



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23TB5
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

August 31, 2000

Duke Energy Corporation
ATTN: Mr. W. R. McCollum
Vice President
Oconee Nuclear Station
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION REMOVED

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-269/00-09, 50-270/00-09, AND
50-287/00-09

Dear Mr. McCollum:

On June 8, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Oconee reactor facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection. The results of this inspection were discussed on June 8 and August 14, 2000, with Mr. W. R. McCollum and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, two potentially safety significant issues was identified with an apparent violation of your Physical Security Plan requirements dealing with your intrusion detection systems and response to contingency events. Compensatory measures were taken and the conditions of concern no longer exist. The NRC is continuing to review the issues and will inform you of its final determination of the significance of the issues and any associated action at a later time.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules and Practice," a copy of this letter without the Safeguards Information Enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at <http://.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room)."

Sincerely,
\RA by Charles A. Casto\
Charles A. Casto, Director
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287

The Determination That This Document Contains

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License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Contains Safeguards Information Was Made By

RA Harold Christensen

Enclosure: (See page 2)

Kenneth P. Barr, Plant Support Branch

Enclosure: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-269/00-09, 50-270/00-09, AND
50-287/00-09 (Safeguards Information)

cc w/encl:

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55

Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station

Location: 7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672

Dates: June 5-8, 2000

Inspectors: D. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector
D. Orrik, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
L. Hayes, Safeguards Inspector

Approved by: Kenneth P. Barr, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Oconee Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2 and 3
NRC Inspection Report 50-269, 270 and 287/00-09

This report covers a one week period of special inspection by two Regional Safeguards Inspectors, one assisting Nuclear Reactor Regulation person, and three specialized contractors. The findings are currently being defined as Unresolved Items pending further NRC review. The significance of the issues have not been determined by the Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

- (Significance to be Determined) The provisions of the Physical Security Plan and Contingency Plan, Revision 9, dated April 26, 2000, specifically paragraph 8.3.1, requires that “an intrusion detection system (IDS) shall be installed such that detection occurs exterior to the protected area barrier.” On several occasions during the inspection, the licensee failed to detect the contractors conducting the tests exterior to the protected area barrier. Pending further NRC review to determine the potential significance of this failure, this finding is identified as an Unresolved Item. (Section 3PP3)

- (Significance to be Determined) The provisions of the Physical Security Plan and Contingency Plan, Revision 9, dated April 26, 2000, specifically Event 6 of the Contingency Plan, states in the event response under Suspected or Confirmed Intrusion or Sabotage Attempt, that the objective of the Security Force is to “interdict between intruders and vital areas.” During one exercise the licensee failed to interdict the intruders before they gained access to vital areas. Pending further NRC review to determine the potential significance of this failure, this finding is identified as an Unresolved Item. (Section 4OA4)