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Highlights

Highlights of [GAO-05-575](#), a report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven for international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States and several other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of Afghanistan's security sector—creating an Afghan army, reconstituting the police force, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the Afghan militias. As the leader for the army pillar, the United States has provided about \$3.3 billion. For the German-led effort to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States has provided over \$800 million. We examined the progress made, and limitations faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and sustain these forces.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop more detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces. GAO also recommends that the Secretaries work to help ensure that progress in the other security pillars is congruous with the army and police programs. Defense, Justice, and State generally concurred with the report's recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or GoodnickD@gao.gov.

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined


What GAO Found

As of March 2005, Defense had trained more than 18,300 Afghan combat troops—over 42 percent of the army's projected total of 43,000—and deployed them throughout the country. During 2004, the Department of Defense significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training. However, Defense efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have fallen behind, and efforts to establish sustaining institutions, such as a logistics command, needed to support these troops have not kept pace. Plans for completing these institutions are not clear.

Germany and the United States had trained more than 35,000 police as of January 2005 and expect to meet their goal of training 62,000 police by December 2005. However, the Department of State has just begun to address structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. Trainees often return to police stations where militia leaders are the principal authority; most infrastructure needs repair, and the police do not have sufficient equipment—from weapons to vehicles. Furthermore, limited field-based mentoring has just begun although previous international police training programs have demonstrated that such mentoring is critical for success. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (which oversees the police force) requires reform and restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany has developed plans specifying how much the program will cost and when it will be completed.

Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces and concurrent progress in the other pillars of security sector reform, Afghanistan could again become a haven for terrorists. However, establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly take years and substantial resources. Available information suggests that these programs could cost up to \$7.2 billion to complete and about \$600 million annually to sustain. Furthermore, the other lead nations have made limited progress in reforming Afghan's judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the militias.

Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.