



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 24, 2006

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
ATTN: Mr. Jeffrey B. Archie
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000395/2006002 AND ANNUAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Dear Mr. Archie:

On March 31, 2006, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 11, 2006, with Mr. Jeff Archie and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kerry D. Landis, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-395
License No.: NPF-12

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000395/2006002
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

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PUBLICLY AVAILABLE NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SENSITIVE NON-SENSITIVE

ADAMS: Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: _____

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SIGNATURE	JXZ	LXC per email	MSL for	BWM1	HJG	KDL for	JXZ for
NAME	JZeiler	MCain	MScott	BMiller	HGepford	LGarner	JPolickoski
DATE	04/21/2006	04/20/2006	04/24/2006	04/20/2006	04/21/2006	04/24/2006	04/21/2006
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 50-395

License No.: NPF-12

Report No.: 05000395/2006002

Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company

Facility: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

Location: P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065

Dates: January 1, 2006 - March 31, 2006

Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Cain, Resident Inspector
J. Polickoski, Acting Resident Inspector
B. Miller, Reactor Inspector, RII (Sections 1R12.2)
M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector, RII (Sections 1R12.2)

Approved by: K. D. Landis, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000395/2006002; 01/01/2006 - 03/31/2006; Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and one announced inspection by regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified by the NRC. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The unit began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). The unit operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Unexpected Cold Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a readiness inspection during the week of February 13 for unexpected cold weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the site's preparations and evaluated the implementation of Operations Administrative Procedure (OAP)-109.1, "Guidelines for Severe Weather." The inspectors walked down accessible areas of risk-significant equipment, including, but not limited to, level instrumentation associated with the refueling water storage tank and condensate storage tank, to assess whether the equipment was adequately protected from cold weather conditions. The inspectors evaluated the status of freeze protection equipment and alarms to verify there were no degradations which could challenge the capability of equipment important to plant operation or safety. Also, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) database to verify that freeze protection problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the CAP, and appropriately resolved.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted three partial equipment alignment walkdowns (listed below) to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other train or system inoperable or out-of-service (OOS). Correct alignment and operating conditions were determined from the applicable portions of drawings, system operating procedures (SOPs), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and technical specifications (TS). The inspections included review of outstanding maintenance work requests (MWRs) and related Condition Evaluation Reports (CERs) to verify that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could impact mitigating system availability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- “A” and “B” service water (SW) pumps while the “C” SW pump was OOS for scheduled maintenance;
- “A” emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the “B” EDG was OOS for scheduled quarterly preventive maintenance; and,
- “A” and “B” motor driven emergency feedwater (MDEFW) pumps while the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump (TDEFW) was OOS for scheduled maintenance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed recent CERs, MWRs, and impairments associated with the fire suppression system. The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to determine whether they supported the operability and availability of the fire protection system. The inspectors assessed the material condition of the active and passive fire protection systems and features and observed the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The inspectors conducted routine inspections of the following nine areas (respective fire zones also noted):

- “A” and “B” EDG rooms (fire zones DG-1.1/1.2 and DG-2.1/2.2);
- “A” and “B” heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) chilled water pump rooms (fire zones IB-7.2, IB-9, and IB-23.1);
- “A” and “B” component cooling water pumps/heat exchangers and service water booster pump room (fire zones IB-25.1.1, IB-1.2, IB-1.3, and IB-1.5);
- Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump room (fire zone IB-25.2);
- SW pump house (fire zones SWPH-1, SWPH-3, and SWPH-5.1/5.2);
- “A” and “B” residual heat removal and reactor building spray pump rooms (fire zones AB-1);
- Control Room (fire zone CB-17.1);
- 1DA switchgear room (fire zone IB-20); and,
- “A,” “B,” and “C” charging pump rooms (fire zones AB-1.5, AB-1.6, and AB-1.7).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

On March 6, 2006, the inspectors observed performance of senior reactor operators and reactor operators on the plant simulator during licensed operator requalification training.

The training scenario (LOR-SA-006) involved a dropped control rod, high main generator turbine vibration, and a control rod ejection loss-of-coolant accident. The inspectors verified that training included risk-significant operator actions and implementation of emergency classification and the emergency plan. The inspectors assessed overall crew performance, communications, oversight of supervision, and the evaluators' critique. The inspectors verified that any training issues were appropriately captured in the licensee's CAP.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated two equipment issues described in the CERs listed below to verify the licensee's effectiveness of the corresponding preventive or corrective maintenance associated with structures, systems or components (SSCs). The inspectors reviewed maintenance rule (MR) implementation to verify that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the MR program. Selected SSCs were reviewed to verify proper categorization and classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors examined (a)(1) corrective action plans to determine if the licensee was identifying issues related to the MR at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were established and effective. The inspectors' review also evaluated if maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFF) or other MR findings existed that the licensee had not identified. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's controlling procedures, i.e., engineering services procedure (ES)-514, "Maintenance Rule Implementation," and the Virgil C. Summer "Important To Maintenance Rule System Function and Performance Criteria Analysis" to verify consistency with the MR requirements.

- CER 0-C-05-1341, Purge oil level switch for "B" HVAC chiller not functioning properly; and,
- CER 0-C-05-4573, Delta-flux for power range nuclear instrument N-43 failed to operate properly due to degraded potentiometer.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Maintenance Rule Periodic Evaluation (Triennial)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Maintenance Rule periodic assessments, "Maintenance Rule Fifth Periodic Assessment [Cycle 14, June 3, 2002 - November 26, 2003, dated 4/19/05]" and "Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment [Cycle 15, November 26, 2003 - June 1, 2005, dated 1/9/06]" while on-site the week of January 9, 2006. These reports were issued to satisfy paragraph (a)(3) of 10 CFR 50.65, and covered two 18-month periods for the single unit. The inspection was to determine the effectiveness of the assessments, that they were issued in accordance with the time requirement of the MR, and included evaluation of: balancing reliability and unavailability, (a)(1) activities, (a)(2) activities, and use of industry operating experience. To verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors reviewed selected MR activities covered by the assessment periods for the following MR a(1) status component and attendant systems: Emergency Feedwater, Building Services, Reactor Coolant, Air Handling, and Instrument Air. Specific procedures and documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed selected plant work order data, assessments, modifications, and the site guidance implementing procedures; discussed and reviewed relevant corrective action reports, reviewed generic operations event data, attendant MR related meeting minutes, and probabilistic risk reports; and discussed issues with system engineers. Operational event information was evaluated by the inspectors in its use in MR functions. The inspectors selected work orders and other corrective action documents on systems recently removed from 10 CFR 50.65 a(1) status and those in a(2) status for the assessment periods to investigate the justification for their status (service water, control building chillers, and component cooling). The inspectors selected MR valves found in the plant's emergency operating procedures (EOPs) to verify functional testing. The inspectors toured and inspected repaired components. The documents were compared to the site's MR program criteria, the MR a(1) evaluations, and MR related data bases.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessments of the risk impacts of removing from service those components associated with planned and emergent work items. The inspectors evaluated the six selected work activities listed below for: (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) the management of risk; (3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work

activities; and (4) that emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's work prioritization and risk characterization to determine, as appropriate, whether necessary steps were properly planned, controlled, and executed for the planned and emergent work activities listed below:

- Work Week 2006-4, risk assessment for "C" SW pump and component cooling water system non-essential cross connect valves (XVB-9525A and XVB-9687A) OOS for scheduled maintenance;
- Work Week 2006-5, risk assessment for switchyard thermography data collection, "B" charging pump OOS for scheduled maintenance, and emergent troubleshooting to repair intermittent steamline low pressure bistable actuation;
- Work Week 2006-6, risk assessment for "B" MDEFW pump, "B" SW pump, and main steam to "A" moisture separator steam pressure transmitter OOS for scheduled maintenance;
- Risk assessment for emergent work to replace "B" solid state protection system isolation and universal logic circuit cards due to degraded condition;
- Work Week 2006-11, risk assessment for "A" EDG OOS for scheduled quarterly maintenance and emergency safeguards transformer XTF-005 work; and,
- Work Week 2006-13, risk assessment for "B" EDG OOS for scheduled quarterly preventive maintenance and testing.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations affecting risk significant mitigating systems to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered; (4) where compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) the impact on TS limiting conditions for operations and the risk significance in accordance with the Significance Determination Process (SDP). Also, the inspectors verified that the operability evaluations were performed in accordance with station administrative procedure (SAP)-999, "Corrective Action Program."

- CER 0-C-06-0181, "A" EDG rocker arm lube oil sump level found low;
- CER 0-C-06-0406, steamline pressure low annunciation and steamline pressure channel III loop "B" bistable actuation;
- CER 0-C-06-0237, TDEFW discharge flow control valve (1FV-3556) indication of mid-position from Hagen controller; and,

- CER 0-C-06-0725, Excessive oil leakage from TDEFW turbine inboard bearing while operating.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated an engineering change request (ECR) package for a modification in the **Barrier Integrity** cornerstone area to evaluate the modification for adverse effects on system availability, reliability, and functional capability. The modification and the associated attributes reviewed is as follows:

ECR 50459, "Replacement of Main Plant Vent Atmospheric Radiation Monitor Controls (RMA-13) and Reactor Building Purge Exhaust Atmospheric Radiation Monitor Controls (RMA-14)":

- Plant Document Updating
- Post-Modification Testing
- Installation Records
- Materials / Replacement Components

For the selected modification package, the inspectors observed the as-built configuration. Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modification design and implementation packages, work orders, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the FSAR, supporting analyses, technical specifications, and design basis information. The inspectors witnessed aspects of the post-modification testing to verify adequate testing of the new radiation monitors was implemented following installation. The inspectors also reviewed selected CERs associated with the modification to confirm that problems encountered with the implementation of the modification were entered into the CAP.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the five maintenance activities listed below, the inspectors reviewed the associated post-maintenance testing (PMT) procedures and witnessed either the testing and/or reviewed test records to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) test acceptance criteria were clear and

adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors verified that these activities were performed in accordance with general test procedure (GTP)-214, "Post Maintenance Testing Guideline."

- PMT for loop "B" steam generator steamline pressure instrument 1PT00485 emergent repair maintenance (MWR 0601372);
- PMT for "B" MDEFW pump and associated room cooling fan following scheduled preventive maintenance (MWRs 0523822 and 0526179);
- PMT for motor operated valve breaker testing on "B" SW screen wash isolation valve (MWR 0523811);
- PMT for TDEFW pump following scheduled preventive maintenance (MWRs 0524222, 0524260, 06014550, and 0601570); and,
- PMT for "B" EDG following scheduled quarterly preventive maintenance activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the six surveillance tests listed below to verify that TS surveillance requirements were followed and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified to ensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function. The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met.

In-Service Tests:

- Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-223.002A, "Service Water Pump Test" (for "B" SW pump)

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Tests:

- STP-114.002, "Operational Leakage Test"

Other Surveillance Tests:

- STP-105.016A, "Train A Charging Pump and Diesel Generator Slave Relay Test;"
- STP-125.002A, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test;"
- STP-345.074, "Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test - Train B;" and,
- Preventative Test Procedure (PTP)-102.001, "Main Turbine Tests."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modificationsa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two plant equipment changes that were considered temporary modifications. The inspectors evaluated the change documents and the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screenings against the system design basis documentation and FSAR to verify that the changes did not adversely affect the safety function of important safety systems. In addition, the inspectors verified that the changes were developed and implemented in accordance with licensee procedures SAP-148, "Temporary Bypass, Jumper, and Lifted Lead Control," and SAP-300, "Conduct of Maintenance."

- Bypass Authorization Request (BAR) 06-01, bypass annunciator alarm of failed containment fire protection heat detector ITE65040; and,
- Removal and Restoration 060007, Loosening diesel generator building link seals around "A" SW pipe header to allow groundwater drainage.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6 Drill Evaluationa. Inspection Scope

On March 6, 2006, the inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of a licensee operator requalification simulator drill that involved a dropped control rod, high main generator turbine vibration, and a control rod ejection loss of coolant accident (LOR-SA-006). The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage and verified the licensee was properly classifying emergency events and making the required notifications and protective action recommendations in accordance with emergency plan procedures

(EPP)-001, "Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan," EPP-001.2, "Alert," EPP-001.3, "Site Area Emergency," and EPP-002, "Communication and Notification." The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's conduct of the drill and critique performance and verified that drill performance issues were captured by the licensee in their CAP.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CERs, or accessing the licensee's computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CER that was initiated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one issue in detail to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions for important safety issues documented in CER 0-C-05-4111 and CER 0-C-05-4167. These CERs were associated with various equipment degradations associated with the feedwater heater drain system (i.e., solenoid valves, air operated valve positioners/actuators/regulators, and instrument air tubing) which, on one occasion, resulted in the need to downpower the unit in November 2005. The inspectors assessed whether the licensee adequately addressed all of the applicable causal factors and identified effective corrective actions. Also, the inspectors verified the issue was processed in accordance with SAP-999, "Corrective Action Program."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jeff Archie and other members of the licensee staff on April 11, 2006. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

.2 Annual Assessment Meeting Summary

On March 31, 2006, the NRC Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 5 met with South Carolina Electric and Gas Company to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station annual assessment of safety performance for the period of January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005. The major topics addressed were the NRC's assessment program and the results of the Virgil C. Summer assessment. Attendees included Virgil C. Summer site management, members of site staff, and a representative of Santee Cooper.

This meeting was open to the public. The presentation material used for the discussion is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML060970298. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

J. Archie, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services
M. Browne, Manager, Quality Systems
A. Cribb, Acting Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
M. Findlay, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
M. Fowlkes, General Manager, Engineering Services
D. Gatlin, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
D. Lavigne, General Manager, Organizational Effectiveness Training
G. Lippard, Manager, Operations
G. Moffit, Manager, Nuclear Operations Training
P. Mothena, Acting Manager, Health Physics and Safety Services
J. Nesbitt, Manager, Materials and Procurement
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R. Stokes, Manager, Design Engineering
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R. Sweet, Acting Manager, Nuclear Licensing
A. Torres, Manager, Planning / Scheduling and Project Management
S. Zarandi, Manager, Maintenance Services

NRC

K. Landis, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None.

Closed

None.

Discussed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

SOP-117, "Service Water System"
SOP-211, "Emergency Feedwater System"
SOP-306, "Emergency Diesel Generator"

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

ES-437, Inspections for Maintenance Rule - Structures, Revision 1
ES-514, Maintenance Rule Program Implementation, Revision 3
SAP-157, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 0
EOP-2.3, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation, Revision 10
EOP-15.0, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 13
EOP-17.1, Response to Reactor Building Flooding, Revision 5

Audits or Self Assessments

Self Assessment Report SA05-PS-03, Assessment of Maintenance Rule Activities During Cycle 15

Non-Conformance Reports (NCN)

03-3436, "C" RCP injection line weld
04-0879, "C" RCP injection line weld

Maintenance Rule Meeting Minutes

File No. CGSS-05-0095, 8/02/05
File No. CGSS-05-0050, 4/26/05

Work Orders

0501808, VU chiller C functional test
0503531, VU chiller A functional test
0507324, VU chiller B functional test
0418029, ECR-50469, Install relief valve XVR19657-CC (TYPICAL)
0510779, Investigate and repair "C" SW pump lower bearing flow (TYPICAL)

Condition Evaluation Reports (CERs)

05-0856, AH fan XFN0030B failed to start during test
04-3702, AH fan XFN0030B failed to start during test
03-2648, AH and VL temperature monitoring
98-1047, ground water corrosion on BS guard pipes
03-2872, IA compressor bypass and suction valves
03-4348, EF TD governor valve linkage
06-0031, Structural Inspections

LIST OF ACRONYMS

BAR	Bypass Authorization Request
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CER	Condition Evaluation Report
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
ECR	Engineering Change Request
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedure
EPP	Emergency Plan Procedure
ES	Engineering Services Procedure
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
GTP	General Test Procedure
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
MDEFW	Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater
MPFF	Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures
MR	Maintenance Rule
MWR	Maintenance Work Request
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OAP	Operations Administrative Procedure
OOS	Out-of-Service
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
PTP	Preventive Test Procedure
ROP	Reactor Oversight Process
RTP	Rated Thermal Power
SAP	Station Administrative Procedure
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SOP	System Operating Procedure
SSC	Structures, Systems, or Components
STP	Surveillance Test Procedure
SW	Service Water
TDEFW	Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater
TI	Temporary Instruction
TS	Technical Specification