10-13.