



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

ABOUT THE REPORT

The Center for Peace and Security Studies of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, the Washington-based Fund for Peace, and the Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute teamed up in a joint project to probe the limits of progress in the development and use of peace operations. This project, which in part was funded through a USIP grant, sought to break relatively new ground with some of the questions asked, some of the evidence employed, and some of the findings offered. This report briefly summarizes the project results. The full results and analyses are found in *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, edited by Donald C. F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta.

Donald C. F. Daniel, the report's author, is a professor at Georgetown University.

© 2008 by the United States Institute of Peace.
All rights reserved.

SPECIAL REPORT 215

NOVEMBER 2008

Donald C. F. Daniel

Whither Peace Operations?

Summary

- Much progress has been achieved over the last decade and a half in the development and use of peace operations as a tool to quell conflicts, but there are limits to how much more progress can be expected.
- The number of troop contributors and troops deployed to peace operations has recently reached unprecedented highs, but the bulk of troops came from a limited number of states.
- The relationship between the United Nations and non-UN peacekeepers seems for the most part complementary. Nonetheless, the rise in non-UN peace operations has probably led to the United Nations becoming too dependent on too small a base of lesser-developed states.
- The characteristics of most troop contributors (e.g., type of governance, national quality of life, ground-force size) correlate with their level of contribution, but even politically willing nations with the "right" characteristics can likely deploy only a small percentage of their troops to operations at any one time.
- While Europe and Africa have achieved the most progress in developing institutional capacities, each continent confronts problems of interinstitutional relations and resource shortages.
- Russia's hegemonic role in Eurasia and the United States' historical legacy in Latin America have hindered development of comprehensive institutional capacities for peace operations in each region.
- East Asia may slowly be moving beyond ideational strictures that crippled efforts to develop regional capacities.
- Institutional progress is not expected in South Asia and the Middle East, and states of each region should not be expected to send military units to intraregional operations. Nearly all South Asian countries, however, will be major players in UN operations. A few exceptions aside, Mideast states will remain bit players on the world scene.
- Demand for easy or moderately challenging operations will generally be met, but the hazardous missions most apt to occur will be called for by states possessing the wherewithal to take them on and bring others along.

CONTENTS

Introduction	2
Universal Trends	2
Regional Trends	5
Plumbing the Limits of Progress	9

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress.

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • **María Otero** (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • **Holly J. Burkhalter**, Vice President, Government Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. • **Anne H. Cahn**, Former Scholar in Residence, American University, Washington, D.C. • **Chester A. Crocker**, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • **Laurie S. Fulton**, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • **Charles Horner**, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. • **Kathleen Martinez**, Executive Director, World Institute on Disability • **George E. Moose**, Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • **Jeremy A. Rabkin**, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • **Ron Silver**, Actor, Producer, Director, Primparous Productions, Inc. • **Judy Van Rest**, Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

David Kramer, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State • **Christopher “Ryan” Henry**, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense • **Richard H. Solomon**, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) • **Frances C. Wilson**, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, National Defense University,

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials,
e-mail: permissions@usip.org

Introduction

Peace operations have undergone several evolutions since the first United Nations-administered peace mission in 1948. A characteristic feature of the most recent evolution, which began about a decade ago, is that today peace operations are more broadly accepted as a tool for contending with destabilizing events in all regions of the globe. Enhancing their effectiveness is now on the agenda of not only the United Nations but also regional organizations and many national government agencies. Although much progress has been achieved in the development and use of peace operations as a tool to quell conflicts, there are limits to how much more progress can be expected. The number of operations and the number of troops deployed to them since 2003 have reached unprecedented highs, and the number of contributing countries has also been rising significantly and may soon plateau.

Against this backdrop, the Center of Peace and Security Studies (CPASS) of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, the Washington-based Fund for Peace, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute teamed up in a joint project—with the financial support of the United States Institute of Peace—to probe the limits of progress in the development and use of peace operations and to consider prospects for their future. The intent of the project was to break relatively new ground with some of the questions asked, some of the evidence and methodologies employed, and some of the findings and conclusions offered. The project attended to a number of questions, including those related to (1) the scope of UN and non-UN peace operations; (2) the nature of the relationship between the United Nations and other organizations involved in peacekeeping; (3) the prospects for peacekeeping operations within all of the world’s regions; (4) the factors that affect global troop capacity for peace operations, including the characteristics of troop contributors; and (5) the various conceptions of what peace operations are and what they require. In addressing these and other questions, the project drew on regional experts from around the globe. It also utilized newly available databases about troop contributions to peace operations, including one from the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) of Sweden that covers operations from 1948 to 2005 and one from CPASS that covers operations (including enforcement missions not included in the FBA data) from 2001 to 2006.

Among other findings, the project identified a number of peace operation trends, some of which are very briefly summarized in this report.¹ These findings are divided into two sections. The first focuses on universal trends that cut across regions and nations and the second focuses on trends specific to the seven regions studied in the project: sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Eurasia, Latin America, East Asia, South Asia, and the greater Middle East. The report concludes with observations about the prospects for peace operations in the future.

Universal Trends

Divided into three parts, this section examines broad organizational trends, trends related to national troop contributors, and trends related to the specialized capabilities needed to undertake hazardous missions or complex missions in failed or failing states.

Organizational Trends

In a roughly eight- to ten-year period beginning in the late 1980s, peace operations transitioned from being a modestly demanding, infrequently employed, collective response mainly to interstate conflicts, to being a regularly employed mechanism for addressing both interstate and intrastate crises that threatened a region’s stability. According to the FBA database, there were a total of 128 peacekeeping missions between 1948 and

2005, of which sixty were administered by the United Nations and sixty-eight by other actors. Through 1988 there were never more than six missions undertaken in any one year, and there were never more than three intrastate missions occurring at any one time in any one year. But since 1998 there have been between thirteen and eighteen total UN missions and eleven to nineteen total non-UN missions each year. Responses to intrastate conflicts since 1989 drove most of this increase. Since 1995–96 annual UN and non-UN intrastate peace operations have ranged from six to twelve and nine to seventeen, respectively.

The increased use of peace operations caused many observers to question whether regional organizations and coalitions of the willing might overshadow the United Nations in peacekeeping and compete with it for mission personnel. But a detailed analysis of the FBA data reveals that the United Nations and regional organizations did not so much compete as complement each another. For example, non-UN actors coordinated their efforts with the United Nations, often sought out the United Nations' material support, and generally recognized their own inability to handle alone the demands of peacekeeping. In short, as regional organizations became more active in peacekeeping, so too did the United Nations.

However, there are two negative features to this otherwise positive picture of complementarity. The first is that there are only so many troops to go around. As a result, both the United Nations and non-UN entities complain of not having adequate numbers of troops to cover all contingencies. The second is that the United Nations has come to be heavily dependent on a small number of lesser-developed contributors—states such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Ghana, Jordan, and, if trends continue upward, China—whose militaries are not necessarily of the highest caliber. In contrast, non-UN missions generally draw most of their troops from countries with high-quality militaries.

The nature and location of a particular conflict often determines which organization will deploy peacekeeping forces. The United Nations is generally the instrument of choice for missions in Africa and for complex missions—such as those that involve helping failed or failing states restore public order and services—in which there is a degree of consent from the parties to the conflict. Regional organizations and coalitions of state actors are usually the choice for the most challenging peace enforcement missions and for local missions in which regional partners want a speedier or more robust response to a crisis. In some circumstances, as in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, a regional organization may take over a UN mission when a convincing show of force is required. In other circumstances, the United Nations may take over a mission from regional powers that either lack the necessary resources to carry on a mission—as in Liberia in 2003 and the Ivory Coast in 2004—or that initiated a mission with the intent of ultimately turning it over to the United Nations after violence and basic order had been restored—as in Haiti in 2004.

Trends Related to Troop Contributors

Peace operations cannot occur, of course, unless countries first provide troops to staff them. Of the 157 potential troop-contributing countries identified in the CPASS database that covered the period from 2001 to 2005, eighty-seven of them were designated as contributors—that is, as countries that provided at least a hundred military personnel at one time to at least one mission. The remaining seventy were designated as either nominal contributors or noncontributors. Based on the number of troops each state contributed and the number of years over which contributions were made, countries designated as contributors were subdivided into two groups: forty-seven countries were identified as major contributors—accounting for about 85 percent of deployed forces—and forty were identified as minor contributors.

A comparison of the profiles of the major, minor, and nominal contributors and the noncontributors revealed some striking results. Most major contributors were democratic, wealthy or middle income, domestically stable, highly developed, and technologically

The increased use of peace operations caused many observers to question whether regional organizations and coalitions of the willing might overshadow the United Nation in peacekeeping and compete with it for mission personnel.

The United Nations is generally the instrument of choice for missions in Africa and for complex missions.

well connected with the rest of the globe. Most nominal contributors and noncontributors had anocratic or autocratic governmental structures and medium or low levels of national wealth, internal stability, development, and technological connectivity to the rest of the globe. Additionally, while a healthy plurality of major contributors possessed large ground forces, a majority of nominal contributors and noncontributors had small ground forces. Most minor contributors fell in the middle but were closer in profile to the nominal and noncontributors than to the major contributors. In short, when countries are ranked based on their level of contributions, a common profile within each rank emerges. The broad pattern is clear: the higher the level of contribution, the more the rank is populated by democratic states with a high quality of life and large ground forces.

The pattern is no less strong when one reverses the focus to ask whether states with certain characteristics are more “inclined” to contribute. Specifically, two-thirds to three-quarters of all democratic, wealthy, domestically stable, highly developed, technologically well-connected states with large ground forces were designated as contributors. In contrast, only one-quarter to one-half of autocratic and poor states with low levels of development, stability, and connectivity and small ground forces were designated as contributors. About half of the anocratic, middle-income states with medium levels of stability, development, and connectivity and medium-size ground forces contributed troops to operations. As more states began to participate in peace operations after 2000—such as Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka—the collective profiles of all contributors became less democratic, less wealthy, less stable, and less technologically well connected. The shifts, however, were very gradual.

Of all of the characteristics, ground-force size was probably the most salient to size of contribution. States with large forces (100,000 and over) averaged contributions of about 3,500 troops per year; those with medium forces (from 25,000 to 99,999) averaged about 1,000; and those with small (less than 25,000) averaged only about 640. Of the thirty-seven states with large ground forces, twenty-five were already contributors. Of the twenty-four states that had the highest increase in yearly contributions over the five years of the analysis, 54 percent of them—including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Poland, and Brazil—had large ground forces. Another 33 percent—including Argentina, Bulgaria, Nepal, Nigeria, and Romania—had medium-size forces. The probability that a state having less than 4,000 ground troops would contribute was close to zero.

The number of deployed troops reached an unprecedented high of 150,000 in 2006, but this figure still represented only 1 percent of all the ground forces in the world and only about 5 percent of the average contributor’s ground forces. Aside from all-purpose generalizations about lack of political will, two other factors explain such low percentages. First, the challenging nature of contemporary peace operations puts a premium on high troop numbers and high force quality, but only about sixty of the world’s states possess the number or quality of forces critical to going abroad and staffing and sustaining peace missions. In 2006, forty-two of these sixty countries were already designated contributors. Second, even for a nation that possesses the needed political will and a large and/or high-quality military, only a small percentage of its troops can be expected to deploy out of country at any one time for a multitude of reasons, such as those related to prior commitments, legal restrictions, downsizing, and rotation cycles. Although total contributions have risen this decade, the combined effect of these factors almost guarantees that the percentages of deployed forces will remain low. While many militaries are getting smaller, a good subset of them should become more flexible, more rapidly deployable, and, with the increase in the number of peacekeeping training centers, better able to perform in nonhazardous missions.

Only about sixty of the world’s states possess the number or quality of forces critical to going abroad and staffing and sustaining peace missions.

Trends Related to Hazardous Mission and Niche Capabilities

There are two areas in which the limits on available resources will remain particularly critical. One is in the provision of capabilities to undertake hazardous operations and the

other is in the provision of niche or specialized capabilities to ensure success in complex missions aimed at reviving failed or failing states. For hazardous missions, an appropriate level of operational leadership capacity is needed in the run-up to and establishment of a mission. There are only about three states—the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—with the capability to deploy globally and about seven other states—Australia, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Nigeria, Russia, and South Africa—with the resources and regional reach needed to plan a mission, stand up and organize the headquarters, and provide the initial core of peacekeeping troops to which other countries would then contribute. In addition to the requisite leadership capacity, specific material capabilities and skill sets are also required and are in equally short supply. These include helicopters, nonlethal weaponry, air protection and air defense systems, and troops that can operate at night and in urban environments where they must be prepared to transition quickly from undertaking benign activities in some areas to combating resistance in others.

Further, missions in which public order remains elusive may require not only robust military capabilities but also specialized units for policing, administering justice, restoring infrastructures and social services, demining, disposing of explosive ordnance, and handling chemical and biological agents. There is considerable variance in the willingness of states to provide these capabilities, but on the whole the picture is positive. Although Africa is a continent with limited resources, countries such as Senegal, Rwanda, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa are stepping forward in one or more areas, particularly in the provision of gendarmerie forces and demining/ordnance disposal teams. In East Asia, two regional leaders, China and Japan, are increasingly becoming notable contributors of specialized capabilities, including to out-of-area missions. Lesser roles can be expected from Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Western European states, especially France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Portugal, are important not only for the specialized capabilities they themselves offer but also for the specialized police training they provide to nations in Africa and elsewhere. New members of the European Union and NATO, meanwhile, such as Poland and Romania, see the provision of specialized capabilities as one way they can establish themselves as engaged regional citizens. The picture is not as upbeat for Latin America—partly for financial reasons—but Brazil may buck the trend. More than Argentina or Chile, it seems determined to carve out a recognized role for itself and may look to become a provider of specialized capacities, particularly in the area of search and rescue and in the deployment of medical units.

Missions in which public order remains elusive may require not only robust military capabilities but also specialized units.

Regional Trends

This section addresses region-by-region trends and examines the factors that affect the willingness of potential troop contributors to participate in or stay out of peace operations.

Africa

Africa possesses developed security organizations at both the continent-wide and sub-regional levels. As a result, the relationships that emerge between the continent-wide African Union and the subregional bodies, such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community, will determine the efficacy of the region's security architecture. The region is also distinctive because of the significant role played by outside countries in supporting the capacity-building efforts of the continent's national militaries and regionwide and subregional organizations. Bilateral support for African peacekeepers has come largely from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Support for African organizations has come from a broader range of countries and groups, including Canada, Japan, the United Nations, the Group of Eight (G8), and the concerted and individual efforts of European Union member countries.

Notwithstanding the expressed determination of Africans and external actors to move toward "African solutions for African problems," one should not expect too much too

Africans have shown that they can be quicker off the mark than the United Nations in deploying missions within Africa, but their ability to sustain missions has often been wanting.

soon. Missions in Africa are generally highly challenging, not only because of the often intransigent and violent politics of the conflict parties but also because of rugged terrain and poor transportation, communication, and economic development infrastructures. The region has a very long way to go in developing the institutional mechanisms—both for political decision making and operational planning—and the military capacities needed to undertake challenging operations on its own.

Africans have shown that they can be quicker off the mark than the United Nations in deploying missions within Africa, but their ability to sustain missions has often been wanting, sometimes requiring the United Nations to take them over. Africans and external actors need to hammer out together a realistic vision of what can be accomplished over time to buttress African capacities. With such a vision, they can establish priorities and set benchmarks for determining how they will expend their very limited resources. Ad hoc initiatives and politically correct rhetoric about African ownership of peacekeeping will not suffice.

Europe

Along with Africa, Europe has garnered a significant amount of attention for its efforts to build and utilize regional security organizations. The fundamental issue is not whether Europeans will participate in operations, because that question has largely been answered in the affirmative; rather, the critical questions concern how they will organize themselves to participate in operations and what level of burden they will be willing to take on. Whereas Africa has the issue of an evolving relationship between the continent-wide African Union and several subregional bodies, Europeans have two regionwide bodies to work through—NATO (twenty-four of its twenty-six members are European) and the European Union. The relations between the two are complex and member countries have much to do to sort out which organization will do what and with which contributors and resources. Factoring what role the United Nations should play in specific cases adds yet another level of institutional complexity.

Ultimately, the two most significant factors shaping Europe's ability to play an increased role in peace operations may be the decisions of governments and populations about (1) how much they are willing to spend to build peace operation capabilities and (2) how many casualties they are willing to sustain as peace operations become more dangerous. Looking forward, there is no indication that defense budgets will rise or that spending will become more efficient. That particularly demanding missions often lead to squabbles about burden sharing does not bode well. Like Africa, the region needs to develop a coherent vision of itself as an independent, comprehensive actor and accordingly must marshal the associated resources. Although Europe is far richer than Africa and already has a significant capacity to undertake operations, one can foresee only gradual change in its willingness and capability to do more than it is doing already.

Although Europe is far richer than Africa and already has a significant capacity to undertake operations, one can foresee only gradual change in its willingness and capability to do more than it is doing already.

Eurasia

While "peace operations" have been a feature of intraregional relations among the states of the former Soviet Union, Russia's dominating role both laterally and in mechanisms such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has hindered the development of a truly regional framework for peace operations. By the time Russia moved to establish a more integrated approach toward them after the turn of the century, it found that Georgia, Moldova, and several Central Asian states had already become more assertive in their relations with Russia and the Baltic states (now members of NATO) no less assertive. Nevertheless, Russia pushed ahead with the formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to take over the CIS's military and security integration function. The CSTO's potential for peace operations is untested but holds some promise because of the proposed creation of CSTO Collective Peace Support Forces. A number of unresolved or

“frozen” regional conflicts that have to date involved Russian “peacekeepers” working alone or with the conflict parties, such as in Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, may yet provide a test for the CSTO. But the recent Russian invasion of South Ossetia, a region claimed by Georgia, only reinforced long-held skepticism among many outsiders about Russian conceptions of peace operations and of the practices appropriate to their undertaking.

Latin America

Regionwide, institutional peace operation initiatives are rare in Latin America and probably will remain so. The most likely venue for such initiatives would be the Organization of American States (OAS), an institution in which the United States has played a heavy hand and exhibited sometimes off-putting preoccupations with the policies of some Latin American governments. But there has not been an OAS-sponsored peace operation since 1965 when, at Washington’s urging, the organization approved the Inter-American Peace Force for the Dominican Republic. Even that mission was characterized by considerable diplomatic maneuvering to accommodate Latin American sensitivities about who was seen to be in charge. The OAS has played a diplomatic role in other regional conflicts and cooperated with the United Nations on Haiti, but it may be a long while yet before the OAS sponsors a mission or puts in place the needed planning, training, and force-generation mechanisms that would enable it to undertake one. That said, some small Caribbean and Central American states have formed a composite battalion to handle a variety of tasks, including regional peacekeeping, and plans are in hand for some Central American states to stand up another battalion that would be kept on standby for UN missions. In addition, Latin America now has a number of peacekeeping training centers, and coordinated training does occur across national divisions, including within a U.S. Southern Command framework. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay are the continent’s most significant contributors to missions (especially UN-sponsored ones), and indications are that they intend to continue in that role.

East Asia

East Asia has long been characterized by its preference for “quiet diplomacy” to resolve crises and by the high value placed on national sovereignty and on the principle of not infringing in the internal affairs of regional neighbors. Developments over the last decade, however, have slowly generated some willingness within the region to move away from such strictures. Incremental change can be seen in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, a series of political and economic crises in the past decade have prompted a number of leading countries in the region to look for more extensive conflict and crisis management mechanisms. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is slowly moving beyond the consensus-based and quiet diplomacy methods that served it through its first three decades as it addresses questions about how to respond to growing transnational and intrastate challenges. In a number of documents and in the proposal for an ASEAN Security Community, it has evidenced a desire to build on the nascent peacekeeping capabilities of its member countries, which were displayed in contributions by Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines to UN and other missions in the region. The association envisions increased cooperation on peacekeeper training, greater sharing of information, and further discussions on establishing ASEAN mechanisms for maintaining peace and stability.

In Northeast Asia, the realization by Japan and China that they needed to play a greater role in international peacekeeping derived not so much from a particular crisis but from each country’s determination to achieve greater prominence regionally and globally. That China has undergone a significant change in its approach to peace operations is clear. Over the last five years it has gone from having virtually minimal involvement in

The recent Russian invasion of South Ossetia only reinforced long-held skepticism among many outsiders about Russian conceptions of peace operations.

The realization by Japan and China that they needed to play a greater role in international peacekeeping derived not so much from a particular crisis but from each country’s determination to achieve greater prominence regionally and globally.

peacekeeping to being on the cusp of joining the list of the top ten largest contributors to UN operations. As for Japan, constitutional provisions have served as a brake on its becoming a steady or major troop contributor. Yet these provisions are under review by the government, including the Diet, and the country has provided forces with specialized capabilities to UN missions and to the U.S.-led mission in Iraq. That Japan accepted the chairmanship of the UN Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations is an indication of its willingness to consider increasing its profile.

South Asia

South Asia is unique because of the long-standing and storied peacekeeping efforts of four countries—Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal—that consistently have been at or near the top of UN peacekeeping contributors. Without the “surplus” military capacity of these four countries and, more recently, of Sri Lanka, the United Nations would be at a great loss for deployed troops. That the region consists of a small number of nations—some with lasting enmities—makes it difficult for it to establish regional institutions for collective action. For example, India’s experience in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in the late 1980s—when it conducted a unilateral “peacekeeping operation” that had to be abandoned in the face of fierce resistance—was not at all encouraging for intraregional efforts in general. In short, one can expect that the South Asian states, while shunning operations in their own region, will continue to operate as major players in the global peace operations arena. They are pressing within the United Nations for a greater role in the decision-making processes leading to the creation and mandating of missions.

The Greater Middle East

The greater Middle East is another region whose countries generally have come to shun operating in their own neighborhood. Further, unlike South Asia, the states of the Middle East—with Morocco and Jordan being notable exceptions—are generally only minor and inconsistent players in global peacekeeping. In addition, the region has faced major challenges in its attempts to establish regional security institutions. Many of the countries view themselves as being aggrieved parties to the region’s major conflicts. This perspective precludes them from valuing the role of peacekeeping in specific cases and, to a great degree, undermines the concept of peacekeeping in their eyes. In the context of the region’s own security situation, most governments maintain their armed forces solely for the purposes of traditional national security and defense. Moreover, the countries in the Middle East are divided on so many levels that the trust necessary to empower the region’s multilateral institutions—for example, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab Cooperation Council—simply does not exist.

National Motives

The project’s regional analyses sought to uncover the national motives behind states’ contributions to peace operations. None of the identified motives—such as a desire to receive monetary remuneration, curry favor with a major power, enhance the national image, and find an outlet for surplus military capability—were surprising, but what was intriguing was that the motives and/or their underlying dynamics were not especially universal. The following three examples illustrate this phenomenon.

First, instability in the Balkans, East Timor, East and West Africa, Eurasia, and the Caribbean stimulated nations in each of those respective regions to augment or to consider augmenting their institutional or national capacities. Yet a motive to respond collectively to destabilizing regional developments was not found in the greater Middle East or South Asia. South Asia may have too few states with too many reasons for mutual distrust, while the states of the greater Middle East may simply be riven by too many national, subna-

Unlike South Asia, the states of the Middle East are generally only minor and inconsistent players in global peacekeeping.

Instability in the Balkans, East Timor, East and West Africa, Eurasia, and the Caribbean stimulated nations in each of those respective regions to augment or to consider augmenting their institutional or national capacities.

tional, and transnational factions, too self-absorbed in their own troubles, and, based on their own regional experiences, too little impressed by the value of peacekeeping.

Second, while an ethos or culture in favor of participation in peacekeeping operations was evident in some regions, the underlying dynamics differed across regions. In Europe, for example, new or aspiring members of the European Union and/or NATO may see peace operations as something they should participate in to demonstrate their regional solidarity. In contrast, the lack of South Asian solidarity seems to be a factor that encourages troop contributions by Pakistan, India, and possibly Bangladesh. In other words, the ethos that exists in South Asia may be based more on competition among neighbors than on regional identity.

Third, nations were motivated by a desire to control their own destiny, but this desire was expressed in different ways in different regions. Although African states want ultimately to rely only on themselves for peacekeeping missions, they accept outside assistance because they see it as a necessary step toward developing the region's own capacities. Similarly, European efforts to augment the European Union's capacity reflect a desire for an alternative to a U.S.-led NATO. Many Latin American states, meanwhile, are discouraged from working through the regionwide OAS because of concerns over U.S. hegemony. And in Eurasia, some states see the Russian-sponsored peace operations simply as a cover for intervention and control, thereby plaguing Russian efforts to make the CSTO a strong union that could handle regional peace operation needs.

Plumbing the Limits of Progress

If progress in the use and development of peace operations is measured by the number of operations, contributors, and troops deployed, the organizational efforts to improve capacity for crisis response, and the nature of the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, then much progress has occurred in the past fifteen years. Yet there are clear limits to continued progress.

A dominating trend is that labor-intensive and challenging intrastate operations have been the norm since the 1990s. That the trend seems irreversible probably means that the demand for ready core military and specialized units (including civilian police) will exceed supply. Uniformity of thought among troop providers as to what peace operations are and what they should entail will also have a profound effect on force supply and demand.

Prior to 1989, there was a generally accepted view of what a "peacekeeping operation"—the term of choice at the time—consisted of and that view did not include highly hazardous missions undertaken with little or shaky consent from the conflict belligerents. Since then, international and national decision makers have mandated operations with little attention paid to proper operational labels. Their concern involved, among other things, the quelling of instabilities and not the niceties of conceptual categories. The amount of consent to be expected was not ignored, but it was not always determinative. Nevertheless, even after missions were authorized, troop contributors still got to choose the missions their troops would go to and the rules under which they would operate.

The most militarily robust organizations (NATO, in particular) and states were the ones that consistently took on and sustained the most potentially violent missions, but those states and organizations are already well overstretched and will remain so for many years to come. NATO itself is plagued with differences among its members as to how much danger they are willing to allow their troops to confront. The net result is that hazardous missions—those that test not only the capabilities of contributors but also their conceptions of what constitutes a peace operation—will be most at risk of not taking place at all or eluding success if undertaken. As more militaries and specialized units become more proficient, the benefits will probably go to the challenging but

European efforts to augment the European Union's capacity reflect a desire for an alternative to a U.S.-led NATO.

The most militarily robust organizations and states were the ones that consistently took on and sustained the most potentially violent missions, but those states and organizations are already overstretched and will remain so.

less hazardous missions—the missions that better fit within the conceptions of what many contributors consider to be a *peace* as opposed to a violence-plagued *enforcement* operation. UN missions generally fit the peace operation designation better than non-UN missions, but the United Nations continues to be dependent on too small a base of national troop contributors.

Whatever a mission's hazard level, increases in the proficiencies of the deployed units will be very slow to come due to national spending limitations and internal political struggles about whether to fund guns or butter. National debates will parallel regional ones as resource issues, political differences, and rivalries slow the development of regional institutional capacities. As in so many other areas of national and international life, rhetoric about what should be done in peace operations exceeds in nearly all cases the reality of what will be accomplished.

It is sobering to consider that the bulk of troops for operations come from a limited number of states and that the major increases in troop contributions in this decade were largely due to established providers upping their contributions as opposed to new states weighing in heavily. It is a positive development that the profiles of most contributors have broadened in the last few years to include a wider variety of states, but the changes are occurring very gradually. The United Nations in particular may still be overly dependent upon too few states whose chief feature is their possession of large ground forces that are not necessarily of high quality. Even states that have the necessary political will may find it difficult to overcome internal structural limits on how many troops they can deploy at any one time. Any major global or regional financial crisis, or any major peace operation disaster resulting in the loss of many of the deployed troops, would almost surely guarantee backsliding and the reversal of positive trends.

In sum, the demand for easy or moderately challenging operations will generally be met, but cautionary or negative factors—in particular, a heavy reliance on a limited number of countries to provide the vast bulk of deployed personnel, the fragile nature of political willingness, differing views about what constitutes a peace operation, and the slow rates of growth in international organization and national capabilities—will have a notable impact on agenda-dominating, challenging, or hazardous missions. Some missions either will not occur at all or will be less than successful. The highly challenging missions most apt to occur will be those called for by states possessing the military and political wherewithal to take them on and bring others along in the process. Although such operations may not necessarily be highly effective—as evidence, consider the state of operations in Darfur and Afghanistan today—and will surely tie up forces that will not be available for use elsewhere, they may be the best that can be expected. With this perspective, one is left with the ironic hope that more military powers and hegemony will arise whose interests coincide with a larger global or regional interest to quell destabilizing conflicts.

Notes

1. The full results and analyses can be found in Donald C. F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta, eds., *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), <http://press.georgetown.edu/detail.html?id=9781589012097>.

An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our Web site (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine these issues.

- *Beyond the National Interest: The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Multilateralism in an Era of U.S. Primacy* by Jean-Marc Coicaud (2007)
- *Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict* by Teresa Whitfield (2007)
- *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* edited by William J. Durch (2006)

Recent Releases

- *Iran's Long Reach: Iran as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World* by Suzanne Maloney (2008)
- *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East* by Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky (2008)

To order any of these titles, go to: <http://bookstore.usip.org>



**United States
Institute of Peace**

1200 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org