HHS Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan
CHAPTER 5: VACCINES
Introduction
Vaccination offers one of the most effective measures for minimizing the
morbidity and mortality related to influenza virus infection. Annual influenza
vaccination has been the primary method by which the disease burden of seasonal
influenza epidemics has been reduced in the United States and globally.
An influenza pandemic, however, will challenge public health officials
to make critical decisions about vaccine use and distribution beyond what is
routinely done for seasonal influenza. Decisions need to be made prior to a
pandemic and, accordingly, HHS has already begun to undertake efforts to
facilitate critical vaccine-manufacturing capacity building and rapid
implementation of pandemic influenza vaccination. Vaccines produced for
pandemic influenza prevention must be safe, readily produced in large
quantities, and delivered quickly, and must protect the largest number of
individuals possible. The rapid production and clinical evaluation of
investigational lots of pandemic vaccines must be a top priority for the United
States and the global public health community. This chapter describes specific
HHS actions on pandemic vaccine research, development, manufacturing
infrastructure building, preparedness, and response for vaccine usage.
Before a vaccine against the circulating pandemic virus strain becomes
available, pre-pandemic vaccine from stockpiles (if closely matched to the
circulating virus) may be made available to persons in designated priority
groups. Once a well-matched vaccine against the circulating pandemic virus
strain becomes available, its distribution and use will become a major focus of
pandemic response efforts.
The primary areas of concern for vaccines relative to pandemic planning
and response include the following:
- Selection of pre-pandemic influenza virus isolates for vaccine
development
- Applicability and linkage of vaccine development and clinical
evaluation projects for pandemic vaccine candidates to prepare vaccine
stockpiles for pandemics
- Availability of influenza virus reference strains for vaccine
manufacturing
- Domestic surge capacity for influenza vaccine manufacturing of
pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles and well-matched pandemic vaccines
- Regulatory review processes for the utilization of and acceptance of
pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines
- Utility of mismatched pre-pandemic vaccines at the precipice of
pandemics
- Positioning of pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines for distribution
- Funding sources and procurement mechanisms that include liability
immunity for pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccine manufacture
- Vaccine safety and efficacy
- Mechanisms for deployment of pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines from
stockpiles
- Communication of messages about vaccines during pre-pandemic and
pandemic periods
The scenarios covered by this implementation plan on pandemic vaccines
include preparations for and actions during pre-pandemic and pandemic phases.
Role of HHS in Vaccines
The role of HHS with respect to vaccines is to facilitate the
development, production, distribution, and utilization of pre-pandemic and
pandemic vaccines. Specifically, HHS will:
- Establish and maintain sufficient stockpiles (~ 40 million doses) of
pre-pandemic influenza vaccineobtained from U.S.-licensed influenza
vaccine manufacturersagainst circulating influenza virus with pandemic
potential without interrupting seasonal influenza vaccine manufacturing during
pre-pandemic periods
- Expand seasonal influenza domestic vaccine production (to cover the
U.S.population for whom vaccine is recommended) through normal commercial
markets
- Develop virus reference strains from human clinical isolates, and
qualify and ship them from HHS and WHO-collaborating virus reference
laboratories to designated U.S.-licensed influenza vaccine manufacturers for
vaccine development and manufacturing
- Work, in concert with Federal partners and the pharmaceutical
industry, to expand and diversify domestic vaccine-manufacturing surge capacity
sufficient to produce vaccine for the entire U.S. population (~ 300 million
persons) within 6 months of the start of a pandemic
- Work with pharmaceutical industry and FDA to expedite the production
and testing of virus reference antigen and serum reagents for vaccine potency
assays
- Complete priority group planning and revise priorities periodically
during a pandemic as warranted
- Work, in concert with Federal partners, with the pharmaceutical
industry to procure vaccine directed against the pandemic strain and to
distribute vaccine to State, local, and tribal public health authorities for
predetermined priority groups based on preapproved State plans
- Provide a well-matched pandemic vaccine within 6 months of the start
of a pandemic for pro rata allocation of pandemic vaccine as available to the
States for distribution to the 300 million people
- Provide a physical security plan for domestic influenza manufacturing
and distribution facilities
- Promote the linkage between influenza surveillance and vaccine
development
- Encourage the monitoring for and reporting of
post-vaccine-administration adverse events to ensure safety and indicate
trends
- Encourage usage of pneumococcal vaccine, especially in elderly
populations, prior to and during an influenza pandemic
- Distribute vaccine according to the prioritization schedule outlined
in the "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan" to prevent disease and virus spread and to
provide continuity of a constitutional government and maintain social and
economic order
- Evaluate vaccine safety and efficacy
Specific Assumptions and Planning Considerations for HHS on
Vaccine Issues
- As susceptibility to the pandemic influenza subtype will be
universal, all persons should have the opportunity for vaccination during a
pandemic.
- Indemnification will be considered for non-U.S. Government
suppliers of pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza virus reference strains and
U.S. pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers.
- Antigenic drifts or new clades of pre-pandemic influenza
viruses will require the continual production of working virus seeds for
vaccine production and vaccine candidates for clinical evaluation for safety,
antigenic dosing, and immunogenicity.
- Although pre-pandemic vaccines may not be well matched to
pandemic viruses and may not provide complete protection, stockpiles of
pre-pandemic vaccines that exhibit cross-clade protection and/or virus
neutralization should provide limited and life-saving immunity to healthy
critical workforce persons.
- A HHS pre-pandemic influenza vaccine stockpile should be of
sufficient size to immunize up to 20 million persons (U.S. military, critical
government workforce, and critical infrastructure and medical workforces).
- The provision of adequate security will be required to protect
vaccine components and stocks during manufacturing, shipping, and storage, and
at administration sites.
|
HHS Actions and Expectations
Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication
HHS facilitation and support for the research and development of an
influenza pandemic vaccine encompasses influenza vaccine type, component, and
delivery development, evaluation, and production; refinement of vaccination
protocols; and enhancement of vaccine manufacturing and government policies for
expanding vaccine manufacturing surge capacities. It also includes the
establishment and testing of vaccine distribution and monitoring networks.
Inherent in this HHS effort and support is the concomitant building of
resources needed for regulatory advice and vaccine production oversight.
Pillar One components of HHS actions listed in this chapter are intended
to integrate HSC actions and expectations concerning pandemic vaccines into a
comprehensive package for influenza vaccine research and development (HSC
6.1.16, 6.1.17), domestic commercial scale vaccine production (HSC 6.1.7,
6.1.8, 6.1.10), pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiling (HSC 4.1.5, 6.1.7, 6.1.14),
pandemic vaccine surge capacity building (HSC 6.1.16), and vaccine distribution
and monitoring (HSC 6.1.6, 6.1.13, 6.1.16, 6.1.13, 6.3.5). Communication of HHS
vaccine recommendations is also embodied in these actions (HSC 6.1.12). These
actions cover HHS provisions for Federal advice and oversight of vaccine
production (HSC 6.1.11) and usage (HSC 6.1.13, 6.1.13, 6.1.14).
Advancing Scientific Knowledge and
Accelerating Development
- Action (HSC 6.1.17.1): HHS will continue to support the development
and clinical evaluation of novel vaccines and vaccination strategies (e.g.,
adjuvants, alternative delivery systems, common epitope vaccines).
- Timeframe: 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Research grants and/or contracts awarded
to support the development of influenza vaccines (including polyvalent
influenza vaccines), adjuvants and dose-sparing strategies, and more efficient
delivery systems, leading to initiation of phase I and II clinical trials to
evaluate influenza vaccines and vaccination strategies.
- Step 1: Fund manufacturers for production of new vaccines to
study and answer questions about vaccine dose schedule.
- Step 2: Prepare, acquire, and provide access to virus reference
strains representative of target influenza viruses.
- Step 3: Provide advice, and advise on manufacturing issues.
- Step 4: Stimulate and coordinate development of adjuvant vaccines
and other immune-enhancing and antigen-sparing approaches.
- Step 5: Engage in Cooperative Research and Development Agreement
(CRADA) with academia and industry to facilitate vaccine development (e.g.,
CRADA between the Laboratory of Infectious Diseases [LID], National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Disease [NIAID], and MedImmune on the development of
live, attenuated pandemic vaccine reference strains).
- Step 6: Award contracts for advanced development of cell-based
influenza vaccines to enhance and enlarge domestic pandemic vaccine
manufacturing capacity.
- Step 7: Provide contracts for advanced development of pandemic
influenza vaccines that afford enhanced immunity (e.g., stimulated protective
immunity, fewer doses) and/or doses-sparing effects (e.g., less antigen in
vaccine) using live, attenuated influenza vaccines, adjuvants,
immunostimulants, immune cytokines, or medical devices toward U.S.
licensure.
- Step 8: Provide contracts for advanced development of "universal"
influenza vaccines that may provide cross-protective immunity against influenza
subtype and strains toward U.S. licensure. The vaccines are expected to be
targeted against conserved influenza M2 proteins or peptides and other viral
and/or host proteins.
- Action (HSC 6.1.16.1): HHS will continue to support the advanced
development of cell-culture based influenza vaccine candidates.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Research grants and/or contracts awarded
to develop cell-culture based influenza vaccines against currently circulating
influenza strains with pandemic potential.
- Step 1: Provide support and advice for new manufacturers
interested in producing influenza virus vaccines.
- Step 2: Provide support and advice for current manufacturers
interested in expanding capabilities for preparation of influenza virus
vaccines.
- Step 3: Provide support for advanced development of improved and
new vaccine technologies, vaccine acquisition, and vaccine manufacturing
facility construction.
- Action (HSC 4.1.6.2): HHS, in coordination with the WHO Secretariat,
will establish at least six new sites for Collaborative Clinical Research on
Emerging Infectious Diseases to conduct collaborative clinical research on
therapeutics and the natural history of avian influenza. In addition, HHS will
provide in-country support for one or more partner countries for human avian
influenza clinical trials. (Also see chapter 1, Pillar One, Actions R and S
[HSC 4.1.6.1 and 4.1.6.2] and chapter 6, Pillar One, Action E [HSC 4.1.6.2].)
- Timeframe: 18 months.
- Measure of Performance: Cooperative programs established in six
new sites, to include the initiation of research and design of clinical
trials.
- Step 1: Develop clinical protocols for implementation to evaluate
the safety and immunogenicity of pandemic vaccine candidates during the
interpandemic period.
- Step 2: Develop clinical protocols for implementation to evaluate
the safety and immunogenicity of pandemic vaccine candidates during the
pandemic period.
- Step 3: Establish new clinical sites overseas for pandemic
vaccine and therapeutics clinical evaluation and provide technical assistance
in the development of in-country vaccine and therapeutic development for
pandemic influenza.
- Action (HSC 6.1.17.4): HHS will increase access to standardized
influenza reagents for use in influenza tests and research. (Also see chapter
2, Pillar One, Action G [HSC 6.1.17.4].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Standardized influenza reagents
distributed to domestic and international partners within three (3) business
days of a request.
- Step 1: Prepare and characterize virus reference strain
reassortants of influenza viruses with pandemic potential for vaccine
development to support laboratory research, clinical studies, and vaccine
manufacturing.
- Step 2: Prepare and characterize reagents (e.g., virus reference
antigens, virus reference antiserum) for standardization of vaccines for
strains with pandemic potential to support laboratory and clinical studies and
manufacturing.
- Action (HSC 6.1.15.3): HHS will develop protocols and procedures to
ensure timely reporting to Federal agencies and submission for publication of
data from HHS-supported influenza vaccine evaluation studies. (Also see chapter
2, Pillar One, Action Q [HSC 6.1.15.3] and chapter 6, Pillar One, Action D [HSC
6.1.15.3].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Data shared within one (1) month of
analysis or publication of completed clinical trial study.
- Step 1: Prepare procedures and plans to select and secure
appropriate data from HHS-supported influenza vaccine evaluation studies.
- Step 2: Prepare database with previously reported pandemic
information from clinical trials and other research venues.
Manufacturing Vaccines
- Action (HSC 6.1.8.1): HHS will work with the pharmaceutical industry
toward the goal of developing domestic vaccine production capacity sufficient
to provide vaccine for the entire U.S. population within 6 months after the
development of a vaccine reference strain.
- Timeframe: 60 months.
- Measure of Performance: Domestic vaccine manufacturing capacity
in place to produce 300 million courses of vaccine within 6 months of
development of a vaccine reference strain during a pandemic.
- Step 1: Secure raw materials and other vaccine-related
supplies.
- Step 2: Award contracts for acquisition of
domestically-manufactured pandemic vaccines based on pandemic virus strain,
vaccine type and efficacy, stage of vaccine development, and vaccine
availability.
- Action (HSC 6.1.10.1): HHS, in coordination with the private sector,
will assess the ability of U.S.-based pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities
to contribute surge capacity and to retrofit existing facilities for pandemic
vaccine production.
- Timeframe: 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Completed assessment.
- Step 1: Assess facility capacities in private sector to support
vaccine manufacturing through requests for information and other fact-finding
mechanisms.
- Expanded egg-based influenza vaccine manufacturing
facilities
- New cell-based influenza vaccine manufacturing
facilities
- Retrofitting of existing domestic FDA-licensed vaccine and
biologics manufacturing facilities.
- Step 2: Make recommendations to policymakers for request of
contracts to build capacity.
- Action (HSC 6.1.16.2): HHS will support the renovation of existing
U.S.manufacturing facilities that produce other FDA-licensed cell-based
vaccines or biologics and the establishment of new domestic cell-based
influenza vaccine manufacturing facilities. (Also see Pillar One, Action G [HSC
6.1.10.1] above.)
- Timeframe: 36 months.
- Measure of Performance: Contracts awarded for renovation or
establishment of domestic-cell based influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity.
- Step 1: Make request for proposals to develop and/or acquire
pandemic vaccines and provide assistance in the building of necessary capacity.
- Step 2: Award contracts leading to the establishment and
maintenance of adequate domestic pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccine
manufacturing capacity.
- Action (HSC 6.1.11.1): HHS will assess its existing authorities and
develop a plan of action to address any regulatory or other legal issues
related to the expansion of domestic vaccine production capacity.
- Timeframe: 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Regulatory and legal issues identified in
assessment.
- Step 1: Determine indemnification issues for manufacturing and
usage of pandemic vaccines.
- Step 2: Determine intellectual property issues for pandemic
vaccine manufacturing.
- Action (HSC 6.1.11.2): HHS will develop a protocol and decision tools
to implement liability protections and compensation, as authorized by the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (P.L. 109148).
- Timeframe: 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Publication of protocol and decision
tools.
- Step 1: Determine product liability relief issues for
manufacturing and usage of pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines and develop
advice for usage of Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act
(P.L. 109148).
- Step 2: Prepare draft declarations for pre-pandemic and pandemic
scenarios.
- Step 3. Prepare operational protocol and agreements with
interdepartmental partners (i.e., Departments of Justice and Treasury) for
utilization of PREP Act for liability immunity.
- Action (HSC 6.1.10.2): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOD, VA, DOC,
DOJ, and Treasury, will assess whether use of the Defense Production Act or
other authorities would provide sustained advantages in procuring medical
countermeasures.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Analytical report completed on the
advantages/disadvantages of invoking the Defense Production Act to facilitate
medical countermeasure production and procurement.
- Step 1: Determine whether usage of the Defense Production Act or
other authorities facilitates the procurement of pandemic countermeasures.
- Step 2: Prepare draft options paper for consideration using
different pre-pandemic and pandemic scenarios.
Prioritizing, Stockpiling, and Storing
Vaccines
- Action (HSC 6.1.7.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOJ, and VA, in
collaboration with State, local, and tribal partners, will determine the
national medical countermeasure requirements to ensure the sustained
functioning of medical, emergency response, and other front-line organizations.
(Also see chapter 8, Pillar One, Action W [HSC 6.1.7.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: More specific definition of sectors and
personnel for priority access to medical countermeasures and quantities needed
to protect those groups; advice provided to State, local, and tribal
governments and to infrastructure sectors for various scenarios of pandemic
severity and medical countermeasure supply.
- Step 1: Collect recommendations from interdepartmental working
group on mechanisms to provide options and recommendations to policymakers on
pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccine prioritization.
- Step 2: Disseminate priority and subpriority vaccination
guidelines through public and private sector partners (Association of State and
Territorial Health Officials [ASTHO], NACCHO, CSTE, Association of Immunization
Managers [AIM], AMA, ACP, American Academy of Pediatrics [AAP], American
Association of Family Practitioners [AAFP], American Nurses Association (ANA),
and National Influenza Vaccine Summit).
- Action (HSC 6.1.7.2): HHS will establish and maintain stockpiles of
pre-pandemic vaccines adequate to immunize at least 20 million persons against
influenza strains that present a pandemic threat, as soon as possible within
the constraints of industrial capacity. (Also see Pillar One, Actions G, K, I,
and H [HSC 6.1.10.1, 6.1.10.2, 6.1.11.1, and 6.1.16.2] above.)
- Timeframe: As soon as possible.
- Measure of Performance: Procurement of 20 million courses of
pre-pandemic vaccine against influenza strains presenting a pandemic
threat.
- Step 1: Assess needs within 6 months and secure raw materials and
other vaccine-related supplies.
- Step 2: Award contracts for acquisition of pre-pandemic vaccines
based on virus strain, vaccine type, stage of vaccine development, vaccine
stockpile inventory, vaccine stability, and pandemic potential.
- Step 3: Within 6 months, determine product liability relief
issues for manufacturing and usage of pre-pandemic vaccines and develop advice
for usage of Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (P.L.
109148).
- Step 4: Facilitate domestic pandemic vaccine surge capacity
building.
- Step 5: Determine whether usage of the Defense Production Act or
other authorities facilitates the procurement of pandemic countermeasures.
- Action (HSC 4.1.5.3): HHS will provide technical expertise,
information and guidelines for stockpiling and use of pandemic influenza
vaccines. (Also see chapter 1, Pillar One, Actions Q and R [HSC 4.1.5.3 and
4.1.6.1].)
- Timeframe: 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: All priority countries and partner
organizations have received relevant information on influenza vaccines and
application strategies.
- Step 1: Assess needs with interagency panel against WHO criteria
and U.S. global vaccine resources and technical expertise.
- Step 2: Determine best ways to assist with available local and
regional vaccine manufacturing resources.
- Step 3: Provide assistance with WHO advice and in collaboration
with regional partners consistent with cultural sensitivities.
Distribution of Vaccines
- Action (HSC 6.1.13.5): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOS, DOD, DOL,
VA, and in collaboration with State, local, and tribal governments and private
sector partners, will develop plans for the allocation, distribution, and
administration of pre-pandemic vaccine. (Also see chapter 8, Pillar One, Action
BB [HSC 6.1.13.5].)
- Timeframe: Within 9 months.
- Measure of Performance: Department plans developed and advice
disseminated to State, local, and tribal authorities to facilitate development
of pandemic response plans.
- Step 1: Develop prioritization guidelines for allocation of
pre-pandemic vaccine prior to and at the onset of a pandemic.
- Step 2: Develop distribution guidelines for federally purchased
pre-pandemic vaccine; guidelines must include standard commercial distribution
contractors for vaccines and integrated plan for physical security measures of
vaccine manufacturing facilities, distribution centers, critical suppliers, and
transportation routes by multilevel law enforcement team.
- Step 3: Contract distribution of pandemic vaccine with private
sector distributors and other carriers.
- Step 4: Institute prescribed physical security measures for
vaccine manufacturing, storage, and distribution centers, critical suppliers,
and transportation routes using a preset pandemic plan and multilevel law
enforcement team.
- Action (HSC 6.1.13.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOD, VA, and
DOJ, and in collaboration with State, local, and tribal partners and the
private sector, will work to ensure that States, localities, and tribal
entities have developed and exercised pandemic influenza countermeasure
distribution plans, and can enact security protocols if necessary, according to
pre-determined priorities. (Also see chapter 6, Pillar One, Action Q [HSC
6.1.13.1]; and chapter 8, Pillar One, ActionX [HSC 6.1.13.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measures of performance: Ability to activate, deploy, and begin
distributing contents of medical stockpiles in localities as needed,
established and validated through exercises.
- Step 1: Determine capabilities needed for implementation, and
develop vaccine delivery plan.
- Step 2: Provide training for vaccine delivery through
exercises.
- Action (HSC 6.1.14.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS and
Sector-Specific Agencies, DOS, DOD, DOJ, DOL, VA, Treasury, and State/local
governments, will develop objectives for the use of, and strategy for
allocating, vaccine stockpiles during pre-pandemic and pandemic periods under
varying conditions of countermeasure supply and pandemic severity. (Also see
Pillar One, Action T [HSC 6.1.13.9] below; chapter 2, Pillar Three, Actions C
[No HSC number] and D [HSC 6.1.13.9]; and chapter 6, Pillar One, Action C
[6.1.14.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 3 months.
- Measure of Performance: Clearly stated objectives for vaccine
usage under different scenarios including vaccine supply and pandemic severity.
- Step 1: Review existing principles and assumptions guiding the
allocation plans for pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines.
- Step 2: Provide revisions to these principles and assumptions to
these allocation plans and present to working groups making recommendations to
policymakers.
- Action (HSC 6.1.14.2): HHS, in coordination with DHS and
Sector-Specific Agencies, DOS, DOD, DOL, VA, Treasury, and State/local
governments, will identify lists of personnel and high-risk groups who should
be considered for priority access to medical countermeasures, under various
pandemic scenarios, according to strategy developed in compliance with HSC
6.1.14.1. (Also see chapter 6, Pillar One, Action N [HSC 6.1.14.2].)
- Timeframe: Within 9 months.
- Measure of Performance: Provisional recommendations of groups who
should receive priority access to vaccines established for various scenarios of
pandemic severity and medical countermeasure supply.
- Step 1: Review existing allocation plans for pre-pandemic and
pandemic vaccines.
- Step 2: Provide options paper on revisions to these allocation
plans and present to policymakers for consideration.
- Action (HSC 6.1.14.3): HHS, in coordination with DHS and
Sector-Specific Agencies, DOS, DOD, DOL, and VA, will establish a strategy for
shifting priorities based on at-risk populations, supplies and efficacy of
countermeasures against the circulating pandemic strain, and characteristics of
the virus.
- Timeframe: Within 9 months.
- Measure of Performance: Clearly stated process for evaluation and
adjustment of prepandemic recommendations regarding groups receiving prior
access to vaccines.
- Step 1: Review pandemic vaccination priority guidelines to divide
priority groups into subgroups if possible. Given pandemic influenza vaccine
may become available only over a long period of time, developing smaller
priority groups appears necessary.
- Step 2: Develop guidelines for estimating priority group size, to
ensure consistency across States and facilitate equitable vaccine distribution
and critical infrastructure workforce needs.
- Step 3: Disseminate priority and subpriority vaccination
guidelines through public and private sector partners.
- Step 4: Establish a strategy for adjusting priorities during the
course of a pandemic based on the features of the pandemic strain.
Monitoring Vaccine Efficacy, Coverage, and
Adverse Events
- Action (HSC 6.1.13.9): HHS, in coordination with DOD, and VA, in
collaboration with State, territorial , tribal, and local partners, will
develop/refine mechanisms to (1) track adverse events following vaccine
administration; (2) ensure that individuals obtain additional doses of vaccine,
if necessary; and (3) define protocols for conducting vaccine effectiveness
studies during a pandemic. (Also see chapter 2, Pillar Three, Action D [HSC
6.1.13.9]; and chapter 6, Pillar Three, Action C [HSC 6.1.13.9].)
- Timeframe: Within 18 months.
- Measure of Performance: Mechanism(s) to track vaccine coverage
and adverse events.
- Step 1: Develop guidelines for vaccine accountability and
reporting, consistent with HHS/CDC's Vaccine Management Business Improvement
Project.
- Step 2: Define parameters for tracking system(s) of vaccine
recipients, including common variables that can be used in State-based systems
and reported to HHS/CDC. This system will allow monitoring of trends and
progress of the pandemic vaccination program and the appropriateness of vaccine
use, and will identify problems in vaccine use to target for remedial action.
- By 2007, develop a system to collect data on pandemic
influenza vaccine doses administered nationally and by State, age group,
recipient (priority) group, and dose (1st or 2nd), and pilot test it in
1015 States.
- The reporting system will use the HHS/CDC Countermeasures and
Response Administration (CRA) Web-based, PHIN-certified system. Because
national and State or local data and analysis needs and IT capabilities vary
greatly; a single, inclusive system is not likely.
- Some States may want to use a system developed by HHS/CDC;
others want a standard data set expectation with a standardized data exchange
format/protocol. States may consider additional data requirements to meet their
own needs.
- By 2008, complete system development and disseminate to all
States.
- Step 3: Develop protocol for use of population-based surveys,
such as HHS/CDC's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), to
provide national- and State-level estimates and to complement the vaccine
tracking system described above.
- Define variables to be collected in surveys, such as age,
gender, priority group, dose of vaccine received, where and when vaccinated,
and reasons for nonvaccination, and modify the BRFSS to enable it to be quickly
modified to rapidly determine vaccine coverage in key populations in the event
of a pandemic
- Pilot test survey in States where vaccine tracking system is
tested, to assess comparability of data collections
- Step 4: Help States with tracking system plans.
- Step 5: Define vaccine safety monitoring approaches through
consultation with State immunization program managers to designate state-level
vaccination adverse event coordinators. All adverse event systems will be
examined for their ability to perform under pandemic conditions, and HHS will
create a plan for coordinating the systems:
- Work with States to ensure timely reporting of adverse events
to Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) and other systems, and timely
investigation of rare adverse events and clusters of adverse events.
- VAERS and other systems enhancements: Activation of a VAERS
Emergency Preparedness Module will allow for receipt and processing of an
additional 40,000 reports over a 3-month period above the annual baseline of
15,000 reports. This will be accomplished via hiring and training of additional
staff by the VAERS contractor in addition to expanding and enhancing VAERS data
systems.
- Consult with State immunization program managers and state
adverse event coordinators (where those exist).
- Step 6: Define Vaccine Safety Rapid Cycle Analysis (RCA) Program
role in pandemic influenza vaccine adverse event reporting:
- Expand the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) role for pandemic
influenza vaccine adverse event surveillance. Currently the VSD RCA assesses
data from eight Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) weekly for rare adverse
events following immunization.
- To adequately perform surveillance for rare neurological
adverse events (such as Guillain-Barre Syndrome [GBS]), this system would need
to be expanded to be able to accurately and rapidly assess the risk for these
events following vaccination.
- Step 7: Establish real-time clinical active surveillance for
select neurological adverse events (e.g., GBS):
- Assess 50 cases of clinically significant neurological
complications following influenza vaccination. This pilot model of influenza
vaccine safety monitoring and response system for clinically significant
neurological complications can serve as an effective model for future vaccine
campaigns that may occur in response to public health emergencies.
- Daily screening or review of VAERS reports and timely
targeted followup of selected reports will enhance completeness and accuracy of
VAERS report data.
- Step 8: Develop vaccine effectiveness assessments that include,
at a minimum, laboratory-confirmed emergency department visits,
hospitalizations, and deaths, though not all outcomes will be assessed through
all mechanisms:
- Establish mechanisms/protocol for assessing effectiveness of
a pandemic influenza vaccine in preventing hospitalization and death among
children and adults in HHS/CDC's NVSN
- Establish mechanism/protocol for assessing the effectiveness
of a pandemic influenza vaccine in preventing hospitalizations and deaths among
children and adults in the EIP sites
- Establish mechanisms in the VSD sites for vaccine
effectiveness assessments in all age groups
Vaccine Education and Training
- Action (No HSC Action): HHS will develop and implement training
exercises for pandemic preparedness.
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measures of performance: Establish training courses and conduct
training exercises on different aspects of the vaccine process.
- Step 1: Specific vaccine-related training needs for pandemic
influenza include those that surround the large-scale administration of a
licensed or unlicensed pandemic influenza vaccine. These training efforts
include activities to implement (1) vaccination clinics (clinic flow setup,
vaccine storage and preparation, security requirements, client tracking/data
entry, vaccine accountability); (2) Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)
contingencies for administering an unlicensed or unapproved vaccine during a
declared emergency; and (3) vaccine adverse event reporting.
- Step 2: Define role of exercises and drills for implementing
vaccination clinics. As a part of the advice that is developed for States for
pandemic influenza vaccine clinic planning, exercises will be identified as a
part of overall planning efforts. Within the advice, HHS/CDC will develop drill
recommendations that include the following target goals (e.g., setup times,
throughputs) for use in pandemic influenza clinic exercises:
- Develop vaccine adverse event reporting training materials
- Consult with public and private sector partners
- HHS/CDC will work with other Federal agencies, State
immunization program coordinators, and private sector partners to establish
target goals for pandemic influenza vaccination efforts and measurement
indicators to assess those goals for overall preparedness assessment
- Step 3: Develop materials and conduct training in a variety of
formats:
- Clinic guideline development and general distribution
- Satellite broadcasts
- HHS/CDC Web site posting
- Web casts
Risk Communications and Public Information
Campaigns
- Action (HSC 6.1.12.1): HHS will collaborate with health care
providers, industry partners, and State, local and tribal public health
authorities to develop public information campaigns and other mechanisms to
stimulate increased seasonal influenza vaccination. (Also see chapter 7, Pillar
One, Action O [HSC 6.1.12.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Domestic vaccine use increased relative
to historical norms.
- Step 1: Determine national influenza vaccination goals for
seasonal use.
- Step 2: Review capabilities needed for implementation.
- Step 3: Define vaccination messages regarding rationale for
priority groups, timing of vaccination, need for two doses, sites for
vaccination, and importance of vaccination.
- Step 4: Develop draft Vaccine Information Statements.
Pillar Two: Surveillance and Detection
Vaccine countermeasures are primarily a function of the preparedness and
response components of this Plan. The results of surveillance and detection
serve as a trigger for deployment of pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccine.
Pillar Three: Response and Containment
In the event of a pandemic, the expedient and seamless production of
pandemic vaccine from generation and testing of influenza virus reference
strains, to vaccine-manufacturing and lot-release testing, to vaccine packaging
and shipment are key elements in the overall domestic pandemic response. Pillar
Three actions deal with HHS facilitation of the provision of pre-pandemic and
pandemic vaccines, when they become available, as part of a comprehensive
response and containment effort against pandemic influenza. The transitions
from the identification of clinical isolates to the ultimate shipment of
finished vaccines from the vaccine distributions centers and then to the States
are covered under Pillar Three. More comprehensive information for regulatory
advice is provided in Appendix AVaccine Regulatory Guidelines.
Pillar Three actions on response and containment activities involve
pandemic vaccine distribution during a pandemic (HSC 6.1.14 and 6.3.5), advice
on vaccination practices (HSC 6.1.11), and the tracking of vaccine-related
adverse events (HSC 6.1.13).
Leveraging National Medical and Public Health
Surge Capacity
- Action (HSC 6.3.5.3): HHS, in coordination with DHS, will allocate
and assure the effective and secure distribution of public stocks of antiviral
drugs and vaccines when they become available. HHS and DHS are currently
prepared to distribute stockpile as soon as countermeasures become available.
- Timeframe: As required and dependent on availability.
- Measure of Performance: Number of doses of vaccine and treatment
courses of antiviral medications distributed.
- Step 1: Implement plan to monitor vaccine distribution.
- Step 2: Collect data on monitoring vaccine distribution.
- Step 3: Revise distribution plans of medical countermeasures
according to pandemic severity, outbreak sites, countermeasure availability,
and data gathered on virus behavior and pathogenic characteristics.
- Action (no HSC action): HHS provides a roadmap for obtaining the
needed information for the efficient submission of high quality Investigational
New Drug applications (INDs), Emergency Use Authorization (EUAs), and Biologics
License Applications (BLAs) for pandemic influenza vaccines.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Development of Web-based interface
reflecting this roadmap for vaccine manufacturers and other HHS agencies.
- Step 1: Initiate development (pre-IND meetings and IND
submissions).
- Step 2: License vaccine, including accelerated approval (Draft
Guidance for Industry, Clinical Data Needed to Support the Licensure of
Pandemic Influenza Vaccines,
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/panfluvac.pdf).
- Step 3: Fast track designation (Guidance for Industry, Fast Track
Drug Development ProgramsDesignation, Development, and application review
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/fsttrk.pdf).
- Step 4: Obtain FDA advice on chemistry, manufacturing, and
controls (CMC) and manufacturing facilities through meetings and other
resources (Guidance for Industry: Content and Format of Chemistry,
Manufacturing and Controls Information and Establishment Description
Information for a Vaccine or Related Product
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/cmcvacc.pdf).
- Step 5: Obtain FDA advice on EUA (Draft Guidance on Emergency Use
Authorization of Medical Products
http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/emergency_use.html).
- Action (HSC 6.1.13.10): HHS, with other federal departments, will
work with DOJ to develop a joint strategic plan to ensure international
shipments of counterfeit vaccine and antiviral medications are detected at our
borders and that domestic counterfeit drug production and distribution is
thwarted through aggressive enforcement efforts. (Also see chapter 1 Pillar
One, Action V [HSC 6.1.13.10]; and chapter 6, Pillar Three, Action E [HSC
6.1.13.10].)
- Timeframe: Within 3 months.
- Measure of Performance: Joint strategic plan developed;
international and domestic counterfeit drug shipments prevented or interdicted.
- Step 1: Investigate reports of counterfeit drugs used for
pandemic treatment or prophylactic purposes and prosecute cases as evidence
warrants.
- Step 2: Investigate reports of counterfeit vaccines used, and
prosecute cases as evidence warrants.
- Step 3: Use authorities and prescribed plans to remedy the
illegal distribution of medical countermeasures.
- Action (No HSC Action): HHS will select a pandemic virus isolate for
virus reference strain production, construct, qualify, and ship pandemic virus
reference strain to vaccine manufacturers.
- Timeframe: Within 6 weeks of pandemic declaration.
- Measure of Performance: Test exercise to determine operational
status.
- Step 1: Perform antigenic and genetic analyses to aid in the
selection of appropriate pandemic virus reference strain(s).
- Step 2: Conduct reverse genetic procedures:
- Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) protocols and standard
operating procedures will be followed.
- Laboratory studies will be performed under enhanced
Bio-Safety Level 3 (BSL3) conditions and facilities by personnel wearing
protective equipment including Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs).
- Vero cells from a vaccine-qualified master cell bank should
be used to recover viruses by plasmid transfection.
- The antigenic properties of the reference virus should be
assessed and shown to be identical to that of the wild type virus from which
the haemagglutinin (HA) and the neuraminidase (NA) segments were obtained.
- The nucleotide sequence of the HA and NA genes of the
reference virus should be determined and should be compared with the sequence
of the respective clones and of the genes from the original wild-type virus.
Any differences should be noted. An assessment of the level of residual plasmid
in the reference virus should be made using PCR technology.
- The virus titer should be determined in the appropriate
substrate (eggs or Madin-Darby Canine Kidney cells).
- Absence of bacterial and/or fungal contamination will be
established by culturing.
- Step 3: Conduct safety testing of resulting vaccine reference
viruses.
- Step 4: Request USDA exemption of the reference virus from the
Select Agent List by providing the following information:
- Data regarding the source of the viruses and genes; complete
nucleotide sequence of the HA
- Pathogenicity testing results in chickens, per OIE
standards
- Trypsin dependence of plaque formation by the reassortant in
chicken embryo fibroblasts cell mono-layers
- Step 5: Transfer of vaccine reference virus via USDA transport
permit to vaccine manufacturers.
- Action (No HSC Action): HHS will provide pandemic vaccine to store
and distribute pandemic vaccines. (Also see Pillar One, Action O [HSC 6.1.13.5]
above.)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Creation of the plan and training
exercise of plan.
- Step 1: Contract storage and stability testing of pandemic
vaccine as needed at vaccine manufacturers and other designated sites.
- Step 2: Contract distribution of pandemic vaccine with private
sector distributors and other carriers.
- Step 3: Institute prescribed physical security measures for
vaccine manufacturing, distribution centers, critical suppliers, and
transportation routes using pandemic plan and multilevel law enforcement team.
- Action (No HSC Action): HHS will develop a plan to coordinate
delivery of pandemic vaccine to designated sites within 12 months upon
consultation with NVPO/HHS, OPHEP/HHS, State, local, and tribal public health
departments. (Also see Pillar One, Action P [HSC 6.1.13.1,] and Pillar Three,
Action A [HSC 6.3.5.3] above.)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Issuance of a vaccine delivery plan.
- Step 1: Review and revise vaccination clinic guidelines using
those developed in 2004 during the influenza vaccine shortage:
- http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/pdf/vaxclinicplanning0405.pdf.
- Consult with public and private sector health leaders.
- Although the Public Health Service Act authorizes HHS to
provide vaccines to States, it does not authorize HHS to provide vaccines
directly to private entities. The Department would need new statutory authority
to do the latter.
- Step 2: Finalize pandemic vaccine delivery plan.
- Step 3: Provide training for vaccine delivery through exercises.
- Action (HSC 6.1.14.4): HHS, in coordination with DHS and
Sector-specific agencies, DOS, DOD, DOL, VA, and Treasury, will present
recommendations on target groups for vaccine and anti-viral drugs when
sustained and sufficient human-to-human transmission of a potential pandemic
influenza strain is documented anywhere in the world. The recommendations will
reflect data from the pandemic and available supplies of medical
countermeasures. (Also see chapter 6, Pillar Three, Action B [HSC 6.1.14.4].)
- Timeframe: Within 23 weeks of outbreak.
- Measure of Performance: Provisional identification of priority
groups for various pandemic scenarios.
- Step 1: Assist in the assessment of global needs and available
resources globally and domestically.
- Step 2: Provide recommendations on plans to assist and allocate
available domestic resources.
- Action (No HSC Action): HHS will review, revise, and implement
tracking plan to monitor pandemic vaccination in consultation with vaccine
manufacturers, vaccine distributors, and State immunization program managers.
(Also see Pillar One, Action T [HSC 6.1.13.9] above; and chapter 2, Pillar
Three, Action D [HSC 6.1.13.9].)
- Timeframe: 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Completion of the vaccination monitoring
plan.
- Step 1: Implement vaccine effectiveness assessments among
NVSN/EIP/VSD sites or other settings as feasible, depending on timing and
spread of pandemic influenza and vaccine availability.
- Step 2: Implement survey periodically (e.g., at least monthly)
for reporting results in HHS/CDC's Epi-X and Morbidity/Mortality Weekly Report.
The survey may be an expansion of the existing BRFSS or a separate focused
survey using BRFSS infrastructure. In addition, use of followup surveys in
which particular groups of respondents are identified during the BRFSS survey
and followed up with a more extensive set of health surveillance questions at a
later date is a potentially efficient means of expanding the utility of the
current system.
- Action (No HSC Action): HHS will develop plans for communications of
vaccines and their usages, priorities, and limitations. (Also see Pillar One,
Action Q [HSC 6.1.14.1] above.)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Issuance of vaccine communication
plan.
- Step 1: Develop a communications plan on pre-pandemic and
pandemic vaccine production and vaccine's allocation, distribution, and usage.
- Step 2: Review and revise vaccination messages regarding
rationale for priority groups, timing of vaccination, need for two doses, sites
for vaccination, and importance of vaccination.
- Step 3: Develop Vaccine Information Statements.
Appendix 5A: Vaccine Regulatory
Guidelines
Vaccine regulatory issues: investigational new drug usage, emergency use
authorization, and licensure. Particular regulatory approaches utilized depend
on whether a pandemic were to occur now, next year, or several years from now.
Approaches would reflect the availability of approved and investigational
vaccines and the characteristics of circulating and emerging viruses. For all
of the mechanisms of expedited/facilitated development or access, early and
frequent interactions between the vaccine manufacturer/sponsor (government or
commercial) and FDA are of the highest importance.
Emergency Use Authority
- During an emergency declared by the HHS Secretary, FDA may authorize
the use of an unapproved vaccine or an unapproved use of an approved vaccine if
certain legal requirements are met.
- If a declared emergency occurs before a vaccine development process
is completed and alternatives are lacking, and in particular, if the vaccine
appears sufficiently promising that the SNS might consider acquiring it for
investigational use, then appropriate Government agencies and sponsors should
focus on ensuring that complete data are rapidly provided to FDA to support
issuance of an EUA.
- Data can be provided through pre-IND or IND submissions and
discussion of ongoing and future development plans, as far in advance of need
as possible.
- FDA would then assess whether the data would potentially support an
EUA and provide advice on any additional studies and data that may be desirable
both for further development and to support emergency use as warranted.
- Analysis of whether the available data and information support
issuing an EUA if requested for temporary use in a declared emergency, and the
timeframe in which this could be done, may depend on multiple factors such as
the adequacy of data provided in advance, including the evidence for safety and
immunogenicity/efficacy and the nature of the emergency.
- Therefore, advance submission and discussion of information from
completed studies and plans for additional studies will be critical to
minimizing the time required for additional evaluation after onset of an
emergency, but the final determination regarding whether the criteria for
issuance of an EUA are met can only be made after an emergency is
declared.
- The Secretary of HHS may declare an emergency, justifying an EUA if
he determines that a public health emergency exists that affects or has the
significant potential to affect national security.
- The FDA Commissioner may issue an EUA if, after consulting with the
Directors of NIH and CDC (to the extent feasible and appropriate), he concludes
that it is reasonable to believe that the product may be effective; the known
and potential benefits outweigh the known and potential risks of using the
product; and there is no adequate, approved, and available alternative.
- FDA shall, to the extent practicable given the circumstances of the
emergency, impose certain conditions on an EUA for an unapproved product and an
EUA for an unapproved use of an approved product, and may impose certain other
conditions.
Biologics License Application (BLA) Licensure
Issues
- Currently there are no U.S. licensed influenza vaccines approved for
pandemic avian influenza strains. FDA has stated on numerous occasions, and as
recently as the November 2930, 2005, National Vaccine Advisory Committee
meeting, that for licensed manufacturers of interpandemic vaccines, use of a
pandemic strainfor example, H5would not require a new BLA, and in
the setting of an evolving pandemic threat or actual pandemic, would be
evaluated in an expedited manner as a strain change prior approval supplement
to an approved BLA.
- License supplement would require information on the manufacturing of
the strain and limited clinical datafor example, immunogenicity and
safety data. In an emergency situation, depending on the quality of the data,
FDA's review would be completed in an expedited manner.
- If the pandemic were to occur prior to licensure of a vaccine against
the pandemic strain, or at a time when an investigational vaccine has advanced
to the stage of human clinical trials under IND, but sufficient data have not
yet been accumulated to support licensure of a BLA, there are several potential
mechanisms FDA can use to facilitate the rapid access to these products,
depending on the amount and quality of data submitted to the FDA for
review.
- Adjuvant, cell-culture-based, and other new technologies would be
considered a new product and, thus, would require the submission of a new BLA
by all manufacturers, regardless of whether they are currently licensed to
manufacture an egg-based influenza vaccine.
- If adjuvants are shown to be useful in dose sparing and added to
candidate pandemic vaccines, this would significantly change the manufacturing
process and the product itself, requiring immunogenicity and safety data and
submission of a new BLA.
- Under accelerated approval the BLA would require manufacturing,
safety, and immunogenicity data, as well as post-licensure confirmatory
clinical studies.
- A pandemic influenza vaccine would be designated for a priority
review during the interpandemic period. The unlicensed product could also
potentially be made available through an IND or EUA.
- New and non-U.S. licensed influenza vaccine manufacturers' submission
of a BLA for licensure of a pandemic influenza vaccine, regardless of the
technology, (e.g., egg-based, tissue culture-based, recombinant) is required
now and in the future.
- Under accelerated approval, BLA requires manufacturing and facility
data as well as safety and immunogenicity data and post-licensure confirmatory
clinical studies. FDA would consider data from clinical studies and use under
licensure (for safety) in other countries in support of U.S. licensure along
with safety and immunogenicity data for accelerated approval, but the data must
support safety and effectiveness of the vaccine.
- Some technologies may not be appropriate for accelerated approval
(e.g., a peptide conjugate vaccine where there is not a marker for protection).
In the event of a pandemic, the review time could be significantly shortened
depending on the quality of the data. The unlicensed product could also be made
available through an IND or EUA.
Appendix 5B: Vaccine Virus Reference
Strain Development, Production, and Qualification
Inactivated influenza vaccines are produced from seed virus that
exploits the extraordinary growth efficiency in embryonated chicken eggs
conferred by the A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 (PR8) internal genes. Reassortants with
the PR8 internal genes and the HA and NA surface protein coding genes from the
novel potentially pandemic strain will be generated in the laboratory following
WHO-sanctioned protocols and Good Laboratory Practice, which streamline
downstream adventitious agent testing. The virus reference stock will be
transferred to vaccine manufacturers. Live, attenuated vaccines are produced
similarly using plasmids encoding target HA and NA genes of pandemic virus and
donor genes containing mutations for temperature-sensitive and attenuation
phenotypes.
The reverse genetics procedures will be performed as described in the
WHO documents entitled WHO Guidance on Development of Influenza Vaccine
Reference Viruses by Reverse Genetics
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_6/en/index.html.
The process of virus rescue by reverse genetics requires 21 days. Subsequent
production of virus stock and titration requires 4 days.
The safety of the resulting vaccine reference viruses will be tested
according to the established WHO guidelines as described in Production of
Pilot Lots of Inactivated Influenza Vaccines from Reassortants Derived from
Avian Influenza Viruses: An Interim Biosafety Risk Assessment
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_RMD_2003_5/en/.
All work with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus and their derivatives is
regulated by the USDA Select Agents Program. Because removal of the polybasic
amino acids from HA and re-assortment with PR8 results in loss of virulence and
transmissibility in poultry, the USDA Select Agent Program is willing to review
experimental evidence to this effect for each reference strain and remove it
from the list if deemed safe. The reassortants that were excluded from the
Select Agent regulations by USDA and meet the safety criteria of the 2003 WHO
document will be made available to vaccine manufacturers for production of
pilot lots of vaccine for experimental use and clinical studies.
|