

Society

Key Messages:

- Population shifts and development choices are making more Americans vulnerable to the expected impacts of climate change.
- Vulnerability is greater for those who have few resources and few choices.
- City residents and city infrastructure have unique vulnerabilities to climate change.
- Climate change affects communities through changes in climate-sensitive resources that occur both locally and at great distances.
- Insurance is one of the industries particularly vulnerable to increasing extreme weather events, but can also help society manage the risks.
- The United States is connected to a world that is unevenly vulnerable to climate change and thus will be affected by impacts globally.

Key Sources



Climate change will affect society through impacts on the necessities and comforts of life: water, energy, transportation, food, natural ecosystems, and health. This section focuses on characteristics of society that make it vulnerable to the potential impacts of climate change.

Because societies and their built environments have developed under a climate that fluctuates within a relatively confined set of conditions, most impacts of a rapidly changing climate will present challenges. Society is especially vulnerable to extremes, such as heat waves and floods, many of which are increasing as climate changes¹. And while there are likely to be some benefits and opportunities in the early stages of warming, as climate continues to change, negative impacts are projected to dominate².

Climate change will affect different segments of society differently due to their varying exposures and adaptive capacity. The impacts of climate change also do not affect society in isolation. Rather, impacts can be exacerbated when they occur in combination with the effects of an aging and growing population, pollution and poverty, and natural

environmental fluctuations^{2,3,4}. Unequal adaptive capacity in the world as a whole also will pose challenges to the United States, because poorer countries are disproportionately affected and the United States is strongly connected to the world beyond its borders through markets, trade, investments, shared resources, migrating species, health, travel and tourism, environmental refugees, and environmental security.



Cedar Rapids, Iowa, June 12, 2008.

Population shifts and development choices are making more Americans vulnerable to the expected impacts of climate change.

Climate is one of the key factors in Americans’ choices of where to live. As the U.S. population grows, ages, and becomes further concentrated in cities and coastal areas, society is faced with additional challenges. Climate change is likely to exacerbate these challenges as changes in temperature, precipitation, sea levels, and extreme weather events increasingly affect homes, communities, water supplies, land resources, transportation, urban infrastructure, and regional characteristics that people have come to value and depend on.

Population growth in the United States over the past century has been most rapid in the South, near the coasts, and in large urban areas (see figure on page 55 in the *Energy* sector). The four most populous states in 2000—California, Texas, Florida, and New York—accounted for 38 percent of the total growth in U.S. population during that time, and share significant vulnerability to coastal storms, severe drought, sea-level rise, air pollution, and urban heat island effects¹. But migration patterns are now shifting: the population of the Mountain West (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico) is projected to increase by 65 percent from 2000 to 2030, representing one-third of all U.S. population growth^{3,5}. And southern coastal areas on both the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico will continue to see population growth; today, 53 percent of the U.S. population lives in the 17 percent of land along the nation’s ocean and Great Lakes coasts^{1,6}.

Overlaying projections of future climate change and its impacts on expected changes in U.S. population and development patterns reveals a critical insight: more Americans will be living in the areas that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change³.

America’s coastlines have seen pronounced population growth in regions most at risk due to hurricane activity, sea-level rise, and storm surge, putting more people and property in harm’s way, as the probability of harm increases³. On the Atlantic and

Gulf coasts where hurricane activity is prevalent, the coastal land in many areas is sinking while sea level is rising; human activities are exacerbating the loss of coastal wetlands that once helped buffer the coastline from erosion due to storms. The devastation caused by recent hurricanes highlights the vulnerability of these areas⁷.

The most rapidly growing area of the country is the Mountain West, a region projected to face more frequent and severe wildfires and have less water available, particularly during the high-demand period of summer. Population movement to these arid and semi-arid regions will stress water supplies⁸. Overuse of rivers and streams in the arid West is common because of high demand for irrigating agriculture, especially those along the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado, in Southern California, and in the Central Valley of California. Rapid population and economic growth in these arid and semi-arid regions has dramatically increased vulnerability to water shortages (see *Water Resources* sector and *Southwest* region)³.

Many questions are raised by ongoing development patterns in the face of climate change. Will growth continue as projected in vulnerable areas, despite the risks? Will there be a retreat from the coastline as it becomes more difficult to insure vulnerable properties? Will there be pressure for the government to insure properties that private insurers have rejected? How can the vulnerability of new development be minimized? How can we ensure that communities adopt measures to manage the significant changes that are projected in sea level, temperature, rainfall, and extreme weather events?

Development choices are based on people’s needs and desires for places to live, economies that provide employment, ecosystems that provide services, and community-based social activities. Thus, the future vulnerability of society will be influenced by how and where people choose to live. Some choices, such as expanded urban development in coastal regions, can increase vulnerabilities to climate-related events, even without any change in climate.



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L1 **Vulnerability is greater for**
 L2 **those who have few resources**
 L3 **and few choices.**

L4
 L5 Vulnerabilities to climate change
 L6 depend not only on where people are
 L7 but also on who they are. In general,
 L8 groups that are especially vulnerable
 L9 include the very young, the very old,
 L10 the sick, and the poor. These groups
 L11 represent a more significant portion of
 L12 the total population in some regions and
 L13 localities than others. For example, the
 L14 elderly more often cite a warm climate
 L15 as motivating their choice of where to
 L16 live and thus make up a larger share of
 L17 the population in warmer areas⁹.

L18
 L19 People with few resources often live
 L20 in marginal locations, such as in river floodplains
 L21 or low-lying coastal areas, which increases their
 L22 risk. For example, the experience with Hurricane
 L23 Katrina showed that the poor and elderly were the
 L24 most vulnerable because of where they lived and
 L25 their limited ability to get out of harm's way. Thus,
 L26 those who have the least often proportionately lose
 L27 the most. And it is clear that people with access to
 L28 financial resources, including insurance, have a
 L29 greater capacity to adapt to, recover, or escape from
 L30 adverse impacts of climate change than those who
 L31 do not have such access. The fate of the poor can be
 L32 permanent dislocation, leading to the loss of social
 L33 relationships and community support networks
 L34 provided by schools, churches, and neighborhoods.

L35
 L36 Native American communities have unique vul-
 L37 nerabilities. Those on established reservations are
 L38 restricted to reservation boundaries and therefore
 L39 have limited relocation options. In Alaska, over 100
 L40 villages on the coast and in low-lying areas along
 L41 rivers are subject to increased flooding and ero-
 L42 sion due to warming¹⁰. Warming also reduces the
 L43 availability and accessibility of many traditional
 L44 food sources for Native Alaskans, such as seals that
 L45 live on ice and caribou whose migration patterns
 L46 depend on being able to cross frozen rivers and
 L47 wetlands. These vulnerable people face losing their
 L48 livelihoods, their communities, and in some cases,
 L49 their culture, which depends on traditional ways of
 L50 collecting and sharing food^{11,12}.



In the future (as in the past), the impacts of climate change are likely to fall disproportionately on the disadvantaged¹. For example, the sensitivity of California's population to increased air and water pollution, heat waves, and other weather-related problems shows significant racial and socioeconomic differences, particularly for those who live and work without air conditioning¹³. Studies specifically examining the impacts of climate change on the African American community in the United States have concluded that they are both economically and physically more vulnerable to climate-related disasters, illness, and price shocks. Economic impacts of climate change such as higher prices for food, water, and energy are also expected to impose new economic burdens on low-income households¹⁴. However, these same studies have concluded that investments in clean energy and improved air quality would significantly benefit these vulnerable populations¹⁵.

City residents and city infrastructure have unique vulnerabilities to climate change.

Over 80 percent of the U.S. population resides in urban areas, which are among the most rapidly changing environments on Earth. In recent decades, cities have become increasingly spread out, complex, and interconnected with regional

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L1 and national economies¹⁶. Cities also experience a
 L2 host of social problems, including neighborhood
 L3 degradation, traffic congestion, crime, poverty,
 L4 and inequities in health and well-being¹⁷. Climate-
 L5 related changes such as increased heat, water
 L6 shortages, and extreme weather events will add
 L7 further stress to existing problems. The impacts of
 L8 climate change on cities are compounded by aging
 L9 infrastructure, buildings, and populations; as well
 L10 as increased air pollution and population growth.
 L11 Further, infrastructure designed to handle past
 L12 variations in climate can instill a false confidence
 L13 in its ability to handle future changes. However,
 L14 urban areas also present opportunities for adapta-
 L15 tion through technology, infrastructure, planning,
 L16 and design¹.
 L17
 L18 As cities grow, they alter local climates through the
 L19 urban heat island effect. This effect occurs because
 L20 cities absorb, produce, and retain more heat than
 L21 the surrounding countryside. The urban heat island
 L22 effect has raised average urban air temperatures
 L23 by 2 to 5°F more than surrounding areas over the
 L24 past 100 years, and by up to 20°F more at night¹⁸.
 L25 Such temperature increases, on top of the general
 L26 increase caused by human-induced warming, affect
 L27 urban dwellers in many ways, influencing health,
 L28 comfort, energy costs, air quality, water quality
 L29 and availability, and violent crime (which increases
 L30 at high temperatures)^{1,4,19,20} (see *Human Health,*
 L31 *Energy, and Water Resources* sectors).
 L32
 L33 More frequent heavy downpours and floods in
 L34 urban areas will cause greater property damage,
 L35 a heavier burden on emergency management,
 L36 increased clean-up and rebuilding costs, and a
 L37 growing financial toll on businesses and homeown-
 L38 ers. The Midwest floods of 2008 provide a recent
 L39 vivid example of such tolls. Heavy downpours and
 L40 urban floods can also overwhelm combined sewer
 L41 and storm-water systems and release pollutants to
 L42 waterways¹. Unfortunately, for many cities, current
 L43 planning and existing infrastructure are designed
 L44 for the historical one-in-100 year event, whereas
 L45 cities are likely to experience this same flood level
 L46 much more frequently as a result of the climate
 L47 change projected over this century^{2,21,22}.
 L48
 L49 Cities are also likely to be affected by climate
 L50 change in unforeseen ways, necessitating diversion

R1 of city funds for emergency responses to extreme
 R2 weather¹. There is the potential for increased sum-
 R3 mer electricity blackouts owing to greater demand
 R4 for air conditioning²³. Unreliable electric power,
 R5 which affected minority neighborhoods during
 R6 New York City’s 1999 heat wave, can pose health
 R7 risks and environmental justice issues because of
 R8 their disproportionate effect on minority popula-
 R9 tions²⁴. In southern California’s cities, additional
 R10 summer electricity demand will intensify conflicts
 R11 between hydropower and flood-control objec-
 R12 tives². Increased costs of repairs and maintenance
 R13 are projected for transportation systems, including
 R14 roads, railways, and airports, as they are negatively
 R15 affected by heavy downpours and extreme heat²⁵
 R16 (see *Transportation* sector). Coping with increased
 R17 flooding will require replacement or improvements
 R18 in storm drains, flood channels, levees, and dams.
 R19
 R20 Coastal cities are additionally more vulnerable than
 R21 others due to their location, which increases risk
 R22 due to sea-level rise, storm surge, and increased
 R23 hurricane intensity. Cities such as New Orleans,
 R24 Miami, and New York are particularly at risk, and
 R25 would have difficulty coping with the sea-level rise
 R26 projected by the end of the century under a higher
 R27 emissions scenario^{†,2}. Hurricane tracks now also
 R28 threaten inland cities of the Appalachian Moun-
 R29 tains, which are vulnerable if hurricane frequency
 R30 or intensity increases. Since most large U.S. cities
 R31 are on coasts, rivers, or both, climate change will
 R32 lead to increased potential flood damage. The larg-
 R33 est impacts are expected when sea-level rise, heavy
 R34 runoff, high tides, and storms coincide¹. Analyses
 R35 of New York and Boston indicate that the potential
 R36 impacts of climate change are likely to be negative,
 R37 but that vulnerability can be reduced by behavioral
 R38 and policy changes^{1,26-28}.
 R39
 R40 Urban areas concentrate the human activities that
 R41 are largely responsible for heat-trapping emissions.
 R42 The demands of urban residents are also associated
 R43 with a much larger footprint on areas far removed
 R44 from these population centers²⁹. Cities thus have a
 R45 large role to play in reducing heat-trapping emis-
 R46 sions, and many are pursuing such actions. For ex-
 R47 ample, over 700 cities have committed to the U.S.
 R48 Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement to advance
 R49 emissions reduction goals.
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


L1 Cities also have considerable potential to adapt to
 L2 climate change through technological, institutional,
 L3 structural, and behavioral changes. For example, a
 L4 number of cities have warning programs in place
 L5 to reduce heat-related illness and death (see *Hu-*
 L6 *man Health* sector). Relocating of development sites
 L7 away from low-lying areas, constructing of new
 L8 infrastructure with future sea-level rise in mind,
 L9 and promoting water conservation are examples
 L10 of structural and institutional strategies. Choosing
 L11 road materials that can handle higher temperatures
 L12 is an adaptation option that relies on new technol-
 L13 ogy (see *Transportation* sector). Cities can reduce
 L14 heat load by increasing reflective surfaces and
 L15 green spaces. Some actions have multiple benefits.
 L16 For example, increased planting of trees and other
 L17 vegetation in cities has been shown to be associated
 L18 with a reduction in crime³⁰, in addition to reducing
 L19 local temperatures.

L20
 L21 Human well-being depends on economic condi-
 L22 tions, natural resources and amenities, health, in-
 L23 frastructure, and government, public safety, social,
 L24 and cultural resources. Climate change will influ-
 L25 ence all of these, but understanding of the many
 L26 interacting impacts, as well as the ways society can
 L27 adapt to them, remains in its infancy^{9,31}.

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 L30 **Climate change affects communities**
 L31 **through changes in climate-sensitive**
 L32 **resources that occur both locally and at**
 L33 **great distances.**

L34
 L35 Human communities are intimately connected to
 L36 resources beyond their boundaries. Thus, com-
 L37 munities will be vulnerable to the
 L38 potential impacts of climate change
 L39 on sometimes-distant resources. For
 L40 example, communities that have
 L41 developed near areas of agricultural
 L42 production, such as the Midwest corn
 L43 belt or the wine-producing regions
 L44 of California and the Northwest,
 L45 depend on the continued productiv-
 L46 ity of those regions, which would be
 L47 compromised by increased tempera-
 L48 ture or severe weather¹. Some agri-
 L49 cultural production that is linked to
 L50 cold climates is likely to disappear



entirely: recent warming has altered the required temperature patterns for maple syrup production, shifting production northward from New England into Canada. Similarly, cranberries require a long winter chill period, which is shrinking as climate warms³⁴ (see *Northeast* region). Most cities depend on water supplies from distant watersheds, and those depending on diminishing supplies (such as the Sierra Nevada snowpack) are vulnerable. Northwest communities also depend upon forest resources for their economic base, and many island, coastal, and “sunbelt” communities depend on tourism.

Recreation and tourism play important roles in the economy and quality of life of many Americans. In some regions tourism and recreation are major job creators, bringing billions of dollars to regional economies. Across the nation, fishing, hunting, skiing, snowmobiling, diving, beach-going, and

Examples of Impacts On Recreation

Recreational activity	Scenario of potential impact of climate change	Economic impact
Skiing, Northeast	20 percent reduction in ski season length	\$800 million loss per year, Potential resort closures ³⁴
Snowmobiling, Northeast	Reduction of season length under higher emissions scenario [†]	Complete loss of opportunities in New York and Pennsylvania within a few decades, 80 percent reduction in season length for region by end of century ^{34,35}
Beaches, North Carolina	14 of 17 beaches permanently underwater by 2080	Lost opportunities for beach and fishing trips = \$3.9 billion over 75 years ³⁶

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L1 other outdoor activities make important economic
 L2 contributions and are a part of family traditions
 L3 that have value that goes beyond financial returns.
 L4 A changing climate will mean reduced opportuni-
 L5 ties for some activities and locations and expanded
 L6 opportunities for others^{9,35}. Hunting and fishing
 L7 will change as animals’ habitats shift and as rela-
 L8 tionships among species in natural communities
 L9 are disrupted by their different responses to rapid
 L10 climate change. Water-dependent recreation in
 L11 areas projected to get drier, such as the Southwest,
 L12 and beach recreation in areas that are expected to
 L13 see rising sea levels, will suffer. Some regions will
 L14 see an expansion of the season for warm weather
 L15 recreation such as hiking and bicycle riding.

L18 **Insurance is one of the industries**
 L19 **particularly vulnerable to increasing**
 L20 **extreme weather events, but can also**
 L21 **help society manage the risks.**

L22
 L23 Insurance—the world’s largest industry—provides
 L24 peace of mind and financial security for many
 L25 Americans. In the future, it will be one of the
 L26 primary mechanisms through which the costs of
 L27 climate change are distributed across society.

L28
 L29 Most of the climate change impacts described
 L30 in this Report have economic consequences. A
 L31 significant portion of these flow through public
 L32 and private insurance markets, which essentially
 L33 aggregate and distribute society’s risk. Insurance
 L34 thus provides a window into the myriad ways in
 L35 which the costs of climate change will manifest,
 L36 and serves as a messenger of these impacts through
 L37 the terms and price signals it sends its customers³⁷.

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 L39 In an average year, about 90 percent of insured ca-
 L40 tastrophe losses worldwide are weather-related. In
 L41 the United States, about half of all these losses are
 L42 insured, which amounted to \$320 billion between
 L43 1980 and 2005 (inflation-adjusted to 2005 dol-
 L44 lars). While major events such as hurricanes grab
 L45 headlines, the aggregate effect of smaller events
 L46 accounts for 60 percent of total insured losses on
 L47 average³⁷. Many of the smallest scale property
 L48 losses and weather-related life/health losses are
 L49 unquantified³⁸.
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R1 Escalating exposures to catastrophic weather
 R2 events, coupled with private insurers’ withdrawal
 R3 from various markets, are placing the federal gov-
 R4 ernment at increased financial risk. The National
 R5 Flood Insurance Program would have gone bank-
 R6 rupt after the storms of 2005 had they not been
 R7 given the ability to borrow about \$20 billion from
 R8 the U.S. Treasury⁴. For public and private insurance
 R9 programs alike, rising losses require a combination
 R10 of risk-based premiums and improved loss-preven-
 R11 tion.
 R12

R13 While economic and demographic factors have no
 R14 doubt contributed to observed increases in losses³⁹,
 R15 these factors do not fully explain the upward trend
 R16 in costs or numbers of events^{37,40}. Analyses dis-
 R17 counting the role of climate change tend to focus
 R18 on a limited set of hazards and geographies. They
 R19 also often fail to account for the vagaries of natural
 R20 cycles and inflation adjustments, or to normal-
 R21 ize for countervailing factors such as improved
 R22 pre- and post-event loss prevention (such as dikes,
 R23 building codes, and early warning systems)⁴¹.
 R24

R25 What is known with far greater certainty is that
 R26 future increases in losses will be attributable to
 R27 climate change as it increases the frequency and
 R28 intensity of many types of extreme weather, such as
 R29 severe thunderstorms and heat waves^{42,43}.
 R30

R31 Insurance is emblematic of the increasing global-
 R32 ization of climate risks. Because large U.S.-based
 R33 companies operate around the world, their cus-
 R34 tomers and assets are exposed to climate impacts
 R35 wherever they occur. Most of the growth in the
 R36 insurance industry is in emerging markets, which
 R37 will structurally increase U.S. insurers’ exposure to
 R38 climate risk because those regions are more vulner-
 R39 able and are experiencing particularly high rates of
 R40 population growth and development.
 R41

R42 The movement of populations into harm’s way cre-
 R43 ates a rising baseline of losses upon which the con-
 R44 sequences of climate change will be superimposed.
 R45 These observations reinforce a recurring theme in
 R46 this Report: the past can no longer be used as the
 R47 basis for planning for the future.
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R49 It is a challenge to design insurance systems that
 R50 properly price risks, reward loss prevention, and




L1 do not foster risk taking (for example by repeat-
 L2 edly rebuilding flooded homes). Market failures
 L3 of this sort compound society’s vulnerability to
 L4 climate change. Rising losses⁴⁴ are already affect-
 L5 ing the availability and affordability of insurance.
 L6 Several million customers in the United States,
 L7 no longer finding private insurance coverage, are
 L8 taking refuge in state-mandated insurance pools,
 L9 or going without insurance altogether. Offsetting
 L10 rising insurance costs is one benefit of mitigation
 L11 and adaptation investments to reduce the impacts of
 L12 climate change.

L14 Virtually all segments of the insurance industry
 L15 are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
 L16 Examples include damage to property, crops, for-
 L17 est products, livestock, and transportation infra-
 L18 structure; business and supply-chain interruptions
 L19 caused by weather extremes, water shortages,
 L20 and electricity outages; legal consequences⁴⁵; and
 L21 compromised health or loss of life. Increasing risks
 L22 to insurers and their customers are driven by many
 L23 factors including reduced periods of time between
 L24 loss events, increasing variability, shifting types
 L25 and location of events, and widespread simultane-
 L26 ous losses.


L28 In light of these challenges, insurers are emerging
 L29 as partners in climate science and the formulation
 L30 of public policy and adaptation strategies⁴⁶. Some
 L31

Insured Losses from Catastrophes, 1980 to 2005



Weather-related insurance losses in the United States are increasing. Typical weather-related losses today are similar to those that resulted from the 9/11 attack (shown in gray at 2001 in the graph). About half of all economic losses are insured, so actual losses are roughly twice those shown on the graph. In addition, the graph only includes catastrophic scale insured losses. Data on smaller-scale losses (many of which are weather-related) are significant but are not included in this graph as they are not comprehensively collected by the U.S. insurance industry.

Lightning-Related Insurance Claims



There is a strong observed correlation between higher temperatures and the frequency of lightning-induced insured losses in the United States. All else being equal, these claims are expected to increase with temperature^{26,51,52}.

have promoted adaptation by providing premium incentives for customers who fortify their properties, engaging in the process of determining building codes and land-use plans, and participating in the development and financing of new technologies and practices. For example, FEMA’s Community Rating System is a point system that rewards communities that undertake floodplain management activities to reduce flood risk beyond the minimum requirement set by the National Flood Insurance Program. Everyone in these communities is rewarded with lower flood insurance premiums (-5 to -45 percent)⁴⁷. Others have recognized that mitigation and adaptation can work hand in hand in a coordinated climate risk-management strategy and are offering “green” insurance products designed to capture these dual benefits^{48,49}.

The United States is connected to a world that is unevenly vulnerable to climate change and thus will be affected by impacts globally.

American society will not experience the potential impacts of climate change in isolation. In an increasingly connected world, impacts elsewhere will have political, social, economic, and environmental ramifications for the United States. As in the United States, vulnerability to the potential impacts of climate change world wide varies by location, population characteristics, and economic status. The rising concentration of people in cities is occurring globally, but is most prevalent in lower-income countries. Many large cities are located in vulnerable areas such as floodplains and coasts. In most of these cities, the poor often live in the most marginal of these environments that are susceptible to extreme events, and their ability to adapt is limited by their lack of financial resources⁴.


In addition, over half of the world’s population—including most of the world’s major cities—depends on glacier melt or snowmelt to supply water for drinking and municipal uses. Today, some locations are experiencing abundant water supplies and even frequent floods due to increases in glacier melt rates due to increased temperatures world wide. Soon, however, this trend is projected to reverse as

even greater temperature increases reduce glacier mass and cause more winter precipitation to fall as rain and less as snow⁵³.

As conditions worsen elsewhere, the number of people wanting to immigrate to the United States will increase. The direct cause of increased migration, such as extreme climatic events, will be difficult to separate from other forces that drive people to migrate. Climate change also has the potential to alter trade relationships by changing the comparative trade advantages of regions or nations (see figure). As with migration, shifts in trade can have multiple causes.

Accelerating emissions in economies that are rapidly expanding, such as China and India, pose future threats to the climate system and already are associated with air pollution episodes that reach the United States.

Meeting the challenge of improving conditions for the world’s poor has economic implications for the United States, as does intervention and resolution of intra- and intergroup conflicts. Where climate change exacerbates such challenges, for example by limiting access to scarce resources or increasing incidence of damaging weather events, consequences are likely for the U.S. government and economy⁵⁴.



As some areas are more severely affected by climate change, such as where drought reduces crop production, trade advantages shift to favor less affected areas. At the same time, people tend to move from more-affected to less-affected regions.