



*Report of the*  
**DEFENSE  
SCIENCE  
BOARD**

• • **TASK FORCE ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION** • • • •



• • **JANUARY 2008** • • • •







This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

The DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication in the 21st Century completed its information gathering in August 2007.

This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.

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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

4 Jan 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic  
Communication

I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, which was conducted within the context of the DSB 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests. This report offers important recommendations for transforming the nation's strategic communication capability.

The DSB first examined the matter of strategic communication in 2001, finding it an important instrument of national power. The Board's commitment to that finding remains strong, particularly in light of the conflicts in which the nation has been embroiled since the tragedies of September 11. In that context, this report examines a series of questions designed to better position the government and the nation in today's security environment. What can the nation learn from successful strategic communication experiences? How can government best understand cultures, values, and changing technologies—and act effectively on this knowledge? How should we enhance government-civil society collaboration to support strategic communication? Can a sustained commitment to strategic communication be achieved?

Answers to these questions motivated the recommendations put forth in this report—recommendations that extend government wide and focus on the importance of proper leadership and resource commitment. I endorse all of the study's recommendations and encourage you to forward this report to the Secretary of Defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "William Schneider, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

Dr. William Schneider, Jr.  
DSB Chairman





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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

December 17, 2007

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication

Strategic communication, coordinated and executed in association with all aspects of national power, can help prevent and limit conflicts as well as enhance responses to global challenges that threaten America's interests and values. This view of the Defense Science Board remains unchanged in this, its third study on the topic of strategic communication. But as the world has changed, the board has refined its views on matters of implementation and relationship building, which are reflected in this report.

Strategic communication is a dynamic process with responsibility held by those at the highest levels of government—the President and senior government leaders. It must be executed with shared knowledge and strong, adaptive networks within government and between government and civil society. But to do so requires a commitment not yet seen, though some steps have been taken to improve the nation's capability. What is needed is a transformation supported by resources and strength of purpose that matches the nation's commitment to defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security.


The task force has identified a number of actions that would enable such a transformation:

- Create an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan Center for Global Engagement as a focal point for strategic communication activities, bringing together government and non-government leaders and expertise.
- Create a permanent strategic communication structure within the White House, one element of which would be a Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication.
- Make greater use in the Department of Defense of existing tools and technologies to support strategic communication—tools such as

network analysis, machine translation, and innovative evaluation and measurement technologies.

- Enhance the policy, budget and personnel authorities for the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
- Conduct a review of the mission, structure, funding, and performance of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, as an integral element of the overall U.S. strategic communication capability.
- Create, within the Department of Defense, a permanent Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Communication, reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Each of these recommendations, and others that support them, are discussed in detail in this report. Important to understand, and highlighted throughout this report, is that a transformation in strategic communication can begin immediately, as many of these recommendations can be acted on today. Taking such action can improve the nation's capability to use this increasingly powerful, multi-dimensional instrument that is critical to America's interests and to achieving the nation's strategic goals.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Vincent Vitto", written over a horizontal line.

Vincent Vitto  
Chairman



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## Executive Summary

The 2007 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication has written this report within the context of a larger study, the *DSB 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests*. The summer study recognized that effective strategic communication, coordinated and executed in association with all aspects of national capacity, can help to prevent and limit conflicts and greatly enhance responses to global challenges that threaten America's interests and values.

In this context, the objectives of the 2007 DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication were to:

- Review and assess the recommendations made in the 2004 DSB report on *Strategic Communication* and the 2001 DSB report on *Managed Information Dissemination*.
- Review and assess strategic communication activities since 2004.
- Establish actionable recommendations for strategic communication in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### Strategic Communication at a Critical Time

The dynamic process of strategic communication begins with choices among strategic priorities and deep comprehension of attitudes and cultures. It integrates the development, implementation, assessment, and evolution of public actions and messages in support of America's interests at home and abroad. Strategic communication is a central responsibility of the President and senior government leaders, and is conducted by a wide variety of civilian and military practitioners. Its successful use depends on shared knowledge and strong, adaptive networks both within government and between government and civil society.

This study is born of a conviction that the instrument of strategic communication is vital to America's future, and must be transformed at strategic and operational levels. The United States and its partners face

an array of trans-national and state-based threats, as well as an abundance of opportunities. These threats and opportunities vary greatly in their nature and potential effect, but they present a common challenge. That is, they require a strategic communication instrument with sustained impact and far greater capacity to understand, engage, and influence global populations on issues of consequence.

Why undertake another study now when many excellent reports have addressed problems in America's strategic communication and public diplomacy? The attacks of 9/11, widespread anti-Americanism, and ongoing threats from terrorist and insurgent networks prompted many of these reports. We are mindful of these issues, but the questions that led to this report are different. What can the nation learn from historic strategic communication successes? How can governments best understand cultures, values, and changing technologies—and act effectively on this knowledge? How should the nation enhance collaboration between government and civil society in support of strategic communication? Is it possible to break the pattern of America's episodic commitment to strategic communication and over-reliance on coercive instruments of power?

This is the Defense Science Board's third report in a decade on strategic communication. The world has changed and so have our views. We remain steadfast in our belief that strategic communication is critically important to the success of every strategy and the wise use of all elements of national power. We have not wavered in our judgment that strategic communication must be transformed with resources and a strength of purpose that match our commitment to defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. But we have changed our thinking in important ways. This report reflects our heightened appreciation that success in strategic communication depends on:

- deep comprehension of the identities, attitudes, cultures, interests, and motives of others
- awareness by leaders and practitioners that *what we do* matters more than *what we say*

- institutionalized connections between a wide variety of government and civil society partners in the United States and abroad
- a durable model of strategic direction that adapts quickly, transforms stovepipes, integrates knowledge and functions, and builds next generation skills and technologies

## **Despite Progress, Much Remains to be Done**

In 2004, this task force found “tactical achievements” in strategic communication, notably in public affairs coordination, U.S. broadcasting to the Middle East, and the embedded media policy of the Department of Defense (DOD). We concluded, however, that despite the promise of statements calling for significant change in the President’s National Security Strategy (2002), “the U.S. had made little progress in building and transforming its strategic communication assets.”

Nearly four years later our view is more positive at the departmental level. The State Department has had strong, consistent leadership for more than two years in the office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. There is new leadership in the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review included a Strategic Communication Working Group, which led to approval of a Strategic Communication Roadmap and creation of a Strategic Communication Integration Group by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In May 2007, the interagency Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee issued a “U.S. National Strategy for Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy.” These developments and a number of positive changes at the operational level are discussed in this report.

Nevertheless, the task force finds reasons for continued concern. Positive changes within organizations are real, but they depend to a considerable extent on the skills and imagination of current leaders. These changes must be evaluated, and those that work should be institutionalized. Resistance from traditional organizational cultures continues. Resources for strategic communication have increased, but they fall substantially short of national needs.

This task force's primary concern is that fundamental transformation in strategic communication has not occurred at the strategic and interagency level. Reforms within organizations are important, but they are not a substitute for strong White House leadership and enduring, flexible networks that connect strategies and capabilities, departments and agencies, government and civil society.

## **Collaboration with Civil Society at a New Level**

The United States will fail in meeting 21<sup>st</sup> century national security challenges if it does not take existing government collaboration with civil society to a new level. Challenges of the kind and magnitude the world now faces cannot be met by states alone. This will mean strengthening traditional partnerships with non-profit organizations in exchanges, broadcasting, and other government functions. Much more needs to be done. The nation must harness the knowledge, skills, creativity, and commitment of academic, non-profit, and business communities in more imaginative ways.

In its 2004 report, the task force recommended institutionalizing relationships between government and civil society through an independent, non-profit entity that would support the government's strategic communication activities. We imagined an entity shaped by the need to provide government agencies with information, analysis, products, and services. In this report, we have broadened our thinking in the context of a global environment that is more complex and information technologies that are changing rapidly.

Government departments alone cannot develop the deep understanding of cultures, influence networks, or information technologies that can be achieved through close collaboration with civil society. Their efforts will benefit from the expertise, methods, core data, and best practices available outside government. In recommending the creation of an independent Center for Global Engagement, the task force does not seek to duplicate or draw funding from effective government strategic communication activities. We do seek an entity that is accountable, that operates in the public interest, that is outside but closely connected with government, and that will greatly enhance an instrument that can only succeed with

shared knowledge and adaptive networks between government and civil society.

## **Sustained White House Leadership**

Strategic communication requires sustained senior leadership at the White House level that focuses exclusively on global communication and directs all relevant aspects of national capacity. These leaders must have authority as well as responsibility—authorities to establish priorities, assign operational responsibilities, transfer funds, and concur in senior personnel appointments. Importantly, these senior leaders must have direct access to the President on critical communication issues when policies are formulated and implemented.

The task force has looked closely at this issue for nearly a decade, and we have reached the following conclusions. Presidents shape the nation's strategic communication in powerful ways, and they require permanent structures within the White House that will strengthen their ability to understand and communicate with global audiences. Coordination committees may occasionally work well, but they are not a substitute for strategic direction that is durable and empowered. Leaders in departments have full-time management responsibilities that limit their ability to direct and coordinate at the interagency level. Departments and agencies have constraints that make it difficult for them to think and act in interagency terms. Ad hoc "czars" and incremental changes to national security structures designed generations ago are not the answer. There is no such thing as a "perfect" strategic direction model. Talented, competent leadership will determine success, but good leaders function best in good structures.

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped and limited strategic communication for decades. Today, America needs a new vision, new structures, and new legislated authorities. These can only be achieved with Presidential direction and the focused actions of leaders in Congress.

## Recommendations

### *Recommendation 1.*

#### *The Center for Global Engagement* \_\_\_\_\_

**The President, Congressional leaders, and interested organizations outside government collaborate to create an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan Center for Global Engagement (CGE).** Three principles should guide the establishment and work of the center. First, that the direction, planning, and execution of the government's strategic communication instrument are government responsibilities. Second, that government cannot succeed in carrying out its responsibilities without sustained, innovative, and high-quality support from civil society. Third, that the academic, research, business, and non-profit communities offer deep reservoirs of untapped knowledge, skills, credibility, and agility needed to strengthen strategic communication.

The Center for Global Engagement should be a:

- 501(c)(3) corporation with an independent director and board of directors
- means to motivate and attract civil society's best and brightest
- hub for innovation in cultural understanding, technology, and media
- repository of expertise
- magnet for innovative ideas
- means to institutionalize continuity and long-term memory
- focus for experimentation and project development

**The task force recommends that Congress provide the Department of State with \$500,000 to develop a charter that will define the mission, structure, and operations of the CGE.** The Department should award these funds through a competitive grant to an organization or group of organizations that will prepare and execute a business plan leading to the creation of the CGE as an independent corporate entity (one option could be to extend the mission of an



existing federally funded research and development center or 501(c)3 corporation).

**Thereafter, Congress should provide sustained funding for the CGE through a line item in the Department of State's budget.**

This should be new money appropriated to the Department. Congress should provide the CGE with an initial appropriation of \$50 million in fiscal year 2009. The objective should be steady funding growth, consistent with performance and use by multiple government agencies, to \$250 million during the first five years.

The CGE should:

- respond to multi-agency government taskings, coordinated through a National Security Council Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication
- provide deep understanding of cultures and cultural dynamics, core values of other societies, and media and technology trends
- provide core data, best practices, and an opinion research clearing house in support of government-sponsored strategic communication programs
- assess the effectiveness of national strategic communication activities and programs
- collaborate with independent organizations that promote universal values, cultural understanding, and global engagement
- maintain a repository of strategic communication talent, skills, and capabilities
- attract fellows from the academic, non-profit, and business communities, and from government

***Recommendation 2.***

***Leadership*** \_\_\_\_\_

**Create a permanent strategic communication structure within the White House.** This structure should have the following elements:

- a Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication
- a Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication
- a Strategic Communication Policy Committee, chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication, to include all departments and agencies with substantial strategic communication responsibilities
- an Associate Director for Strategic Communication in the Office of Management and Budget
- legal and regulatory authorities as necessary for the Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication to:
  - (1) assign operational responsibilities, transfer funds, and concur in personnel appointments
  - (2) provide guidance on strategic communication to an independent Center for Global Engagement

### ***Recommendation 3.***

#### ***Critical Science and Technology Opportunities*** \_\_\_\_\_

**The Department of Defense should make greater use of existing tools and technologies to support strategic communication.** For example, existing science and technology capacity can be used to:

- identify nodes of influence through network analysis
- support communication and media analysis with machine translation
- understand viral information flows and influences
- utilize innovative evaluation and measurement methodologies (e.g., sentiment detection/analysis).

**The task force recommends that \$50 million a year be invested to advance knowledge in these areas** and that this research budget be managed by the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency, the National Science Foundation, and the intelligence community. The task force recognizes the current but disparate efforts in these areas and recommends vigorous engagement across the strategic communication community to share the existing knowledge base.

***Recommendation 4.***

***Department of State*** \_\_\_\_\_

**The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should be given enhanced policy, budget, and personnel authorities.** The task force recommends a significant increase in the budget for the State Department's public diplomacy programs, including exchanges over a five-year period. The budget should be tripled and additional funds used in the following areas:

- exchanges (e.g. Fulbright, International Visitor Leadership Program, International Military Education and Training)
- Americans studying/conducting research abroad
- recruitment, training, and deployment of additional public diplomacy positions
- support for strategic communication and public diplomacy activities of the U.S. military's combatant commands
- Internet, websites, blogging, Rapid Response Units, and Digital Outreach Teams
- opinion, attitude, and behavioral research and evaluation of/for public diplomacy programs
- book translation programs
- utilization of sports and entertainment figures as cultural diplomats
- training and partnerships with key civil society activists (journalists, local media, civic organizations)

- online English language (English as a second language) programs focused on marginalized young Muslim populations
- public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job creation in key strategic nations (Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq)

The task force recommends that a senior State Department public diplomacy representative be assigned to each combatant command.

***Recommendation 5.***

***Broadcasting Board of Governors*** \_\_\_\_\_

**Conduct a review of the mission, structure, funding, and performance of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, as an integral element of the overall U.S. strategic communication capability.** The task force recommends that the following be part of the review:

- current media mix
- relationship among the U.S. international broadcasting services (such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia)
- utilization of new communication media
- new models for utilization and funding of news and program services
- language priorities (currently 60 languages)
- audience research (e.g., market research, media usage, impact)
- management structures and relationships with the Executive Branch

The task force is pleased with the passage of Section 316 of the 9/11 bill that provides the President new authority to support requirements for surge broadcasting. The task force urges the administration and the Congress to implement procedures and funding measures to utilize this much-needed authority when a surge requirement is identified.

***Recommendation 6.******Department of Defense***

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**Create a permanent Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic Communication, reporting to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.** This new office would include senior representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Joint Staff, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. This new office would review and coordinate all information activities aimed at foreign governments across public affairs and information operation domains.

**Significantly increase the strategic communication budgets of each combatant commander.** The task force suggests that funding be tripled and identified within a separate budget for each geographic combatant command, and that additional funds be used in the following activities:

- task federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Institute for Defense Analyses and RAND, to conduct cultural analysis and program development in each combatant commander's area of responsibility
- provide communications infrastructure in support of stability operations and disaster relief operations
- increase public affairs presence at each combatant commander to support security cooperation
- increase collaborative planning and experimentation with nongovernment organizations

**Increase engagement in support of strategic communication.**

For example:

- increase hospital ship and crew activation to support security cooperation programs
- utilize Corps of Engineers capabilities to support programs for disaster relief, flood control, and infrastructure development (security cooperation)

- release reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop management, weather forecasting, food and water supply management, deforestation, and other similar activities
- create opportunities for civil sector participation (e.g., media, nongovernment organizations, academics) at the National Defense University, the military service colleges, and Centers for Regional Security Studies

Finally, the task force recommends that psychological operations be relabeled according to whether they are in support of military operations or other activities, such as security cooperation and DOD support to public diplomacy.

### ***Recommendation 7.***

#### ***Actions for Today***

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Many of the specific actions identified in Recommendations 4 and 6 can be implemented immediately. We have organized these actions in Recommendation 7 and encourage addressing them immediately.

#### **The task force recommends that the Department of Defense and Department of State implement immediate actions as follows:**

- Establish and enhance combatant commander's budgets for strategic communication to:
  - fund FFRDCs (such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, RAND) to conduct cultural analysis and program developments in the area of responsibility
  - provide communications infrastructure in support of stability operations and disaster relief operations
- Increase Defense Department support for strategic communication by, for example:
  - increasing hospital ship and crew activation to support security cooperation programs

- releasing reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop management, weather forecasting, food and water supply management, deforestation
- creating opportunities for civil sector participation (e.g., media, nongovernment organizations, academics) at the National Defense University, the military service colleges, and Centers for Regional Security Studies
- Expand the Department of State's strategic communication funding and for such activities as:
  - online English language programs focused on marginalized young Muslim populations
  - Internet, websites, blogging, Rapid Response Units, and Digital Outreach Teams
  - public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job creation in key strategic regions (e.g. Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq)





# Chapter 1. Introduction

The 2007 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication has written this report within the context of a larger study, the *DSB 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests*. The summer study recognized that effective strategic communication, coordinated and executed in association with all aspects of national capacity, can help prevent and limit conflicts, and greatly enhance responses to global challenges that threaten America's interests and values.

In this context, the objectives of the 2007 DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication were to:

- review and assess the recommendations made in the 2004 DSB report on *Strategic Communication* and the 2001 DSB report on *Managed Information Dissemination*<sup>1</sup>
- review and assess strategic communication activities since 2004
- establish actionable recommendations for strategic communication in the 21<sup>st</sup> century

Strategic communication is an integrated process that includes the development, implementation, assessment, and evolution of public actions and messages in support of policies, interests, and long-term goals. This challenging, senior-level management responsibility spans complex organizational capabilities, broad geographies, diverse audiences, collaborative partnerships, and timeframes. In successful strategic communication, "actions" are often the most authentic "messages."

Strategic communication differs from public relations and public affairs. It includes but goes beyond media affairs and short-term news streams to focus on mid-range and long-term objectives that require

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1. See [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic\\_Communication.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf) and <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf>. The executive summary and recommendations of the 2004 report and the recommendations of the 2001 report are included in Appendices C and D, respectively, of this report.

multi-disciplinary capabilities, engagement in a dialogue of ideas, and durable partnerships with civil society organizations. As such, strategic communication is more “long-term strategic.” Public affairs is more “short-term tactical.” Coordination between them is vital and facilitated in the Department of Defense (DOD) through development of an Integrated Strategic Communication Plan.

In recent years, private sector and civil sector organizations around the globe have embraced the capabilities associated with integrated strategic communication. Many have reorganized and resourced their organizations to enhance the capacity of strategic communication to support mission accomplishment, as well as to mitigate potential competitive threats.

The release of the first *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (see next page) has recently elevated the role of strategic communication in achieving long-term U.S. national security goals. However, the U.S. government has yet to identify the comprehensive leadership structure, interagency coordination process, and resource levels through which sustained long-range planning and implementation of “whole of government” integrated strategic communication can be achieved. The 2007 DSB Strategic Communication Task Force sought to assess U.S. government capability gaps in strategic communication in the face of innovative technologies, systems, operational concepts, and management processes that have developed since the 2004 DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication. This report summarizes key findings and recommends opportunities to strengthen the strategic communication management process to enhance its ability to serve U.S. national interests in an increasingly complex and multi-dimensional policy environment.

## Effective Strategic Communication is Vital to Achieve U.S. Strategic Objectives

The *U.S. National Security Strategy*<sup>2</sup> and the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*<sup>3</sup> list the following strategic objectives:

- champion aspirations for human dignity
- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends
- work with others to defuse regional conflicts
- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
- develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power
- transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century
- engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization

“Effective communication must build and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds.”

*2005 Quadrennial Defense Review*

Strategic communication is critical to achieving all U.S. strategic objectives. It is an increasingly powerful instrument, essential to the success of persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments of national

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2. See [www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2006/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2006/).

3. See U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf>

power. It involves significant and sustained investments across all departments and agencies; and it requires coordinated policies, programs, messages, and actions.

## **Positive Changes Implemented: Department of State**

Since the publication of the 2004 Defense Science Board report on *Strategic Communication*, progress has been made in improving the nation's strategic communication capability.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the most important advance has been in establishing strategic communication as a priority at the highest levels of the U.S. government. In April 2006 a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) chaired by Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen P. Hughes, was established.<sup>5</sup> In June 2007, the PCC released a *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*.<sup>6</sup> This document presents a clear and well-articulated strategy intended to serve as a framework for strategic communication implementation plans across the interagency. Agencies are in the process of preparing and submitting to the PCC their specific strategic communications plans.

In order to achieve greater agility in communicating U.S. policy, the Department of State has established three public diplomacy "hubs" in Dubai, London, and Brussels.<sup>7</sup> These operations are in response to the increasingly regional nature of today's media, which transcend national borders and require that U.S. government spokespersons get into regional news cycles, not those in Washington D.C. In Dubai, for example, more than one thousand media operations are represented.<sup>8</sup> The public diplomacy hubs have increased the U.S. presence in pan-Arab media by more than thirty percent since they were established in

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4. See [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic\\_Communication.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf).

5. A discussion of roles and responsibilities of the PCC is included in *U.S. National Strategy on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, June 2007.

6. See <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf>.

7. See <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84970.pdf>.

8. See <http://www.state.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm>.

2006.<sup>9</sup> In addition, Under Secretary Hughes has issued a set of “rules” to empower the nation’s diplomats to seize media opportunities in making the case for U.S. policies without the slow headquarters clearance process that previously characterized media operations in the Department of State.<sup>10</sup>

When the 2004 DSB report was written, the U.S. government had no effective, agile way to respond to what international media were communicating to mass audiences (in Arabic, Farsi, or other regional languages) about America, its policies, and its military operations. The State Department’s new Rapid Response Unit—consisting of a state-of-the-art broadcast center—now constantly monitors international media, with the help of the intelligence community’s Open Source Center, and produces a daily report that informs policy makers of what is driving world news from Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. The Rapid Response Unit provides the U.S. position on many of those issues in an email to several thousand senior officials, from cabinet secretaries to combatant commanders. Some combatant commands have similar rapid response units.

With significant assistance from the DOD and the Open Source Center, the Department of State has set up an interagency Counter Terrorism Communication Center to develop culturally sensitive messages to undermine ideological support for terror.

The Department of State also has begun a Digital Outreach initiative, in which American Arabic language bloggers counteract the misinformation and disinformation rampant in the Arab blogosphere about the United States, its policies, and actions.<sup>11</sup> These individuals, who clearly identify themselves as employees of the Department of State, face off daily against an army of anonymous bloggers unbound by any standard of “truth,” providing verifiable, factual information to anyone reading Arab language blogs.

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9. See <http://www.state.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm>.

10. See <http://www.state.gov/r/us/64106.htm>.

11. “At State Department Blog Team Joins Muslim Debate,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/22/Washington/22bloggers.html>.

The national strategy recognizes that perhaps the most effective tool of strategic communication over the last fifty years has been educational exchange programs in critical areas. Since the 2004 DSB report, there has been a substantial increase in the number of exchange participants, from approximately 27,000 to almost 39,000 in 2006. Following a decline in the number of student visas issued in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, which reached a low of 473,719 in 2003, the downward trend has been reversed. More than 591,000 student visas were issued in 2006 and the Department of State has partnered with America's higher education community to send a clear message that the United States wants the future leaders of the world to come to the United States to study and get to know its culture, social values, and political system.



Similar gains have been made in other programs. The flagship Fulbright Exchange program has seen substantial increases both in the number of American students and researchers studying abroad and in the numbers of foreign scholars and researchers coming to the United States to teach and conduct research.

English as a second language (ESL) instruction programs and infrastructure are expanding, and currently the State Department is funding ESL programs reaching more than 10,000 young people—often from marginalized populations—in more than 40 Muslim-majority countries. ESL instruction provides young people with an employable skill and opens the door to dialogue with America and its values.

Promising steps have been taken to institute a culture of measurement in the field of public diplomacy. Early in her tenure, Under Secretary Hughes established a unified Public Diplomacy Evaluation Office to undertake a range of evaluation and performance-measurement initiatives. This office has developed an evaluation strategy encompassing the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, and overseas missions; a core set of public diplomacy performance indicators; a global public diplomacy tracking system; and the first pilot study to attempt to quantify the aggregate impact of public diplomacy programs and products.

## **Positive Changes Implemented: Department of Defense**

The task force reviewed the DOD activities involving strategic communication since the DSB 2004 report and is encouraged that several recommendations from that report are being pursued. Significant capability shortfalls in several combatant commands remain, however, and should be resourced without further delay.

Notably, the *2005 Quadrennial Defense Review* process included for the first time a Strategic Communication Working Group. That group produced a Strategic Communication Roadmap signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on September 25, 2006.

As members of the Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG), the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Director of the Joint Staff, and representatives from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs formed an executive committee that meets on a weekly basis, with bi-weekly meetings with the deputy secretary.

A high-level mechanism for re-allocating resources within DOD, the deputy secretary's Advisory Working Group now includes SCIG-recommended resource requirements in its issues for decision.

A new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Joint Communications was established in the public affairs office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to support SCIG activities, oversee initial compliance with the Strategic Communication Roadmap tasks, and better define the role of public affairs personnel in supporting combatant commanders and joint task force commanders overseas.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy established a separate office, Support to Public Diplomacy, in January 2007, with a deputy assistant secretary reporting directly to the principal deputy—paralleling a specific recommendation by the DSB in 2004. That office is now coordinating across functional and regional offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to institutionalize the

development of strategic communication plans to counter ideological support to terrorism.

At the combatant commands, U.S. Central Command plans and operates in the information environment through a Strategic Effects cell in Baghdad and an analogous function with NATO forces in Kabul. An Arab media engagement cell was established in Dubai in 2005<sup>12</sup>, and Central Command representatives are working with Open Source Center and Defense Intelligence Agency representatives to fashion a regionally focused media analysis and response center in Qatar.



DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies, and the war colleges, provide counter ideological support for terrorism strategies to future foreign civilian and military leaders involved in security functions in their countries.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in cooperation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Open Source Center, provides unclassified daily reports on Arab media and terrorist use of the Internet relevant to the geographic combatant commanders, as well as situational awareness briefings concerning terrorist propaganda, to US forces deploying to Iraq.

U.S. European Command has re-organized its information activities around a concept called Operation Assured Voice, which has a combined information operation and public affairs cell reporting to the Chief of Staff. Websites aimed at the Balkans and North Africa carry content in the appropriate languages to support the commander's mission to shape the environment in his area of responsibility. The European Command approach is a model for other combatant commands to consider.

U.S. Southern Command has established a separate office for strategic communication for "launching ideas, not Tomahawks."

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12. This cell was disestablished in the wake of the new State Department hub in Dubai.



U.S. Strategic Command, designated to support the geographic combatant commands with respect to information operations, currently provides a daily report and weekly summaries to regional commanders highlighting foreign print media in their regions. Strategic Command's Joint Information Operations Warfare Command is partnering with U.S. Special Operations Command to examine better ways to use psychological operations messaging and products to influence key target audiences in the war on terror.

Special Operations Command, as both a supported and supporting command, has developed a trans-regional website initiative and has expanded its trans-regional psychological operations (PSYOP) program under the auspices of its Joint PSYOP Support Element. More than a dozen Special Operation Command Military Information Support Teams are deployed worldwide in support of Embassy Country Teams.



Open Source Center

As a government legacy support, the Open Source Center (formally the Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has expanded monitoring and reporting of foreign broadcasting and the Internet, and carries foreign media products generated by DOD components on its global website. The Open Source Center has recently created a new Emerging Media Center designed to draw outside experts to support its work in this area.

While many positive steps have been taken within the Departments of State and Defense, many of these actions have been organizational and tactically reactive. The task force believes that fundamental transformation in the goals, methods, and structures of strategic communication is vital to the national interest. Collaboration between government and civil society on an unprecedented scale is imperative. Significant reforms are essential in the way strategic communication is directed and funded. Strategic communication can no longer be hostage to three-year cycles of short-term commitment followed by short-term inattention. Changes must be substantial and durable. These kinds of changes can only occur when led by a President with bipartisan Congressional support.

## Chapter 2. What is Strategic Communication and Why Does it Matter?

Strategic communication is vital to U.S. national security. It is an increasingly powerful, multi-dimensional instrument that is critical to America's interests and to achieving the nation's strategic goals.

Although attention to strategic communication is widespread, its power and potential are generally misunderstood. Too often it is an afterthought in determining strategic priorities. For many it is simply a matter of crafting and disseminating messages. Today's threats and opportunities call for a radically different approach. Asymmetric threats abroad and vulnerabilities at home are decreasing the effectiveness of military force and increasing the need to invest in other instruments of power.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, significant new opportunities exist to leverage national capacity within government and to mobilize talent, expertise, and creativity outside government. The nation needs to build capacity in both with much greater emphasis on institutions that connect government and civil society.<sup>14</sup>

The United States can no longer depend on an instrument that is low priority, reactive, and episodic—something “discovered” after an attack and addressed only in occasional bursts of national commitment. National needs require a proactive and durable means to engage and influence the attitudes and behavior of global publics on a broad range of consequential issues.

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13. For an expanded analysis of this point, see the forthcoming report of the *DSB 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests*. See also John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization*, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007).

14. By “civil society” we mean the totality of voluntary civic, social, and commercial organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the structures of a state.

Strategic communication is essential to the successful use of all persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments of national power. It can amplify or diminish their effects. It is necessary long before, during, and after armed conflict. It can help prevent or limit conflict. It is central to the formulation and implementation of strategies, and it must be treated accordingly.

## **Strategic Communication is an Interactive Process**

Strategic communication is a sustained and coherent set of activities that include:<sup>15</sup>


- *understanding* identities, attitudes, behaviors, and cultures; media trends and information flows; social and influence networks; political, social, economic, and religious motivations
- *advising* policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders on the public opinion and communication implications of their strategic and policy choices—and on the best ways to communicate their strategies and policies
- *engaging* in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions that support national interests and, wherever possible, common interests and shared values
- *influencing* attitudes and behavior through communication strategies supported by a broad range of government and civil society activities
- *measuring* the impact of activities comprehensively and over time

These activities are elements in a continuous, dynamic, and iterative process that begins with choices among strategic priorities and deep comprehension of attitudes and cultures. This means more than just an appreciation of the opinions and motivations of others. It means seeing

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15. See also Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, *Strategic Communication*, September 2004, pp. 11-13. [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic\\_Communication.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf).

ourselves as others see us, rather than through the “looking glass” of our own perceptions. It means full use of the rich variety of interpretive tools available for penetrating analysis of cultures and influence networks. Planning, advising leaders, building relationships, advocacy campaigns, assessment of impact, and adaptation to changing circumstances follow, as illustrated in Figure 1.



**Figure 1.** Strategic Communication Process

Strategic communication takes place in three timeframes:

1. short-term news streams
2. medium-range campaigns on high-value policies
3. long-term engagement

Strategic communication is conducted not just by the Departments of State and Defense, but by at least 64 U.S. government agencies, 50 states, many U.S. cities, coalition partners, and a wide variety of civil society organizations. Public diplomacy, military civil affairs, military

international education and training programs, cultural diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and support for democracy are among the means by which it is carried out.

Strategic communication differs from education, journalism, advertising, branding, and public relations. To succeed, however, it depends on strong relationships with civil society and uses many of civil society's methods, skills, and norms.<sup>16</sup> Strategic communication is an instrument of statecraft that depends on shared knowledge and adaptive networks—both within government and between government and society. It must be understood, directed, coordinated, funded, and conducted in ways that leverage relationships with civil society in support of the nation's interests at home and abroad.

## **Strategic Communication Depends on Cultural Context**

While “all politics is local,” all communication is now global. Gaps between what the nation says and does—and gaps between what it says and what others hear—have strategic consequences. These “say-do” and “say-hear” gaps affect U.S. interests in ways that can be measured in lives, dollars, and lost opportunities. We, as a nation, continue to underestimate them to our disadvantage.

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16. On differences between strategic communication by governments and civil society, and the value of importing civil society's methods, see Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, *Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation* (Washington, DC: 2007), [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\\_MG607.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG607.pdf); U.S. General Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research*, GAO-07-904, Washington, DC, July 2007, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07904.pdf>; and Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy as Strategic Communication,” Chapter 17, pp. 336-357, in James J. F. Forest (editor), *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, volume 1, (Westport, CT: Praeger); earlier version in “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, Washington, DC, August 31, 2005, <http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf#search=%22gregory%20firewalls%22>.

Successful strategic communication requires an interactive relationship between senders and receivers.<sup>17</sup> People understand and relate to ideas and information when they can identify with what is conveyed. Successful communicators enlist interest and evoke common ground.<sup>18</sup> They enlist interest through credible symbols (actions, images, and words) that resonate with others. They evoke common ground by focusing on culturally independent concepts that are globally valued—human dignity, health, personal safety, education, the environment, and economic well-being—and do so in ways that build support and mobilize allies. The opinions of others should not determine U.S. strategies, but taking them into account is critically important to any successful strategy.

Deep appreciation that what the nation says often is not what others hear is also critical. Words such as “democracy,” “rule of law,” and “freedom” have different meanings in different cultures at different stages of their development. When the United States says democracy, our message may be self-rule; but others may hear chaos. To U.S. citizens, rule of law means order; for others it may mean oppression. To some, jihad means terrorism; to others it means holy war or purification. Understanding the “pictures in the heads” of others is a crucial first step in strategic communication.

Actions are more important than carefully crafted messages. Additionally, it is important to avoid message vulnerabilities. Messages intended to galvanize support at home often have negative impact internationally—such as “global war on terror,” and “fighting them there so we don’t have to fight them here.” Images, body language, and media context in real and virtual worlds are messages as well—messages that often conflict with actions and words.<sup>19</sup>

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17. Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and Bud Goodall, *A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Model for Communication in a Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity*, Report #0701, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, April 3, 2007.

18. See the section on “Historic Strategic Communication Successes” in Chapter 2 of this document.

19. Images of Saddam Hussein talking with visibly frightened children during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the “Mission Accomplished” sign behind President Bush on the USS Abraham Lincoln after major combat in Iraq in 2003 make the point.

Most people don't choose between true and false messages. In a complex globalizing world they choose between trustworthy and untrustworthy messengers. For presidents, policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders, credibility and "message authority" matter more than the message.

## **Strategic Communication Must Be Agile**

Strategic communication is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas. This is not a war between the West and Islam. It is not a war against terrorism, although it is about challenging ideas that give rise to terrorism. Strategic communication is an instrument that can be used to engage and influence global publics on a broad range of strategic issues (such as nuclear proliferation, trade, energy, global pandemics, climate change, and a variety of challenges from state and non-state actors).

To succeed, strategic communicators must be agile and adaptive. Events and actions provide opportunities for interpreting positive values in fresh and effective ways. Some events and actions—by the United States, its allies, and its adversaries—can be anticipated. Engagement and influence strategies can be planned in advance. Other events and actions are surprises. Skilled communicators need a basic understanding of issues and themes. But in a world of rapid change, they also need the support of rapid response capabilities that monitor the forces and media frames driving events. They need both the mindsets and the tools that will enable them to seize opportunities and adapt. Agility is critical.

Adversaries present opportunities to offer a contrasting positive vision based on shared values where they exist, as well as to delegitimize their actions and messages. This means emphasizing actions, relationships, images, and messages that build on shared values. It means empowering surrogates and credible third parties (exchange participants, religious leaders, foreign media, and academics) without undermining their legitimacy.

The United States also must identify its opponent's weaknesses and exploit them vigorously. The nation should emphasize actions and

statements that are inconsistent with prior statements or with the core values and cultures of the communities it seeks to influence. Attention to failures, inconsistencies, and falsehoods—time after time—can create a compelling story that isolates extremists, undermines their efforts, and possibly changes opinions and actions.



The identities and beliefs of the audience are key. For example, the image of a child suicide bomber shows a violation of sacred values. To many Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the image of a mosque destroyed by Muslims may be an unexplained inconsistency and a desecration. Sometimes a single statement or image persists in the mind of the listeners or viewers. For example, John Kennedy’s statement “Ich bin ein Berliner” had lasting impact. The single image of an Iraqi woman holding up her finger coated with purple ink to indicate that she had voted had immediate impact and staying power.

Rapid response is challenging because of the many media organizations that are operating 24/7 and responding to the same situations.<sup>20</sup> Citizen reporters who can transmit via a multiplicity of channels— websites, blogs, listserves, and virtual platforms such as YouTube—add to the challenge. All have access to rapid communication. Media frames of events travel across the world with light speed. They shape the perceptions of competing elites and global publics. Media frames reflect different cultural contexts




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20. See Chapter 4 for an expansion of this issue.



and the mindsets of reporters and editors. In breaking news environments, media frames are not likely to change what people think, but they are powerful agents in telling people what to think about.

Rapid responses and generational struggle are not inconsistent. Strategic communication requires sprinters and long-distance runners.

## Historic Strategic Communication Successes

Americans have had many strategic communication successes. In some cases it was a single document or speech (the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg address) or an image (the moon landing). In other cases, success was a product of actions, complemented by images and words, in the context of strategic objectives (the Marshall Plan, Dayton Accords, HIV/AIDS initiatives). In still other cases, long-term relationships between people and institutions led to success (the Fulbright program, large-scale educational and scientific exchanges).



What were the elements of success?

- Strategic objectives were defined at the nexus of national interests and shared values.
- Sustained Presidential leadership, bipartisan support, and generous funding were linked to comprehensive strategies.
- Civilian and military departments and agencies collaborated.
- Programs and activities were culturally, politically, and/or economically relevant.
- Activities were understood, timely, focused, credible, meaningful, and accessible to the intended populations.
- Significant government and non-government resources were involved.
- Successes were often scientifically and/or technologically enabled.

Not every element was relevant to every success, but lessons were taught and can be learned (Table 1). Effective communication strategies in the past were grounded in actions, relationships, images, and words. They were sustained, comprehensive, relevant, and adequately resourced. Presidential leadership and bipartisan support were critical.

**Table 1.** Lessons Taught from Successful Strategic Communication Activities

Actions trump words	Relationships are critical
Partners count	Coordination is critical
Messenger authority	Trusted voices
Language matters	Images matter
Speed counts	Endurance counts

## Strategic Communication Challenges

Effective strategic communication is inherently difficult. As the examples of historic communication successes illustrate, shared values and a genuine, positive correlation of interests are necessary. Ironically, the explosion of new communications media and the attendant social change it is spawning will make it more difficult to frame positive outcomes in the foreseeable future. As traditional barriers to information flow fall, the speed with which information circulates and its ubiquity will overwhelm the ability to distinguish important from trivial. More and more, image will overwhelm context.

The “say-do gap,” always a challenge for powerful nations that must balance competing and often conflicting interests, will be more obvious. The ability of the U.S. government to operate in secrecy or to control messages, perceptions, and attitudes will be greatly diminished.

The growing youth bulge adds to complexity. In many developing societies the percentage of youth in the population is rising rapidly, as that percentage decreases in most developed countries. Young people have access to new information sources that will often amplify distrust of traditional sources.

The viral nature of electronic media, coupled with the growing proliferation of electronic communication devices, means that almost every action or operation that can be witnessed can also be recorded, distributed, manipulated, and distorted. Individual actions will be amplified. In military situations, small, tactical actions will be viewed globally and take on strategic significance.

A thoughtful, sustained, and comprehensive response is essential. The United States will have to think and operate differently and must learn to think and communicate in ways that unite rather than divide. Polarizing rhetoric may have short-term benefits in motivating support at home, but abroad it can have adverse long-term consequences that reduce the willingness of potential allies to collaborate, and give unwarranted legitimacy and unity of effort to dispersed adversaries.

The more difficult interpersonal communication is, the more important it becomes. The more difficult it is to engage potential adversaries in a common search for solutions, the more important it is to try. The easier it is to employ military power to respond to challenges to national interests, the more important it becomes to consider alternative responses.

## **Transforming Strategic Communication**

The world is changing, with profound consequences for how the United States considers and uses strategic communication. During the hot and cold wars of the 20th century, states were dominant actors. Relatively few non-state actors occupied the world stage. Contests about ideas were secular struggles between authoritarian and democratic worldviews. Bright lines separated war and peace. Information systems used analog technologies. Governments organized on hierarchical principles. National armies fought on battlefields with industrial age weapons.

That world no longer exists. Globalism, networks, non-state actors, ideas, advanced technologies, and new forms of warfare are transforming strategic communication and all other instruments of 21st century statecraft. The United States will struggle to engage in effective strategic communication in a world where states are becoming more limited in their legitimacy and in their capacity to satisfy human needs.

Highly centralized, prescriptive, top-down communication strategies will matter far less. Resilient strategies grounded in deep comprehension of the attitudes, cultures, and goals of others will matter much more. Strong networks, rather than hierarchies, will be critical to these strategies—networks characterized by openness, trust, access, and collaborative effort by multiple public and private actors with diverse motives.

## Chapter 3. The World is Changing

The world has changed in fundamental ways that profoundly affect the significance and role of strategic communication. It has become increasingly interdependent (global economies, environment, and media), urbanized (over half the world's population live in cities<sup>21</sup>), and influenced by youth (44 percent of the world's population is under 25, and 27 percent is under 15<sup>22</sup>). Failed states have provided enabling conditions and safe havens for non-state actors to develop and engage in global terrorism. The spread of the Internet, information technology, and communications has accelerated globalization and further enabled terrorism.

According to independent polling, the United States faces continuing decay in support for U.S. policy and rising anti-Americanism, which challenges national interests.<sup>23</sup> Actions and words with global impact are increasingly important in this interdependent world, as evidenced by activities such as the Peace Corps and U.S. support to the Indonesian Tsunami relief. Unfortunately, the U.S. government has a poor understanding of foreign languages and cultures, which exacerbates the challenge. This chapter details global changes, identifies opportunities and threats, and articulates their implications for strategic communication.

### Multiple Dimensions of Change

#### *Accelerating Globalization*

Faster, deeper, cheaper interdependencies at transcontinental distances are transforming social consciousness and concrete

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21. UN General Assembly, GA/EF/3160, 26 October 2006. See <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gaef3160.doc.htm>.

22. U.S. Census Bureau, see <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg>.

23. Pew Global Attitudes Project.

connections between states, and between states and non-state actors.<sup>24</sup> While globalism is not new, the speed and density of globalism are new.

### ***Demographics, Migration, Urbanization***

More people, more people on the move, and more young people are creating formidable challenges. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 44 percent of the world's population is under the age of 25<sup>25</sup> and projects a population increase worldwide from 6 billion in 1999 to 9 billion in 2042<sup>26</sup>, with highest growth rates in an arc extending from Brazil, through Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus, to South and Southeast Asia. Academic and government studies show that a youth bulge in this arc increases the likelihood of instability, extremism, and outbreaks of civil conflict.<sup>27</sup> People on the move include highly skilled professionals, economic migrants with few skills, and large numbers of refugees and displaced persons.<sup>28</sup> For the first time in history, according to United Nation and World Bank reports, more than half of the world's people live in cities.<sup>29</sup>

### ***Layered Governance***

More governance occurs in global, regional, sub-national, and non-territorial public spheres. State actors still dominate on many global issues. Increasingly, however, rules governing behavior and means to satisfy human needs and wants exist in:

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24. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Governance in a Globalizing World," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalizing World*, (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 193-218.

25. U.S. Census Bureau, see <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg>.

26. U.S. Census Bureau, see <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html>.

27. See for example <http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf>.

28. Robert P. Cincotta, Robert Engleman, Daniele Anastasion, *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War*, Population Action International, Washington, DC, 2003, [http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The\\_Security\\_Demographic/The\\_Security\\_Demographic\\_Population\\_and\\_Civil\\_Conflict\\_After\\_the\\_Cold\\_War.pdf](http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Security_Demographic/The_Security_Demographic_Population_and_Civil_Conflict_After_the_Cold_War.pdf); UNHCR, *2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons*, June 2007, <http://www.rms.org.nz/document/UNHCR%20global%20trends%202006.pdf>

29. UN General Assembly, GA/EF/3160, 26 October 2006. See <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gaef3160.doc.htm>.

- global and regional associations of states (United Nations, World Trade Organization, and the European Union)
- sub-state connections between provinces, cities, “countries within countries” (Quebec and Kurdistan)
- networks of government professionals focused on single issues
- the activities of a multitude of civil society actors at all levels

### ***Many “Big Ideas”***

A contested mix of secular and religious ideas—globalization, fundamentalism, terrorism, multiculturalism, post-colonialism, and anti-Americanism—has replaced the secular ideological struggles of the last century.<sup>30</sup> Leaders, practitioners, scholars, and publics now debate “clashes of civilizations,” “plural identities,” “religious and secular authority in governance,” “terrorism,” “zones of democratic peace,” “support for democracy,” “climate change,” “the promise and perils of globalism,” and varieties of “anti-Americanism.” Within Islam, the contrasting views of Sunni and Shia, and adherents of violent and non-violent means in each, are shaping geopolitics and the future of one of the world’s great religions.

### ***Networks and Non-State Actors***

Driven by globalization and a digitized information environment, networks are becoming the dominant architecture of society and politics.<sup>31</sup> Rapid change and reversible processes flatten hierarchies. Vertically, command and control models matter less, but they still matter. Horizontally, “social capital” models matter more. Global problems outrun the capacities of stovepiped institutions. Small events have systemic effects. Extraordinary growth is occurring in networks of regional and global groups with activist, corporate, religious, ethnic, terrorist, criminal, and knowledge-based agendas.

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30. See, for example, Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).

31. Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Vol 1 of *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*, (Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishers, 2006).

### ***New Paradigm of War***

Armed conflict within civilian populations by state and non-state contestants in frequent long-term conflicts is now the norm. Wars between states are rare.<sup>32</sup> Today, adversaries with global reach and no fixed location successfully challenge sovereign states with fixed borders and known vulnerabilities. The media are a decisive theater of operations. Virtual conflict and “perceptual damage” are as important as real conflict and real damage.

### ***Digital Technologies***<sup>33</sup>

The Internet is transforming diplomacy, markets, media, civil society, and war. North America, Oceania/Australia, and Europe lead the world in Internet penetration as a percentage of population. Asia, Europe, and North America have the greatest numbers of users. The highest rates of usage growth, however, are in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Mobile devices, expanded bandwidth, software innovation, and an explosion in use by non-Westerners are generating new forms of horizontal collaboration and competition. The Internet is enabling discovery, innovation, and value creation on an unprecedented global scale. Likewise unprecedented is its use by terrorists and insurgents for planning, publicity, recruitment, fundraising, and training. Society’s dependence on the Internet increases vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. More than other form of media, the Internet detaches content from sender identity and social frames that give credibility and meaning. Source and context are not necessarily self-evident (Al Qaeda’s terrorists, Second Life’s avatars), and tactical events become instant strategic problems (Abu Ghraib, Danish cartoons).

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32. As Philip Bobbitt states: “National security will cease to be defined in terms of borders alone because both the links among societies as well as attacks on them exist in psychological and infrastructural dimensions, not on an invaded plain marked by the seizure and holding of territory.” *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), p. 813. Rupert Smith argues similarly, that “war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.” *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p. 3.

33. See Chapter 4 for an expansion on this topic.



### ***Climate Change, Scarce Water, and Energy***

A growing scientific consensus argues that global warming is accelerating, sea levels are rising, and weather severity is increasing. According to the *UN Human Development Report, 2007*, “Climate change is the greatest challenge facing humanity at the start of the 21st Century” raising the “specter of unprecedented reversals in human development.”<sup>34</sup> The same report finds that a “water crisis is deepening around the world,” that “more than one billion people lack clean water for drinking,” and that 2.6 billion “lack sanitation.” Dwindling supplies of cheap petroleum and other energy sources is coupled with increasing demand. Government-controlled national oil companies dominate oil supplies and prices. The search for more oil and alternative energy sources is creating an energy transition and changing geopolitics.

### ***Global Media***

Advanced technologies are transforming global media and creating new media forms—24/7 news streams, satellite and cable television, video for high broadband, video for cell phones, blogs, video games, and more. Western media no longer dominate. Challenges come not only from Al Jazeera (Arabic, English), pan-Arab media, and robust Asian and Latin American satellite networks, but also from rapid growth in low budget, good quality local media around the world. The United States and many other countries are experiencing a decline in appointment news and print media consumption, and a rise in multi-channel Internet, cable, and talk radio news. Pervasive many-to-many communication raises central investment and production issues for one-to-many broadcasting by government and commercial services. The viral spread of unmediated information creates formidable problems for all stakeholders, political leaders, media organizations, and news consumers.

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34. [http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr\\_20072008\\_en\\_complete.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf).

### ***State Challenges***

States are changing too. China, India, Russia, and Iran are projecting more regional and global influence with new hard and soft power assets. Petroleum-based autocracies (such as Venezuela) with surplus resources play on the world stage. Demographic pressures, group grievances, poverty, and a host of other drivers of instability are creating failed states, including prominently Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Afghanistan.

### **Positive Trends: Opportunities**

Not all change is bad. There are positive global trends and opportunities as well. These positive trends include the fact that freedom and democracy has had a 30-year gain—from 42 “free” countries in 1976 to 90 “free” countries in 2006, although it has been flat since its 1998 peak.<sup>35</sup> There has been an increase in international assistance by non-governmental organizations (Doctors without Borders, Gates Foundation, and Oxfam). Increased innovation and a rapid rise in the use of the Internet, mobile devices, bandwidth, and collaboration software are enabling communities of interest and new forms of value creation in a global community. The life expectancy gap is closing between developing and high-income countries. Survival rates of children are increasing with 2.1 million fewer deaths in 2004 than in 1990. Adult literacy has increased from 75 to 90 percent since 1990 and primary school enrollment is up. Since 1990, the percent of people around the globe living under \$1 per day is down from 28 to 21 percent. Taken together, these improvements in wealth, health, education, freedom, civil society engagement and technology provide hope and new opportunities.

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35. Arch Puddington, *Freedom in the World 2007: Freedom Stagnation Amid Pushback Against Democracy*. See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=130&year=2007>.

## Negative Trends: Threats

Unfortunately, these positive trends are countered by a number of negative trends. Between 1959 and 1999 the world population grew from 3 billion to 6 billion, and is projected to grow to 9 billion by 2042, with a notable youth bulge in vulnerable countries. In addition, the United Nations (UN) warns that climate change (e.g., rising sea levels) will be the “greatest challenge facing humanity.” The UN also notes the “water crisis is deepening” with more than 1 billion people lacking clean water and 2.6 billion lacking proper sanitation. While many search for alternative fuels, global fossil fuel demand is up and supply is down driving higher prices as government oil companies dominate (Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia). Based on an index of instability indicators, a number of states are considered “failed,” including Sudan, Congo, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, Haiti, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The Internet is used as an asymmetric weapon by terrorists (for secure communication, planning, publicity, recruitment) and represents a vulnerable critical infrastructure subject to cyber attack. Also, global communications can make instant strategic problems out of tactical events (such as Abu Ghraib). Illicit networks, such as AQ Kahn, have increased the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials, and knowledge to state and non-state actors.


According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of worldwide refugees has surged (driven by Iraq) to 9.9 million, including 4.3 million Palestinians. Worldwide there are 24.5 million displaced persons. By 2010, more than half the world’s population will live in cities. Infectious disease remains a threat, especially HIV/AIDs in Africa as well as global risks of tuberculosis, severe diarrhea, respiratory infections, and malaria.

According to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking System, in 2006 terrorist attacks increased over 25 percent (to 14,000) resulting in a 40 percent increase in deaths (20,000), the majority of which have occurred in Iraq.<sup>36</sup> As illustrated in

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36. See [www.nctc.gov](http://www.nctc.gov).

Figure 2, nearly all of the attacks with more than 10 deaths have occurred in the Near East and South Asia, while attacks elsewhere have declined. A worrisome trend is that sub-Saharan Africa incidents are up 64 percent from last year, from 256 to 422 incidents. Global changes that occur faster than people can accept them breed frustration and humiliation. In the words of author Thomas Friedman, terrorism is spawned by a poverty of dignity, not a poverty of money.<sup>37</sup> Finally, UN statistics show a rise in crime in all countries.



Source: Terrorism Knowledge Base, [www.tkb.org](http://www.tkb.org).

### Figure 2. Terrorism Intensity across the Middle East

In conclusion, leveraging opportunities is as important in strategic communication as defending against threats. Positive trends that provide new strategic communication opportunities include:

- an increase in the world's democracies (Freedom House finds 90 countries were "free" in 2006, compared with 42 in 1976.)

37. Thomas L. Friedman, "A Poverty of Dignity and a Wealth of Rage", *The New York Times*, July 15, 2005. See <http://thomasfriedman.blogspot.com/2005/07/poverty-of-dignity-and-wealth-of-rage.html>

- an explosion of humanitarian and nongovernment organizations (Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontieres, the Gates Foundation)
- newly empowered individuals at all levels of society collaborating and sharing knowledge with mobile and virtual technologies
- an increase in average life expectancy
- a decrease in child mortality
- a rise in adult literacy and primary school enrollment rates coupled with a shrinking gender gap
- an overall decline in income poverty generated by high economic growth rates in China and India

Negative trends with particular relevance to strategic communication include:

- social unrest driven by the size and location of youth populations
- economic migrants, refugees, and displaced persons
- the spread of infectious disease
- extremism and religious militancy born of frustration, humiliation, and change that is faster and deeper than people and cultures can accept

## **Anti-Americanism on the Rise**

One particularly negative trend worthy of highlighting is that America suffers an image problem around the globe. This problem includes attacks on America's policies as well as suspicions of America's intentions. For example, via a series of multinational surveys focusing on worldwide issues, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has found America's motives are questioned. The Pew Foundation (Kohut 2007) found widespread opposition to the war in Iraq with strong anti-American sentiments among Muslim publics. A 2005 Pew poll found that many in Muslim countries believed suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq were justifiable. Pew's 2006 poll showed that majorities in Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan believe the

war in Iraq has made the world more dangerous. More startling, their 2005 poll found about half of Moroccans (56%) and Jordanians (49%) and about one-in-four in Turkey believe suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Many foreign publics in the Mideast, Europe, and beyond, question America's motives. As shown in Figure 3, majorities in Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, and Jordan believe U.S. motives are to control Mideast oil, to dominate the world, to target unfriendly Muslim governments, and to protect Israel.<sup>38</sup>

As illustrated in Figure 4, all five majority Muslim countries now see the U.S. as a threat to their country.<sup>39</sup> Even the majority (nearly 70%) of the public polled in NATO member Turkey were "very" or "somewhat" worried that the United States could be a military threat against their country. Further, a BBC World Service poll of more than 18,000 adults in 18 different countries shows an increasingly negative view of the United States influence (Figure 5).<sup>40</sup> The Pew study found the United States was viewed around the world to be as dangerous as Iran and North Korea to world peace. Even 60 percent of Britons found the war in Iraq has made the world more dangerous.

Figure 6 shows a multiyear trend of Pew surveys, which, except in Pakistan, illustrates a downward trend in favorable opinion of the U.S. in many countries.<sup>41</sup> Not only is the U.S. viewed increasingly unfavorably, but also favorable views toward individual Americans (as distinct from the U.S. as a nation) have decreased, as shown in Figure 7.


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38. *Pew Report: A Year After Iraq War*. See <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=206>.

39. Pew 2006.

40. BBC January 2007. See [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international\\_security\\_bt/306.php?nid=&id=&pnt=306&lb=btis](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international_security_bt/306.php?nid=&id=&pnt=306&lb=btis).


41. Pew, 2006. Pew Global Attitudes Project. *Conflicting Views in a Divided World: How Global Publics View: Muslim-Western Relations, Global Issues, U.S. Role in the World, Asian Rivalries*. See <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/DividedWorld2006.pdf>.



Questions asked of those who believe the war on terrorism is not a sincere effort, or have mixed views. Percentages show the percent of the TOTAL POPULATION who believe each is an important reason the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism.


Source: Pew Report, *A Year After Iraq War*

**Figure 3.** Suspicions of American Power




Source: Pew Report, *A Year After Iraq War*

**Figure 4.** United States Seen as Threat to Muslim Countries



Source: BBC, January 2007


**Figure 5.** U.S. Influence Viewed Negatively



Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project

**Figure 6.** Downward Trend in Favorable Opinions of the United States






Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project

Note: Percent favorable indicates those responding with a very or somewhat favorable opinion of Americans.

### Figure 7. Downward Trend in Favorable Opinions of Americans

In spite of these negative perceptions abroad, however, there is some hope. For example, America's humanitarian response to the horrific December 2004 tsunami helped improve its image in the world's largest Muslim country, Indonesia. Following a significant drop of public support for American in response to the Iraq war, American aid resulted in more than doubling of support (from 15 to 38%) for Americans (see Figure 8).<sup>42</sup> Although less pronounced, Pew noted a similar pattern in Pakistan following U.S. aid for the October 2005 earthquake, from 23 percent in 2005 to 27 percent in 2006.

42. Kohut, Andrew. 2007. America's Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Testimony to Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, March 14, 2007.




Source: America's Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project

### Figure 8. Tsunami Relief Boosts U.S. Image

While it is difficult to ascribe favorable opinions of the U.S. as the result of particular incidents, favorability can be compared when polling similar populations on differing topics at the same time. With the caveat that correlation does not equate to causation, Figure 9 juxtaposes 2005 opinions of the United States in general and opinions of the U.S. Tsunami relief effort. In all but three countries surveyed (India, Britain, and Poland), the U.S. Tsunami relief efforts were viewed more positively than the United States in general.


The United States need not be perfect, but simply better than the alternative peer or non-peer competitors. There are some indicators of hope. For example, the majority of publics in Africa prefer democracy to any other kind of government (Figure 10).<sup>43</sup>

43. Afrobarometer, 2005. See <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brafricara/209.php?nid=&id=&pnt=209&lb=braf>.



Source: Data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

**Figure 9.** Opinions of the United States in 2005 and the Tsunami Relief Effort



Source: Afrobarometer, 2005

Note: Percent saying "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government."

**Figure 10.** Democracy Preferred in Africa

A 2005 sample of 2,089 Afghan adults found that 81 percent held a negative view of Al-Queda's influence on the world, 88 percent held a negative view of the Taliban, and 90 percent held an unfavorable (75% very unfavorable) view of Osama bin Laden.<sup>44</sup> That same poll found an 83 percent favorable (39% very favorable) rating of "the US military forces in our country." A 2007 poll found that 74 percent of Iranians have an unfavorable view of bin Laden.<sup>45</sup>

There is also some optimism suggested by other trends in Arab opinion polls. A worrisome 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project poll indicated that many in Muslim countries believed suicide attacks against Americans and other westerners in Iraq were justifiable. In that poll, just over half of Moroccans (56%) and nearly half of Jordanians (49%) thought such attacks justifiable. Even in Turkey, where bin Laden is unpopular and support for terrorism is generally low, about one-in-four said suicide bombings against Americans and Westerners in Iraq can be justified.

Fortunately, as Figure 11 illustrates, many Muslim publics have shown reductions in support for suicide bombings against civilians, in some cases as much as 40 percentage point change in attitudes in the past five years. Unfortunately, a persistent worry is that 70 percent of respondents from Palestinian territories (roughly equally proportional across gender, ages, and religiosity) believe suicide bombing against civilians can be often or sometimes justified. Also a concern, Muslim majorities in Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories believe that tensions between the Sunnis and Shia are a problem beyond Iraq, although these views are not shared in Asian countries with large Muslim populations.<sup>46</sup> Muslim populations both in the Middle East and Asian continue to see the U.S. as a military threat.<sup>47</sup>

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
44. Afghan, 2005. See <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/155.php?nid=&id=&pnt=155&lb=bras>.

45. See <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnaficara/313.php?nid=&id=&pnt=313&lb=btis>.

46. Pew Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: *A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World. Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries*. July 24, 2007.

<http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/257.pdf>, p. 58.

47. Ibid. p. 58.



Source: About the Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 2007

Note: Percent who believe suicide bombing justified

**Figure 11.** Suicide Bombing Never Justified (Muslim Respondents)

Except within the Palestinian territories where confidence remains high (57%), Muslims overall show very low confidence that bin Laden is a leader who will do the right thing in world affairs. For example, while four years ago 56 percent of Jordanians supported bin Laden, that support has dropped to only 20 percent in 2007.<sup>48</sup>

## Implications for Strategic Communication

The future will not be just a projection of current trends. Surprise and punctuating events are inevitable. Nevertheless, understanding how the world is changing points to discernable implications for planning and investment priorities in strategic communication.

48. Ibid. p. 148.

### ***Durable, Expanded, Resourceful, Forward Leaning***

The United States no longer has the luxury of a strategic communication instrument that is limited, reactive, and employed only episodically. Strategic communication is required before, during, and after violent conflicts, at home and abroad.

### ***“No One Size Fits All”***

Preoccupation with terrorism and current conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan) marginalizes the use of strategic communication on other pressing issues: governance, economic growth, the distribution of public goods, and cross-border challenges.

### ***Net-Centric Tools and Structures***

Stovepipes, gatekeepers, and tribal cultures still dominate. Hierarchies have a role. However, today's information technologies and social structures favor networks and much stronger and more imaginative links between governments and civil society. Achieving this requires unusual leaders, hybrid institutions, and flexible practitioners. In strategic communication, as in other instruments of statecraft, the strategies employed, the skills developed, and the tools used need to be based on networking mindsets.

### ***New Communications Paradigm***

Strategic communication will require a much larger investment in “listening,” understood as deep comprehension of cultures, attitudes, and influence network. It will require practitioners willing to take risks and policymakers comfortable with “edgy” attention-getting content. Strategic communication calls for varsity play in the next generation Internet, and rethinking the government's one-to-many mass audience broadcasting model from top to bottom. Diplomats and soldiers must learn to operate successfully in the space between state and non-state actors on multiple issues in constantly changing patterns of interaction.

### ***Trust and Attention Counts More than Information***

Fifty years ago, governments took advantage of widespread demand for news and information. Today, information saturation creates an attention deficit. The signal-to-noise ratio makes communication more difficult. Disseminating information and “getting the message right” are not top priorities. Trust, credibility, actions, legitimacy, and reputations are critical to success.

### ***Bridging the Challenge/Reform Disconnect***

That the world is changing more rapidly than leaders, practitioners, and their institutions is not news. Reports with recommendations calling for change abound, but few offer implementing roadmaps, and too many focus on change from within. Fixing strategic communication only from within means change that is marginal and slow. Fixing strategic communication requires focused attention and political courage from presidents and lawmakers. Radical transformation will take years.

### ***Prepare for Uncertainty***

Strategic communication requires leaders and practitioners recruited and trained to adapt quickly in a world in which unexpected personalities, low probability, high-impact events, and technology breakthroughs will play unforeseen roles.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter examined the positive and negative trends in the world and implications for strategic communication. In the next chapter, the task force considers how to address the revolutionary changes in the ways people access and share information as a consequence—principally of the global spread of satellite television and the rise of the Internet.

## Chapter 4. Technology is Changing

### Media Transformation

In the last two decades, revolutionary changes have occurred in the ways people access and share information, driven principally by the global spread of satellite television and the rise of the Internet (Figure 12). Today people everywhere have many alternative sources for news and entertainment; state control of content is becoming technically impossible; and the physical means of transport is no longer the primary concern as it has been in the past, when shortwave radio was the primary means of reaching citizens in foreign countries.



**Figure 12.** Media Access Then and Now

### ***Traditional Media are Losing their Influence***

Satellite and cable television have changed the nature of broadcast media by opening up an abundance of alternative channels to international audiences. Instead of being limited to a handful of broadcast channels, viewers are now offered an almost unlimited choice of channels. People are free to choose content that closely matches their own interests and biases. With the audience splintering and the variety in available viewpoints, the great trusted and unifying voices, such as



Walter Cronkite, have been irrevocably lost. The media now serves to amplify any latent polarization, and the very presence of so many differing viewpoints has caused people to lose their trust in media itself.

A Pew Research poll released in August 2007 highlights some of these trends in the U.S. audience:<sup>49</sup>

On the trust in media:

In 1985, most Americans (55%) said news organizations get the facts straight. Since the late 1990s, consistent majorities – including 53% in the current survey – have expressed the belief that news stories are often inaccurate. As a consequence, the believability ratings for individual news organizations are lower today than they were in the 1980s and 1990s.

On the growing partisan divide:

In the current survey, however, fewer than half of Republicans (41%) express a favorable opinion of major national newspapers, a 38-point decline when compared with 1985.

Thirty years ago Americans typically had a choice of seven channels; now, according to the Nielsen reports, the average U.S. home receives 104 channels.<sup>50</sup> In the competition for eyeballs this plentiful choice exacerbates the polarization of media. As Fox News turns right, CNN is forced to the left to retain its share. The same systemic behavior might be expected elsewhere in the world.

### ***Worldwide Satellite Access***

Satellite television is now the primary means of media access in most of the world. In the Middle East and North Africa, only

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49. *Internet News Audience Highly Critical of News Organizations: Views of Press Values and Performance: 1985-2007*. The Pew Research Center, August 2007, see <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=348>.

50. See <http://www.nielsenmedia.com/nc/portal/site/Public/menuitem.55dc65b4a7d5adff3f65936147a062a0/?vgnnextoid=48839bc66a961110VgnVCM100000ac0a260aRCRD>.


Afghanistan relies more on radio than television for news and entertainment. In other countries, the use of television exceeds that of radio by more than 2 to 1. Even in Iran, perhaps the most tightly controlled regime for media, citizens are able to access uncontrolled content on satellite television. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting approves and monitors all television and radio programming put on the air. However, in their quest for alternative perspectives and lighter fare, Iranians tune to expatriate-run satellite stations, flouting the official ban on dish ownership. Los Angeles-based stations garner more than 10 percent weekly viewership in spite of the Islamic Republic's crackdowns on dish ownership.<sup>51</sup> In addition, Voice of America Persian TV has significant weekly audience reach.

Direct-to-home television now serves about 24 percent of households in the Mideast, and Arab consumers typically have access to some 55-60 free-to-air Arabic language services (Figure 13). Al Jazeera was launched in 1996 out of Qatar, and now rivals the BBC in the number of worldwide viewers in the range of 40–50 million. Al Jazeera's viewing tops 70 percent in the Gulf Kingdoms and almost 60 percent of adults in Morocco and Tunisia. This popularity has largely been achieved by taking on subjects that were once considered politically or culturally taboo, and in spite of provoking the ire of regional governments and socially conservative elements. The prevalence of satellite dishes in the Middle East is best illustrated by this picture of an Arab village (Figure 14).

Popular programming in the Middle East may not be that different than in the United States—entertainment, news, reality shows, call-in shows, and even “Who Wants to be a Millionaire” or “Star Search,” modeled after “American Idol.” A representative from Intermedia, experienced in researching Middle East audiences, told the task force that “allowing self-criticism” was the best way to acquire credibility for U.S. content in this region.

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51. Intermedia.



Source: Intermedia

Note: Percent of adults who report owning a satellite dish

**Figure 13.** Dish Ownership in the Middle East



Source: Intermedia


**Figure 14.** Satellite Dishes in an Arab village

In their quest for increased viewership, broadcast news coverage everywhere invariably emphasizes sensational events, giving terrorists and insurgents an easy and automatic way to publicize their actions. The nightly news leads with videos of bombings, and the building of a new school doesn't even make the cut. News is, almost by definition, bad news. Consumers are usually looking for entertainment, and crime, mayhem, tragedies, and the like are considered entertaining. The strategic communication problem is to make good news as entertaining as bad news. Needless to say, this is a considerable challenge.

Terrorists also have other advantages in their use of media. They have fast response and great flexibility, enabled by a decentralized leadership with local autonomy. Moreover, they are unconstrained by considerations of truth. Their concern with communication is exemplified by actions that seemed to have been planned with media attention as the primary objective.


### ***The Global Rise of the Internet***

About a quarter of Americans currently use the Internet as their primary news source. These Internet users tend to be younger and better educated than the public as a whole, and a recent Pew survey finds that they hold relatively unfavorable opinions of the mainstream media. The United States is, of course, relatively advanced in its use and reliance on the Internet. Much of the rest of the world is still evolving in its Internet access, and may follow the general rule of exponential growth with an annual doubling in the number of users (Figure 15). Although the penetration of the Internet in the Middle East is estimated at only 10 percent, a larger number of people may occasionally access the Internet in public kiosks, such as at Internet cafes. A poll from Intermedia breaks down access based on weekly usage as shown in Figure 16.



Source: www.internetworldstats.com

**Figure 15.** Internet Penetration by World Region



Source: Intermedia

**Figure 16.** Percentage Using the Internet Weekly in Mideast Countries

This survey data may obscure the possibility that the relatively small number of Internet users may be among the most influential people in the country. Moreover, the information these users gain on the Internet may be spread by word-of-mouth, or reported by the more conventional media. Thus, it is hard to determine the overall importance of the Internet in influencing opinions abroad. However, it is certain that is that the number of Internet users is inevitably growing.

### ***Information Flows on the Internet***

The Internet has broken the traditional broadcast paradigm. Instead of one-to-many, as in the broadcast media, the primary flows are one-to-one. The paradigm here is *pull*, rather than *push*. Consequently, it is observed that on the Internet broadcast is hard, but conspiracy is easy. While satellite television has both dramatically increased the reach of broadcast media and splintered its audience, the rise of the Internet has personalized news, empowered the individual to become a news source, and facilitated the gatherings of like-minded people.

The Internet offers a number of different models for information flow. The closest to the traditional broadcast model is the handful of mega-sites devoted to news, such as CNN, MSN, the New York Times, and other print and television organizations looking to expand the reach of their content into the new medium. According to figures tracked by Nielsen/NetRatings, nytimes.com attracted about 12.5 million readers worldwide in June 2007. That is a huge global audience for news, and approximately ten times the *Times*' print circulation.

There is a phenomenon on the Internet known as the "long tail." Access is dominated by a few popular sites, followed by a multitude of sites (the long tail), each with very few viewers. The Internet greatly exacerbates the splintering evident in satellite television; instead of a thousand channels, there is an unlimited number, and the cost of broadcast is almost zero. Anyone can be a broadcaster, and everyone can easily find a source of content that exactly matches his or her own biases.

Many of these "broadcast channels" take advantage of the Internet paradigm by enabling individual visitors to post comments. For

example, the Al Jazeera English web site posts comments from individuals, many of which are critical of the Al Jazeera coverage. Such critical comments appear to contribute positively to the overall credibility of the site.

The most popular web sites on the Internet do not vary greatly from country to country. Table 2 compares the list of site popularity in the United States with that in Iran. The list is dominated by the search engines, connectivity suppliers, and repositories of basic information.

**Table 2.** Most Popular Web Sites, August 2007

	United States	Iran
<b>1</b>	Yahoo	Yahoo
<b>2</b>	Google	Google
<b>3</b>	Myspace	Rapidshare
<b>4</b>	YouTube	MSN
<b>5</b>	MSN	Megaupload
<b>6</b>	Wikipedia	Persianblog.com*
<b>7</b>	Amazon.com	Tinypic
<b>8</b>	AOL	Wikipedia
<b>9</b>	Blogger.com	4Shared
<b>10</b>	Go	Window Live
<b>11</b>	Megaupload	Farsnews*
<b>12</b>	CNN	Lana.ir*
<b>13</b>	Internet movie database	Mobile9.com
<b>14</b>	Photobucket	GSM.ir
<b>15</b>	Comcast	Internet movie database
<b>16</b>	Microsoft	Parseek.com*
<b>17</b>	Flickr	Islamic Republic News Agency

\*In Persian

Source: Alexa International

The popular search engines Yahoo, Google, and MSN, have enormous power in information space; so much so that there have been instances where states have censored their search results. In a sense, these engines are politically and culturally neutral, depending on computer algorithms to determine best fits for queries. Google uses a page-rank algorithm, which uses a link analysis of the web to determine

which sites are most linked by other sites on a given topic. (There are other factors considered in addition, and the algorithm is kept secret.) In whatever manner the rankings are determined, they shape the world opinion on important subjects. Furthermore, these search engines are used to derive a great deal of contextual information relevant to strategic communication.

In addition to search engines and commercial information providers, there are a number of enormously popular sites that enable or facilitate individuals to post and exchange views, information, images, and opinions. In the United States, those sites on the list include Myspace (social interactions), YouTube (videos), Facebook (social interactions), eBay (auction), Craigslist (lodging), Wikipedia (encyclopedia entries), Blogger.com (tools for blogs), Photobucket (images), and Flickr (photos).

A second model for information flow on the Internet is exemplified by Wikipedia, which has become the international authority on encyclopedia-style information by implementing an open source model where entries are iteratively corrected by users. (There is moderation by a steering committee.) Supposedly, the information is self-correcting, and entries eventually settle to a communal “truth” that in some cases may exhibit a bias representing the main view of the interested community. Wikipedia might be taken as an instance of the phenomenon known as “the wisdom of crowds.”

### ***Viral Information***

Perhaps the most important model of information flow on the Internet is that of viral connectivity. Sites like Myspace, YouTube, Facebook, Blogger, Photobucket, and Flickr enable the exchange of information from one individual to another. A piece of information flows from one individual to another, with a multiplicative effect as it spreads like an epidemic. Studies have verified the popular notion of “six-degrees of separation,” showing how little reach is required to achieve widespread communication.

Perhaps the power of viral communication is exemplified in how quickly good jokes can traverse the world practically overnight. In the



Internet world a blogger might create a story that gets popularized by being quoted and linked by other sites. These links are noted by Google, which moves the blog site up on its ranking. Technorati.com adds the site to its current list of the most popular blogs (Figure 17). Both of these reports provide positive feedback to amplify the popularity of the original story—regardless of whether it is right or wrong, good or bad.



**Figure 17.** Guide to Blogs on Technorati.com

In order for this “information infection” to occur, the information must have the property of inducing replication—something that cries out for being passed along. A research question is how to create “good viruses” and how to contain the contagion of “bad viruses.”


Some critics worry that blogs exacerbate social tensions by handing a powerful free electronic platform to extremists. Bad people find one another in cyberspace and so gain confidence in their ideas. The conventional media filter out extreme views to avoid offending readers,

viewers, and advertisers, while most bloggers have no such inhibition. On the other hand, blogs have a self-correcting mechanism of real-time criticism that is lacking in the conventional media.

There are an estimated 80 millions blogs currently on the Internet. While the great majority of all these blogs are voices in the dark, there are others that can be quite influential. Once again there is an instance of the long tail. Which few are the most popular, and/or the most influential? Taken in its totality, the “blogosphere” constitutes a treasure trove that can be mined for sociological and cultural information and opinion. For example, blogs can give insight into questions such as: What are the Islamic bloggers saying about a recent Al Qaeda action?

The United States has limited resources to counter this multitude of individual blogs. Those resources should be reserved for only the most influential blogs as determined by quantitative measurements. Even in these cases it is not clear what the rules of engagement should be. When should responses be identified as from the U.S. government, as opposed to from responsible individuals? What forms of response are most effective? In this evolving medium the United States has little experience or wisdom in means of influence.

Viral information is also exemplified in the meteoric rise of YouTube since it was founded in February 2005 (Figure 18). Users contribute videos, which are accessible by other users. YouTube now serves in excess of 100 million videos each day. Some of these videos become enormously popular, while most languish unseen—another “long tail.” YouTube lists prominently the most popular videos, which then become famous for being famous. A popular video on YouTube can be viewed by millions of people and have considerable influence in the Internet world. The phenomenon needs study to understand the characteristics that underlie such popularity.



**Figure 18.** User-supplied Videos on YouTube

The world's youth is congregating in chat rooms, on MySpace and FaceBook, and in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (Figure 19). In 2006, the number of registered users on MySpace exceeded 100 million. In these Internet "places" young people are making friends, exchanging information and opinions, and forming coalitions in chat rooms. In many cases, there is nary an adult present.

The chat rooms and multi-player online games serve as worldwide laboratories for the study of the cultures and evolving opinions of the youth. Aside such studies, it is not clear how these media can be used for influence. As in the case of blogs, the questions of if, when, and how to enter these media have no obvious answers.



**Figure 19.** Where the Youth of the World Gathers


## Technology Transformation

### *Foreign Language Information Access*

Human language technology provides a window into foreign cultures and concerns as well as a vehicle for engagement. In terms of understanding content, as Figure 20 illustrates for English language text, the current best systems enable the automated extraction of entities (e.g., people, places, and things) at 95 percent accuracy, relations among entities (e.g., person A was the leader of organization Y at time T) at 70–80 percent accuracy, and events (e.g., organization Z purchased WMD pre-cursor material W from person Q) at about 60 percent accuracy.<sup>52</sup>

52. Message Understanding Conference, Automated Content Extraction Program, Event99, and BioCreative

Entity, relation, and event extraction systems are, respectively, approximately 5, 10, and 20 percent less accurate than human performance. Accuracy here is measured as a balance of precision (Did the system get only the correct items?) and recall (Did the system get all the correct items?). Performance in new domains such as biological entity extraction (e.g., genes and proteins), important for biological weapons intelligence, has already shown promising 80 percent accuracy for entity extraction after only two years of development in the National Science Foundation-supported BioCreative initiative.<sup>53</sup> Notably, entity and relation extraction rivals human performance in English and is advancing rapidly in some foreign languages (Chinese, Arabic).



Source: Message Understanding Conference

**Figure 20.** Information Extraction Performance across Languages

53. Hirschman, L., Yeh, A., Blaschke, C., and Valencia, A. 2005. *Overview of BioCreAtivE: Critical Assessment of Information Extraction for Biology*. *BMC Bioinformatics* 2005, 6(Suppl 1):S1.

## Communication and Media Analysis using Machine Translation

Advances in statistical machine translation have increased accessibility to foreign documents, web sites, blogs, and even broadcast news. Government-funded community evaluations (such as trec.nist.gov) have accelerated development. Integration of emerging components has enabled new capabilities, such as content-based retrieval of foreign video and multilingual chat. For example, Figure 21 illustrates the integration of a broadcast news video indexing system (Virage Video Logger) together with a statistically trained commercial machine translation system (Language Weaver) to enable an end user to perform cross-language retrieval.



**Figure 21.** Retrieval and Translation of Arabic News Broadcast in Commercial

The example shows a user query of "Bin Laden," retrieval of a relevant Arabic news program, its speech transcription, and its translation into English. Related machine-translation technology is

integrated with search engines to enable foreign web site browsing with instant messaging to enable multilingual chat (Figure 22). These capabilities can dramatically enhance both understanding of activities and interests in foreign media, as well as enable direct one-on-one engagement with foreign audiences. While current methods can be employed if augmented by human linguists, further development in machine translation is required to enhance quality and expand applicability to lower density languages.




**Figure 22.** Translingual Instant Messaging (TrIM) between English and Arabic Speakers

### ***Social Network/Influence Analysis***

Tools such as Google's PageRank algorithm have successfully used analysis of links among web pages to automatically determine the popularity of a site. Simply put, PageRank considers a web page with more links to it ("inward links") as more significant than one with fewer links but also weighs links from more "important" pages more heavily. For individual web servers, tools such as Google Analytics (Figure 23) can enable web site managers to automatically compute usage statistics such as the volume of visits per page, the origin of searchers (by URL

and geographically), if they were new or returning visitors, the number of pages viewed per visit, and the bounce rate.<sup>54</sup> More generally, for larger sites, site ratings (Neilson's internet rating, Technorati, for example) can be employed to understand popular sites; however, more granular demographic data is needed (by age, economic status, religion).



Source: mycvs.org

**Figure 23.** Google Analytics

As illustrated in the left side of Figure 24, information flows from ISI/Al-Qaeda to a forum to a news website to Al Jazerra TV.<sup>55</sup> On the right hand side, data collected from alexa.com illustrates the geographical spread of visitors to the primary distribution sites for insurgent media (in this example, the largest number of visitors to

54. See <http://mycvs.org/wp/wp-content/images/google-analytics-results.png>.

55. Kimmage, D. and Ridolfo, K. 2007. *Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas*, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty regional analysts. Video briefing at [http://www.newamerica.net/events/2007/iraqi\\_insurgent\\_media](http://www.newamerica.net/events/2007/iraqi_insurgent_media).



most sites coming from Saudi Arabia and also Egypt and the Palestinian territories).



Source: *Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas*

**Figure 24.** Information Flow and Measurement

Just as it is possible to understand the importance of web pages (for both searching and assessing them) by exploiting their relationships, so too should it be possible to understand the importance of users by assessing their social influence. Researchers have already conducted significant research on social network analysis, such as information and communication flows and structures (email propagation is one example).<sup>56</sup> One technical opportunity that overcomes privacy concerns associated with social network analysis is to analyze public communication fora (public blogs, listservs, text chat) in order to assess contributor frequency and communication networks—that is, who talks to whom. Further, with limited text analysis it is possible to assess which ideas or views are “picked up” by which users. Assessing how rapidly ideas spread from one user or site to another, and how broadly content is communicated, can give a sense of their degree of “infectivity.”

Moreover, to the extent there is a shift in attitudes or behaviors, it is possible this could be reflected in the communication (someone expressing a change in their beliefs or promising or threatening to take some action)

56. Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. 1994. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge University Press.

that might indicate the “affectivity” of the idea. It might be possible to measure the “virulence” of an idea, i.e., track “infections ideas” as a precursor to interdicting or influencing it. Developments in de-identification—i.e., removing proper names or individual identifying information from free text—promise to enable data mining while ensuring privacy.<sup>57</sup> Important open research questions include how individuals establish trust, form identity, and create groups in the digital domain.

Another important development on the web is the rapid expansion of social technologies. These include social networking (sites like mySpace, Facebook, LinkedIn) that enables individuals to create pages that link into friends and colleagues and share information. In addition, social bookmarking sites (such like del.icio.us, Flickr) enable users to bookmark and label their favorite sites and content, which can then be shared with a larger community.

As might be expected, users exhibit social behavior in social media. For example, according to Gladwell, some participants take on special roles.<sup>58</sup> These include:

- *connectors* who are hubs in social networks
- *mavens* who are experts (such as bloggers who detect media misinformation)
- *salespeople* who persuasively influence others, often subconsciously


These individuals can wield disproportionate influence and cause “social epidemics,” or sudden and often chaotic phase changes from one state to another (when a particular idea becomes viral). Finally, their contributions reflect the power law, i.e., contribution is an inverse log scale—few contribute most content; many contribute little. Figure 25 illustrates this long tail power law in an example search on “Green Zone” at the photo sharing site, Flickr. As illustrated by the graph to

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57. Gupta, D. Saul, M. and Gilbertson, J. 2004. *Evaluation of a Deidentification (De-Id) Software Engine to Share Pathology Reports and Clinical Documents for Research*. American Journal of Clinical Pathology. 2004 (121):176-186.

58. Gladwell, M. 2000. *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*. Little Brown.

the right in the figure, of 482 images from 22 photographers of the Green Zone in Baghdad, 40 percent are provided by one individual, 18 percent of the contributors provide 80 percent of the content (the so called 80-20 rule), and 80 percent of the photographers provide less than 22 photos, the average per photographer. This Flickr example illustrates how a few productive or influential contributors dominate the information space.



**Figure 25.** Power Law in Flickr Photo-Sharing Site

### ***Automated Sentiment Analysis***

Given the volume and importance of electronic information, distinguishing between opinions and facts<sup>59</sup>—or at least detecting the degree of an author's pro/con feelings toward a topic—is becoming increasingly important. Innovative approaches using language processing for sentiment detection and analysis promise scalable and accurate measurement of positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable)

59. Cardie, C., Wiebe, J., Wilson, T., and Litman, D. 2003. "Combining Low-Level and Summary Representations of Opinions for Multiperspective Question Answering." *AAA/ Spring Symposium on New Directions in Question Answering*, pages 20–27.

opinions in documents, websites, blogs, and chat.<sup>60</sup> Depending upon the source and purpose, effective sentiment analysis could require content segmentation, topic identification, information extraction, author identification, machine translation, and sentiment classification.

Sentiment analysis is used for stock market analysis,<sup>61</sup> product reviews,<sup>62</sup> and analysis of multilingual political discourse.<sup>63</sup> In a test of opinions about an organization and pharmaceutical products, Nasukawa and Yi<sup>64</sup> demonstrated high precision (75-95%) in detecting sentiments in a half million web pages and a quarter million news articles, and believe these could be extended to billions of pages. These methods could provide the foundation for identifying issues of importance to an author or group, measuring their level of confidence, their agreeability/argumentativeness, and “extremeness” of their views. Important future areas of research include relating sentiment measures to identity, trust, and reverence.

### ***Gaming***

Computer games have become a multibillion-dollar industry. The Army has successfully used games for recruiting but has also found them to have unforeseen benefits in virtual basic training. Already insurgents have used games to engage and motivate youth to support Jihad. Given the availability of gaming engines as a foundation, these could have valuable strategic communication applications, including teaching English, skills for employment, and education of universal values.

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60. Wilson, T., Hoffmann, P., Somasundaran, S., Kessler, J., Wiebe, J., Choi, Y., Cardie, C., Riloff, E., and Patwardhan, S. 2005. *OpinionFinder: A System for Subjectivity Analysis*. Proceedings of HLT/EMNLP 2005 Demonstration Abstracts, pages 34–35, Vancouver, October 2005.

61. Das, S., and Chen, M. 2001. *Yahoo! for Amazon: Sentiment Parsing from Small Talk on the Web*. August 5, 2001. EFA 2001 Barcelona Meetings.

62. Kushal, Dave, Lawrence, Steve, and Pennock, David M. 2003. *Mining the Peanut Gallery: Opinion Extraction and Semantic Classification of Product Reviews*. In *WWW*, pages 519–528.

63. Mullen, T. and Malouf, R. 2006. *A Preliminary Investigation into Sentiment Analysis of Informal Political Discourse*. Proceedings of the AAAI Workshop on Analysis of Weblogs, 2006.

64. Nasukawa, T. and Yi, J. 2003. *Sentiment Analysis: Capturing Favorability Using Natural Language Processing*. International Conference on Knowledge Capture Proceedings of the 2nd International ACM Conference on Knowledge Capture. Sanibel Island, FL, 70 – 77.

### ***Scientific Progress***

While many of the above technologies can be beneficially applied today, additional research is required to advance the underlying theories and algorithms. For machine learning, data and annotated foreign language corpora for algorithm training are expensive but essential to accuracy improvements. Task-oriented evaluations, such as TREC ([trec.nist.gov](http://trec.nist.gov)), have fostered community-wide progress. Simple, usable, and open solutions that focus on analytic/operational impact are essential. Finally, the nature of the strategic communication challenge will require multidisciplinary scientific teams, iterative and staged processes, and rigorous application of the scientific method to ensure resultant capabilities that can effectively support mission requirements.

### ***Conclusions***

Advances in technology in the last two decades have led to a revolution in media, opening access to a seemingly infinite number of channels and introducing new models for the origins and flow of information.

Although technology has served as the enabler, much of the information ecology today is a social invention. The world wide web itself, as well as some of its most important constituents, like Wikipedia, eBay, Facebook, and YouTube, are social inventions. This invention continues at an incredible rate. YouTube, for example, went from nothing to 100 million daily videos in only a little over a year. Understanding and influencing this fast-evolving landscape is obviously a difficult matter. The pace of change may be greater than that of understanding.

With the rise of the Internet and satellite television, state censorship of content is becoming much less effective, and will ultimately become impossible. Technically, it is quite difficult to control information access on the Internet. Even though some countries limit Internet connectivity through proxy servers that filter content, many users know how to circumvent these filters, and the information they access gets passed along in other ways.

With so many pathways that information can reach people, the emphasis today should be much less on the physical mechanism for delivery than it has been in the past. The problem now is crafting messages that inherently want to travel through this complex and variegated landscape.

## Chapter 5. Engaging National Capability

In the fast-paced environment of real-time public and private communication, issue experts and casual observers alike are flooded with information and viewpoints. Gone are the days of limited access to the means of mass transmission of ideas as was common when governments and large private institutions were the only entities with sufficient finances to utilize mass media.

Message reach and clarity are now constrained primarily by imagination and tenacity, rather than access to communications technology or financial assets. As a result, the ability to astutely break through the cacophony of vantage points with a compelling rationale that motivates individual behavior becomes a supreme challenge for all who seek to influence future outcomes. In this complex environment, “actions” can become the most authentic “messages.”

The United States has among its citizens some of the world’s most accomplished experts in the skills requisite to develop and respond to strategic communication. Within the U.S. government there is also a long legacy of significant programming and communication outreach to foreign publics, with some of the most successful efforts originating in the early period of the Cold War.

Recent U.S. government strategic enhancements are attempting to address the changing communications environment. Following the release of the first *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* in June 2007, each federal agency is now preparing its own strategic communication plan. When complete, these strategic plans will provide the groundwork for increased coordination and collaboration.

However, when compared to private and civil sector enterprises that have rapidly embraced the capabilities associated with integrated strategic communication, the U.S. government continues to have an underdeveloped strategic communication management process. This deficiency limits its ability to leverage the world-class capabilities of its

citizens outside the federal government to contribute to its effort. It also makes a daunting task even more challenging, since the U.S. government continues to depend on many strategic and organizational methodologies that originated in the pre-Internet, broadcasting-oriented world, further limiting its ability to collaborate to accomplish shared interagency and public/private goals.

## **Strategic Communication Originating in the United States has Many Sources**

Many federal, state, and local nongovernmental, corporate, and individual enterprises originating in the United States are involved in strategic communication with foreign audiences. While there is often a single enterprise performing the role of program leader, each program relies on many essential contributions from beyond the domain of its central team to accomplish its goals.

The solutions to the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are not going to be met by government working alone.

They come from all sectors of American society working together

*Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice*

A snapshot of several of the programs sponsored by these enterprises shows the diversity of subject expertise and resource management necessary to conduct foreign outreach on behalf of U.S. interests. Also highlighted below are some of the existing and complex

collaborations between public, private, and non-governmental organizations in the accomplishment of shared goals.

### ***Federal: International Educational Exchange Programs***

U.S. government-sponsored international exchange and training activities are defined in Congressional and Presidential mandates as the “movement of people between countries to promote the sharing of ideas, to develop skills, and to foster mutual understanding and



cooperation, financed wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, with U.S. government funds.”<sup>65</sup>

During fiscal year 2005, 15 cabinet-level departments and 49 independent agencies and commissions reported management of 239 international exchange and training programs (Figure 26). Nearly 900,000 foreigners and U.S. citizens participated in these exchanges, ranging from academic exchanges for students, research exchanges for scholars, and professional skill development for mid-career professionals.<sup>66</sup> While over \$1.2 billion in federal funds (63% of total) was expended to conduct these programs in fiscal year 2005, federal investment leveraged an additional \$708 million (37% of total) from non-U.S. government sources (Figure 27)—including contributions from foreign governments, U.S. private sector, foreign private sector, and international organizations.<sup>67</sup>

This funding split is the result of a long-term successful international public/private partnership, as well as federal interagency collaboration. While visas are coordinated through the Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. government personnel in each agency are responsible for developing, implementing, and evaluating the programs, and often work through public/private partnerships with the private sector and non-governmental organizations to administer the programs.<sup>68</sup>


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65. Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training (IAWG), 2005 Report, see [www.iawg.gov](http://www.iawg.gov).

66. IAWG, 2005 Report, “FY 2005 Participants by Federal Sponsor: Total U.S. & Foreign” p. 14, see [http://www.iawg.gov/rawmedia\\_repository/039262c1\\_618a\\_400f\\_bade\\_4716fe743ae4](http://www.iawg.gov/rawmedia_repository/039262c1_618a_400f_bade_4716fe743ae4).


67. IAWG, *FY 2005 Inventory of Programs*.

68. IAWG, 2005 Report, “FY 2005 Participants by Federal Sponsor: Total U.S. & Foreign” p. 15.



Source: IAWG

**Figure 26.** Fiscal Year 2005 Participants by Federal Sponsor



Source: IAWG

**Figure 27.** Fiscal Year 2005 Sources of Funding

***Federal: Broadcasting Board of Governors***

Over 155 million people are reached each week through the international broadcasting services of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Tracing its roots back to the creation of the U.S. Information Agency in the early 1950s, today the BBG is the sole independent federal agency that oversees all U.S. government and government-sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting. The BBG seeks to provide a strong, independent media where one does not exist. The following six broadcasting units comprise the BBG:

**Voice of America** (VOA) broadcasts on radio, television, the Internet, VOAMobile for Internet-enabled devices, Real Simple Syndication feeds, and podcasts in over 45 languages and provides news updates over VOA Internet.



**Alhurra** provides Arabic-language news and information to 22 countries in the Middle East.

**Radio Sawa** combines a mix of Western and Arabic pop music with news and information with a



24/7 Arabic-language network to reach youth in various regions of the Middle East.



**Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)**, offering more than 1,000 hours of programming from the Arctic Sea to the Persian Gulf in 28 languages, is streamed live and on-demand over the Internet.

**Radio Free Asia (RFA)** broadcasts news, information, and commentary in nine languages to China, Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea.



**Radio and TV Marti** provide news, information, and other programming to the people of Cuba. Radio Marti broadcasts 162 hours weekly of news and information (mostly live). TV Marti broadcasts 168 hours weekly of news, information, and entertainment programming via satellite and 30 hours weekly via the airborne platform. Approximately 15 hours weekly of TV Marti broadcasts are original programming. Broadcasting units are assisted by the engineering, technical, and administrative capabilities of the **International Broadcasting Bureau**.

Connectivity is an essential element of the growing social media phenomenon. While the “one-to-many” model of communication has been primarily operative in large-scale information transfer in the past, the “many-to-many” model is spreading rapidly to challenge old communication hierarchies based on corporate and state leadership of the assets needed to transmit information. As individuals, especially in younger populations, increasingly choose to acquire and forward information online, BBG has developed VOA Internet to reach this tech-enabled audience. Looking ahead, the U.S. government will need to assess whether the historic funding allocation of BBG toward broadcasting as its primary means of message transfer should be maintained or reallocated in recognition of emerging media vehicles and audience dynamics.

### ***State and Local: Sister Cities International***

Municipal partnerships between U.S. cities, counties, and states, and similar jurisdictions in other nations provide opportunities for civic leaders and citizens to experience and explore other cultures, and to build economic ties.

Launched in 1956 following a White House summit in which President Eisenhower called for new people-to-people exchanges to enhance citizen diplomacy and cross-cultural friendship, **Sister Cities International**<sup>69</sup> was created to promote peace through mutual respect, understanding, and cooperation. It is a global citizen diplomacy network, originating from the town square.



Sister City International programs involve community-based efforts that draw on the skills of local government, business, and the private voluntary sector, including civil society nonprofit organizations and citizen volunteers. Areas of focus include sustainable development, youth and education, arts and culture, humanitarian assistance, and economic growth programs.

There are currently 694 Sister Cities International communities in the United States, with at least one in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. These cities are partnered with 1,749 international communities in 134 countries. While Europe has 35 percent of all sister city relationships with the United States (an artifact of the program's origination during a period of heightened reconstruction of post World War II Europe), communities in Africa, Latin America, Asia/Oceania, the Caribbean, Eurasia, the Middle East, and Canada, are also partnered with U.S. communities.

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69. See [www.sister-cities.org](http://www.sister-cities.org).

### ***Private Sector: Global Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Social Responsibility***

Expressions and images associated with the United States reach across the globe. Many U.S. brands and cultural icons are widely appreciated around the world. It is not unusual for crowds of individuals who are protesting U.S. government policies overseas to be wearing apparel emblazoned with U.S. commercial logos, evidence of the frequent dichotomy that exists between the viewpoints on the U.S. government as distinguished from American culture.

In recent years, there has been phenomenal growth in the number and scope of community engagement efforts by the private sector, both in the U.S. and abroad. Public/private partnerships increasingly offer a means for partners to achieve common goals that are beyond the scope of their individual abilities but achievable through shared effort. Employee volunteer programs have become an important aspect of community outreach as well.

More U.S. corporations are acknowledging global responsibility to their customers, partners, employees, and shareholders, as well as to the communities in which they do business. Global corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility are receiving increased attention as being important future indicators of corporate performance.



The United Nations Global Compact,<sup>70</sup> the world's leading voluntary corporate citizenship initiative, both builds on and encourages this trend, as do investment analysts who are increasingly taking notice.

Campus programs, such as Net Impact<sup>71</sup>, provide training and capacity building to the next generation of business leaders interested in corporate social responsibility, sustainable enterprise, and social entrepreneurship.




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70. See [www.unglobalcompact.org](http://www.unglobalcompact.org).

71. See [www.netimpact.org](http://www.netimpact.org).

### ***Nongovernmental and Civil Society Organizations***

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are generally any non-profit organizations that are independent from government. NGOs generally seek to mobilize support and voluntary contributions to impact social, economic, and political activities in communities. Voluntarism and altruism are important characteristics.

While NGOs often work in areas underserved by government aid, many receive a significant percentage of their operating income from government sources when they work together in partnership to achieve shared goals. Other NGOs seek to achieve change by exerting outside influence on the political system.

The nature and capabilities of NGOs varies widely. They range from global organizations with a large headquarters staff supported by thousands of volunteers, to mega philanthropies underwritten by wealthy individuals, to small, community-based self-help groups launched and boot-strapped through the inspiration of one social entrepreneur.

Reflecting the diversity of their programming and outreach activities, definitions across the NGO sector vary. For example, the World Bank classifies NGOs into three main groups: international organizations that implement operations in more than one country, national organizations that work in one country, and community-based membership organizations that work exclusively at the grassroots. Alternatively, the Organization of American States refers to NGOs as civil society organizations.

### ***Individuals: Both Nodes and Hubs in the Net-centric World***

In the increasingly net-centric environment of daily life, individuals around the globe are empowered to build “communities of interest” based on new forms of idea championship that both challenge and support nation state interests. Among those individuals with direct personal access to new communication vehicles, there will

continue to evolve new methods of combining the physical world with the digital world.

Net-centricity allows individuals empowered by technology to simultaneously become consumers, replicators, and disseminators of information on a massive scale. Around these “hub individuals” grow “communities of interest.”

Since the most powerful information in both the physical and virtual world is transmitted by a trusted source, communications forwarded across wide networks by “hub individuals” become strategic issues for diplomatic, economic, and security planners.

## **Community-Building through Information Affluence**

The power of ideas creates information affluence. Information can also bring individuals together. Three examples of community building through use of communication technology and techniques include First Voice International, One Laptop Per Child, and Sesame Workshop.

### ***First Voice International Delivers Life-Saving Information to Isolated Areas***

**First Voice International** (FVI) is a nonprofit organization with exclusive access to five percent of the WorldSpace Satellite Network and communication capacity through an expanding number of affiliated community radio stations.<sup>72</sup> Working through partnerships with international organizations, government agencies, and community groups, FVI provides locally relevant, and often locally produced, information to audiences with the greatest need who are living in both the urban and the most isolated areas of Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East.

“one receiver,  
many ears”

FVI content emphasizes issues such as HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, good governance, natural resource management, and disaster

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72. See [www.firstvoiceint.org](http://www.firstvoiceint.org).



relief. Through the approach of “one receiver, many ears,” listening groups in remote areas receive the signal directly from a shared satellite radio receiver that can be purchased for as little as \$68 wholesale (compared to a conventional satellite dish that can cost over \$1,000). In urban areas and their surrounding communities, FVI reaches many more people through 190 community radio partners in 24 countries in Africa and Asia. While some station operators broadcast the content stream live over their AM and FM transmitters, others record it for rebroadcast or translate the programs into local languages before broadcasting.

Through its First Voice Multimedia Service, FVI enables transmission of high volumes of web-based text and multimedia material to teachers, health care providers, local government officials, and humanitarian organizations working in areas of Africa and Asia where Internet access is unavailable, unreliable, or very expensive. This transmission is accomplished through the data ports on the FVI-enabled satellite radios that can be connected to a personal computer through adapter cards. FVI supports this technical capability with community-based training in the use and maintenance of the radio and multimedia equipment. It has further expanded the reach of its grassroots network by providing community information centers in extremely isolated communities with computers equipped with multimedia service.

### ***One Laptop Per Child Embraces the Collaborative Spirit of the Network***



OLPC

In the developing world, one in three children do not complete the third grade and most receive little, if any, formal education. This lack of education has both personal and societal consequences for them, the societies in which they live, and the world community. Without access to education and the tools to expand their personal horizons, these children are faced with the prospect of growing into adults with

limited opportunity to escape poverty. Few are able to visualize a different life for themselves beyond what they observe first-hand in the lives of their parents and neighbors. With an under-educated workforce, their communities face challenges in competing economically in the increasingly global information economy and their governments are not likely to be able to provide services to large populations that are not self-supporting.

**One Laptop Per Child**, (OLPC) seeks to provide children in developing countries with new opportunities to explore, experiment, and express themselves.<sup>73</sup> It is based on the premise that children have

*“It’s an education project, not  
a laptop project”*

*Nicholas Negroponte,  
Founder One Laptop Per Child*

innate capacities to learn, share, and create on their own. The mission of One Laptop Per Child is to ensure that all school-aged children in the developing world are able to engage effectively with their own personal laptop, networked to the world, so that they, their families, and their communities can openly learn. One Laptop per Child focuses on designing and manufacturing laptops. It works with national government agencies (Ministry of Education) that are responsible for the distribution of the laptops and for training teachers on their use. One Laptop per Child will also initiate a short-term “give 1 get 1” program in North America in November 2007.



The XO laptop is designed specifically for children in remote and impoverished geographies to help them “learn learning” and includes a web browser, rich media player, and e-book reader. By using the XO to access and explore information, these children will be exposed to the full range of human knowledge and use it to develop their potential to contribute to their families, neighborhoods, and nations.

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73. See [www.laptop.org](http://www.laptop.org).

### ***Sesame Workshop International Creates Educational Television Around the World***

A ground-breaking educational children’s television series when it first aired in the United States in 1969, *Sesame Street* has become one of the longest-running U.S. television shows in history. Produced by the nonprofit organization **Sesame Workshop**,<sup>74</sup> its distinctive format of live action, animation, and colorful characters combines both education and entertainment for preschoolers. In addition to letter and word recognition and mathematics, instructional goals have included basic life and social skills, delivered through a world of humor and fun. It has received more Emmy Awards than any other television series. Over the last 35 years, *Sesame Street* has also become one of the world’s most highly regarded educational programs for children. The original series has aired in 120 countries and millions of children and their parents around the world have watched the programs.



Beginning 1972, *Sesame Street* international co-productions were developed to reach diverse international audiences. New York-based producers from Sesame Workshop work with child development experts, directors, producers, and writers in each country to connect the magic and fun of *Sesame Street* with specific local language and cultural needs. This collaborative effort has resulted in customized *Sesame Street* broadcasts in Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Mexico, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

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74. See [www.sesameworkshop.org](http://www.sesameworkshop.org).

## Personal Interactions as Compelling Messages

The U.S. government and civil society have a long track record of positive actions and outreach toward communities across the globe. A snapshot of a few key programs includes the Fulbright Program, academic study abroad, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Peace Corps, public/private partnerships and inter-agency collaborations, and military-to-military exchanges.

### ***Fulbright Program is the Flagship International Exchange Program of the United States***



Since its creation under legislation introduced by then-Senator J. William Fulbright in 1946, the Fulbright Program<sup>75</sup> has sought to “increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.” Over 279,000 Fulbright scholars and professional experts (105,400 from the U.S. and 174,000 from other countries) have participated in educational and cultural exchange programs over the last 50 years. The 35th Fulbright alumnus to be awarded a Nobel Prize was Muhammad Yunus, founder and Managing Director of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, who was honored in 2006 for pioneering the practice of microcredit and microenterprise that creates opportunities for those living in extreme poverty.

There are Fulbright grant programs for three audiences: students, scholars and professionals, and teachers and administrators:

- **The Fulbright U.S. Student Program** offers fellowships for U.S. graduating seniors, graduate students, young professionals, and artists to study abroad. During the 2006–2007 academic year, more than 1,200 Americans studied in over 140 countries through the full or partial support of this program.
- **The Fulbright English Teaching Assistantships Program** facilitates the English language abilities and knowledge of the

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75. [www.exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright/](http://www.exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright/).

United States among foreign students by placing American scholars and teachers near capital cities in over 20 countries.

- **The Fulbright U.S. Scholar Program** supports the research and lecture programs in over 130 countries by approximately 1,100 American scholars and professionals in such diverse fields as agriculture, business, journalism, public health and technology.
- **The Fulbright Senior Specialists Program** is a short-term grant for a period of 2–6 weeks, designed to enhance collaboration with professional counterparts at non-U.S. institutions of higher learning.
- **The Fulbright Teacher and Administrator Exchange Program** primarily facilitates one-on-one exchanges between American administrators in K-12 schools, community colleges, and four-year institutions and their counterparts in more than 30 countries worldwide.

While the primary source of funding for the Fulbright programs is Congressional appropriation (\$184.6 million in fiscal year 2006), participating governments and host institutions also contribute financially through cost sharing and indirect support. Other important elements of program administration are the nonprofit bi-national **Fulbright Commissions and Foundations** that oversee the Fulbright program abroad and propose the annual programs. Over 65 **Fulbright Alumni Associations** operate as private, nonprofit organizations to facilitate relationships among former grantees and the U.S. Fulbright associations also provides hospitality and outreach for visiting Fulbright students, scholars, and teachers during their stays in the United States.

### ***Foreign Student Study in the U.S. Expands Perspective***

In fiscal year 2007, the United States issued a record number of 591,000 student visas for international students to come to the U.S. to study, reversing a period of decline following September 11, 2001.<sup>76</sup>

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76. U/S Hughes 11 July 2007 DOD Conference on Strategic Communication.

According to Under Secretary of State Karen Hughes, “we are actively partnering with America’s higher education community to send a clear message that we want the future leaders of the world to come here to study and get to know us.”<sup>77</sup>

***USAID Provides Economic and Humanitarian Assistance in more than 100 Countries***



At its creation in 1961, the **U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**<sup>78</sup> combined existing government agencies to become the first U.S. foreign assistance organization whose primary emphasis was long-range economic and social development assistance efforts on a country-by-country basis.

Headquartered in Washington, D.C., USAID has field offices in many regions of the world. It works to improve the lives of millions in more than 100 developing countries through technical assistance and capacity building, training and scholarships, food aid and disaster relief, infrastructure construction, small-enterprise loans, and credit guarantees. Through this foreign assistance, USAID seeks to further U.S. foreign policy interests by working to expand democracy and free markets while improving the lives of people in the developing world.

USAID has working relationships with more than 3,500 American companies and over 300 U.S.-based private voluntary organizations. The Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation “provides direct support to efforts made by the U.S. Private Voluntary Organization community and by its partner nongovernmental organizations to address critical needs in developing countries and emerging democracies.”<sup>79</sup>

Since January 2006, the USAID administrator has also served as the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, with authority over all Department

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77. U/S Hughes 11 July 2007 DOD Conference on Strategic Communication.

78. See [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov).

79. See [www.usaid.com](http://www.usaid.com).

of State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs charter, to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible.

### ***Peace Corps***

**The Peace Corps** was established by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to promote world peace and understanding.<sup>80</sup> Its goals continue to be to help the people of interested countries meet their needs for trained men and women, to promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served, and to promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans. Over 187,000 Peace Corps volunteers have lived and worked at the invitation of 139 host countries in the 46 years of the program's existence.



Peace Corps volunteers must be U.S. citizens and at least 18 years of age. Peace Corps service is a 27-month commitment. Today there are 7,749 volunteers working in many activity areas, including education, youth outreach and community development; business development; agriculture and environment; health and HIV/AIDS; and information technology. Specific duties and responsibilities vary widely and generally involve collaboration with local community members and nongovernmental organizations in the host countries.

In September 2007, the Peace Corps launched a website ([www.peacecorps.gov/minisite/50plus/](http://www.peacecorps.gov/minisite/50plus/)) as part of a larger initiative aimed at attracting potential Peace Corps volunteers over the age of 50. Only 5 percent of current Peace Corps volunteers are age 50 or older, yet this demographic cohort of the American population is seen as having significant professional and life experience as well as an interest in finding meaningful and rewarding opportunities for service that fits with the Peace Corps mission and goals.

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80. See [www.peacecorps.gov](http://www.peacecorps.gov).

### ***Life Saving Outreach through U.S. Government Interagency and Public/Private Partnerships***



The *USNS Comfort* hospital ship conducted a four-month humanitarian mission to 12 Central American, South American, and Caribbean nations during the summer of 2007. The primary objective was to address regional health service support requirements ashore, and promote clinical information sharing across the region. Other missions included outpatient shipboard health service support and minor construction projects in the host country.

The *USNS Comfort* mission was coordinated with partner nations in the region, including Belize, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, to provide free outpatient health care services to communities in need. Planning, coordination, and implementation included representatives from several U.S. government departments and agencies, such as Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Health and Human Services, and U.S. Public Health Service, as well as volunteers from nongovernmental organizations such as Operation HOPE,<sup>81</sup> Operation Smile,<sup>82</sup> and Atlanta Rotary Club.

The embarked medical crew of more than 500 doctors, nurses, and healthcare professionals brought a wide range of capabilities, including medical, dental, nursing, pharmacy, veterinarian, engineering, and environmental health services. These U.S. federal government and U.S. nongovernmental organization professionals were trained and equipped to provide general outpatient surgery, ophthalmology surgery, basic medical evaluation and treatment, preventative medicine treatment, dental screenings and treatment, optometry screenings, eyewear distribution, public health training, and veterinary services.

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81. See [www.projhope.org](http://www.projhope.org).

82. See [www.operationssmile.org](http://www.operationssmile.org).



As of early September 2007, more than 76,000 patients had been seen. Since so many patients need to be treated for more than one medical condition, this resulted in a total of 295,817 patient encounters.

### ***Military-to-Military Exchanges***

The DOD conducts International Military Education and Training (IMET) to:

- encourage mutually beneficial and increased understanding between the U.S. and foreign countries
- improve the ability of participating foreign countries to achieve greater self-reliance by effectively utilizing their resources (including defense articles and services obtained from the U.S.)
- increase awareness of the national publics of countries participating in this training of issues related to internationally-recognized human rights

DOD also operates Regional Centers for Security Studies, such as the Marshall Center and the Asia Pacific Center. During 2007, military-to-military exchanges included 2,300 IMET participants and 1,900 Department of Defense Regional Center participants.

## **Organizing the U.S. Government for Integrated Strategic Communication**

Rapid response to emerging situations is a demanding discipline requiring dedication of time, attention, and resources. Necessarily, the concept development, experimentation, and identification of new audiences and new vehicles all take a back seat to short-term exigencies.

As a result of current federal funding and resource allocation levels, U.S. government strategic communication teams are limited in their ability to explore mid-range and long-range strategic communication strategies and initiatives. Nor do they have time to formalize lessons learned for use by other U.S. government teams working on similar issues, or consistently pool social and cultural information across departments and agencies as a shared resource for future use. Pockets

of exceptional U.S. government expertise are interwoven with shared blind spots.

The PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, the Interagency Crisis Communication Team, and the Counterterrorism Communications Center all have evolved to enhance interagency coordination. However, there is currently no formal, centralized conduit for strategic communication exchange. Only a central repository for foreign public opinion data is contemplated by the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*.

Without diminishing the ability of the U.S. government to manage more immediate challenges, improvements in four areas would facilitate the ability of the government to achieve integrated strategic communication as called for in the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*.

1. know what the U.S. government knows
2. increase social and cultural understanding
3. collaborate with outside partners and experts
4. facilitate U.S. government strategic communication integration

### ***Know What the U.S. Government Knows***

The opportunity to methodically build upon the knowledge base and lessons learned of past and current U.S. government strategic communication efforts across country teams, departments, and agencies is currently constrained by time-sensitive demands, current staffing, and funding levels.

Currently, when a department or agency faces a strategic communication informational need or skill set beyond the ability of its staff it will often contract individually with an outside supplier, not knowing that related data or skill sets already exist or are being simultaneously pursued elsewhere in the U.S. government. Not only is this wasteful in terms of time and assets, but it greatly reduces, if not eliminates, the opportunity to both build upon lessons learned elsewhere and to combine resources in a superior joint effort.

Such government-wide situational awareness is limited by the lack of a central clearinghouse for information, lessons learned, and professional resources related to U.S. government strategic communication. The lack of such a clearinghouse makes it challenging and time-consuming for any individual strategic communication team to know what other U.S. government and industry experts know and to leverage that knowledge in a time-sensitive environment to the advantage of the nation. It also reduces the ability for coordinated interagency and public/private partnerships to face shared challenges.

Similar needs for collaborative information flow and dissemination have resulted in the development of data fusion centers, such as the Counterterrorism Communications Center at the Department of State and the NCTC at the Directorate of National Intelligence. NCTC also hosts a repository, NCTC Online, that serves as a library of information across the full range of intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, and other federal organizations working on associated national security issues.

### ***Increase Social and Cultural Understanding***

The complexity of the challenges associated with strategic communication is increasing. Dramatic changes in information technology and media interface have enabled communities of interest to proactively use the mediasphere.

As a result of the advent of global internet connectivity with low barriers to participation, the prior communication model is transitioning from “top-down and one-to-many” to “bottom-up and many-to-many” in which one individual or small groups can truly shape opinion through their words and actions.

In light of the complexity associated with the successful management of U.S. government strategic communication today and in the future, many managers currently responsible for strategic communication have been working to develop comprehensive planning tools. In December 2006, the *Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM3-24/MCMP3-33.5) highlighted the importance of deep cultural understanding. In June 2007 the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy*

*and Strategic Communication* called for a central repository of information and analysis of public opinion in different countries. Both of these documents highlighted the need for greater interagency exchange within the U.S. government and collaboration with external partners.

### ***Collaborate with Outside Partners and Experts***

The United States has an exceptional range and depth of expertise among its corporations, universities, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens. Many are world-class practitioners of strategic communication or have skills that are essential to its successful implementation in various cultural contexts. Others have long established track records of successful programmatic implementation on their own initiative or in partnership with the U.S. government. Their contributions to future U.S. government efforts could both complement and supplement the capacities and resources of current staffs.

Partnering with the U.S. government to achieve shared goals can be a challenging bureaucratic process. Both USAID and the Department of State have created offices to facilitate the process.

USAID maintains a registry of U.S. private and voluntary organizations seeking to work with USAID. Through a competitive grant program administered by its Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, USAID provides direct support to efforts made by the U.S. private and voluntary organization community and by its partner nongovernmental organizations to address critical needs in developing countries and emerging democracies. Non-profit organizations based outside the U.S. work directly with USAID missions.

**“We also must develop effective ways to marshal the great creativity of our private sector. American companies, universities, private foundations, our travel industry all have extensive contact with people throughout the world...I welcome ideas to more fully engage the private sector because I believe this engagement is critical to our success.”**

*Karen Hughes, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs*

In 2006, the Office of Private Sector Outreach was established at the Department of State to facilitate partnerships between the U.S. government and companies, universities, foundations, and nongovernmental organizations. However, on an individual expert level, the U.S. government is not organized or resourced to readily identify, mobilize, and fund significant collaboration with outside individuals who possess expertise relevant to advancing U.S. government strategic communication objectives. This is a time-consuming process requiring a depth of industry contacts that strategic communication practitioners cannot be expected to have the time to maintain or expand.

Listed here are just a few of the professional skill sets present in the U.S. population that have direct relevance to strategic communication:

- **Communications technologists** can provide insight toward methodologies that maximize utility of existing communication modalities, as well as identify emerging technical capabilities.
- **Behavioral scientists and cultural anthropologists** provide deep understanding of human cultures, identities, attitudes, and behaviors.
- **Educators** with knowledge of culturally relevant pedagogies offer valuable perspectives.
- **Historians** are versed in cultural perspectives and can act as interpreters of current and future events.
- **Economists** provide data models to understand and forecast financial events.
- **Religious scholars and leaders** offer insight into important dimensions of cultural life.
- **Linguists and translators** develop cultural sensitivities that are of great value in the selection of key words, messages, and communication formats that resonate with intended audiences.
- **Political scientists** provide insights into power and influence in modern societies.

- **Librarians and researchers** provide expert information access and data management skills and have country- and culture-specific knowledge, contacts, and capabilities.
- **Corporate business managers and entrepreneurs** have country and regional cultural experience, as well as ongoing relationships with international audiences, government leaders, and nongovernmental voluntary organizations.
- **Marketing managers** of products and services are accustomed to leading the complex and interdisciplinary management process associated with building and maintaining brand equity.
- **Market researchers** who advise U.S. global brand management teams have developed a wide range of measurement techniques to research and monitor international consumer interests, attitudes and preferences.
- **Advertising copywriters, art directors, and media planners** have proven abilities to transform copy and media strategies into compelling messages, events, and programs, as well as identify media vehicles that attract target audiences.
- **Producers and directors** of films, television programming, radio, video games, and advertising commercials are expert in crafting compelling and persuasive storylines and images.
- **Artists, authors, and musicians** live lives of demonstrated creativity that transcends national boundaries, and their personal stories and bodies of work offer windows into the American population.
- **Retired government officials** can provide historical perspective as well as program continuity.

### ***Facilitate U.S. Government Strategic Communication Integration***

As mandated in June 2007 by the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, all U.S. government departments, agencies, and embassies are required to develop an agency-specific plan

to implement the public diplomacy/strategic communication objectives of the national strategy.

This requirement represents an important step forward in the integration of strategic communication across the U.S. government. However, without the time to build leadership and staff awareness of the “best practices” and “tactics, techniques, and procedures” in the private sector and social sector with relevance to integrating strategic communication across the U.S. government, the forthcoming plans are likely to reflect existing programs and trends. U.S. government strategic communication would benefit from shared access to lessons learned and knowledge of outside sources of expertise.

With the recognition of the importance of integrated strategic communication in the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* and its contribution to successful achievement of the national security strategy, it becomes important to provide additional support to these interagency and intra-agency efforts.

## Chapter 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

In light of a changing world and the significant impact new technology and media are having on information flow, effective, comprehensive, and coordinated strategic communication is vital to U.S. national security. Since the DSB last reported on this issue in 2004, positive changes were implemented in the DOD and Department of State. However, when compared to the private sector and civil sector enterprises, which have rapidly embraced the capabilities associated with integrated strategic communication, the U.S. government continues to have an underdeveloped strategic communication management process. The conclusion of the task force is that much remains to be done to achieve an effective strategic communication approach, infrastructure, and operation.

In order to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. government strategic communication enterprise, the task force makes seven recommendations:

1. Create a Center for Global Engagement.
2. Consolidate the nation's strategic communication leadership.
3. Invest in critical information science and technology (S&T) opportunities.
4. Significantly increase Department of State budget for public diplomacy and exchanges.
5. Review the Broadcasting Board of Governors missions, structure, funding, and performance.
6. Significantly increase DOD budget for strategic communication.
7. Take immediate actions that leverage existing budgets and programs to achieve near and medium term benefits.



## Center for Global Engagement

In seeking ways to enhance government-private sector collaboration in support of strategic communication, the task force examined roles, functions, and organizational structures. We concluded that direction, planning, coordination, and programmatic implementation is a government responsibility requiring change at the White House and National Security Council (NSC) level. We also concluded that America's interests would be well-served by creating a Congressionally mandated independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Global Engagement (CGE).

The center should be a hybrid organization modeled on FFRDCs, such as the RAND Corporation and the National Endowment for Democracy. The center should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation. Its authority should enable it to provide services to government departments on a cost-recovery basis and contract with academic, commercial, and government and non-government organizations.

The NSC's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee should provide program and project direction to the center. The Center for Global Engagement should be governed by an independent nonpartisan board of directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an *ex officio* member of the board. The board of directors should appoint the center's director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance.

The center should be guided by three purposes:

1. Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decision-makers on issues vital to U.S. national security, including global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences; information technologies; the implications of all source intelligence assessments; and non-

departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices.

2. Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products, and programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats.
3. Support government strategic communications through services provided on a cost recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term assignments; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness.

The center would perform functions in six critical areas:

1. Perform audience polling and analysis, including ethnographic, psychographic, demographic, behavioral, and tracking research; hypothesis testing (focus groups); and other “listening” and assessment techniques used in political campaigns.
2. Perform cultural influence analysis, including values, religion, entertainment, and education.
3. Analyze media influences on audiences, including content analysis, agendas, political/social tendencies, relevance and credibility, and media organization structure, ownership, and business models.
4. Foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information.
5. Work with the commercial and academic sectors for the development of a range of products and programs that communicate strategic themes and messages to appropriate target audiences. Broad themes and messages would include respect for human dignity and individual rights; individual education and economic opportunity; and personal freedom, safety, and mobility. Examples of products would be a children’s TV series; video and interactive games; support for

the distribution and production of selected foreign films; and web communications, including blogs, chat rooms, and electronic journals. Programs might include training and exchanges of journalists, support for selected foreign television documentaries, maintenance of databases of third party validators and supporters for conferences, and the design and implementation of country and regional campaigns to support themes and messages and de-legitimize extremism and terrorism.

6. Continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness, efficiency, and message continuity to adapt themes, products, and programs as directed by the Chair of the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee and its members.

Program execution and operational implementation will continue to be a government responsibility.

The center should receive core funding that supports steady state operations through a new Congressional line item in the Department of State's annual appropriation. To initiate funding for the center, a new appropriation of \$50 million should be included in fiscal year 2009. This core funding should grow to \$150 million over a five-year period. The center's core funding would support basic operations (staff and administration), information and analysis (polling, media research, cultural studies), maintenance of databases and skills inventories, and self-initiated projects and programs.

The center would also develop additional funding for projects and programs provided through contracts and task orders from the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee's departments and agencies (e.g., DOD, USAID). We estimate that the funds from other agencies and departments would be modest initially but would grow to about \$100 million over five years as the CGE establishes its credibility. Total funding for the CGE is expected to exceed \$250 million after five years.

The center's success will depend on its ability to serve as a central source of independent, objective expertise safeguarded from special pleadings of organizational interests. Structures and methods must:

- be agile, adaptable, and cutting edge
- are multi-disciplinary and fuse capabilities from a variety of sources
- respect past gains as they lay a strong foundation for the future

Regular critical feedback to key decision-makers based on polling and research, and longer-term independent analyses that help refocus and reassess policy and strategic communication initiatives, will be essential.

Therefore, the task force makes the following recommendation:

***Recommendation 1.***

***The Center for Global Engagement*** \_\_\_\_\_

The President, Congressional leaders, and interested organizations outside government collaborate to create an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan Center for Global Engagement. Three principles should guide the establishment and work of the center. First, the direction, planning, and execution of the government's strategic communication instrument are government responsibilities. Second, government cannot succeed in carrying out its responsibilities without sustained, innovative, and high quality support from civil society. Third, the academic, research, business, and non-profit communities offer deep reservoirs of untapped knowledge, skills, credibility, and agility needed to strengthen strategic communication.

The Center for Global Engagement should be a:

- 501(c)(3) corporation with an independent director and board of directors
- means to motivate and attract civil society's best and brightest
- hub for innovation in cultural understanding, technology, and media
- repository of expertise
- magnet for innovative ideas
- means to institutionalize continuity and long-term memory

- focus for experimentation and project development

The task force recommends that Congress provide the Department of State with \$500,000 to develop a charter that will define the mission, structure, and operations of the CGE. The department should award these funds through a competitive grant to an organization or group of organizations that will prepare and execute a business plan leading to the creation of the CGE as an independent corporate entity (one option could be to extend the mission of an existing FFRDC or 501(c)3 corporation).

Thereafter, Congress should provide sustained funding for the CGE through a line item in the Department of State's budget. This should be new money appropriated to the department. Congress should provide the CGE with an initial appropriation of \$50 million in fiscal year 2009. The objective should be steady funding growth, consistent with performance and use by multiple government agencies, to \$250 million during the first five years.

The CGE should:

- respond to multi-agency government taskings, coordinated through a National Security Council Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication
- provide deep understanding of cultures and cultural dynamics, core values of other societies, and media and technology trends
- provide core data, best practices, and an opinion research clearing house in support of government sponsored strategic communication programs
- assess the effectiveness of national strategic communication activities and programs
- collaborate with independent organizations that promote universal values, cultural understanding, and global engagement
- maintain a repository of strategic communication talent, skills, and capabilities
- attract fellows from the academic, non-profit, and business communities and from government

## **Strategic Communication Leadership**

To ensure that gains made in the planning and conduct of the nation's strategic communication are maintained and built upon, it is crucial that the U.S. consolidate strategic communication leadership. We recommend that the NSC establish and coordinate a Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication. We also recommend that the position of Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication (DNA/SC) be established to provide a direct link between the leadership of strategic communication and the President.

We also recommend that the current position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs be chair of the Policy Coordinating Committee for Strategic Communication.

We also recommend that the Office of Management and Budget create a position of Program Associate Director for Strategic Communication to allow effective coordination and advocacy for the overall government wide funding profile.

### ***Recommendation 2.*** ***Leadership*** \_\_\_\_\_

Create a permanent strategic communication structure within the White House with these elements:

- a Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication
- a Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication
- a Strategic Communication Policy Committee, chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication, to include all departments and agencies with substantial strategic communication responsibilities
- an Associate Director for Strategic Communication in the Office of Management and Budget

- legal and regulatory authorities as necessary for the Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication to:
  - (1) assign operational responsibilities, transfer funds, and concur in personnel appointments
  - (2) provide guidance on strategic communication to an independent CGE

Figure 28 establishes the relationships between the new leadership changes we have recommended and the CGE. The position of NSC Deputy for Strategic Communication and the new Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication will develop policy and advise the President and Principals Committee through the normal NSC process. The existing PCC for Strategic Communication should be strengthened and maintained with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as chair. The PCC will receive policy guidance from the Deputy NSC Advisor and the Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication and will work with the leadership of the CGE to reach out to industry, academia, nongovernmental organizations, and other think-tanks to provide the cultural and media analyses, establish focus groups on strategic communication, and develop programs and projects as directed by the PCC that support strategic communication objectives.



**Figure 28.** Organization for Strategic Communication

## Critical Information S&T Opportunities

There are a number of scientific and technological tools and methodologies that can be applied to the understanding of today's complex information ecology. The Internet has created a vast universe of real-time and archival information and a Petri dish for experimentation that can be used and analyzed to better understand what the world is thinking and how this thinking can be influenced.

Social network analysis has matured in recent years and can be applied to Internet traffic to identify nodes of influence in the viral flow of information. Who are the change agents and opinion leaders in a particular culture, region, or topic? The hypothesis is that there are a small number of these influential nodes, which reduces the problem of achieving mass influence to the more tractable problem of influencing a few key people.



Machine translation is currently at a state at which it can be used to automatically analyze Internet content. It can also be used in the analysis of content in printed media, and to a lesser degree, that in broadcast radio and television. From these translations it is possible to extract not only raw information and opinion, but indications and metrics about attitudes and feelings about important issues.

Sentiment analysis is a technique used to detect favorable and unfavorable opinions toward specific subjects within large numbers of documents. Using a syntactic parser and a “sentiment lexicon” it identifies the semantic relationships between the sentiment expressions and the subject of interest. Put simply, it tells us what the world (or some meaningful subset of the world) thinks about something.

While there is much that can be done with existing tools, strategic communication is a field that could greatly benefit from an expanded research program. Because of the revolutionary changes in the communications landscape in recent years, the field is fertile with new opportunities for the derivation and application of analytical techniques. This research program can be started immediately with existing mechanisms at the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Science Foundation, and within the intelligence community. The task force is recommending an increase in funding for this area of \$50 million.

Finally, it must be emphasized how important it is for the people and organizations involved in strategic communications to share both data and results across the entire community. While this should go without saying, too often sharing becomes the exception, rather than the rule.

### ***Recommendation 3.***

#### ***Critical S&T Opportunities*** \_\_\_\_\_

The DOD needs to make greater use of existing tools and technologies to support strategic communication. For example, existing S&T capacity can be used to:

- identify nodes of influence through network analysis

- support communication and media analysis with machine translation
- understand viral information flows and influences
- utilize innovative evaluation/measurement methodologies (such as sentiment detection/analysis)

The task force recommends that \$50 million a year be invested to advance knowledge in these areas and that this research budget be managed by DARPA, the National Science Foundation, and the intelligence community. The task force recognizes the current but disparate efforts in these areas and recommends vigorous engagement across the strategic communication community to share the existing knowledge base.

### **Significant Increase in Department of State Budget for Public Diplomacy and Exchanges**

The task force recommends strengthening the current position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The under secretary should have the authority and responsibility to review, coordinate, and certify to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) agency budgets for strategic communication, including but not limited to State, Defense, USAID, Treasury, Commerce, and others. To accomplish this, it may be necessary to seek legislative changes to provide the DNA/SC authority to allocate, transfer, and reprogram strategic communication funds. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should also have the authority to review and concur on key strategic communication/public diplomacy personnel assignments within the Department of State, as well as to control strategic communication resources and personnel currently lodged in State's regional and functional bureaus.

We recommend a substantial increase in the budget for public diplomacy programs and exchanges at the Department of State. Specifically, over a five-year period, beginning in fiscal year 2009, we recommend tripling the President's fiscal year 2008 request.

While we do not wish to prescribe specific allocations for these budgetary increases, we do suggest some specific areas of focus. For educational and cultural exchange programs, we believe substantial increases should go to the Fulbright; the International Visitor Leadership Program; youth exchanges; English language instruction; increased utilization of “cultural diplomats,” such as American sports and entertainment figures; and programs to increase opportunities for Americans to study and conduct research abroad and to provide exchange and training opportunities for key foreign influences, including journalists, pundits, academics, and government officials.

For the diplomatic and consular programs/public diplomacy account, emphasis should be placed on the recruitment, training, and deployment overseas of public diplomacy positions, and in particular to make senior public diplomacy Foreign Service officers available as advisors to combatant commanders. Increases should also be provided for opinion, attitude, and behavioral research and evaluation of, and for, public diplomacy programs. Other areas of emphasis include expanded Bureau of International Information Program activities (use of the Internet, foreign language websites, blogging, text messaging), as well as more “traditional” programs, such as book translation programs.

***Recommendation 4.***

***Department of State*** \_\_\_\_\_

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should be given enhanced policy, budget, and personnel authorities.

The task force recommends a significant increase in the budget for the State Department’s public diplomacy programs, including exchanges over a five-year period. The budget should be tripled and those additional funds be used in the following areas:

- exchanges (such as Fulbright, International Visitor Leadership Program, International Military Education and Training)
- Americans studying/conducting research abroad
- recruitment, training and deployment of additional public diplomacy positions

- support for strategic communication and public diplomacy activities of the U.S. military's combatant commands
- Internet, websites, blogging, rapid response units, and Digital Outreach Teams
- opinion, attitude, and behavioral research and evaluation of/for public diplomacy programs
- book translation programs
- utilization of sports and entertainment figures as cultural diplomats
- training and partnerships with key civil society activists (journalists, local media, civic organizations)
- online English language programs focused on marginalized young Muslim populations
- public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job creation in key strategic nations (Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, for example).

The task force recommends that a senior State Department public diplomacy representative be assigned to each combatant command.

## **Review of Broadcasting Board of Governors Mission, Structure, Funding, and Performance**

The Broadcasting Board of Governors oversees an array of important, global media that reaches tens of millions of people in 57 languages. The context in which these media operate is in rapid transition. The traditional distinction between international broadcasting (high frequency and medium wave radio) and domestic broadcasting (AM/FM radio and terrestrial broadcast TV) is blurring, and both international and domestic broadcasters are increasingly being supplanted by trans-national direct broadcast satellite TV and a growing assortment of Internet-based media offerings.

Audience preferences and habits are changing and U.S. national strategic communication priorities are increasingly focused on reaching audiences in areas with significant Muslim populations. The entities that

provide BBG broadcast services (VOA, RFE/RL, RFA, Radio and TV Marti, Middle East Broadcasting Networks) are responding to this shift in audience preference and national priorities. Radio continues to be the dominant distribution medium, but several services are accelerating a transition to TV distribution. This requires new investment in production facilities, training, and distribution.

There is also increasing use of internet protocol–based services (web sites, podcasts, etc.) Both VOA and REF/RL have achieved significant success with their web distribution.

***Recommendation 5.***

***Broadcasting Board of Governors*** \_\_\_\_\_

Conduct a review of the mission, structure, funding, and performance of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, as an integral element of the overall U.S. strategic communication capability. The task force recommends that the following be part of the review:

- current media mix
- relationship among the U.S. international broadcasting services (e.g., VOA, RFE/RL, RFA)
- utilization of new communication media
- new models for utilization and funding of news and program services
- language priorities (currently 60 languages)
- audience research (market research, media usage, impact)
- management structures and relationships with the executive branch.

The task force is pleased with the passage of Section 316 of the 9/11 bill that provides the President new authority to support requirements for surge broadcasting. The task force urges the administration and the Congress to implement procedures and funding measures to utilize this much-needed authority when a surge requirement is identified.

## **Significant Increase in the DOD Budget for Strategic Communication**

The task force recommends that the Department of Defense create a permanent leadership position to coordinate all strategic communication activities within the Department and provide representation to the PCC for Strategic Communication. We believe this requires a new permanent policy office led by a Deputy Under Secretary with representation from the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. This new office would review and coordinate all strategic communication to foreign audiences across public affairs, information operations, and the combatant command domains.

The task force recommends that the Department make the investments necessary to create an off-the-shelf capability to enable Joint Task Force personnel, in coordination with host nation representatives, to communicate effectively with affected publics. Significant deficiencies in this critical component of stability operations existed in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and would most likely be the case in many of the large ungoverned, or marginally governed, spaces that Joint Task Force commanders could encounter. We also urge the Department to ensure that planning for such communication shortfalls be included in both Contingency Planning Guidance and Security Cooperation Guidance to the combatant commands.

Currently, DOD-funded FFRDCs, such as RAND and the Institute for Defense Analyses, provide indirect support to the combatant commands by working through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and supporting commands such as Joint Forces Command. Ongoing research programs on empowering moderate and countering extremist voices, for example, could be developed on a regional basis for application in partnership with country teams and local authorities. Engagement strategies for regional media and other influence nodes could be developed and tailored for each combatant command.

The task force also identified more specific actions that could, if taken, provide direct support to security cooperation programs. Replicating the recent deployment of the *USNS Comfort* to Central and

South America through activations of additional hospital ships would provide geographic combatant commands and country teams an opportunity to match words with actions about U.S. values, in partnership with local authorities and perhaps nongovernmental organizations (such as Doctors without Borders). Similarly, a cooperation program between the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and U.S. Strategic Command to provide unclassified reconnaissance products for regional and local environmental studies, crop management, and weather forecasting, for example, to country teams offers an opportunity to partner with local authorities.

The task force noted that there appear to be opportunities to leverage IMET and DOD Regional Center programs toward improving interaction between the military and the private sector. At the National Defense University, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces has unsuccessfully sought increasing industry representation across its annual future leaders class for several years.

Eliminate current funding restrictions on DOD Regional Centers providing for the participation by both faculty and students whose origin and expertise fall outside the security and defense occupational fields (e.g. journalists, media executives, and other opinion shapers). This would serve to significantly enrich a program that emphasizes educating the role of security in civilian societies, harmonizing views on common security challenges, de-legitimizing terrorist-driven extremism, and building support for moderate governments and societies.

Finally, the task force recognizes that the negative connotation people associate with the use of the term "PSYOP" hinders the effective application of sound principles and doctrine. The task force recommends that PSYOP activities that support military operations and training be relabeled "Tactical Information Operations." PSYOP support to U.S. embassies and to geographic combatant commands in the context of security cooperation should also be renamed more appropriately, such as "military information support" or "public diplomacy support."

***Recommendation 6.***  
***Department of Defense*** \_\_\_\_\_

Create a permanent Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Communication, reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This new office would include senior representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Joint Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. This new office would review and coordinate all information activities aimed at foreign audiences across public affairs and information operation domains.

Significantly increase the strategic communication budgets of each combatant command. Funding should be tripled and identified within a separate budget for each geographic combatant command. The additional funds should be used in the following activities:

- Task FFRDCs—such as the Institute for Defense Analyses and RAND—to conduct cultural analysis and program development in each combatant commander’s area of responsibility.
- Provide communications infrastructure in support of stability operations and disaster relief operations.
- Increase public affairs presence at combatant commands to support security cooperation.
- Increase collaborative planning and experimentation with nongovernmental organizations.

The task force recommends an increase in interagency engagements that support strategic communication activities by geographic combatant commands. For example:

- Increase hospital ship and crew activation to support security cooperation programs.
- Utilize Corps of Engineers capabilities to support programs for disaster relief, flood control, and infrastructure development (security cooperation).
- Release reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop management, weather forecasting, food and water supply management, deforestation, and other similar activities.



- Create opportunities for civil sector participation (media, NGOs, academics) at the National Defense University, the military service colleges, and Centers for Regional Security Studies.

Finally, the task force recommends that PSYOP be relabeled according to whether they are in support of military operations or other activities such as security cooperation and DOD support to public diplomacy.

## **Actions for Today**

### ***Recommendation 7.***

#### ***Actions for Today*** \_\_\_\_\_

Many of the specific actions identified in recommendations 4 and 6 can be implemented immediately, and are organized here in recommendation 7. The task force recommends that the Departments of Defense and State implement immediate actions such as:

- Establish and enhance combatant commander budgets for strategic communication to
  - fund FFRDCs to conduct cultural analysis and program developments in the area of responsibility
  - provide communications infrastructure in support of stability operations and disaster relief operations
- Increase DOD support for strategic communication through, for example:
  - increases in hospital ship and crew activation to support security cooperation programs
  - release of reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop management, weather forecasting, food and water supply management, and deforestation
  - creation of opportunities for civil sector participation at the National Defense University, the military service colleges, and Centers for Regional Security Studies

- Expand the Department of State's strategic communication funding and for activities such as:
  - online English language programs focused on marginalized young Muslim populations
  - Internet, websites, blogging, rapid response units, and Digital Outreach Teams
  - public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job creation in key strategic regions (such as Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq).

## Appendix A. Task Force Membership

### CHAIRMAN

Name	Affiliation
Mr. Vincent Vitto*	Private Consultant

### TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Mr. Robert Coonrod	Private Consultant
Dr. Barry Fulton	Private Consultant
Prof. Bruce Gregory	George Washington University
Prof. Anita Jones*	University of Virginia
Dr. Robert Lucky*	Private Consultant
Dr. Mark Maybury	The MITRE Corporation
Ms. Leigh Warner	Private Consultant

### GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Amb. Brian Carlson	State Department and OSD Policy
BG Mari Eder	Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, US Army
Mr. Morris Jacobs	U.S. State Department
Mr. John Matheny	OSD Policy
Mr. John Mills	OASD NII / CIO
RDML Frank Thorp	Joint Communications and SCIG, OSD

### STAFF

Mr. Andrew Chappell	DSB Military Liaison
Dr. Philippe Loustaunau	Strategic Analysis Inc.

\* Defense Science Board member

## Appendix B. Presentations to the Task Force

Name	Topic
<b>MARCH 1, 2007</b>	
Mr. Alberto Fernandez, Director, Middle-East, U.S. Department of State  Mr. Thomas Skipper, Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Department of State	Views from the Regional Bureaus
Ms. Gretchen Welch, PPR Director, U.S. Department of State	Policy Plans and Resources (PPR)
Mr. Jeremy Curtin, IIP Coordinator, U.S. Department of State	International Information Programs (IIP)
Mr. Thomas Farrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Academic Programs, U.S. Department of State  Ms. Chris Miner, Managing Director for Professional and Cultural Exchanges Programs, U.S. Department of State	Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
<b>MARCH 23, 2007</b>	
Mr. Robert Giesler, USD (Intelligence)  Col Glen Ayers, J-39	IO and PSYOP
RDML Frank Thorp, Director, OASD (Public Affairs)  Ms. Alisa Stack-O'Conner, USD (Policy)	Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy
Hon. Ryan Henry, PUSD (Policy)  LTG Walter (Skip) Sharp, DJS JCS	Roundtable Discussion
Mr. Michael Pease, IDA  Dr. Caroline Ziemke, IDA	Discussion

**APRIL 13, 2007**

Dr. Jon B. Alterman, Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)	The Lexus Hits an Olive Tree
Mr. David Brugger, CEO of Brugger Consulting & Brugger Global Media, former President, Association of America's Public Television Stations (APTS)  William Siemering, President, Developing Radio Partners	Community-Based Media
Mr. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, chairman of U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)	BBG Perspective
Mr. Gary Knell, President and CEO, Sesame Workshop	Sesame Perspective
Mr. Joe Norris, Senior Analyst/Transnational Issues Terrorism/Near East Program, DNI Open Source Center  Dr. William C. Hannas, Senior Officer for East Asia S&T, DNI Open Source Center	The Current State of the Arab Media and The China RDA Metadata Mapping Project
Dr. Adam Powell, Director, Integrated Media Systems Center, USC Viterbi School of Engineering	International Broadcasting: Future Trends and Techniques

**MAY 4, 2007**

Ms. Mary Lou Jepsen, MIT Media Lab	One Laptop per Child
Mr. Robert Gehorsam, CEO, Forterra Systems Inc.	On Line Gaming
Mr. Ben Gross, Social Technologies Group, UC Berkeley, and UI Urbana-Champaign	Social Technologies
Ms. Susan Gigli, Chief Operating Officer, InterMedia  Dr. Haleh Vaziri, Regional Research Manager for Middle East/North Africa, InterMedia	InterMedia

Mr. Mike Pease, IDA	Enemy use of Immersive Computer Game Technology
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**MAY 18, 2005**

Mr. Kevin Klose, President, NPR	NPR perspective
Ms. Jody Olsen, Deputy Director, Peace Corps	Peace Corps Perspective
Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND	Discussion
Professor Jarol B. Manheim, School of Media and Public Affairs, GWU	Social Network Analysis
Mr. Bruce Sherman, BBG Mr. Brian Conniff, BBG	BBG 2008-2013 strategy Radio Sawa & AlHurra TV

## **Appendix C. Executive Summary and Recommendations from the 2004 DSB Report on Strategic Communication**

Below are the executive summary and the recommendations of the 2004 Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication.<sup>83</sup>

The Defense Science Board Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities was formed in early 2004 (the terms of reference are contained in Appendix A) and culminated in the production of a final report and summary briefing in August of 2004. The DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication conducted its deliberations within the overall Summer Study schedule and revisited a topic that was addressed in October 2001.<sup>84</sup> The current Strategic Communication Task Force re-examined the purposes of strategic communication and the salience of recommendations in the earlier study. It then considered the following questions:

- a. What are the consequences of changes in the strategic communication environment?
- b. What Presidential direction and strategic communication means are required?
- c. What should be done about public diplomacy and open military information operations?

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83. [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic\\_Communication.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf)

84. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, October 2001, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/mid.pdf>. The report was briefed to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Under Secretary of State for Management, and the National Security Council's Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications and Information and Senior Advisor for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations.

The task force met with representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), White House Office of Global Communications, Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and the private sector. Based on extensive interaction with a broad range of sectors in the government, commercial, and academic worlds, as well as a series of highly interactive internal debates, we have reached the following conclusions and recommendations.

This task force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be transformed.

America's negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem.

***Understanding the problem.*** Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative.

To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against the tactic of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both government and non-government. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states ("getting it right" in Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), we will fail. *Chapter 2 of this report examines the complex nature of this new paradigm and implications for sustained and imaginative action.*

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on "doable tasks," develops themes and



messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. This approach will build on in depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of sustained effort. Just as importantly, through evaluation and feedback, it will enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft. *Chapter 3 of this report addresses ways in which strategic communication can be generated and managed with effect.*

We need to move beyond outdated concepts, stale structural models, and institutionally based labels. Public diplomacy, public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) and open military information operations must be coordinated and energized. *Chapter 4 of this report recommends changes in the strategic communication functions and structures of the Departments of State and Defense, U.S. embassies and combatant commands.*

***Leadership from the top.*** A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required. Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the President's statements and actions, and those of senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices. Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards. These objectives mean

officials must take full advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, understand cultures, and assess influence structures – not occasionally but as an iterative process. *Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated.*

Swift and sustained Presidential direction is also required to connect strategy to structure.

In 1947, America confronted new threats and opportunities as well. The President with bipartisan support in Congress carried out policy and organizational initiatives that shaped U.S. national security for two generations. Today, we face challenges of similar magnitude, made more formidable by a world where geography, military power, and time to react are no longer sufficient to ensure our security. Strategic communication and other 21<sup>st</sup> century instruments of statecraft require changes different in kind but similar in scale to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

These changes will occur only with sustained, enthusiastic, and deeply committed Presidential leadership – and the collaborative and bipartisan support of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of Congress.

***Government-private sector partnership.*** Finding new ways to harness strategic communication to the flexibility and creative imagination of the private sector will be central to successful strategic communication in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The commercial sector has a dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and media surveys, information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring the influence of communications. Academic and research communities offer vast untapped resources for education, training, area and language expertise, planning and consultative services.

Effective sharing between government and society in the conduct of strategic communication is not new. Government grants to private organizations have long been a way to carry out international educational and cultural exchanges, foreign opinion polling, democratization and media training programs, and much of U.S. international broadcasting. Grants extend the reach of government

programs and capitalize on the expertise and flexibility of non-government partner organizations.

Recent study groups, including the October 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force, have recommended more extensive collaboration. These observers see value not only in leveraging private sector competencies but in new structures and a *degree of distance* that attracts credible messengers with non-government resumes, creative thinkers and talented communicators uncomfortable working with government agencies, and skilled, language qualified professionals available for temporary crisis deployment.

Collaboration between government and the many benefits of private sector thinking and skills should be strongly encouraged. The complexity of strategic communication problems calls for balanced coordination of effort. Independent analysis is required in a wide range of fields: cultures and values, international intellectual engagement, communications studies, and applied science. Teamwork among civilian agencies and military services will be necessary to draw effectively on the seminars of universities, professional skills of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and imagination of the media production industry. Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For all their strengths, private organizations represent particular interests. Investments in strategic communication must be grounded in the public interest as determined by appropriate executive branch and Congressional authorities.

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped implementation of U.S. strategic communication for more than half a century. New thinking and new collaborative structures hold promise of a transformed and continuous strategic communication capability that serves America's interests.

The task force has made a set of recommendations listed below which we believe will make a significant difference. The time line and scale of their impact is difficult to quantify but we will not succeed in revitalizing Strategic Communication if we tinker around the edges. Given the enormous challenges we face, we can succeed only if we use all the instruments of national power. We should expect to see some

progress within a year but we are dealing with at least a decade to have a significant impact. US public diplomacy efforts in the Cold War, the creation of the Peace Corps and the launch of a new brand or product within the private sector in a highly competitive environment are examples of efforts that have required comparable time scales and the challenges we face today are potentially more complex. We must begin and maintain our intensity and focus until we succeed.

### ***Recommendation 1.***

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The task force recommends that the President issue a directive to:

- Strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences;
- Coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations; and
- Provide a foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic communication.

### ***Recommendation 2.***

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The task force recommends that the President should establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create legislation and funding for a:

- Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication;
- Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC; and an
- Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the Director of Central Intelligence; the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations; concur in strategic communication personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide program and project direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication.

### ***Recommendation 3.***

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The task force recommends that the President work with Congress to create legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations represented on its Strategic Communication Committee. The Center should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Rand Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual appropriation approved by Congress as part of the Department of State budget. The NSC's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic Communication Committee should provide program and project direction to the Center. The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by an independent nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex-officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center's Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance.

The Center should be guided by three purposes:

- Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decision makers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends

and influences on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source intelligence assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices.

- Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats.
- Support government strategic communications through services provided on a cost recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness.

#### ***Recommendation 4.***

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The task force recommends that the Secretary of State redefine the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. The Under Secretary should serve as the Department's principal on the NSC's Strategic Communication Committee; have adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation; direct the Department's foreign opinion and media research activities; approve senior public diplomacy assignments; and review the performance ratings of public diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. The Department's current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy should be tripled from current levels and placed under the control of the Under Secretary. The Department should provide a core funding grant to the Center for Strategic Communication in the amount of an annual appropriation in the Department's budget.

***Recommendation 5.***

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The task force recommends that public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State should be at the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission positions or the Senior Foreign Service should have served at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in the Department or in an interagency assignment relevant to public diplomacy. The Bureau of International Information Programs should be directed by an Assistant Secretary.

***Recommendation 6.***

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The task force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department's principal on the NSC's Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee. The Under Secretary for Policy should coordinate strategic communication activities with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should extend the role and responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to act as the Department's focal point for military support of public diplomacy and create a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs to coordinate all activities associated with military support for public diplomacy; and provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation.

***Recommendation 7.***

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The task force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State's diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. STRATCOM's and U.S. SOCOM's Information Operations responsibilities to include DOD support for public diplomacy. The Department should triple current resources (personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DOD support to public

diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM for expanded support for strategic communication programs.



## **Appendix D. Recommendations from the 2001 DSB Report on Managed Information Dissemination**

Below are the recommendations of the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination<sup>85</sup>.

### ***Recommendation 1.***

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The task force recommends that the President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to

1. Strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and thereby shape understanding of and support for U.S. national security policies, and
2. Coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information.

The directive should require all regional and functional National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committees to

1. Assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when national security options are considered and
2. Recommend or develop strategies for public information dissemination strategies before or in concert with policy implementation.

### ***Recommendation 2.***

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The task force recommends that the NSPD establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. The committee should be chaired by a person of Under

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85. See <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf>

Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State. The chair will be assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members of senior rank should be designated by the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

### ***Recommendation 3.***

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The task force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy Coordinating Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities, including the authority to require

- Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures,
- Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications,
- Identify appropriate media channels, and
- Produce information products.

### ***Recommendation 4.***

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The task force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination through a dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the current interagency working group on international public information augmented by an expanded staff and budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A robust, expanded, and multi-agency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon expertise from DOS, DOD, the Joint Staff, 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group, CIA, and commercial media and communications entities must be established to facilitate audience research and to develop channels and information products.

***Recommendation 5.***

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The task force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the Department of State's International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.

***Recommendation 6.***

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The task force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and diversify the products and services of the Department of State's International Information Bureau to include significantly expanded use of

- Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcast channels;
- American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for both direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels;
- The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreign publics through foreign press and media channels;
- Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) containing key foreign audiences and influence structures;
- Joint State-DOD training and increased interagency assignments; and
- A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DOD officers available for crisis response deployment.

***Recommendation 7.***

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The task force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DOD under OASD(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DOD open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. DOD membership should

include senior Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives.

***Recommendation 8.*** \_\_\_\_\_

The task force recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DOD's draft OASD(SO/LIC) guidelines to

- Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff,
- Revitalize the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans,
- Strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government's strategic information programs, and
- Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee's Secretariat.

***Recommendation 9.*** \_\_\_\_\_

The task force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DOD's information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. Enhancements include

- Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV,
- Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue,
- Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and
- Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

***Recommendation 10.*** \_\_\_\_\_

The task force recommends that the President and his senior national security advisors strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by

- Insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed to the Internet revolution,
- Taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and
- Significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments and influence structures.

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
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## Appendix F. Glossary

BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CGE	Center for Global Engagement
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CSIS	Center for Strategic & International Studies
DARPA	Defense Advance Research Projects Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DNA/SC	Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication
DOD	Department of Defense
DSB	Defense Science Board
ECA	Educational and Cultural Affairs
ESL	English as a Second Language
FFRDC	Federally Funded Research and Development Center
FVI	First Voice International
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
IIP	International Information Programs
IMET	International Military Education and Training
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NGO	nongovernmental organizations
NSC	National Security Council

NSF	National Science Foundation
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committee
PPR	Policy Plans and Resources
PSYOP	psychological operations
RFA	Radio Free Asia
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
S&T	science and technology
SCIG	Strategic Communication Integration Group
TriM	Translingual Instant Messaging
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USNS	U.S. Naval Ship
VOA	Voice of America
WMD	weapons of mass destruction





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