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
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ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

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SECURITY THREAT GROUP (STG) PROGRAM EVALUATION

Final Report to:

The National Institute of Justice
Grant #: 99-CE-VX-0004

TERRY L. STEWART
Director

FINAL REPORT

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ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

SECURITY THREAT GROUP (STG) PROGRAM EVALUATION

Final Report

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Executive Summary

This evaluation of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Security Threat Group (STG) Program consists of an *Impact Evaluation* and a *Process Evaluation*. The Department's STG program is dedicated to controlling gang activity in Arizona's prisons. It was adopted in steps, beginning with Director's Management Order 91-24 in 1991, which prohibited inmates from joining gangs, and is currently subject to the provisions of Department Order 806, Security Threat Groups. In policy revisions adopted in November 1994, August 1995, and September 1997, the ADC defined STGs, set up a process by which gangs active in the prison system were to be certified as STGs, and inmates were to be validated as members of STGs, and specified sanctions for gang membership, including placement in the Special Management Unit II, a super-maximum security unit for validated STG members who refuse to renounce their gang affiliation (effective September 2, 1997). The purpose of the STG program, as specified in the 1997 Order, Department Order 806, is "to minimize the threat that inmate gang or gang like activity poses to the safe, secure, and efficient operation of institutions."

Part I: Impact Evaluation

The stated purpose of the impact evaluation is to determine: 1) the extent to which disciplinary violations committed by validated STG members dropped as a result of isolation in SMU II (an incapacitation effect), 2) whether or not and by how much disciplinary violations across the inmate population dropped in conjunction with the STG program (deterrence and related effects), 3) how much and in what direction disciplinary violations by renounced gang members dropped as a result of the renouncement process (a desistance effect), and 4) the impact that STG and other gang membership has on disciplinary violation rates, controlling for factors such as unit security level, age, ethnic background, overcrowding, and other factors.

Major conclusions from the Impact Evaluation are as follows:

- **Violation Rates and Gang Membership** Current evaluation results indicate that members of certified prison gangs [STGs], uncertified prison gangs, and street gangs commit serious disciplinary violations at rates two to three times higher than do non-gang inmates housed in units of the same security level. Over the period from July 1994 to December 2000, members of certified prison gangs (STGs) recorded the highest violation rates in the case of assault, drug violations, rioting, weapons violations, and other violent violations. On the other hand, members of street gangs recorded the highest rates of fighting, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment, while members of uncertified prison gangs recorded the highest rate of threat violations. Evaluation findings also establish that the New Mexican Mafia and the Border Brothers pose the greatest threat to prison security among the seven certified STGs. The New Mexican Mafia recorded the highest rates of assault, rioting, and drug violations, and the second highest rates of threats, other violent violations, and tampering with equipment. On the other hand, the Border Brothers recorded the highest rates of fighting, weapons violations, and loss/destruction of property, and the second highest rates of assault and rioting.
- **Incapacitation Effect** One of the primary concerns of the current STG evaluation was a determination of the impact of placing validated STG members in the Special Management Unit II. Evaluation findings in this area show that SMU II placement had a definite incapacitation effect on the violent and disruptive activities of these inmates. Rates of assault, drug violations, threats, fighting, and rioting all declined by over 50% following SMU II placement. Although rates of other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, and weapons violations increased following placement, the former are considered to pose a greater threat to inmate and staff safety.

- Deterrence and Related Effects In conjunction with several other ADC security advancements during the 1990s, gang policy initiatives in 1995 and 1997 associate with significant declines across the inmate population in rates of assault, drug violations, threat violations, weapons violations, and other violent violations. Aside from the incapacitation effect of SMU II placement, which applied to a relatively small group of inmates, these declines are judged to reflect in part a likely general deterrent effect of gang policy initiatives. In most cases, the observed declines occurred among all types of gangs, as well as among non-gang inmates. Declines were greater for validated STG members than for other gang members, and were greater for other gang members than for non-gang inmates.

- Desistance Effect of Renouncement The STG Program provides validated gang members with the opportunity to renounce their gang affiliation, desist from gang activities, and avoid placement in the tightly controlled environment of the Special Management Unit II. Among the 625 inmates validated as STG members during the time frame of this study, 90 or 14.4% subsequently renounced their gang affiliation and were successfully debriefed by the STG Unit in Central Office. The rate of renouncement is judged to be low in part due to the threat of retaliation from members of the gang, and in part to the lack of a strong incentive to renounce, i.e., most renounced members remain in a supermax security unit. While few validated members elect to renounce, the current evaluation does suggest some desistance effect to renouncement in that violation rate reductions for renounced STG members were both large and were generally in excess of reductions for unrenounced members. However, reductions were not as great as those for unrenounced members in the case of assault, threat violations, fighting, and tampering with equipment. Furthermore, renounced members continue to commit violations in most categories at rates well in excess of violation rates in the general inmate population.

• Violation Rate Correlates Across Prison Units Analyses of disciplinary violation rates across 50 prison units over the period May-August 2001 identify the following factors as positive correlates of serious disciplinary activity in the unit (listed from Very High to Low correlation):

- 1) Unit security level (more violations occur in more secure units) (Very High).
- 2) The concentration of street gang members in the unit (Very High).
- 3) The median inmate age in the unit (younger inmates → more violations) (Very High).
- 4) The concentration of gang members in general in the unit (Very High).
- 5) The concentration of inmates committed for violent offenses in the unit (High).
- 6) The concentration of prison gang members in the unit (High).
- 7) The concentration of African Americans in the unit (Medium).
- 8) The concentration of Mexican Nationals in the unit (Medium).
- 9) The concentration of Mexican Americans in the unit (Medium).
- 10) The level of overcrowding in the unit (inmates relative to bed capacity) (Low).
- 11) The concentration of inmates with prior Arizona prison commitments (Low).

Analysis shows that factors 1-6 are highly correlated with one another, e.g., more secure units have higher concentrations of street and prison gang members and more inmates committed for violent crimes. Likewise, inmate age and street gang concentration are highly correlated inasmuch as street gang members tend to be much younger than other inmates. In relation to gang member concentration, as the percent of gang members of any type in a unit increases, so do assaults, threats, fighting, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, other non-violent violations, total violent violations, and total non-violent violations. Overall, the concentration of gang members in a unit explains 40% of the variation in assault rates, 38% of the variation in rates of loss/destruction of property, and 36% of the variation in rates of violent violations in general. Other violations are sensitive to gang member concentration, but to a much lesser extent. Overcrowding is positively correlated with rates of assault, drug violations, threat violations, fighting, other violent violations, tampering with equipment, and other non-violent violations, but is negatively correlated with rioting, weapons violations, and loss/destruction of property.

• Violation Rate Correlates Across the Inmate Population Analyses of disciplinary violations during the first three years of confinement for 2,188 males committed to ADC in 1996 identify the following factors as positive correlates of serious disciplinary activity:

- 1) Inmate age at commitment (younger inmates record more violations) (Very High).
- 2) Any gang membership (prison or street) (High).
- 3) Street gang membership (High).
- 4) Prison gang membership (High).
- 5) Institutional risk score (High).
- 6) Mexican American ethnicity (High).
- 7) Current commitment for a violent offense (High).
- 8) Current commitment for a property offense (Medium).
- 9) The security level of the unit where the inmate is housed (Medium).
- 10) One or more prior Arizona prison commitments (Low).

Further analysis using logistic regression models establishes that, when other good predictors of institutional misconduct are statistically controlled, prison gang members are 74% more likely than non-gang inmates to commit serious violations, while street gang members are 26% more likely to commit such violations.

Impact Evaluation Conclusion

The results of the Impact Evaluation show that the STG program and accompanying security enhancement initiatives have led to a dramatic and widespread reduction in violent and disruptive activity in the Arizona prison system over the period 1994-2000. This conclusion is supported by results which show a strong incapacitation effect of isolating validated gang members in super-maximum security, and by findings regarding an apparent deterrent effect of gang policies on a number of inmate groups. The "logic" of the STG program is further supported by findings demonstrating that gang membership predicts serious institutional misconduct independent of other factors such as inmate age and ethnicity. The overall impact, while most dramatic for validated STG members, also applies to other gang suspects (2nd highest impact) and to inmates not identified as gang suspects (least but still significant impact).

Part II: Process Evaluation

The Process Evaluation contains an analysis of the information collected during field interviews of prison administrators in nine prison complexes and 20 prison units, as well as an analysis of Correctional Officer and inmate survey responses. In all, 111 prison administrators were interviewed and 654 Correctional Officer (CO) and 463 inmate surveys were collected. The analysis compares the perceptions of the prison administrators (i.e., Wardens, Security Chiefs, Special Security Unit [SSU] Coordinators, Deputy Wardens, Associate Deputy Wardens, SSU Officers and Inspections and Investigations [I&I] Officers) with those of Correctional Officers and inmates on a number of questions the interview guides and surveys had in common. Major conclusions from the Process Evaluation are as given below.

- **Mission and Goal of the STG Program** Prison administrators overwhelmingly identify the mission and goal of the STG program to be the identification, validation, and removal of STG gang members from the general inmate population. While most recognize the ultimate mission of the STG program to reduce gang activity and violence in the Arizona prison system, they did not identify this as the primary goal of the program.
- **Impact on STGs and Street Gangs** In support of the results of the Impact Evaluation, the Process Evaluation indicates that the STG validation process has been successful in isolating STG members. Administrators estimate that only 5% of inmates in their units are members of STGs. However, they also estimate that 35-40% of the inmates in their units are street gang members and that both prison and street gang members have been increasing in recent years, particularly the latter. The Border Brothers and New Mexican Mafia are rated as the most powerful in controlling drugs, recruiting new members, and influencing other inmates.

- **Controlling the Gang Problem** Prison administrators overwhelmingly believe that the STG program is achieving the goal of reducing gang violence in their units. They believe the gang problem can be controlled but never completely eliminated. Correctional Officers were a bit more pessimistic, while inmates were generally defiant, saying that the STG program would not affect their willingness to join a gang.
- **Identifying STG Gang Members** Correctional administrators noted during their field interviews that it has become much more difficult to identify STG members because inmates are now aware of the policy, do not like the consequences of being validated (i.e., placed in super maximum security), and therefore avoid the things that have been used in the past to identify them, e.g., tattoos, self-admission, memberships lists, gang literature, and gang correspondence. They now avoid these things so it is difficult to get enough evidence in order to validate suspects.
- **Inmate and Staff Safety** Inmate and staff safety at the time of the field interviews were both rated fairly high by administrators, who gave both an 8 on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is not at all safe and 10 is very safe. However, COs rate both inmate and staff safety as only a 6 and 32% believe staff safety has been decreasing in recent years primarily because of staff shortages. Inmates believe that inmates who are members of a gang are less safe than those who are not, and 41% of inmates believe it is likely or very likely that any individual inmate would be assaulted in his unit. A multiple regression analysis was performed to determine which factors best explain perceived inmate and staff safety. For perceived staff safety the factors that came out on top were the security level of the unit (less secure units are rated as safer) and the percent of inmates who are gang members (prison or street gang). For perceived inmate safety the same factors came out on top except for security level of the unit, which rated 10th.

- **Factors Related to Perceptions of Staff and Inmate Safety** Prison conditions are related to perceptions of staff safety. Administrators rate prison conditions more favorably than do COs. As might be expected, COs rate prison conditions more favorably than do inmates. Inmate-staff relations are rated as moderately respectful at best, although administrators' perceptions are much more favorable than those of COs and inmates. Inmate and staff morale are rated a moderate 5.0 on the 1 to 10 scale, with administrators again having a better perception than COs or inmates. Perceptions of prison conditions, inmate and staff morale, and how respectful inmate-staff relations are, turned out to be good predictors of perceptions of both staff and inmate safety. Together, these factors account for 66% of the variation in perceptions of staff safety and 52% of the variation in perceptions of inmate safety.
- **Training for the STG Program** Both administrators and COs say they have not had much formal training regarding the STG program. Both groups give the training they have had fairly low marks, particularly COs. A lack of formal training is a problem because it makes the identification of STG gang members difficult. Although SSU Officers rely on CO staff to help identify STG members, 53% of COs said they did not think they had a role in this process.
- **Inmate Perceptions** Information gathered by the STG Unit, which conducts debriefings of renounced STG members, reveals the main reasons for renouncing are: 1) the renounced inmate no longer believes in the gang's philosophy, 2) the renounced inmate believes there is no future in gang activity, and 3) the renounced inmate is tired of the activities of other members of the gang. According to renounced inmates, the principal things inmates expect to get out of being in a gang are respect, status, and support from their fellow gang members. Many said they were asked to assault inmates and recruit other members as requirements of being a member. Just about all said their gang was governed by a council in which the members were all equal.

Process Evaluation Conclusion

According to the opinions expressed by prison administrators, Correctional Officers, and inmates, which support the findings of the Impact Evaluation, the STG program is having a definite impact on gang activity in Arizona prisons. However, all three groups believe that complete control is not possible. The perceptions of some prison administrators and Correctional Officers that staff and inmate safety has not been improving is at odds with results of the Impact Evaluation, which show that prison safety has improved dramatically. It is recommended that steps be taken to make all prison administrators and Correctional Officers aware of the results of this evaluation, so as to bring subjective perceptions more in line with the objective reality.

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ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS *SECURITY THREAT GROUP (STG) PROGRAM EVALUATION*

Introduction

This evaluation of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Security Threat Group (STG) Program consists of two major components:

- An Impact Evaluation of the effect the program is having on gangs and prison safety;
- A Process Evaluation of the manner in which the program is being implemented.

Program Description and Baseline Data

The STG program was adopted in steps through a series of gang policy initiatives beginning with Director's Management Order (DMO) 91-24 in December 1991, which prohibited inmates from engaging in any form of gang activity. However, DMO 91-24 did not impose sanctions on inmates identified as gang members. The first gang policy that imposed sanctions and that specifically defined a Security Threat Group (STG), Management Order #57, was adopted in August 1995. This was followed by Department Order (DO) 806 in September 1996, and by further revisions to DO 806 in September 1997 and November 1999.

It was the 1997 revision to DO 806 which first required the placement of validated STG members in the Department's most secure facility, the Special Management Unit II. The effective date of this policy, September 2, 1997, is considered by the Department to be the official start date of the STG program. The general mandate of the program, as stated in DO 806 is: "To minimize the threat that gang or gang like activity poses to the safe and efficient operation of institutions, no inmate shall create, promote or participate in any club, association, organization or gang, except as permitted by Departmental written instructions."

To enforce this mandate, a process was established by which gangs are certified as STGs, and suspected members of STGs are validated as actual members. The process begins as intelligence officers in the STG Unit of the Division of Inspections and Investigations (I&I) in Central Office accumulate sufficient evidence regarding the gang-related activities of a group of inmates, e.g., the Aryan Brotherhood, to warrant certification and submits this evidence to the STG Validation Committee (STGVC), which makes the decision whether or not to recommend certification of the gang to the ADC Director. If and when the Director signs the certification paperwork, the gang is officially certified as an STG, and the process of validating members of the gang may proceed.

In brief, the process involves identifying a suspect as an STG member, either at reception or by a Special Security Unit (SSU) operating in the prison unit to which the inmate is assigned, collecting evidence in the form of a validation packet, and forwarding the packet to an STG Hearing Committee (STGHC), which determines if the suspect is to be a validated member. For the STGHC to consider an inmate for validation, there must be an accumulation of at least 10 points in two or more categories of objective validation criteria, e.g., tattoos, gang paraphernalia, association with known gang members, etc. Inmates validated as members of a certified gang have three options: 1) they can accept validation but refuse to renounce their gang affiliation, 2) they can accept validation, renounce their affiliation, and be debriefed by intelligence officers from the STG Unit, or 3) they can appeal the validation finding. For inmates who elect to appeal the decision of the STGHC, the STGVC determines if the appeal is to be upheld or not. Inmates who refuse to renounce, and those who lose their appeal, are reclassified and placed in Special Management Unit II (SMU II), a super-maximum security unit at the Eyman Complex in Florence, Arizona. Those who renounce and are debriefed are placed in protective segregation.

Validated STG members who end up in SMU II (or in a Special Management Area [SMA] in the case of females) are locked down in their cells except for three hours a week set aside for showers and recreation. Although SMU II security procedures allow only strictly controlled inmate movement, there is still a considerable risk to both staff and inmates. Correctional Officers assigned to SMU II must wear eye protection, vests and other security gear when dealing with the highly volatile population in the unit. This is necessary, in part, because attacks between rival gang members continue despite the extreme security precautions.

In contrast to some other states with STG programs, e.g., Connecticut and Massachusetts, the Department has taken a hard line approach against reintegration of gang members back into the general population, whether they renounce or not. If there was a mantra to the Arizona STG program, that mantra would be "identification, validation, and isolation." The goal is simply to remove active gang members from the general population and to incapacitate them.

The Arizona STG program has no provision to move validated but not renounced gang members out of super-maximum security at SMU II. They are required to remain at that facility for the duration of their current sentence and throughout future incarcerations, and are not allowed to participate in education, counseling, or other inmate programs. When a validated STG member released from incarceration re-enters the prison system at the Alhambra Reception Center in Phoenix, they are identified as a validated member and are immediately shipped right back to SMU II. Once an inmate is validated as a member of an STG, there is no way out, short of a successful appeal or renouncement. [Note: The Department recently lost a lawsuit, *Mark Koch v. Samuel Lewis, et. al.* (USDC CIV 90-1872 PHX JBM), which may lead to the establishment of an upper limit to the length of time validated STG members may be isolated in SMU II. The decision in this case is currently under appeal.]

At the time this research began there were six (6) certified STG gangs in Arizona prisons: the Aryan Brotherhood [AB] (a white supremacist gang), the Old Mexican Mafia [EME] (a gang of Mexican Americans), the New Mexican Mafia [New EME] (formed in the early 1980's as a splinter group of the Old Mexican Mafia; now a blood feud rival of the latter), the Grandel (a conglomerate of former street gang members from the Glendale, Arizona area), the African Mau Mau (an African American gang), and the Border Brothers (a gang of Mexican Nationals).

By the time the research concluded, two more gangs had been certified as STGs: the Surenos (a conglomerate of street gang members from Southern California), and the Warrior Society (a Native American gang). Because the Surenos were certified prior to the time the impact portion of the STG evaluation began, this group is classified as an STG throughout the Impact Evaluation. However, the Warrior Society was only recently certified and is treated as an uncertified prison gang in the impact component of the evaluation.

Between September 2, 1997 (the program start date) and December 20, 2001 (the completion date for this report), a total of 649 inmates had been considered for validation by the STGHCs. Of this total, 625 (96.3%) were officially validated as STG members. Table 1 on the following page shows the gang affiliations all 625 validated members, as well as the affiliations of validated members who remained incarcerated in SMU II as of December 20, 2001.

Not all of the difference between total validated STG members (625) and validated members remaining in SMU II (390) is due to gang members being released from prison (133). Among the 625 validated members, 12 (1.9%) had a validation appeal upheld by the STGVC, while 90 (14.4%) were successfully debriefed by the STG Unit and renounced their gang affiliation, leaving 523 validated members whose validation survived appeal and renouncement proceedings. Of these 523, 390 or 74.6% remain in ADC custody in the SMU II unit.

Table 1

Gang Affiliations of Validated Security Threat Group Members

GANG AFFILIATION	GANG MEMBER VALIDATIONS	VALIDATED MEMBERS IN SMU II (December 20, 2001)
Aryan Brotherhood	103	74 (71.8%)
Border Brothers	225	100 (44.4%)
Grandel	95	60 (63.2%)
African Mau Mau	23	14 (60.9%)
New Mexican Mafia	87	65 (74.7%)
Old Mexican Mafia	26	17 (65.4%)
Surenos	55	50 (90.9%)
Warrior Society	11	10 (90.9%)
TOTAL	625*	390 (62.4%)

* Includes two female members of the Grandel and one female member of the Aryan Brotherhood.

The 390 validated but unrenounced inmates in custody constitute 67.7% of the 576 residents of SMU II, and 1.4% of the total inmate population of 27,761. The remaining 186 inmates in SMU II include 116 inmates on death row and 90 inmates transferred from other facilities due to their disruptive behavior. Also, among the 90 inmates who successfully renounced their gang affiliation, 61 or 67.7% remain in ADC custody in protective segregation units as of December 20, 2001. These inmates are housed in PS sections of the SMU I Unit at the Eyman Complex (also a supermax facility) and the Morey Unit at the Lewis Complex.

Regarding the appeal decision-making process of the STGVC, 287 or 45.9% of the 625 validated STG members elected to appeal the validation finding of the STGHC. Among the 287 who appealed, 265 or 92.3% had their appeal denied, 12 or 4.2% had their appeal upheld, and 10 (3.5%) are pending the appeal decision.

With regard to renouncement proceedings, 135 or 21.6% of the 625 validated members applied for formal renouncement. Of this group, 90 or 66.7% successfully debriefed, 22 or 16.3% were rejected for renouncement following the debriefing, 6 or 4.4% are still in the debriefing process, and 17 or 12.6% had their renouncement proceeding terminated prior to completion due to leaving ADC custody.

The number and percent of validated members who have applied for renouncement varies across certified gangs (from high to low %-wise) as follows: African Mau Mau (11 or 47.8%), Old Mexican Mafia (12 or 46.2%), Aryan Brotherhood (30 or 29.1%), Grandel (20 or 21.1%), Border Brothers (42 or 18.7%), Warrior Society (2 or 18.2%), New Mexican Mafia (13 or 14.9%), and Surenos (5 or 9.1%). The frequency of renouncement is directly tied to the average age of gang members, the African Mau Mau, Old Mexican Mafia, and Aryan Brotherhood having, on average, by far the oldest members among the certified gangs.

Description of the Evaluation Components

As previously stated, the present evaluation of the STG program consists of two components:

- An **Impact Evaluation** directed to the development of objective empirical data regarding the impact of the STG program on gang activity and on safety in the Arizona prison system;
- A **Process Evaluation** based on the perceptions of prison staff and program administrators regarding the program and the manner in which it has been implemented.

The Impact Evaluation is presented first in order to facilitate a comparison of the findings of the two components. In part, the process component is used to determine the extent to which staff perceptions are in agreement with the empirical findings of the impact component.

The **Impact Evaluation** describes:

- The direct **incapacitation** effect of isolating validated STG members in SMU II; determined by comparing “before and after” violation rates of validated STG members;
- The general **deterrence** effect of the STG program, and the effects of accompanying initiatives, such as protective segregation, on prison violation rates across the inmate population; determined by examining changes in violation rates within broad groups of inmates (STG, other gang, and non-gang populations) following the effective dates of major STG initiatives;
- The **desistance** effect of gang renouncement, which hypothesizes that renounced gang members will dissociate from their gangs of choice and become less involved in gang-related activities; determined from reductions in violation rates among renounced members;
- The relative contribution of gang membership (STG, other prison gang, and/or street gang membership) to disciplinary violation rates in comparison to other factors such as unit security level, ethnic background, age, prior commitments, and various prison conditions such as the facility overcrowding rate and the CO vacancy rate.

The Process Evaluation was prepared to describe the manner in which the program is being implemented and the perceptions of prison staff and inmates regarding program success. It is based on face-to-face interviews with prison administrators (i.e., Prison Operations and STG Unit staff in Central Office, prison complex Wardens, complex Security Chiefs, Special Security Unit [SSU] Coordinators, Inspections and Investigations Officers, prison unit Deputy Wardens, unit Associate Deputy Wardens, and SSU Officers). In addition, surveys were distributed to Correctional Officers (654 useable returns) and inmates (463 useable returns).

The interview guides for prison administrators focused on, but were not limited to, the respondents' perceptions regarding the following:

- The goals of the STG program;
- The success of the program;
- Problems being encountered;
- The impact of the program on STG gangs;
- The impact of the program on inmate and staff safety

Except for Central Office records examined by evaluation staff, including an automated Prison Operations database and validated and debriefed inmate files, the Process Evaluation is based on the perceptions of interviewees and survey respondents. In some cases their perceptions are supported by the Impact Evaluation and in some cases not. We will point out important correspondences and discrepancies in conjunction with the process component.

It should be emphasized that the interpretations and conclusions reached in this report regarding the STG program are those of the evaluators alone and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Arizona Department of Corrections or the opinions or perceptions of corrections officials regarding the program.

PART I: IMPACT EVALUATION

The impact component of the current evaluation is directed to an objective, empirical determination of whether or not, by how much, and in what manner the safety and security of the Arizona prison system has improved as a result of the intervention of the Security Threat Group (STG) Program of the Arizona Department of Corrections. To this end, the Impact Evaluation examines trends and changes in the level (rate) of disciplinary violations charged to members of several inmate groups, including:

- Validated but unrenounced STG members;
- Renounced STG members;
- STG suspects;
- Other prison gang members;
- Street gang members;
- Inmates not known to be affiliated with any gang.

In addition, the evaluation examines correlations of various factors with the level of disciplinary activity in the prison system, those factors including gang membership, other inmate characteristics such as age, ethnic background, and prior commitments, and conditions in the housing units where inmates reside, such as security level and the extent of overcrowding.

While one of the principal goals of the evaluation is to determine the impact of the STG program on validated gang members, it is important to consider the impact on other inmate groups as well, including more-inclusive groups of gang members, and especially so in light of the fact that validated gang members constitute less than 2% of the total inmate population (451 members or 1.6% of 27,761 inmates on December 20, 2001).

As many as 3,792 inmates (13.7% of the inmate population on December 20, 2001) have been identified as at least a suspect of a prison or street gang. This includes 1,186 STG gang members (4.3%), 405 members of other prison gangs (African American Council, La Raza, Peckerwoods, and Skinheads) (1.5%), and 2,201 members of street gangs such as West Side City (7.9%).

In addition to type of gang affiliation (STG, other prison, street) and gang status (suspect, validated, or renounced), another important variable in the present evaluation is the security level of the unit where an inmate resides. There are four primary security levels in the Arizona prison system, including Level 2 (minimum security), Level 3 (medium security), Level 4 (high security), and Level 5 (maximum security). In addition, a portion of the inmate population resides in so-called "super-maximum security," which includes the two Special Management Units (SMUs) at the Eyman Complex in Florence, Arizona, namely the Special Management Unit I (SMU I), where most renounced STG members are housed in protective segregation beds, and Special Management Unit II (SMU II), which houses validated but unrenounced STG members. Finally, a portion of the inmate population resides (temporarily) in detention beds normally reserved for inmates who have committed serious disciplinary violations and are awaiting reclassification.

- SMU I and SMU II (super-maximum security);
- Detention
- Level 5 (maximum security)
- Level 4 (high security)
- Level 3 (medium security)
- Level 2 (minimum security)

Unit security levels are important because they reflect the view of the Department as to how much of a security risk an individual inmate poses. The Department has an inmate classification system which assigns inmates to security levels and facilities on the basis of a "custody level" determination. In turn, the inmate's assigned custody level (same scale as the security level of a prison unit) is normally based on the combination of a Public Risk (P) Score, and an Institutional Risk (I) Score. There are exceptions, but most inmates are assigned to facilities on the basis of the P/I score determined at reception to the Department. These scores, and the inmate's assigned custody level, are subject to change during the periodic process of "reclassification." In many cases, inmates who commit serious institutional violations (and receive misconduct reports) are reclassified and transferred to more secure facilities. In fact, many of the inmates housed in the two SMUs are there because of the disciplinary records they've accumulated in the units from which they were transferred. In this sense, the SMUs serve as longer-term detention facilities. The other primary purpose of the SMUs is, of course, to house validated gang members.

Because gang members tend to score higher than average in relation to most ADC classification criteria, they are more likely than other inmates to be held in higher security prison units, and this was the case both before and after the advent of the STG program in 1997. Table 2 on the next page, which shows the percentage of gang members, and non-gang inmates, resident in each of the seven security level categories over the period July 1994 to December 2000, demonstrates this fact. As indicated in Table 3, we also find a general correlation between security level and gang member concentration, with the more secure units exhibiting a greater concentration of gang members. However, even in the most secure facilities, the two SMUs, less than half of the resident inmates were affiliated with gangs over this period.

Table 2

**Security Level Distributions
Of Gang and Non-Gang Populations
July 1994 through December 2000***

UNIT SECURITY LEVEL	GANG MEMBERS	NON-GANG INMATES
SMU II	229 (7.4%)	269 (1.3%)
SMU I	297 (9.6%)	618 (3.1%)
Detention	158 (5.1%)	502 (2.5%)
Level 5	262 (8.5%)	1,209 (6.0%)
Level 4	670 (21.7%)	3,243 (16.1%)
Level 3	956 (31.0%)	7,353 (36.5%)
Level 2	511 (16.6%)	6,971 (34.6%)
TOTAL	3,083 (100.0%)	20,165 (100.0%)

* The table indicates the average number and percent of gang and non-gang members in a security level over the period July 1994 to December 2000.

Table 3

**Gang Member Concentration
By Unit Security Level
July 1994 through December 2000***

UNIT SECURITY LEVEL	GANG MEMBERS	NON-GANG INMATES
SMU II	46.0%	54.0%
SMU I	32.5%	67.5%
Detention	23.9%	76.1%
Level 5	17.8%	82.2%
Level 4	17.1%	82.9%
Level 3	11.5%	88.5%
Level 2	6.8%	93.2%
COMPOSITE	13.3%	86.7%

* The table indicates the overall percent of inmates in a security level who were gang and non-gang members over the period July 1994 to December 2000.

Evaluation Parameters

For purposes of the Impact Evaluation, which began in earnest in early 2001, a data cutoff date of December 31, 2000 was established. Accordingly, all time series and other evaluation data extend up to and including that date. By the same token, with the evaluation focused on changes and trends in disciplinary activity associated with the September 2, 1997 advent of the STG program, it was necessary to collect data for a period of time prior to that date. Initially, it was decided to go as far back as January 1, 1990, inasmuch as some of the data required for the study (i.e., for the general time series analysis) was available that far back. However, it was later determined that gang-related data, e.g., gang affiliation and status, was only available in reliable form back to July of 1994.

In light of the fact that the focus of the evaluation is on gang activity, the majority of the analyses in this report are based on a time frame extending from July 1, 1994 to December 31, 2000. The exception is a time series analysis of disciplinary violation rates for the inmate population as a whole. The data series for this analysis covers the period from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2000.

In some cases, the data collected for the study was for individual inmates, i.e., the incapacitation and individual multiple regression analyses. In these cases, we were careful to note the exact period of incarceration for each inmate examined. In other cases, the data collected was in aggregate form, either for specific months, e.g., disciplinary violations for assault charged to STG gang members in December of 1997, or for specific prison units in the case of the unit multiple regression analysis, e.g., total assaults by STG gang members in the SMU II Unit over the period May-August 2000. When data were for individual months, they were often further aggregated to apply to individual quarters, i.e., in the time series analysis.

All of the individual case data and most of the aggregate data accessed for the purposes of the Impact Evaluation were obtained from the Adult Inmate Management System (AIMS), the inmate database of the Department of Corrections. The AIMS database contains between one and two thousand data elements for every inmate who is now or has previously been incarcerated in the Arizona prison system since 1984. For this evaluation, however, we make use of only about 52 AIMS data elements, with emphasis on gang-related and disciplinary data.

Selected data elements include demographic information, committing offenses, gang affiliation (specific gang), gang status (suspect, validated, or renounced), and disciplinary actions filed against the inmate, including violation code and type, date and location of the violation, and the penalty imposed. *Violation categories considered in the Impact Evaluation include assault, drug violations, threat violations (extortion, intimidation, and other threats), fighting, rioting, other violent violations (sexual assault, arson, throwing objects/items), weapons violations, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment (e.g., locks).* Total and all other violations were also available for certain analyses. All other violations include theft, disobeying orders, refusing to work, giving/receiving tattoos, being in unauthorized area, horseplay, etc.

As is the case with all crime statistics (e.g., the Uniform Crime Reports), AIMS data have certain limitations. In the same manner that the Uniform Crime Reports identifies only a fraction of the crimes reported in victimization surveys, AIMS reports only a fraction of the illegal, violent, and disruptive activity that inmates engage in within the confines of the prison system. Since we cannot identify violations which are not reported as such in AIMS, we are naturally limited in our analyses to official disciplinary data kept by the Department. There is also a difference between the number of inmates identified as gang members in the AIMS database (as entered by prison staff) and the actual number of gang members active in the prison system.

Since 1997, the AIMS database has identified only about 13-15% of the inmate population as gang members, whereas prison administrators estimate that 35 to 40% of inmates in their units are members of street gangs alone, not to mention prison gangs. One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that only those inmates officially identified as suspects are indicated as such in AIMS. As suggested by prison administrators, it is likely that many gang members have not been officially identified as suspects. Another reason for the discrepancy may be the fact that inmates do not advertise their gang affiliations to ADC staff members, especially in light of the sanctions and restrictions associated with validated membership.

Nonetheless, evaluation findings demonstrate that those inmates officially identified as suspects record violations at much higher rates than do those who are not so-identified. Accordingly, it was the judgment of the evaluation team that the AIMS data on inmate gang status and affiliation were sufficiently complete to allow their use for evaluation purposes. Of course, these data are the sole data that ADC officials use to monitor the gang situation in the Department. To wit, any time an inmate is identified as a gang suspect, that information is entered into AIMS.

Beyond the above, there is one further limitation to the data available in the AIMS system. Specifically, a major revision to the inmate disciplinary system in December 1994 affected the way violations are filed and hence the way violation data are recorded in AIMS.

These include:

- Determination of Guilt Procedural changes in the way investigations and hearings are conducted (e.g., time frames to process violations) to make it easier to establish guilt;
- Minor to Major Violations Some violations that had previously been classified as minor (e.g., fighting) were reclassified to major violations.

These changes eventually caused a large increase in guilty and in major violations, but not an increase in total violations filed. In order to factor out the impact of the disciplinary system revision (which would obviously bias any analysis of changes in violation rates over time), impact analyses were conducted separately for the category of all violations regardless of guilt and for the category of all guilty violations. As it turns out, the results were essentially the same for both methods of measuring violations. Accordingly, it was decided to report only on the results of the “all violations” analyses, side-stepping the issue of guilt.

Disciplinary Violation Rates: Setting the Stage

Throughout the Impact Evaluation, we examine trends and changes in disciplinary violation “rates,” which take into account:

- The number of violations committed (charged);
- The number of inmates to whom these violations were charged;
- The average number of months (or years) of incarceration served by the inmates charged.

Violation rates examined in this evaluation were calculated as “the number of violations per 1,000 inmates per year of incarceration.” For example, if 500 inmates committed 250 violations over a two-year average period of incarceration, the violation rate would be:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Violation Rate} &= (1,000 * \text{Number of Violations}) / (\text{Number of Inmates} * \text{Avg. Length of Incarceration}) \\ &= (1,000 * 250) / (500 * 2) = 250.00 \end{aligned}$$

This can be reasoned out as follows. If 500 inmates committed 250 violations over the two-year average period, then 1,000 inmates would have committed twice as many, namely 500 violations. Since these 500 violations would have been committed over an average two-year period, 250 violations would have been committed by these 1,000 inmates over an average one-year period, hence the violation rate is 250 violations per 1,000 inmates per year.

Frequently it was necessary to calculate disciplinary violation rates from aggregate data, in which case we did not typically know the average length of incarceration, but rather the number of inmates incarcerated at given points in time (ends of months). In these cases, we calculated the average number of inmates incarcerated over the time period in question, and used this result to calculate the aggregate violation rate. For instance, if we knew that 20 assault violations were charged to STG gang members during the fourth quarter of 1997, and that, on average, 200 STG members were incarcerated over the quarter, we could calculate the assault violation rate for STG members over the quarter as follows:

$$\textit{Assault Violation Rate} = (1,000 * 20 * 4) / (200) = 400.00$$

Again, this calculation can be reasoned out by simple logic. If STG members committed 20 assaults over the quarter, then they would have committed 4 times 20 or 80 assaults over a one-year period (four quarters and hence the multiplication of 20 by 4 in the formula). Furthermore, if these violations were committed by an average of 200 STG members, then an average of 1,000 STG members would have committed five times as many assaults (5 times 80) or 400 total assaults over the one-year period, hence 400 assaults per 1,000 inmates per year. Note that if the assaults had been committed during a one-month period rather than a quarter, then the multiplier in the formula would have been 12 rather than 4.

In addition to violation rates for individual offenses, in some contexts a "weighted" violation rate was computed in order to compare the total seriousness of disciplinary activity across groups of inmates. The weighted rate, a general but unvalidated measure of seriousness, was calculated based on the severity weights of 5 for assault, 4 for rioting, 3 for threat violations, weapons violations, and other violent violations, 2 for drug violations, fighting, and loss/destruction of property, 1 for tampering with equipment, and 0 for other violations.

Over the 78-month (6.5-year) period from July 1994 to December 2000, the primary time frame of this evaluation, 13.26% of the inmate population consisted of inmates identified as prison or street gang members. Over this period, the average inmate population of 23,248 broke out as 3,083 gang members (13.3%) and 20,165 non-gang inmates (86.7%). More specifically, the average inmate population of 23,248 broke out into the following average numbers of gang members by gang type and affiliation (from high to low):

Gang Type

- Street Gang Members (1,479 = 6.4%)
- STG Members (1,164 = 5.0%)
- Other Prison Gang Members (446 = 1.9%)

Gang Affiliation

- Border Brothers (280)
- Aryan Brotherhood (254)
- New Mexican Mafia (216)
- Peckerwoods (153)
- Surenos (130)
- Grandel (128)
- African American Council (117)
- African Mau Mau (116)
- Warrior Society (81)
- Skinheads (68)
- Old Mexican Mafia (40)
- La Raza (27)

Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 on the following four pages break out disciplinary violation results over the period July 1994-Dec. 2000 for total, gang, and non-gang populations (Table 4); by gang type (Table 5); by STG gang status (Table 6); and by STG gang affiliation (Table 7). As indicated in Table 4, violation rates were typically between 2 to 3 times as high for gang members as for non-gang inmates, the ratio ranging from 1.86 to 1 for drug violations (least linked to gang membership) to 2.68 to 1 for rioting (most linked to gang membership).

Table 4

**Disciplinary Violations and Violation Rates
Gang, Non-Gang, and Total Inmate Populations
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATGORY	TOTAL POPULATION		GANG MEMBERS		NON-GANG INMATES	
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate
Assault	8,176	54.1	2,257	112.4	5,919	45.2
Drug Violations	21,216	140.4	4,701	234.1	16,515	126.0
Threat Violations	9,262	61.3	2,375	118.3	6,887	52.5
Fighting	7,732	51.2	1,824	90.8	5,908	45.1
Rioting	4,952	32.8	1,442	71.8	3,510	26.8
Weapons Violations	7,215	47.8	1,809	90.1	5,406	41.2
Other Violent Viol.	2,212	14.6	533	26.5	1,679	12.8
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	10,133	67.1	2,672	133.1	7,461	56.9
Tampering w/Equip.	4,789	31.7	1,224	61.0	3,565	27.2
TOTAL VIOLATIONS	75,687	—	18,837	—	56,850	—
WEIGHTED RATE*	—	440.6	—	843.6	—	378.6

* Weighted Rate = (5*Assault Rate+4*Rioting Rate+3*Threat Rate+3*Weapons Rate+3*Other Violent Rate+2*Fighting Rate+2*Drug Violation Rate+2*Loss/Destr. of Property Rate+1*Tampering Rate)/3.

Table 5

**Disciplinary Violations and Violation Rates
By Gang Type
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATGORY	CERTIFIED PRISON GANGS*		UNCERTIFIED PRISON GANGS		STREET GANGS	
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate
Assault	944	124.8	325	112.0	988	102.8
Drug Violations	1,965	259.8	731	251.8	2,005	208.5
Threat Violations	871	115.2	403	138.8	1,101	114.5
Fighting	647	85.5	244	84.1	933	97.0
Rioting	598	79.1	172	59.2	672	69.9
Weapons Violations	818	108.2	259	89.2	732	76.1
Other Violent Viol.	218	28.8	52	17.9	263	27.4
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	950	125.6	308	106.1	1,414	147.1
Tampering w/Equip.	458	60.6	134	46.2	632	65.7
TOTAL VIOLATIONS	7,469	—	2,628	—	8,740	—
WEIGHTED RATE	—	899.8	—	821.6	—	806.2

* The seven (7) certified Security Threat Groups (STGs).

Table 6

**Disciplinary Violations and Violation Rates
By STG Gang Status
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATGORY	VALIDATED (Unrenounced)		VALIDATED (Renounced)		SUSPECT (Unvalidated)	
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate
Assault	253	115.7	47	116.3	644	123.0
Drug Violations	569	260.2	82	203.0	1,314	259.7
Threat Violations	216	98.8	44	108.9	611	128.7
Fighting	153	70.0	29	71.8	465	90.0
Rioting	190	86.9	21	52.0	387	71.0
Weapons Violations	322	147.3	46	113.9	450	90.0
Other Violent Viol.	73	33.4	14	34.7	131	23.2
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	375	171.5	49	121.3	526	105.9
Tampering w/Equip.	145	66.3	40	99.0	273	51.7
TOTAL VIOLATIONS	2,296	—	372	—	4,801	—
WEIGHTED RATE	—	944.8	—	817.7	—	862.5

Table 7

**Disciplinary Violation Rates
By STG Gang Affiliation*
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATGORY	Aryan Brotherhood	Border Brothers	Grandel	African Mau Mau	New Mexican Mafia	Old Mexican Mafia	Surenos
Assault	114.3 (3)	128.1 (2)	95.1 (7)	108.6 (4)	175.5 (1)	107.1 (5)	103.8 (6)
Drug Violations	285.3 (3)	179.9 (6)	299.7 (2)	165.5 (7)	350.9 (1)	248.6 (5)	278.4 (4)
Threat Violations	153.5 (3)	63.5 (7)	81.9 (5)	123.1 (4)	163.3 (2)	206.5 (1)	68.4 (6)
Fighting	68.9 (6)	106.5 (1)	78.2 (5)	82.1 (4)	84.9 (3)	53.5 (7)	94.4 (2)
Rioting	81.0 (3)	84.4 (2)	75.8 (5)	47.7 (6)	97.0 (1)	42.1 (7)	76.7 (4)
Weapons Viol.	99.7 (5)	133.0 (1)	91.5 (6)	111.2 (3)	103.4 (4)	126.2 (2)	87.3 (7)
Other Violent Viol.	25.4 (5)	34.2 (3)	27.7 (4)	17.2 (7)	35.0 (2)	45.9 (1)	20.1 (6)
Loss/Dest. of Prop.	94.9 (6)	168.9 (1)	149.3 (2)	63.6 (7)	125.5 (4)	149.1 (3)	118.0 (5)
Tamper w/Equip.	61.7 (4)	66.8 (3)	56.6 (6)	27.8 (7)	68.5 (2)	76.5 (1)	60.2 (5)
WEIGHTED RATE	897.1 (3)	882.5 (4)	831.0 (5)	712.8 (7)	1,120.6 (1)	939.5 (2)	798.3 (6)

* Includes validated members, renounced members, and suspects. The violation rate rank among the seven (7) certified gangs is in parenthesis.

Ratio of Gang to Non-Gang Violation Rates

- Rioting (2.68 to 1)
- Assault (2.48 to 1)
- Loss/Destruction of Property (2.34 to 1)
- Threat Violations (2.25 to 1)
- Tampering with Equipment (2.24 to 1)
- Weapons Violations (2.19 to 1)
- Other Violent Violations (2.07 to 1)
- Fighting (2.01 to 1)
- Drug Violations (1.86 to 1)

Among the three broad gang types (certified prison gangs [STGs], uncertified prison gangs, and street gangs), members of certified gangs (STGs) recorded the highest violation rates in the case of assault, drug violations, rioting, weapons violations, and other violent violations. On the other hand, members of uncertified prison gangs (African American Council, La Raza, Peckerwoods, Skinheads, and Warrior Society) recorded the highest rate of threat violations, while members of street gangs recorded the highest rates of fighting, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment.

Among the seven (7) STGs, validated but not renounced members recorded the highest rates of drug violations, rioting, weapons violations, and loss/destruction of property. However, renounced members recorded the highest rates of other violent violations and tampering with equipment. STG suspects recorded the highest rates of assault, threat violations, and fighting.

The weighted violation rate, reflecting the severity of violations, was 2.23 times as high for gang members as for non-gang inmates, was 10% higher for STG members than for uncertified gang members, and was 12% higher for STG members than for street gang members. Among STG members, the weighted violation rate was 16% higher for validated but not renounced members than for renounced members, and was 10% higher for validated but unrenounced members than for suspects.

Among the seven STGs, the New Mexican Mafia ranked 1st in assault, drug violations, rioting, and the weighted violation rate, 2nd in threat violations, other violent violations, and tampering with equipment, and 3rd in fighting. The Old Mexican Mafia ranked 1st in threat violations, other violent violations, and tampering with equipment, 2nd in weapons violations and the weighted violation rate, and 3rd in loss/destruction of property. The Border Brothers ranked 1st in fighting, weapons violations, and loss/destruction of property, 2nd in assault and rioting, and 3rd in other violent violations and tampering with equipment. The Aryan Brotherhood ranked 3rd in assault, drug violations, threat violations, rioting, and the weighted violation rate. Finally, the Grandel ranked 2nd in drug violations and loss/destruction of property, while the African Mau Mau ranked 3rd in weapons violations and the Surenos ranked 2nd in fighting.

Perhaps the most telling result regarding disciplinary violation rates, and a clear indictment of gang activity in the Arizona prison system, is the fact that in no instance did a gang category considered in this evaluation, e.g., prison gang, street gang, specific STG gang, etc., record a disciplinary violation rate which was less than the comparable rate for the non-gang population. The closest instance was the tampering rate for the African Mau Mau (27.8), which was only slightly above the tampering rate for non-gang inmates (27.2). This finding clearly highlights the utility of targeting gang members of all types for heightened security measures in the prison setting. In light of this fact, the Department is currently seeking grant funding to assist in fine-tuning the inmate classification system for the purpose of facilitating a more strategic response to gang activity in the Arizona prison system. This potentiality is based on the fact that the present classification system is effectively "under-classifying" gang members to the extent that the disciplinary violation rates which gang members record are well in excess of the violation rates for non-gang inmates housed in the same security levels (see Table 8).

Table 8**Ratio of Gang to Non-Gang Violation Rates*
By Unit Security Level
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATGORY	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Detention Facility	SMU I	SMU II
Assault	3.42	2.35	2.47	2.30	1.29	0.74	0.47
Drug Violations	2.28	2.57	1.94	1.73	0.92	1.42	1.92
Threat Violations	2.91	2.36	2.25	1.56	0.91	0.75	0.62
Fighting	1.92	2.07	2.08	1.81	0.77	0.91	0.53
Rioting	3.51	2.31	2.64	2.10	1.98	2.09	3.70
Weapons Viol.	1.83	2.06	1.82	1.94	0.91	0.93	1.08
Other Violent Viol.	2.47	1.74	2.09	1.39	0.52	0.71	0.49
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	1.98	2.11	2.35	1.16	1.07	0.89	0.69
Tampering w/Equip.	1.84	1.80	2.40	0.97	0.95	0.88	0.64
WEIGHTED RATE	2.53	2.32	2.24	1.87	1.08	0.87	0.67

* The ratio is calculated as the violation rate for gang members divided by the violation rate for non-gang inmates.

The largest ratios of gang to non-gang violation rates are:

- **Rioting in Level 2 Units (3.51 to 1)**
- **Assault in Level 2 Units (3.42 to 1)**
- **Threat Violations in Level 2 Units (2.91 to 1)**
- **Rioting in Level 4 Units (2.64 to 1)**
- **Drug Violations in Level 3 Units (2.57 to 1)**
- **Assault in Level 4 Units (2.47 to 1)**
- **Other Violent Violations in Level 4 Units (2.47 to 1)**
- **Tampering with Equipment in Level 4 Units (2.40 to 1)**
- **Threat Violations in Level 3 Units (2.36 to 1)**
- **Assault in Level 3 Units (2.35 to 1)**
- **Loss/Destruction of Property in Level 4 Units (2.35 to 1)**
- **Rioting in Level 3 Units (2.31 to 1)**
- **Assault in Level 5 Units (2.30 to 1)**
- **Drug Violations in Level 2 Units (2.28 to 1)**
- **Threat Violations in Level 4 Units (2.25 to 1)**

In general, as one might expect, the ratios of gang to non-gang violation rates are highest in the case of assault and rioting, both ratios averaging 2.64 across Levels 2-5. The next highest average ratios are for threat violations (2.27) and drug violations (2.13). These four types of violations, assault, rioting, threat violations, and drug violations, are the ones which are the most commonly associated with gang members, and this perception is certainly supported by current evaluation data. These are the four types of violations which should, hypothetically, be the most sensitive to measures aimed at controlling gang-related activities in prison. This is one of the things we will be looking for in the incapacitation analysis, to be described in the next section.

In any case, the data examined above clearly indicate that gang members commit serious disciplinary violations at much higher rates than do non-gang inmates housed in units of the same security level. This establishes the fact of a fertile ground for measures directed at moving gang members into more secure facilities, as is the case with the STG program. The remaining portion of the Impact Evaluation is devoted to determining the extent to which this possibility has already become an actuality.

Major Components of the Impact Evaluation

Four major questions are addressed in the Impact Evaluation:

- Incapacitation Did the placement of validated STG members in SMU II, as per the provisions of the September 1997 revision to DO 806, have a direct incapacitation effect on these inmates and, if so, how much were their violent and disruptive activities curtailed as a result?
- Deterrence and Related Effects Did violation rates across the inmate population decrease following the effective dates of STG policy revisions occurring in 1995 and 1997? Did other factors come into play which could have contributed to a drop in violation rates?
- Desistance Did violation rates among STG members who renounced their gang affiliation fall as a result of a hypothetical dissociation from the gang, indicating that these inmates "desisted" from gang activities?
- Violation Predictors What is the statistical relationship and relative contribution of gang membership (STG, other prison gang, or street gang), security level, ethnic background, age, prior commitments, and various prison conditions, to the rates of various violations?

The first question is addressed by comparing violation rates of validated STG members prior to SMU II placement with comparable rates during the period of placement. The second question is addressed by means of a time series analysis of violation rates within broad groups of inmates. The third question is addressed by determining the extent to which violation rates of renounced STG members dropped in conjunction with the 1997 gang policy initiative. Finally, correlation and multiple regression methods are used to address the fourth question.

Incapacitation Analysis

One of the primary goals of the Security Threat Group (STG) Program of the Arizona Department of Corrections is to remove validated STG members from the general inmate population and to isolate them in the super-maximum security Special Management Unit II (SMU II) at the Eyman Complex in Florence, Arizona. The expectation is that placement in SMU II will reduce the number of serious disciplinary violations that validated members might have committed had they remained in the lower security units in which they were housed.

SMU II is considered by ADC officials to be the most secure facility in the Arizona prison system, and it is for this reason that it was selected as the site for housing validated gang members. For one thing, SMU II inmates are in cells by themselves, which are operated by remote controls so that there is as little contact as possible between the inmate and other inmates and staff. Furthermore, there is evidence that gang members placed in SMU II are controlled to a greater extent than are other inmates housed there, i.e., their rates of assault, threat violations, fighting, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment are about half what they are for other inmates in SMU II (see previous section). However, higher violation rates among non-gang members in SMU II may also be due to the fact that SMU II is the ultimate destination point for the most violent and disruptive inmates in the prison system.

Whether or not there is an added effect to SMU II placement which is peculiar to gang members, it has been documented that STG members (and members of other types of gangs) commit violations at much higher rates do than non-gang inmates, hence isolating them in a supermax facility should make regular prison units safer for both staff and inmates. Whether it achieves this goal or not, placement in SMU II should "incapacitate" gang members and directly reduce their disciplinary violation rates.

The research literature on incapacitation typically addresses attempts to measure the effect on crime rates when individuals are convicted, sent to prison and thereby removed from the community. It is assumed that when an offender is imprisoned, the community will be safer during the period of incarceration. Incapacitation within a prison system is similar inasmuch as targeted inmates, e.g., validated STG members, are removed from the larger prison community and are placed in more secure facilities. Hypothetically, this should reduce the violations they commit as well as violations in the units from which they are removed.

For purposes of this analysis, four hundred thirty (431) validated STG gang members were tracked from the time they entered prison on their current offense (the current incarceration begin date) to the time they entered SMU II, and then for the uninterrupted period of time they resided in SMU II until their eventual release (or until December 31, 2000, whichever came first). However, violations for these inmates were measured only within the period from July 1, 1994 through December 31, 2000. This violation window was imposed in part due to the changes in the inmate disciplinary system discussed above, and in part to keep the "pre-SMU II placement period" from spanning an overly lengthy period of time, i.e., some gang members entered prison as early as the 1970's.

All seven of the certified STG gangs are included in the analysis, including the Aryan Brotherhood (69), Border Brothers (179), New Mexican Mafia (67), Old Mexican Mafia (14), Grandel (73), African Mau Mau (15), and Surenos (14). Because the numbers of validated members of the Old Mexican Mafia, African Mau Mau, and Surenos are small, incapacitation results for these STGs are not broken out in the analysis. However, the results for these gangs are reflected in the results for "All Certified STGs" in Table 9 on the next page.

Table 9, which applies to all 431 STG members included in the analysis, reveals violations and violation rates for the "pre-SMU II placement period" (33.1 month average) and the "post-SMU II placement period" (19.1 month average). It also shows the percent difference in each violation rate from the first period to the second, i.e., hypothetical incapacitation effects. Tables 10-13 present the same data for the four major STGs. *As anticipated from the results presented in the previous section, rates of the types of violations most commonly associated with gang membership, i.e., assault, drug violations, threat violations, and rioting, all decreased by a large percentage, as did fighting, another violation frequently linked to gangs.*

Table 9

**The Incapacitation Effect
of SMU II Placement
*All Certified STGs***

VIOLATION CATGORY	Pre-SMU II Placement Period (33.1 Months Avg.)		Post-SMU II Placement Period (19.1 Mos. Avg.)		Percent Difference (Violation Rate)
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	
Assault	181	152.2	49	71.4	-53.1%
Drug Violations	462	388.6	65	94.8	-75.6%
Threat Violations	165	138.8	40	58.3	-58.0%
Fighting	122	102.6	2	2.9	-97.2%
Rioting	136	114.4	17	24.8	-78.3%
Weapons Violations	128	107.7	172	250.7	+132.9%
Other Violent Viol.	31	26.1	32	46.6	+78.9%
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	169	142.2	176	256.6	+80.5%
Tampering w/Equip.	60	50.5	77	112.2	+122.4%
WEIGHTED RATE	—	1,117.9	—	781.3	-30.1%

Table 10

**The Incapacitation Effect
of SMU II Placement
*Aryan Brotherhood***

VIOLATION CATGORY	Pre-SMU II Placement Period (33.0 Mos. Avg.)		Post-SMU II Placement Period (28.7 Mos. Avg.)		Percent Difference (Violation Rate)
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	
Assault	49	258.2	11	66.7	-74.2% (1)*
Drug Violations	83	437.4	10	60.6	-86.1% (2)
Threat Violations	48	253.0	18	109.1	-56.9% (4)
Fighting	7	36.9	0	0.0	-100.0% (1)
Rioting	30	158.1	4	24.2	-84.7% (2)
Weapons Violations	29	152.8	16	97.0	-36.6% (1)
Other Violent Viol.	5	26.4	2	12.1	-54.0% (1)
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	32	168.6	31	187.9	+11.4% (2)
Tampering w/Equip.	14	73.8	19	115.1	+56.0% (2)
WEIGHTED RATE	—	1,526.5	—	565.7	-62.9% (1)

* Rank among the four major STG gangs.

Table 11

**The Incapacitation Effect
of SMU II Placement
*New Mexican Mafia***

VIOLATION CATGORY	Pre-SMU II Placement Period (40.2 Mos. Avg.)		Post-SMU II Placement Period (21.7 Mos. Avg.)		Percent Difference (Violation Rate)
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	
Assault	38	169.3	9	74.3	-56.1% (2)*
Drug Violations	123	548.0	17	140.3	-74.4% (3)
Threat Violations	43	191.6	8	66.0	-65.5% (3)
Fighting	19	84.7	1	8.3	-90.2% (4)
Rioting	33	147.0	1	8.3	-94.4% (1)
Weapons Violations	21	93.6	20	165.1	+76.4% (2)
Other Violent Viol.	15	66.8	7	57.8	-13.5% (3)
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	32	142.6	19	156.8	+10.0% (1)
Tampering w/Equip.	9	40.1	13	107.3	+167.6% (3)
WEIGHTED RATE	—	1,360.4	—	663.2	-51.2% (2)

* Rank among the four major STG gangs.

Table 12
The Incapacitation Effect
of SMU II Placement
Grandel

VIOLATION CATGORY	Pre-SMU II Placement Period (24.6 Mos. Avg.)		Post-SMU II Placement Period (17.3 Mos. Avg.)		Percent Difference (Violation Rate)
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	
Assault	16	106.9	5	47.5	-55.6% (3)*
Drug Violations	69	461.1	5	47.5	-89.7% (1)
Threat Violations	20	133.6	3	28.5	-78.7% (1)
Fighting	13	86.9	0	0.0	-100.0% (2)
Rioting	14	93.6	3	28.5	-69.5% (3)
Weapons Violations	10	66.8	21	199.5	+198.6% (3)
Other Violent Viol.	3	20.0	1	9.5	-52.6% (2)
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	15	100.2	31	294.6	+193.9% (4)
Tampering w/Equip.	10	66.8	5	47.5	-28.9% (1)
WEIGHTED RATE	—	977.8	—	598.6	-38.8% (3)

* Rank among the four major STG gangs.

Table 13
The Incapacitation Effect
of SMU II Placement
Border Brothers

VIOLATION CATGORY	Pre-SMU II Placement Period (32.7 Mos. Avg.)		Post-SMU II Placement Period (15.9 Mos. Avg.)		Percent Difference (Violation Rate)
	Violations	Violation Rate	Violations	Violation Rate	
Assault	54	110.7	21	88.5	-20.0% (4)*
Drug Violations	132	270.6	30	126.5	-53.3% (4)
Threat Violations	39	80.0	6	25.3	-68.4% (2)
Fighting	70	143.5	1	4.2	-97.1% (3)
Rioting	49	100.5	9	37.9	-62.2% (4)
Weapons Violations	52	106.6	97	409.0	+283.6% (4)
Other Violent Viol.	8	16.4	19	80.1	+388.4% (4)
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	74	151.7	81	341.5	+125.1% (3)
Tampering w/Equip.	25	51.3	34	143.4	+179.7% (4)
WEIGHTED RATE	—	915.8	—	1,075.1	+17.4% (4)

* Rank among the four major STG gangs.

The sizeable decreases in rates of assault, threat violations, and rioting among validated STG members are not significant solely because they reflect the kinds of violations most often associated with gang members. Rather, the more important point here is that these are *the most serious and violent* among the nine violation categories. *Placement in SMU II has curtailed the most dangerous and disruptive aspects of the gang-related activities of validated STG members.*

From Table 9, we can see that, while rates of five of the nine violation categories decreased substantially, rates of loss/destruction of property, other violent violations, tampering with equipment, and weapons violations actually increased. This can be explained in part by the fact that inmates can commit these types of violations while in their cells, and even while in supermax cells. Without the access to other inmates necessary to commit more serious violations, an STG member is left to his own devices in the isolated environment of his cell, which often leads to incidents of these four less serious types of violations. The increase in weapons violations can also be explained in part by the fact that cell searches are more effective in SMU II and because the definition of what constitutes a weapon is broader in the SMUs, e.g., a paper clip may be considered a weapon in these units, but not in lower security units.

The results of the incapacitation analysis indicate that SMU II placement worked the best for the Aryan Brotherhood. This gang ranked 1st for declines in assault, fighting, weapons violations, and other violent violations, and 2nd for declines in drug violations, rioting, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment. Incapacitation worked next best for the New Mexican Mafia, which ranked 1st for declines in rioting and loss/destruction of property, and 2nd for declines in assault and weapons violations. The Grandel ranked 1st for declines in drug and threat violations and tampering with equipment, and 2nd for declines in fighting and other violent violations. Finally, the Border Brothers ranked 2nd for declines in threat violations.

While incapacitation worked the least best for the Border Brothers, this gang still recorded a 20% decrease in assault, a 53% decrease in drug violations, a 68% decrease in threat violations, a 97% decrease in fighting, and a 62% decrease in rioting. These results show that SMU II placement has impacted the Border Brothers along with the other three gangs. These rates, however, lie in stark contrast to a 284% increase in weapons violations, a 388% increase in other violent violations, a 125% increase in loss/destruction of property, and a 180% increase in tampering with equipment. The nearly 4-fold increase in weapons violations by members of this gang is likely due to the fact that they have been known to fashion homemade darts in their cells, which they use to attack other inmates as they pass by. This has happened with enough frequency that it was noted both by STG Unit staff in Central Office and by Eyman SSU staff.

Conclusions of the Incapacitation Analysis

From the rather dramatic nature of the violation rate reductions unveiled above, it is clear that isolating STG gang members in the SMU II facility had a direct incapacitation effect in that they committed far fewer gang-related violations (i.e., assault, drug violations, threat violations, fighting, and rioting) while resident there. Isolation in SMU II greatly reduces gang member contact with other members of their gang of choice, with members of rival gangs, and with the inmate population in general. Reductions in drug violations, and to an extent reductions in fighting and rioting, are to be expected because these types of violations usually occur with frequency only in less secure facilities (i.e., Levels 2 and 3 for drug violations and Levels 2, 3, and 4 for fighting and rioting). On the other hand, although rates of assault and threat violations are normally higher in more secure facilities, the extremely tight security and close monitoring of inmate movement in the SMU II facility are apparently sufficient to prevent the type of contact with inmates and staff necessary for assaults and threats to occur with frequency.

Time Series Analysis

The flip side of the incapacitation issue concerns the impact the STG program has had on the prison community in general, and on the behavior of large groups of inmates, such as STG gangs as a whole, other prison and street gangs, and non-gang inmates. The principal question here is: "Did violation rates decrease across the Arizona prison population in conjunction with the STG policies adopted in August 1995 and September 1997?" These two policies are highlighted because they represent a relative "fleshing out" of the ADC strategy for controlling gang activity, as well as the advent of a generally more serious attitude toward security issues. While the Arizona STG program is generally regarded as having begun in September 1997, in effect it was in operation prior to that time. It was the August 1995 policy which first called for SMU placement (SMU I at that time) for validated gang members. SMU II did not open until February of 1996.

Time series analysis is a statistical method for interpreting a set of observations over a period of time. The purpose of the analysis is to determine if an intervention at a specific point in time caused a change in the series. For example, it has been used to determine if a crackdown on drunk driving had an effect on the number of fatalities caused by drunk drivers. This is accomplished by determining if there is a statistically significant drop in the time series after the intervention. In this section we make use of the a particular time series methodology, Box-Jenkins ARIMA (Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average), to determine how much impact two ADC gang policy initiatives of the 1990's (one in August 1995 and the other in September 1997 – both described below) had on disciplinary violation rates across the inmate population, including specific impacts on violations by STG gang members, by members of other prison and street gangs, and by non-gang inmates.

The Incremental Nature of the STG Policy

The Box-Jenkins ARIMA statistical methodology tests the hypothesis that two interventions (the 1995 and 1997 Orders) associated with a decline in disciplinary violations. However, the STG program was introduced incrementally by the Arizona Department of Corrections over the period 1991-1999. The two changes in the inmate disciplinary system that occurred in December 1994, as described above, had a side effect of increasing the number of guilty and major violations by making it easier to reach a guilty finding, and by changing some violations from minors to majors. Also, throughout the decade of the nineties, inmates who committed disciplinary violations, including gang members, were increasingly reclassified and placed into higher security units (in most cases other than SMU II) where, it was assumed, their disruptive activities would decrease.

Moreover, the Department initiated a protective segregation (PS) policy in early 1998 that likely had the effect of reducing assaults by removing potential victims from the general population. This was supplemented by ADC classification initiatives aimed at segregating rival gangs (e.g., the New Mexican Mafia and the Border Brothers; and later the Surenos from rival gangs) and by efforts to enhance the protective segregation program by holding those inmates accountable who threaten other inmates and force them into PS beds.

These initiatives and several others, all of which are believed to have contributed to an improvement in the safety and security of the Arizona prison system, were in addition to the gang policy initiatives adopted during the nineties. Unfortunately, the current evaluation design did not allow for a calculation of the individual and unique effects of each of these initiatives. This is not necessarily an indictment of the current research inasmuch as a calculation of this nature would prove difficult in any case because these initiatives all overlap and interrelate.

It is the belief of the evaluation team that all of the ADC security initiatives of the nineties, including the STG program as a centerpiece, have worked together to form a "whole" strategy aimed at addressing the security problem from a balanced interactive perspective. While this evaluation necessarily focuses on the STG program, it is not possible to isolate the effect of this particular program from the effects of other parallel efforts, and particularly in light of the fact that the present research is correlational rather than experimental. In correlational research, one cannot attribute precise cause and effect to the research findings. This is particularly the case with regard to the results of the time series analysis. Although this analysis is capable of demonstrating reductions in disciplinary violations in conjunction with the implementation of gang policy initiatives, we cannot assume that such initiatives constituted the "sole cause" of these reductions. Rather, it seems likely that the reductions occurred as the result of the combined effect of all of the enhancements to the security operations of the Department. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the STG program has formed an important piece in the security puzzle and, accordingly, it is useful to spell out the manner in which the program developed.

In order to understand the incremental nature of the STG policy, and the significant role of the 1995 and 1997 Orders, Management Order #57 and Department Order 806, we briefly describe the four main ADC gang policy initiatives.

The 1991 Gang Policy Initiative Although ADC officials began to take action against gangs in the late 1980's, Management Order 91-24, effective December 2, 1991, was the first to prohibit inmates from engaging in gang activity. The Order defined gangs, and what is required to identify gang members. It also set up a validation committee and established criteria for determining if an inmate was a gang member.¹ The criteria that were to be used were:

¹ These Department Orders are too lengthy to be included in this report.

- Self-proclamation.
- Witness testimony.
- Correspondence.
- Paraphernalia.
- Tattoos.
- Association with known gang members.

Three or more of these criteria were required to indicate membership in a gang. However, no penalties were specified in the Order for those identified as gang members.

The 1994 Gang Policy Initiative Director's Management Order 94-24, effective November 4, 1994, prohibited "engaging in any organized activity that represents a threat to prison security." The Order defined a Security Threat Group (STG) in rather broad terms as follows:

"Any organization, association or groups of persons, either formal or informal (including traditional prison gangs), that may have a common name or identifying sign or symbol, and whose members or associates engage in or have engaged in activities that include, but are not limited to: planning, organizing, threatening, financing, soliciting or committing unlawful acts or acts which violate the Department's policies or rules, which threaten the safe and orderly operation of prisons."

We quote this definition at length because it shows that the policy, as written, could apply to a variety of inmate groups, including traditional prison gangs and groups of inmates belonging to street gangs.

This Order also specified sanctions that could be administered to any inmate identified as a member of an STG, including reclassification to a higher security level, assignment of an institutional risk score no lower than 5, ineligibility for compassionate leave, and prohibition from working on jobs outside the secure perimeter. The criteria to be used to identify STG members are the same as in the 1991 Order, with the addition of one item: "Any overt acts that are apparent STG activity."

The 1995 Gang Policy Initiative Management Order #57, effective August 22, 1995, is the same as the 1994 Order in regard to its purpose, the definition of what constitutes an STG, and the provision for an STG Validation Committee. However, it also adds several new dimensions. Some of the more important ones are:

- Establishes an STG "Certification Process" for determining which groups are STGs (the 1994 Order only specified a process for identifying inmates as STG members).
- Calls for a training regimen to be established for correctional staff regarding STG member identification and validation processes, and sets requirements aimed at involving staff in documenting STG activity.
- Gives identified staff the responsibility to determine if an inmate is an STG member, to share information, and to maintain validation packets.
- Expands the STG validation process.
- Adds an additional criterion ("any other indicia of STG membership") for identifying and validating an inmate as an STG member.
- Broadens sanctions to include placement in an SMU as one of several penalties (SMU I was the only SMU open at the time; SMU II did not open until early 1996).

The 1995 Order, therefore, significantly intensified and expanded the scope and penalties of the STG program, which is one of the reasons why it is being pinpointed as the first major intervention in the time series analysis.

The 1997 Gang Policy Initiative Department Order 806, first adopted on September 1, 1996, but later significantly enhanced effective September 2, 1997, superceded the 1995 Order and expanded the scope of the STG policy. The major changes in the 1997 Order are:

- Broadens the purpose of the program to prohibit inmates from creating, promoting or participating in any club, association, organization or gang except as permitted by Department instructions.
- Specifies what documentation is necessary to certify a group as an STG and to validate an inmate as a member of the STG.
- Sets up a monitoring process (including phone, mail, and cell searches).
- Expands the sanctions for validated STG membership, including assignment to SMU II.
- Describes in more detail the STG validation hearings, appeals, and debriefing processes.

This 1997 Order constituted another major intensification of the STG program and is pinpointed as the second intervention point in the time series analysis. However, it should be emphasized that inmates validated as STG members were being placed in SMU I (the other super-maximum security unit at the Eyman Complex in Florence, Arizona) prior to the September 1997 Order. For example, as many as 20.1% of identified STG members (both validated and suspected members) were resident in SMU I as early as July of 1994. SMU II opened in early 1996 and, although policy did not require placement in SMU II until after the September 1997 Order took effect, nonetheless a number of validated members were moved from SMU I to SMU II as early as February of 1996.

Although the September 1997 Order represents a definite benchmark in the establishment of the STG program in Arizona, steps were being taken to place validated STG gang members in higher security units prior to the implementation of that order. Table 14 on the next page shows that the percent of validated STG gang members resident in SMU II increased from 0.0% in December 1995, to 30.2% in June 1996, to 44.3% in June 1998, and to 93.6% in June 2001.

Two things should be noted in this regard. First, at any given time a portion of validated members have yet to be placed in SMU II, either because they were just recently validated and have yet to be transported, or because they were pending an appeal. Also, the AIMS data on gang status could not be recreated for dates prior to 2001. As a result, there is likely an over-estimation of the number of validated members resident outside SMU II in prior years. An unknown number in the "validated" category were no more than suspects on the dates indicated in Table 14, and perhaps some had not even been identified as suspects. Accordingly, the data in Table 14 should be taken only as a general indication of STG member movement to SMU II.

Among unvalidated STG suspects, the percent in less secure Level 2 and 3 units declined from 43.4% in July 1994 to 33.7% in June 2001, as did the percent in the SMUs, in Level 5, and in detention beds, this percent dropping from 38.6% in July 1994 to 27.9% in June 2001. However, the percent in Level 4 units increased from 18.0% in July 1994 to 38.4% by June 2001. The percent of non-STG prison gang suspects (i.e., Warrior Society, Peckerwoods, Skinheads, African American Council, La Raza) remained relatively stable in all security levels throughout the time period from July 1994 to December 2000, with the exception that the percent in Level 5 units (excluding the SMUs) did increase from about 5.5% in 1994-95 to about 10% in 2001. Within the street gang population, the percent in Levels 2 and 3 declined from 55.6% in July 1994 to 47.6% by June 2001, with most of the difference moving to Level 4.

Table 14

**Distribution of Validated STG Members*
Across Unit Security Levels
July 1994 through June 2001**

MONTH	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Detention Facility	SMU I	SMU II
July 1994	7.9%	27.5%	22.3%	16.6%	3.9%	21.8%	0.0%
December 1994	7.2%	30.5%	23.3%	14.4%	5.1%	19.5%	0.0%
June 1995	6.8%	28.9%	24.9%	8.8%	7.2%	23.3%	0.0%
December 1995	4.0%	36.2%	18.8%	5.8%	6.5%	28.6%	0.0%
June 1996	5.4%	26.8%	13.8%	6.0%	6.0%	11.7%	30.2%
December 1996	6.1%	29.6%	16.2%	11.3%	2.7%	10.4%	23.8%
June 1997	5.7%	30.1%	16.1%	11.5%	5.7%	12.3%	18.6%
December 1997	3.5%	22.5%	12.6%	10.1%	11.4%	9.3%	30.6%
June 1998	3.4%	21.8%	8.3%	11.5%	3.9%	6.8%	44.3%
December 1998	3.8%	15.3%	8.1%	9.8%	6.7%	7.2%	49.0%
June 1999	3.5%	9.4%	7.9%	6.0%	7.2%	6.7%	59.3%
December 1999	2.4%	8.0%	8.3%	6.4%	4.0%	5.1%	65.8%
June 2000	2.1%	4.7%	7.4%	5.9%	3.2%	4.4%	72.4%
December 2000	1.0%	1.3%	2.3%	5.5%	4.2%	2.9%	82.9%
June 2001	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	3.5%	1.4%	0.7%	93.6%

* This table concerns inmates who were eventually validated as STG gang members by September 30, 2000.

Thus, in addition to the movement of validated STG members into SMU II, ADC classification strategies over the period 1994-2001 tended to move unvalidated STG suspects from both higher and lower security levels into Level 4 and street gang members up to Level 4 from Levels 2 and 3, creating an accumulation of unvalidated gang members in that level.

Furthermore, although the movement of validated STG members into SMU II began as early as February 1996, the largest increase in the percent of validated STGs in SMU II (13.7%) occurred between December 1997 and June 1998, after the 1997 Order had taken effect (see Table 14). Therefore, AIMS data indicate that the September 6, 1997 Order had a large impact on STG gangs, with that impact continuing at somewhat lower levels over the period from June 1998 through June 2001. Here, then, we find further support for using the effective date of the 1997 Order as an intervention point in the time series analysis.

Time Series Analysis Results

In the time series analysis, we examine trends and changes in violation rates over the period from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 2000 for all inmates, with this period truncated to begin on July 1, 1994 for gang members and non-gang inmates. This date was selected to begin the latter series due to limitations of the AIMS database, which made it difficult to determine which inmates were gang members in the early nineties. Also, the evaluators wished not to rely too heavily on data from the old (pre-Dec. 1994) disciplinary system.

Violation rates were first calculated on a quarterly basis, yielding a time series of 44 (26) quarters in length. Subsequently, in order to examine the hypothesized effects of the 1995 and 1997 gang policy initiatives, "composite" violation rates were computed for four separate periods of time identified as Period I, Period II, Period III, and Period IV. One focus of the time series analysis was to gauge changes in violation rates between periods.

Period I is the 18-quarter period from January 1990 to June 1994, for which gang data were not available. Period II is the 5-quarter period just prior to the 1995 initiative (July 1994-Sept. 1995). Period III is the 8-quarter period following the 1995 initiative but prior to the 1997 initiative (Oct. 1995-Sept. 1997). Finally, Period IV is the 13-quarter period following the 1997 initiative (Oct. 1997 to Dec. 2000). By examining changes in violation rates from Period II to Period III, we address the impact of the 1995 initiative. By examining changes from Period III to Period IV we address the impact of the 1997 initiative. Finally, by examining changes from Period II to Period IV, we address the combined impact of both initiatives.

Figures 2 through 33 at the end of this section display the individual violation rate series examined in the report. Figures 2 through 13 are for all inmates, while Figures 14 through 23 are for gang members (all types, treated as a group), and Figures 24 through 33 are for non-gang inmates. As previously indicated, the time series are of length 44 (all inmates) and 26 (gang members/non-gang inmates). In each figure, lines are drawn at the July-September 1995 quarter (the 23rd), to represent the intervention of the August 1995 initiative, and at the July-September 1997 quarter (the 31st), to represent the intervention of the September 1997 initiative.

Violation Rate Changes

ARIMA results for "all inmates" indicate statistically significant drops after both interventions in assault, drug violations, threat violations, weapons violations, other violent violations, and weighted violations. Rioting dropped significantly after the first intervention, but jumped significantly after the second, while loss/destruction jumped significantly after the first intervention but dropped significantly after the second. "All violations" and "all other violations" dropped significantly after the second intervention. Fighting jumped significantly after the first intervention, while tampering jumped significantly after each intervention.

ARIMA results for gang members show statistically significant drops after both interventions in assault, drug violations, threat violations, weapons violations, other violent violations, and weighted violations, as was the case for all inmates. Rioting dropped significantly after the first intervention, but jumped after the second. Fighting, loss/destruction of property, and tampering jumped significantly after the first intervention but dropped significantly after the second.

Finally, ARIMA results for non-gang inmates show statistically significant drops after both interventions in assault, drug violations, threat violations, other violent violations, and weighted violations. Rioting dropped significantly after the first intervention only. Fighting, weapons violations, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment jumped significantly after the first intervention but dropped significantly after the second.

Tables 15-17, which consist of data extracted from Figures 2-33, summarize composite violation rates for Period II, Period III, and Period IV as previously defined, as well as percent changes in rates between periods. The three tables are for all inmates (Table 15), gang members (Table 16), and non-gang inmates (Table 17). The percent changes include:

- Changes from Period II to Period III, reflecting the impact of the first initiative.
- Changes from Period III to Period IV, reflecting the impact of the second initiative.
- Changes from Period II to Period IV, reflecting the combined impact of both initiatives.

For all inmates (Table 15), the largest drops after the first intervention were in rioting and drug violations, while loss/destruction of property jumped dramatically. The largest drops after the second intervention were in other violent violations and assault, with no violation increasing substantially. The largest composite drops, reflecting the impact of both interventions, were in other violent violations, rioting, assault, drug violations, and threat violations.

Table 15
Percent Changes in Violation Rates
All Inmates
July 1994 through December 2000

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Violation Rate			Percent Change		
	Period II	Period III	Period IV	II to III	III to IV	II to IV
Assault	76.1	62.6	42.9	-17.8%	-31.4%	-43.6%
Drug Violations	207.9	133.1	124.0	-36.0%	-6.8%	-40.3%
Threat Violations	80.6	66.9	52.4	-16.9%	-21.7%	-34.9%
Fighting	46.5	52.1	52.1	+12.1%	+0.1%	+12.2%
Rioting	61.0	26.5	27.6	-56.6%	+4.2%	-54.8%
Weapons Violations	54.1	49.0	45.2	-9.6%	-7.8%	-16.6%
Other Violent Viol.	24.1	18.2	9.8	-24.3%	-46.2%	-59.3%
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	51.9	80.6	64.4	+55.5%	-20.2%	+24.1%
Tampering w/Equip.	30.2	31.3	32.4	+3.6%	+3.4%	+7.1%
All Other Violations	2,338.5	2,424.1	2,203.2	+3.7%	-9.1%	-5.8%
ALL VIOLATIONS	3,023.3	2,943.0	2,655.7	-1.1%	-9.8%	-10.7%
WEIGHTED VIOL.	581.2	461.4	386.8	-20.6%	-16.2%	-33.4%

Table 16
Percent Changes in Violation Rates
Gang Members
July 1994 through December 2000

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Violation Rate			Percentage Change		
	Period II	Period III	Period IV	II to III	III to IV	II to IV
Assault	156.7	132.4	92.8	-15.5%	-29.9%	-40.8%
Drug Violations	376.4	265.9	186.1	-29.4%	-30.0%	-50.6%
Threat Violations	176.1	145.9	91.9	-17.1%	-37.0%	-47.8%
Fighting	80.0	99.1	89.6	+24.0%	-9.6%	+12.0%
Rioting	135.8	60.7	61.9	-55.3%	+2.0%	-54.4%
Weapons Violations	107.7	101.7	80.6	-5.6%	-20.7%	-25.2%
Other Violent Viol.	46.1	37.7	16.8	-18.3%	-55.4%	-63.5%
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	93.3	182.5	119.6	+95.6%	-34.5%	+28.2%
Tampering w/Equip.	55.5	74.2	56.1	+33.8%	-24.4%	+1.1%
WEIGHTED VIOL.	1,157.0	976.6	708.7	-15.6%	-27.4%	-38.7%

Table 17

**Percent Changes in Violation Rates
Non-Gang Inmates
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Violation Rate			Percent Change		
	Period II	Period III	Period IV	II to III	III to IV	II to IV
Assault	65.8	52.7	34.5	-19.9%	-34.5%	-47.6%
Drug Violations	186.3	129.3	105.2	-30.6%	-18.6%	-43.5%
Threat Violations	68.4	64.1	41.2	-6.3%	-35.7%	-39.8%
Fighting	42.1	52.7	41.8	+25.2%	-20.7%	-0.7%
Rioting	51.6	21.6	21.8	-58.1%	+0.9%	-57.8%
Weapons Violations	47.3	50.1	34.4	+5.9%	-31.3%	-27.3%
Other Violent Viol.	21.3	18.1	7.2	-15.0%	-60.2%	-66.2%
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	46.5	77.6	48.8	+66.9%	-37.1%	+4.9%
Tampering w/Equip.	27.0	33.7	23.7	+24.8%	-29.7%	-12.2%
WEIGHTED VIOL.	507.7	433.2	307.8	-14.7%	-28.9%	-39.4%

For gang members (Table 16), the largest drops after the first intervention were in rioting and drug violations, while loss/destruction of property and tampering with equipment jumped dramatically. The largest drops after the second intervention were in other violent violations, threat violations, and loss/destruction of property, with no violation increasing substantially. The largest composite drops, reflecting both interventions, were in other violent violations, rioting, drug violations, threat violations, and assault, again with no violation increasing substantially.

For non-gang inmates (Table 17), the largest drops after the first intervention were in rioting and drug violations, while loss/destruction of property jumped substantially. The largest drops after the second intervention were in other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, threat violations, and assault, with no violation increasing substantially. The largest composite drops, again reflecting the impact of both interventions, were in other violent violations, rioting, assault, drug violations, and threat violations, again with no violation increasing substantially.

The only major divergence between results for gang members and non-gang inmates is that the weapons violation rate for gang members decreased significantly following the first intervention, while the comparable rate for non-gang inmates increased significantly. Otherwise, there were variations between gang members and non-gang inmates in the magnitudes of changes, so Table 18 was prepared to compare percent changes from Period II to Period IV.

Of significance is the fact that percent changes from Period II to Period IV (Table 18) were comparable between gang members and non-gang inmates with the exceptions of fighting and tampering with equipment, where non-gang inmates improved more than gang members, and loss/destruction of property, where gang members improved more than non-gang inmates. In all other cases, percent changes from Period II to Period IV are quite close, suggesting that gang policy initiatives have not distinguished gang members from non-gang inmates.

Table 18**Percent Changes in Violation Rates
Gang Members Versus Non-Gang Inmates
Period II to Period IV**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	GANG MEMBERS	NON-GANG INMATES
Assault	-40.8%	-47.6%
Drug Violations	-50.6%	-43.5%
Threat Violations	-47.8%	-39.8%
Fighting	+12.0%	-0.7%
Rioting	-54.4%	-57.8%
Weapons Violations	-25.2%	-27.3%
Other Violent Viol.	-63.5%	-66.2%
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+28.2%	+4.9%
Tampering w/Equip.	+1.1%	-12.2%
WEIGHTED VIOLATIONS	-38.7%	-39.4%

However, this conclusion is compromised by the fact that gang members record much higher violation rates than do non-gang inmates, and so a given percentage change constitutes a larger "absolute" change for gang members than for non-gang inmates. For instance, the absolute drop of 31.3 in the assault rate from Period II to Period IV for non-gang inmates constitutes a 47.6% percentage drop for these inmates. For gang members, however, the absolute drop of 31.3 would constitute no more than a 20.0% percentage drop. It is for this reason that, when comparing violation rate drops between gang and non-gang populations, it is more appropriate to use absolute changes than percentage changes.

Absolute changes are changes in the "absolute level" of violations, whereas percentage changes are changes in the "relative level" of activity for the inmate group being considered. A high percentage drop in a given violation rate may not amount to much if that rate tends to be very low, e.g., physical assaults by child molesters on other inmates. Another reason to prefer absolute drops is that they translate directly into "absolute violation reductions," i.e., into actual numerical decreases in violations. Knowing the size of an absolute drop, and the number of inmates affected, we can easily calculate how many violations were "saved" or "prevented." Calculations like this are not possible based on percentage drops alone.

The use of absolute drops in lieu of percentage drops when comparing results between gang members and non-gang inmates receives further support from the results of simple linear regression calculations (see the "Regression Lines of Best Fit" on Figures 2-33), which indicate much larger downward trends in violation rates over the period July 1994-Dec. 2000 for gang members than for non-gang inmates. For instance, the slope of the regression line for the gang member assault rate (-3.10) is almost double the slope of the regression line for the non-gang inmate assault rate (-1.58).

In response to these considerations, additional tables were constructed (Tables 19-21) which summarize absolute rather than percentage changes. However, in this context we modify the type of change we are considering. Since we now know that both interventions had a significant impact on violation rates (in terms of percentage reductions in rates), we can combine Period III and Period IV to obtain a single composite period of impact, that being the period from October 1995 to December 2000 (Period III/IV). Our goal, then, is to determine the total impact of the combination of the two interventions over this longer period of time, both in terms of absolute reductions in violation rates and in terms of reductions in raw numbers of violations (absolute violation reductions as discussed in the previous paragraph).

To this end, Table 22 shows that absolute changes for gang members were typically two to three times as high as were absolute changes for non-gang inmates. Absolute drops were much greater for gang members than for non-gang inmates in the case of assault, drug violations, threat violations, rioting, weapons violations, other violent violations, and weighted violations. On the other extreme, absolute increases in violation rates were also greater for gang members, i.e., fighting, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment.

From Tables 23-25, which break out the gang member violation rate drops appearing in Table 22, we can identify greater absolute drops for STG gang members than for other prison gang and street gang members (Table 23), as well as greater absolute drops for validated but unrenounced STG members than for either renounced members or unvalidated STG suspects (Table 24). In addition, Table 25 identifies greater absolute drops for certain prison gangs than for others, e.g., for the New Mexican Mafia, the Aryan Brotherhood, the Grandel, the Skinheads, the Peckerwoods, and the African American Council. In general, across all violation categories, the Skinheads experienced the greatest absolute reductions in violation rates.

Table 19
Absolute Changes in Violation Rates
All Inmates
July 1994 through December 2000

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Violation Rate			Absolute Change		
	Period II	Period III	Period IV	II to III	III to IV	II to III/IV
Assault	76.1	62.6	42.9	-13.5	-19.6	-26.3
Drug Violations	207.9	133.1	124.0	-74.8	-9.0	-80.7
Threat Violations	80.6	66.9	52.4	-13.6	-14.5	-23.1
Fighting	46.5	52.1	52.1	+5.6	+0.1	+5.7
Rioting	61.0	26.5	27.6	-34.5	+1.1	-33.9
Weapons Violations	54.1	49.0	45.2	-5.2	-3.8	-7.6
Other Violent Viol.	24.1	18.2	9.8	-5.9	-8.4	-11.4
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	51.9	80.6	64.4	+28.8	-16.3	+18.2
Tampering w/Equip.	30.2	31.3	32.4	+1.1	+1.1	+1.8
WEIGHTED VIOL.	581.2	461.4	386.8	-120.8	-73.2	-168.4

Table 20

**Absolute Changes in Violation Rates
Gang Members
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Violation Rate			Absolute Change		
	Period II	Period III	Period IV	IV to III	III to IV	II to III/IV
Assault	156.7	132.4	92.8	-24.3	-39.6	-51.4
Drug Violations	376.4	265.9	186.1	-110.5	-79.8	-165.1
Threat Violations	176.1	145.9	91.9	-30.2	-54.0	-67.1
Fighting	80.0	99.1	89.6	+19.2	-9.5	+12.6
Rioting	135.8	60.7	61.9	-75.1	+1.2	-74.2
Weapons Violations	107.7	101.7	80.6	-6.0	-21.1	-20.4
Other Violent Viol.	46.1	37.7	16.8	-8.4	-20.9	-22.7
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	93.3	182.5	119.6	+89.2	-62.9	+46.2
Tampering w/Equip.	55.5	74.2	56.1	+18.8	-18.1	+6.4
WEIGHTED VIOL.	1,157.0	976.6	708.7	-180.4	-267.9	-363.5

Table 21

**Absolute Changes in Violation Rates
Non-Gang Inmates
July 1994 through December 2000**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Violation Rate			Absolute Change		
	Period II	Period III	Period IV	II to III	III to IV	II to III/IV
Assault	65.8	52.7	34.5	-13.0	-18.2	-24.9
Drug Violations	186.3	129.3	105.2	-57.0	-24.1	-72.8
Threat Violations	68.4	64.1	41.2	-4.3	-23.0	-19.2
Fighting	42.1	52.7	41.8	+10.5	-10.9	+3.5
Rioting	51.6	21.6	21.8	-30.0	+0.2	-30.0
Weapons Violations	47.3	50.1	34.4	+2.8	-15.7	-7.4
Other Violent Viol.	21.3	18.1	7.2	-3.2	-10.9	-10.3
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	46.5	77.6	48.8	+31.1	-28.9	+12.4
Tampering w/Equip.	27.0	33.7	23.7	+6.7	-10.0	+0.2
WEIGHTED VIOL.	507.7	433.2	307.8	-74.5	-125.4	-156.3

Table 22

**Absolute Changes in Violation Rates
Gang Members Versus Non-Gang Inmates
Period II to Period III/IV**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	GANG MEMBERS	NON-GANG INMATES	RATIO GANG TO NON-GANG
Assault	-51.4	-24.9	2.06 to 1
Drug Violations	-165.1	-72.8	2.27 to 1
Threat Violations	-67.1	-19.2	3.49 to 1
Fighting	+12.6	+3.5	(3.6 to 1)
Rioting	-74.2	-30.0	2.47 to 1
Weapons Violations	-20.4	-7.4	2.76 to 1
Other Violent Viol.	-22.7	-10.3	2.20 to 1
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+46.2	+12.4	(3.73 to 1)
Tampering w/Equip.	+6.4	+0.2	(32.0 to 1)
WEIGHTED VIOLATIONS	-363.5	-156.3	2.33 to 1

Table 23

**Absolute Changes in Violation Rates
By Gang Type
Period II to Period III/IV**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	CERTIFIED PRISON GANGS	UNCERTIFIED PRISON GANGS	STREET GANGS
Assault	-48.7	-59.5	-47.4
Drug Violations	-205.1	-129.1	-129.7
Threat Violations	-77.8	-53.8	-60.0
Fighting	+6.1	+9.0	+18.1
Rioting	-93.5	-59.8	-61.4
Weapons Violations	+13.0	-45.6	-38.5
Other Violent Viol.	-40.1	-2.7	-14.3
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+50.6	+6.4	+52.0
Tampering w/Equip.	+2.6	+16.8	+3.3
WEIGHTED VIOLATIONS	-408.8	-351.2	-312.3

Table 24

**Absolute Changes in Violation Rates
By STG Gang Status
Period II to Period III/IV**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	VALIDATED (Unrenounced)	VALIDATED (Renounced)	SUSPECT (Unvalidated)
Assault	-102.9	-9.9	-30.5
Drug Violations	-279.5	-156.9	-181.5
Threat Violations	-118.7	-136.8	-55.8
Fighting	-25.9	+36.9	+16.8
Rioting	-141.8	-74.4	-77.4
Weapons Violations	+29.4	+54.5	+0.1
Other Violent Viol.	-33.9	-58.8	-41.1
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+80.5	+46.7	+35.9
Tampering w/Equip.	+23.4	+19.6	-7.0
WEIGHTED VIOLATIONS	-625.9	-299.1	-339.0

Table 25
Absolute Changes in Violation Rates
By STG Gang Affiliation*
Period II to Period III/IV

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Aryan Brotherhood	Border Brothers	Grandel	African Mau Mau	New Mexican Mafia	Old Mexican Mafia	Surenos
Assault	-55.3	+2.0	-80.7	-109.5	-58.9	+15.4	+23.3
Drug Violations	-112.7	-327.9	-309.5	+3.4	-242.0	-353.6	-116.5
Threat Violations	-78.9	-23.1	-20.2	-83.0	-110.7	-97.5	-15.4
Fighting	+24.8	+19.1	-16.1	-32.9	-23.8	+19.6	+43.1
Rioting	-156.0	-52.6	-52.9	-33.5	-119.2	-113.5	-66.5
Weapons Viol.	-9.2	+54.6	+8.4	+20.2	-23.8	+86.8	+35.3
Other Violent Viol.	-44.7	+8.8	-102.5	-37.6	-35.0	-85.0	-38.2
Loss/Dest. of Prop.	+12.8	+71.1	+137.6	+20.0	+17.3	+68.1	+53.9
Tamper w/Equip.	-16.1	+33.5	+8.8	-24.5	-11.9	+95.8	+5.7
WEIGHTED RATE*	-488.4 (2)	-173.8 (6)	-441.7 (3)	-342.1 (5)	-596.2 (1)	-366.7 (4)	-79.2 (7)

* Includes validated members, renounced members, and suspects. In the case of the weighted violation rate, the violation rate rank among the seven (7) certified gangs is in parenthesis. Comparable drops in the weighted violation rate for uncertified prison gangs were as follows: Skinheads (-806.4), Peckerwoods (-462.3), African American Council (-410.4), and La Raza (-356.9).

Summary of absolute violation rate reductions from Period II to Period III/IV:

General Inmate Group

- ALL INMATES (-168.4)
- Gang Members (-363.5)
- Non-Gang Inmates (-156.3)

Gang Type

- STG Members (-408.8)
- Other Prison Gang Members (-351.2)
- Street Gang Members (-312.3)

STG Gang Status

- Validated/Unrenounced (-625.9)
- Suspect (-339.0)
- Validated/Renounced (-299.1)

STG Gang Affiliation

- New Mexican Mafia (-596.2)
- Aryan Brotherhood (-488.4)
- Grandel (-441.7)
- Old Mexican Mafia (-366.7)
- African Mau Mau (-342.1)
- Border Brothers (-173.8)
- Surenos (-79.2)

Uncertified Prison Gang Affiliation

- Skinheads (-806.4)
- Peckerwoods (-462.3)
- African American Council (-410.4)
- La Raza (-356.9)

Of interest is the fact of greater absolute drops for all gang categories than for non-gang inmates with but two exceptions, the Border Brothers and the Surenos. The lower absolute drops for the Border Brothers is consistent with the results of the incapacitation analysis, which indicated a lesser impact for this gang.

Major Conclusion

The STG program and accompanying security enhancement initiatives appear to have had a substantial effect on certified Security Threat Groups (STGs), a marked carryover effect on other gang elements in Arizona prisons, and a lesser but still significant effect on non-gang inmates.

As noted, the fact that absolute drops in violation rates are greater for gang members than for non-gang members is tied to the fact that gang members record higher violation rates to begin with. This is one of the main reasons gang members are targeted by security custody enhancement initiatives. Because their violation rates are higher, there is a correspondingly greater potential to achieve violation savings (i.e., absolute numerical reductions in violations) by targeting these inmates instead of non-gang members. Since percent reductions in violation rates were comparable for gang members and non-gang inmates, it had to be the overall higher violation rates among gang members which pushed their absolute violation rate reductions to higher levels. In turn, these higher absolute violation rate reductions translate into higher absolute violation reductions, i.e., into violation "savings." Per capita, there are greater violation savings to be had from targeting higher risk populations, and gang members are no exception.

To estimate actual violation savings associated with the violation rate reductions identified above, we calculate, for gang and non-gang populations alike, how many fewer violations would have occurred after the 1995 initiative had violation rates remained where they were prior to that initiative. The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 26-28.

Table 26

**Estimated Violation Savings/Losses
Gang Members Versus Non-Gang Inmates
October 1995 through December 2000 (63 Months)**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	GANG MEMBERS	NON-GANG INMATES	ALL INMATES
Assault	871	2,714	3,585
Drug Violations	2,750	7,936	10,686
Threat Violations	1,142	2,091	3,233
Fighting	-209	-376	-585
Rioting	1,281	3,264	4,545
Weapons Violations	363	804	1,167
Other Violent Viol.	383	1,120	1,503
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	-775	-1,352	-2,127
Tampering w/Equip.	-90	-23	-113
TOTAL SAVINGS	5,716	16,178	21,894

Table 27

**Estimated Violation Savings/Losses
By Gang Type
October 1995 through December 2000 (63 Months)**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	CERTIFIED PRISON GANGS	UNCERTIFIED PRISON GANGS	STREET GANGS
Assault	324	143	404
Drug Violations	1,335	311	1,104
Threat Violations	501	130	511
Fighting	-34	-22	-153
Rioting	614	144	523
Weapons Violations	-74	110	327
Other Violent Viol.	255	7	121
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	-317	-15	-443
Tampering w/Equip.	-21	-40	-29
TOTAL SAVINGS	2,583	768	2,365

Table 28

**Estimated Violation Savings/Losses
By STG Gang Status
October 1995 through December 2000 (63 Months)**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	VALIDATED (Unrenounced)	VALIDATED (Renounced)	SUSPECT (Unvalidated)
Assault	194	3	127
Drug Violations	526	52	757
Threat Violations	224	45	232
Fighting	49	-12	-71
Rioting	267	25	322
Weapons Violations	-55	-18	-1
Other Violent Viol.	64	20	171
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	-152	-15	-150
Tampering w/Equip.	-44	-6	29
TOTAL SAVINGS	1,073	94	1,416

The results show that, had composite violation rates over the 15-month period July 1994-Sept. 1995 carried forth intact to the 63-month period Oct. 1995-Dece. 2000, there would have been 21,894 fewer violations in the nine violation categories, 347.5 fewer violations per month, and 0.0172 fewer violations per inmate per month (206.4 fewer violations per 1,000 inmates per year of incarceration). This total violation savings over the 63 months breaks out as follows:

Violation Savings

3,585 fewer **Assaults** (871 or 24.3% by gang members)
10,686 fewer **Drug Violations** (2,750 or 25.7% by gang members)
3,233 fewer **Threat Violations** (1,142 or 35.3% by gang members)
4,545 fewer **Rioting Violations** (1,281 or 28.2% by gang members)
1,167 fewer **Weapons Violations** (363 or 31.1% by gang members)
503 fewer **Other Violent Violations** (383 or 25.5% by gang members)

Violation Losses

585 more **Fighting** incidents (35.7% by gang members)
2,127 more **Loss/Destruction of Property** incidents (775 or 36.4% by gang members)
113 more **Tampering with Equipment** incidents (90 or 79.6% by gang members)

Net Violation Savings

21,894 fewer **Total Violations** (5,716 or 26.1% by gang members)

The total gang member savings of 5,716 breaks out as:

- STG Members (2,583 or 45.2%)
- Other Prison Gang Members (768 or 13.4%)
- Street Gang Members (2,365 or 41.4%)

Finally, the total STG member savings of 2,583 breaks out as:

- Validated/Unrenounced (1,073 or 41.5%)
- Validated/Renounced (94 or 3.6%)
- Suspect (1,416 or 54.8%)

Deterrence Effect

Declines in violation rates by validated STG gang members are to be expected because of the incapacitation effect, as previously discussed. But the drop in violation rates for STG suspects as well as for other prison gang members, street gang members, and especially non-gang members, requires a more-detailed explanation. Some of the decline in violation rates for STG suspects, other prison gang members, and street gang members can be due to a deterrent effect. To the extent that these inmates are aware of the existence of the policy and are concerned about being reclassified into more secure facilities, including SMU I and II, they may be deterred from violating prison rules or engaging in illegal behavior. This is also likely true of inmates identified in this study as non-gang members but who are actually gang members (an indeterminate portion of our "non-gang member" group). However, not all of the decline in violation rates for these groups can be due to a deterrent effect because factors other than the STG policies are considered to have contributed to a drop in violation rates.

It was previously noted that the STG program is but one of several measures taken by the Department to improve security and to reduce violent and disruptive activity in the prison system. These measures include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:

- **Protective Segregation** In early 1998, a new protective segregation (PS) policy (Director's Instruction #67) took effect which resulted in the movement of many potential assault victims from the general inmate population into special PS units at several prison complexes. Thereafter, the number of inmates in PS beds increased from 1.7% of the inmate population in March 1998 to 3.0% of the population in September 2001. Accordingly, it is believed that the PS policy has helped to reduce assaults against inmates over the last three and one-half years.

- Drug Interdiction In 1999, the Department received a grant from the National Institute of Corrections for the development and implementation of a Drug-Free Prison Demonstration Project at the Perryville Prison Complex. This program has brought together a variety of drug interdiction strategies, including ion scanning, the increased use of drug service dogs, expanded random and targeted urinalysis, and other measures. The goal of this program is to reduce, and to eventually eliminate (or virtually eliminate), the presence and use of illegal drugs within the complex. If successful, it is expected that the program will be replicated at other prison complexes. An interim evaluation has identified a reduction in drug use and drug-related disciplinary violations at the complex during an initial phase of the program, and a final evaluation is currently pending. In addition, the Department has taken stronger security measures at all prison complexes to reduce the flow of drugs into the prison system. This has included the recent implementation of a drug-testing program for staff members. While we cannot demonstrate the precise impact of drug interdiction initiatives, it is likely that they've had some impact on the level of drug violations across the Department, and particularly at the Perryville complex.

- Gang Segregation During the last several years, the Department has revised its classification procedures to reduce the extent of contact and interaction between rival gangs. This particular strategy was formulated primarily in response to the known rivalry between the New Mexican Mafia, a Mexican American gang, and the Border Brothers, a gang of Mexican Nationals. In addition, in recent months, the Surenos, a conglomeration of former street gang members from Southern California (e.g., SUR 13) and a certified Security Threat Group, has been segregated at the Tucson complex in order to reduce the extent of their interaction with rival gangs, most notably the New Mexican Mafia.

This strategy has, in all probability, reduced the numbers of assaults and threats against gang members by members of rival gangs. It is well known, for example, that rival gangs compete for supremacy in narcotics trafficking and extortion in the prison system, and this competition often takes the form of assaultive activity. In addition, the "blood in" requirement of prison gang membership is often fulfilled by means of an assault on a member of a rival gang. The Border Brothers, for instance, are known to shoot homemade darts at other inmates passing by the fronts of their cells. This has even occurred with frequency at the SMU II unit, and is one major reason why weapons violations did not decrease among validated STG members following placement at that unit.

- The Flip Side of Protective Segregation In conjunction with the protective segregation program, which has served to remove potential victims of assault from the general population, the Department has developed and implemented classification procedures which target the perpetrators of threats against inmates who subsequently request protective segregation. By means of this mechanism, the Department has addressed both sides of the "violence equation," namely both the victim and the perpetrator. This is yet another indication of the balance and complementarity exhibited by the Department's overall security enhancement strategy.

Other factors, beyond the STG program, which may have contributed to the reductions in serious institutional violations identified in this report include:

- Physical Design Improvements in the physical design of facilities vis-à-vis enhanced security provisions, e.g., electronic monitoring of inmate movement, and a commensurate reduction in the opportunity for disruptive activity, e.g., at SMU II and at the Lewis Complex, the newest ADC prison which opened in late 1998.

- The Attenuation of Gang Leadership The STG program is known to have specifically targeted the leaders of certified gangs. In most cases, these are the gang members for which validation is the most straightforward due to the extensive nature of their gang involvements. In fact, in a number of cases gang leaders have been shipped out-of-state by means of the interstate compact for prisoners in order to reduce or eliminate their influence on the rank and file of the gang. With their removal from the general population, it is possible that their replacements, and/or those who move up in the ranks in response to the removal of leaders, are not as effective in orchestrating the illegal and disruptive activities of the gang. This would naturally lead to a reduction in disciplinary violations filed against gang members. This is a form of incapacitation which would not be accounted for in the formal incapacitation analysis previously discussed.
- A Lower Risk Inmate Population? Another possibility is that inmates incarcerated toward the latter part of the 11-year period under study were less violent and disruptive than those incarcerated in earlier years. However, Table 29 on the next page shows that this is not the case. For example, the percent committed for violent crimes (also more likely to commit violent crimes in prison) increased over the 11-year period, as did the percent with prior commitments. The number of violent and repetitive offenders in Arizona prisons is known to have increased as the result of the Truth-in-Sentencing law, which took effect in 1994.
- Under-Identification of Gang Members Another conceivable, and highly likely, explanation for the drop in violations by non-gang members is that this category actually contains a number of gang members who have not been identified as such in the AIMS database (and hence in this study). The gang member portion of the inmate population, according to AIMS data, is at most 15%. However, as reported in the Process Evaluation, prison administrators estimate that as many as 40% of their inmates are street gang members.

Table 29

**Inmate Population Profile
Arizona Department of Corrections
*Fiscal Year Ending, 1990-2000***

FISCAL YEAR ENDING	% Non- Caucasian	% Under 30 Years of Age	% 1+ Prior ADC Commitments	% Current Assault Commitment	% Current Violent Commitment
1990	48.8%	43.5%	35.2%	7.8%	33.8%
1991	49.7%	41.9%	35.5%	7.8%	33.6%
1992	51.1%	40.9%	38.2%	8.1%	33.2%
1993	52.9%	39.9%	38.6%	8.5%	33.1%
1994	52.9%	38.5%	37.8%	9.4%	33.9%
1995	52.3%	38.3%	37.7%	10.6%	35.7%
1996	53.0%	37.2%	37.4%	11.4%	35.7%
1997	53.3%	35.9%	36.4%	11.9%	35.9%
1998	53.4%	35.6%	37.0%	11.9%	35.0%
1999	53.9%	35.6%	37.2%	12.1%	35.3%
2000	54.5%	35.0%	37.5%	12.3%	36.1%

Also, according to a recent estimate by an STG Unit staff member, as many as 25% of inmates entering the prison system are gang members. Given the apparent under-identification of gang members in the AIMS database, it is likely that some of the decline in prison violations attributed to non-gang members is actually a decline in violations by gang members.

The factors outlined above are in addition to the incapacitation and deterrence effects of the STG program. In all probability, their effects are responsible for a significant albeit indeterminate portion of the violation rate reductions identified for the non-gang population. For example, prior to the implementation of the protective segregation policy in early 1998, an inmate could be placed in a PS bed simply by requesting it. After the new policy took effect, however, the inmate was required to justify why he or she needed protection, and this often led to the identification of the perpetrator of the threat, and likely reduced future victimizations by that perpetrator.

It is also possible that these factors have contributed to a reduction in violations by gang members, above and beyond the deterrence and incapacitation effects of the STG program. The gang segregation program, for instance, is likely to have impacted violations among gang members by reducing victimization opportunities. *Unfortunately, it is not possible to isolate and quantify the effects of any of these factors, or the overall deterrent effect of the STG program, on either gang or non-gang members.*

All of these initiatives, including the STG-related initiatives, have worked to form a “whole” strategy within the Arizona Department of Corrections for dealing with security issues in ADC facilities. Each has worked “hand-in-hand” with the other initiatives, and, accordingly, their effects are hopelessly interwoven and causally connected. We can only say that their combined effects are dramatic and convincing, as demonstrated by the time series analysis!

Conclusions of the Time Series Analysis

The time series analysis identifies substantial declines in the rates of several major disciplinary violations in conjunction with STG gang policy initiatives taking effect in August 1995 and September 1997. However, these reductions could also be due in part to the individual and combined effects of several other security enhancement initiatives utilized by the Department of Corrections during the same time frame. The reductions include substantial drops in assault, drug violations, threat violations, rioting, weapons violations, and other violent violations. On the other hand, these interventions appear *not* to have had a favorable effect on three less serious categories of violations, including fighting, loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment, all of which demonstrated increases following one or both of the two gang policy initiatives.

The magnitudes of these reductions, which are greatest and the most demonstrable in the case of assault, drug violations, threats, and other violent violations, suggest that the STG program and accompanying security enhancement initiatives have significantly impacted the illegal, violent, and disruptive activities of gangs in Arizona prisons, including STG gangs, uncertified prison gangs, and street gangs. The analysis also identifies a likely carryover effect of these initiatives on similar activities by non-gang members, although a portion of this impact may be due to an incomplete identification of gang members by prison authorities.

Figure 2

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES

All Violations, 1990-2000




Figure 3

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES Assault, 1990-2000




Figure 4

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES

Drug Violations, 1990-2000




Figure 5

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES Threat Violations, 1990-2000




Figure 6

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES Fighting, 1990-2000




Figure 7

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES Rioting, 1990-2000




Figure 8

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES

Weapons Violations, 1990-2000




Figure 9

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES

Other Violent Violations, 1990-2000




Figure 10

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES Loss/Destruction of Prop., 1990-2000




Figure 11

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES Tampering with Equipment, 1990-2000




Figure 12

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES All Other Violations, 1990-2000





Figure 13

TREND IN DISCIPLINARY VIOLATION RATES

Weighted Violations, 1990-2000



Weighted violations are calculated on 5 points for assault, 4 for rioting, 3 for threat violations, weapons violations, and other violent violations, 2 for drug violations, fighting, and loss/destruction of property, 1 for tampering with equipment, and 0 for all other violations (weighted sum divided by 3).

Figure 14

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES Assault, 1994-2000




Figure 15

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES

Drug Violations, 1994-2000




Figure 16

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES Threat Violations, 1994-2000




Figure 17

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES Fighting, 1994-2000




Figure 18

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES Rioting, 1994-2000




Figure 19

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES

Weapons Violations, 1994-2000




Figure 20

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES

Other Violent Violations, 1994-2000




Figure 21

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES Loss/Destruction of Prop., 1994-2000




Figure 22

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES Tampering with Equipment, 1994-2000





Figure 23

TREND IN GANG MEMBER VIOLATION RATES

Weighted Violations, 1994-2000



Weighted violations are calculated on 5 points for assault, 4 for rioting, 3 for threat violations, weapons violations, and other violent violations, 2 for drug violations, fighting, and loss/destruction of property, 1 for tampering with equipment, and 0 for all other violations (weighted sum divided by 3).

Figure 24

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Assault, 1994-2000




Figure 25

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Drug Violations, 1994-2000




Figure 26

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Threat Violations, 1994-2000




Figure 27

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Fighting, 1994-2000




Figure 28

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Rioting, 1994-2000




Figure 29

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Weapons Violations, 1994-2000




Figure 30

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Other Violent Viol., 1994-2000




Figure 31

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Loss/Destruction of Prop., 1994-2000




Figure 32

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Tampering with Equipment, 1994-2000





Figure 33

TREND IN NON-GANG VIOLATION RATES Weighted Violations, 1994-2000



Weighted violations are calculated on 5 points for assault, 4 for rioting, 3 for threat violations, weapons violations, and other violent violations, 2 for drug violations, fighting, and loss/destruction of property, 1 for tampering with equipment, and 0 for all other violations (weighted sum divided by 3).

Desistance Analysis: The Impact of Renouncing Gang Affiliation

The purpose of this section is to determine if there is a "desistance" effect associated with the gang renouncement procedures of the STG program, i.e., do validated STG members who renounce their gang affiliation, thereby avoiding SMU II placement, desist from gang activities as a result of a dissociation from their gang? One might expect their disciplinary violation rates to drop because of this dissociation and perhaps also due to their subsequent placement in protective segregation beds at the SMU I facility, also a super maximum security unit.

Although SMU I, which opened in 1986, is considerably older than SMU II (opened in 1996), and although it lacks the sophisticated electronic monitoring present at SMU II, it is still a super maximum security unit and would be expected to curtail disciplinary violations by renounced members to some extent.

However, there is the question as to whether or not this dissociation from the gang is actually happening. According to information provided by the STG Unit in Central Office, which conducts debriefings of renounced gang members, the debriefings do not provide much valuable information on gang activities. This raises the possibility that renounced gang members are not really dissociating from their gangs, but are only formally renouncing to avoid SMU II placement. Available data would seem to weigh against this possibility, however, inasmuch as only 1 in 8 (68 of 557) validated STG members elects to renounce. If STG gangs had found a way to circumvent the renouncement process, one might expect more of the validated members to elect to renounce. The common perception, which is probably the correct one, is that those who renounce are, in fact, alienated from the gang and are subsequently placed on a hit list by the gang. This is judged to be a consequence of the "blood in/blood out" policy of prison gangs, and is the reason why renounced members are placed in protective segregation.

The important question, however, is whether or not there is a practical advantage for the Department to the gang renouncement process. Do disciplinary violation rates for those who renounce drop by at least as much (or nearly as much) as violation rates for those who refuse to renounce? If they do not, one might question the utility of the renouncement process. While renouncement carries a favorable connotation, i.e., a reduction in the overall "operating strength" of the gang, if these inmates are continuing their violent and disruptive activities, this would seem not to constitute a significant improvement over the pre-renouncement scenario.

Inasmuch as renounced STG members are not subject to the full incapacitation effect of SMU II placement, but rather to a reduced incapacitation effect of SMU I placement, we might not expect their violation rates to drop by as much as would be the case for those who fail to renounce and are placed in SMU II. On the other hand, this must be weighed against any reduction in violations resulting from gang dissociation. However, since we cannot disentangle these two effects, the most we can do is to compare violation rates and reductions in rates between those who renounce and those who refuse to renounce. Hopefully, these comparisons will shed some light on the utility of formal renouncement.

The Frequency and Risk of Renouncement

Among the 625 inmates validated as STG members during the time frame of this study, just 90 or 14.4% elected to renounce and were debriefed by the STG Unit. As noted, these inmates were subsequently placed in protective segregation. The fact that this percentage is so low, and that most validated members of STG gangs are resisting renouncement, weighs against the strategy of the renouncement process. The specter of SMU II placement is apparently not sufficient in most cases to counter a perception of the danger of retaliation from gang leadership, and especially given the blood in/blood out policy mentioned above.

The above notwithstanding, the risk of retaliation apparently varies from gang to gang inasmuch as the percentage of validated members who renounce is much lower for certain gangs. Among the seven certified STGs, the percentage who have requested formal renouncement proceedings is as follows: African Mau Mau (47.8%), Old Mexican Mafia (46.2%), Aryan Brotherhood (29.1%), Grandel (21.1%), Border Brothers (18.7%), New Mexican Mafia (14.9%), and Surenos (9.1%).

Age may be one of the factors associated with the risk of renouncement inasmuch as the three gangs with the highest rates of renouncement are those with the oldest average member age, those being the Old Mexican Mafia, the Aryan Brotherhood, and the African Mau Mau. The generally younger members of the New Mexican Mafia, Border Brothers, Grandel, and Surenos are apparently more militant and retaliatory, the Surenos providing a prime example.

The low rate of renouncement among validated STG members may be due in part to the lack of a strong incentive for undertaking this process. As previously mentioned, renounced members are placed in a facility of the same security level, supermax, as those who refuse to renounce. One alternative to the present policy may be to utilize less secure PS facilities in lieu of SMU I. In fact, ADC is now placing some renounced members in a Level 4 PS unit at the Lewis Complex. However, they must first satisfy classification criteria for Level 4 placement and must pass a polygraph test regarding the sincerity of their renouncement. In less secure facilities, however, renounced members may be subject to a greater risk of retaliation. In light of the way the STG program in Arizona is structured, there may not be a simple solution to the problem of a low rate of gang member renouncement.

Desistance Results

Whereas deterrence in the context of prison gang management represents a general disinclination among gang members to continue disruptive activities in response to the perception of undesirable consequences, desistance is much more tangible and immediate. It amounts to a pact or agreement with prison authorities to discontinue gang activities by means of dissociation from the gang. At least that is the theory around which the renouncement procedures of the Arizona STG policy are structured. To test the cogency of the desistance theory in relation to the STG program, violation rate changes from the period Oct. 1995-Sept. 1997 to the period Oct. 1997-Dec. 2000 were calculated for both renounced STG members and for members who refused to renounce.

If renounced gang members have truly dissociated themselves from their gangs of choice, one would expect to see significant absolute drops in violation rates among these inmates following the September 2, 1997 revision to Department Order 806, which strengthened the previous STG policy by requiring SMU II placement for validated gang members. One might also expect to see absolute reductions in violation rates which are comparable to or larger than those recorded by gang members who refuse to renounce. On both counts, it is most appropriate to compare violation rates during the period immediately prior to this policy revision (Oct. 1995-Sept. 1997) with violation rates following the revision (Oct. 1997-Dec. 2000).

Violation rate reductions for gang members who renounce (1st) in comparison to those who refuse to renounce (2nd) are as follows: assault (-38.5 to -48.5), drug violations (-279.6 to -201.9), threat violations (-8.6 to -82.2), fighting (-5.2 to -25.5), rioting (-59.2 to -16.8), weapons violations (-63.0 to +31.6), other violent violations (-13.6 to -1.8), tampering with equipment (-5.8 to -35.0), and loss/destruction of property (-40.5 to -4.1).

In calculating the total violation rate reduction across all nine categories, we find a 34% larger drop for renounced members (-514.0) than for members who refused to renounce (-384.2). Furthermore, this discrepancy holds up when we look only at the more serious violations (excluding fighting, tampering with equipment, and loss/destruction of property). To wit, the serious violation rate drop for those who renounced (-462.5) is 45% larger than for those who refused to renounce (-319.6). In contrast, the violation rate drop for the composite of the three less serious violations was 25% greater for those who refused to renounce (-64.6) than for those who renounced (-51.5). Violation rate reductions were greater for renounced members in the case of drug violations, rioting, weapons violations, other violent violations, and loss/destruction of property. On the other hand, reductions were greater for those who refused to renounce in the case of assault, threat violations, fighting, and tampering with equipment.

Evidently, the renouncement procedures invoked by the STG policy do carry some desistance effect in that violation rate reductions for renounced STG members were not only large, they were in excess of those observed for gang members incapacitated in SMU II. The apparent desistance effect was greatest in the case of drug violations (-279.6), weapons violations (-63.0), rioting (-59.2), loss/destruction of property (-40.5), assault (-38.5), and other violent violations (-13.6).

The issue that remains to be addressed is the end result of desistance, i.e., to what level did violation rates for renounced STG members fall following the 1997 policy initiative? If violation rates for renounced members were low to begin with, the reductions itemized above could have resulted in very low rates following the 1997 initiative. The answer to this question is provided by a comparison of violation rates between renounced STG members (1st) and those who refused to renounce (2nd) over the period Oct. 1997-Dec. 2000.

These results are as follows: assault (100.4 to 85.0), drug violations (71.7 to 153.2), threat violations (81.2 to 54.5), fighting (76.5 to 57.8), rioting (14.3 to 60.2), weapons violations (100.4 to 162.0), other violent violations (19.1 to 28.1), tampering with equipment (100.4 to 57.8), loss/destruction of property (114.7 to 181.3), all nine violations (678.9 to 839.9), serious violations (387.1 to 543.0), and the three less serious violations (291.6 to 296.9).

While, overall, violation rates following the 1997 initiative were lower for those who renounced than for those who refused to renounce, violation rates for renounced members were actually higher in the case of assault, threat violations, fighting, and tampering with equipment. This suggests that the desistance effect, while significant in terms of the reduction in disruptive activity over time, did not, in fact, curtail that activity.

Specifically, although violation rates for renounced gang members dropped considerably following the 1997 initiative, renounced member rates (1st) after the initiative were still relatively high in comparison to rates for the overall inmate population (2nd): assault (100.4 to 42.9), drug violations (71.7 to 116.9), threat violations (81.2 to 48.5), fighting (76.5 to 48.7), rioting (14.3 to 27.6), weapons violations (100.4 to 41.1), other violent violations (19.1 to 8.6), tampering with equipment (100.4 to 28.4), loss/destruction of property (114.7 to 59.0), all nine violations (678.9 to 421.7), serious violations (387.1 to 285.6), and the three less serious violations (291.6 to 136.1), the exceptions being drug violations and rioting.

Clearly, while there was some significant desistance effect associated with the 1997 policy initiative, this effect was far from complete. Renounced gang members continued to commit most violations at rates well in excess of the population as a whole. This was particularly evident in the case of assault, weapons violations, other violent violations, tampering with equipment, and loss/destruction of property.

While violation rates among renounced gang members dropped significantly following the 1997 policy initiative, they were quite high over the previous Oct. 1995-Sept. 1997 period (1st), being comparable to the rates over this period for those who subsequently refused to renounce (2nd): assault (138.9 to 133.6), drug violations (351.3 to 355.1), threat violations (89.9 to 136.7), fighting (81.7 to 83.3), rioting (73.5 to 77.0), weapons violations (163.4 to 130.4), other violent violations (32.7 to 29.9), tampering with equipment (106.2 to 92.7), loss/destruction of property (155.2 to 185.4), all nine violations (1,192.8 to 1,224.1), serious violations (849.7 to 862.7), and three less serious violations (343.1 to 361.4). As indicated by these comparisons, violation rates for the two groups were nearly identical during the period prior to the 1997 gang policy initiative. This is significant because it establishes the fact that those who elect to renounce were not less active members of their gangs. One might have expected that less active members would be more likely to renounce, perhaps being less dedicated to the continuation of gang activities. Evidently, however, the decision to renounce is not influenced by the previous level of disruptive activities of STG members.

Conclusions of the Desistance Analysis

The STG program provides validated gang members the opportunity to renounce their gang affiliation and avoid placement in the tightly controlled environment of SMU II. The current evaluation suggests some desistance effect to renouncement in that violation rate reductions for renounced STG members were large and were, overall, in excess of those observed for validated gang members placed in SMU II. However, reductions were not as great as those for unrenounced members in the case of assault, threat violations, fighting, and tampering with equipment. Furthermore, renounced members continue to commit violations in most categories at rates well in excess of violation rates in the general inmate population.

Correlates of Prison Violence and Disruptiveness

As previously established, gang member violation rates are typically two to three times as high as comparable rates for non-gang inmates, e.g., 2.25 times as high for threat violations, 2.48 times as high for assault, and 2.68 times as high for rioting. Furthermore, this is true for most categories of gang members, including the broad groupings of STG gangs, other prison gangs, and street gangs. However, the question arises as to whether or not it is their gang affiliation that pushes up violation rates, or if other factors, such as age, ethnic background, offense type, criminal history, and conditions in the units in which they reside, account for their greater proclivities to violent and disruptive behavior. If gang-related activity did not make its own unique contribution to violence and disruptiveness, then there would be little rationale for an STG program or for any special measures directed at gang members. One could deal with these inmates through normal classification channels, taking into account non-gang related factors known to be correlated with violence and other misconduct.

To address this question, we first establish the extent of correlation of gang membership and other factors with disciplinary violation rates. We then move beyond simple correlation to consider the way predictors of violence and disruptiveness overlap and/or piggyback upon one another. By means of a careful sorting of identified correlates of prison misconduct, we can determine the extent to which gang affiliation transcends or augments other factors. Two types of analysis are brought to bear on this problem, one in which prison units constitute the unit of analysis, and the procedure is to examine aggregate unit characteristics, such as the % of gang members in a unit. The second type of analysis is one in which inmates constitute the unit of analysis, and inmate characteristics are the factors to be examined. In both forms of analysis, we will base our conclusions on the results of correlation and regression analyses.

Prison Unit Analysis

This analysis examines disciplinary violations in 50 prison units of the Arizona prison system over the 4-month period from May 1, 2000 through August 31, 2000, treating the individual prison unit as the unit of analysis. Disciplinary violation rates (violations per 1,000 inmates per year of incarceration) over this period for each of the 50 units and for each of 12 types of prison violations were computed and entered into a database. In addition, data describing the inmates and the conditions in each of these units were extracted from AIMS and other data sources and entered into the database. This includes 41 unit-level explanatory variables, e.g., the average age of inmates in the unit, the percent with prior commitments, the percent Caucasian, the Correctional Officer vacancy rate for the unit, etc. Each of the 41 explanatory variables was calculated as of June 30, 2000, the exact center point of the 4-month period. Whereas this analysis reflects conditions for that particular date, it is likely that these conditions, being relatively stable, apply equally as well across the 4-month period.

The prison unit analysis differs from the individual inmate analysis, presented in the next section, in that explanatory variables reflect aggregate measures of characteristics of prison units, and of the inmates in those units, e.g., the percent of gang members among the residents of the unit. In contrast, in the individual inmate analysis, the explanatory variables are not aggregated. We know the exact age, gang affiliation, number of assaults committed during the 4-month period, etc., for each of the units of analysis. As a result, there are some differences in the conclusions reached in the two analyses. Generally speaking, the individual analysis is the more definitive, but the unit analysis is useful because it shows which violations correlate with the overall "presence" of gangs in prison. For instance, the most visible gang members may be using the services of less known and less easily identified members, as well as "wannabies."

Gang Member Concentration

The first and foremost factor to be considered in the prison unit analysis is the “gang member concentration” in a unit, i.e., the percent of the inmates in the unit who are known and identified gang members. This general factor includes the following unit-level variables:

- The percent who are members of any prison or street gang.
- The percent who are members of a prison gang.
- The percent who are members of a street gang.
- The percent who have a specific gang affiliation, e.g., the Aryan Brotherhood.

The question is simply this: Do units with higher concentrations of gang members typically record higher violation rates? Also, for which gang and violation categories does this pattern hold true, and what is the extent of correlation in each case? In answer to these questions, Table 30 on the next page indicates the correlation between each of the first three gang member concentration variables listed above and the rates of each of 12 types of misconduct in the Arizona prison system over the 4-month period of interest.

Correlations given in the table are Pearson Correlation Coefficients, which vary from -1.00, indicated perfect negative correlation, to 0.00, indicating no correlation, to +1.00, indicating perfect positive correlation. High positive coefficients, such as the +0.557 correlation between % prison gang membership in a unit and the rate of assault, establish that violation rates are higher where there are higher concentrations of gang members.

Table 30 shows all positive correlations with two exceptions, those being the correlations between the % of prison gang members in a unit, as well as the % of gang members in general, and the drug violation rate. The correlations in these cases are negative, not because gang members aren't committing drug violations, but rather because gang members tend to reside in more secure units where access to drugs is more problematic. Drug violation rates are higher in less secure units.

Table 30

**Unit-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Gang Member Concentration**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	% PRISON GANG MEMBERS	% STREET GANG MEMBERS	% ANY GANG MEMBER
Assault	+0.557**	+0.542**	+0.624**
Fighting	+0.159	+0.487**	+0.331*
Rioting	+0.021	+0.187	+0.100
Threat Violations	+0.189	+0.392**	+0.308*
Weapons Violations	+0.427**	+0.293*	+0.423**
Other Violent Viol.	+0.385**	+0.426**	+0.456**
TOTAL VIOLENT	+0.458**	+0.629**	+0.598**
Drug Violations	-0.202	+0.033	-0.121
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+0.594**	+0.409**	+0.588**
Tampering w/Equip.	+0.325*	+0.517**	0.457**
Other Non-Violent Viol.	+0.291*	+0.314*	+0.340*
TOTAL NON-VIOLENT	+0.253	+0.313*	+0.314*

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

From Table 30, we can conclude that where there are more gang members, there are more violations of all types, with the exception of drug violations, as indicated above. This is most clearly the case for assault, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, all other violations, and all violent violations, all showing significant correlations with all three of the gang concentration variables. The correlations in the table are the most curious in the case of rioting, which was the single violation category that most distinguished gang members from non-gang inmates, the rioting violation rate ratio being 2.68 to 1 in favor of gang members. Although positive, rioting correlations are much lower than might be expected from the fact that gang members tend to specialize in this type of offense. One must recognize, however, that, as with drug violations, rioting typically does not occur with frequency in the more secure units where many gang members reside.

Table 30 reveals that the % of prison gang members in a unit correlates significantly with rates of assault, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, all other violations, and all violent violations. In turn, the % of street gang members in a unit correlates significantly with rates of assault, threat violations, fighting, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, all other violations, total violent violations, and total non-violent violations, i.e., with all but drug violations and rioting. Finally, the % of gang members in a unit (prison or street) correlates significantly with the same violations as did the % of street gang members in a unit. Of interest is the fact that the average correlation across the 12 types was higher for street gang member concentration (+0.378) than for either prison gang member concentration (+0.288) or any gang member concentration (+0.368).

The last type of gang member concentration to be considered is specific gang affiliation, and for this purpose we will focus our attention on the four largest STG gangs, the Aryan Brotherhood, the New Mexican Mafia, the Grandel, and the Border Brothers. Table 31 on the next page shows correlations between concentrations of each of these four gangs in a unit and rates of violations across units. The results are as follows:

- **% Aryan Brotherhood** The % of Aryan Brotherhood members in a unit correlates significantly with rates of weapons violations, loss/destruction of property, other non-violent violations, and total non-violent violations.
- **% New Mexican Mafia** The % of New Mexican Mafia members in a unit correlates significantly with rates of weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, other non-violent violations, and total non-violent violations.
- **% Grandel** The % of Grandel members in a unit does not correlate significantly with rates of any violation.
- **% Border Brothers** The % of Border Brothers in a unit correlates significantly with rates of assault, threat violations, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, and total violent violations.

The high correlations of the % of Border Brothers in a unit with the rates of most violations, in opposition to the generally low correlations for the other three major STG gangs, is curious. However, it can likely be explained in part by the fact that this single gang, being a gang of Mexican Nationals, is a rival gang of Mexican American gangs, and is most likely at odds with Mexican American inmates in general. It would seem that the greater the number of Border Brothers in a unit, the greater the potential for ethnic conflict. It may also be due to the fact that the Border Brothers are segregated in a few select facilities with higher violation rates.

Table 31

**Unit-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Concentrations of the Four Major STGs**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	% ARYAN BROTHERHOOD	% NEW MEXICAN MAFIA	% GRANDEL	% BORDER BROTHERS
Assault	+0.285	+0.213	-0.002	+0.677**
Fighting	-0.040	-0.057	-0.076	+0.274
Rioting	+0.051	+0.029	-0.060	-0.045
Threat Violations	-0.010	+0.034	-0.020	+0.375**
Weapons Violations	+0.431**	+0.292*	+0.001	+0.338*
Other Violent Viol.	+0.259	+0.338*	+0.132	+0.360*
TOTAL VIOLENT	+0.226	+0.179	-0.028	+0.594**
Drug Violations	-0.107	-0.121	-0.130	-0.167
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+0.580**	+0.620**	+0.280	+0.370**
Tampering w/Equip.	+0.185	+0.211	+0.011	+0.348*
Other Non-Violent Viol.	+0.392**	+0.335*	+0.028	+0.154
TOTAL NON-VIOL.	+0.352*	+0.302*	+0.014	+0.132

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two *'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Ethnic Group Concentration

The second general factor to be examined in the prison unit analysis is "ethnic group concentration," i.e., the % of the residents in a unit who are members of specified ethnic groups, e.g., Caucasians, Mexican Americans, etc. Specifically, we will examine:

- The percent who are Caucasian.
- The percent who are African American.
- The percent who are Mexican American.
- The percent who are Mexican National.

The question here is whether or not higher concentrations of any of the four ethnic groups correlate with higher violation rates. This is important in part because almost all of the gangs in Arizona prisons are unique to particular ethnic groups, e.g., the Aryan Brotherhood, Skinheads, and Peckerwoods are Caucasian, the Old and New Mexican Mafia, Grandel, and Surenos are Mexican American, the African Mau Mau and African American Council are African American, and the Border Brothers are Mexican National. Again, we find answers in the form of a tabulation of correlation coefficients in Table 32 on the next page.

The results show that the % of Caucasians in a unit is significantly negatively correlated with almost all rates, with the exception of fighting, rioting and weapons violations. This result says that where there are more Caucasians, there are fewer violations. The % of African Americans in a unit correlates significantly with rates of drug and threat violations, tampering with equipment, all other violations, total violent violations, and total non-violent violations. The % of Mexican Americans in a unit correlates significantly with rates of assault, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, and total violent violations. Finally, the % of Mexican Nationals in a unit correlates significantly with rates of threat violations and total violent violations.

Table 32

**Unit-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Ethnic Group Concentration**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	% CAUCASIAN	% AFRICAN AMERICAN	% MEXICAN AMERICAN	% MEXICAN NATIONAL
Assault	-0.353*	-0.054	+0.444**	+0.121
Fighting	-0.204	-0.030	+0.212	+0.093
Rioting	-0.126	+0.033	+0.111	+0.065
Threat Violations	-0.530**	+0.624**	-0.037	+0.347*
Weapons Violations	-0.222	-0.066	+0.312*	+0.080
Other Violent Viol.	-0.375**	-0.080	+0.344*	+0.213
TOTAL VIOLENT	-0.567**	+0.333*	+0.277*	+0.307*
Drug Violations	-0.308*	+0.711**	-0.250	+0.166
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	-0.341*	-0.106	+0.404**	+0.155
Tampering w/Equip.	-0.497**	+0.417**	+0.173	+0.218
Other Non-Violent Viol.	-0.438**	+0.467**	+0.074	+0.251
TOTAL NON-VIOL.	-0.465**	+0.539**	+0.044	+0.261

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Other Inmate Characteristics

Other inmate characteristics available to be correlated with violation rates include median inmate age, prior ADC commitments (1 or more), and a current commitment for a violent, property, or drug crime (see Table 33 on the next page). The results show that median inmate age correlates significantly with rates of most violations (negative correlations indicate younger age groups commit violations at higher rates), the exceptions being drug violations and rioting. The average correlation of median age with rates of violations across the 12 categories (-0.376) is only slightly less (in absolute value) than the comparable average for % of street gang members in a unit (+0.392), which is due in part to a strong correlation between these variables.

Perhaps somewhat surprising is the fact that the % of inmates in a unit who have one or more prior commitments to the Department is not significantly correlated with the rate of any violation. The highest correlations are with weapons violations (+0.246), all other violations (+0.270), and total non-violent violations (+0.243), none of which are significant at the .05 level. Further, this cannot be explained by the fact that inmates with prior commitments tend to be older since the correlation between % with one or more priors and inmate age is only -0.070. Rather, inmates with prior commitments tend to be property offenders (correlation of +0.248) who do not commit with frequency the types of violations highlighted in this evaluation.

In regard to the general committing offense category, the % of inmates committed for a violent crime is significantly correlated with rates of fighting, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, all other violations, total violent violations, and total non-violent violations. In contrast, the % committed for either a property crime or a drug crime is not significantly correlated with the rate of any violation, which is due to the fact that most property and drug offenders reside in less secure facilities with lower violation rates.

Table 33

**Unit-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Other Inmate Characteristics**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	MEDIAN AGE	% 1+ PRIOR COMMITTS	% VIOLENT	% PROPERTY	% DRUG
Assault	-0.535**	+0.142	+0.247	-0.019	-0.209
Fighting	-0.400**	+0.008	+0.466**	-0.222	-0.235
Rioting	-0.283	-0.093	+0.271	-0.112	-0.096
Threat Violations	-0.332*	+0.028	+0.231	-0.245	-0.093
Weapons Violations	-0.332*	+0.246	+0.243	-0.013	-0.210
Other Violent Viol.	-0.476**	-0.021	+0.406**	-0.115	-0.165
TOTAL VIOLENT	-0.601**	+0.111	+0.435**	-0.223	-0.247
Drug Violations	-0.046	+0.026	+0.018	-0.072	+0.075
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	-0.462**	+0.069	+0.493**	-0.100	-0.260
Tampering	-0.426**	+0.052	+0.301*	-0.238	-0.195
Other Non-Violent Viol.	-0.306*	+0.270	+0.318*	-0.062	-0.007
TOTAL NON-VIOL.	-0.307*	+0.243	+0.310*	-0.079	-0.011

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two *'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Prison Unit Conditions Left to be correlated with violation rates across prison units are unit conditions such as security level, inmate to CO ratio, overcrowding, and the CO vacancy rate. Table 34 on the next page itemizes these correlations. The expectation was that violations would increase as these four conditions increased. This certainly is the case with unit security level, which correlates with the rates of every violation except rioting, drug violations, and total non-violent violations. This is due, in large part, to the fact that the higher security level units house greater percentages of gang members and other violent and disruptive inmates, who commit serious violations at higher rates than do other inmates.

The CO vacancy rate did not correlate significantly with the rate of any violation, and hence is not a good predictor of violation rates in general. This is not due to a correlation with unit security level inasmuch as this correlation is only -0.003 . The inmate to CO ratio has significant negative correlations with all but rioting, drug violations, other non-violent violations, and total non-violent violations, and is again an indicator of lower security levels. Generally speaking, the lower the security level, the greater the inmate to CO ratio.

Unit overcrowding is significantly correlated with drug violations, threat violations and other non-violent violations. This variable also shows a significant positive correlation ($+0.420$) with rates of major violations (a category which was not selected for this analysis). This is noteworthy since these violations are large in number and are more disruptive to the efficient operation of correctional institutions than are minor violations. It should also be noted that overcrowding has a small positive correlation ($+0.064$) with unit security level, indicating that higher security units in the Department were somewhat more overcrowded than were lower security units on the target date for this analysis (June 30, 2001). This indicates a lack of sufficient beds to house the more dangerous elements of the Arizona prison population.

Table 34

**Unit-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Prison Unit Conditions**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	UNIT SECURITY LEVEL	OVER- CROWDING	INMATE TO CO RATIO	CO VACANCY RATE
Assault	+0.539**	+0.148	-0.456**	-0.076
Fighting	+0.375**	+0.043	-0.351*	-0.037
Rioting	+0.221	-0.107	+0.052	+0.004
Threat Violations	+0.439**	+0.412**	-0.448**	-0.157
Weapons Violations	+0.427**	-0.110	-0.332*	+0.027
Other Violent Viol.	+0.515**	+0.033	-0.352*	+0.001
TOTAL VIOLENT	+0.681**	+0.258	-0.581**	-0.117
Drug Violations	+0.094	+0.319*	-0.103	-0.186
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+0.554**	-0.044	-0.372**	-0.027
Tampering w/Equip.	+0.584**	+0.191	-0.476**	-0.029
Other Non-Violent Viol.	+0.228**	+0.093*	-0.204	-0.142
TOTAL NON-VIOL.	+0.258	+0.141	-0.227	-0.158

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA)

MRA is a procedure that will determine what percent of the variation in a violation rate, such as assault, can be predicted by the percent of prison gang members (or street gang members) in a unit in comparison to other variables such as the median age of inmates, the security level of the unit, and the inmate to CO ratio in the unit. However, this is possible only if each of the independent variables entered into the analysis is relatively independent of the others. If there is a high degree of correlation among the explanatory variables, then it is not possible to determine what percent a specific variable, such as the percent of prison gang members in a unit, explains of the variation in a violation rate when holding other variables, such as the unit security level, constant. When the explanatory variables vary together, it is not possible to hold one variable constant while determining what impact the others have, because as one changes, the other variables also change.

This is called "multicollinearity" in statistics. Unfortunately, there is a high degree of multicollinearity present among the explanatory variables in the prison unit database, as indicated in Table 35 below. For instance, the percent of prison gang members in a unit is significantly correlated (and most often with high significance) with the percent of street gang members in a unit (+0.539), the percent of any gang members (+0.922), the percent Mexican American (+0.510), the median age of inmates (-0.486), the percent committed for a violent crime (+0.496), the unit security level (+0.603), and inmate to CO ratio (-0.511). All of the potential explanatory variables listed in Table 35 have a significant (and usually highly significant) correlation with several other explanatory variables. Therefore, it is not possible to sort out the independent contribution of each of variable. This prevents us from undertaking a definitive multiple regression analysis.

Table 35

**Multicollinearity Among
Violation Rate Correlates**

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	% PRISON GANG MEMBERS	% STREET GANG MEMBERS	% ANY GANG MEMBER	% MEXICAN AMERICAN	MEDIAN AGE
% Street Gang Members	0.539**	----	----	----	----
% Any Gang Member	0.922**	0.823**	----	----	----
% Mexican American	0.510**	0.582**	0.611**	----	----
Median Age	-0.486**	-0.869**	-0.727**	-0.599**	----
% Violent	+0.496**	+0.589**	+0.605**	+0.233	-0.457**
% Property	-0.112	-0.035	-0.091	-0.061	-0.170
% Drug	-0.297*	-0.264	-0.321*	-0.319*	+0.004
Unit Security Level	+0.603**	0.637**	0.679**	0.353**	-0.592**
Inmate to CO Ratio	-0.511*	-0.531**	-0.591**	-0.255	0.445**

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Table 35

**Multicollinearity Among
Violation Rate Correlates
(Continued)**

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	% VIOLENT	% PROPERTY	% DRUG	UNIT SECURITY LEVEL
% Property	-0.282*	----	----	----
% Drug	-0.428**	+0.654**	----	----
Unit Security Level	+0.659**	-0.251	-0.500**	----
Inmate to CO Ratio	-0.456**	+0.012	+0.363*	-0.785**

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two *'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

The only thing that can be done in the MRA is to determine (Table 36) the percent of variation across prison units in the rates of the 12 types of violations that can be explained by:

- The percent of prison gang members in a unit.
- The percent of street gang members in a unit.
- The percent of gang members of all types in a unit.

The violations for which the percent of prison members in a unit explains a large (highly significant) percent of the variance are assault, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, and total violent violations. In contrast, the violations for which the percent of street gang members in a unit explains a large percent of the variance are assault, fighting, threat violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, and total violent violations. Finally, the violation categories for which the percent of gang members of any type in a unit explains a large percent of the variance are assault, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, and total violent violations. The percent of prison gang members in a unit explains a higher percent of the variance in violation rates across units than the percent of street members in the case of assault, weapons violations, and loss/destruction of property. None of the gang categories explain the variance in rioting and drug violation rates.

Obviously, other factors than gang member concentration in prison units explain a high percentage of the variance in violation rates across units. For both gang members and non-gang inmates, variables such as the median age of inmates, the percent committed for a violent crime, and the unit security level, explain a significant percent of the variance in prison violation rates across units when considered individually. However, because these variables are highly correlated with one another (multicollinearity), and with the percent of gang members in a unit (prison, street, or any), the unique contributions of each of the variables cannot be sorted out.

Table 36

**Percent of Variance in
Unit-Level Violation Rates Explained
By Gang Member Concentration**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	% PRISON GANG MEMBERS	% STREET GANG MEMBERS	% ANY GANG MEMBER
Assault	31.0%**	29.4%**	38.9%**
Fighting	2.5%	23.7%**	11.0%*
Rioting	0.0%	3.5%	1.0%
Threat Violations	3.6%	15.4%**	9.5%*
Weapons Violations	18.2%**	8.6%*	17.9%**
Other Violent Viol.	14.8%**	18.1%**	20.8%**
TOTAL VIOLENT	21.0%**	39.6%**	35.8%**
Drug Violations	(4.1%)	0.1%	(1.5%)
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	35.3%**	16.7%**	34.6%**
Tampering w/Equip.	10.6%*	26.7%**	20.9%**
Other Non-Violent Viol.	8.5%*	9.9%*	11.6%*
TOTAL NON-VIOLENT	6.4%	9.8%*	9.9%*

Note: Percentages labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Conclusions of the Unit Multiple Regression Analysis

The major conclusion of the unit MRA is that the percent of gang members in a unit (prison or street) explains a fairly high percent of the variance (variation) in rates of violent violations (35.8%), loss/destruction of property (38.4%), and tampering with equipment (13.2%). On the other hand, from 62% to 87% of the variance in the rates of these violations (depending on the violation) is unexplained by the presence of gang members. This is due to the fact that non-gang inmates commit a large percentage of prison violations and that other variables, such as age, ethnic background, overcrowding, etc., explain or predict these violations.

However, due to multicollinearity of predictor variables, using the prison unit as the unit of analysis does not enable us to identify the unique amount of variation in violation rates which can be explained by gang membership or any other variable considered in this section. To determine the unique explanation associated with gang membership, we turn to the individual multiple regression analysis.

Individual Multiple Regression Analysis

The target population for this analysis consists of all 2,188 male inmates admitted during 1996 to the Arizona Department of Corrections by way of commitment from the court (not those returned for violating release conditions) who were subsequently confined for at least three years following that commitment. The analysis examines the nature and frequency of disciplinary violations for each inmate during the 36 months immediately following the date of commitment. For those inmates committed on February 1, 1996, for example, the recorded violations would cover the period from February 1, 1996 to January 31, 1999.

The characteristics of this group of inmates are summarized in Table 37. Average inmate age at commitment is 30.22 years, with individual ages ranging from 14 to 69 years. Somewhat over 40% of the inmates were white, while nearly 25% were Mexican American, 15% were African American, and 13% were Mexican National. Nearly half (48.8%) were committed for a violent offense and most (62%) had not been committed to prison in Arizona previously. Sentences ranged from three to fifty years, with an average of 8.26 years. Gang affiliation was determined on the basis of information available in June 2001. In some instances, street or prison gang affiliation (for those with affiliations during prior commitments) was known at the time of commitment. In other cases, gang affiliation may not have been assessed until sometime during commitment. As is reported in Table 37, 83% of the targeted inmates were not known to be affiliated with any gang while incarcerated, while 8.3% were identified as members of street gangs and an additional 8.4% were identified as members of prison gangs. The distribution of non-gang, street gang and prison gang members within the target population compares quite favorably with the reported distribution of non-gang, street gang and prison gang inmates in the general population over the time period these inmates were incarcerated.

Table 37

**Characteristics of Inmates Targeted for
the Individual Multiple Regression Analysis**

CHARACTERISTIC	N	%
AGE AT ADMISSION		
<i>Mean = 30.22</i>	Low = 14	
<i>Standard Deviation = 9.83</i>	High = 69	
ETHNICITY		
Caucasian	921	42.1%
African American	332	15.2%
Native American	82	3.7%
Mexican American	543	24.8%
Mexican National	280	12.8%
Other	30	1.4%
COMMITTING OFFENSE		
Rape	37	1.7%
Robbery	233	10.6%
Assault	364	16.6%
Other Sex Offense	181	8.3%
Other Violent Offense	254	11.6%
Drug Trafficking	409	18.7%
Property Crime	562	25.7%
DWI	112	5.1%
Other	36	1.6%
PRIOR ARIZONA PRISON COMMITMENTS		
None	1,360	62.2%
One	491	22.4%
Two	223	10.2%
Three or More	66	5.2%
<i>Mean = 0.62</i>		
<i>Standard Deviation = 0.99</i>		
SENTENCE LENGTH IN YEARS		
<i>Mean = 8.26</i>	Low = 3	
<i>Standard Deviation = 5.88</i>	High = 50	

Table 37

**Characteristics of Inmates Targeted for
the Individual Multiple Regression Analysis
(Continued)**

CHARACTERISTIC	N	%
PUBLIC RISK SCORE (P)		
1	3	0.1%
2	182	8.3%
3	1,078	49.3%
4	768	35.1%
5	157	7.2%
<i>Mean = 3.41</i>		
<i>Standard Deviation = 0.75</i>		
INSTITUTIONAL RISK SCORE (I)		
1	34	1.6%
2	840	38.3%
3	1,261	57.6%
4	30	1.4%
5	23	1.1%
<i>Mean = 2.62</i>		
<i>Standard Deviation = 0.60</i>		
GANG MEMBERSHIP		
No Gang Membership	1,823	83.3%
Street Gang	182	8.3%
Aryan Brotherhood	15	0.7%
Border Brothers	62	2.8%
Grandel	16	0.7%
African Mau Mau	8	0.4%
Old Mexican Mafia	1	0.0%
New Mexican Mafia	19	0.9%
Surenos	22	1.0%
Warrior Society	3	0.1%
African American Council	5	0.2%
Peckerwoods	19	0.9%
Skinheads	13	0.6%

Over the three-year period, the 2,188 target population members compiled a total of 17,608 disciplinary violations, for an average of 8.05 per inmate for three years or 2.68 per inmate per year. The 17,608 included 1,412 violent violations (average of 0.81) and 16,196 non-violent violations (average of 7.24). Altogether, 8.0% of the violations were violent and 92.0% were non-violent. The distribution of violations¹ is reported in Table 38. Overall, 2,026 or 92.6% of the target population were charged with one or more violations, including 874 (39.9%) with one or more violent violations, and 2,002 (91.5%) with one or more non-violent violations.

More specifically, 257 (11.7%) were charged with an assault, 314 (14.4%) with fighting, 169 (7.7%) with rioting, 258 (11.8%) with a threat violation, 296 (13.5%) with a weapons violation, 84 (3.8%) with another violent violation, 536 (24.5%) with a drug violation, 350 (16.0%) with loss/destruction of property, 205 (9.4%) with tampering with equipment, and 1,972 (90.1%) with another non-violent violation. The mean numbers of violations per inmate were as follows: assault (0.166), fighting (0.181), rioting (0.085), threat violations (0.167), weapons violations (0.165), other violent violations (0.047), drug violations (0.362), loss/destruction of property (0.244), tampering with equipment (0.118), all other (non-violent) violations (6.513), total violent violations (0.810), total non-violent violations (7.238), and total violations (8.048).

¹ The use of charged violations is a more liberal measure of inmate misconduct than the use of only those violations sustained by a disciplinary review committee, somewhat analogous to the distinction between arrests and convictions. There is a risk that the use of violations charged will create the Type I error of overestimating the true nature of the inmate's misconduct. This is especially problematical if there is any likelihood that inmates known to be members of street or prison gangs may be charged more frequently as a means of harassment or control, even when such charges cannot be substantiated. On the other hand, the use of only those violations which have been substantiated before a review committee increases the likelihood of the Type II error of including false positives, and may very well underestimate the true nature of the inmate's misconduct. To address these possibilities, the regression analyses that follow were run separately for each of the two measures. Because there were no systematic differences in the effects of the independent variables on the two measures of inmate misconduct which would alter the conclusions reported here, we elect to simplify the presentation and report only the analysis of charged violations (whether substantiated or not).

Table 38

**Frequency of Disciplinary Violations
Among Targeted Inmates**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	Violations	Mean	Standard Deviation	0	1	2	3 or More
Assault	363	0.166	0.55	88.3%	8.7%	2.0%	1.1%
Fighting	395	0.181	0.49	85.6%	11.4%	2.4%	0.5%
Rioting	185	0.085	0.30	92.3%	7.0%	0.7%	0.0%
Threat Violations	366	0.167	0.57	88.2%	8.9%	1.8%	1.1%
Weapons Violations	360	0.165	0.48	86.5%	11.4%	1.8%	0.4%
Other Violent Violations	103	0.047	0.26	96.2%	3.2%	0.5%	0.1%
<i>VIOLENT VIOLATIONS^a</i>	<i>1,412</i>	<i>0.810</i>	<i>1.45</i>	<i>66.3%</i>	<i>18.5%</i>	<i>6.3%</i>	<i>8.9%</i>
Drug Violations	793	0.362	0.74	75.5%	16.2%	5.5%	2.7%
Loss/Destr. of Property	533	0.244	0.72	84.0%	11.8%	2.1%	2.1%
Tampering w/Equipment	259	0.118	0.43	90.6%	7.9%	1.0%	0.5%
Other Non-Violent Viol.	14,251	6.513	6.50	9.9%	11.3%	11.7%	67.1%
<i>NON-VIOLENT VIOL.^b</i>	<i>16,196</i>	<i>7.238</i>	<i>7.10</i>	<i>8.5%</i>	<i>10.6%</i>	<i>10.4%</i>	<i>70.5%</i>
<i>ALL VIOLATIONS</i>	<i>17,608</i>	<i>8.048</i>	<i>7.90</i>	<i>7.4%</i>	<i>10.1%</i>	<i>9.4%</i>	<i>73.1%</i>

Gang Affiliation and Disciplinary Violations

Among the 2,188 inmates in the target population, 183 were prison gang members, 182 were street gang members, and 1,823 were non-gang inmates. The 183 prison gang members committed 274 violent violations (1.50 avg.) and 1,865 non-violent violations (10.19 avg.). Likewise, the 182 street gang members committed 225 violent violations (1.24 avg.) and 2,162 non-violent violations (11.88 avg.). In contrast, the 1,823 non-gang inmates committed 1,273 violent violations (0.70 avg.) and 11,809 non-violent violations (6.48 avg.).

The frequency of disciplinary reports by type of violation and type of gang affiliation is reported in Table 39. The percentage of inmates who were charged with assault varied as 27.3% for prison gang members, 18.7% for street gang members, and 9.5% for non-gang inmates, all significant differences. The same pattern of significant differences held true for all violent violations as a group, i.e., the percentage of inmates who were charged with a violent violation varied as 66.1% for prison gang members, 55.5% for street gang members, and 35.8% for non-gang inmates. There was a similar pattern at work in the case of loss/destruction of property. The percentage of inmates charged with this violation varied as 36.3% for street gang members, 29.0% for prison gang members, and 12.7% for non-gang inmates.

In all other cases, there was a non-significant difference between at least two of the three groups. In the case of fighting, threat violations, drug violations, tampering with equipment, other non-violent violations, all non-violent violations, and all violations, both gang member groups were charged significantly more often than were non-gang inmates, but there was no significant difference between the two gang groups. In the case of rioting, prison gang members were charged significantly more often than were either street gang members or non-gang inmates, but there was no significant difference between the latter two groups.

Table 39

**Frequency of Disciplinary Violations
By Type of Gang Affiliation
One-Way ANOVA Results***

VIOLATION CATEGORY	NON- GANG INMATES	STREET GANG MEMBERS	PRISON GANG MEMBERS	ALL INMATES
Assault ^a	9.5%	18.7%	27.3%	11.7%
Fighting ^b	12.6%	20.9%	25.1%	14.4%
Rioting ^c	6.5%	9.9%	17.5%	7.7%
Threat Violation ^b	9.9%	22.5%	19.7%	11.8%
Weapons Violation	12.7%	15.9%	19.1%	13.5%
Other Violent Violation	3.5%	4.9%	6.0%	3.8%
VIOLENT VIOLATION^a	35.8%	55.5%	66.1%	39.9%
Drug Violation ^b	22.6%	37.4%	30.6%	24.5%
Loss/Destr. of Property ^a	12.7%	36.3%	29.0%	16.0%
Tampering w/Equipment ^b	7.7%	17.0%	18.0%	9.4%
Other Non-Violent Viol. ^b	88.7%	97.8%	96.7%	90.1%
NON-VIOLENT VIOL.^b	90.1%	98.4%	98.4%	91.5%
ANY VIOLATION^b	91.4%	98.4%	98.9%	92.6%

* The table shows the percentage of inmates who committed one or more violations of each type. Percentages are shown rather than frequencies to facilitate interpretation. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) examined mean violation scores (0/1) where "0 = No Violation" and "1 = One or More Violations." Because the non-gang inmate group contained so many more cases than the two gang member groups, the harmonic mean of the group sizes was used in the Analysis of Variance.

^a There is a statistically significant ($p < .05$) difference between the mean scores of each of the three groups: the mean for non-gang inmates is significantly different from the mean for street gang and prison gang members, and the mean for street gang members is significantly different from the mean for prison gang members.

^b There is a statistically significant ($p < .05$) difference between the mean scores for non-gang inmates and gang members, but no difference in mean scores between street gang members and prison gang members.

^c There is a statistically significant ($p < .05$) difference between the mean score for prison gang members and the mean scores for non-gang inmates and street gang members, but no difference in the mean between street gang members and non-gang inmates.

We begin our multivariate analysis with an examination of correlations between individual inmate characteristics, such as gang membership and age, and the incidence of each of the 12 types of violations (number of violations). Correlations are reported in four general categories, including gang membership (Table 40), ethnic group membership (Table 41), general committing offense category (Table 42), and other inmate characteristics (Table 43).

Table 40 shows that all three types of gang membership, including prison gang, street gang, and any gang membership, correlate positively with all types of violations, and in most cases to a high level of significance. Positive but not significant correlations include the correlation of prison gang membership with the incidence of drug violations (+0.037) and other violent violations (+0.028), and the correlation of street gang membership with the incidence of rioting (+0.036), weapons violations (+0.021), and other violent violations (+0.028). Any gang membership correlated significantly with the incidence of all types of violations.

Table 41 shows limited correlations of ethnic group membership with the incidence of disciplinary violations, the exception being the Mexican American category, for which significant correlations were revealed for all categories other than assault, threat violations, other violent violations, and tampering with equipment. African American ethnicity correlated significantly only with threat violations, all other violations, and total non-violent violations, while Mexican National ethnicity did not significantly correlate with any violation.

A current violent committing offense correlated significantly with all violations other than drug violations, threat violations, other violent violations, and tampering with equipment. On the other hand, a current property offense correlated significantly only with drug and threat violations, loss/destruction of property, all other violations, and total non-violent violations. None of the other committing offense types significantly correlated with any violation.

Table 40

**Individual-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Gang Membership**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	PRISON GANG MEMBERSHIP	STREET GANG MEMBERSHIP	ANY GANG MEMBERSHIP
Assault	+0.132**	+0.042*	+0.129**
Fighting	+0.070**	+0.068**	+0.102**
Rioting	+0.106**	+0.036	+0.106**
Threat Violations	+0.062**	+0.078**	+0.104**
Weapons Violations	+0.055*	+0.021	+0.057**
Other Violent Viol.	+0.028	+0.028	+0.041*
TOTAL VIOLENT	+0.144**	+0.094**	+0.176**
Drug Violations	+0.037	+0.087**	+0.092**
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+0.079**	+0.157**	+0.175**
Tampering w/Equip.	+0.055*	+0.067**	+0.090**
Other Non-Viol. Viol.	+0.121**	+0.183**	+0.225**
TOTAL NON-VIOLENT	+0.127**	+0.194**	+0.238**

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Table 41

**Individual-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Ethnic Group Membership**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	CAUCASIAN	AFRICAN AMERICAN	MEXICAN AMERICAN	MEXICAN NATIONAL
Assault	+0.026	-0.026	-0.006	-0.016
Fighting	-0.017	+0.016	+0.045*	-0.035
Rioting	-0.070**	-0.026	+0.102**	+0.020
Threat Violations	-0.030	+0.066**	+0.036	-0.062**
Weapons Violations	-0.026	-0.034	+0.042*	-0.003
Other Violent Viol.	-0.005	-0.013	+0.030	-0.011
TOTAL VIOLENT	-0.027	+0.016	+0.062**	-0.046*
Drug Violations	-0.016	-0.040*	+0.090**	-0.080**
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	-0.047*	+0.002	+0.064**	-0.006
Tampering w/Equip.	-0.013	-0.016	+0.036	-0.004
Other Non-Violent Viol.	-0.128**	+0.053*	+0.127**	-0.025
TOTAL NON-VIOLENT	-0.124**	+0.041*	+0.134**	-0.032

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two *'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Table 42

**Individual-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
General Committing Offense Category**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	VIOLENT OFFENSE	SEX OFFENSE	PROPERTY OFFENSE	DRUG OFFENSE	DWI
Assault	+0.073**	-0.055*	+0.038	-0.060**	-0.048*
Fighting	+0.097**	-0.022	-0.012	-0.064**	-0.039
Rioting	+0.076**	-0.067**	-0.019	-0.010	-0.037
Threat Violations	+0.016	-0.042*	+0.055*	-0.038	-0.028
Weapons Violations	+0.086**	-0.048*	-0.003	-0.052*	-0.028
Other Violent Viol.	+0.029	-0.022	+0.002	-0.019	+0.006
TOTAL VIOLENT	+0.100**	-0.072**	+0.033	-0.074**	-0.056*
Drug Violations	-0.037	-0.086**	+0.088**	-0.021	+0.037
Loss/Destr. of Prop.	+0.064**	-0.062**	+0.051*	-0.056*	-0.055*
Tampering	+0.030	-0.036	+0.023	-0.028	-0.011
Other Non-Violent	+0.076**	-0.139**	+0.103**	-0.056**	-0.093**
TOTAL NON-VIOL.	+0.078**	-0.145**	+0.108**	-0.064**	-0.088**

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Table 43

**Individual-Level Violation Rate Correlates:
Other Inmate Characteristics**

VIOLATION CATEGORY	MEDIAN AGE	1+ PRIOR COMMITTS	SENTENCE LENGTH	PUBLIC RISK SCORE	INST. RISK SCORE	UNIT SECURITY LEVEL
Assault	-0.174**	-0.025	-0.008	+0.045*	+0.059**	+0.058**
Fighting	-0.159**	+0.003	+0.009	+0.116**	+0.059**	+0.148**
Rioting	-0.148**	-0.002	-0.008	+0.051*	+0.064**	+0.034
Threat Violations	-0.125**	+0.089**	-0.046*	-0.018	+0.045*	+0.021
Weapons Violations	-0.150**	+0.003	-0.011	+0.023	+0.061**	+0.055*
Other Violent Viol.	-0.110**	-0.006	-0.028	+0.002	+0.038	+0.040*
TOTAL VIOLENT	-0.252**	+0.028	-0.028	+0.070**	+0.092**	+0.110**
Drug Violations	-0.089**	+0.168**	-0.100**	-0.117**	+0.045*	-0.115**
Loss/Dest. of Prop.	-0.208**	+0.001	-0.022	+0.010	+0.098**	+0.065**
Tampering w/Equip.	-0.168**	+0.008	+0.008	+0.021	+0.100**	+0.047*
Other Non-Violent	-0.423**	+0.010	-0.154**	-0.076**	+0.091**	-0.023
TOTAL NON-VIOL.	-0.429**	+0.027	-0.150**	-0.077**	+0.106**	-0.020

Note: Correlations labeled with one * are significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$) and are referred to as "significant," while those labeled with two **'s are significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$) and are referred to as "highly significant."

Median age at commitment positively correlated in a highly significant manner with all 12 types of violations, and in most cases to a greater extent than any other inmate characteristic. One or more prior Arizona prison commitments correlated significantly only with drug and threat violations, while sentence length significantly correlated only with drug and threat violations, all other violations, and total non-violent violations. In the latter case, the correlations were all negative, meaning that inmates with shorter sentences recorded more violations.

The public (P) and institutional (I) risk scores, which are used to classify inmates for custody level determination, correlated positively with a number of violations and particularly the institutional risk score. The latter significantly correlated with all violations except other violent violations. The public risk score significantly correlated only with assault, fighting, rioting, all other violations, and total violent violations, and, in fact, correlated negatively with drug violations, all other violations (non-violent) and total non-violent violations. The unit security level (of the first placement following commitment), which is generally based on a combination of the P and I scores, significantly correlated with assault, fighting, weapons violations, other violent violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, and total violent violations, but correlated negatively (still significantly) with drug violations, meaning that inmates in less secure facilities committed more of these violations.

A summary analysis was undertaken to compare the correlations resulting from the individual inmate analysis, as discussed above, with those resulting from the prison unit analysis. For each predictor (e.g., gang membership and age), average correlations were computed across 12 violation categories, including assault, fighting, rioting, threat violations, weapons violations, other violent violations, drug violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment, all other violations, total violent violations, and total non-violent violations.

Prison Unit Analysis (Average Correlation Across 12 Violation Categories)

- 1) Unit Security Level (+0.4105)
- 2) Street Gang Concentration (+0.378)
- 3) Median Inmate Age at Commitment (-0.375)
- 4) Any Gang Concentration (+0.368)
- 5) Concentration of Inmates Committed for Violent Offenses (+0.312)
- 6) Prison Gang Concentration (+0.288)
- 7) Concentration of African American Inmates (+0.232)
- 8) Concentration of Mexican National Inmates (+0.190)
- 9) Concentration of Mexican American Inmates (+0.176)
- 10) Overcrowding (inmates as percent of capacity) (+0.115)
- 11) Concentration of Inmates with 1+ Prior Arizona Prison Commitments (+0.089)
- 12) Concentration of Inmates Committed for Sex Offenses (-0.059)
- 13) CO Vacancy Rate (-0.075)
- 14) Concentration of Inmates Committed for Property Offenses (-0.125)
- 15) Concentration of Inmates Committed for Drug Offenses (-0.138)
- 16) Concentration of Inmates Committed for DWI (-0.148)
- 17) Inmate to CO to Ratio (fewer inmates per CO means more violations) (-0.321)
- 18) Concentration of Caucasian Inmates (-0.369)

Individual Inmate Analysis (Average Correlation Across 12 Violation Categories)

- 1) Age at Commitment (younger → more violations) (-0.203)
- 2) Any Gang Membership (+0.128)
- 3) Street Gang Membership (+0.088)
- 4) Prison Gang Membership (+0.085)
- 5) Institutional Risk Score (+0.071)
- 6) Mexican American Ethnicity (+0.063)
- 7) Commitment for a Violent Offense (+0.057)
- 8) Sentence Length (shorter sentences → more violations) (-0.045)
- 9) Commitment for a Property Offense (+0.039)
- 10) Unit Security Level (where housed) (+0.035)
- 11) One or More Prior Arizona Prison Commitments (+0.025)
- 12) Public Risk Score (+0.004)
- 13) African American Ethnicity (+0.003)
- 14) Mexican National Ethnicity (-0.025)
- 15) Commitment for DWI (-0.033)
- 16) Caucasian Ethnicity (-0.040)
- 17) Commitment for a Drug Offense (-0.045)
- 18) Commitment for a Sex Offense (-0.066)

A comparison of the two rankings indicates much commonality in the relative size of correlations. It is noteworthy, however, that inmate age and gang membership stand out as predictors in the individual analysis, while the importance of unit security level diminishes.

There is also far less multicollinearity in the individual inmate data (see Appendix B).

Multiple Regression Analysis of Gang Membership Effects

The analysis relies on multiple regression models to identify the independent effects¹ of prison and street gang membership on disciplinary violations when the effects of other factors are simultaneously controlled. Because the frequency distribution of each of the specific types of disciplinary violation (e.g., assaults and fighting) is non-normal, the prediction models use a dichotomous dependent variable (did or did not receive a disciplinary report), which calls for Logistic Regression² procedures. Summary measures of violent, non-violent, and total violations are analyzed with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression.

In the regression models, ethnicity is coded as "African American" or as "Hispanic" (Mexican-American or Mexican National), with whites as the unstated reference group. Commitment offense is dichotomized, with those committed for a non-violent offense as the reference group. Similarly, street and prison gang membership are entered as independent variables with non-gang inmates as the unstated reference category. Here, the analysis examines the likelihood of a violation for street or prison gang members compared to non-gang inmates.

¹ Regression analysis assumes no multicollinearity among the independent variables. Because both street gang membership and prison gang membership are highly related to age, prior commitments, and commitment for a violent offense, there is a risk of multicollinearity among these factors. However, our collinearity diagnostics indicates that, while there is some multicollinearity in the data, it is not severe enough to prevent sorting out the independent contribution that the independent variables explain in the dependent variable.

²Two statistics are used to determine if the logistic regression model improves our predictive ability: the log likelihood statistic of the model and the chi-square statistic. The tables report the log likelihood for the model, with all predictors included, and the chi-square statistic reflects the degree to which the model represents an improvement over the intercept-only, or baseline, model. The difference between the log likelihood for the intercept-only model and the log likelihood for the final model is interpreted as a chi-square distributed statistic. The chi-square is the difference between -2 times the log-likelihood for the intercept-only model and that for the final model. A significant chi-square statistic indicates that the model gives a significant improvement over the intercept-only model. That is, it indicates that the model gives better predictions than if we just guessed based on the marginal probabilities for the outcome categories. However, since the 2,188 inmates included in this analysis do not constitute a random sample, we do not rely on statistical significance in interpreting the findings. A third statistic, the Nagelkerke (1991, 1992) pseudo-R² statistic, assesses the overall goodness of fit of the model and, in effect, tells us how much better the model is than the intercept-only model. With logistic regression models, the R² is based on the likelihood ratio and serves as an estimate of the coefficient of determination. Nagelkerke's pseudo R² is asymptotically independent of the sample size, it varies between "0" and "1"; it admits the interpretation of the proportion of unexplained variation; and it is consistent with the estimation method: the R² is defined in terms of the difference in (log) likelihood achieved.

Logistic Regression Results: Log Odds Ratios

Table 44 displays the results of the logistic regression of disciplinary violations on nine predictors (explanatory variables), including:

- 1) Age
- 2) African American (Y/N)
- 3) Hispanic (Y/N)
- 4) Violent Crime (Y/N)
- 5) One or More Prior Arizona Prison Commitments (Y/N)
- 6) Sentence Length
- 7) Institutional Risk
- 8) Street Gang Member (Y/N)
- 9) Prison Gang Member (Y/N)

The table shows the "log odds or relative likelihood ratio" for a given variable (e.g., age) as a predictor of a given type of misconduct (e.g., assault). The log odds ratio indicates the strength of the variable as a predictor of misconduct when the effects of all of the other variables in the analysis are controlled for (e.g., "all else being equal"). For dichotomous variables, such as gang membership, the log odds ratio measures the ratio of the likelihood (probability) of a given type of violation (1 or more violations) for inmates with the stated characteristic (e.g., prison gang membership) to the likelihood of a violation for inmates in the unstated reference category (e.g., non-gang inmates).

Log odds ratios (significantly) greater than 1.000 show a positive independent contribution of the variable to the prediction of misconduct. Generally, log odds ratios less than 1.000 identify variables for which the reverse is true. However, in the case of age and sentence length, a log odds ratio less than 1.000 indicates that the variable works as a positive predictor in the reverse direction of the way it is coded, e.g., that younger inmates and those with shorter sentences have a greater likelihood of a violation than do older inmates and those with longer sentences. These observations should be kept in mind as the figures in Table 44 are interpreted.

Table 44

Effects of Gang Membership on Receipt of a Disciplinary Report: Logistic Regression Results

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	LOG ODDS RATIO*								
	Assault	Fighting	Rioting	Threats	Weapons	Other Violent	Drugs	Loss/ Dest.	Tamper
Age	0.925	0.951	0.935	0.938	0.947	0.926	0.965	0.933	0.917
African American	0.516	1.197	1.131	1.346	0.701	0.741	0.628	0.895	0.735
Hispanic	0.519	0.918	1.722	0.862	0.915	0.830	0.831	0.986	0.848
Violent Crime	1.143	1.499	1.210	1.251	1.460	1.134	0.893	1.189	0.867
1+ Prior Commits	1.290	1.177	1.329	1.979	1.498	1.572	2.198	1.385	1.335
Sentence Length	0.998	0.992	0.988	0.961	0.982	0.973	0.960	0.984	1.007
Institutional Risk	1.221	1.190	1.187	0.984	1.189	1.250	0.943	1.296	1.414
Street Gang Member	1.351	1.072	0.752	1.599	0.781	0.787	1.723	2.095	1.212
Prison Gang Member	2.860	1.782	1.871	1.807	1.156	1.226	1.316	1.927	1.719
-2 Log Likelihood	1,440	1,709	1,105	1,478	1,659	678	2,308	1,749	1,248
Chi-Square	143.8	90.5	84.7	109.6	75.1	34.6	128.8	174.8	113.0
Nagelkerke R ²	0.124	0.072	0.091	0.095	0.062	0.056	0.085	0.131	0.109

* In cases where the predictor is dichotomous (2-valued), the log odds ratio is the ratio of the likelihood of a given type of violation (1 or more violations) for inmates with the stated characteristic to the likelihood of a violation for inmates in the unstated reference group when controlling for all other explanatory variables, e.g., prison gang members were 2.860 times as likely to receive a disciplinary report for assault as were non-gang inmates (the unstated reference group) when controlling for age, ethnicity, prior commitments, etc.

Table 39, which identified raw violation frequencies in the target population, revealed that, without controlling for the effects of other variables, prison gang members were more likely to receive a disciplinary report than were non-gang inmates by the following amounts:

Unadjusted Likelihood Ratios (Prison Gang Members)
(No Control for Effects of Other Variables)

- Assault (2.87 times as likely)
- Fighting (1.99 times as likely)
- Rioting (2.69 times as likely)
- Threat Violations (1.99 times as likely)
- Weapons Violations (1.50 times as likely)
- Other Violent Violations (1.71 times as likely)
- Drug Violations (1.35 times as likely)
- Loss/Destruction of Property (2.28 times as likely)
- Tampering with Equipment (2.34 times as likely)

Table 44, on the other hand, shows that, when all of the other variables in the analysis are controlled for, prison gang members are more likely to receive a disciplinary report than are non-gang inmates by the following amounts:

Adjusted Likelihood Ratios (Prison Gang Members)
(Control for Effects of Other Variables)

- Assault (2.86 times as likely)
- Fighting (1.78 times as likely)
- Rioting (1.87 times as likely)
- Threat Violations (1.81 times as likely)
- Weapons Violations (1.16 times as likely)
- Other Violent Violations (1.23 times as likely)
- Drug Violations (1.32 times as likely)
- Loss/Destruction of Property (1.93 times as likely)
- Tampering with Equipment (1.72 times as likely)

A comparison of the two sets of results shows that controlling for the effects of the other variables in the analysis has significantly reduced the relative likelihood ratios for prison gang members in the case of rioting (2.69 to 1.87), weapons violations (1.50 to 1.16), other violent violations (1.71 to 1.23), and tampering with equipment (2.34 to 1.72).

The corresponding comparisons for street gang members are as follows:

Unadjusted Likelihood Ratios (Street Gang Members)
(No Control for Effects of Other Variables)

- Assault (1.97 times as likely)
- Fighting (1.66 times as likely)
- Rioting (1.52 times as likely)
- Threat Violations (2.27 times as likely)
- Weapons Violations (1.25 times as likely)
- Other Violent Violations (1.40 times as likely)
- Drug Violations (1.65 times as likely)
- Loss/Destruction of Property (2.86 times as likely)
- Tampering with Equipment (2.21 times as likely)

Adjusted Likelihood Ratios (Street Gang Members)
(Control for Effects of Other Variables)

- Assault (1.35 times as likely)
- Fighting (1.07 times as likely)
- Rioting (0.75 times as likely)
- Threat Violations (1.60 times as likely)
- Weapons Violations (0.78 times as likely)
- Other Violent Violations (0.79 times as likely)
- Drug Violations (1.72 times as likely)
- Loss/Destruction of Property (2.10 times as likely)
- Tampering with Equipment (1.21 times as likely)

Again, a comparison of the two sets of results shows that controlling for the effects of other variables has significantly reduced the relative likelihood ratios for street gang members in all cases except drug violations. Furthermore, the logistic regression results have indicated that, when other variables are held constant, street gang members are even less likely than are non-gang inmates to be charged with rioting, weapons violations, and other violent violations. Furthermore, it is evident that controlling for other variables, such as age, a strong correlate of street gang membership, has dramatically changed the results, and has demonstrated that the unique contribution of gang membership is generally much greater for prison gang membership than it is for street gang membership.

By dividing the relative likelihood ratios for prison gang members by the corresponding ratios for street gang members, we can summarize the results above as follows:

- **Assault**: Prison gang members are 2.86 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 2.12 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with assault. In turn, street gang members are 1.35 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with assault.
- **Fighting**: Prison gang members are 1.78 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 1.66 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with fighting. In turn, street gang members are 1.07 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with fighting.
- **Rioting**: Prison gang members are 1.87 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 2.49 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with rioting. In turn, street gang members are 0.75 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with rioting.
- **Threat Violations**: Prison gang members are 1.81 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 1.13 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with a threat violation. In turn, street gang members are 1.60 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with a threat violation.
- **Weapons Violations**: Prison gang members are 1.16 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 1.49 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with a weapons violation. In turn, street gang members are 0.78 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with a weapons violation.
- **Other Violent Violations**: Prison gang members are 1.23 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 1.56 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with another violent violation. In turn, street gang members are 0.79 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with another violent violation.
- **Drug Violations**: Prison gang members are 1.32 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 0.77 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with a drug violation. In turn, street gang members are 1.72 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with a drug violation.
- **Loss/Destruction of Property**: Prison gang members are 1.93 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 0.92 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with loss/destruction of property. In turn, street gang members are 2.10 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with loss/destruction of property.
- **Tampering with Equipment**: Prison gang members are 1.72 times as likely as non-gang inmates and 1.42 times as likely as street gang members to be charged with tampering with equipment. In turn, street gang members are 1.21 times as likely as non-gang inmates to be charged with tampering with equipment.

Table 44 also identifies the significant ties between violations and predictors:

- **Age:** Assault, fighting, rioting, threat violations, weapons violations, other violent violations, drug violations [weak], loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment.
 - **African American Ethnicity:** Threat violations [weak].
 - **Hispanic Ethnicity:** Rioting.
 - **Violent Committing Offense:** Fighting, threat violations [weak], weapons violations.
 - **Prior Arizona Prison Commitments:** Assault [weak], rioting [weak], threat violations, weapons violations, other violent violations, drug violations, loss/destruction of property, tampering with equipment [weak].
 - **Sentence Length:** Threat violations, other violent violations [weak], drug violations.
 - **Institutional Risk:** Other violent violations [weak], loss/destruction of property [weak], tampering with equipment.
 - **Street Gang Member:** Assault [weak], threat violations, drug violations, loss/destruction of property.
 - **Prison Gang Member:** Assault, fighting, rioting, threat violations, drug violations [weak], loss/destruction of property, and tampering with equipment.
-
- **Assault:** Age, Caucasian ethnicity, prior commitments [weak], street gang membership [weak], prison gang membership.
 - **Fighting:** Age, violent committing offense, prison gang membership.
 - **Rioting:** Age, Hispanic ethnicity, prior commitments [weak], prison gang membership.
 - **Threat Violations:** Age, African American ethnicity [weak], violent committing offense [weak], prior commitments, sentence length (shorter), street gang membership, prison gang membership.
 - **Weapons Violations:** Age, violent committing offense, prior commitments.
 - **Other Violent Violations:** Age, prior commitments, institutional risk [weak], sentence length (shorter).
 - **Drug Violations:** Age [weak], prior commitments, sentence length (shorter), street gang membership, prison gang membership [weak].
 - **Loss/Destruction of Property:** Age, prior commitments, institutional risk [weak], street gang membership, prison gang membership.
 - **Tampering with Equipment:** Age, prior commitments [weak], institutional risk, prison gang membership.

Percent Explanation of Variance

The logistic regression models explain the following percentages of the variance in the incidence of each type of violation (Table 44): assault (12.4%), fighting (7.2%), rioting (9.1%), threat violations (9.5%), weapons violations (6.2%), other violent violations (5.6%), drug violations (8.5%), loss/destruction of property (13.1%), and tampering with equipment (10.9%).

These results show that, among the nine types of violation, assault and loss/destruction of property are the most predictable from the nine explanatory variables included in the model.

OLS Regression Results: Violent, Non-Violent, and Total Violations

Compared to violation-specific categories (e.g., assault), the numbers of violent, non-violent, and total violations better approximate a normal distribution, thereby enabling the use of OLS regression to examine predictive ability (Table 45). The combined effect explains 9.2%, 22.4%, and 22.6% of the variation in the number of reports for violent, non-violent, and total violations, respectively. Age is by far the strongest predictor of the three types of violations, followed by prison gang membership (violent violations), street gang membership (non-violent violations), and both types of gang membership equally (total violations). Other good predictors include: violent committing offense (violent), prior commitments, and sentence length (shorter).

Conclusions of the Individual Multiple Regression Analysis

Analyses of disciplinary violations recorded by 2,188 males committed in 1996 identify the following variables as good predictors of institutional misconduct across nine violation categories: inmate age at commitment (excellent), any gang membership (very good), street gang membership (good), prison gang membership (good), institutional risk score (moderate), Mexican American ethnicity (moderate), and commitment for a violent offense (moderate). Without controlling for effects of other variables, prison and street gang membership are equally good predictors of misconduct, however, when other variables are controlled, prison gang membership proves to be the stronger predictor. With statistical controls applied, prison gang members are, on average, 1.74 times more likely to commit violations than are non-gang inmates and are 1.38 times more likely than street gang members to commit violations. This establishes that gang members are not more likely to commit violations simply because they are younger, tend to commit violent crimes, or tend to have prior commitments, etc. Gang membership demonstrates its own unique and significant contribution to the likelihood of misconduct.

Table 45

Effects of Gang Membership on Receipt of a Disciplinary Report: OLS Regression Results

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	REGRESSION COEFFICIENT (Beta)		
	VIOLENT	NON-VIOLENT	ANY VIOL.
Age	-0.245	-0.396	-0.399
African American	-0.020	+0.027	+0.021
Hispanic	-0.043	+0.006	-0.002
Violent Crime	+0.066	-0.002	+0.010
1+ Prior Commitments	+0.069	+0.081	+0.085
Sentence Length	-0.051	-0.144	-0.139
Institutional Risk	+0.044	+0.009	+0.016
Street Gang Member	+0.031	+0.098	+0.094
Prison Gang Member	+0.110	+0.083	+0.094
R ²	0.092	0.224	0.226

PART II: PROCESS EVALUATION

The process evaluation is based on field interviews of prison administrators, on surveys completed by Correctional Officers and inmates, and on an examination of records provided by prison officials. Twenty prison units in nine prison complexes were visited, with each prison unit visited twice. During the first visit, researchers interviewed Wardens, Complex Security Chiefs, Special Security Unit (SSU) Coordinators, and Inspections and Investigations Officers at each complex. At each unit, interviews were conducted with Deputy Wardens, Associate Deputy Wardens, Security Chiefs, and SSU Officers. In addition, surveys were distributed to a random sample of 60 Correctional Officers in each unit. A second visit was made to each unit to administer surveys to a random sample of 40 inmates per unit (interview guides and surveys are attached as Appendix C). A total of 111 administrators and staff were interviewed and surveys were completed by 654 Correctional Officers and 463 inmates.

Correctional Officer surveys were delivered to the Deputy Warden of each unit in envelopes addressed to specific Correctional Officers selected at random by the researchers. Each envelope contained the questionnaire, along with a postage-paid return envelope addressed to the School of Justice Studies at Arizona State University. The Officers were asked to return the sealed envelope to their shift supervisor who, in turn, mailed them in batches. This guaranteed a high response rate (73%). The inmate surveys were administered to groups of approximately 20 inmates selected at random by the researchers. Typically, the inmates sat at desks in the visitation area. Researchers supervised and were able to respond to the inmates' questions. Inmates were told that their participation was voluntary, and they received no compensation or incentive to participate.

Inmates were not specifically told that the survey was a part of an ongoing evaluation of the STG program; instead, they were told that researchers from Arizona State University were doing a study of issues regarding inmate safety. Nevertheless, inmates were suspicious and a number of them refused to answer the questions, particularly the questions about gangs.

The interview and survey responses are divided into three categories for this report:

- 1) Responses from Administrators and staff, including Wardens, Deputy Wardens, Associate Deputy Wardens, Security Chiefs, Special Security Unit (SSU) Coordinators and Officers, and Inspections and Investigators (I&I) Officers;
- 2) Responses from Correctional Officers (COs);
- 3) Responses from inmates.

The interview and survey questions are, for the most part, unique to each of the three categories, but several questions are common to each. This makes it possible to compare the perceptions of respondents for certain items, their perceptions being different in many areas. For example, staff safety may rate very high when measured by the number of inmate attacks on staff, but if the staff perceive that they are not safe, then this perception is a reality to them and suggests the need to do something to correct erroneous perceptions.

The responses within the three categories described above will be organized around topical areas as follows:

- 1) Background and demographic information;
- 2) Views about what the mission and goals of the STG program are;
- 3) Identifying and validating STG gang members;
- 4) Training for the STG program;
- 5) Impact of the program on STG Gangs.
- 6) Inmate and staff safety;
- 7) Opinions and attitudes of respondents;
- 8) Conditions in the prison units;
- 9) Conclusions.

Background and Demographic Information

The administrators we interviewed had worked for ADC an average of 14.8 years and at their assigned unit an average of 2.5 years. SSU Coordinators and Officers had worked in the program for an average of two years. Correctional Officers had worked for ADC an average of three years and at their assigned unit an average of 1.7 years, except for the Lewis Complex, where COs had worked for ADC on average for only 1 year and at the complex for only 10 months. There obviously is quite a bit of turnover for both administrators and COs, although it is somewhat greater for COs. According to administrators, a shortage of COs is one of the main problems to be dealt with in carrying out an effective STG program.

The inmates surveyed came from 38 states, as well as Mexico, Europe, Asia and Africa. The majority were born in Arizona (39.7%), California (13.6%), and Mexico (10.3%). On average, they had lived in Arizona for 14 years before entering prison. Fifty-six percent claimed this was their first time in prison, and on average they'd served 3 years on this conviction and had 1.7 years left to serve. Seven were serving life sentences. Their average age was 33 years and they'd typically completed 11 years of school. Forty-three percent were Caucasian, 36% Hispanic, 16% African American, and 3% Native American.

Views about the Mission and Goals of the STG Program

If getting administrators to agree about the mission and goals of the STG program is a Departmental objective, then this has been accomplished. Overwhelmingly, they say that identifying, validating and removing STG prison gangs from the yards is the main goal of the STG program. Only a few referred to improved staff safety, less contraband, or fewer serious incidents among inmates as goals.

Identifying and Validating STG Gang Members

During the first few years of the program, identifying and validating STG members was straightforward because they did not hesitate to wear their gang tattoos or openly proclaim their membership. Membership in a prison gang gave an inmate a sense of power and belonging, access to drugs and money, and protection. The main sources of information on suspected gang members, according to prison administrators, are the following (ranked most to least mentioned):

- Tattoos
- Self admission
- Membership lists, gang literature, correspondence
- Snitch information (tied with above)
- Cell searches
- Line staff observation of inmate associates
- Court records and pre-sentence reports

Validation points are allotted to each of these information sources (e.g., membership lists are worth 9 points). In order to validate an inmate as an STG member, the STG coordinator must have evidence from two or more distinct sources (e.g., tattoos and memberships lists) tallying at least 10 points. Because STG members did not at first try to hide their memberships, during the first few years 450 inmates were validated as STG members and were isolated in the super-maximum security SMU II; in addition, 56 inmates who had been validated as STG gang members successfully renounced their membership and were debriefed.

Once an inmate is identified as a suspect, the SSU Coordinator conducts an interview with the inmate. SSU Coordinators say these interviews, and an accompanying STG questionnaire, are very productive. They often obtain the names of other gang members and tips on where to look for more information. The interviews also help to develop a good relationship with the inmate. The STG members who agree to renounce their gang affiliation are debriefed by a representative of the STG Unit in the Division of Inspections and Investigations (I & I).

During the debriefings, inmates are asked a series of questions about their activities as a gang member and about specific gangs. Regarding their reasons for renouncing membership, debriefed inmates say: 1) they no longer believe in their gang's philosophy (43%); 2) there was no future in being a member (32%); and 3) they were tired of the activities of other members of the gang. Overwhelmingly, they said they became involved by being recruited by other inmates. The principal activity they performed to become a member was to assault an inmate, or in some instances to recruit another member. The principal thing they expected to gain from gang membership was respect from other inmates.

They were also expecting enhanced status within the prison, support from other inmates, and protection from other gangs. Several gave more than one reason, usually a combination of respect and status. The main things they said they actually received from being a gang member were status and being a member of a family. However, a fairly large percent said they received nothing from being a member. Thirty-six of the 54 (67%) said they were asked to commit an assault as a gang member, while 19 of the 54 said they did successfully recruit someone. Forty-four of 56 (79%) said their gang was governed by a council whose members were of equal rank.

The main intelligence tools SSU Officers use to identify gang members are cameras, videotapes, audio recorders, phone monitoring, mail scans, incident reports, the AIMS/GRITS (Gang Related Inmate Tracking System) computer system, and informants.

As inmates came to realize the consequences of being validated as STG gang members, they began to "go underground." They stopped wearing tattoos, stopped admitting that they were gang members, stopped keeping membership lists, and became cautious about who they were seen with. As a result, there has been a decline in the frequency of hearings and the number of inmates who are being validated has declined (Table 46).

Table 46

**Frequency of STGHC Meetings and
Validations for Selected Validation Criteria**

QUARTER	STGHC MEETINGS	VALIDATIONS FOR SELECTED CRITERIA		
		GANG TATTOOS	SELF- ADMISSION	GANG ASSOCIATIONS
4 th Quarter 1997	110	100	79	49
1 st Quarter 1998	67	59	58	31
2 nd Quarter 1998	26	18	17	18
3 rd Quarter 1998	28	22	20	10
4 th Quarter 1998	48	35	34	12
1 st Quarter 1999	44	23	30	3
2 nd Quarter 1999	29	12	20	5
3 rd Quarter 1999	32	16	19	6
4 th Quarter 1999	12	9	11	2
1 st Quarter 2000	24	6	6	9
2 nd Quarter 2000	21	11	13	5
3 rd Quarter 2000	15	6	8	4
4 th Quarter 2000	23	18	20	8

The number of STG validations has been declining while the number of STG suspects has continued to climb, the latter constituting a relatively stable 3.2% of the inmate population. Therefore, the decline in validations must be due to the fact that it's becoming more difficult to develop a case for validation. In fact, gang members are discontinuing many of the things that were previously used to validate them, e.g., tattoos and self-admissions. Administrators and SSU Officers list the following problems involved in identifying and validating gang members:

- Difficulty in getting enough evidence;
- Inability to check all mail;
- A lack of staff;
- The need to share SSU Coordinator information. SSU Coordinators are hesitant to share information with COs because they fear doing so might jeopardize their investigation;
- The lack of formal training and ability to know what to look for;
- A lack of bed space to house validated members;
- Bureaucratic obstacles;
- Blocks to validation.

Although SSU Officers say they rely on COs to help identify suspects, the majority of COs (53%) do not believe they have a role in identifying STG members. Administrators had four distinct recommendations for improving the STG program:

- Increase the number of points for certain items such as self-admission;
- Provide more training for line staff in how to compile evidence;
- Provide more staff and more SSU Officers;
- Provide SSU coordination in Central Office to help standardize operations and to facilitate the sharing of information across complex lines.

Training for the STG Program

The lack of formal training about the STG program is an obvious shortcoming for both administrators and COs. Although the majority of COs (74.6%) said they've received training about the STG Program, most reported that they received this training at the Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA) or as routine "on-the-job" training (very little time is spent in COTA on gangs). In addition, 21.5% rated the training as "not at all adequate" (Table 47 on next page).

Table 47

**Administrator and CO Ratings of
Training for the STG Program**

RATING	ADMINISTRATORS (79)	CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS (478)
EXCELLENT	18 (22.8%)	26 (5.4%)
VERY GOOD	27 (34.2%)	124 (25.9%)
ADEQUATE	26 (32.9%)	225 (47.1%)
NOT AT ALL ADEQUATE	8 (10.1%)	103 (21.5%)

Administrators also have had little specific, formal STG training. Twenty-eight percent said that most of their training was on-the-job training; 16% had attended gang conferences and 14% received "Block" training. Most administrators (40%) believe they needed more in-depth training and 27% believe that more of the staff needs training.

Impact on STG Gangs and Street Gangs

According to prison administrators, on average only about 5% of inmates in their units are STG gang members. At the same time, however, 32% of administrators said that the percent of STG gang members has been increasing over the past year. One reason for the increase is the fact that newly admitted street gang members, who are typically younger and more violent than other inmates, become recruits for the STG gangs. Another reason is the relatively recent arrival of the Surenos, who have come from Southern California to Arizona. They have moved here, according to prison administrators, because of the three-strikes law in California.

Although the STG program has definitely decreased the number of STG members in the general population, the number of street gang members remains high – prison administrators estimate that 35 to 40% of their inmates belong to street gangs – and a full 27% of administrators say their numbers have been increasing over the past two years. Street gangs should be distinguished from STG gangs because they have not been formally certified as STGs, a process that takes time and resources. Street gang members belong to gangs formed on Arizona's streets, but which have not organized into true "prison gangs" in the prison system. There are numerous such gangs scattered throughout Arizona's prisons. In addition to STG gangs and street gangs, there are several other gangs which were considered prison gangs for the purposes of this study, one of which – the Warrior Society - was recently certified as an STG. According to prison administrators, approximately 5% of their inmates are members of these other prison gangs.

According to most of the administrators, street gang members are a significant and growing problem because they are younger, more violent, and less respectful of authority. However, 48% of prison administrators say that STG gangs are the greater security threat because they are better organized than street gangs.

The seven STG gangs in Arizona's prisons at the time this report was written are the Aryan Brotherhood, New Mexican Mafia, Old Mexican Mafia, African Mau Mau, Grandel, Border Brothers and Surenos. Table 48 presents the reported perceptions of the levels of organization for each of these gangs in controlling drugs, recruiting new members, and influencing inmates. (The Surenos are not included in the table because they were not certified as an STG at the time our interviews were conducted.) The Border Brothers and New Mexican Mafia rank first and second on the three criteria. According to our respondents they are the most effective in controlling drugs, recruiting members, and influencing inmates. In fact, it is the rivalry between these two gangs that is the main source of conflict in Arizona's prisons today. Members of these gangs cannot be housed in the same unit because it would lead to violence and bloodshed. Control of drugs is the main reason for much of the violence in prisons today, as it has been for over 40 years.

Even though inmates are aware of the consequences of being validated as an STG gang member and are much more cautious as a result, they still are rather defiant. Fifty-nine percent of surveyed inmates say they are very or somewhat familiar with the Department's STG policy. However, 89% said it has not affected their willingness to get involved in gang activity. At the same time, 38% said that inmates are more reluctant to join prison gangs now than in the past year or so. This response seems to indicate that inmates think the policy is indeed having a dampening effect on STG gangs.

Table 48

**Administrator and CO Ratings of
How Well-Organized STG Gangs Are***

AREA OF ORGANIZATION	ARYAN BROTHERHOOD	NEW MEXICAN MAFIA	OLD MEXICAN MAFIA	GRANDEL	BORDER BROTHERS
Controlling Drugs	6	8	3.5	6	8
Recruiting New Members	5	6.5	2	5	8
Influencing Inmates	8	8	3	5	8
Overall Rating	6.3	7.5	2.8	5.3	8

* Measured on a 10-point scale where 1 is not at all organized and 10 is very well organized.

Inmate and Staff Safety

Improving inmate and staff safety is one of the anticipated outcomes of the STG program. If the number of gang members on the yard declines, the logic runs, then inmate and staff safety should improve. But there is ambivalence among administrators and Correctional Officers about how well this is being accomplished. While more administrators than not said attacks by STG gang members on staff and other inmates have been declining over the previous two years, the differences are not large (see Table 49) and a substantial percent (40%) said attacks on staff have remained the same.

On the other hand, it is clear that administrators believe that street gang member attacks on staff have been increasing (22%) or staying the same (67%). A significant percent of administrators (45%) say that attacks on inmates by street gang members have increased (see Table 49). Correctional Officers were more likely than administrators to believe that inmate attacks on other inmates have been increasing over the past two years: forty-five percent said they have been increasing; only 8% said they have been decreasing and 47% said that these attacks have remained the same over the past two years.

Inmates were also asked about the likelihood that inmates and staff would be assaulted (see Table 50). In general, inmates believed that other inmates were more likely to be assaulted than staff. For example, 17% said it was very likely that an inmate would be assaulted in his living unit, while only 7% said it was very likely that staff would be assaulted.

Given that a fairly large percent of administrators and Correctional Officers believe that attacks by gang members and inmates on staff and other inmates have been increasing over the past two years, just how safe are these two groups? Table 51 shows that administrators rate inmate and staff safety much higher than do Correctional Officers and inmates.

Table 49

Administrator and CO Perceptions of Physical Attacks on Inmates and Staff

A. Administrator Perceptions

Attacks on Staff Have Been:	By STG Gangs	By Street Gangs
Increasing	27%	22%
Decreasing	33%	12%
About the Same	40%	66%

Attacks on Inmates Have Been:	By STG Gangs	By Street Gangs
Increasing	28%	44%
Decreasing	40%	10%
About the Same	32%	46%

B. Correctional Officer Perceptions

Have Been:	Attacks on Staff	Attacks on Inmates
Increasing	26%	45%
Decreasing	29%	8%
About the Same	45%	47%

Table 50

**Inmate Perceptions of the
Likelihood of Being Assaulted**

Assault On	Not at All Likely	Somewhat Likely	Likely	Very Likely	TOTAL
Inmate	22%	37%	24%	17%	100%
Staff	37%	39%	17%	7%	100%

Table 51

**Administrator, CO, and Inmate
Perceptions of Safety**

A. Administrator Perceptions

% Who Say It Has Been:	Safety of Staff	Safety of Inmates
Increasing	69%	22%
Decreasing	11%	12%
About the Same	20%	66%
TOTAL	100%	100%
Overall Rating*	8	8

B. Correctional Officer Perceptions

Attacks on Inmates Have Been:	Safety of Staff	Safety of Inmates
Increasing	27%	36%
Decreasing	32%	19%
About the Same	41%	45%
TOTAL	100%	100%
Overall Rating*	6	6

C. Inmate Perceptions

It is Safe or Dangerous for:	Members of a Gang	Inmates Not Members of a Gang
Very Safe	13%	16%
Safe	12%	16%
Somewhat Safe	32%	37%
Somewhat Dangerous	32%	24%
Dangerous	5%	4%
Very Dangerous	6%	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%

* The overall rate is on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is not at all safe and 10 is very safe.

Administrators also were much more likely than Correctional Officers to believe that inmate and staff safety has been increasing. Still, overall, administrators, Correctional Officers, and inmates themselves rated inmate safety reasonably high; administrators give both inmate and staff safety a rating of 8 on a 10-point scale and Correctional Officers give each a rating of six.

Inmates believe that inmates who are not members of a gang are safer than those who are: 69% said that inmates who are not members of a gang are very safe, safe, or somewhat safe, while only 57% said inmates who were members of a gang were very safe, safe, or somewhat safe (see Table 51).

There is some ambivalence about how much staff and inmate safety has improved over the past two years. This may be because, while STG gang activity has declined, street gang activities have increased. Moreover, staff and inmate safety is related to factors other than how much gang activity there is. Other changes in recent years have contributed to overall safety, including rapid responses to any disturbance, better physical design of the newer prison units, improved training of Correctional Officers, placing inmates in protective segregation, and policies which restrict inmate movement. The number of inmates placed in protective segregation increased from 398 in March 1998 to 805 in September 2001. These factors, together with the STG program, explain to a large extent why inmate and staff safety are given fairly high ratings by administrators, Correctional Officers and inmates themselves.

The prison administrators who perceived that STG gang attacks on staff have been increasing gave several reasons why this is occurring; a few said it was because the Border Brothers and Surenos are angry about the STG policy and retaliate against staff as a result. Some said STG gang attacks on inmates have increased because of power struggles and attempts to control contraband.

In particular, conflict between Mexican Americans (New Mexican Mafia) and Mexican Nationals (Border Brothers) is the main reason for attacks on inmates. Street gang attacks on staff and other inmates have been increasing, some prison administrators believe, because inmates from street gangs are immature and reckless young men who bring the conflicts they had on the streets into prison, and they are trying to take over the yards.

In addition to removing STG gang members from the yards, the other reasons given by prison administrators who believe inmate and staff safety is increasing are:

- More controlled movement of inmates;
- The new protective segregation policy;
- More observant and better-trained staff;
- The incident management system (IMS);
- Security improvements such as fencing and cameras.

It is, of course, true that gangs are only one of several factors contributing to perceptions of staff and inmate safety. It is difficult to determine which are the most and which are the least important. One statistical technique for sorting out the factors is called multiple regression. A multiple regression analysis was performed using administrators' responses about inmate and staff safety in order to determine which factors are more and which less important. In statistical terms, the regression analysis tells how well each factor predicts the perceptions of staff and inmate safety.

Together, the nine factors related to staff perceptions of safety are fairly good predictors since the multiple correlation is a very high 0.814 (out of a possible 1.0, which would be a perfect correlation enabling perfect prediction – see Table 52). Table 52 shows that the security level of the unit is the best predictor of staff safety.

Table 52

**Multiple Regression Analysis of Factors
Related to Perceived Staff and Inmate Safety**

Rank	Perceived Staff Safety	Beta		Rank	Perceived Inmate Safety	Beta
1	Security level of Unit	-.503		1	Percent of inmates currently street gang members	-.411
2	Percent of inmates currently street gang members	-.327		2	Percent of inmates currently STG gang members	-.240
3	Percent of inmates currently other prison gang members	-.307		3	Percent of inmates currently other prison gang members	-.214
4	Percent of inmates currently STG gang members	-.264		4	How good is inmate food	.196
5	Inmate morale	-.249		5	Inmate morale	.163
6	How good is inmate food	.209		6	Effectiveness of COs in handling troubling inmates	.153
7	Staff morale	.184		7	Inmate-staff relations	.135
8	Effectiveness of COs in handling troublesome inmates	.166		8	Length of time staff worked at the facility	-.110
9	How respectful inmate-staff relations are	.129		9	How respectful inmate-staff relations are	.031
				10	Security level of facility	-.030
	R = .814	R² = .663			R = .720	R² = .518

Note, however, that it ranks last as a predictor of inmate safety. Because the Beta Coefficient is negative, this indicates that staff safety is worse in the higher security units. In general, for both staff and inmate safety, the best predictor of perceived safety is the percent of inmates who are gang members, with the percent of street gang members being a slightly better predictor than the percent of either STG or other prison gang members.

A general conclusion that can be reached from the regression analysis is that the proportion of gang members in a unit is the most important factor for both staff and inmate safety, although the security level of the unit also contributed to perceived staff safety; that is, perceived staff safety decreases as the security level goes up, and staff are perceived to be the most safe in the less secure units. This is because the more secure units have a larger percentage of gang members.

Even though the multiple correlation coefficient (R) is very high for both staff and inmate safety, the coefficients of determination (R^2) show that the factors in the model explain 66% and 52% of variation respectively for perceived staff and inmate safety; this means that about 44% of the variation for perceived staff safety and 48% for perceived inmate safety are still to be explained by other factors. These other factors were mentioned above. Protective segregation is probably the most important because it places the most vulnerable inmates in units where they cannot be reached by the inmates who are likely to attack them.

The variables included in the model show that the percent of inmates who are gang members is an important factor in both perceived staff and inmate safety, and to the extent that gang activity can be reduced, perceived staff and inmate safety will improve. On the other hand, prison administrators and Correctional Officers say that the number of street gang members is increasing in their units, which is a problem that the STG policy has not yet addressed.

Opinions and Attitudes of Respondents

When asked if they thought the STG policy is achieving the goal of reducing gang violence in their complex or unit, prison administrators overwhelmingly said yes. Their comments about this include the following:

- It identifies and removes the leaders and deters others.
- They are not as apt to brag about gang membership.
- They fear the loss of earned time credits.
- It has become more risky for inmates.

On the other hand, when asked if the gang problem can be controlled, their responses are that it cannot be totally eliminated because the gangs keep recruiting young people from the streets. Although gangs cannot be eliminated, one administrator commented, "We can control the malicious activities so that they do not run the yards." Another said the gang problem can be controlled if the Department is willing to spend the money. Yet another said: "Now there are no more open associations, which makes managing the yards much better. Before there were no real serious consequences to gang membership, making it easier to extort other inmates."

Correctional Officers were more pessimistic than administrators about the possibility of being able to control gangs; only 50% said that the gang problem can be controlled. Inmates themselves, as might be expected, were even more doubtful about the impact of the STG program. Sixty percent said they were very or somewhat familiar with the STG policy, but only 10% said it affected their own willingness to join a gang and a full 89% said it did not. Of course, their responses show they are being defiant. In addition, only 21.8% of the 413 inmates in the survey answered this particular question, perhaps indicating that only those who felt strongly about it answered.

Conditions in Prison Units: Additional Factors
Related to Inmate and Staff Safety

Some of the previous research about prison violence has found that various conditions within the prison, such as availability of recreational and health facilities, and adequacy of living quarters, are related to prison violence. This is also the case in Arizona's prisons. As will be noted below, there is a difference in perceptions among administrators, COs and inmates about conditions in their units.

All three groups were asked the same questions about (1) relations between inmates and staff (how respectful); (2) ease of smuggling drugs into the unit; and (3) such conditions as food, recreation programs, work for inmates, shower facilities, cells and inmate and staff morale. As will be shown below, administrators in general perceived these to be better than COs, who, in turn, perceived them to be better than inmates.

Table 53 shows that administrators have a much more positive view of inmate-staff relations than do COs and inmates themselves. Of course, it might be expected that inmates would have the most negative view; some inmates said that they give as much respect to staff as staff shows them and others complained about new, younger staff who do not treat them very well. "They think they are Gods," one inmate complained.

Inmate-staff relations are strongly related, in the perception of administrators, to the security level of the unit (the higher the security level, the less respectful relations are); to the adequacy of training COs receive in handling troublesome inmates (the more adequate the training, the more respectful the relations); and to inmate and staff morale (the higher the inmate and staff morale, the more respectful their relations).

Table 53

**Administrator, CO, and Inmate
Perceptions of Inmate – Staff Relations**

% Saying Relations Are:	Administrators	COs	Inmates
Very Respectful	21.2%	5.8%	6.0%
Moderately Respectful	68.2%	76.0%	46.6%
Not Very Respectful	9.4%	16.9%	37.3%
Hostile	1.2%	1.3%	10.1%

Inmate-staff relations are somewhat related in the perception of COs to staff safety (the more respectful relations are perceived to be, the greater the perceived level of safety among staff), and also to inmate and staff morale (the more respectful their relations are, the higher are the inmate and staff morale).

Inmates' perceptions are similar to those of administrators and COs: the more respectful inmates perceive relations to be, the higher they perceive inmate and staff morale to be and the more safe they feel they are.

Turning now to how the three groups rate various things such as food for inmates, Table 54 shows again that administrators rate food and other conditions within the prison more favorably than do COs and far better than do the inmates. A few things stand out in Table 54. One is that inmates perceive staff morale to be very low, far lower than staff themselves and less than half as positive as administrators rate staff morale. A second is that COs perceive that it is easier to smuggle drugs into the unit than do administrators.

Table 54 also shows that, according to COs and inmates, inmate and staff morale, food, effectiveness of COs in handling troubling inmates, and how respectful inmate-staff relations are also predict staff and inmate safety, although in diminishing amounts and in slightly different order for staff and inmates. For example, the quality of inmate food ranks 4th for inmate safety but 6th for staff safety (nevertheless, their beta weights are approximately the same). The conclusion here is the higher that food is rated by inmates and staff, the better staff and inmate safety is perceived to be.

Inmate and staff morale are not very high; COs rate their own morale a 5 on the 1 to 10 scale, and inmates believe that staff morale is only a 3 on the scale where 1 is not at all good and 10 is very good (see Table 54).

Table 54

**Administrator, CO, and Inmate
Perceptions of Various Conditions**

Conditions	Administrators	COs	Inmates
Food	7.0*	5.0	2.0
Recreational Programs	7.0	6.0	3.0
Work for Inmates	8.0	6.0	3.0
Shower Facilities	8.0	7.0	4.0
Cells	8.0	7.0	5.0
Inmate Morale	7.0	5.0	5.0
Staff Morale	7.0	5.0	3.0
Ease of Smuggling Drugs	6.0	7.0	----

*Median rating on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is not at all good and 10 is very good.

Although the morale of prison administrators was not rated on this scale, their morale can be questioned from the fact that a number of administrators said that they were hoping the state legislature would pass a bill that had been introduced allowing them to retire after 20 years of service with good retirement benefits. Several said that they would retire just as soon as their 20 years were up. Finally, it is clear that inmates are upset about a lack of recreation programs and health and educational opportunities. They complained that recreational facilities were antiquated and hours were restricted so that inmates on work details often could not use the facilities. They also complained that the only educational programs were GED programs and they were not available in all units. Finally, a number of inmates complained that they had to be very sick – near death some said – in order to get help.

Drugs are one form of contraband that gangs fight over. Asked to use a 10-point scale (1= not at all easy, 10 = very easy) to rate the ease of smuggling in drugs, administrators gave a median rating of 6.0 (see Table 55). They were almost evenly split about whether this had increased (24%) or decreased (30%) over the past two years, with most saying it was about the same. Correctional Officers rated the ease of smuggling in drugs higher than administrators (median of 7) and they were more likely to believe that this had remained the same (62%) or increased (27%). Only 11% believed that the ease of smuggling drugs into the unit had decreased over the past two years. Since control of drugs is one of the main sources of conflict among gangs and a threat to both staff and inmate safety in prisons, administrators devote a lot of attention to preventing their importation into prison. However, the main sources of smuggled drugs, according to prison administrators, are contact visits by relatives and friends, work crews, and Correctional Officer staff. Because prisoners are allowed to have contact visits (unless they are in maximum security), this means control is difficult even with the use of drug sniffing dogs.

Table 55

**Administrator and CO Perceptions of
Ease of Smuggling Drugs**

Ease of Smuggling Has:	Increased	Decreased	About the Same	Total	Rating*
Administrators	19%	41%	40%	100%	6
COs	27%	11%	62%	100%	7

*The rate is on a 10-point scale where 1 is not at all easy and 10 is very easy.

Process Evaluation Conclusions

While prison administrators and Correctional Officers are positive about the STG program and believe it is succeeding, there is some ambivalence in the perceptions and attitudes of Correctional Officers and inmates about the ability of the STG program to ultimately control gangs and improve staff and inmate safety. As might be expected, administrators are more positive and hopeful about the program than are Correctional Officers. But a fairly large percentage of administrators recognize that complete control is not possible. The STG program has definitely reduced the number of STG members in the population, but administrators also say that the number of street gang members is increasing. They are a serious problem in the opinion of administrators, because they are younger, more violent and less respectful of authority. Part of the problem is that it is getting more difficult to identify and validate STG gang members. In addition, as new gangs become certified as STGs (i.e., the Surenos and Warrior Society) the number of STG suspects also increases, particularly inasmuch as it is harder to identify and validate them. Also, the training that administrators and Correctional Officers receive about gangs is not rated very high by them and most Correctional Officers do not believe they have a role in helping identify gang suspects.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The results of the Impact Evaluation conclusively establish that the Security Threat Group (STG) Program of the Arizona Department of Corrections has had a direct and significant incapacitation effect on the violent and disruptive activities of validated STG members. This evaluation has also demonstrated substantial reductions in assaults, drug violations, and other types of serious institutional misconduct among STG members, other prison gang members, and street gang members in conjunction with STG policy initiatives taking effect in 1995 and 1997. There is also an apparent carryover effect to non-gang inmates, although the numerical reductions in violation rates are not as substantial as they are for gang members. The STG program is believed to be only partly responsible for these effects because other factors, as described in the text, are thought to have had an effect as well. At the same time, the process of validating STG membership is becoming more difficult. Gang members are less likely to declare their gang membership or wear tattoos, are less likely to keep incriminating documents, and are more careful about whom they associate with. As a result, the numbers of validation hearings and validated gang members have been decreasing.

In fact, only a small fraction of gang members in the Arizona prison system are subject to the gang certification and validation procedures around which the current STG policy is structured. The Department should look for ways to expand the reach of gang control and cover a wider percentage of active gang members. There may be ways to accomplish this end without resorting to formal gang validation criteria, e.g., classification strategies which focus on the factors which research may show distinguish gang members from other inmates and which correlate with their violent and disruptive activities.

This strategy should initially focus on STG suspects and other prison gang members, but should eventually be extended to cover the street gang population as well. This evaluation establishes conclusively that the prison violation rates of street gang members are in line with those of prison gang members and set them apart from the mainstream of the Arizona prison population.

Street gang members in Arizona prisons are not the focus of the STG program or this evaluation, but they are increasing in numbers and they are relevant to the problem of gangs in Arizona prisons. According to prison administrators, STG gangs recruit new members from members of street gangs, and this perception is supported by statements taken from debriefing documents, which indicate that most renounced STG members were recruited by their gangs. Beyond this, street gang membership is relevant because some of these gangs may eventually be certified as STGs. Members of the Grandel and the Surenos were originally members of various street gangs, the Grandel from Glendale, Arizona and the Surenos from Southern California.


In order to determine how much recruitment takes place of street gang members into the ranks of STGs, future research should focus on this issue. Additionally, determining how many STGs originated as street gangs in STG programs in other states as well as in Arizona would help identify how big a problem this really is. According to the prison administrators we interviewed, approximately 40% of the inmates in the units we studied are street gang members. The AIMS data record only 8% as being street gang members. The discrepancy between the AIMS figure and the prison administrators' estimate may be due to the fact that only known suspects are entered into the AIMS database, whereas prison administrator's estimates are based on their perceptions. Neither, of course, is completely accurate.

In the view of administrators, street gangs are a growing problem because many of the inmates entering prison are street gang members and they are younger, more violent, and less respectful of authority. They are not as troublesome as STG gangs, administrators say, because they are not as well organized. Nevertheless, street gang members' violation rates are much greater than the violation rates of inmates who are not members of gangs. Because they are far more numerous than STG gang members, they account for a much larger percentage of total violations than do STG gang members. Accordingly, measures to enhance control of the activities of these inmates would help improve the safety of the Arizona prison system.

Finally, the perceptions of some prison administrators and Correctional Officers that staff and inmate safety has not been improving is at odds with the results of the Impact Evaluation, which show that prison safety has improved dramatically. It is clear that steps should be taken to make all prison administrators and Correctional Officers aware of the results of this evaluation so as to bring subjective perceptions more in line with the objective reality.

Appendix A
STG Validation Process

STG VALIDATION PROCESS



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Appendix B

Correlations Among Predictors in the Individual Multiple Regression Analysis

**Correlation Matrix:
Individual Multiple Regression Analysis**

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	PRISON GANG MEMBERSHIP	STREET GANG MEMBERSHIP	ANY GANG MEMBERSHIP	AGE AT COMMITMENT
Street Gang Membership	-0.091	---	---	---
Any Gang Membership	+0.675	+0.673	---	---
Age at Commitment	-0.135	-0.259	-0.292	---
Institutional Risk Score	+0.120	+0.142	+0.194	-0.175
Mexican American	+0.067	+0.187	+0.188	-0.194
Violent Offense	+0.073	+0.115	+0.140	-0.265
Property Offense	-0.008	-0.014	-0.016	-0.001
Unit Security Level	+0.058	+0.069	+0.094	-0.147
1+ Prior Prison Commits	+0.044	-0.010	+0.025	+0.201
Public Risk Score	+0.049	+0.028	+0.057	-0.118
African American	-0.068	+0.071	+0.002	-0.032
Mexican National	+0.156	-0.071	+0.064	-0.022
DWI	-0.063	-0.047	-0.082	+0.130
Caucasian	-0.100	-0.153	-0.188	+0.215
Sentence Length	+0.033	+0.005	+0.028	+0.017
Drug Offense	+0.008	-0.047	-0.029	+0.131
Sex Offense	-0.067	-0.090	-0.117	+0.185

**Correlation Matrix:
Individual Multiple Regression Analysis
(Continued)**

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	INSTITUTIONAL RISK SCORE	MEXICAN AMERICAN	VIOLENT OFFENSE	PROPERTY OFFENSE
Mexican American	+0.088	---	---	---
Violent Offense	+0.038	+0.060	---	---
Property Offense	+0.006	-0.023	-0.486	---
Unit Security Level	+0.077	+0.034	+0.484	-0.291
1+ Prior Prison Commits	+0.078	+0.030	-0.194	+0.201
Public Risk Score	+0.053	-0.007	+0.505	-0.359
African American	+0.011	-0.243	+0.055	-0.010
Mexican National	-0.001	-0.220	-0.044	-0.109
DWI	-0.081	+0.039	-0.192	-0.137
Caucasian	-0.094	-0.490	-0.082	+0.128
Sentence Length	+0.043	-0.007	+0.249	-0.199
Drug Offense	+0.123	-0.048	-0.396	-0.282
Sex Offense	-0.186	-0.042	-0.248	-0.177

**Correlation Matrix:
Individual Multiple Regression Analysis
(Continued)**

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	UNIT SECURITY LEVEL	1+ PRIOR COMMITS	PUBLIC RISK SCORE	AFRICAN AMERICAN
1+ Prior Prison Commits	-0.110	---	---	---
Public Risk Score	+0.800	-0.156	---	---
African American	+0.036	+0.118	+0.031	---
Mexican National	-0.040	-0.140	-0.050	-0.162
DWI	-0.239	+0.122	-0.216	-0.069
Caucasian	-0.024	-0.018	-0.009	-0.361
Sentence Length	+0.469	-0.052	+0.578	+0.028
Drug Offense	-0.273	+0.029	-0.287	+0.052
Sex Offense	+0.203	-0.132	+0.273	-0.104

**Correlation Matrix:
Individual Multiple Regression Analysis
(Continued)**

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	MEXICAN NATIONAL	DWI	CAUCASIAN	SENTENCE LENGTH
DWI	-0.008	---	---	---
Caucasian	-0.327	-0.009	---	---
Sentence Length	-0.042	-0.108	+0.018	---
Drug Offense*	+0.227	-0.111	-0.131	-0.179
Sex Offense*	-0.050	-0.070	+0.137	+0.224

* The correlation of drug offense and sex offense is -0.144.

Appendix C

Interview Guides and Survey Instruments

Interview
Date _____

Place: Complex _____ Unit _____

Interview Guide for Wardens, Deputy and Assistant Deputy Wardens and Security Chiefs

I am part of an ASU team that is evaluating the STG Program of ADOC. I would like to ask you a few questions about the STG Program and your job. Your responses are strictly confidential. You will not be identified in any way.

First, I'd like to ask a few questions about yourself.

1. How long have you been a

Warden _____ # of months _____
Deputy Warden _____ # of months _____
Chief of Security _____ # of months _____

2. What did you do before this? _____

3. In all, how long have you worked for ADOC? # of months _____

4. How long at this facility? # of months _____

4a. Do you have any role in the STG program here? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, what is the nature of your involvement? _____

If no, why not? _____

5. What kind of training have you received regarding the STG program?

6. How would you rate the training for the STG program?

Excellent _____
Very Good _____
Adequate _____
Not at all adequate _____

7. What changes / improvements would you recommend should be made in the training?
(Probe: Who should receive it?) _____

June, 2000

7a. Do you provide training for your staff now? What kind? (Get a copy of the materials used.)

The STG Program

8. In your words, what is the mission and goals of the STG program? _____

9. How do (would) you measure the extent to which the STG program is meeting it's goals?

10. How many staff members in this unit have assigned duties in the STG program?

of full time _____
part time _____
average # of hours per week of part time _____

10a. If additional resources were made available what would you ask for? How would you use them? _____

10b. Do you have an intelligence officer whose main responsibility is to identify gang members?

Yes _____ No _____

If yes, how does he/she go about doing this? _____

If no, why not? _____

11. How effective is each of the following for identifying gang members?

	Very	Moderately	Not Very
strip and cell searches	_____	_____	_____
mail and telephone monitoring	_____	_____	_____
monitoring of inmate accounts	_____	_____	_____

12. How effective are each of the following for controlling / preventing inmates from becoming gang members?

restrictions on work activity	_____	_____	_____
restrictions on visitors	_____	_____	_____
restriction on sentence credits	_____	_____	_____

June, 2000

12a. What are some of the main organizational problems you face in carrying out an effective STG program?

Identifying Gang Members

13. What is the main source of information about who is a STG gang member? _____

14. What percent of inmates in this unit would you say are STG gang members now? % _____

15. Has this been _____ increasing, _____ decreasing, or about the same _____ over the past 2 years?

Why? _____

16. What percent are street gang members? % _____.

17. Has this been _____ increasing, _____ decreasing, _____ about the same, over the past 2 years?

Why? _____

18. How about new prison gangs such as the Seranos, what percent are members now? % _____

19. Has this been _____ increasing, _____ decreasing, _____ about the same over the past two years?

Why? _____

20. When an inmate becomes an STG gang member in prison, what is the main reason why? Are they subject to pressure from other gang members?

June, 2000

41. Would you say the inmate safety in the unit over the past 2 years has been

increasing _____
 decreasing _____
 about the same _____

Why is that? _____

42. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all safe and 10 is very safe, how safe would you say staff safety is now?

Not at all Safe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very Safe

Why? _____

43. Would you say the staff safety in the unit over the past 2 years has been

increasing _____
 decreasing _____
 about the same _____

Why is that? _____

44. For each of the following, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not well organized and 10 is well organized, how well organized in this unit (complex) would you say each gang is on each of the 3 dimensions?

	Aryan Brotherhood	New Mexican Mafia	Old Mexican Mafia	African Mau Mau	Grandels	Border Brothers
Control of Drugs						
Recruiting New Members						
Influencing Other Inmates						

June, 2000

45. How has the STG program changed the way you manage inmates? Probes: Is it harder, easier, no different? _____

46. How has the STG program changed the way inmates school/relate to other inmates in this unit? _____

47. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all easy and 10 is very easy, how easy would you say it is to smuggle drugs into this unit now?

Not at all Easy Very Easy
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

48. Over the past 2 years, has this?

increased _____
 decreased _____
 remained the same _____

49. What are the physical ways that contraband are smuggled into this unit?

50. On a 1 to 10 scale, where one is not at all good and 10 is very good, how would you rate each of the following in the unit:

	Not at all good									Very good
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Food	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Recreation Programs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Work for inmates	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Shower facilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
cells	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
inmate morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
staff morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

51. Do you have open communication with police in the community? Yes _____ No _____

52. How good are your relations with police?

very good _____
 moderately good _____
 not very good _____

June, 2000

Respondents Opinions and Attitudes

53. Do you think that the STG program is achieving the goal of reducing gang violence in this unit?

yes _____
no _____

Explain

54. How likely would you say it is that the gang problem can be controlled in DOC? Why is that? _____

55. If there was one thing that could be done that would reduce the influence of gangs in this unit, what would it be? _____

56. Of the things that are being done now, which do you think is the most effective? Least effective? _____

Thank you for your help.

June, 2000

Interview
Date _____

Place: Complex _____ Unit _____

Interview Guide for SSU, Coordinator and SSU Officers

I am part of an ASU team that is evaluating the STG Program of ADOC. I would like to ask you a few questions about the STG Program and your job. Your responses are strictly confidential. You will not be identified in any way.

First, I'd like to ask a few questions about yourself.

1. How long have you been involved in the STG Program? # of months _____

1a. Did you volunteer for this assignment? Yes _____ No _____

1b. What other duties do you have besides STG?

2. What did you do before this? _____

3. In all, how long have you worked for ADOC? # of months _____

4. How long at this facility? # of months _____

5. What kind of training have you received relating to the STG program?

When? _____ How many weeks of training? _____

5a. Do you receive annual refreshers? Yes _____ No _____

6. How would you rate the training that you received?

Excellent _____
Very Good _____
Adequate _____
Not at all adequate _____

7. What changes/improvements would you recommend should be made in the training?
(Probe: who should receive it?) _____

7a. How likely is it that you will remain working in the STG program?

Very _____
Somewhat _____
Not Very _____

June, 2000

7b. Do you want to remain involved? Yes _____ No _____

Why is that? _____

The STG Program

8. In your own words, what is the mission and goals of the STG Program? _____

9. How do you measure the extent to which the STG Program is meeting its goals?

10. Please describe what your duties are in the STG Program. _____

11. How effective is each of the following for identifying gang members?

	Very	Moderately	Not Very
strip and cell searches	_____	_____	_____
mail and telephone monitoring	_____	_____	_____
monitoring of inmate accounts	_____	_____	_____

12. How effective is each of the following for controlling / preventing inmates from becoming gang members?

	Very	Moderately	Not Very
restrictions on work activity	_____	_____	_____
restrictions on visitors	_____	_____	_____
restriction on sentence credits	_____	_____	_____

12a. How long on average does it take for you to complete an STG validation packet? _____

12b. How many staff in this complex are assigned to the STG program? # _____

12c. If additional resources were made available what would you ask for and how would you use them? _____

June, 2000

12d. Do you meet with Correctional Officer staff? How often? About what? _____

12e. What is your relationship with the I & I Staff? Do you meet with them – what about – how often?

12f. Which agencies, units, divisions are most valuable to you in carrying out your duties?

Identifying Gang Members

13. What is your main source of information about individual STG gang members?

13a. Do you also get information that an inmate may be gang member from...

	Yes	No	How Useful?		
			Very	Somewhat	Not Very
other complex and unit staff	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
counselors	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
recreational specialists	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
food service employees	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
work supervisors	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
other inmates	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
others (specify) _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

13b. How many inmates suspected of being STG gang members, do you interview in a month?

13c. What type of interviews do you conduct with STG suspects?

13d. Are these interviews productive in determining a suspect's involvement in a particular STG? Explain _____

June, 2000

13e. Has there been a change in the number of STG suspects that you interview over the past year? _____ Why? _____

14. What percent of inmates in this complex and unit would you say are STG gang members now? % _____

15. Does this percentage reflect an _____ increase or _____ decrease over the past year?

16. What percent of inmates in this complex and unit would you say are street gang members now? % _____

17. Has this been _____ increasing, _____ decreasing, _____ about the same over the past 2 years?

18. How about new prison gangs such as the Seranos, what percent are members now? % _____

19. Has this been _____ increasing, _____ decreasing, _____ about the same over the past two years?

Why? _____

20. When an inmate becomes an STG gang member in prison, what is the main reason why? Are they subjected to pressure from other gang members?

20a. What procedure do you follow for recording information about a suspected STG gang member?

20b. What kind of data do you keep on each suspect? _____

20c. What kind of STG intelligence tools are available? Who has access to these tools? _____

June, 2000

20d. Does intelligence information get sent to all other units? Yes _____ No _____

If no, why not? _____

20e. When a Corrections Officer fills out an information report regarding suspected gang members, what happens to the report? Probes: Do you usually see them? Who else sees them?

20f. What generally is included in these information reports? The Serious Incident Reports?

20g. Who makes decisions about what gets entered onto the AIMS and GRITS systems?

20h. Who is responsible for inputting data onto AIMS and GRITS? _____

20i. Who has access to the AIMS and GRITS data screens? _____

21. What are the main problems you face in identifying / validating / recording information about gang members? _____

21a. How many suspected / validated gang members have you had in this complex and unit over the past year?

suspected _____ # validated _____

21b. What recommendations would you make for improving the STG program in your unit? In ADOC? _____

June, 2000

Condition in the Unit

22. On a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is no problem and 10 is a very big problem, please rate how much of a problem STG gangs are in this unit now.

No problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very big problem. 8 9 10

23. Would you say that the STG gang problem over the past 2 years has been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

24. On a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is no problem and 10 is a very big problem, please rate how much of a problem street gangs are in this unit now.

No problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very big problem. 8 9 10

25. Would you say that the street gang problem over the past 2 years has been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

26. How about new prison gangs such as the Seranos, how big of a problem are they?

No problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very big problem. 8 9 10

27. Would you say these prison gangs over the past 2 years have been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

28. Which of these 3 types of gangs poses a greater security threat? Why?

29. How are relations between inmates and staff?

very respectful _____
moderately respectful _____
not very respectful _____
hostile _____

Explain _____

45. How has the STG program changed the way you manage inmates? Probes: Is it harder, easier, no different? _____

46. How has the STG program changed the way inmates school/relate to other inmates in this unit? _____

47. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all easy and 10 is very easy, how easy would you say it is to smuggle drugs into this unit now?

Not at all Easy Very Easy
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

48. Over the past 2 years, has this?

increased _____
 decreased _____
 remained the same _____

49. What are the physical ways that contraband are smuggled into this unit?

50. On a 1 to 10 scale, where one is not at all good and 10 is very good, how would you rate each of the following in the unit:

	Not at all good									Very good
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Food	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Recreation Programs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Work for inmates	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Shower facilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
cells	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
inmate morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
staff morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

51. Do you have open communication with police in the community? Yes _____ No _____

52. How good are your relations with police?

very good _____
 moderately good _____
 not very good _____

June, 2000

Respondents Opinions and Attitudes

53. Do you think that the STG program is achieving the goal of reducing gang violence in this unit?

yes _____

no _____

Explain

54. How likely would you say it is that the gang problem can be controlled in DOC? Why is that? _____

55. If there was one thing that could be done that would reduce the influence of gangs in this unit, what would it be? _____

56. Of the things that are being done now, which do you think is the most effective? Least effective? _____

Thank you for your help.

June, 2000

Interview
Date _____

Place: Complex _____ Unit _____

Interview Guide for I & I Officers

I am part of an ASU team that is evaluating the STG Program of ADOC. I would like to ask you a few questions about the STG Program and your job. Your responses are strictly confidential. You will not be identified in any way.

First, I'd like to ask a few questions about yourself.

1. How long have you been an I & I Officer? Number of months _____.

2. What did you do before this? _____

3. In all, how long have you worked for ADOC? Number of months _____.

4. How long at this facility? Number of months _____.

4a. Do you have any role in the STG program in this unit? If so, what is it? _____

5. Have you received any training relating to the STG program? If so, what kind and how long?

6. How would you rate the training you received?

Excellent _____
Very good _____
Adequate _____
Not at all adequate _____

7. What changes / improvements would you recommend should be make in the training?
(Probe: Who should receive it?) _____

The STG Program

8. In your own words, what is the mission and goals of the STG program? _____

9. How do you measure the extent to which the STG program is meeting it's goals?

9a. Do you meet with the STG coordinator? If yes, how often and what about?

9b. What are the problems you face in getting the cooperation of the STG coordinator regarding gang members? _____

9c. How does the STG coordinator deal with the information about gangs that you provide?

9d. What are the problems you face in getting the cooperation of the STG officers regarding gang members? _____

9e. How does the STG officer deal with the information about gangs that you provide?

Condition in the Unit

22. On a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is no problem and 10 is a very big problem, please rate how much of a problem STG gangs are in this unit now.

No problem

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very big problem.

8

9

10

23. Would you say that the STG gang problem over the past 2 years has been

increasing _____

decreasing _____

about the same _____

24. On a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is no problem and 10 is a very big problem, please rate how much of a problem street gangs are in this unit now.

No problem
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very big problem.

25. Would you say that the street gang problem over the past 2 years has been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

26. How about new prison gangs such as the Seranos, how big of a problem are they?

No problem
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very big problem.

27. Would you say these prison gangs over the past 2 years have been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

28. Which of these 3 types of gangs poses a greater security threat? Why?

29. How are relations between inmates and staff?

very respectful _____
moderately respectful _____
not very respectful _____
hostile _____

Explain _____

30. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not very good and 10 is very good, how good are the COs in this unit at handling troublesome inmates?

Not Very Good
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very Good

Explain _____

34. Would you say that physical attacks by STG gang members on staff over the past 2 years have been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

Why is that? _____

35. Would you say that physical attacks by STG gang members on other inmates over the past 2 years have been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

Why is that? _____

36. Would you say that attacks by STG gang members on other (STG) gang members over the past 2 years have been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

Why is that? _____

37. Would you say that physical attacks by street gang members on staff over the past 2 years have been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

Why is that? _____

38. Would you say that physical attacks by street gang members on other inmates over the past 2 years have been

increasing _____
decreasing _____
about the same _____

Why is that? _____

Respondents Opinions and Attitudes

53. Do you think that the STG program is achieving the goal of reducing gang violence in this unit?

yes _____
no _____

Explain

54. How likely would you say it is that the gang problem can be controlled in DOC? Why is that? _____

55. If there was one thing that could be done that would reduce the influence of gangs in this unit, what would it be? _____

56. Of the things that are being done now, which do you think is the most effective? Least effective? _____

Thank you for your help.

Correctional Officer Survey
Instructions

The Arizona Department of Corrections and Arizona State University have formed a research partnership through a grant from the National Institute of Justice.

We are conducting research about conditions in Arizona's prisons. Your responses to this survey will help immensely in providing information aimed at improving safety and conditions in the prisons.

Your responses are strictly confidential. You will not be identified in any way. All responses from a sample of some 660 correctional officers will be statistically tabulated.

Please respond to each question, place your response in the attached envelope and mail it. Thank you for your help and cooperation.

Correctional Officer Survey

1. Please indicate today's date _____.

2. At which prison complex to you work? _____.

3. In which prison unit do you work? _____.

(3) 4. In all, how long have you worked for ADOC? # of months _____

(4) 5. How long at this facility? # of months _____

6. Have you received any training regarding gangs and the STG Program?

Yes _____

No _____ (Skip to Q. 6)

If yes, what kind of training? _____

7. How would you rate the training that you received?

Excellent _____

Very Good _____

Adequate _____

Not at all adequate _____

8. What changes/improvements would you recommend should be made in the training?

9. Do you have any role/involvement in identifying gang members in this unit?

Yes _____

No _____

If yes, what is the extent of your role/involvement?

10. Who do you usually report to when you have information about gang member?

11. Do you provide written reports? Yes _____
No _____

12. If yes, please describe what criteria do you use in identifying gang members? (association, tattoos, etc.) _____

13. Please describe an example or two of when and how you identified an inmate as a gang member (do not use names). _____

(41) 14. Is there a particular gang that is dominant in this unit? Yes _____
No _____

If yes, which one? _____

15. Has their activity over the past year or so

increased _____
decreased _____
remained the same _____

16. How can your role in identifying gang members be improved? _____

Conditions in the Unit

(26) 17. How are relations between inmates and staff? very respectful _____
moderately respectful _____
not very respectful _____
hostile _____

Explain _____

(28) 18. What kind of training have you had in managing inmates? _____

(48) 29. On a 1 to 10 scale, where one is not at all good and 10 is very good, how would you rate each of the following in the unit:

	Not at all good							Very good		
Food (Inmate Meals)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Recreation Programs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Work for inmates	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Shower facilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
cells	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
inmate morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
staff morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Respondent's Opinions and Attitudes

(52) 30. Is it possible for the gang problem to be controlled in DOC? Yes? _____ No? _____

Why is that? _____

(53) 31. If there was one thing that could be done that would reduce the influence of gangs in this unit, what would it be? _____

(54) 32. Of the things that are being done now, which do you think is the most effective? Least effective? _____

Thank you for your help. Please mail you response in the enclosed addressed return envelope.

June, 2000

Date _____

Place: Complex _____ Unit _____

Inmate Survey

This survey about safety in Arizona's prisons is being conducted by the School of Justice Studies at Arizona State University. Your responses are strictly confidential. You will not be identified in any way. We appreciate your help in answering the questions which will help us improve the safety of inmates in Arizona's prisons. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. We are only interested in your opinions and truthful responses.

First, please answer these few questions about yourself.

1. What state were you born in? _____
2. Why did you move to Arizona? _____

3. How long were you living in Arizona before entering prison? # of months _____
4. Is this the first time you have been in prison? Yes _____ (Skip to 7).
No _____
5. If no, where were you in prison before? _____
6. How long have you been in prison before this sentence? _____
7. How long have you been in this unit? # of months _____
8. How long in ADOC prison on this conviction? # of months _____
9. How much longer do you still have to serve? # of months _____

The following three questions about yourself will allow us to determine whether you are similar to other inmates in this unit.

10. What is your age? _____

July, 2000

11. To which of the following ethnic groups do you belong?

- Hispanic/Latino _____
- African American _____
- Caucasian _____
- American Indian _____
- Asian _____
- Other (specify) _____

12. Please circle the highest grade of school you have completed.

High School— College—

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Conditions in the Unit

13. How do inmates and staff get along in the unit?

- very respectful _____
- moderately respectful _____
- not very respectful _____
- hostile _____

Why is that? _____

14. During the time you have been in this unit, has the way that inmates and staff get along

- gotten better _____
- gotten worse _____
- remained about the same _____

Why is that? _____

15. On a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 is not at all good and 10 is very good, how would you rate each of the following in the unit:

	<u>Not at all good</u>			<u>Neutral</u>				<u>Very good</u>		
Food for inmates	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Recreation Programs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Work for inmates	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Shower facilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
cells/dorms	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

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inmate morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
staff morale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

16. On the same 1 to 10 scale, where 1 is not all adequate and 10 is very adequate, how would you rate the recreation program here?

Not at all adequate										Very Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Why is that? _____

17. On the same scale rate the opportunity for education here.

Not at all adequate										Very Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Why is that? _____

18. On the same scale rate the health services here

Not at all adequate										Very Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Why is that? _____

19. On the same 1 to 10 scale, how safe do you feel in this unit now?

Not at all safe										Very safe
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Why is that? _____

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27. Do you think that inmates are more reluctant to join prison gangs now than in the past year or so?

Yes _____

No _____

Why is that? _____

28. Would you say that physical attacks by gang member inmates on other inmates during the time you have been in this unit have been

increasing _____

decreasing _____

about the same _____

29. Would you say that physical attacks by non-gang member inmates on inmates during the time you have been in this unit have been

increasing _____

decreasing _____

about the same _____

Why is that? _____

30. Why do people join gangs in prison? _____

31. The Department of Corrections has a written policy about prison gangs. How familiar are you with that policy?

Very _____

Somewhat _____

Not at all _____ (skip to 34)

32. Has this policy affected your willingness of to get involved in gang activity?

Yes _____

No _____

Why is that? _____

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33. Has this policy affected the willingness of other inmates to get involved in gang activity?

Yes _____

No _____

Why is that? _____

34. What things can be done to make you feel safer in this prison? _____

Thank you for you help.

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