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BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT  
OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL EMERSON N GARDNER JR  
DEPUTY COMMANDANT, PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES DEPARTMENT,  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES OF  
THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

MARINE CORPS'  
EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE PROGRAM

June 26, 2007

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**Lieutenant General Emerson  
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Deputy Commandant for Programs  
and Resources**



Lieutenant General Gardner is currently assigned as the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

Lieutenant General Gardner is a 1973 cum laude graduate of Duke University; he was named an Olmsted Scholar for 1978 and studied history and political science for two years at Goettingen, Germany. He is a graduate of The Basic School, Defense Language Institute, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, the Norwegian Defense College and the National Security Leadership Course at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

A Naval aviator since 1974, Lieutenant General Gardner has served as a helicopter pilot in all three Marine Air Wings. At HMX-1 from 1980-1985 he was a White House Liaison Officer and Presidential Helicopter Command Pilot. As Commanding Officer of HMM-261 from 1989-1991, Lieutenant General Gardner led the Raging Bulls in Operation Sharp Edge, the evacuation of Liberia, and Operations Desert Shield and Storm. He has more than 4,300 flight hours in most of the aircraft currently in the Marine Corps inventory.

Lieutenant General Gardner served as Commanding Officer of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) for two deployment cycles to the Mediterranean from 1996 to 1998. During his tour the MEU conducted Operation Silver Wake, the non-combatant evacuation (NEO) of Albania, Operation Guardian Retrieval, contingency support for a NEO of Kinshasa, Zaire and Dynamic Response, the first employment of SACEUR's Strategic Reserve into Bosnia.

As a staff officer, Lieutenant General Gardner has served as G-3 Current Ops Officer with the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade in Okinawa, Deputy G3 for II Marine Expeditionary Force and as the J-3 (Operations Officer) for the Standing Joint Task Force, MARFORLANT. From 1993-1995 he was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Logistics at Allied Forces Northern Europe at Kolsas, Norway and at Allied Forces Northwestern Europe, in High Wycombe, England. From 1998-2000 he served as Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington DC. His tour as the Deputy Commander of US Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic from 2000-2002 included extended temporary additional duty as the Deputy J-3 for Current Operations at US Central Command in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Most recently General Gardner was the Director for Operations, J3 at US Pacific Command.

Chairman Taylor, Congressman Bartlett, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the Marine Corps' requirements for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, our plans to resource its acquisition and how the program relates to other major ground vehicle modernization programs.

**Requirements.** The EFV is a high-speed, tracked, armored amphibious assault vehicle designed to move Marines from amphibious ships located over-the-horizon to objectives up to 100 miles inland. Once ashore, the EFV has the speed and maneuverability to operate with the M1A1 Abrams tank. The EFV enables the Joint commander to use oceans, lakes and rivers as avenues of approach and maneuver. Manned by a crew of three Marines, the vehicle has a troop capacity of 17 Marines with their individual combat equipment. Unlike previous assault amphibian craft, the EFV possesses an advanced, stabilized, 30-millimeter cannon that is both lethal and highly accurate. While designed for forcible entry from the sea, the EFV will augment forward deployed Marines with additional capabilities suitable for missions such as non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, ground mechanized operations, and security operations.

The EFV's high-speed land and water maneuverability and highly lethal day/night fighting ability significantly enhance the capability of Marine forces in support of the Joint commander. The EFV is the final piece to the three-pronged approach to achieving over-the-horizon forcible entry from the sea. In conjunction with Marine tiltrotor and rotary wing aircraft and Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicles, the EFV enables the insertion of significant Marine forces from ships directly to operational objectives inland. The EFV is the essential remaining piece to this national requirement. It provides the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) with the rapid build-up of combat power necessary to face increasingly capable enemy forces. Without the EFV, naval ships will have to come within the range of coastal defenses to offload Marines by legacy surface means such as the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV).

In response to tasks in the 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance, the Marine Corps assessed our mission, force laydown, future threats and modified our planned tactical mobility portfolio. The new portfolio includes 573 EFVs -- a reduction from the previous acquisition objective of 1,013 EFVs -- and about 600 wheeled expeditionary vehicles. In conjunction with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), the new portfolio provides increased capability and capacity for

irregular operations while maintaining necessary capability and capacity for forcible entry operations. The portfolio provides sufficient EFVs to support the surface assault portion of a forcible entry operation consisting of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades – a force that could total approximately 30,000 Marines, maintain our forward presence mission with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), and support necessary training and maintenance activities. The procurement of armored wheeled vehicles will give the Corps flexibility in ground operations to include certain irregular warfare operations. This combined vehicle fleet provides greater flexibility and equivalent carrying capacity as the original EFV program at substantially lower cost.

As part of the OSD effort to certify the EFV program this past spring, the Marine Corps conducted a complete review of the program's cost, schedule, and performance. Technical experts and operators assessed every facet of the EFV and made recommendations on how to best restore the health of this critical program. The primary focus of the effort was to increase vehicle reliability to an acceptable level, a goal that would require additional design efforts and weight growth. To provide the necessary room for reliability growth, three modifications to vehicle performance have been made.

First, we removed the vehicle's smoke grenade capability. This capability is a hold-over from the original program Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and provides a legacy capability no longer required.

Second, we changed the operating construct and reduced the fuel carried for ship-to-shore movements by up to 100 gallons. The fuel used for a forcible entry operation will provide sufficient range for a 25-nautical mile high water speed approach and a 100-nautical mile combat operating radius ashore. In exclusive land operations, the EFV retains a combat operating radius of 345-nautical miles.

Third, we changed a water mobility key performance parameter (KPP), reducing the high water speed significant wave height requirement from 3 feet to 2 feet. A working group of Marine operators and technologists determined that this change will have minimal impact on operational capability and any affects could be mitigated by a minor change in tactics, techniques or procedures (TTPs).

These modifications provide an additional 1,750 pounds of weight growth capacity for critical design work required to achieve desired reliability without significant impact upon the

vehicle's operational suitability. The new EFV program represents a prudent balance of cost, schedule, and performance.

**Resources.** The Marine Corps is committed to funding the restructured EFV program using cost estimates determined by the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG). The new CAIG estimate for FY 2008 is \$22M greater than the amount requested in the President's FY 2008 budget. To address this shortfall, the Marine Corps will use FY 2007 EFV program funds that have become available as a result of the program pause to accommodate the Nunn-McCurdy review process. The use of FY 2007 EFV resources to fund the FY 2008 shortfall will ensure that the revised EFV program remains on track without disrupting any other portion of the FY 2008 budget. For FY 2009 and beyond, the Marine Corps will present a budget that funds the program to the CAIG estimate across the FYDP.

We believe the EFV program to be affordable. Our PR 2009 budget proposal to the Secretary of the Navy proposes fully funding the program through FY 2013. As a percentage of our total Marine Corps procurement account, EFV procurement funding will not exceed 39% of our total investment within the 2009-2013 FYDP. After FY 2013 and until fully fielded, the EFV accounts for approximately 34% of the Marine Corps procurement budget. While we cannot presume to know the Marine Corps' funding levels through the end of the EFV buy, we believe that this level of funding is affordable for this essential and one of a kind national capability.

**USMC Ground Vehicle Modernization Programs.** As the nation's force in readiness, the Marine Corps must possess a range of ground vehicle capabilities. Like the Marine Corps itself, the mix of type and number of troop transport vehicles must be balanced to handle a range of missions and threats. Our vehicle modernization strategy is aimed at providing the vehicles to achieve this balanced objective.

We intend to replace our 1,300 legacy Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs) with a fleet of 573 EFVs and approximately 600 Marine Personnel Carriers (MPC), armored wheeled vehicles similar to the Army's STRYKER or a personnel variant of our current Light Armored Vehicle. The exact type and number of this wheeled partner vehicle is the subject of an ongoing analysis of alternatives. This mix of tracked and wheeled vehicles will be able to move from

ship to shore independently or in LCACs and once ashore move as fast as supporting M1A1 tanks.

We currently have over 23,000 unarmored and armored HMMWVs. We are procuring 3,700 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to replace them where possible in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF / OEF). While the MRAP is very effective against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and will make an immense difference in the current fight, it is not the expeditionary vehicle we want to replace all of our HMMWVs for the long term. We are teamed with the Army to develop the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle as a more capable, expeditionary replacement for the HMMWV. The FY 2008 President's Budget submission robustly funds the Research and Development (R&D) for this vehicle to speed its fielding without sacrificing required capabilities.

The Marine Corps Combat Development Center is conducting a comprehensive analysis of our ground vehicle fleet that will capture the myriad requirements and develop a comprehensive fielding plan to achieve these capabilities. That plan will shape our POM 2010 submission.

The EFV is essential to this nation's forcible entry capability - a capability that provides strategic influence in a dangerous world. Without the EFV, the United States does not have the ability to conduct surface assaults from ships over the horizon. If told to perform our primary mission today, Navy ships would have to operate well within range of coastal defenses. Rapidly acquiring the EFV reduces the risk of casualties and the loss of ships. Our forcible entry operations project power using the triad of Marine tiltrotor and rotary wing aircraft, Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicles, and the EFV. As such, the Marine Corps is committed to fully resourcing the EFV program. It occupies the center of our tactical vehicle modernization strategy and will ensure we are prepared to operate across the spectrum of conflict when our Nation needs it the most. Thank you for this opportunity to address the Committee.