



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER  
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

October 22, 2001

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  
ATTN: Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr., Vice President  
P. O. Box 1295  
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

**SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT NOS. 50-424/01-05 AND 50-425/01-05**

Dear Mr. Beasley:

On September 29, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Units 1 and 2 reactor facilities. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on September 26, 2001, with Mr. J. Gasser and other members of your staff. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Since September 11, 2001, your staff has assumed a heightened level of security based on a series of threat advisories issued by the NRC. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the heightened level of security was recommended for all nuclear power plants and is being maintained due to the uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist attacks. The steps recommended by the NRC include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with local law enforcement and military authorities, and limited access of personnel and vehicles to the site.

The NRC continues to interact with the Intelligence Community and to communicate information to you and your staff. In addition, the NRC has monitored maintenance and other activities which could relate to the site's security posture.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is

SNC

2

accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

***/RA/***

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425  
License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection Report  
50-424/01-05 and 50-425/01-05  
w/Attachment

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

SNC

3

cc w/encl:  
J. D. Woodard  
Executive Vice President  
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  
Electronic Mail Distribution

J. T. Gasser  
General Manager, Plant Vogtle  
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  
Electronic Mail Distribution

J. A. Bailey  
Manager-Licensing  
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  
Electronic Mail Distribution

Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel  
Division  
Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs  
2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive  
Plaza Level East; Suite 356  
Atlanta, GA 30334-4600

Office of Planning and Budget  
Room 615B  
270 Washington Street, SW  
Atlanta, GA 30334

Office of the County Commissioner  
Burke County Commission  
Waynesboro, GA 30830

Director, Department of Natural Resources  
205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252  
Atlanta, GA 30334

Manager, Radioactive Materials Program  
Department of Natural Resources  
Electronic Mail Distribution

Attorney General  
Law Department  
132 Judicial Building  
Atlanta, GA 30334

Resident Manager  
Oglethorpe Power Corporation  
Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant  
Electronic Mail Distribution

Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.  
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker  
10th Floor  
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20004-9500

Arthur H. Domby, Esq.  
Troutman Sanders  
NationsBank Plaza  
600 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 5200  
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216

Senior Engineer - Power Supply  
Municipal Electric Authority  
of Georgia  
Electronic Mail Distribution

SNC

4

Distribution w/encl:  
R. Assa, NRR  
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB  
PUBLIC

OFFICE	RII:DRP	RII:DRP	RII:DRS	RII:DRS			
SIGNATURE	SCahill per verbal	SCahill per verbal	KO'Donohue	CPayne			
NAME	JZeiler	TMorrissey	KO'Donohue	CPayne			
DATE	10/17/01	10/17/01	10/17/01	10/17/01		10/ /2001	10/ /2001
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

DOCUMENT NAME: C:\MYFILES\Checkout\01-05.wpd

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Report No: 50-424/01-05 and 50-425/01-05

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 7821 River Road  
Waynesboro, GA 30830

Dates: July 1, 2001 through September 29, 2001

Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector  
T. Morrissey, Resident Inspector  
K. O'Donohue, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)  
C. Payne, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)

Approved by: Stephen J. Cahill, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000424-01-05, IR 05000425-01-05, on 07/01-09/29/2001; Southern Nuclear Operating Company; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, resident inspector report.

This report covers a 13 week period of inspection conducted by resident inspectors and regional operations engineers. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at essentially 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) until August 24, when an automatic reactor trip occurred while closing a generator rectifier bank disconnect switch. The unit was restarted on August 26 and attained full power operation on August 30. The unit operated at essentially 100% RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at essentially 100% RTP throughout the inspection period.

### **1. REACTOR SAFETY** **Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity**

#### 1R04 Equipment Alignment

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted partial walkdowns of the following systems to evaluate the operability of selected trains or backup systems when the redundant train or system was inoperable or out of service. The walkdowns included verification of local and control room valve switch and breaker positions to ensure the systems were correctly aligned. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report.

- 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Distribution System
- 2B High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) System
- 2A and 2B Safety Injection (SI) Systems

##### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 1R05 Fire Protection

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted plant tours to evaluate the licensee's control of combustible materials and ignition sources and the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression systems and fire protection barriers. The inspectors compared the licensee's fire protection procedures to the requirements in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9. The inspectors periodically reviewed the licensee's fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) log to determine if the corrective actions for fire protection degradations were properly prioritized. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Condition Reports (CRs) 2001001793, 2001001816, and 2001002165 to verify that fire protection issues were being appropriately addressed in the corrective action program. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report. Plant areas toured included the following:

- Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater pump house
- 2B HHSI pump room
- 2A and 2B Containment Spray pump rooms
- 2A and 2B SI pump rooms
- Unit 2 Boric Acid Transfer Pump rooms
- 1A and 1B remote shutdown rooms and Class 1E 4.16 KV switchgear rooms
- 1A and 1B SI pump rooms
- Unit 1 120 volt safety related vital battery rooms

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

.1 Licensed Operator Requalification (Quarterly Review)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 5, the inspectors observed a simulator evaluation of licensed operators and evaluated their actions against Dynamic Simulator Scenario # 34. The inspectors assessed the following items: 1) correct use and implementation of abnormal operating, emergency operating, annunciator response, and emergency classification procedures, 2) proper control board manipulations including high-risk operator actions, 3) quality of crew command and control, 4) quality of communications, and 5) effectiveness of the post evaluation critique. The inspectors also verified that the simulator control boards closely matched the control boards in the actual control room. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Licensed Operator Requalification (Biennial Review)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history since the last requalification program inspection for indications of operator weaknesses. The inspectors also reviewed the biennial written examinations for five shift crews to evaluate their effectiveness in providing a basis for assessing operator knowledge of material covered in the requalification training program. Examination quality, licensee effectiveness in integrating industry, plant and student feedback into the requalification training program, and examination development methodology were reviewed to evaluate licensee performance. The inspectors observed annual dynamic simulator examinations (five scenarios) for four operator teams to assess the adequacy of the licensee's evaluation of operator knowledge and abilities. During these observations, the inspectors reviewed licensee evaluator effectiveness in pinpointing operator performance deficiencies requiring supplemental training. The inspectors also observed portions of the



walkthrough examination administered during this requalification segment to assess evaluator performance.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's remedial training program for operator deficiencies identified during the previous year. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of on-shift licensed operator qualification records, watchstanding records and medical records to ensure compliance with 10CFR 55.59, Requalification, and 10CFR 55.53, Conditions of License.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule (MR) Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following equipment issues and associated CRs to assess the effectiveness of licensee maintenance efforts related to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the MR regarding characterization of failures, performance criteria or a(1) performance goals, and corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed CRs 2001001532, 2001001455, 2001001418, and 2001001801, to verify that equipment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and appropriately dispositioned.

- Main condenser vacuum decrease due to valve misalignment (CR 2001001350)
- 2A Solid State Protection System (SSPS) #2 power supply replacement (CR 2001001385)
- Battery Charger 1AD1CB failed load test (CR 2001001518)
- Failure of quarterly comparison, Containment Radiation Monitors 1RE 2565C and 2RE 2565C (CRs 2001001575 and 2001001577)
- Battery Charger 2CD1CA failed high voltage shutdown circuit (CR 2001001737)
- Failure of trip control timer relay for Unit 1 Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) pump #4 (CR 2001001854)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities and the Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs), to evaluate the licensee's risk management effectiveness and compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors reviewed risk assessments conducted prior to work performance and risk management controls implemented to verify they were completed

in accordance with licensee procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling. The inspectors conducted a review to ensure plant risk was reassessed for emergent work activities. The maintenance activities and MWOs reviewed and evaluated included the following:

- Troubleshoot abnormal discharge pressure indication on 2A HHSI pump (MWO 20102050)
- Replace fuse in 1A EDG voltage indication circuitry (MWO 10102229)
- Replace circuit breaker for 120 Volt safety related battery charger 2CD1CA (MWO 20100320)
- Unit 1 NSCW pump #1 system outage (MWO's 10100302, 10100163, 10100164, 10001849 and 10100380)
- Replace failed control timer relay in Unit 1 NSCW pump #4 (MWO 10100170)
- Troubleshoot problem with multiplexer test switch on Train A SSPS ( Procedure 10024-C, Equipment Troubleshooting, CR 2001001846)
- Replace motor on Unit 1 NSCW pump #6 discharge valve (MWO 10100398)
- Replace degraded motor on Unit 1 NSCW pump #5 (MWO 10100167)
- Repair Unit 1 Main Generator Rectifier Bank #1 (MWO 10102522)
- Clean/inspect/lubricate/test valve 1HV8807A (MWO 10000200)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions and Events

Unit 1 Reactor Trip Following Main Generator Trip on Loss of Field Excitation Voltage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operating logs, emergency and abnormal operating procedures, sequence of event log, and computer data of plant equipment response following a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip that occurred on August 24 to verify that the operating crew responded appropriately to the event. Further details regarding the trip are included in Section 4OA3, Event Followup, of this report. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations to assess the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the evaluations to verify that they were processed in accordance with procedure 00150-C, Condition Reporting and

Tracking System. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report. Operability evaluations reviewed included the following:

- Loose jacket water exhaust shroud bolts on 1A EDG (CR 2001001504)
- Failure of overvoltage trip and load sharing circuitry on safety related battery charger 2CD1CA (CR 2001001737)
- Loose fuse holder for Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve 2HV15212C control and valve position indication circuitry (CR 2001001746)
- Abnormal indications on Unit 1 and Unit 2 engineered safety features sequencer systems (CR 2001002146)
- Potential separation of electrical connections in safety related applications (CRs 2001002057 and 2001002196)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors used NRC inspection procedure 71111.16, Operator Workarounds, and reviewed conditions that required compensation by the operators existing on both units during the report period. The inspectors review was to determine if these workarounds could increase the likelihood of an initiating event or could affect multiple mitigating systems. The inspectors also reviewed the cumulative effects of potential workarounds on the operator's ability to correctly and timely respond to plant transients.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Design Change Package (DCP) 98-VAN-0005, Replace Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Doors in Railroad Bay with Automatic Opening Fire Doors and DCP 96-VAN-0018 to replace a failed Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank level transmitter. The inspectors review was to verify that the modified systems' design had not been degraded and that the modifications had not left the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors compared the DCP's to the requirements of procedures 58007-C, Design Changes Packages. In addition, DCP 98-VAN-0005, was compared to the requirements of procedure 00310-C, Standard for Use of Doors, and NFPA 80-1983, Standard for Fire Doors and Windows, to verify the functionality of the FHB post accident ventilation system remained functional under accident conditions. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or witnessed post-maintenance testing for maintenance activities to verify that the testing adequately demonstrated that the equipment was operable. The inspectors also compared testing activities to the requirements in procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, and the system outage schedule where applicable. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report. Post maintenance testing associated with the following maintenance activities were witnessed and reviewed.

- 2B HHSI room cooler system outage (MWOs 20100878, 20100877 and 20002984)
- Troubleshooting abnormal discharge pressure indication for 2A HHSI pump during performance of IST procedure (MWO 20102050)
- Replace fuse in 1A EDG output voltage indication circuitry (MWO 10102229)
- Replace circuit breaker for safety related vital battery charger 2CD1CA (MWO 20100320)
- Unit 2 NSCW pump #3 system outage (MWOs 20100238, 20100241, 20101604, and 20102187)
- Replace failed control timer relay in Unit 1 NSCW pump #4 (MWO 10100170)
- Troubleshooting Unit 1 Bank B rod bank low limit alarm actuation failure during rod operability testing (MWO 10102506)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the testing or reviewed completed records to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately demonstrated that the equipment was operable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed CR 2001001605 to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for the associated surveillance test problems. Licensee documents used to support this inspection activity are listed in the Attachment of this report. Surveillance test witnessed or reviewed included the following:

- Procedure 14980-1, 1B Diesel Generator Operability Test
- Procedure 87006-1, Movable Incore Detector System Operating Instructions
- Procedure 28820-C, Battery Charger Load Test (Charger 2CD1CA)

- Procedure 14811-2, Boric Acid Transfer Pumps and Discharge Check Valve Inservice Test
- Procedure 14980-2, 2B Diesel Generator Operability Test
- Procedure 14546-1, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test
- Procedure 14420-2, SSPS and Reactor Trip Breaker Train A Operability Test
- Procedure 88025-1, Determination of Movable Incore Detector Operating Voltage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**4. OTHER ACTIVITIES**

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PI data for the Emergency AC Power System submitted to the NRC for the first and second quarters of 2001 to determine its accuracy and completeness. Documentation reviewed included operator logs, licensee maintenance rule database, licensee event reports, and licensee monthly PI Summary reports. The inspectors compared licensee performance to procedure 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator Preparation and Submittal, and NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision (Rev.) 1, to verify PI procedure and reporting requirements were met.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Barrier Integrity Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PI data for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity submitted to the NRC for the first and second quarters of 2001 to determine its accuracy and completeness. Documentation reviewed included completed radiochemistry datasheets from procedure 35110-C, Chemistry Control of the Reactor Coolant System, and the licensee's monthly PI Summary reports. The inspectors compared licensee performance to procedure 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator Preparation and Submittal and NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 1, to verify PI procedure and reporting requirements were met.

The inspectors performed a review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PI data for RCS Leakage submitted to the NRC for the fourth quarter of 2000 through the second quarter of 2001 to determine its accuracy and completeness. Licensee documentation reviewed

included the licensee's monthly PI Summary reports, operator logs, and leakage calculation results obtained from procedures 14905-1,2, RCS Leakage Calculation. The inspectors compared licensee performance to procedure 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator Preparation and Submittal and NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 1, to verify PI procedure and reporting requirements were met.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

Unit 1 Reactor Trip Following Main Generator Trip on Loss of Field Excitation Voltage

a. Inspection Scope

On August 24, an automatic reactor trip occurred from 100% RTP due to a trip of the main turbine-generator following the unexpected loss of generator field excitation while re-closing a generator rectifier bridge disconnect switch. The inspectors reviewed operating logs, sequence of event log, and post-trip equipment response computer data following the trip to verify proper operation of plant mitigation equipment. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's NRC Event Notification report to confirm that the licensee properly classified the event and submitted it in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and procedure 00152-C, Federal and State Reporting Requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 26, 2001. No proprietary information was identified.

## Supplementary Information

### PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

#### Licensee

W. Bargeron, Manager Operations  
R. Brown, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness  
W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support  
G. Frederick, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager  
J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager  
P. Rushton, Plant Support Assistant General Manager

#### NRC

S. Cahill, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2

### ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None.

### INSPECTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

#### **Section 1R04**

Drawing Nos. 2X4DB114-117, Chemical and Volume Control System  
Drawing Nos. 2X4DB119-121, Safety Injection System

#### **Section 1R05**

Procedure 92855-1, Zone 155 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse -Train B Fire Fighting Preplan  
Procedure 92856-1, Zone 156 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse Fire Fighting Preplan  
Procedure 92857A-1, Zone 157A Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse -Train C Fire Fighting Preplan  
Procedure 92857B-1, Zone 157B Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse Fire Fighting Preplan  
Procedure 92791-1, Zone 91 Control Building- Level A Fire Fighting Preplan  
Procedure 92792-1, Zone 92 Control Building- Level A Fire Fighting Preplan  
Procedure 92798-1, Zone 98 Control Building- Level A Fire Fighting Preplan  
Procedure 92000-C, Fire Protection Program  
Procedure 92015-C, Use, Control and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials  
Procedure 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources  
Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) 99-VAA650, Door Database

#### **Section 1R11**

Procedure 10000-C, Conduct of Operations  
Procedure 13003-C, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation  
Procedure 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction  
Procedure 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection  
Procedure 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant  
Procedure 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions

**Section 1R14**

19000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection  
12006-C, Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown

**Section 1R15**

CR 2001001744, Valve 2HV7603B exceeded close time acceptance criteria  
Solid State Logic System for Power Plant Control Technical Manual  
Procedure 13540-1,2, Safety Features Sequencer System

**Section 1R17**

CR 2001001578, QC identified discrepancies during door inspection of DCP 98VAN-0005  
CR 2001001106, 2HV-12006 operator not per design configuration  
CR 2001001634, Unapproved anchors used in installation of DCP 98VAN-0005  
CR 2001001782, 1LT0993 Loop IV RWST level failed high  
CR 2001001768, Replacement transmitter installed for failed 1LT0993 not model specified by  
DCP 96-VAN0018

**Section 1R19**

Procedure 25210-C, General Vibration Measurement, Revision 13.0  
Procedure 25732-C, Megger Testing Motors, Revision 8.0  
Procedure 14808-2, Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Test  
(2A CCP)  
Procedure 14614, SSPS Slave Relay K608 Train A Test Safety Injection (2A CCP)  
CR 2001001702, 2 A High Head Safety Injection pump discharge pressure gage would not  
indicate pressure during IST, possible blockage