

1 **United States Climate Change Science Program**
2 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.2**
3 **The First State of the Carbon Cycle Report (SOCCR):**
4 **North American Carbon Budget**
5 **and Implications for the Global Carbon Cycle**

6
7 ***Executive Summary***

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9 **Lead Authors: Scientific Coordination Team**

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11 **Scientific Coordination Team Members: Anthony W. King¹ (Lead), Lisa Dilling² (Co-Lead),**
12 **Gregory P. Zimmerman¹ (Project Coordinator), David M. Fairman³, Richard A. Houghton⁴,**
13 **Gregg H. Marland¹, Adam Z. Rose⁵, and Thomas J. Wilbanks¹**

14
15 ¹Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ²University of Colorado, ³Consensus Building Institute, Inc.,

16 ⁴Woods Hole Research Center, ⁵The Pennsylvania State University and University of Southern California

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20 **ABSTRACT**

21 North America is currently a net source of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, contributing to the global
22 buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and associated changes in the earth's climate. In 2003,
23 North America emitted nearly two billion metric tons of carbon to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide. North
24 America's fossil fuel emissions in 2003 (1856 million metric tons of carbon $\pm 10\%$ with 95% certainty) were
25 27% of global emissions. Approximately 85% of those emissions were from the United States, 9% from
26 Canada and 6% from Mexico. The conversion of fossil fuels to energy (primarily electricity) is the single
27 largest contributor, accounting for approximately 42% of North American fossil emissions in 2003.
28 Transportation is the second largest, accounting for 31% of total emissions.

29 There are also globally important carbon sinks in North America. In 2003, growing vegetation in North
30 America removed approximately 530 million tons of carbon per year ($\pm 50\%$) from the atmosphere and
31 stored it as plant material and soil organic matter. This land sink is equivalent to approximately 30% of the
32 fossil fuel emissions from North America. The imbalance between the fossil fuel source and the sink on
33 land is a net release to the atmosphere of 1335 million metric tons of carbon per year ($\pm 25\%$).

34 Approximately 50% of North America's terrestrial sink is due to the regrowth of forests in the United
35 States on former agricultural land that was last cultivated decades ago, and on timber land recovering

1 from harvest. Other sinks are relatively small and not well quantified with uncertainties of 100% or more.
2 The future of the North American terrestrial sink is also highly uncertain. The contribution of forest
3 regrowth is expected to decline as the maturing forests grow more slowly and take up less carbon dioxide
4 from the atmosphere. But, this expectation is surrounded by uncertainty because how regrowing forests
5 and other sinks will respond to changes in climate and carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere is
6 highly uncertain.

7 The large difference between current sources and sinks and the expectation that the difference could
8 become larger if the growth of fossil fuel emissions continues and land sinks decline suggest that
9 addressing imbalances in the North American carbon budget will likely require actions focused on
10 reducing fossil fuel emissions. Options to enhance sinks (growing forests or sequestering carbon in
11 agricultural soils) can contribute, but enhancing sinks alone is likely insufficient to deal with either the
12 current or future imbalance. Options to reduce emissions include efficiency improvement, fuel switching,
13 and technologies such as carbon capture and geological storage. Implementing these options will likely
14 require both voluntary and policy-driven mechanisms at local, regional, national, and international levels.
15 Meeting the demand for information by decision makers will likely require new modes of research
16 characterized by close collaboration between scientists and carbon management stakeholders.

20 **Synthesis and assessment of the North American carbon budget**

21 Understanding the North American carbon budget, both sources and sinks, is critical to the United
22 States Climate Change Science Program goal of providing the best possible scientific information to
23 support public discussion, as well as government and private sector decision making, on key climate-
24 related issues. In response, this Report provides a synthesis, integration and assessment of the current
25 knowledge of the North American carbon budget and its context within the global carbon cycle. The
26 Report is organized as a response to questions relevant to carbon management and to a broad range of
27 stakeholders charged with understanding and managing energy and land use. The questions were
28 identified through early and continuing dialogue with these stakeholders, including scientists, decision
29 makers in the public and private sectors, including national and sub-national government; carbon-related
30 industries, such as energy, transportation, agriculture, and forestry; and climate policy and carbon
31 management interest groups.

32 The questions and the answers provided by this Report are summarized below. The reader is referred
33 to the indicated chapters for further, more detailed, discussion. Unless otherwise referenced, all values,
34 statements of findings and conclusions are taken from the chapters of this Report where the attribution
35 and citation of the primary sources can be found.

1 **What is the carbon cycle and why should we care?**

2 The carbon cycle, described in Chapters 1 and 2, is the combination of many different physical,
3 chemical and biological processes that transfer carbon between the major storage pools (known as
4 reservoirs): the atmosphere, plants, soils, freshwater systems, oceans, and geological sediments. Hundreds
5 of millions of years ago, and over millions of years, this carbon cycle was responsible for the formation of
6 coal, petroleum, and natural gas, the fossil fuels that are the primary sources of energy for our modern
7 societies.

8 Humans have altered the Earth's carbon budget. Today, the cycling of carbon among atmosphere,
9 land, and freshwater and marine environments is in a rapid transition—an imbalance. Over tens of years,
10 the combustion of fossil fuels is releasing into the atmosphere quantities of carbon that were accumulated
11 in the earth system over millions of years. Furthermore, tropical forests that once held large quantities of
12 carbon are being converted to agricultural lands, releasing additional carbon to the atmosphere as a result.
13 Both the fossil-fuel and land-use related releases are *sources* of carbon to the atmosphere. The combined
14 rate of release is far larger than can be balanced by the biological and geological processes that naturally
15 remove carbon dioxide (CO₂) from the atmosphere and store it in terrestrial and marine environments as
16 part of the earth's carbon cycle. These processes are known as *sinks*. Therefore, much of the carbon
17 dioxide released through human activity has “piled up” in the atmosphere, resulting in a dramatic increase
18 in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. The concentration increased by 31% between 1850
19 and 2003, and the present concentration is higher than at any time in the past 420,000 years. Because
20 carbon dioxide is an important greenhouse gas, the imbalance between sources and sinks and the
21 subsequent increase in concentration in the atmosphere is causing changes in the Earth's climate.

22 Furthermore, these trends in fossil fuel use and tropical deforestation are accelerating. The magnitude
23 of the changes raises concerns about the future behavior of the carbon cycle. Will the carbon cycle
24 continue to function as it has in recent history, or will a CO₂-caused warming result in a weakening of the
25 ability of sinks to take up carbon dioxide, leading to further warming? Drought, for example, may reduce
26 forest growth. Warming can release carbon stored in soil, and warming and drought may increase forest
27 fires. Conversely, will elevated concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere stimulate plant growth
28 as it is known to do in laboratory and field experiments and thus strengthen global or regional sinks?

29 The question is complicated because carbon dioxide is not the only substance in the atmosphere that
30 affects the earth's surface temperature and climate. Other greenhouse gases include methane (CH₄),
31 nitrous oxide, the halocarbons, and ozone, and all of these gases, together with water vapor, aerosols,
32 solar radiation, and properties of the earth's surface, are involved in the evolution of climate change.
33 Carbon dioxide, alone, is responsible for approximately 55-60% of the change in the Earth's radiation
34 balance due to increases in well-mixed atmospheric greenhouse gases and methane, for about another

1 20% (values are for the late 1990s; with a relative uncertainty of 10%; IPCC, 2001). These two gases are
2 the primary gases of the carbon cycle, with carbon dioxide being particularly important. Furthermore, the
3 consequences of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide extend beyond climate change alone. The
4 accumulation of carbon in the oceans as a result of more than a century of fossil fuel use and deforestation
5 has increased the acidity of the surface waters, with serious consequences for corals and other marine
6 organisms that build their skeletons and shells from calcium carbonate.

7 Inevitably, the decision to influence or control atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide as a
8 means to prevent, minimize, or forestall future climate change, or to avoid damage to marine ecosystems
9 from ocean acidification, will require management of the carbon cycle. That management involves both
10 reducing sources of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere and enhancing sinks for carbon on land or in the
11 oceans. Strategies may involve both short- and long-term solutions. Short-term solutions may help to
12 slow the rate at which carbon accumulates in the atmosphere while longer-term solutions are developed.
13 In any case, formulation of options by decision makers and successful management of the earth's carbon
14 budget will require solid scientific understanding of the carbon cycle.

15 Understanding the current carbon cycle may not be enough, however. The concept of managing the
16 carbon cycle carries with it the assumption that the carbon cycle will continue to operate as it has in
17 recent centuries. A major concern is that the carbon cycle, itself, is vulnerable to land-use or climate
18 change that could bring about additional releases of carbon to the atmosphere from either land or the
19 oceans. Over recent decades both terrestrial ecosystems and the oceans have been natural sinks for
20 carbon. If either, or both, of those sinks were to become sources, slowing or reversing the accumulation of
21 carbon in the atmosphere could become much more difficult. Thus, understanding the current global
22 carbon cycle is necessary for managing carbon, but is not sufficient. Projections of the future behavior of
23 the carbon cycle in response to human activity and to climate and other environmental change are also
24 important to understanding system vulnerabilities.

25 Perhaps even more importantly, effective management of the carbon cycle requires more than basic
26 understanding of the current or future carbon cycle. It also requires cost-effective, feasible, and politically
27 palatable options for carbon management. Just as carbon cycle knowledge must be assessed and
28 evaluated, so must management options and tradeoffs. See Chapter 1 for further discussion of why the
29 general public, as well as individuals and institutions interested in carbon management, should care about
30 the carbon cycle.

31

1 **How do North American carbon sources and sinks relate to the global carbon** 2 **cycle?**

3 In 2004 North America was responsible for approximately 25% of the carbon dioxide emissions
4 produced globally by fossil fuel combustion (Chapter 2). The United States, the world's largest emitter of
5 carbon dioxide, accounted for 86% of the North American total in 2004 (85% in 2003). In 2003, Canada
6 accounted for 9%, and Mexico for 6%, of the total. North America contributed approximately 30% of
7 cumulative carbon dioxide emissions globally from fossil-fuel combustion (and cement manufacturing)
8 since 1750 (through 2002). Among all countries, the United States, Canada, and Mexico ranked,
9 respectively, as the first, seventh, and eleventh largest emitters of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels in 2003
10 (Marland *et al.*, 2006). The United States ranked eleventh in per capita emissions (5.43 tons carbon per
11 year) in 2003; Canada ranked thirteenth (4.88 tons carbon per year) and Mexico eighty-ninth (1.10 tons
12 carbon per year). Per capita emissions of the United States and Canada were, respectively, 4.8 and 4.3
13 times the global per capita emissions of 1.14 tons carbon per year. Mexico's per capita emissions were
14 slightly below the global value. Combined, these three countries contributed more than a quarter (27%) of
15 the world's entire fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions in 2002 and almost one third (32%) of the
16 cumulative global fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions between 1751 and 2002. Emissions from parts of
17 Asia are increasing at a growing rate and may surpass those of North America in the near future, but
18 North America is incontrovertibly a major source of atmospheric carbon dioxide, historically, at present,
19 and in the immediate future.

20 The contribution of North American carbon sinks to the global carbon budget is less clear. The *global*
21 terrestrial sink is quite uncertain, averaging somewhere in the range of 0 to 3800 million tons of carbon
22 per year during the 1980s, and in the range of 1000 to 3600 million tons of carbon per year in the 1990s
23 (IPCC, 2000). This report estimates a North American sink of approximately 500 million tons of carbon
24 per year for 2003, with 95% certainty that the actual value is within plus or minus 50% of that estimate, or
25 between 250 and 750 million tons carbon per year (Chapter 3) (see the Text Box on *Treatment of*
26 *Uncertainty*). Assuming a global terrestrial sink of approximately two billion tons of carbon per year (as
27 inferred by the atmospheric analyses for the 1990s), the North American terrestrial sink reported here of
28 approximately 500 million tons of carbon per year suggests that the North American sink is perhaps 25%
29 of the global sink. In contrast, previous analyses using global models of carbon dioxide transport in the
30 atmosphere estimate a North American sink for 1991-2000 of approximately one billion tons of carbon
31 per year, or approximately 50% of a global sink of roughly two billion tons of carbon per year (see
32 Chapter 2). The North American sink estimate of this Report is derived from studies using ground-based
33 inventories, and the difference between estimates is likely influenced by the methodology employed and
34 the period of the analysis (see Chapters 2 and 3).

1
2 **TEXT BOX on *Treatment of Uncertainty* goes here**
3

4 The global terrestrial sink is predominantly in northern lands, most likely as a consequence of forest
5 regrowing on abandoned agricultural land in northern temperate regions (e.g., the eastern United States)
6 and patterns of forest fire and recovery in the boreal forests of Canada and Eurasia. The sink north of 30°
7 N alone is estimated to be 600 to 2300 million tons of carbon per year for the 1980s (IPCC, 2001). Thus,
8 the sink of approximately 500 million tons of carbon per year in North America is consistent with the
9 fraction of northern land area in North America (37%), as opposed to Eurasia (63%). Rates of forest
10 clearing in the tropics, including those of Mexico, currently exceed rates of recovery, and thus tropical
11 regions dominated by rainforests or other forest types are currently a source of carbon to the atmosphere.

12 It is clear that the global carbon cycle of the 21st century will continue to be influenced by large
13 fossil-fuel emissions from North America, and that the North American carbon budget will continue to be
14 dominated by the fossil-fuel sources. The future trajectory of carbon sinks in North America, and their
15 contribution to the global terrestrial sink is less certain, in part because the role of regrowing forests is
16 likely to decline as the forests mature, and in part because the response of forests and other ecosystems to
17 future climate change and increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations is uncertain. The
18 variation among model projections and scenarios of where and how future climate will change contribute
19 to that uncertainty. Additionally, response to a particular future change will likely vary among ecosystems
20 and the response will depend on a variety of incompletely understood environmental factors.

21
22 **What are the primary carbon sources and sinks in North America, and how and**
23 **why are they changing?**
24

25 ***The Sources***

26 The primary source of human-caused carbon emissions in North America that contributes to the
27 increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is the release of carbon dioxide during the combustion of
28 fossil fuels (Figure ES-1) (Chapter 3). Fossil fuel carbon emissions in the United States, Canada and
29 Mexico totaled approximately 1900 million tons of carbon in 2003 (with 95% confidence that the actual
30 value lies within 10% of that estimate¹) and have increased at an average rate of approximately 1% per
31 year for the last 30 years. The United States was responsible for approximately 85% of North America's
32 fossil fuel emissions in 2003, Canada for 9% and Mexico 6% (Table ES-1). The overall 1% growth in

¹ See the Text Box on *Treatment of Uncertainty* for a discussion of numerical data and estimates.

1 United States emissions masks faster than 1% growth in some sectors (e.g., transportation) and slower
2 growth in others (e.g., increased manufacturing energy efficiency).

3
4 **Figure ES-1. North American carbon sources and sinks (million tons of carbon per year) in 2003.**

5 Height of a bar indicates a best estimate for net carbon exchange between the atmosphere and the indicated
6 element of the North American carbon budget. Sources add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere; sinks
7 remove it. Error bars indicate the uncertainty in that estimate, and define the range of values that include
8 the actual value with 95% certainty. See Chapter 3 and Chapters 6-15 of this report for details and
9 discussion of these sources and sinks.

10
11 **Table ES-1. North American annual net carbon emissions (source = positive) or uptake (land sink =**
12 **negative) (million tons of carbon per year) by country. See Table 3-1, Chapter 3 for references to**
13 **sources of data.**

14
15 Total United States emissions have grown at close to the North American average rate of about 1.0%
16 per year over the past 30 years, but United States per capita emissions have been roughly constant, while
17 the carbon intensity (carbon emitted/dollar of real [inflation adjusted] GDP) of the United States economy
18 has decreased at a rate of about 2% per year (Chapter 3). The decline in the carbon intensity of the United
19 States' economy was caused both by increased energy efficiency, particularly in the manufacturing sector,
20 and structural changes in the economy with growing contributions from sectors such as services with
21 lower energy consumption and carbon intensity. The service sector is likely to continue to grow.
22 Accordingly, carbon emissions will likely continue to grow more slowly than GDP (see Chapter 3).

23 The extraction of fossil-fuels and other primary energy sources and their conversion to energy
24 commodities and services, including electricity generation, is the single largest contributor to the North
25 American fossil-fuel source, accounting for approximately 42% of North American fossil emissions in
26 2003 (Chapter 6). Electricity generation is responsible for the largest share of those emissions:
27 approximately 94% in the United States in 2004, 65% in Canada in 2003, and 67% in Mexico in 1998.
28 Again, United States emissions dominate. United States emissions from electricity generation are
29 approximately 17 times larger than those of Canada and 23 times those of Mexico, reflecting in part the
30 relatively greater population of the United States in both cases and its much higher level of development
31 than Mexico. On a per capita basis, the emissions from electricity generation are 2.14 tons of carbon for
32 the United States in 2004, 1.15 tons of carbon for Canada in 2003, and 0.28 tons of carbon for Mexico in
33 1998 (note these are the latest years for which data are available).

34 More than half of electricity produced in North America (67% in the United States) is consumed in
35 buildings, making that single use one of the largest factors in North American emissions (Chapter 9). In

1 fact, the carbon dioxide emissions from United States buildings alone were greater than total carbon
2 dioxide emissions of any country in the world, except China. Energy use in buildings in the United States
3 and Canada (including the use of natural gas, wood, and other fuels as well as electricity) has increased by
4 30% since 1990, corresponding to an annual growth rate of 2.1%. In the United States, the major drivers
5 of energy consumption in the buildings sector are growth in commercial floor space and increase in the
6 size of the average home. Carbon emissions from buildings are expected to grow with population and
7 income. Furthermore, the shift from family to single-occupant households means that the number of
8 households will increase faster than population growth—each household with its own heating and cooling
9 systems and electrical appliances. Certain electrical appliances (such as air-conditioning equipment) once
10 considered a luxury are now becoming commonplace. Technology- and market-driven improvements in
11 the efficiency of appliances are expected to continue, but the improvements will probably not be
12 sufficient to curtail emissions growth in the buildings sector without government intervention.

13 The transportation sector of North America accounted for 31% of total North American emissions in
14 2003, most (87%) of it from the United States (Chapter 7). The growth in transportation and associated
15 carbon dioxide emissions has been steady during the past forty years and has been most rapid in Mexico,
16 the country most dependent upon road transport. The growth of transportation is driven by population, per
17 capita income, and economic output, and energy use in transportation is expected to increase by 46% in
18 North America between 2003 and 2025. If the mix of fuels is assumed to remain the same, carbon dioxide
19 emissions would increase from 587 million tons of carbon in 2003 to 859 million tons of carbon in 2025.

20 Emissions from North American industry (not including fossil fuel mining and processing or
21 electricity generation) are a relatively small (12%) and declining component of North America's
22 emissions (Chapter 8). Emissions decreased nearly 11% between 1990 and 2002, while energy
23 consumption in the United States and Canada increased by 8-10% during that period. In both countries, a
24 shift in production toward less energy-intensive industries and dissemination of more energy efficient
25 equipment has kept the rate of growth in energy demand lower than the rate of growth of industrial GDP.
26 Emission reductions in industry have also resulted from the voluntary, proactive initiatives of both
27 individual corporations and trade associations in response to climate change issues (see Chapter 4).

28 The remaining portion (approximately 15%) of North American fossil-fuel emissions includes those
29 from other sectors. This includes natural gas and other non-electrical fossil energy used in residential and
30 commercial buildings and fuels used in agriculture.

31 **The Sinks**

32 Approximately 30% of North American fossil fuel emissions are offset by a sink of approximately
33 530 million tons of carbon per year. The total sink is a combination of many factors, including forest
34

1 regrowth, fire suppression, and agricultural soil conservation (Figure ES-1) (Chapter 3, Part III: Chapters
2 10-15). The sink is currently about 500 million tons of carbon per year in the United States and
3 approximately 80 million tons of carbon per year in Canada. Mexican ecosystems are a net source of
4 about 50 million tons of carbon per year, mostly as a consequence of ongoing deforestation. The coastal
5 ocean surrounding North America is perhaps an additional small net source of carbon to the atmosphere
6 of approximately 20 million tons of carbon per year. The coastal ocean is, however, highly variable, and
7 that number is highly uncertain with a variability (standard deviation) of greater than 100%. North
8 America's coastal waters could be a small sink and in some places are. How much the coastal carbon
9 exchange with the atmosphere is influenced by humans is also unknown.

10 The primary carbon sink in North America (approximately 50%) is in the forests of the United States
11 and Canada (Figure ES-1). These forests are still growing (accumulating carbon) after their re-
12 colonization of farmland 100 or more years ago. Forest regrowth takes carbon out of the atmosphere and
13 stores most of it in aboveground vegetation (wood), with as much as a third of it in soils. The suppression
14 of forest fires also increases a net accumulation of carbon in forests. As the recovering forests mature,
15 however, the rate of net carbon uptake (the sink) declines. In Canada, the estimated forest sink declined
16 by nearly a third between 1990 and 2004, but with high year-to-year variability. Over that period, the
17 annual changes in above ground carbon stored in managed Canadian forests varied from between a sink
18 of approximately 50 million tons of carbon per year to a source of approximately 40 million tons of
19 carbon per year. Years when the forests were a source were generally years with high forest fire activity.

20 Woody encroachment, the invasion of woody plants into grasslands or of trees into shrublands, is a
21 potentially large, but highly uncertain carbon sink. It is caused by a combination of fire suppression and
22 grazing. Fire inside the United States has been reduced by more than 95% from the pre-settlement levels,
23 and this reduction favors shrubs and trees in competition with grasses. The sink may be as large as 20% of
24 the North American sink, but it may also be negligible. The uncertainty of this estimate is greater than
25 100%. Woody encroachment might actually be a *source*, maybe even a relatively large one. The state of
26 the science is such that we simply don't know (see Chapter 3 and the Overview of Part III).

27 Wood products are thought to account for about 13% of the total North American sink. The
28 uncertainty in this sink is $\pm 50\%$. Wood products are a sink because they are increasing, both in use (e.g.,
29 furniture, house frames, etc.) and in landfills. The wetland sink, about 9% of the North American sink but
30 with an uncertainty of greater than 100%, is in both the peats of Canada's extensive frozen and unfrozen
31 wetlands and the mineral soils of Canadian and United States wetlands. Drainage of peatlands in the
32 United States has released carbon to the atmosphere, and the very large volume of carbon in North
33 American wetlands (the single largest carbon reservoir of any North American ecosystem) is vulnerable
34 to release in response to both climate change and the further drainage of wetlands for development. Either

1 change might shift the current modest sink to a potentially large source, although many aspects of
2 wetlands and their future behavior are poorly known.

3 Two processes determine the carbon balance of agricultural lands: management and changes in
4 environmental factors. The effects of management (e.g., cultivation, conservation tillage) are reasonably
5 well known and have been responsible for historic losses of carbon in Canada and the United States (and
6 current losses in Mexico), albeit with some increased carbon uptake and storage in recent years.

7 Agricultural lands in North America are nearly neutral with respect to carbon, with mineral soils
8 absorbing carbon and organic soils releasing it. The balance of these sinks and sources is a net sink of 10
9 ± 5 million tons of carbon per year (Fig. ES-1). The effects of climate on this balance are not well known.

10 Soil erosion leads to the accumulation of carbon containing sediments in streams, rivers and lakes
11 (both natural and man-made). This represents a carbon sink, estimated at approximately 25 million tons of
12 carbon per year for the United States. We know of no similar analysis for Canada or Mexico. The result is
13 a highly uncertain estimate for North America known to no better than the estimate for the United States
14 alone, plus or minus more than 100%.

15 The density and development patterns of human settlements are drivers of fossil-fuel emissions,
16 especially in the important residential and transportation sectors. Conversion of agricultural and wildlands
17 to cities and other human settlements reduces carbon stocks, while the growth of urban and suburban trees
18 increases them. However, the rates of carbon uptake and storage in the vegetation and soils of settlements,
19 while poorly quantified, are probably relatively small, certainly in comparison to fossil fuel emissions
20 from these areas. Thus, settlements in North America are almost certainly a net source of atmospheric
21 carbon.

22

23 **What are the direct, non-climatic effects of increasing atmospheric carbon** 24 **dioxide or other changes in the carbon cycle on the land and oceans of North** 25 **America?**

26 The potential impacts of increasing concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide (and other
27 greenhouse gases) on the earth's climate are well documented (IPCC, 2001) and are the dominant reason
28 for societal interest in the carbon cycle. However, the consequences of a carbon cycle imbalance and the
29 buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere extend beyond climate change alone. Ocean acidification and
30 "CO₂ fertilization" of land plants are foremost among these direct, non-climatic effects.

31 The uptake of carbon by the world's oceans as a result of human activity over the last century has
32 made them more acidic (see Chapters 1 and 2). This acidification negatively impacts corals and other
33 marine organisms that build their skeletons and shells from calcium carbonate. Future changes could

1 dramatically alter the composition of ocean ecosystems of North America and elsewhere, possibly
2 eliminating coral reefs by 2100.

3 Rates of photosynthesis of many plant species often increase in response to elevated concentrations of
4 carbon dioxide, thus potentially increasing plant growth and even agricultural crop yields in the future
5 (Chapters 2, 3, 10-13). There is, however, continuing scientific debate about whether such “CO₂
6 fertilization” will continue into the future with prolonged exposure to elevated carbon dioxide, and
7 whether the fertilization of photosynthesis will translate into increased plant growth and net uptake and
8 storage of carbon by terrestrial ecosystems. Recent studies provide many conflicting results. Experimental
9 treatment with elevated carbon dioxide can lead to consistent increases in plant growth. On the other
10 hand, it can also have little effect on plant growth, with an initial stimulation of photosynthesis but limited
11 long-term effects on carbon accumulation in the plants. Moreover, it is unclear how plants and ecosystem
12 might respond simultaneously to both “CO₂ fertilization” and climate change. While there is some
13 experimental evidence that plants may use less water when exposed to elevated carbon dioxide, extended
14 deep drought or other unfavorable climatic conditions could reduce the positive effects of elevated carbon
15 dioxide on plant growth. Thus, it is far from clear that elevated concentrations of atmospheric carbon
16 dioxide have led to terrestrial carbon uptake and storage or will do so over large areas in the future.
17 Moreover, elevated carbon dioxide is known to increase methane emissions from wetlands, further
18 increasing the uncertainty in how plant response to elevated carbon dioxide will affect the global
19 atmosphere and climate.

20 The carbon cycle also intersects with a number of critical earth system processes, including the
21 cycling of both water and nitrogen. Virtually any change in the lands or waters of North America as part
22 of purposeful carbon management will consequently affect these other processes and cycles. Some
23 interactions may be beneficial. For example, an increase in organic carbon in soils is likely to increase the
24 availability of nitrogen for plant growth and enhance the water-holding capacity of the soil. Other
25 interactions, such as nutrient limitation, fire, insect attack, increased respiration from warming, may be
26 detrimental. However, very little is known about the complex web of interactions between carbon and
27 other systems at continental scales, or the effect of management on these interactions.

28
29 **What potential management options in North America could significantly affect**
30 **the North American and global carbon cycles (e.g., North American sinks and**
31 **global atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations)?**

32 Addressing imbalances in the North American and global carbon cycles requires options focused on
33 reducing carbon emissions (Chapter 4). Options focused on enhancing carbon sinks in soils and

1 vegetation can contribute as well, but their potential is far from sufficient to deal with the magnitude of
2 current imbalances.

3 Currently, options for reducing carbon emissions include:

- 4 • Reducing emissions from the transportation sector through efficiency improvement, higher prices for
5 carbon-based fuels, liquid fuels derived from vegetation (ethanol from corn or other biomass
6 feedstock, for example), and in the longer run (after 2025), hydrogen generated from non-fossil
7 sources of energy;
- 8 • Reducing the carbon emissions associated with energy use in buildings through efficiency
9 improvements and energy-saving passive design measures;
- 10 • Reducing emissions from the industrial sector through efficiency improvement, fuel-switching, and
11 innovative process designs; and
- 12 • Reducing emissions from energy extraction and conversion through efficiency improvement, fuel-
13 switching, technological change (including carbon sequestration and capture and storage) and reduced
14 demands due to increased end-use efficiency.
- 15 • Capturing the carbon dioxide emitted from fossil-fired generating units and injecting it into a suitable
16 geological formation or deep in the sea for long-term storage (carbon capture and storage).

17

18 In many cases, significant progress with such options would require a combination of technology
19 research and development, policy interventions, and information and education programs.

20 Opinions differ about the relative mitigation impact of emission reduction versus carbon
21 sequestration. Assumptions about the cost of mitigation and the policy instruments used to promote
22 mitigation significantly affect assessments of mitigation potential. For example, appropriately designed
23 carbon emission cap and trading policies could achieve a given level of carbon emissions reduction at
24 lower cost than some other policy instruments by providing incentives to use the least-cost combination
25 of mitigation/sequestration alternatives.

26 However, the evaluation of any policy instrument needs to consider technical, institutional and
27 socioeconomic constraints that would affect its implementation, such as the ability of sources to monitor
28 their actual emissions, the constitutional authority of national and/or provincial/state governments to
29 impose emissions taxes, regulate emissions and/or regulate efficiency standards. Also, practically every
30 policy (except cost-saving energy conservation options), no matter what instrument is used to implement
31 it, has a cost in terms of utilization of resources and ensuing price increases that leads to reductions in
32 output, income, employment, or other measures of economic well-being. These costs must be weighed
33 against the benefits (or avoided costs) of reducing carbon emissions. In addition to the standard reduction
34 in damages noted above, many options and measures that reduce emissions and increase sequestration

1 also have significant *co-benefits* in terms of economic efficiency (where market failures are being
2 corrected, as in many cases of energy conservation), environmental management, and energy security.

3 The design of carbon management systems must also consider unintended consequences
4 involving other greenhouse gases. For instance, carbon sequestration strategies such as reduced tillage can
5 increase emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, which are also greenhouse gases. Strategies for dealing
6 with climate change will have to consider these other gases as well as other components of the climate
7 systems, such as small airborne particles and the physical aspects of plant communities.

8 Direct reductions of carbon emissions from fossil fuel use are considered ‘permanent’ reductions,
9 while carbon sequestration in plants or soils is a ‘non-permanent’ reduction, in that carbon stored through
10 conservation practices could potentially be re-emitted if management practices revert back to the previous
11 state or otherwise change. This *permanence* issue applies to all forms of carbon sinks. For example, the
12 carbon sink associated with forest regrowth could be slowed or reversed from sink to source if the forests
13 are burnt in wildfires or forest harvest and management practices change.

14 In addition, a given change in land management (e.g., tillage reduction, pasture improvement,
15 afforestation) will stimulate carbon storage for only a finite period of time. Over time, as the processes of
16 carbon gain and loss from vegetation and soil comes into a new balance with the change in land
17 management, carbon storage will tend to level off at a new maximum, after which there is no further
18 accumulation (sequestration) of carbon. For example, following changes in tillage to promote carbon
19 absorption in agricultural soils (see Chapter 10) the amount of carbon in the soil will tend to reach a new
20 constant level after 15–30 years. The sink declines, then disappears, or nearly so, as the amount of carbon
21 being added to the soil is balanced by losses. The same pattern is observed as forests recover from fire,
22 harvest or other disturbance, or as forests regrowing on abandoned farmland become more mature (see
23 Chapters 3 and 11).

24 Another issue surrounding carbon uptake and storage is *leakage*, whereby mitigation actions in one
25 area (e.g., geographic region, production system) stimulate additional emissions elsewhere. For storage of
26 carbon in forests, leakage is a major concern; reducing harvest rates in one area, for example, can
27 stimulate increased cutting and reduction in stored carbon in other areas. Leakage may be of minor
28 concern for agricultural carbon storage, since most practices would have little or no effect on the supply
29 and demand of agricultural commodities.

30 Options and measures can be implemented in a variety of ways at a variety of scales, not only at
31 international or national levels. For example, a number of municipalities, state governments, and private
32 firms in North America have made commitments to voluntary greenhouse gas emission reductions. For
33 cities, one focus has been the Cities for Climate Protection program of International Governments for
34 Local Sustainability (formerly ICLEI). For some states and provinces, the Regional Greenhouse Gas (Cap

1 and Trade) Initiative is nearing implementation. For industry, one focus has been membership in the Pew
2 Center and in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Climate Leaders Program.

4 **How can we improve the usefulness of carbon science for decision making?**

5 Effective carbon management requires that relevant, appropriate science be communicated to the
6 wide variety of people whose decisions affect carbon cycling (Chapter 5). Because the field is relatively
7 new and the demand for policy-relevant information has been limited, carbon cycle science has rarely
8 been organized or conducted to inform carbon management. To generate information that can
9 systematically inform carbon management decisions, scientists and decision makers need to clarify what
10 information would be most relevant in specific sectors and arenas for carbon management, adjust research
11 priorities as necessary, and develop mechanisms that enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the
12 information being generated.

13 In the United States, the Federal carbon science enterprise does not yet have many mechanisms to
14 assess emerging demands for carbon information across scales and sectors. Federally funded carbon
15 science has focused predominantly on basic research to reduce uncertainties about the carbon cycle.
16 Initiatives are now underway to promote coordinated, interdisciplinary research that is strategically
17 prioritized to address societal needs. The need for this type of research is increasing. Interest in carbon
18 management across sectors suggests that there may be substantial demand for information in the energy,
19 transportation, agriculture, forestry and industrial sectors, at scales ranging from local to global.

20 To ensure that carbon science is as useful as possible for decision making, carbon scientists and
21 carbon managers need to create new forums and institutions for communication and coordination.
22 Research suggests that in order to make a significant contribution to management, scientific and technical
23 information intended for decision making must be perceived not only as credible (worth believing), but
24 also as salient (relevant to decision making on high priority issues) and legitimate (conducted in a way
25 that stakeholders believe is fair, unbiased and respectful of divergent views and interests). To generate
26 information that meets these tests, carbon stakeholders and scientists need to collaborate to develop
27 research questions, design research strategies, and review, interpret and disseminate results. Transparency
28 and balanced participation are important for guarding against politicization and enhancing usability.

29 To make carbon cycle science more useful to decision makers in the United States and elsewhere in
30 North America, leaders in the carbon science community might consider the following steps:

- 31 • Identify specific categories of decision makers for whom carbon cycle science is likely to be salient,
32 focusing on policy makers and private sector managers in carbon-intensive sectors (energy, transport,
33 manufacturing, agriculture and forestry);

- 1 • Identify and evaluate existing information about carbon impacts of decisions and actions in these
2 arenas, and assess the need and demand for additional information. In some cases, demand may need
3 to be nurtured and fostered through a two-way interactive process;
- 4 • Encourage scientists and research programs to experiment with new and different ways of making
5 carbon cycle science more salient, credible, and legitimate to carbon managers;
- 6 • Involve not just physical or biological disciplines in scientific efforts to produce useable science, but
7 also social scientists, economists, and communication experts; and
- 8 • Consider initiating participatory pilot research projects and identifying existing “boundary
9 organizations” (or establishing new ones) to bridge carbon management and carbon science.

11 **What additional knowledge is needed for effective carbon management?**

12 Scientists and carbon managers need to improve their joint understanding of the top priority questions
13 facing carbon-related decision-making. Priority needs specific to individual ecosystem or sectors are
14 described in Chapters 6-15 of this report. To further prioritize those needs across disciplines and sectors,
15 scientists need to collaborate more effectively with decision makers in undertaking research and
16 interpreting results in order to answer those questions. To improve this understanding, more deliberative
17 processes of consultation with potential carbon managers at all scales can be initiated at various stages of
18 the research process. This might include workshops, focus groups, working panels, and citizen advisory
19 groups. Research on the effective production of science that can be used for decision making suggests that
20 ongoing, iterative processes that involve decision makers are more effective than those that do not (see
21 Chapter 5).

22 In the light of changing views on the impacts of CO₂ released to the atmosphere, research and
23 development will likely focus on the extraction of energy while preventing CO₂ release. Fossil fuels
24 might well remain economically competitive and socially desirable as a source of energy in some
25 circumstances, even when one includes the extra cost of capturing the CO₂ and preventing its atmospheric
26 release when converting these fuels into non-carbon secondary forms of energy like electricity, hydrogen
27 or heat. Research and development needs in the energy and conversion arena include clarifying potentials
28 for carbon capture and storage, exploring how to make renewable energy affordable at large scales of
29 deployment, examining societal concerns about nuclear energy, and learning more about policy options
30 for distributed energy and energy transitions. There is also need for better understanding of the public
31 acceptability of policy incentives for reducing dependence on carbon intensive energy sources.

32 In the transportation sector, improved data on Mexican greenhouse gas emissions and trends is
33 needed, as well as the potential for mitigating transportation-related emissions in North America and
34 advances in transportation mitigation technologies and policies. In the industry and waste management

1 sectors, work on materials substitution and energy efficient technologies in production processes holds
2 promise for greater emissions reductions. Needs for the building sector include further understanding the
3 total societal costs of CO₂ as an externality of buildings costs, economic and market analyses of various
4 reduced emission features at various time scales of availability, and construction of cost curves for
5 emission reduction options.

6 Turning to the ecosystem arena, in agricultural and grazing land sectors inventories still carry a
7 great deal of uncertainty, especially in the arena of woody encroachment. If such inventories are to be the
8 basis for future decision making, reducing such uncertainties may be a useful investment. Quantitative
9 estimates of land use change and the impact of various management practices are also highly uncertain, as
10 are the interactions among carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide as greenhouse gas emissions. If
11 carbon accounting becomes a critical feature of carbon management, improved data are needed on the
12 relationship of forest management practices to carbon storage, as well as inexpensive tools and techniques
13 for monitoring. An assessment of agroforestry practices in Mexico as well as in temperate landscapes
14 would also be helpful. Importantly, there is a need for multi-criteria analysis of various uses of
15 landscapes—tradeoffs between carbon storage and other uses of the land must be considered. If markets
16 emerge more fully for trading carbon credits, the development of such decision support tools will likely
17 be encouraged.

18 Soils in the permafrost region store vast amounts of carbon, but there is little certainty about how
19 these soils will respond to changes brought about by climate. While these regions are likely not subject to
20 management options, improved information on carbon storage and the trajectory of these reservoirs may
21 provide additional insight into the likelihood of release of large amounts of carbon to the atmosphere that
22 may affect global decision making. Similarly, there is great uncertainty in the response of the carbon
23 pools of wetlands to climate changes, and very little data on freshwater mineral soils and estuarine carbon
24 both in Canada and Mexico.

25 With respect to human settlements, additional studies of the carbon balance of settlements of varying
26 densities, geographical location, and patterns of development are needed to quantify the potential impacts
27 of various policy and planning alternatives on net greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, in the coastal
28 regions, additional information on carbon fluxes will help to constrain continental carbon balance
29 estimates should information on that scale become useful for decision making. Research on ocean carbon
30 uptake and storage is also needed in order to fully inform decision making on options for carbon
31 management.

32 With respect to carbon management, there is a need for more insight into how incentives to reduce
33 emissions affect the behavior of households and businesses, the influence of reducing uncertainty on the
34 willingness of decision makers to make commitments, the affect of increased R& D spending on

1 technological innovation, the socioeconomic distribution of mitigation/sequestration costs and benefits,
2 and the manner in which mitigation costs and policy instrument design affect the macroeconomy.
3 Improvements in decision analysis in the face of irreducible uncertainty would be helpful as well.
4

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1 **[START OF TEXT BOX]**

2

3 **Treatment of Uncertainty**

4 Sources of uncertainty vary widely across the many sectors and elements of the North American carbon cycle.
5 The attention to uncertainty and the methods for dealing with uncertainty also vary across the disciplines that study
6 these elements and across individual studies and publications. There is no single applicable quantitative method for
7 integrating these variable sources, methods, and characterizations.

8 To provide for synthesis across and comparability among carbon cycle elements, the following convention
9 has been adopted for characterizing uncertainty in the Report's synthetic findings and results (for example, in the
10 synthesized carbon budget for North America of Chapter 3 and in the *Executive Summary*). Uncertainty is
11 characterized using five categories:

- 12
- 13 (1) ***** = 95% certain that the actual value is within 10% of the estimate reported,
 - 14 (2) ***** = 95% certain that the estimate is within 25%,
 - 15 (3) *** = 95% certain that the estimate is within 50%,
 - 16 (4) ** = 95% certain that the estimate is within 100%, and
 - 17 (5) * = uncertainty > 100%.

18

19 Unless otherwise noted, values presented as “ $y \pm x\%$ ” should be interpreted to mean that the authors are 95%
20 certain the actual value is between $y - x\%$ and $y + x\%$. Where appropriate, the absolute range is sometimes reported
21 rather than the relative range: $y \pm z$, where $z = y \times x\% \div 100$. The system of asterisks is used as shorthand for the
22 categories in tables and text.

23 These are informed categorizations. They reflect expert judgment, using all known published descriptions
24 of uncertainty surrounding the “best available” or “most likely” estimate. The 95% boundary was chosen to
25 communicate the high degree of certainty that the actual value was in the reported range and the low likelihood
26 (1/20) that it was outside that range. This characterization is not, however, a statistical property of the estimate, and
27 should not be confused with statistically defined 95% confidence intervals.

28 The authors of this Report have used this system for categorizing uncertainty only where they have
29 synthesized diverse published information and compared across this diversity. When citing an existing published
30 estimate, authors were encouraged to include the characterizations of uncertainty reported by those publications
31 (e.g., ranges, standard error, or confidence intervals). There are circumstances in which no characterization of the
32 uncertainty of data or information is shown, such as when a number is taken from a published source that itself did
33 not include a characterization of uncertainty. In these cases, the authors have not provided a characterization of
34 uncertainty, and the reader should assume that no characterization of uncertainty was available to the authors.
35 Additional discussion of sources of uncertainty and their treatment in this Report can be found in the *Preface* under
36 “The Treatment of Uncertainty in this Report.”

37 **[END OF TEXT BOX]**

1
2 **Table ES-1. North American annual net carbon emissions (source = positive) or uptake (land sink =**
3 **negative) (million tons carbon per year) by country. See Table 3-1, Chapter 3 for references to sources of**
4 **data.**

Source (positive) or Sink (negative)	United States	Canada	Mexico	North America
<i>Fossil source (positive)</i>				
Fossil fuel (oil, gas, coal)	1582 ^{*****} (681, 328, 573)	164 ^{*****} (75, 48, 40)	110 ^{*****} (71, 29, 11)	1856 ^{*****} (828, 405, 624)
<i>Nonfossil carbon sink (negative) or source (positive)</i>				
Forest	-259 ^{***}	-47 ^{***}	+52 ^{**}	-254 ^{***}
Wood products	-57 ^{***}	-11 ^{***}	ND	-68 ^{***}
Woody encroachment	-120 [*]	ND	ND	-120 [*]
Agricultural soils	-8 ^{***}	-2 ^{***}	ND	-10 ^{***}
Wetlands	-23 [*]	-23 [*]	-4 [*]	-49 [*]
Rivers and lakes	-25 ^{**}	ND	ND	-25 [*]
Coastal oceans ^a				
Total carbon source or sink	-492 ^{***}	-83 ^{**}	48 [*]	-526 ^{***}
<i>Net carbon source (positive)</i>	1090 ^{*****}	81 ^{***}	158 ^{***}	1330 ^{*****}

5
6 Uncertainty:

7 ***** (95% confidence within 10%)

8 **** (95% confidence within 25%)

9 *** (95% confidence within 50%)

10 ** (95% confidence within 100%)

11 * (95% confidence bounds >100%)

12 ND = No data available

13 ^a Coastal waters within 100 km of the North American coastline, defined by the region in which the surface water
14 concentration of carbon dioxide is influenced by coastal processes, may be a source of 19 million tons of carbon per year but with
15 95% confidence bounds of > 100% (i.e., they may be a small sink). See discussion of coastal ocean sources and sinks in Chapters
16 3 and 15, and their distribution by ocean region rather than country in Chapter 15.




Figure ES-1. North American carbon sources and sinks (million tons carbon per year) circa 2003. Height of a bar indicates a best estimate for net carbon exchange between the atmosphere and the indicated element of the North American carbon budget. Sources add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere; sinks remove it. Error bars indicate the uncertainty in that estimate, and define the range of values that include the actual value with 95% certainty. See Chapter 3 and Chapters 6-15 of this report for details and discussion of these sources and sinks.