UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

April 16, 2001

Otto L. Maynard, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION--NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-482/00-11

Dear Mr. Maynard:

On March 31, 2001, the NRC completed inspections at the Wolf Creek Generating Station. The enclosed report presents the results of these inspections which were discussed during meetings on February 15 and March 9 and 30, 2001, with you and members of your staff.

These inspections were an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified an issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with this issue. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William D. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-482
License: NPF-42

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-482/00-11

cc w/enclosure:
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Only inspection reports to the following:
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NRR Event Tracking System **(IPAS)**
WC Site Secretary **(SLA2)**
Dale Thatcher **(DFT)**

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RIV:SRI:DRP/B	SPE:DRP/B	SRI:EMB	EP:DRS/PSB	RI:EMB
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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket:	50-482
License:	NPF-42
Report No.:	50-482/00-11
Licensee:	Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility:	Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:	1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas
Dates:	December 31, 2000, through March 31, 2001
Inspectors:	F. L. Brush, Senior Resident Inspector
	R. A. Kopriva, Senior Project Engineer
	L. E. Ellershaw, Senior Reactor Inspector
	P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
	P. A. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:	W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B
ATTACHMENT:	Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Wolf Creek Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-482/00-11

IR 50-482/00-11; on 12/31/2000 - 3/31/2001; Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; Wolf Creek Generating Station. Integrated Resident/Regional Report. Fire Protection

The report covers a 13-week period of resident inspection and announced inspections by Region IV inspectors. The inspection identified one Green finding which was a noncited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place. The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

  The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal (Section 1R05).

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power for the report period with the following exceptions. On March 16, 2001, the licensee reduced plant power to 15 percent to allow installation of the auxiliary transformer. On March 19, 2001, the licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power. On March 22, 2001, the licensee reduced plant power to 80 percent to allow repair of a water leak on the main generator hydrogen cooler heat exchanger. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power the following day.

1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, **Emergency Preparedness**

1R02 Changes to License Conditions and Safety Analysis Report (71111.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed 10 safety evaluations to verify that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures or conducted tests or experiments without prior NRC approval.

The inspectors reviewed 11 safety evaluation screenings, in which the licensee determined that safety evaluations were not required, to ensure that licensee's exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

The inspectors reviewed 10 performance improvement requests initiated by the licensee that addressed problems or deficiencies associated with 10 CFR 50.59 to ensure that appropriate corrective actions were being taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following walkdowns:

- Partial walkdown of Emergency Diesel Generator B when Emergency Diesel Generator A was inoperable for testing
- Partial walkdown of auxiliary feedwater Pump A and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump when auxiliary feedwater Pump B was inoperable for testing
- Partial walkdown of essential service water Train B when containment cooler Train A was inoperable due to unplanned maintenance on essential service water containment isolation Valve EF HV-31

The inspectors performed the walkdowns to verify equipment alignment and identify discrepancies that could impact redundant system operability. The inspectors used the following procedures and information to perform the walkdowns:

- CKL AL-120, Auxiliary feedwater normal lineup, Revision 29
- CKL KJ-121, Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 valve checklist, Revision 21
- CKL EF-120, Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup, Revision 36
- Portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report

The inspectors also discussed the walkdowns with various licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following areas to determine that the licensee implemented a fire protection program for the control of combustibles that maintains the fire detection and suppression equipment and passive fire protection features and adequately compensates for inoperable or degraded fire protection equipment, systems, or features:

- Auxiliary building 2000 foot north piping penetration room
- Auxiliary building 2000 foot south piping penetration room
- Auxiliary building 2047 foot control room air conditioning and filtration units Room A
- Auxiliary building 2047 foot control room air conditioning and filtration units Room B
- Control building 2016 foot north vital battery and switchboard and nonvital switchgear rooms
- Control building 2016 foot air conditioning Unit SGK05A room
- Control building 2016 foot air conditioning Unit SGK05B room
- Emergency core cooling system Train B pump rooms

b. Findings

The inspectors identified that a 3-hour rated fire door between the safety-related switchgear rooms was partially open. License Condition 2.C(5)(a) of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License requires, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire program. The fire protection program required that 3-hour rated fire doors remain closed if compensatory measures were not in place. The license condition was not met since the 3-hour fire barrier between the switchgear rooms was not intact and the licensee did not have compensatory measures in place.

The licensee's failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program was a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2001-0025 (50-482/0011-01).

The inspectors entered the significance determination process since the partially open door affected a fire separation barrier for multiple safety systems. This had a credible impact on safety and was an impairment to a fire protection feature. The door was partially open for less than 3 hours, the ignition frequency was relatively low, the automatic fire detection and suppression systems were minimally affected, and manual firefighting effectiveness was unaffected. Using the plant specific significance determination process "Transients with Power Conversion System" worksheet, this violation was evaluated as having had very low safety significance. The secondary heat removal and power conversion system mitigation capabilities were available for decay heat removal.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee's flooding mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the licensee's design requirements and the risk assumptions. The areas inspected were the residual heat removal pump Rooms A and B and containment spray pump Rooms A and B. The inspectors discussed the flood mitigation system with various licensee personnel and reviewed the following information:

- Drawing M12-LF01, Auxiliary Building Floor and Equipment Drain System, Revision 01
- Drawing M12-LF03, Auxiliary Building Floor and Equipment Drain System, Revision 03
- Flood Calculation FL-04, Revision 1
- Portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed control room operator simulator training to verify that the licensed operator requalification program ensures safe operation of the plant by adequately evaluating how well the operators and crews have mastered the training objectives. The scenario included the loss of all ac power. The inspectors reviewed Document LR 50 010 09, “Simulator Guide, Loss of all AC,” Revision 4.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

1. Periodic Evaluation Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's reports documenting the performance of the last two maintenance rule periodic effectiveness assessments. These periodic evaluations covered a 10-month period from July 1998 through May 1999 and an 18-month period from May 1999 through November 2000. These two periodic evaluations were prepared as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3).

The inspectors determined that the licensee's program had identified and monitored risk-significant functions associated with structures, systems, and components using reliability and unavailability. Additionally, the performance of nonrisk-significant functions were monitored using plant level criteria. The inspectors reviewed the conclusions reached by the licensee with regard to the balance of reliability and unavailability for specific maintenance rule functions. This review was conducted by examining the licensee's evaluation of all risk-significant functions that had exceeded performance criteria during the evaluation periods. The inspectors also examined the licensee's evaluation of program activities associated with placement of maintenance rule program risk-significant functions in Categories (a)(1) and/or (a)(2). This review was conducted by the examination of periodic evaluation conclusions reached by the licensee for functions of the emergency ac power/emergency diesel generators, residual heat removal, essential service water, chemical and volume control, plant service water, high pressure coolant injection, reactor protection, and containment isolation associated systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Effectiveness of Maintenance Rule Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for those meetings listed in Attachment 1 with an emphasis on issues associated with functions of the emergency ac power/emergency diesel generators, containment isolation, component cooling water, high pressure coolant injection, and chemical and volume control systems. For the identified functions, the inspectors followed up by obtaining the needed documentation (listed in Attachment 1) and assessing the maintenance rule program performance related to:

- Program adjustments made in response to unbalanced reliability and availability
- Cause determination of degraded performance or failure to meet performance criteria
- Functional failure evaluation and determination of maintenance preventable functional failures
- Adequacy of corrective action and goal setting
- Monitoring of established goals for functions placed in Category (a)(1)
- Program revisions to scoping and risk-significance
- Creation of new risk-significant functions to improve performance monitoring
- Assessment of plant level performance

In order to validate that the licensee was identifying programmatic issues from outside of the maintenance rule program, the inspectors also reviewed the reports for the nuclear quality engineering audit, plant evaluation program report, self-assessment of the industry technical information program, self-assessment of the Maintenance Rule (a)(4) readiness, and quarterly maintenance rule management reports distributed since the fourth quarter of 1999 that are referenced in Attachment 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the use of the corrective action system within the maintenance rule program. This evaluation was accomplished by reviewing the performance improvement requests and a sample of the control room logs listed in the attachment. The purpose of this review was to establish that the corrective action program was entered at the appropriate threshold for the purposes of:

- Starting the evaluation and determination of the corrective action process when performance criteria were exceeded
- Correction of performance-related issues or conditions identified during the periodic evaluation
- Correction of generic issues or conditions identified during programmatic audits or assessments

The inspectors verified that the identification and implementation of corrective action were acceptable.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. Maintenance Effectiveness for Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance rule implementation for the containment hydrogen control system and emergency diesel generators (standby diesel engine system) to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to scoped structures, systems, and components. The inspectors reviewed various maintenance rule information.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessment for equipment outages as a result of planned and emergent maintenance to evaluate the licensee's effectiveness in

assessing risk for planned and emergent maintenance. The inspectors also discussed the planned and emergent work activities with planning and maintenance personnel. The inspectors' review included the following:

- Operational risk assessments for planned maintenance for the weeks of January 15 and March 12, 2001
- Actual, planned, and emergent work schedules for the same weeks

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following to ensure that operability was properly justified for the component or system:

- Unplanned safety injection system relief valve lifting
- Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip and throttle valve equalizing valve steam leak
- Oscillating pressure on the nitrogen supply system to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater system flow control valves and steam generator atmospheric relief valves

The inspectors also discussed the component or system operability status with licensee personnel and reviewed applicable portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following licensee identified operator workarounds to identify any potential effect on the functionality of mitigating systems:

- Component cooling water system isolation valve leakby
- Letdown heat exchanger temperature control valve slow response time
- Pressure locking on two charging system valves
- Main generator hydrogen cooler temperature control valve control problems

The inspectors reviewed other long-term deficiencies to determine if they met the operator workaround definition.

The inspectors reviewed the following:

- Procedure AP 22C-002, “IPS Daily Schedule,” Revision 6
- The licensee’s workaround list dated February 8, 2001

The inspectors also discussed the workaround list with various licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed the postmaintenance testing on the following equipment to verify that procedures and test activities are adequate to verify system operability:

- Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A
- Containment spray Pump A
- Safety injection Pump A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed all or part of the following surveillance activities to verify that risk significant structures, systems, and components are capable of performing their intended safety functions and assessing their operational readiness:

- STS EJ-100A, “Residual Heat Removal System Inservice Pump Test,” Revision 21
- STS KJ-005A, “Manual/Auto Start, Synchronization and Loading of Emergency Diesel Generator NE01,” Revision 38

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the restoration from the auxiliary transformer temporary modification to verify that the modification restoration had not affected the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors walked down Instrumentation Cabinets MA104A and -104C and the auxiliary transformer and reviewed Temporary Modification Order 00-014-MA, Revision 2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (7111403)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Revision 2 to the Wolf Creek Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Revision 1 to APF 06-002-01, "Emergency Action Levels," both transmitted by the licensee on January 19, 2001, to determine if the revisions decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed an emergency drill to evaluate the conduct of the drill. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator control room, the technical support center, and the emergency offsite facility. The inspectors reviewed the 2001 Semi-Annual Drill 01-SA-01 Scenario, Revision 0.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the following performance indicators to determine the accuracy and completeness of the performance indicator:

- Reactor coolant system activity
- Safety system functional failures
- Safety system unavailability
- Unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours, April 1999 through September 2000

The inspectors discussed the system status with various licensee personnel. The inspectors also reviewed licensee information and the Technical Specifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

1. (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-482/1999-017-00: failure to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Requirements 3.7.6 and 3.7.7 for the control room emergency ventilation system and emergency exhaust system-auxiliary building. The licensee initiated corrective action program document Performance Improvement Request 2000-0590. The LER was reviewed and no findings of significance were identified. This LER is closed.

2. (Closed) LER 50-482/2000-005-00: failure to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.7.16.1 for fuel storage pool boron concentration. The licensee initiated corrective action program document Performance Improvement Request 2000-3666. The LER was reviewed and no findings of significance were identified. This LER is closed.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the resident inspection results to Mr. O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of licensee management on March 30, 2001.

The inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to Mr. K. A. Harris, Licensing Manager, and other members of licensee management by telephone on February 15, 2001.

The inspectors presented the maintenance rule periodic inspection results to Mr. B. T. McKinney, Vice President Plant Operations and Plant Manager, and other members of licensee management on February 15, 2001.

The inspectors presented the safety evaluation inspection results to Mr. O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 9, 2001.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether or not any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The inspectors did not receive any proprietary materials.

ATTACHMENT

Supplemental Information

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

K. A. Harris, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action
J. W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection
O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. T. McKinney, Vice President Plant Operations and Plant Manager
R. Muench, Vice President Engineering and Information Services
C. R. Younie, Manager, Operations
C. C. Warren, Vice President Operations Support

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

ITEMS OPENED

Opened

50-482/0011-01	NCV	Failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program (Section 1RO5)

ITEMS CLOSED

Closed

50-482/1999-017-00	LER	Failure to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Requirements 3.7.6 and 3.7.7 for the control room emergency ventilation system and emergency exhaust system-auxiliary building (Section 4OA3)
50-482/2000-005-00	LER	Failure to satisfactorily perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.7.16.1 for fuel storage pool boron concentration (Section 4OA3)
50-482/0011-01	NCV	Failure to maintain in effect the provisions of the fire protection program (Section 1RO5)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Fire Protection

- FPP A-4 Auxiliary building 1974 foot and 1967 foot emergency core cooling system Train B pump rooms, Revision 4
- FPP A-24 Auxiliary building 2000 foot north piping penetration room, Revision 5
- FPP A-25 Auxiliary building 2000 foot south piping penetration room, Revision 6
- FPP A-21 Auxiliary building 2047 foot control room air conditioning and filtration units Room B, Revision 5
- FPP A-22 Auxiliary building 2047 foot control room air conditioning and filtration units Room A, Revision 5
- FPP C-13 Control building 2016 foot air-conditioning Unit SGK05A room, Revision 6
- FPP C-14 Control building 2016 foot air-conditioning Unit SGK05B room, Revision 6
- FPP C-16 Control building 2016 foot north nonvital switchgear, battery, and switchboard rooms, Revision 6
- Combustible loading information program for Rooms 3415 and 3416
- Updated Safety Analysis Report fire hazards analysis

Maintenance Rule Documents

- Functional failure determination checklist for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system, initiated by Performance Improvement Request 2000-2867
- Functional failure determination checklist for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system, initiated by Performance Improvement Request 2000-3172
- Functional failure determination checklist for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system, initiated by Performance Improvement Request 2000-3178
- Functional failure determination checklist for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system, initiated by Performance Improvement Request 2000-3186
- Functional failure determination checklist for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system, initiated by Performance Improvement Request 2000-3213
- Functional failure evaluations for GS-02, containment hydrogen control system

- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for GS-02, collect and analyze containment atmosphere samples for hydrogen concentration, June 5, 2000
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) disposition checklist and documentation summary for KJ-01, provide emergency 4160 volt ac power to the respective 4160 volt ac bus within 12 seconds of a demand for up to 7 days in the event of a loss-of-offsite power to that bus, March 31, 1999
- Maintenance rule bases information, KJ-01, standby diesel engine system
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for GS, containment hydrogen control system
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for KJ-01, standby diesel engine system
- Maintenance rule paragraph (a)(3) periodic assessment Report SEL 00-030
- Maintenance rule performance evaluation for GS-02, collect and analyze containment atmosphere samples for hydrogen concentration
- Performance Improvement Requests 2000-3135 and -3385

Procedures

- AI 23M-003, “Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Duties and Responsibilities,” Revision 3
- AP 22C-002, “Integrated Plant Scheduling, Revision,” Revision 6
- AP 22C-003, “Operational Risk Assessment Program,” Revision 6
- AP 23M-001, “WCGS Maintenance Rule Program,” Revision 3
- EDI 23M-010, “Determination of Structures, Systems, and Components Within the Scope of the Maintenance Rule,” Revision 1
- EDI 23M-020, “Determining the Safety Significance of Structures, Systems, and Components Within the Scope of the Maintenance Rule,” Revision 1
- EDI 23M-030, “Establishing Performance Criteria for Structures, Systems and Components Within the Scope of the Maintenance Rule,” Revision 2
- EDI 23M-040, “Establishing (a)(1) Corrective Actions and Goals,” Revision 2
- EDI 23M-050, “Monitoring Performance to Criteria and Goals,” Revision 3

Periodic Assessment Reports

- SEL 99-015, Period July 1, 1998, through May 9, 1999
- SEL 99-030, Period May 10, 1999, through November 6, 2000

Self-Assessment Reports

- SEL 00-027, “Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Readiness,” October 5, 2000

Quarterly Maintenance Rule Management Reports

- August 1999 through December 31, 1999
- January 1, 2000, through March 31, 2000
- April 1, 2000, through June 30, 2000
- July 1, 2000, through September 30, 2000

Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes

January 5, 2000	March 22, 2000	July 20, 2000
January 14, 2000	March 27, 2000	July 21, 2000
January 18, 2000	April 10, 2000	August 14, 2000
January 31, 2000	April 24, 2000	September 13, 2000
February 14, 2000	May 8, 2000	November 20, 2000
February 28, 2000	June 5, 2000	December 18, 2000
March 8, 2000	June 14, 2000	January 17, 2001
March 13, 2000	July 13, 2000	January 26, 2001
March 16, 2000	July 17, 2000	

Performance Improvement Requests

98-1467	99-1886	99-2185	2000-2867
98-2222	99-1896	99-2845	2000-2977
98-3544	99-1898	99-3076	2000-3172
99-1860	99-1958	2000-1771	2000-3178
99-1866	99-2106	2000-1821	2000-3213

Operability Evaluations

- Configuration Change Package 05114, Revision 1
- Control room shift manager’s log
- Evaluation for nonconforming conditions of installed plant equipment for safety injection system relief Valves EM8851 and EM8853B
- Performance Improvement Request 1994-0415

- Terry-turbine controls guide, September 1990

Performance Indicator Verification

- CHA RC-004, “Gamma Isotropic, Total Curie Content and Dose Equivalent Iodine Determination,” Revision 6
- CHA RC-005, “Determination of Gas Activity,” Revision 4
- CHS SJ-143, “Sample Station Sampling Instruction,” Revision 12
- Dose equivalent iodine surveillance results for 2000
- Licensee Event Reports 2000-001-00, -002-00, -002-01, -003-00, -004-00, -005-00, and 1995-008-00
- Licensee worksheets
- Performance Improvement Request 2001-0481
- Selected NRC inspection reports
- Selected control room operator logs

Postmaintenance Testing

- STS AL-101, “Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Inservice Pump Test,” Revision 28
- STS EN-100A, “Containment Spray Pump A Inservice Pump Test,” Revision 13
- STS EM-100A, “Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test,” Revision 19
- STS FC-201, “Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine System Inservice Valve Test,” Revision 12
- STS EN-201A, “Train A Borated Refueling Water Storage System Inservice Valve Test,” Revision 0