



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

July 27, 2001

Carolina Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. John W. Moyer
Vice President
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Unit 2
3851 West Entrance Road
Hartsville, SC 29550

**SUBJECT: H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT- NRC INSPECTION REPORT
50-261/01-03, 72-03/01-01**

Dear Mr. Moyer:

On June 30, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Robinson facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on June 29, 2001, with Mr. T. Walt and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green). This issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a non-cited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this non-cited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulator Commission; ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the H. B. Robinson facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Public Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-261, 72-03
License No.: NPF-23, SNM-2502

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-261/01-03, 72-03/01-01

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-261, 72-03
License No: NPF-23, SNM 2502

Report No: 50-261/01-03, 72-03/01-01

Licensee: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2

Location: 3581 West Entrance Road
Hartsville, SC 29550

Dates: April 1, 2001 - June 30, 2001

Inspectors: B. Desai, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Hutto, Resident Inspector
R. Carrion, Health Physicist (Section 2OS1)
D. Holman, Physical Security Inspector (Sections 3PP1, 3PP2,
4OA1, 4OA3 and 4OA5)
A. Nielsen, Health Physicist (Section 2PS2)
F. Wright, Senior Health Physicist (Sections 2OS1, 2OS2, 4OA1,
4OA5, and 4OA7)
S. Vias, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)

Approved by: B. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000261-01-03, on 04/01 - 06/30/2001, Carolina Power & Light Company, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2. Refueling and Outage Activities.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a senior health physicist, two health physicists, a physical security inspector and a senior reactor inspector. The inspectors identified one green finding which is a non-cited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green. The inspectors identified a Non-cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1. for failure to provide adequate procedures to maintain the reactor vessel head vented during refueling preparations.

This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the pressurizer and loops remained vented and the decrease in vessel level was less than two feet (Section 1R20).

B. Licensee Identified Findings

A violation of very low significance was identified by the licensee and has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. This violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The unit was at approximately 73 percent power, coasting down for refueling outage (RFO)-20 at the start of the report period. On April 7, the unit was taken off-line for RFO-20 and was placed back on-line following the outage on May 12. The unit operated at full power until June 16, when power was reduced to 80 percent to perform repairs on a heater drain pump packing seal plug. The unit was returned to full power operations on June 17.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed plant documents including plan-of-the-week, system descriptions (SD), Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), and piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) to determine correct system lineup. The inspectors performed several partial system walkdowns and one complete system walkdown to verify proper equipment alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could impact the safety function of the system or could contribute to an initiation of a plant transient.

Partial System walkdowns included:

- Electrical Power Lineup to Safety Related 480V Buses E-1 and E-2 while Unit Auxiliary Transformer Out of Service
- SD-016, 480/120 VAC Electrical System, Revision 0
- Electrical Alignment to B Safety Injection Pump (swing pump normally racked out)
- P&ID number 5379-1082, Revision 41
- A and B Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) During Switchyard work (increase station blackout risk)
- P&ID number G-190204-A, Revision 28

Complete System walkdown included:

- Containment walkdown prior to unit startup. The inspectors emphasis during this walkdown was on evaluating the general condition of the containment building; inspecting for loose materials in containment that could prevent the emergency sump from performing its function; and walkdowns of the pressurizer area for integrity of instrument lines and visual confirmation of the absence of any leaks, of the reactor vessel head, the operating containment coolers, and the steam

generator areas for absence of any leaks. The following documents were reviewed by the inspectors:

- SD-59, "Pressurizer," Revision 3
- SD-35, "Containment and Support," Revision 35
- PLP-006, "Containment Vessel Inspection Closeout," Revision 50

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Within the areas identified below, the inspectors observed the following to determine whether any conditions adversely affected fire protection defense-in-depth features:

- transient combustible materials;
- any welding or cutting being performed in the area;
- the physical condition of the fire detection devices;
- the physical condition of the automatic suppression system (where used);
- the availability and general condition of portable fire extinguishers;
- the physical condition of manual suppression systems, including fire hoses;
- the material condition of electrical raceway fire barrier systems;
- the material condition of the fire doors;
- the condition of ventilation fire dampers;
- the physical condition of seals in accessible electrical and piping penetrations;
- the adequacy of compensatory measures, where degraded features were identified.

The inspected areas included the following:

- EDG A and B rooms
- 4.16KV switchgear room
- Safety injection pump room
- Turbine deck
- Component cooling water (CCW) pump room
- Charging pump room
- E-1 and E-2 480V emergency bus room

The inspectors also responded to a small fire that occurred in the area of the main turbine on May 14. The fire was extinguished by the licensee fire brigade with a halon fire extinguisher within ten minutes. The fire was caused by turbine lube oil that had soaked into turbine lagging material during the refueling outage. This fire started during plant startup activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

IR06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis of the affects of containment flooding as described in UFSAR sections 2.4, 4.4.1, and 3.9. Containment walkdowns were conducted during the refueling outage to determine the affects of a leaking refueling cavity seal. The inspectors verified that the leak from the cavity seal was within the capacity of the re-circulation pump to return the water to the refueling cavity and did not pose a flooding concern inside containment during the refueling outage.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated inservice inspection (ISI) activities during the Unit 1 refueling outage to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI ISI program. This was the second and final outage of the third period of the third ten-year interval. The inspectors reviewed procedures, documents, and selected ISI records and observed the ISI work activities listed below:

- Inservice Inspection Report for Robinson Nuclear Station (Unit 2) RO#19, 12/15/99
- CPL Letter, 2/1/99, Response to Request for additional information GL 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations"
- Nuclear Assessment Section Report R-ES-01-01, 3/16/01, "Inservice Inspection / Inservice Testing / Station Blackout"
- Steam Generator Degradation Assessment RFO-20 Pre-Outage Planning Report, 01-TR-FSW-005, 3/20/01
- EST-083, R/19, Inservice Inspection Pressure Testing of Reactor Coolant System (Refueling Shutdown Interval)
- Eddy Current Examination Plan for Steam Generator Tubing at HB Robinson, R/1
- HBR-UT-86-1 (SP-1455), 1/8/01, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic and Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds
- NDEP-0612, R/15, VT-2 Visual Examination of Nuclear Plant Components
- NDEP-0613, R/16, VT-3 Visual Examination of Nuclear Plant Components

- NDEP-0425, R/3, Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for Wrought Austenitic Piping (PDI)
- HBR-PT-86-1 (SP-1453), 1/8/01, Liquid Penetration Examination Solvent Removable Dye Techniques
- NDEP-0201, R/23, Liquid Penetrant Examination
- EGR-FGD-081, R/1, Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Procedure Acceptance Criteria
- HBR-VT-86-3, R/1, Visual Examination for Mechanical and Structural Condition of Components and their Supports
- PT 3-SI-14 (239/12) 3" SS C-F-1
- UT 3-SI-14 (239/12) 3" SS C-5-21
- PT 3-SI-14 (239/13) 3" SS C-F-1
- UT 3-SI-14 (239/13) 3" SS C-5-21
- PT 3-SI-14 (239/14) 3" SS C-F-1
- UT 3-SI-14 (239/14) 3" SS C-5-21
- PT 8-SI-29 (231/39) 8" SS C-F-3 (augmented)
- VT 143/J-WS (CVCS) ISO HBR2-10618 Sht 55, R4
Welded Anchor F3.10-50
- VT 142/E (SI) ISO HBR2-10618 Sht 54
Closed Box Restraint F3.10-50
- VT 144/C-AWS (RC) ISO HBR2-10618 Sht 56
RCP A Pump Support F2.10-40
- RT AFW70-W1 4" CS NDEP 107 R/3
- RT AFW70-W2 4" CS NDEP 107 R/3

The above observations, records, qualification and certification records for examiners, and calibration records for equipment used during these activities were evaluated for compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1986 Edition, with no Addenda and licensee procedure, NDEP -A, "Nuclear NDE Procedures and Personnel Process," Revision 3, and for proper disposition of indications or defects, if present. The inspector also reviewed Condition Reports (CRs) with respect to ISI/NDE issues to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting ISI/NDE issues. Special visual examinations for boron deposits were conducted of the entire reactor vessel head and the main loop connections to the reactor vessel, due to recent problems reported at other reactors. Special attention and discussions were held with regards to the eddy current testing techniques and analysis of steam generator low row u-bend tubes due to problems reported at other facilities. The inspector observed acquisition and analysis of the 3rd 10-yr reactor vessel ISI and verified compliance to the "Examination Plan for Automated Nondestructive Examination of the Reactor Pressure Vessel and Associated Piping Welds at HB Robinson Nuclear Plant, Examination Plan IST, Project 00-0133," December 2000.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalificationa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator requalification training activities which included simulator scenarios. The training scenarios involved a feedline rupture and subsequent anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance during the scenarios by verifying that the crew correctly diagnosed abnormal conditions and that the appropriate emergency operating procedures (EOP) and abnormal operating procedures (AOP) were used. The inspectors verified that effective command and control of the crew was demonstrated. The inspectors witnessed the post training critique to determine if the training objectives were met.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a simulator scenario for a licensed operator continuing training class where the simulator cellular phone was used to contact the in-plant auxiliary operator. The licensee initiated AR-43155, "Simulator Phone Connected to Plant Phone System", to determine the root cause of the event. Immediate corrective actions included removal of the cellular phone from the simulator and verification that other means of communication from the simulator did not inadvertently connect to the in-plant communication systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementationa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's maintenance efforts by evaluating several conditions that occurred during the inspection period. The inspection determined the risk significance of the condition, licensee implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to characterization of failures, the appropriateness of the associated a(1) or a(2) classification as well as the associated performance criteria, and the utilization of the corrective action program. The specific conditions evaluated by the inspectors included:

- Isolation valve seal water check valve IVSW - 71 in-service testing failure
- Steam generator safety valve SV1-1C Functional Failure
- Boric acid transfer pump failure during shutdown
- Radiation monitors R-11,R-12 multiple failures

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessments for the following plant configurations. The inspectors verified that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) were being implemented by the licensee during scheduled and emergent maintenance activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately evaluated plant risk in accordance with Operations Management Manual OMM-048, "Work Coordination and Safety Assessment," Revision 11, during the scheduling of planned and emergent work items. The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of licensee actions to plan and control scheduled work to minimize overall plant risk while the emergent work items were being addressed. The inspectors reviewed the applicable plant risk profiles, work week schedules, and maintenance work requests associated with the following out of service equipment.

- Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) canopy seal weld repair and reactor vessel head inspection. This emerging issue was reviewed by the inspectors and it involved a weld repair of the B-10 CRDM canopy seal to stop a reactor coolant system leak that was identified during the outage.
- Service water booster pump out-of-service with ongoing switchyard work. This combination of activities was reviewed by the inspectors to assure that plant risk was managed due to the increase in the station blackout initiator risk associated with the switchyard activities.
- A residual heat removal (RHR) pump testing with C charging pump unavailable. The inspectors assured that the licensee had appropriately considered the risk consequences of removing the A RHR pump for a scheduled surveillance with the unavailability of the C charging pump due to suction stabilizer maintenance.
- B deepwell pump out-of-service during switchyard maintenance. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessment for the activities involving the switchyard work (station blackout risk) and the B deepwell pump which provides a backup source of water to the auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW) pumps.
- Unavailability of all three deepwell pumps. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment as well as licensee management of the emergent maintenance activity associated with the isolation of all three deepwell pumps to make repairs to valve DW-19.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures, operator logs, plant computer data, and associated plant computer printouts to determine if operator response was in accordance with the response required by the procedures and training for the following non-routine evolution and event.

- AOP-014, "Loss of CCW Inventory," as a result of stuck open relief valve CC-715
- GP-005, "Power Operation," Section 8.4, "Electrical Startup and Loading of Generator," Revision 68, during plant startup from the refueling outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations contained in the following AR affecting mitigating systems and barrier integrity. The inspectors verified that operability was properly justified and the component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.

- AR 30516, Pressurizer PORV Degraded Cable

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a cumulative review of existing operator workarounds to determine any change from the previous inspection period. The review also considered the effect of the workarounds on the operators ability to implement AOPs or EOPs. Additionally, the inspectors periodically reviewed ARs and held discussions with operators to determine if any conditions existed that should have been identified by the licensee as operator workarounds. Three existing workarounds listed below were reviewed and discussed with several operators for their understanding of the workarounds impact on the plant.

- Vent header must be pumped down. Waste gas compressors cannot be left in auto (97-008)
- Cylinder heating steam bypasses are used to maintain pressure. MS-72 may have to be closed after a trip to minimize cooldown (99-004)
- Frequent monitoring of gland steam pressure and adjustments of GS-36 during power changes (00-003)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Engineering Service Request, (ESR) 00-00027, Improve IB Power Source to Allow Replacement of RPS Relays, Revision 15, and verified that the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the safety related instrument buses were maintained and not degraded as a result of the modification. The inspectors reviewed the associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, and verified that the modification implementation did not result in risk significant configurations that would place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors also verified that during the implementation, in-plant EOP and AOP actions, and key safety functions were not affected.

The inspectors reviewed ESR 01-00063, "CRDM Head Adapter Repair," Revision 0, that was implemented to repair a seal weld leak on the lower canopy seal for the number 68 full length control rod drive mechanism located at grid location B-10. The inspectors reviewed the ESR package and observed portions of the repair activity. The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and discussed the repair methodology for this non-pressure boundary leak with the licensee.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the following post maintenance tests (PMT) and/or reviewed the test data to determine that the tests were adequate for the scope of maintenance and that the acceptance criteria and test results demonstrated the operational readiness of the systems structures and components (SSCs) in accordance with plant TS. The activities were selected based on a risk assessment associated with the scheduled or emergent activity.

- OST 302-1 "Service Water System Component Test Train 'A' (Quarterly)," Revision 34
- OST 201-2 "MDAFW System Component Test Train 'B'," Revision 13
- OST 14 "LLRT of Personnel Air Lock Door Seals (Within Three Days of Entry when CV Integrity is Required)," Revision 7
- OST 910 "Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator (Monthly)," Revision 25
- OST 702 "ISI Secondary Side Valve Test (Cold Shutdown (Mode 5 or 6) Greater Than 48 Hours, Unless Previously Completed Within Ninety Days)," Revision 34
- OST 202 "Steam Driven AFW System Component Test," Revision 50

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

.1 Planned Refueling Outage Inspections

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's outage activities to ensure that the licensee considered risk in developing outage schedules; adhered to administrative risk reduction methodologies to control plant configuration; developed mitigation strategies for potential losses of key safety functions; and adhered to operating license and TS requirements for ensuring defense-in-depth. The following specific areas were inspected:

Review of RFO 20 Plan. Prior to the outage, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's outage risk assessment that included the equipment out-of-service (EOPS) analysis during shutdown, verified that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's outage risk control plan as implemented through procedure OMP-003, "Shutdown Safety Function Guidelines," Revision 14, and verified that the licensee delineated shutdown safety function requirements for each plant configuration defined in the plan. The inspectors also confirmed through review of various plant operating manual procedures that the licensee had developed mitigation/response strategies for potential losses of the key safety functions.

Monitoring of Shutdown Activities. The inspectors verified that TS cooldown requirements were met as implemented through plant procedure GP-007, "Plant Cooldown from Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown," Revision 56.

Outage Configuration Management. The inspectors verified that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk control plan for key safety functions and applicable TS when risk significant equipment was removed from service. The inspectors verified that configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected conditions were controlled in accordance with the shutdown safety function guidelines. The inspectors routinely verified that the shutdown safety function requirements were posted in the control room and that operators were cognizant of plant configuration.

Clearance Activities. The inspectors verified that clearance tags were properly hung and that associated equipment was appropriately configured to support clearance functions for the following clearances:

- 00008982, R220-5175A 480V Bus E1
- 00009003, R220-C2060A Letdown Inside Containment

Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation. The inspectors verified that the reactor vessel level instruments and standpipe indications were installed and configured to provide accurate indication and that the instruments were calibrated appropriately in accordance with GP-008, "Draining the Reactor Coolant System," Revision, 52.

Electrical Power. The inspectors verified that the status and configuration of electrical systems met TS requirements and the licensee's shutdown safety function status requirements. The inspectors verified that transformer maintenance was controlled commensurate with safety and was consistent with the licensee's outage risk control plan assumptions.

RHR System Monitoring. The inspectors routinely observed RHR parameters throughout the outage to verify that the system was properly functioning.

Spent Fuel Pool Operation. The inspectors verified that outage work did not impact the ability of the operations staff to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system during and after core offload.

Inventory Control. The inspectors verified that flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition were consistent and maintained in accordance with OMP-003. The inspectors verified that reactor vessel inventory controls were adequate to prevent inventory loss.

Reactivity Control. The inspectors verified that proper control of reactivity was maintained in accordance with TS. Activities which could cause potential unexpected reactivity changes were identified in OMP-003 and were verified to have proper controls. Additionally, the inspectors verified reactivity issues were addressed prior to and during recycling of water from the containment sump to the refueling cavity as a result of minor cavity seal leakage.

Refueling Activities. The inspectors verified that fuel handling operations were performed in accordance with TS and the licensee's fuel handling/management procedures. The inspectors verified through visual observation selected fuel assemblies were in the correct position and orientation during core reload. The inspectors verified that fuel assemblies were tracked from core offload through core reload.

Monitoring of Heatup and Startup Activities. The inspectors verified that TS, license conditions, commitments, and administrative prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations. The inspectors reviewed RCS leak rates at normal operating temperature and pressure and verified that containment integrity was set in accordance with OP-923, "Containment Integrity," Revision 28. The inspectors performed a walkdown of containment prior to startup to verify that debris had not been left which could affect containment sump performance. The inspectors observed reactor startup and initial criticality and portions of physics acceptance testing in accordance with EST-050, "Refueling Startup Procedure," Revision 33, and EST-105, "Post-Refueling Power Escalation Procedure," Revision 16.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Isolation of Reactor Vessel Head Vent Path.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee configuration management control related to an inadvertent closure of a reactor vessel head vent valve during reactor coolant system(RCS) drain-down activities. At the time of the event, the unit was in mode 5 with RHR in service . The reactor vessel level was being controlled at -4 to -10 inches (below the lip of the vessel) as indicated on the two standpipe level indications. The inspectors reviewed AR-30657 that was initiated by the licensee as a result of this event.

b. Findings

(Green) The inspectors found that the licensee's procedures for control of RCS inventory during refueling preparations were not adequate in maintaining the reactor vessel head vented such that nitrogen accumulated in the vessel head, resulting in the inadvertent drain-down by operators of 16 inches of reactor vessel inventory. This finding was also determined to be a non-cited violation of Robinson TS 5.4, "Procedures."

During head removal preparations on April 10, the reactor vessel head vent path was isolated by maintenance personnel when manual head vent valve RC-500 was closed. The work control center (WCC) senior reactor operator (SRO) authorized the refueling team to operate RC-500, if needed, for removal of a head vent spool piece. This was not communicated to operations personnel in the control room. There was no procedural guidance in place to control the configuration of RC-500 and there were no instructions in the maintenance work package to operate the valve. The valve was left in the closed position by the maintenance personnel.

On April 11, during steam generator (SG) drain-down and reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown activities, nitrogen accumulated in the unvented reactor vessel head. This caused the RCS standpipe level indication to increase while actual vessel level decreased. The operations crew initially interpreted this level increase to RCS heatup, and water draining from the SG U-tubes. The operators maintained the indicated level in their control band of -4 to -10 inches by intermittently diverting letdown to the chemical volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank (HUT). Approximately 1100 gallons of RCS coolant was diverted into the HUT over a period of 24 hours. Subsequently, an oncoming control room shift supervisor (CRSS) questioned the reason for the RCS letdown and diversions as well as the prior crew's interpretation of the increased standpipe level indications. An investigation identified that RC-500 was closed.

The reactor vessel head vent path was restored by opening RC-500 on April 12, 33 hours after the valve was initially shut. After the venting it was determined that the standpipe was indicating 16 inches higher than the actual vessel level. Approximately

1100 gallons of water was added to the RCS to restore level in the control band. The inspectors verified that throughout this event, the RHR system continued to operate and the RCS temperature remained unchanged

The inspectors reviewed the procedure controlling drain-down activities, GP-008, "Draining the Reactor Coolant System," Revision 52, and found that it contained precautions for maintaining the vessel head vented to prevent nitrogen bubble formation during passive seal injection but no specific instructions for controlling the head vent valve RC-500. The inspectors also reviewed GP-010, "Refueling," Revision 48, and found no instructions for controlling the configuration of RC-500.

The inspectors found that the lack of procedural guidance for controlling RC-500 during head removal activities, inadequate communications between the WCC and the control room, and the operators' initial failure to consider procedural precautionary statements for nitrogen bubble formation in the head during cooldown, resulted in a loss of 16 inches of RCS inventory. This loss of RCS inventory control had a credible impact on safety as RCS inventory control represents one of the safety functions important during shutdown operations. However, the finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because the pressurizer and coolant loops remained vented during the period that RC-500 was shut. Had the unvented head condition gone undetected indefinitely, the nitrogen would have ultimately vented through the pressurizer once RCS level reached the top of the hot leg. Once vented, the nitrogen accumulation in the vessel head would have stopped and restored accurate level in the standpipe.

The inspectors concluded that licensee procedures for controlling RCS inventory during refueling operations were inadequate. Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, including procedures for draining the reactor vessel and removal of the reactor vessel head.

Contrary to the above, procedures GP-008 and GP-010 were inadequate in controlling reactor vessel head removal activities. Specifically, configuration of vessel head vent valve RC-500 was not addressed in either of the two refueling and draindown procedures, allowing the inadvertent closure of valve RC-500. This resulted in an inaccurate vessel level indication and a consequent unnecessary draindown. This violation of TS 5.4.1. is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 50-261/01-03-01: Inadequate Procedures for Maintaining Reactor Vessel Head Vented During Refueling Preparations. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program under action request AR 30657 as a significant adverse condition report.

.3 Component Cooling Water Relief Valve Lifting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed an event involving the lifting of CCW relief valve CC-715 and the resulting draindown of the CCW system. At the time of the event, the RCS was in

mode 5 with RHR system in service. The inspectors reviewed significant AR-31337 that was initiated by the licensee as a result of this event.

b. Findings

On May 4, CCW relief valve CC-715 lifted during a scheduled surveillance test "OST-946, "Phase 'A' CV Isolation Override Keyswitch Testing (Refueling)" Revision 5. At the time of the surveillance, the CCW surge tank level transmitter LT- 614 was out of service for calibration. With LT-614 out-of-service, there was no CCW surge tank level indication or low- level alarm available. OST-946 included isolation testing of CCW valve CC-739 located at the discharge of the excess letdown heat exchanger. Valve CC-739 closed upon receiving a test containment isolation signal. This caused a momentary pressure transient in the CCW system and caused CCW valve to lift and stay open. Subsequently, CCW inventory was lost through the stuck open valve. With the CCW surge tank level indication out of service for scheduled calibration, the depletion of CCW inventory through the relief valve went un-noticed in the control room. The loss of CCW inventory caused a low pressure in the CCW system resulting in a CCW to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) low flow alarm to annunciate in the control room. Immediately thereafter, a low CCW system pressure alarm was received and the third CCW pump automatically started. The control room entered AOP -014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction", Revision 18, and initiated makeup to the CCW system through the primary water system. Additionally, CCW to the excess letdown heat exchanger was isolated by closing an upstream manual isolation valve. The CCW surge tank level calibration activity was secured and the tank level was returned to its normal level.

A licensee investigation of this event identified maintenance on valve CC-715 had been incorrectly performed. Valve CC-715 had been tested in accordance with EST-112, "Pressure, Safety, and Relief Valve Bench Testing," Revision 13, to satisfy ASME code requirements on April 25. The nominal valve setpoint is 122-130 psig; however, the valve lifted at 119 psig during the bench testing per EST-112. Additionally, some seat leakage was noted. As a result, the relief valve was disassembled and reassembled following corrective maintenance in accordance with maintenance procedure CM-102, "Nozzle Relief Valve Maintenance" Revision 24. For the reassembly, CM-102 specified that the nozzle and guide ring be positioned to negative 105 notches. Instead, the mechanic set the nozzle and guide ring to positive 105 notches. This error impacted the valve's reseal pressure setpoint. The post maintenance test following maintenance consisted of verifying the valve relief setpoint.

Completed licensee corrective actions included repair of the relief and verification of work packages of other relief valves that had the potential for being improperly set. No other instances of similar improper relief valve settings were identified. Additional long term corrective actions are described in the AR which were reviewed by the inspectors and noted to be comprehensive.

The inspectors determined that the lifting of relief CC-715 on May 4, was a precursor to an actual loss of decay heat removal while the unit was in mode 5. RCS as well as spent fuel temperature remained constant and RHR cooling was maintained throughout this event. RCS time to boil was calculated by the licensee to be 45 minutes at the time of

the event. The inspectors determined that in addition to a precursor to an actual loss of decay heat removal event, the loss of CCW inventory had the potential for compromising the mitigation systems following a loss of decay heat removal as the CCW system functions include providing heat removal capability from the RHR heat exchanger, cooling water flow to the RHR pumps, as well as provides cooling water flow to the Safety Injection (SI) pump bearing and the Charging Pump oil cooler. The inspectors utilized the checklist provided in NRC MC 0609, Appendix G and determined that the finding required a phase 2 risk analysis to determine the risk significance of this event. The inspectors have provided the details of this event to the NRC Senior Risk Analyst in the Region. Pending further evaluation by the NRC, this item will be considered as an unresolved item (URI). The URI will be tracked as 50-261/01-03-02, CCW Relief Valve Lifting During Shutdown.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the following surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data to verify that the surveillance test results demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions. Specifically, the inspectors considered the following: pre-conditioning, plant risk, appropriate acceptance criteria, adequate test equipment, procedure adherence, completeness of data, adequate test frequency, and configuration control.

- OST 163 “Safety Injection Test and Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start on Loss of Power and Safety Injection (Refueling),” Revision 36
- OST 908 “Component Cooling System Component Test (Quarterly),” Revision 49
- EST 028 “Main Steam Safety Valve Testing (Refueling Shutdown Interval and as needed after Maintenance),” Revision 23
- EST 145 “Determination of Control Rod Position Using the Movable Incore Detector System,” Revision 2
- OST 401-1 “EDG ‘A’ Slow Speed Start,” Revision 13
- OST 402-2 “EDG ‘B’ Diesel Fuel Oil System Flow Test,” Revision 15

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee’s conduct of the emergency preparedness drill held on June 12, 2001. The drill scenario involved a security threat, fuel handling accident, and anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). The

inspectors observed the scenarios to determine licensee opportunities for event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations, and the timeliness and accuracy associated with these activities. The inspectors observed the post drill critiques and verified the licensee's ability to assess the drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports written as result of the licensee's drill assessment:

- AR 43488 Wall clock use versus ERFIS time during EP drills
- AR 43473 General Emergency classification not made
- AR 43469 Alert declaration not timely

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety [OS]

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

a. Inspection Scope

Licensee activities were evaluated against licensee procedures, Technical Specifications (TS), and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. To evaluate the licensee's control of access to radiologically significant areas, the inspectors performed plant walk downs of radiologically controlled areas; reviewed selected radiation work permits; observed pre-job briefings and work-in-progress; interviewed workers about their knowledge of radiation work practices; and observed postings and control of access to radiologically controlled areas, high radiation areas, and very high radiation areas. Health physics technician job coverage was observed during the walk downs and the inspectors independently measured dose rates at selected locations of the containment and auxiliary buildings. The inspectors reviewed the requirements specified in licensee procedure AP-031, "Administrative Controls For Entry Into Locked and Very High Radiation Areas," Revision 29. Licensee control of locked high radiation areas was reviewed and key control inventories were verified.

The licensee's ability and implementation of processes to identify and resolve radiological control problems were reviewed by the inspectors. Selected health physics-identified items in the licensee's corrective action program were reviewed and evaluated for assignment, closeout timeliness and trending.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The review was conducted to verify the licensee was providing adequate radiation protection controls to maintain occupational radiation workers exposures ALARA as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1101 Radiation Protection Programs and licensee procedures. The inspectors observed RFO ALARA program preparations and their application early in the RFO, and reviewed the licensee's documentation of performance following the outage. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in establishing and implementing occupational radiation exposure goals and estimates.

The inspectors reviewed the following procedures and documents:

- HPP-006, "Radiation Work Permits," Revision 60
- Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 01-0128-02, Reactor head repairs/canopy weld/Inspections, to include all associated work activities;
- RWP 01-0115-03, Reactor coolant pump (RCP) or motor work, to include all associated work activities;
- RWP 01-0113-03; Remove/Install S/G primary manways and diaphragms; Remove/install nozzle covers; Remove/install manipulator; Perform eddy current activities; To include all associated inspections and work activities for support;
- ALARA Work Plans (AWPs) RFO 20, RCP Maintenance, ALARA review number 01-006, Revision 2
- AWP RFO 20, Insulation Activities, Revision 2
- AWP RFO 20, Reactor Headwork/Refueling, ALARA review number 01-015, Revision 2

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety [PS]

2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's facilities, processes, and programs in the areas of radioactive waste processing, waste characterization and classification, shipment preparation, shipping records, and identification and resolution of problems. The objective of this review was to verify that the radioactive material processing and transportation programs complied with the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR 170-189.

To evaluate waste processing, the inspector toured the solid radwaste drumming area and the liquid radwaste filter bed train. The inspectors discussed the operation and status of each system with a health physics technician and the cognizant system

engineer. The inspector also observed the condition of two waste evaporators that had been taken out of service (abandoned in place). The inspector compared the solid and liquid radwaste processing systems with the descriptions in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

Waste characterization and classification was evaluated by review of current and past radio-chemical analyses and discussion with a radwaste technician. Independent laboratory results were compared to in-house gamma spectrometer analyses for the dry active waste and spent resin waste streams. Waste classifications were examined to verify compliance with 10 CFR 61. The licensee's waste sampling program was reviewed to verify sampling frequency was adequate to deal with changing plant conditions.

The inspector observed the shipment of a radioactive pressure vessel surveillance capsule (Type A shipment, shipment # 01-0077). Shipment packaging, labels, and markings were examined to verify compliance with 49 CFR 170-189. Health physics technicians were observed and interviewed during the shipment preparation to evaluate their level of knowledge of shipping regulations. The licensee's program for training shipping technicians as well as the training record of one of the technicians were examined.

The inspector selected five non-excepted shipping records for detailed review against the requirements of 10 CFR 71 and 49 CFR 170-189. These included two shipments of low specific activity (LSA) material, two shipments of spent nuclear fuel, and the shipment of a radioactive pressure vessel surveillance capsule (as mentioned above). The licensee's procedure for creating and maintaining shipping records was reviewed.

The inspector reviewed several ARs in the area of radwaste/shipping and three were chosen for detailed examination. The issues in these reports were discussed with the shipping supervisor and the corrective actions taken were independently verified. The inspector reviewed a licensee self-assessment in the area of spent fuel shipment preparation.

The inspectors reviewed the following records and procedures:

- AR 00017745
- AR 00021616
- AR 00030196
- HPS-NGGC-0001, "Radioactive Material Receipt and Shipping Procedure," Revision 12
- shipment # 01-0024
- shipment # 01-0006
- shipment # 00-0029
- shipment # 00-0024
- shipment # 01-0077
- HPP-255, "Shipping and Receiving the IF-300 Cask," Revision 16
- Self-Assessment # 15334, Spent Fuel Shipping Preparations
- RNP-RA/01-0079, 2000 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
- Radioactive waste sample, tracking # 00R001957

- Radioactive waste sample, tracking # 00R000137
- HPP-256, "Advance Notification for Spent Fuel Shipments," Revision 14
- UFSAR, Chapter 11, "Radioactive Waste Management"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Access Authorization (Behavior Observation Program)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated licensee procedures, Fitness For Duty (FFD) reports, and licensee audits. Additionally, the inspector interviewed five representatives of licensee management and five escort personnel concerning their understanding of the behavior observation portion of the personnel screening and FFD program. In interviewing these personnel, the inspector evaluated the effectiveness of their training and abilities to recognize aberrant behavioral traits, physiological indications of narcotic and alcohol use, and work call-out reporting procedures. Licensee compliance was evaluated against requirements in the H.B. Robinson Physical Security Plan and associated procedures, and 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness For Duty Programs. The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- H.B. Robinson Physical Security Plan (Revision 9)
- Nuclear Generation Group Standard Procedures: SEC-NCCG-2101, 2102, 2140, 2141, 2142
- Fitness for Duty Semi-Annual Reports, January through December, 2000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed access control activities, and search/access control equipment testing. In observing the access control activities, the inspector assessed whether officers could detect contraband prior to it being introduced into the protected area. The protective barriers for the Final Access Control facility were inspected to ensure compliance with protection standards in the Physical Security Plan. Additionally, the inspector assessed whether the officers were conducting access control equipment testing in accordance with regulatory requirements through observation, review of procedures, and log entries. Preventative and post maintenance procedures were

evaluated and observed as performed. Lock, combination, and key control procedures were evaluated, as well as, aspects of the site access authorization program. Licensee compliance was evaluated against requirements in the H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Physical Security Plan and associated procedures, and 10 CFR Part 73.55, Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage, and Part 73.56, Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants. The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Security Procedures: Sp-004, SP-009, SP-010, SP-012
- RNP Security Lesson Plans: LP-310 E-Scan Color X-Ray System
- RNP Security Search Area Equipment Testing Guidance
- Security Rotation Rosters, past 30 days
- Various Outside Auxiliary Operator Logs, TIN R0016
- Operations Management Manual OMM-001-2

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

.1 Barrier Integrity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the RCS leak rate PI data for the month of May 2001 through review of the licensee leak rate measurement procedure, review of actual RCS leak rates, and review of licensee methodology during the performance of the RCS leak rate. The inspectors also corroborated the RCS leak rate data with other parameters including containment sump level and containment radiation monitors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Radiation Safety

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness and Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Radiological Effluent PIs. To verify the PI data, the inspectors reviewed listings of the issues related to the Chemistry and the Radiation Protection programs which were entered into the licensee's corrective action program during the period January 1, 2001 through March 2001. The inspectors verified that

there were no issues in those listings which should have been reported as Occupational or Public Radiation Safety occurrences during the first quarter.

The inspectors also reviewed procedure REG-NGGC-0009, "NRC Performance Indicators," Revision 0. The failure to meet TS requirements for access controls to a locked high radiation area was initially documented in Adverse Condition Investigation Report (A/R No. 00030704) in April 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Safeguards

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated Robinson programs for gathering and submitting data for the Fitness-for-Duty/Personnel Reliability Program, Personnel Screening Program, and Protected Area Equipment PIs. The evaluation included Robinson's tracking and trending reports and security event reports for the Performance Indicator data submitted from the first quarter to the fourth quarter of 2000. Licensee performance was evaluated against requirements in NEI 99-02, Revision 0, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. The inspectors also reviewed the Safeguard Event Logs for 2000-2001.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 Loss of CCW

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the loss of CCW event that occurred on May 4. The details of the inspection are discussed in section 1R20 of this inspection report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) LER 50-261/1999-S01-00, Protected Area Access By Temporary Craft Laborer Based on Falsified Information

This LER was reviewed by the inspectors and verified to be included within the licensee's corrective action program. No findings of significance were identified. This LER is closed.

40A5 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

.1 Radiological Control of ISFSI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed implementation of selected elements of the licensee's radiological control program for the ISFSI. Specifically, to assess whether the requirements of 10 CFR 72.106 were being properly implemented, the inspectors reviewed the most recent quarterly radiation monitoring surveillances. The inspector observed licensee radiation protection staff performing those surveys and reviewed licensee's survey records. The inspector determined the licensee was performing daily surveillances of horizontal storage module air inlets and outlets. The inspector determined the licensee had submitted the 2000 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the ISFSI as required by 10 CFR Part 72.44(d)(3). During the inspection the inspectors determined the licensee was performing quality assurance audits of the ISFSI in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72-176. The inspector reviewed an on-going audit of the ISFSI with one of the licensee's auditors and reviewed the audit checklist and findings.

The following records and licensee procedures were reviewed:

- Operations Surveillance Test 021, Daily Surveillances, Revision 6;
- E&RC Surveillance Test, RST-025, Surveillance of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Revision 9;
- Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, March 01, 2001; and
- Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Technical Specifications for Materials License SNM-2502.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Safeguards Controls of ISFSI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector toured the ISFI, also known as Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) and evaluated licensee compliance with requirements in the H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Physical Security Plan, 10 CFR Part 72.212 Conditions of General License Issued Under 72.210, and 10 CFR Part 73.55, Requirements for Physical Protection of

Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage. The evaluation included questioning various members of the guard force concerning their commitment to monitor maintenance activity at the HSM.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Walt and other members of licensee management on June 29, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented during the exit meeting.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspections should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).

If you deny this non-cited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Robinson facility.

NCV Tracking Number

Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet

NCV 50-261/01-03-03

Licensee TS 5.7 required each high radiation area having radiation intensity greater than 1,000 mRem/hr at 30 centimeters (12 inches) be locked to prevent unauthorized entry into such areas. On April 12, 2001, a radiological survey around the top of the Containment Vessel Sump flapper valves in "B" RCP Bay, detected dose rates of 2,500 mrem/hr. Dose rates increased in the work area following a planned flux thimble guide tube retraction. The licensee failed to meet the TS 5.7 requirements for controlling access to a high radiation area having dose rates greater than 1, 000 mrem /hr. The area had been unlocked or controlled. The licensee documented the event in Significant Adverse Condition Investigation report 30704 (Green).

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED**Licensee**

E. Kapopoulos , Operations Manager
C. Martin, Site Support Services Manager
S. Collins, Radiation Protection Superintendent
E. Caba, Engineering Superintendent
D. Stoddard, Robinson Engineering Support Services Manager
E. Rothe, Maintenance Manager
T. Walt, Director of Site Operations
R. Steele, Outage Management Manager
T. Cleary, Plant General Manager
W. Farmer, Engineering Superintendent
J. Fletcher, Regulatory Affairs Manager
E. Gardner, Interim Training Manager
J. Moyer, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Plant
S. Young, Superintendent Security
D. Crook, Supervisor Access Authorization
H. Gardner, Senior Security Support Analyst
D. Davis, Senior Security Support Analyst

NRC

L. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II
K. Barr, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch, Region II
B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, Region II
W. Rogers, Senior Reactor Analyst, Region II

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSEDOpened

50-261/01-03-02	URI	CCW Relief Valve Lift During Shutdown (Section 1R20).
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Opened and Closed

50-261/01-03-01	NCV	Inadequate Procedures for Maintaining Reactor Vessel Head Vented During Refueling Preparations (Section 1R20).
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50-261/01-03-03	NCV	Failure To Control Access To B Reactor Coolant Pump Bay Following Planned Flux Thimble Guide Tube Retraction (Section 4OA7).
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