Saturday, November 12, 2016

Saudi MOH Reports 1 MERS Case In Tobuk


 




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The Saudi MOH has announced their 7th MERS case of November, this time involving a 51 y.o. Saudi male, with a history of camel contact, who is listed in critical condition.



Despite more than two years of warnings from the MOH about the risks of contracting MERS from camels (see KSA MOH Reiterates Camel Warnings On MERS), camel-to-human transmission continues reseed the virus into the human population.



Switzerland: FSVO Confirms H5N8 Now Detected At Lake Geneva













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Three days ago HPAI H5N8 was confirmed in dead Tufted ducks retrieved from the shores of Lake Constance in the Northeast of Switzerland. 
Today, we've confirmation the virus has been detected in dead birds along the shore of Lake Geneva, roughly 150 miles to the southwest, very near the border of France.
Thus far 8 European nations (Hungary, Poland, Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, Croatia, Denmark, and Switzerland) have reported H5N8 since the beginning of November, mostly in wild birds, but increasingly affecting poultry holdings as well. 

This from the Swiss Federal Office of Food Safety and Veterinary.


Confirms bird flu virus in wild birds on Lake Geneva 


Bern, 11.12.2016 - After the bird flu virus has occurred in the Lake Constance region, has been the virus now confirmed in wild birds that have been discovered dead on the shore of Lake Geneva Vaud. The Federal Office of Food Safety and Veterinary Office (BLV) is now extending the control areas and adjusts the measures to continuously to prevent the infection of domestic poultry in all circumstances. For a transmissibility of the virus to humans, there is no evidence.


In a tufted duck and laughing gull, which have been found dead in the port of Lausanne (Vaud), the avian influenza virus subtype H5N8 was detected by. Several days ago similar cases have already occurred on the banks of Lake Constance.

Given the increased risk of infection in areas where stopping wild waterfowl that recently decreed protective measures need to be intensified around the larger lakes. To avoid any contact of wild birds with domestic poultry, must be in a control area of ​​one kilometer wide poultry be kept indoors or in housing systems with a tight roof and lateral boundaries.
The BLV is beginning next week to adjust the relevant regulation. Should it require further development, the BLV would reinforce the measures further. The goal is to prevent the infection of domestic poultry in all circumstances.

So far no cases in poultry farms

A great vigilance is warranted. The poultry farmers are encouraged to implement the recommendations of BLV. Those encounter dead wild birds are requested not to touch them and to contact a Park Ranger, to the surveillance authority or to the cantonal police.
At the present time there is no evidence of infection with avian influenza in Swiss poultry farms. For portability of avian influenza subtype H5N8 from animals to humans, there is no evidence.

Friday, November 11, 2016

DEFRA: Updated Assessment Of H5N8 In Europe
















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An indication of how quickly events are changing on the ground in Europe's battle against avian H5N8, for the third time in less than a week the UK's DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs) has published an updated assessment.

Today's assessment takes special note of what appears to be a higher mortality rate among wild birds than we've previously seen with H5N8, and its similarities to the the spread of H5N1 in the middle of the last decade.  They write:
The pattern of this year’s reports is different to previous years (2014/15) when this virus was first detected in Europe. The mortality events and the species of wild waterfowl affected might indicate possible changes in virus pathogenicity and/or changes in host specificity.

Viruses continually evolve, and in Monday's FAO On HPAI H5's 4th Intercontinental Wave, we saw the following discussion of H5N8's detection earlier this summer in Russia:
The precise origin of the Tyva 2016 H5N8 virus remains unknown although available evidence suggests it was derived from earlier H5N8 viruses detected in Eastern China (WHO 2016). The virus is readily distinguishable from strains of H5N8 virus found in Europe and North America in 2014-15.

The other concern, which hasn't seen much discussion this week, is that HPAI H5N8 has shown a remarkable propensity for mixing with other viruses and churning out viable reassortants.  

Last month, in Migratory Birds & The Spread Of Highly Pathogenic Avian Flu, we looked at a study which described  the H5N8 (clade 2.3.4.4) virus as: 
. . . . remarkably promiscuous, creating reassortants with multiple neuraminidase subtypes. Improving our understanding of the circumpolar circulation of avian influenza viruses in migratory waterfowl will help to provide early warning of threats from avian influenza to poultry, and potentially human, health.
All of which gives this year's introduction and spread of H5N8 a certain degree of uncertainty.  Past performance - particularly with flu viruses - is no guarantee of future results.

This from DEFRA.

Updated Outbreak Assessment number 2
 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 in Europe

 
11th November 2016 Ref: VITT/1200 Avian Influenza in Europe

Disease Report

Currently eight countries in Europe (Austria , Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland) have reported numerous detections of H5N8 HPAI, between 3rd and 11th November. These outbreaks have effected various wild bird species including Tufted Ducks (Aythya fuligula), Coots (Fulica atra), Common Pochard (Aythya ferina), gull species, curlews, wild geese and wild swans. A number of these mortalities have been associated with wider wild bird mortality events.

Situation Assessment

These findings suggest there are at least two potential migration routes for wild birds which may be infected with this virus strain. Firstly, Poland, Northern Germany, Denmark and Netherlands on a Northern Baltic route and Croatia, Hungary, Southern Germany, Switzerland and Austria along a central European route to include the Danube and Mediterranean route Migratory birds are currently moving from the Baltic into NW Europe and the UK.
The pattern of this year’s reports is different to previous years (2014/15) when this virus was first detected in Europe. The mortality events and the species of wild waterfowl affected might indicate possible changes in virus pathogenicity and/or changes in host specificity. However significant uncertainties exist at this early stage and other wild waterfowl species may be infected without mortality.

The number, rate, mortality and geographic spread of these new cases in wild birds is significant and shares some features with the initial spread of H5N1 HPAI of the goose/Guandong lineage of viruses to Europe in late 2005/early 2006. . As a result, the risk to the UK of the incursion of a wild bird infected with H5N8 HPAI in the coming weeks has significantly increased to medium from low. The risk to poultry farms will depend on their level of biosecurity, but generally we consider at the present time it remains at low but heightened.

Conclusion

We would like to remind all poultry keepers to maintain high standards of biosecurity, remain vigilant and report any suspect clinical signs promptly. Poultry keepers should also remind themselves of the mild clinical signs of LPAI infection and be aware of any changes in egg production, feed and water intake or rise in mortality above baseline. Whilst clinical signs in chickens and turkeys with HPAI can be very marked with often rapid onset they may initially manifest as reductions in feed or water intake (>5%). Furthermore clinical signs in domestic waterfowl for this current strain of virus are less certain and may present as a wide spectrum with variable mortality. Any significant wild bird die-offs can be reported via the Defra helpline at defra.helpline@defra.gsi.gov.uk

We will continue to report on the situation

South Korea: MAFRA Reports H5N6 Detected In Wild Bird Feces














   


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Potentially, a very big story. For the first time since it emerged in the spring of 2014, the Highly Pathogenic H5N6 virus has been detected outside of it's current range of China (and to a lesser extent) Laos, Hong Kong and Vietnam.


Unlike H5N8, which emerged in South Korea in January of 2014 and subsequently spread - via migratory birds - around the world, the H5N6 virus is known to infect both birds and humans, and can produce severe and even fatal illness. 

We've been watching for two years to see if the H5N6 virus would follow the footsteps of H5N1 and H5N8, and begin to spread beyond Mainland China via migratory birds (see H5N6: The Other HPAI H5 Threat).


Today, we have some early signs suggesting it has. South Korea is understandably placing their poultry industry on high alert for additional signs that the virus has arrived.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza is detected in wild birds feces    

2016-11-11 10:50:00

Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Food has announced that H5N6-type highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus was detected in wild birds feces collected from October 28, Cheonan pungsemyeon M management material bars cloth.


* Detected Inspector: research in wild bird fecal samples from Konkuk harvesting (10.28), jongran vaccination (11.1), our check (11.4) and H5 AI antigen detection (11.9), H5 AI antigen detection requires powerful liquid samples sent to the quarantine division (11.10), H5N6 confirmed and highly pathogenic AI diagnosis (11.11) in poultry farms, raising awareness of such producer organizations, and to provide information to issue a 'migratory caution' stage of "migratory information notification system", and birds of flu engineering defenses conduct point of detection points within a radius of 10km area in accordance with the 'wild bird surveillance specified regions', and movement restrictions for all poultry farmers in the area, surveillance and inspection (11.14 days to), daily disinfection and dedicated public servants designated, conducted a migratory doraeji one days disinfection measures, including biosecurity measures.


* wild bird surveillance area specified when sampling after 14 days from the date of the last if it is determined that there is no longer carried out a complete overhaul in my poultry farm local movement restrictions off agri-food section in the past, poultry breeding farms, when HPAI viruses are detected in wild birds when HPAI occurs * Given a point, not a bird in the wild-type H5N6 HPAI is detected for the first time this year, the importance of biosecurity as a high risk farmhouse farmhouse influx emphasized necessary than ever.


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Science: Protection Against Novel Flu Subtypes Via Childhood HA Imprinting

Credit NIAID










#11,896

It's long been known that previous exposure to an influenza subtype - say H1N1 - can leave behind (varying levels) of immunity against future exposures. Those born between 1918 and 1957 - during a time when the H1N1 virus was the only influenza subtype in circulation - fared far better during 1977 return of the `Russian (H1N1) flu' than did children and teenagers born after 1957.

We saw a similar outcome during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, with those born before 1957 seeing less illness than others, despite the fact that H1N1 had been in circulation (along side H3N2) since 1977.

Today we've research indicating that the first influenza subtype you are exposed to makes the biggest, and most lasting, impression on your immune system.  And that the resultant immune response may carry over to other - similar - subtypes.


There are 18 known HA (hemagglutinin) subtypes,which are divided into two major HA groups (1 & 2  see chart below). Depending from which group your first exposure came, you may carry some degree of protection against novel flu viruses of that same group.



In other words, if your first influenza exposure was to H1N1 or H2N2 (group1), you may carry some degree of immunity to the H5 viruses (H5N1, H5N6, etc.). If, however, your first exposure was to H3N2 (group 2), you may carry some protection against H7N9 instead.

And all of this has implications for pandemic planning, prioritization of vaccines (when they are available), and mitigation responses.  It also raises some interesting questions on the effect this might have on `universal' vaccines.

For those born before 1968, when H3N2 began its reign, their first flu exposure was almost certainly group 1.  Those born between 1968 and 1977, group 2.  Those born after 1977, could fall into either category.


It's a fascinating bit of research, and you'll definitely want to follow the link and read it in its entirety, as I've only barely scratched the surface.



Katelyn M. Gostic1,Monique Ambrose1, Michael Worobey2,*, James O. Lloyd-Smith1,3,*

Science  11 Nov 2016:
Vol. 354, Issue 6313, pp. 722-726
DOI: 10.1126/science.aag1322
Lifelong protection against severe influenza

The first influenza attack that a child suffers can affect the way that their lifelong immunity to the virus builds up. A wide range of influenza A virus subtypes infect humans. Subtype H5 belongs to HA group 1 (which also includes H1 and H2 subtypes), and subtype H7 belongs to HA group 2 (which also includes the H3 subtype).    

Gostic et al. found that birth-year cohorts that experienced first infections with seasonal H3 subtype viruses were less susceptible to the potentially fatal avian influenza H7N9 virus (see the Perspective by Viboud and Epstein). Conversely, older individuals who were exposed to H1 or H2 subtype viruses as youngsters were less susceptible to avian H5N1-bearing viruses. A mathematical model of the protective effect of this imprinting could potentially prove useful to predict the age distribution and severity of future pandemics.    

    Science, this issue p. 722; see also p. 706


 Abstract

Two zoonotic influenza A viruses (IAV) of global concern, H5N1 and H7N9, exhibit unexplained differences in age distribution of human cases. Using data from all known human cases of these viruses, we show that an individual’s first IAV infection confers lifelong protection against severe disease from novel hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes in the same phylogenetic group.
Statistical modeling shows that protective HA imprinting is the crucial explanatory factor, and it provides 75% protection against severe infection and 80% protection against death for both H5N1 and H7N9. Our results enable us to predict age distributions of severe disease for future pandemics and demonstrate that a novel strain’s pandemic potential increases yearly when a group-mismatched HA subtype dominates seasonal influenza circulation. These findings open new frontiers for rational pandemic risk assessment.

Austria: H5N8 Confirmed In Poultry (Turkeys)

Vorarlberg Austria - Credit Wikipedia










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Austria is now reporting the H5N8 virus has been confirmed in a flock of free-range turkeys in Vorarlberg, Austria's westernmost federal state, which borders Lake Constance.

This is the second European Turkey operation to be hit in the past week, the first involving 9,000 birds in Hungary.  This report from DiePresse.com.


The reported on Thursday suspected case has been confirmed. For consumers, there is, according to the Ministry of Health no risk.

 ( DiePresse.com


The reported on Thursday suspected case of bird flu in poultry has hardens. For the Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES) sent samples from a Vorarlberg operation on Lake Constance the highly contagious H5N8 virus was detected, the Health Ministry said on Friday. The entire stock of Geflügelzüchters will be culled.
 
The free-range turkey growing operation on Lake Constance, which is in close proximity from the locality tested positive to bird flu virus Wild birds, was immediately blocked by the official veterinarian. The animals of the poultry holdings are now culled humanely, animal carcasses shall be destroyed and the operation then cleaned and disinfected. For consumers there was no danger, it was again the Ministry of Health. So far there is no evidence that the subtype H5N8 is dangerous to humans.

Protection zone around operating

To the affected holding, a protection zone with a radius of at least three kilometers and a surveillance zone with a minimum radius of ten kilometers now be removed. Within the protection zone all poultry producing farms are examined by official veterinarians. 
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