

**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN LIBERIA:
MIXED RESULTS FROM HUMBLE BEGINNINGS**

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March 2008

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This monograph is largely based on a Refugees International mission to Liberia during August 2007. The mission had a two-fold objective: to assess the plight of people displaced during the war, and to assess progress with the process of security sector reform (SSR). Because of the dual nature of this mission and the resultant time constraints, interviews were not conducted with senior government officials beyond the Governance Reform Commission; nor were members of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice consulted before publication. Inputs from the Government of Liberia would have provided the basis for a more thorough and balanced analysis of the SSR process.

The author wishes to thank all in Liberia who provided information and insights. Superintendent Dag Roger Dahlen of the Norwegian Police and Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wyatt of the U.S. Army deserve special thanks for their time, interest, and candid exchange of information on police and military reform, respectively. Sincerest thanks also go to Colonels Clarence Bouchat and Thomas Dempsey of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the U.S. Army War College for reviewing and commenting on earlier drafts of the monograph.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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ISBN 1-58487-345-0


FOREWORD

The reform and the democratic control of the security sector—and the joining together of security and development—have become a major focus of international intervention into post-conflict societies. In theory, security sector reform (SSR) programs derive from a comprehensive national defense and security review. They involve, at the core, the transformation of a country's military and police forces—but they also involve a comprehensive review and restructuring of intelligence services, the penitentiary, the judiciary, and other agencies charged in some way with preserving and promoting the safety and security of the state and its citizenry. However, the process of SSR in Liberia, supported by the United Nations, the United States, and a number of bilateral donors, is far more rudimentary than the conceptual paradigm suggests. It is aimed simply at the training and equipping of the army and the police, with little attention or resources being devoted to the other components of the security system.

In this monograph, Mr. Mark Malan of Refugees International finds that the SSR program in Liberia is not governed by an overarching strategic framework, not informed by a wide-ranging and integrating public security concept, and not effectively linked to wider government planning and budgeting processes. He argues that a multi-sectoral, whole-of-government approach to SSR, while conceptually valid, has not been applied in Liberia. He concludes that much more can be done to arrest insecurity in Liberia within a more modest program that focuses primarily on military and criminal justice reform, but that this would require a sustained injection of technical and

financial support from the United States. He also calls for the U.S. Government to provide advice and support to the Government of Liberia in the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive national security strategy and policy.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on the role of the international community, and especially the United States, in supporting security sector reform in Africa as an essential building block for regional peace and security.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MARK MALAN joined Refugees International as Peacebuilding Program Officer in May 2007. He also serves as the Executive Coordinator for the Washington, DC-based Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. From 2004 to 2006, Mr. Malan headed the KAIPTC's Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Department, where he established and developed the Centre's research agenda and output. From 1996 to 2003, he was a senior researcher and head of the Peace Missions Program at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which delivered specialized training and research in support of ongoing efforts to establish indigenous Southern African capacities for participation in peace missions. Before joining the ISS, Mr. Malan enjoyed 20 years of service with the South African military, where he attained the rank of lieutenant colonel and held a variety of posts, including senior lecturer in Political Science at the SA Military Academy. Mr. Malan has developed a number of regional peacekeeping training courses and manuals, and has published extensively on issues relating to regional security and peacekeeping in Africa.

SUMMARY

After 14 years of civil war in which human rights were widely and seriously abused by all sides, there is a clear and urgent need to comprehensively reform Liberia's entire security sector. Outside of Europe, a whole-of-government approach to security sector reform (SSR) may be conceptually valid, but it seems to be unworkable in practice. In Africa, donor countries have not had the fortitude to see comprehensive processes through, and recipient countries have not had the financial and human resource capacity to implement or sustain ambitious, overarching SSR programs. Where United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are deployed, SSR continues to slip into a systemic funding vacuum, with the Security Council mandating missions to conduct SSR and hoping that a "lead nation" will step forward. The lead nation for Liberia, because of its "special relationship" with the country, is the United States.

Responsibility (including financial support) for the reconstitution of Liberia's security sector is shared among the U.S. Government, which is leading the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the Liberian government (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice), and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which is implementing police reform. Both the UN and the United States have made a promising start with police and military reform, but they have not done nearly enough towards accomplishing the SSR goals laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1509 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Liberia.

Since 2004, UN Police officers (UNPOL) have assisted the Liberian National Police (LNP) in trying to maintain law and order, at the same time as they

were mandated to restructure, retrain, and reequip the police service. However, UNMIL had no money to fulfill its mandate to rebuild the police from scratch. Instead, UN police vetted and recruited a few hundred new police officers from the dismantled LNP to work alongside them. The United States subsequently provided \$500,000 for training 3,500 new officers at the Liberian National Police Academy. By August 2007, 3,522 officers had graduated from the National Police Academy and are being deployed country-wide. But the LNP remains ineffective, largely because of critical shortages of essential police equipment – from vehicles and radios to handcuffs and raincoats (it rains 50 percent of the time in the country). Donors have provided assistance to the LNP in dribs and drabs, and invariably very late. Improving funding and addressing urgent leadership and management challenges will improve the present low morale and poor discipline of the LNP.

Progress with military reform has also been relatively slow. Liberia still has no operational army. What remained of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) after the war was effectively a force constituted of loyalists to deposed President Charles Taylor. The United States pledged \$210 million to the task of creating an effective 2,000-strong Liberian army, contracting DynCorp and PAE to help dissolve the old army and recruit and train a new force. While the DynCorp-led recruiting, vetting, and training process is ongoing and some recruits have completed a basic training course, they are not yet integrated into units under effective command. Weak and erratic funding from the U.S. Department of State is the main cause of the slow pace of AFL development. Liberia needs an operationally proficient army. In a region “awash

with small arms,” there is a constant need for effective patrolling to deter the cross-border movement of weapons and recruitment of mercenaries. The 14,000-strong UN force should therefore not be reduced below a strength of 9,000 until the AFL is operational.

Moreover, the UN should ensure that future benchmarks for the drawdown of UNMIL police officers and military forces are determined by qualitative criteria, not based on numbers trained. This will require enhanced efforts to produce reliable crime statistics and the conduct of victimization surveys among the population of Monrovia and the rural areas. It should also entail a shift in mindset from quantity to quality of human resources, including the development of personal performance appraisal systems.

It is further recommended that the UN and the U.S. Government, in close consultation, robustly advise and support the Government of Liberia with the process of drafting and adopting a comprehensive national security strategy and policy—as a matter of utmost priority within the wider governance reform agenda. This would provide a legitimate policy framework within which to get the AFL fully operational without further time slippage so that it can conduct operations alongside UNMIL before the final drawdown and exit of the UN force. It is also essential that the U.S. Congress provide sufficient funding to the SSR Program to keep the buildup of the AFL, UN planning for the drawdown of UNMIL, and ultimately the peacebuilding process in Liberia all on track. At the same time, Congress should insist on more credible measures to ensure that civics and human rights become a central element of the U.S. training program for the AFL.

Ultimately, the U.S. Government should move beyond the current short-termism of the SSR Program; it should transform it into an approach that embodies a “sustained injection of technical and financial support” and includes the integration of active duty U.S. military advisors into the AFL, as well as closer coordination with and support to UNMIL and the LNP. To consolidate democratic gains and avoid a relapse into armed conflict, the UN and the United States, as well as other significant donor partners, need to stay the course in Liberia as they have done in Kosovo. SSR is a long-term process, not an ephemeral event.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN LIBERIA: MIXED RESULTS FROM HUMBLE BEGINNINGS

INTRODUCTION

Fourteen years of civil war displaced nearly one-third of Liberia's population and took the lives of approximately 250,000 people. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1989, Liberia's rulers had developed systems of parallel and informal governance that marginalized and hollowed-out state institutions. They virtually subcontracted the management of state security and revenue resources to an informal group of presidential associates – which led inevitably to the collapse of the state bureaucracy and security services. By the 1990s, the Liberian state no longer maintained a monopoly over force, and did not collect revenues or administer territory. Rather, Liberia had evolved into a nonstate oligarchy, which – under the Presidency of Charles Taylor – became the most extreme and pernicious form of privateer governance in West Africa.

The results of misrule, combined with civil war, are evident. Nearly 85 percent of the adult population is unemployed, and 80 percent live below the poverty line. Public and private institutions as well as infrastructure have been destroyed, all but eliminating foreign investment and confidence. Water and electricity are urgently needed for the urban areas. The capital city Monrovia has grown from a city with a prewar population of 300,000 to well over a million people. There are only an estimated 25 Liberian medical doctors in the country to care for a population of approximately 3 million people.

The international community is now supporting a multidimensional transition from war to peace,

from militant misrule to rule of law. This support has coalesced around the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Established in September 2003 by Security Council Resolution 1509, UNMIL has helped to restore relative calm to the country by supporting and overseeing a Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) process entailing the disarmament of over 100,000 combatants, the disbanding of the former armed factions, partially restoring state authority in the counties, and launching a security sector reform (SSR) program.

Despite this progress, there is little room for complacency. The incidence of armed robbery – often involving gangs – and of rape and gender-based violence is still unnervingly high, and by all accounts on the increase. There have been violent protests by disgruntled groups and incidents relating to land disputes, as well as several violent demonstrations involving university students. Former combatants continue to stage demonstrations to protest delays in the payment of subsistence allowances.¹

With so many disaffected former combatants on the streets and out of work, Liberia remains vulnerable to acts of subversion. On July 17, 2007, George Koukou, a former Speaker of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, and Major General Charles Julu, a former Army Chief of Staff and commander of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit during President Doe's administration, were arrested and charged with treason for planning to destabilize the Government. Julu had led a coup attempt in 1994. The arrests were made after local authorities in Côte d'Ivoire detained a third Liberian, Colonel Dorbor, who had allegedly attempted to purchase and transport arms to Liberia. According to Information Minister Lawrence Bropleh, there is "hard evidence" that Julu was planning a coup.²

This type of incident underscores the need for effective policing of the border areas – a task currently fulfilled by UNMIL – to deter the possible cross-border movement of weapons and recruitment of mercenaries, as well as to reassure the local populations and foster better coordination among security agencies deployed in the border areas. Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire have been notoriously unstable, and there is always a threat of cross-border incursions from these countries.

Beyond security concerns, there are pressing priorities that were not addressed as part of the transition process—including constitutional reform, economic recovery, and poverty reduction. Moreover, the weak institutional base for the rule of law has resulted in major human rights issues that require priority attention, including poor detention conditions and high levels of sexual and gender-based violence.³ There are also major residual tasks remaining from the UN-led transition period, including completion of the reintegration of war-affected persons and ex-combatants,⁴ consolidating state authority throughout the country, rehabilitating the judicial system and ensuring access to justice, and carrying forward the security sector reform program.

Responsibility (including financial support) for the reconstitution of Liberia’s security sector is shared between the U.S. Government, which is leading the reform of the AFL, the Liberian government (Ministry of Defense [MOD] and Ministry of Justice [MOJ]), and the UNMIL, which is implementing police reform.

AIM AND SCOPE

The aim of this monograph is to present an explanatory overview and analysis of the starting point for and progress made with the process of security sector reform in Liberia—with particular reference to the armed forces and the police. The objective is to make recommendations on short-term adjustments to security sector reform (SSR) support, as well as suggestions on longer-term improvements to the U.S. Government and the international community's approach to SSR implementation.

The monograph begins with an explanation of what SSR is (and is not)—theoretically and in the Liberian context—before focusing on the rationale and urgent need for concerted and sustained SSR in Liberia. An overview of the legal and conceptual framework for engaging in SSR in Liberia is provided as further backdrop to the substantive sections dealing with the reform (or rebuilding) of the AFL and the Liberia National Police (LNP). The concluding section provides both a critical analysis of the SSR process and recommendations for further action.

SSR IN CONTEXT

The concept of SSR was first put forward to a larger public in a speech by Clare Short, the first minister of the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DfID), in 1998. The need for comprehensive reform of the “security sector” had been identified earlier, but it was speeches by Short and the policy statements by her department from 1998 to 2002 that made SSR prominent as a term and as a concept.⁵

However, several scholars and analysts were wary of using the term “reform” and suggested other words such as “Security Sector Transition” and “Security Sector Transformation.” The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also began to promote a new term in 2003, namely, “Justice and Security Sector Reform” (JSSR). The Development Assistance Commission (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has settled on the term “Security System Reform” and views “security system” as comprising a number of sectors – a very important one of which is the justice sector.⁶ In recognition of this varied input, the terms “justice and security reform,” “justice and security providers,” “justice and security delivery,” and “justice and security development” are used in many places throughout the text of the new OECD handbook on SSR,⁷ instead of “security system” and “security system reform.” **NOTE:** *Any compact treatment of Liberian governmental and security reform inevitably entails use of a host of acronyms, of which the preceding paragraph provides a foreglimpse. Although each acronym will be explained in the text with its first appearance, the reader is encouraged to refer as needed to the glossary at the end of the monograph for subsequent uses.*

The OECD/DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance define the security system as including core security actors (e.g., armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g., ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies, and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g., the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, and traditional justice

systems); and nonstatutory security forces (e.g., private security companies, guerrilla armies, and private militias).

However SSR is defined⁸ and circumscribed, reform and democratic control of the security sector and the joining together of security and development have become a major focus of international intervention in post-conflict societies since the turn of the 21st century. While effective security structures under civilian and democratic control may not guarantee economic development, they are certainly regarded as a precondition. This thinking is reflected in Liberia's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS), in which the government has prioritized key development issues and challenges in four reform pillars:

- Enhancing national security;
- Revitalizing economic growth;
- Strengthening governance and the rule of law; and
- Rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services.

Significantly, national security is the first pillar, separate from strengthening governance and the rule of law, suggesting a narrower definition of the security sector than that embodied in current SSR theory.⁹

In an ideal world, SSR is an essential part of a comprehensive post-conflict peace-building process, where the SSR program derives from a comprehensive national defense and security review. It involves, at its core, the transformation of the country's military and police forces—but it also involves a comprehensive review and restructuring of intelligence services, the penitentiary, the judiciary, and other agencies charged in some way with preserving and promoting the safety and security of the state and its citizenry.

However, in real-life transitions from peace to war, the process of SSR – as supported by the international community and bilateral donors – is often far more rudimentary than the conceptual paradigm suggests. It often involves a narrower focus than even the OECD’s “core security actors,” and is aimed simply at the training and equipping of armed forces and police agencies, with little attention or resources being devoted to the other components of the security system.¹⁰

In practice, the OECD/DAC found that in non-OECD countries, reforms are rarely governed by an overarching strategic framework, informed by a wide-ranging and integrating public security concept, or effectively linked to wider government planning and budgeting processes in ways that help to strengthen governance.¹¹ Moreover, SSR is generally perceived by the beneficiaries of assistance to be a “foreign-driven, often political process”¹² concerned with “spreading Western norms and practices to inform how security institutions should be governed . . . at the expense of a sustained injection of technical and financial support.”¹³ Nor has SSR in practice been able to provide tangible improvements in human security. As Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake have noted: “Neither the recent salience of the subject nor the engagement of new actors appears to have been parlayed into significant measurable improvements in safety and security in conflict-prone, conflict-afflicted, transitional, and/or violence-fraught societies.”¹⁴

This observation holds true in Liberia, at least at the 4-year mark in the country’s transition from war to peace (August 2003 to August 2007). Despite the rhetoric of SSR theory and a UN peace operation costing nearly a billion dollars a year, the country

still lacks a national security strategy, a promulgated defense policy, and robust security sector oversight and management mechanisms. The judiciary remains in urgent need of a comprehensive overhaul, as do the prison services. However, the SSR process has been limited almost exclusively to the UN's efforts to build up the Liberian police, and the rather intermittent efforts of the United States to reform and professionalize the Ministry of National Defense (MOD) and to establish a new Liberian army.

THE NEED FOR SSR IN LIBERIA

Stating the Obvious.

The need for comprehensive SSR in Liberia is hardly in dispute. During the 1980s, then-President Samuel Doe recruited soldiers from his own Krahn tribe into the armed forces, using them to harass other ethnic groups. After helping to oust Doe and being elected president in July 1997, Charles Taylor used various state security agencies as his private militia.¹⁵

The elections were intended to produce a government that would guarantee the safety and security of political parties in particular and the Liberian people in general. To these ends, Taylor was mandated to restructure the army, police, and various security agencies to reflect the neutrality of the administration. However, the warlord-turned-president resisted the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to oversee a process of SSR. Taylor took the position that the Abuja Accord, which mandated ECOWAS forces to restructure the Liberian army, expired on August 2, 1997, when he was inaugurated as

head of state, and that the restructuring of the national army was his responsibility according to provisions of the country's constitution.

Taylor proceeded to marginalize the national army, i.e., the AFL, because he questioned its loyalty (members of Doe's Krahn tribe still dominated the AFL). Instead of unifying and professionalizing the security sector, Taylor created a network of competing security units and militias, headed by long-standing supporters, many of whom had been child soldiers who fought with him when he was a rebel leader. Most prominent among these was the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU), headed by Taylor's son "Chucky."¹⁶ Similarly, former National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) officials within the police service wielded considerable power. President Taylor's cousin, national police chief Joe Tate, was accused of having led gangs of looters and a political death squad during the civil war.¹⁷

Members of the security forces in rural areas, generally paid and provisioned inadequately, often extorted money, food, and goods from citizens. It was common practice to compel local communities to provide food, shelter, and labor assistance to members of the security forces stationed in their villages. The Special Security Service (SSS) and the Special Operations Division (SOD), both mobilized to combat Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebels, consisted of former NPFL rebels who were paid a one-time fee of \$150 and then expected to loot and pillage to support themselves.

In short, a key feature of security institutions in Liberia has been the gross abuse of human rights (often with impunity) by security personnel through torture, arbitrary arrests and killings, and the use of official powers for private gains. Not surprisingly, by the time of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA), the population and the transitional government were deeply mistrustful of law enforcement and military officials. Police and military officers were not regarded as a source of protection, but rather as powers to be feared.

Liberia's Post-War Security Architecture.

Liberia's postwar security architecture has been characterized by redundancy, inadequate control, and incoherence. The present government inherited no fewer than 15 separate agencies and structures tasked with a variety of security functions, some discrete and some overlapping. These are listed in a recent RAND Corporation report as follows: Ministry of Defense (MOD); Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN); Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); Ministry of National Security (MNS); National Security Agency (NSA); Liberia National Police (LNP); National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); Special Security Service (SSS); Customs—Financial Security Monitoring Division (FSD); Forest Development Authority Police (FP); Liberia Petroleum Refining Company Security Force (LPRC); Liberia Seaport Police (LSP); Liberia Telecommunications Corporation Plant Protection Force; Monrovia City Police (MCP)—also known as Department of Traffic and Public Safety; and Roberts International Airport Base Safety (RIA).¹⁸

According to a 2006 report of the Liberian Governance Reform Commission, the security sector also includes the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Fire Service (NFS). However widely or narrowly defined, the fact is that the security sector in Liberia is characterized by a proliferation of agencies performing overlapping functions, as is evident from

the brief outline of the roles and functions of several key security agencies provided below:

- **Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).** The AFL was created by the Defence Act of 1956 with the sole purpose of protecting the territorial integrity of Liberia. In theory, it is the only security institution in Liberia with clear and nonoverlapping duties with other agencies.
- **Liberia National Police (LNP).** Established by an Act of Legislature on June 6, 1975, the National Police Force has the duty to detect crimes; apprehend offenders; preserve law and order; protect life, liberty, and property; and enforce all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged.¹⁹
- **National Security Agency (NSA).** The NSA was created on May 20, 1974, after President William Tolbert abolished the Executive Action Bureau and the National Bureau of Investigation. The main functions of the NSA are to develop plans; collect, analyze, and disseminate overt political, economic, cultural, and sociological intelligence for Liberia; and provide all possible means for the adequate protection of the government and people of Liberia against subversion, espionage, sedition, adverse propaganda, and sabotage. The NSA is legally the national body with the “sole authority to coordinate the activities of all national intelligence collecting services and receive, evaluate, and disseminate the data as directed.” It has police, subpoena, and law enforcement powers, with a charter that includes internal security.²⁰
- **National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).** The NBI was reestablished by an Act of Legislature

in December 1998 for the purpose of investigating “major crimes including homicide (except vehicular homicide), illegal entries into the country, robbery, arson, rape, grand larceny, kidnapping, burglary, embezzlement, forgery, smuggling, violation of the narcotics law, counterfeiting, [and] theft of government property.”²¹

- **Special Security Services (SSS).** The SSS was established on February 23, 1966, its primary mission being (1) to “protect and secure the President, his immediate family, other officials, and visiting dignitaries (VIPs) as designated by the President; and (2) to protect the Executive Mansion and its surrounding grounds.”²² The Act establishing the SSS provides further that “in the performance of the functions of the Service, an Agent may arrest or cause to be arrested any person or persons committing a crime [in] flagrant delicto, or aiding and abetting any crime or violation, or who may reasonably be suspected of the commission of a crime.”²³
- **Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).** The DEA was established on December 23, 1999, following the dissolution of the National Inter-Ministerial Drug Committee (NIDC). The DEA’s mandate is to “conceive and formulate anti-drug policies; coordinate, collaborate [on], and facilitate the efficient and effective enforcement of all domestic anti-drug legislations.” The Act which established the DEA transferred all the functions and specialized personnel of the narcotic divisions of the Liberia National Police Force and the National Security Agency to the DEA.²⁴ However, no corresponding amendments were

made to the Acts that established the NSA and the LNP.

- **Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN):** The BIN was established on August 28, 1955, by an Act of Legislature and duly charged with the responsibilities to prevent or investigate illegal entries of persons into Liberia; apprehend foreigners found in the country without legal status; and investigate foreigners who violate the Alien and Naturalization Laws of Liberia.²⁵

It is not simply the number of agencies that is cause for concern, but also the redundancy and ambiguity concerning their functions and roles. For example, all of the agencies discussed above have the authority to arrest and detain individuals. Moreover, the NSA, LNP, NBI, and SSS, as well as the MOD, all collect intelligence, including criminal intelligence, political intelligence, and – in the case of the NSA – foreign and national security intelligence.

Ministry of National Security (MNS), established on September 6, 1979, also has a special responsibility for intelligence, together with a role in coordinating the entire gamut of security services. The Minister of National Security is tasked to “prepare intelligence and security briefs for the President, monitor and give guidance to the operational activities of the various security services, primarily Presidential security operations and counterintelligence and counterespionage operations of the security services.” The Ministry is also mandated to “coordinate the activities of all security services and shall prepare and implement rules and regulations pertaining to personnel, finance, logistics, training, operations, and organizations necessary for the efficient operation

of the security services subject to approval by the President.”²⁶

However, overarching responsibility for developing national security strategy and policies is supposed to be vested in the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was created on March 12, 1999, by an Act of Legislature with, among others, the following duties: (1) “identify and define the National Security goals of the Republic in relation to national power”; (2) “initiate or discuss proposed national security policies, including the consideration of alternative courses of action and to submit policy recommendations for approval and timely action of the President”; and (3) “constitute, organize, and supervise under the direction of the President the security and other agencies of government in [such] a manner as to ensure their provision of intelligence, counterintelligence, and other information that shall be necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of the Council.”²⁷ The Act also provides for an Advisor to the President on Security Affairs who, *inter alia*, coordinates the activities of the Council including the planning of meetings, preparation of Agenda, and recording of minutes of Council meetings.

The conflicting legislative acts also lead to ambiguity regarding the duties and responsibilities of the agencies. These acts were enacted at different times and under different governments without reference to preexisting acts still on the books. Certainly the multiplicity of agencies carries with it a cost factor. Additionally, such overlapping of functions can lead to unnecessary tensions and conflicts among the personnel of the agencies, again at significant cost.²⁸ As stated in the RAND Report,

A variety of security organs, performing a range of functions, even overlapping ones, is not in and of itself un-

acceptable. Wealthy countries often have complex and even inefficient structures to provide insurance and redundancy. . . . [However,] for a country the size of Liberia, neither the multiple services nor the required management structure are affordable or justifiable. Multiple security services are also a breeding ground for politicization and corruption.²⁹

While the notorious ATU has been demobilized under the terms of the CPA, there are strong arguments for the abolition of a number of the other remaining security agencies, e.g., the DEA (because its mandate overlaps with the LNP and NSA); and the NBI (its duties overlap with the NSA, LNP, and BIN). There have also been calls for the dissolution of the MNS, because it performs overlapping functions with the NSA and the NSC. However, rationalization of the security sector cannot proceed until the Liberian government produces a long-awaited National Security Strategy and supplementary legislation and policy documents.

Oversight and Monitoring.

It is not just the security agencies that are in disarray and in need of capacity-building support. International and government efforts to rationalize, train, and rebuild the security agencies will be undermined – or may even have perverse consequences – if appropriate oversight and monitoring mechanisms are not in place. Effective oversight is a question of lines of authority, hiring and firing powers, and reporting chains – all issues that are confused and confusing in Liberia. For example, the Ministry of Justice has *de jure* oversight of the LNP and NSA but little authority over them in practice. Historically, these institutions have easily and consistently bypassed the Ministry of Justice and reported directly to the President.

This highlights another challenge: centralized power within the office of the President. While appealing from the perspective of having a single voice and a single decisionmaker, too much authority concentrated in one individual can make daily decisionmaking impossible, as everyone waits for a single extremely busy individual to make the most trivial decisions. In most effective governments, the chief executive has ultimate oversight over security decisions, but is not heavily involved in the daily management. Moreover, such centralized control has been abused by past holders of the presidency in Liberia as well as elsewhere. The high regard generally felt for the integrity of the present President, Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, may not necessarily be applicable to future administrations. In slavish support of past presidents, Liberian security agents have violated human rights with impunity.

Juxtaposed to a powerful presidency is a very weak Liberian parliament. One of the main shortcomings of the Liberian security sector over past years has been the lack of effective oversight and democratic control. This lack derives from various factors, including excessive presidential powers, lack of independent and credible parliaments, and lack of capable parliamentary administration. Moreover, the overlapping functions of security institutions are reflected to an extent in the corresponding legislative oversight committees. There are a number of committees contesting for supremacy in conducting security sector oversight. These include the Committee on National Security, the Committee on National Defense, and the Committee on the Judiciary.

This duplication is clearly untenable—at least for those who truly want Liberia to have an effective and democratically accountable security sector. As

the RAND Report states, “The criteria of coherence, legitimacy, effectiveness, and affordability suggest that Liberia should have a new, properly distributed security sector . . . architecture that is clearly codified and communicated. Whichever [architecture] is selected, it is doomed to failure absent appropriate decision-making and command authority structures.”³⁰

THE LEGAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SSR IN LIBERIA

The Legal Framework.

SSR is being pursued and implemented in Liberia within a somewhat convoluted legal framework. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2003, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), and the 1986 Constitution of Liberia together provide the context and legal basis for the implementation of SSR in Liberia. Let us discuss each in turn.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA constitutes a major legal reference for the SSR process in Liberia. The conditions for implementing the SSR program are captured in Articles VII and VIII of Part Four of the CPA. Under Article VII, section 1(b), it is stipulated that “the Armed Forces of Liberia shall be restructured and will have a new command structure. The forces may be drawn from the ranks of the present Government of Liberia (GOL) forces, the LURD, and the MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate background and experience. The Parties request that ECOWAS, the UN, African Union (AU), and the International Contact Group for Liberia (ICGL) provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics, and experienced trainers for the security reform effort. The parties

also request that the United States play a lead role in organizing this restructuring program."³¹

The CPA also provided specific criteria for the restructuring of the AFL, in particular specifying that recruits would be screened with respect to educational, professional, medical, and fitness qualifications, and prior history regarding human rights abuses. Further, it stipulated that the restructured army should reflect regional balance within the country, and that the AFL's mission shall be to defend Liberian "national sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural disasters."³²

The CPA makes specific references to the agencies that should be restructured. For example, Article VII refers to the LNP and other security services such as the Immigration Service, Special Security Services, customs security guards, and other statutory security units.³³ The Agreement also calls for the disarmament and disbanding of the "Special Security Units including the Anti-Terrorist Unit, the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the Liberia National Police Service, and such paramilitary groups that operate within organisations such as the National Port Authority (NPA), the Liberian Telecommunications Corporation (LTC), the Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation, and the Airports."³⁴

UN Security Council Resolution 1509. This resolution, dated September 19, 2003, clearly stipulates that the UNMIL shall support the reform of the security sector. Specifically, the Security Council,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations . . . decides that UNMIL shall have the following mandate [regarding] Support for Security Reform: [T]o assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, and to develop a

civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States; [and,] to assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States.³⁵

Although the CPA is specific about the role of the United States in the restructuring of the army, Resolution 1509 refers simply to “Interested States.” It is, however, specific about the role of UNMIL in restructuring and training the police.

The Constitution of Liberia. From August 2003 to January 2006, the CPA was the major source of legal authority for SSR in Liberia. Article XXXV, section 1(b), of the CPA suspended parts of the Liberian Constitution. The CPA states that “the provisions of the present Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, the Statutes and all other Liberian laws, which relate to the establishment, composition, and powers of the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial branches of the Government, are hereby suspended.”³⁶ However, the presidential election of 2005 and subsequent inauguration of Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in January 2006 have again made the Constitution of Liberia relevant to the process.³⁷

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Liberia, under Article 54 (e), the President “appoints members of the military from the rank of lieutenant or its equivalents and above; and field marshals, deputy field marshals, and sheriffs.”³⁸

The Constitution also provides broad authority and responsibility to the national legislature on security issues. For example, Article 34 (b) stipulates that the Legislature has the power to “provide for the security of

the Republic”; and under Article 34 (c), the Legislature also has the power “to provide for the common defense, to declare war, and to authorize the Executive to conclude peace; to raise and support the Armed Forces of the Republic, and to make appropriations therefor provided that no appropriation of money for that use shall be for a longer term than one year; and to make rules for the governance of the Armed Forces of Liberia.”³⁹ Although the Constitution empowers the legislative branch to involve itself in the SSR process in Liberia, its role, regrettably, has been passive and marginal.⁴⁰

There is obviously room for debate as to which of these three documents is legally supreme, but there has been little dispute over the legality of SSR per se. There is broad agreement that the security sector should be reformed and transformed.⁴¹ However, there are strong differences of opinion within Liberian civil society, and within some of the security agencies themselves, as to the nature and scope of reform – and the rationale behind it.

The Conceptual Framework.

In view of the role played by ill-governed and predatory security institutions in the Liberian civil wars (1989-96 and 1999-2003), the success and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia depend, to a large extent, on a security sector that is reformed to operate effectively, ideally within a framework of effective democratic control. Thus, the challenge before the national, regional, and international communities lies not just in rebuilding the Liberian military and police force, which would take considerable resources, but also in defining their new roles in the post-conflict society and

ensuring effective oversight and management. As the RAND Report states,

However well-designed, Liberia's security forces will not be coherent, legitimate, effective, or affordable without a governance structure that also meets these criteria. That includes not only an elected government at the top but also the ministries and agencies that manage day-to-day administration and operations; the ways in which they interact with one another; and the regulations, rules, and laws that bind them as they enforce Liberia's laws and ensure its integrity.⁴²

Accordingly, the RAND Corporation recommended, among other things, that:

- The National Security Council should begin functioning regularly and without delay;
- In addition to its regular duties, the NSC should have cognizance over the implementation of security sector transformation plans; and
- Legal and functional experts from Liberia and its partners should be engaged to frame a new national security law under the direction of the NSC.⁴³

Obviously, the legislature is also a crucial actor in SSR theory, certainly in established democracies, given the parliamentary, legislative, representative, and oversight functions normally associated with representative bodies. However, the Liberian legislature is at this point beset with inadequacies, including lack of parliamentary support, executive domination, corruption, lack of integrity among individual legislators, and, not least, lack of capacity to perform its oversight functions.⁴⁴ The legislature itself is obviously in need of capacity-building assistance,

but this is a very long-term prospect. There is a need to concentrate now on the art of the possible and those areas of SSR that need to be pursued as a matter of priority and urgency.

According to the IPRS, the government's medium-term approach is "to develop a national security strategy to guide SSR and extend national security actions to ensure national safety, security, and peace as well as build national security capabilities." The Governance Reform Commission (GRC), the MOD, and the MOJ are supposed to lead this process. The IPRS also commits the government to developing a "comprehensive longer-term operational and institutional security reform agenda . . . in order to rationalize various security forces, facilitate a change in culture of the security forces, define clear missions and tasks and ensure there are no duplications, overlap, or conflicts of interest between security agencies."⁴⁵

The delivery date set by the government for a "national security policy and architecture formulated and endorsed by cabinet taking into account air, sea, and land borders" was March 2007. The target for delivery of a "national defense strategy and other institutional level security strategies in support of the national security policy" was April 2007.⁴⁶

While the GRC, in collaboration with the MOD and MOJ, is supposed to lead on the development of a national security strategy, it has not succeeded in moving the process forward at a satisfactory pace. The Chairman of the GRC, Dr. Amos Sawyer, is a professor at Indiana State University and is not in Monrovia full time.⁴⁷ Moreover, the GRC is burdened with the overall agenda of governance reform; and, while SSR is regarded as the bedrock of all other reforms, it is also the most problematic. The GRC has deep concerns

about the legal framework for SSR (outlined in the previous section of this monograph), and how it is being interpreted and applied.

For example, while the CPA indeed provided for the United States to play a lead role in defense transformation, the GRC contends that the U.S. SSR team is “muscling out everybody else” in the area of defense sector transformation, and that the U.S.-driven process does not sufficiently take account of the regional realities and security situation. In particular, defense restructuring is proceeding in isolation from the ECOWAS security architecture, and does not seem to be based on a thorough analysis of the security dynamics of the Mano River Basin. Sawyer points to the ongoing investigations into the Julu “coup plot” as an indicator that meetings to plan for the overthrow of the extant Liberian government have been held outside the country in Côte d’Ivoire and possibly Guinea. While the Government of Liberia is sensitive to such developments, the AFL is being organized according to an apparently threat-independent approach to defense planning and structuring.⁴⁸

The Defense Act which framed Liberia’s defense policy was extremely controversial and has been withdrawn by President Johnson-Sirleaf.⁴⁹ SSR Program staff from the United States subsequently assisted MOD staff with the drafting of a new Liberian National Defense Act (NDA) in coordination with and incorporating guidance from Minister of National Defense Samukai and MOJ Counselor Frances Johnson-Morris. The draft Act, which is similar to the U.S. Code Title X, was completed in December 2006, but it is still being debated and vetted by the Liberian legislature. According to Tom Dempsey, who was on the SSR Program Team at the time, the draft Act “delineated

the responsibilities and missions of the Liberian Defense sector and established a solid foundation for civilian control and oversight of the Armed Forces of Liberia.”⁵⁰

However, the GRC contends that the new draft does not differ significantly from the old Defense Act, and that there is a clear need to first develop a comprehensive security sector policy as well as an authoritative defense policy which can then be enacted in specific legislation.⁵¹ The GRC attributes delays in the formulation and promulgation of a national security strategy and policy to a turf struggle among the “security community,” UNMIL, and the GRC. Sawyer explains as follows:

The security community – including the Ministry of Defense, the IGP, the SSR Team, and the National Security Advisor – favors secrecy and “opaqueness.” UNMIL (which takes the lead on police reform) feels that the UN Security Council is the legitimate authority to provide direction to the SSR process and that UNMIL should therefore be the lead agency. The GRC sees SSR as part and parcel of human security policy and of the overall governance reform agenda which it leads.⁵²

The GRC has produced a draft “National Security Policy Statement of Liberia,” dated February 2007. It is a normative statement of principles and a guide to policy formulation rather than a National Security Policy. The document has not been discussed by government, and it has no official status.⁵³ Sawyer contends that the security community, UNMIL, and the GRC have reached an impasse that will require strong intervention by President Johnson-Sirleaf to resolve. The GRC, for its part, is not pushing the issue. Rather, it is focusing on those parts of the governance reform

agenda that have not been stymied by seemingly intractable differences in outlook.⁵⁴

In the absence of an authoritative and comprehensive National Security Strategy, as well as attendant legislation and policies, the only clear guidance for pursuing SSR in Liberia remains the RAND Report, which is based on international “best practices” and clear, logical analysis rather than an in-depth understanding of Liberia and the West African region. Nevertheless, the rebuilding of the police and the establishment of a new Liberian army cannot be delayed until turf issues are settled. UNMIL will not be in country providing security for an indefinite period. Nor is American interest in defense sector reform likely to last much beyond a few years.

Moreover, there should be little disagreement concerning the RAND Report’s general recommendation, i.e., that Liberia’s capabilities architecture should be in accord with a security concept whereby (1) public safety and law enforcement are immediate concerns, (2) the appearance of organized armed internal opposition can be anticipated and prevented, and (3) future external threats that may arise without long warning can be countered.

Nor can anyone argue with the finding that, even with foreign assistance, Liberia’s economy cannot sustain large forces,⁵⁵ and that the key to cost-effectiveness for Liberia’s security forces is to have complementary capabilities that cover the forces’ core security functions, possess the right qualities, and can be used flexibly. The RAND Report concludes that,

The largest and most crucial components of Liberia’s security sector are the Liberian National Police (LNP) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The former should be the country’s main internal security force; the latter

should embody the country's main capabilities for military combat. The size and capabilities of the LNP and AFL largely determine the effectiveness, cost, and thus the cost-effectiveness of Liberia's security sector. Their roles and missions and the relationship between them will largely determine how the new state provides security. Lack of clarity on missions risks duplication or gaps in capabilities, political contention [control], and operational failure [avoidance]."⁵⁶

In addition to a reconstituted police service and armed forces, The RAND Corporation's analysis of possible operational contingencies also suggested a need for an additional capability that would complete and tie together currently planned capabilities: a mobile unit of the LNP that can perform either in a law-enforcement mode or in combat. RAND therefore recommended the establishment of a police quick-reaction unit (QRU) that would complement the regular police. Unlike the police support unit, which is meant to deal with civil unrest (e.g., riot control), the QRU would be capable of defeating those organized armed threats that extended beyond the capabilities of regular police but did not warrant the use of the army.⁵⁷

THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA

The Liberian military began as the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF), which was formed in 1908. It became known as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in 1984, and included the Liberian National Guard (LNG) Brigade and related units (together comprising 6,300 personnel), as well as the Liberian National Coast Guard (about 450 personnel). The LNG Brigade, based at the Barclay Training Center (BTC) in Monrovia, was composed of six infantry battalions, a military engineer

battalion, a field artillery battalion, and a support battalion. The AFL was essentially the personal army of former President Samuel Doe. Immediately before the first Liberian Civil War (1989-96), the AFL consisted of about 6,000 soldiers. The government army was decimated by the rebellion launched by Taylor's guerrilla movement in 1989 and was never properly reconstituted thereafter.

Role of the New AFL and the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Program.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as noted earlier, states that "the Mission of the Armed Forces of Liberia shall be to defend the national sovereignty and, in extremis, respond to natural disasters."⁵⁸ There was good reason for this—the parties to that agreement did not want the new AFL to become an instrument of internal repression as had been the case under past regimes. In the absence of a valid National Defense Act, the RAND Report again provides the most credible direction for the establishment of a new army, beginning with a definition of the role and functions, as well as the posture, of the AFL:

The primary missions of the AFL are (a) to safeguard the country against possible external threats and (b) to support internal security forces in defeating any insurgency or other internal threat for which Liberia's internal security forces prove inadequate on their own. At present, non-state external and internal threats are more likely than threats from neighboring states. The size of the AFL is less important than that it be superior in quality and capability to foreseeable threats.⁵⁹

Underpinning this RAND assessment is the sound logic that the armed forces should be commensurate

with a rationally perceived set of threats and should be financially and operationally sustainable. More concretely, the size, structure, and function of the new AFL should be framed by financial, regional, and historical concerns. According to Sean McFate, a former member of the SSR Program staff, the government of Liberia therefore envisioned an infantry force that was able to move quickly while at the same time posing no threats to its neighboring countries:

The force must be postured so that it is strong enough to defend the integrity of the nation's borders but not so strong that it threatens neighbors with its force-projection capability. Its structure, equipment, and training must be appropriate to the force's mission (for example, Liberia does not require F-16 fighter jets). Perhaps most critically, the new security force must not be so large that the government cannot pay its salaries. Such a condition is a precipitant to civil war.⁶⁰

As previously noted, the CPA explicitly requests that the United States play a leading role in organizing the restructuring of the Liberian Armed Forces. The United States pledged \$210 million and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Interim Transitional Government of Liberia, formalizing the U.S. role and commitment through the SSR Program to assist in demobilizing the existing Liberian military; recruiting and vetting recruits for an entirely new force; and training, equipping, and sustaining that force until it is operational.

The most controversial facet of the SSR Program is the use by the U.S. Department of State of two private contractors to deliver U.S. Government support to the government of Liberia. DynCorp International has been contracted to provide basic facilities and basic training for the AFL, while Pacific Architects and

Engineers (PAE) won the contract for building some of the bases, for forming and structuring the AFL and its component units, and for providing specialized and advanced training, including mentoring of the AFL's fledgling officer and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) corps. DynCorp's job is essentially to "recruit and make soldiers," while PAE is employed to "mentor and develop" them into a fully operational force. In addition to the contracted trainers, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is seconding eight active duty officers and NCOs to work alongside PAE in mentoring the AFL commanders. While EUCOM will pay for these officers' general service benefits, PAE will provide them with accommodations and vehicles.

Three military bases have been established under the SSR Program: the Barclay Training Camp (BTC), the Sandee S. Ware Military Barracks (built at the old Voice of America (VOA) transmitter facility at Careysburg on the outskirts of Monrovia), and the Edward B. Kessely Military Barracks (formerly Camp Schiefflin). DynCorp has rehabilitated and managed BTC and Camp Ware, while PAE has built the facilities and managed Kessely Military Barracks.

The SSR Program has provided for the demobilization of 13,770 soldiers who served in the old AFL, allocating payments of between U.S.\$285 and \$4,300, depending on the seniority and length of service of demobilized personnel. The SSR Program also supported the demobilization of the Ministry of National Defense, which had 400-450 personnel on its books, and the retraining of select candidates. On March 20, 2007, 119 civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense graduated after completing 17 weeks of training offered by DynCorp. The SSR Program subsequently supported the MOD with the recruiting

and vetting of 12,100 applicants for service in the new AFL. DynCorp designed, and continues to manage, the ongoing recruiting and vetting program.

Recruiting and Vetting.

Given the long civil war, the acute suffering of civilians, and the widespread atrocities committed by all of the armed groups, the Government of Liberia and the SSR Program established a number of stages for screening recruits for the new Liberian army. As explained by McFate: “The goal of the recruiting, vetting, and training components of security sector reform is to achieve a force that maintains a professional ethos, respects the rule of law, cultivates public service leadership, is apolitical, and accepts civilian control with transparent oversight mechanisms.”⁶¹

On January 18, 2006, queues of hundreds of young men and women began forming from early morning as authorities kicked off a countrywide recruitment drive for the new AFL. New recruits have been drawn from every ethnic group and all 15 Liberian counties. An extensive news media campaign drew villagers by foot, car, and bus to take part in the process. President Johnson-Sirleaf wants 20 percent of Liberia’s new soldiers to be women, and Minister of Defense Brownie Samukai has set this figure as a target for the AFL, not a goal to be achieved at the expense of operational proficiency. There are indications that some of the female recruits in the current class may be dropped from the basic program because of difficulties in meeting physical fitness standards.⁶² All applicants are held to the same selection standards. They must be Liberian citizens between 18 and 45 years in age; free of HIV, TB, and drug use; and able to pass basic knowledge and fitness tests before they are accepted. In addition,

MOD has ruled that all commissioned officers in the AFL must possess a recognized university degree at the bachelor's level.⁶³

There is concern for ensuring that the new AFL reflects a healthy regional and ethnic balance.⁶⁴ Initial AFL and MOD recruiting efforts by DynCorp included robust missions to every county of Liberia, despite the challenges posed by the lack of adequate roads and the poor local infrastructure. This deliberate effort to recruit in outlying communities, strongly supported by Minister Samukai and the Johnson-Sirleaf administration, provided tangible evidence of the Liberian government's commitment to reverse a long history of neglecting outlying counties and rural areas in general. It played a critical role in establishing the legitimacy of the new AFL and the new MOD, both of which benefitted from this effort. There has also been strong emphasis on ensuring that those with a history of committing human rights abuses are not admitted to the AFL. A vetting council, comprising a representative of the MOD, the Liberian civil society, and the U.S. Embassy, assesses each candidate's physical fitness, literacy level, health, and human rights record. This body, the Joint Personnel Board (JPB), is the final arbiter of who gets accepted and who gets rejected for training and service in the AFL. The government of Liberia also specified that each candidate has to have attained at least a 12th grade education. The JPB also has additional external advisory participants such as UNMIL, UN Police (UNPOL), and other governmental departments.

The vetting process has been particularly difficult in Liberia because of the paucity of reliable documents attesting to candidates' education, medical condition, and criminal records. Consequently, in addition to

fitness, medical, and literacy tests, the board interviews candidates at length. With the information gathered in the interview, board representatives then travel into candidates' communities to confirm basic facts, inquire as to their suitability to serve in the security forces, and assess the public's trust of the candidate. Furthermore, the board widely distributes pictures of the candidates throughout the country, including the candidates' home communities. Citizens are encouraged to anonymously report any reason a particular candidate should not serve in Liberia's armed forces.

The vetting process has proved thorough. DynCorp established a mobile hotline and fielded a team of human rights investigators composed of Western, external African (primarily Gambian), and experienced local Liberian nationals to follow up on reports from the public. Through the exams, interviews, and public announcements, 75 percent of the candidates who applied to the new army were rejected, a comparatively high number compared results produced by previously used vetting protocols. In contrast, the candidates for the police, a process managed by the UN, had a 10 percent rejection rate.⁶⁵

Once background investigations are completed, applicants' files are reviewed by the JPB, and individuals are either recommended or not recommended for service in the AFL. All recommended files go into a candidate pool, where they are arranged in order of merit. The order of merit takes into account applicants' schooling, aptitude test scores, and physical fitness. Points awarded in each category are totaled, and the person with the most points is moved to the top of the order of merit, and so on. When the next class is selected, it is taken from the top of the list. Those who pass a final medical examination are admitted

to training. Recruits who have successfully passed through the vetting process are offered a 5-year service contract, with a 1-year probation period allowing for dismissal from the AFL for misconduct, or if evidence of human rights abuses emerges during this period.

On August 21, 2007, the MOD announced a new recruitment drive for a further accession of AFL recruits. There will be special emphasis on female recruits, with only approximately 5 percent of the extant AFL being female. The campaign is to extend to the southeastern counties in order to promote geographical balance in the AFL. Though the initial recruitment campaign for the AFL took place in all 15 counties, it was a costly venture in terms of money and time. Future recruiting efforts outside Monrovia will involve a scaled-down team. On August 22, 2007, during a special, highly publicized recruitment day for the AFL in Monrovia, there were over 340 applicants, 75 of whom were university graduates. The next batch of recruits was scheduled to commence training in November 2007.

Training.

The Government of Liberia has decided that the new AFL will be trained according to U.S. Army doctrine because this had been the basis of the training of the old AFL. Every soldier, irrespective of ultimate branch, is first trained as an infantry rifleman during basic training, i.e., the Initial Entry Training (IET) course, which was 11 weeks long for the initial intake. The period has subsequently been reduced to 8 weeks by cutting 3 weeks of training time initially devoted to human rights training and education in civics and civil-military relations in a democracy. These subjects have been dropped from the curriculum because of the high cost of basic training.

The high cost results mainly from instructor salaries. DynCorp instructors are all former drill instructors from the U.S. Army or the U.S. Marine Corps, or former members of service training center instructional groups. With an average age of 39 years, they are the type of employee who can command excellent remuneration in the private security industry in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This drives up the DynCorp salary bill. Training in civic consciousness, human rights, and International Humanitarian Law is therefore planned for a later stage of training, after soldiers are assigned to permanent units. This training is slated to be conducted by a number of providers, including the U.S. contractor (PAE) responsible for training the permanent military units plus the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNMIL (specifically on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse). The American Bar Association has offered to present civics training.

The 105 recruits who graduated from basic training in November 2006 entered shortly thereafter into more advanced phases of training: Infantry Advanced Individual Training Course (AIT) of 4 weeks,⁶⁶ Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNOC) of 4 weeks, or, for the 11 candidates selected, 6-week Officer Candidate School (OCS).⁶⁷ Approximately 50 soldiers were selected for the first BNOC; 34 of the graduates of this course are now serving as NCOs in the AFL, 11 were selected for OCS, nine of whom were commissioned in the rank of second lieutenant.⁶⁸

A 40-member band has been trained and is already performing excellently during ceremonial duties. Almost all band members can read sheet music, and some members held senior ranks (lieutenant colonel and colonel) in the old AFL. Fitness and other selection and training requirements for band members were

adjusted to take account of the need for musical aptitude, confirmed during an audition. The oldest member of the AFL band is 67. Together with the 105 graduates from the first accession, from which a guard of honor is drawn for ceremonial occasions, the AFL band performs extremely well and has already become a source of national pride for the government and people of Liberia.

Some AFL soldiers are providing a form of civic service. A group of 19 combat medics rotates through the John F. Kennedy Hospital in Monrovia, where they assist medical personnel in providing medical care to the public. There is a memorandum of agreement between the MOD, the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation, PAE (the contractor involved), and John F. Kennedy Hospital that governs this arrangement. The soldiers benefit from increasing their experience, while the hospital, woefully understaffed, gains much needed assistance from trained medical personnel. This specialized training is managed by PAE and supported by an active duty U.S. Air Force medic.⁶⁹

The second class of 525 recruits began training at Ware Barracks on July 23, 2007. By August 28, there had been only five dropouts from this class. The training program is much like the basic training presented in most armies; it includes subjects such as personal hygiene, drill, weapons instruction, field craft, and land navigation. The facilities at Camp Ware are designed to accommodate groups of a maximum of around 550 recruits. The facilities are functional, but by no means luxurious or extravagant. They include a well-equipped sick bay with a full-time medical doctor; barracks with sleeping bays, showers, laundry, and messing facilities.

Ranges include a field training area, 50mm rifle range, rifle-propelled grenade (RPG) firing range,

hand grenade range, bayonet training course, and an obstacle course. The basic weaponry provided to the AFL – AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers – is compatible with that of other ECOWAS countries. These weapons were donated by the Romanian government.⁷⁰

The second IET class graduated on September 7, 2007. They continued with AIT of 4 weeks duration, after which 210 were selected for BNOG (together with 30 candidates from the January 2007 accession). The remainder of the class (about 290) joined the holding company at Kessely Barracks (EBK) comprising 102 soldiers from the first accession. The next OCS class, starting in November-December 2007, was selected from those who graduated from the BNOG class. The officers schooling in the United States were scheduled to join the soldiers and NCOs in the holding unit, from which three companies were to be activated on December 19, 2007.

The Planned 23rd Infantry Brigade.

The end state for the AFL is a professional army “modeled on U.S. Army doctrine that will support the national objectives of the Government of Liberia.”⁷¹ The SSR Program is due to deliver by September 2010 an AFL that will essentially be composed of the 23rd Infantry Brigade. The total planned strength of this brigade is 2,000 men and women consisting of 146 officers and 1,854 enlisted personnel. The Brigade, to be commanded by a colonel, will have a headquarters element manned by 113 personnel. The constituent units, subunits, and sub-subunits of the brigade are planned as follows:

- 1st and 2nd Battalions – light infantry battalions, each composed of 680 soldiers and organized

into a battalion headquarters, three rifle companies, and a combat support company (the latter composed of an 81mm mortar platoon, signals platoon, and transport unit. The rifle companies will each comprise a company headquarters (including a 60mm mortar section) and three rifle platoons.

- Engineering company with a strength of 220.
- Military police company with a strength of 105.
- Brigade Training Unit (BTU) with a strength of 162.
- Band platoon with 40 members.

While the basic and specialized training of enlisted ranks and junior officers is well underway, there is clearly a gap when it comes to senior command positions in the AFL. Ideally, the appointment of the brigade commander, battalion commanders, and senior staff officers should have preceded the formation, activation, and operationalization of the 23rd Brigade. The Brigade certainly cannot be declared operational until such posts are filled by competent officers. The problem has been partially addressed by employing three retired officers who were previously in the AFL, demobilized, retrained in the MOD staff course, served as MOD staff members, and have since been recommissioned and sent to the Nigerian National War College for a year of executive level training (to return around August 2008).

Command Issues.

To address the glaring gaps in senior command positions, the Liberian MOD wants to “reinstate” former senior AFL officers to fill nine key vacant

positions in the Brigade hierarchy, including the brigade commander and battalion commander slots. However, the former AFL has been disbanded, so this would amount to direct commissioning of civilians rather than reinstatement, clearly not in line with the vision of a professional AFL with new standards. A possible alternative has been suggested by the ODC Chief, that is, the employment, under a loan service agreement, of qualified officers from ECOWAS and perhaps other countries to the AFL, to occupy company and field grade command positions for a period of approximately 5 years. During this time, select officers who have been commissioned in the new AFL would have time to complete a 39-week command and staff course and gain the necessary experience for promotion to appropriate levels of command.⁷² In addition, one slot in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff course has been reserved for the candidate for brigade commander.

According to a recent GRC report, the commander-designate of the brigade to be formed has not yet been selected. There is strong opposition to any attempt to appoint a new recruit to lead the brigade, leaving basically four options, all of which are problematic in some respect.⁷³ The options outlined in the report are as follows:

1. Appoint a foreign brigade commander. This is contentious and politically sensitive, particularly because a Nigerian currently heads the army. Liberians will find it difficult to accept another foreign commander, and under the Constitution this would be legally dubious.

2. Appoint a retired Liberian officer from the U.S. Army. This person would have to renounce his or her U.S. nationality, and is likely to have no knowledge of the local environment.

3. Appoint a former officer of the AFL, a high school graduate under 60 years of age who has had advanced military training, who did not participate in the civil war, and who is apolitical. This option would require an exception to the present rule that only college graduates can become officers.

4. Appoint a Liberian serving in the U.S. Army and have him/her seconded to the Liberian army. Again, the issue of citizenship would be problematic.

The issue of command of the 23rd Infantry Brigade should ideally be addressed in the long-awaited national security and defense strategy and policy. In the interim, the incumbent Chief of Defense Staff, Major General S. A. Adurrahman (who is on loan from the Nigerian Army), looks set to stay in the post for some time to come. Two additional majors from the Nigerian Army recently arrived at defense headquarters to join another Nigerian major and several NCOs serving on the General's staff in Monrovia.

Funding and Resources.

Except for salaries, the SSR Program is funding every aspect of the AFL, from bases and base maintenance to uniforms and rations during the initial training phase.⁷⁴ However, according to the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), the SSR Program is not entirely a U.S. "closed shop," as suggested by the GRC and some civilian interlocutors. There is a Defense Support Group for Liberia, composed of representatives of all interested donor governments, which meets quarterly in Monrovia. Assistance to the AFL is being provided by other partners, sometimes making up for shortfalls in essential areas where needs cannot be met by the

U.S. team due to funding limitations. For example, the UK has offered to train company grade officers and has seconded an advisor (a lieutenant colonel) to the program. This officer is currently assisting the MOD. To help meet pressing needs for general transport, ECOWAS has lent the AFL six 5-ton trucks from its logistics depot outside Freetown in Sierra Leone. Nigeria has offered 220 training slots on courses with the Nigerian Army. Some offers of bilateral assistance, however, appear to have less utility. For example, China has offered to sponsor the participation of two members of the AFL on a 9-month sports course in China; it has also reached an agreement with the Liberian Government to construct a military base, which can accommodate 780 soldiers, at Tubmanburg. It is unclear what use, if any, this base will have.⁷⁵

The DynCorp and PAE contracts are managed and accounted for by the U.S. Government through three key officials: The Contracting Officer (State Department, Office of Acquisitions Management [AQM]); Contracting Officer's Representative (State Department, Africa Bureau); and Chief of Office of Defense Cooperation (presently Lieutenant Colonel William Wyatt, who is assigned to the U.S. Embassy, Monrovia). The ODC Chief is responsible for liaison with the Liberian MOD and for direct supervision of the activities of DynCorp and PAE in Liberia. He reports to the Contracting Officer through the Contracting Officer's Representative in the Africa Bureau.

The U.S. component of the SSR Program, including the DynCorp and PAE contracts, is funded through various elements of the U.S. foreign assistance budget. This includes funding through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for eight of the nine AFL officers who graduated in May

2007, and two AFL NCOs who are currently attending courses in the United States. Much has been said of the high costs involved in forming the AFL, with the figure of U.S.\$210 million having been criticized by many as far too high. The truth is that the SSR Program was never fully funded, that funding to date has fallen far short of this figure, and that money, even when forthcoming, has been disbursed in dribs and drabs.

In the FY 07/08 budget, for example, only \$13 million was appropriated. This was followed by an additional \$11 million transfer from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) in June 2007 and by \$35 million from the July 2007 supplemental budget voted for Liberia (the total of the latter supplemental was \$45 million, but \$5 million of this was allocated for the establishment of the Police Quick-Response Unit and \$5 million for support to the LNP and Corrections Service). The \$35 million in the July 2007 supplemental was not enough to see the SSR Program through to conclusion, but it came just in time to prevent the collapse of the recruitment and basic training program (the Department of State would not allow the commencement of training for a further accession until the money to pay them was secured).⁷⁶ According to a former senior DynCorp employee in Liberia, the U.S. Department of State has been lax in overseeing the SSR process and promoting an effective and sustained SSR Program in Liberia; in particular, it has been “reluctant to go to the Hill for money for the program.”⁷⁷

Weak and erratic funding is thus said to be the main cause of the slow pace of AFL development, with the timelines specified in original contracts and agreed to with the Liberian MOD slipping badly.⁷⁸ Only 5 percent of the force had completed the basic IET course by August 2007. With the graduation of the second

accession on September 7, 2007, this figure increased to 32 percent (604 plus 40 band members). By the first week of February 2008, 57 percent of the force should have completed basic training; and by the first week of May 2008, the figure should be up to 82 percent of the 2,000 soldiers.

Past delays in funding have increased the time taken for DynCorp to fulfil its contract to provide basic training for all recruits. As previously mentioned, Dyn Corp's services are particularly costly. The company currently employs 82 international staff members in Liberia, as well as 239 Liberian staff. The thorough recruiting and vetting process, including the services of expert investigators, is time-consuming and very costly. Like other State Department contracts, the DynCorp contract has been signed on a "cost plus [overhead]" basis. Cost escalation for goods and services, including idle personnel time due to late disbursement of funding, is therefore passed on directly to the U.S. Government; and DynCorp has a fixed fee for every month that it is physically retained in Liberia, regardless of whether contractual work is proceeding. The combined expenses of DynCorp and PAE totalled \$18 million in the first 6 months of 2007.⁷⁹ There have also been nonmonetary costs associated with incomplete training. For example, MOD staff members were educated on schedule, but the subsequent planned mentoring program in the MOD was cancelled due to lack of money.

UNMIL has also expressed concern about delays in establishing an operational AFL, because time frames for the drawdown and ultimate withdrawal of UNMIL forces depend largely upon AFL (and LNP) capacity to assume responsibility for the territorial integrity of Liberia.⁸⁰

Despite criticism of the slow pace of implementation of the SSR Program and the buildup of the AFL, the delay

may be regarded as a blessing in disguise. MOD still lacks basic management capacity and is hard-pressed to administer the salaries and see to the welfare of the 105 soldiers and 525 recruits currently on its payroll. Salaries have been paid late, and the payroll and administrative burden will increase dramatically as the current accession of recruits graduate, and the new class is inducted into the AFL. As matters stand, with sufficient funding in place, the 1st Battalion should be operational⁸¹ by September 2009, and the 2nd Battalion by March 2010. This should provide enough time for the MOD to build the necessary managerial capacity to effectively administer the full 23rd Brigade.

However, the extant level of programmed funding is sufficient to provide for the basic training of a total of only 1,600 recruits, which means that the 2nd battalion cannot be formed unless there is a further supplemental before the Fiscal Year (FY) 09 budget kicks in. (The U.S. administration's request for SSR funding in the 2009 budget exceeds by far that allocated for 2007/08; the first disbursement is due in January 2009). There are only \$16.8 million in the SSR Program budget for 2008. If additional funding was not made available before the end of 2007, then DynCorp would have to be put into "sleep mode," cutting back on its staffing levels, expenditures, and training output, thereby greatly extending the present planning time-lines of the SSR Program. Since the drawdown plans for the UNMIL force include benchmarks that are directly linked to these time-lines, the unfolding scenario may well lead to an adjustment of UN force planning—an expensive adjustment, given the current \$722 million annual budget of UNMIL, of which the United States is assessed to pay nearly \$190 million.⁸²

Transparency and Accountability.

Liberian civilian groups and some government officials have been complaining of lack of visibility of the contract between the U.S. Department of State and DynCorp (little is said of PAE, probably because DynCorp is far more visible and in the news media limelight). The concerns are mainly about several controversies involving DynCorp in other countries, perceived lack of performance by DynCorp in Liberia, and lack of consultation with Liberian stakeholders on the military transformation process.⁸³ For example, according to Ezekial Pajibo and Emira Woods,

After more than 2 years in Liberia . . . DynCorp has not only failed to train the 2,000 men it was contracted to train, it has also not engaged Liberia's legislature or its civil society in defining the nature, content, or character of the new army. . . . [T]he creation of Liberia's new army has been the responsibility of another sovereign state, the United States, in total disregard to Liberia's constitution, which empowers the legislature to raise the national army.⁸⁴

This criticism is unfair. DynCorp and PAE are not parties to the agreements, the U.S. Government is.

According to the ODC Chief, the details of the contracts with DynCorp and PAE may not be revealed, not even to the Government of Liberia; to do so is against U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations. Complaints about lack of transparency should be a non-issue. The United States is providing gratis assistance to Liberia in the restructuring of its armed forces through an assistance package that the Liberian government has approved and accepted. The Government of Liberia is certainly entitled to obtain information on the design of the new AFL (which it has agreed to) and on

progress made in implementing agreed plans and on the quality of equipment and training provided to the AFL. Information of this nature is shared on a regular basis with MOD through the ODC Chief.

The U.S. Government, in turn, accepts its responsibility to deliver promised and agreed assistance through the SSR Program, and to effectively oversee the services of the contractors that it hires to do the job. The ODC Chief is very aware of this responsibility, and is doing his utmost to ensure timely delivery of quality military assistance. While the ultimate goal is to establish a professional and operational AFL at the planned strength, the immediate target is to complete the basic training of 2,000 soldiers, which will allow for the conclusion of the DynCorp contract and provide the basis for PAE to proceed apace with specialized training. It is envisaged that PAE will remain under contract for up to 3 years after the conclusion of the DynCorp contract, with PAE mentors partnering the new AFL commanders at brigade, battalion, and company level once the latter have returned from IMET courses in the United States.

The U.S. view is not shared by the GRC, which complains that the buildup of the AFL is being done in a very insular way, one which pays only lip service to the concept of Security Sector Reform (including the name of the U.S. assistance team), and which is not linked to a broader security sector policy. While international SSR guidelines (as promulgated by the OECD DAC, for example) call for a consultative process of SSR, there is strong resistance to public discourse on security from the Liberian authorities, particularly MOD, MOJ, the Presidency, and the IGP – as well as the SSR Program team. Liberians in general assume, because of past practice, that security issues are secret in nature, and that they should not be discussed openly.⁸⁵

According to Dr. Amos Sawyer, “The image of DynCorp creating an armed elite is disconcerting to many Liberians.” He recalls that in 1980, the U.S. Government spent \$500 million to train and equip the army of then president Samuel Doe, and adds that “every armed group that plundered Liberia over the past 25 years had its core in these U.S.-trained AFL soldiers.”⁸⁶ There is thus a fear that when the United States withdraws support for its SSR Program and funding for the AFL, Liberia will be sitting on a time bomb, viz., a well-trained and armed force of elite soldiers who are used to good pay and conditions of service, which may be impossible for the government of Liberia to sustain on its own.

Regarding concerns expressed by civilian organizations as well as the GRC on the vulnerability of the Liberian government to a *coup d’etat* by the new AFL once the United States phases out its support and funding for the SSR Program, the ODC Chief is of the opinion that this will be countered through two factors: the SSR Program’s focus on ongoing mentoring and on building a very strong and competent NCO corps; and by limiting the size of the AFL to that which can be effectively managed (and adequately paid).

THE LIBERIAN NATIONAL POLICE (LNP)

Mandate of the UN Police (UNPOL).

During the civil wars, police in Liberia (like the other security services) abused human rights and used official powers for private gains. There was no effective law enforcement, and mob justice was rampant. By the time of the August 2003 *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (CPA), the population and the transitional government

were deeply mistrustful of the Liberian National Police. UN Security Council Resolution 1509 of September 19, 2003, clearly stipulates that UNMIL shall support the reform of the security sector by assisting “the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States.”⁸⁷ In addition, the CPA makes specific reference to the security agencies to be restructured, including the LNP. Article VII refers to the Liberia National Police and other security services such as the Immigration Service, Special Security Services, customs security guards, and other statutory security entities.⁸⁸

In the absence of a comprehensive national security strategy and policy, the RAND Corporation’s report seems to provide the clearest guidance on the role and functions of the new LNP:

The primary missions of the LNP are (a) to prevent and fight crime and (b) to maintain public safety. These missions call for a light but sizable, community-friendly police force that can earn the confidence and cooperation of the Liberian people. Anticipating occasional civil disorder, the LNP should also have a branch capable of riot control—e.g., the police support unit (PSU).⁸⁹

To achieve its mission, UNPOL has an authorized strength of 1,240 officers from 35 countries. Eighteen of the officers are designated to serve in corrections and another six to advise and monitor the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. Five former police units, totaling some 600 officers, the only armed UN Police units, are specialized in civil disturbances.

In addition to the 56 female officers presently in the mission, one of the formed police units is entirely composed of female officers. In pursuit of its law enforcement mandate, UNPOL established an Operations Section, tasked to create, secure, and sustain a crime-free environment within the Liberian society by supporting the LNP. The section pursues this mission primarily through Joint Task Force Patrols, collocation with zone advisors, establishment of outlying area teams, operating a joint communications center, conducting crime analysis (including traffic analysis), and maintaining the Civilian Police Analysis Cell (CPAC).⁹⁰ UNPOL is now deployed in support of the LNP in 29 zones and depots in Monrovia and 32 outlying areas in all 15 counties.

Rebuilding the LNP.

In 2004, UNPOL began, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1509 and the CPA, to reform the LNP from scratch. UNPOL was required to assist the LNP in maintaining law and order, restructuring, retraining, and reequipping the police service. At that time, public confidence in the LNP was “zero.” UNPOL registered some 5,000 people who claimed to be members of the LNP. Some had no uniforms, and none had been paid for the past few years. They had survived mainly by extracting bribes from members of the public whom they were supposed to serve and protect. There was no effective law enforcement at all, and mob justice was rampant. Only the traffic division had smart uniforms and could be seen on duty; they were in a better position to impose bogus fines on motorists and sustain themselves than other patrol officers.⁹¹

UNPOL faced an extremely difficult task. It did not have an executive mandate, granting UN Police powers of arrest. This power was reserved for the same police that they were required to reconstitute. The solution was to vet and recruit a few hundred new LNP officers from those who had been registered, and to work alongside them in attempting to maintain law and order. From their personal allowances, UNPOL officers bought black T-shirts with POLICE printed in white bold lettering as a makeshift uniform for this small cadre of officers. They also purchased stationery and basic office supplies for the new LNP officers; there was simply no budget line or funding within UNMIL for creating and operationalizing the LNP. UNPOL then commenced joint patrolling with 400 personnel of the LNP "Interim Police."⁹²

UNMIL started reintroducing the LNP to the public through a sensitization program, supported by the UNMIL Public Information Section, emphasizing that UNPOL was acting in support of the new LNP, and not as an independent law enforcement agency. Simultaneously, UNPOL was busy developing a comprehensive recruitment, selection, and training program. Policy guidelines for the latter were formulated in conjunction with the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) through a joint NTGL-UNMIL Rule of Law Implementation Committee. Once this committee had approved the recruitment and selection criteria, as well as the training curriculum, for the LNP, the recruitment process started in earnest. At this stage, however, "not a dime had been forthcoming" in support of UNPOL's mandate to restructure the LNP.⁹³

Once recruitment began, the United States provided U.S.\$500,000 for the program, and UNMIL provided

sleeping accommodations in tents for trainees at the Liberian National Police Academy in Paynesville on the outskirts of Monrovia. Other donors followed, providing assistance in a piecemeal fashion. In 2006, for example, Norway and the Netherlands provided a donation for the building of permanent barracks at the Police Academy, while Belgium provided side arms and ammunition for training selected LNP candidates.

A target of 3,500 trained LNP officers was agreed with the NTGL. The elected government of Liberia has subsequently adjusted this figure upwards, to 6,000.⁹⁴ The selection and vetting criteria agreed by UNMIL and the Government of Liberia are similar to those in most African countries. Candidates for selection must be Liberian citizens, be between 18 and 35 years of age, and have a high school education (12th grade). They must also be physically fit and mentally competent, with no criminal record, including no criminal charges pending or being subject to any investigation for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or any crime that violates international human rights conventions. In addition, candidates must relinquish any positions held in any political organization. Recruitment and vetting have been coordinated by the UNPOL Restructuring and Recruiting section. All members of the new LNP must serve a 2-year probationary period before their appointments become permanent.

The vetting process for the LNP was vigorous, though admittedly not perfect. The current UNPOL Commissioner feels that everything possible was done under the circumstances and with the resources available—including running background checks on all applicants. However, according to a member of the U.S. SSR Team in Monrovia, the background checks were inadequate. Instead of checking on applicants'

character in their home communities, or countrywide as DynCorp did with the AFL, a list of names was simply sent to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and agencies for scrutiny and comment.⁹⁵

Nevertheless, 2,700 individuals who had registered as former police members failed to meet the selection criteria for admission to the Police Academy for training. UNMIL did not have the U.S.\$4 million that was needed to provide severance packages for redundant LNP members. This meant that they were on the streets, together with the new LNP officers, until late in 2005, when the UK eventually provided the money for their deactivation.⁹⁶ During this period, some police officers were still extorting bribes from members of the public. The police salary in 2004 was U.S.\$17 per month, and was seldom paid. After graduation from the Academy, LNP officers started receiving a regular gross salary of \$92 per month. This was originally funded by the United States, but is now the responsibility of the Government of Liberia.⁹⁷ The process of deactivating 2,351 members of the old LNP and 870 SSS officers was finally concluded in June 2007, with dismissed members receiving a one-time payout of approximately U.S.\$1,200 each.⁹⁸

As recommended in the RAND Report, an integral Police Support Unit (PSU) was formed within the LNP. Specialized disorder control and tactical operations training were provided to 300 vetted and trained Police Academy graduates in Nigeria. Fifty-eight LNP members, including some members of the PSU, have received firearms training to date and are now qualified to carry firearms.⁹⁹ The bulk of LNP training is also conducted at the Police Academy. While the training program initially focused on meeting numerical targets, it is increasingly focused, under new UNPOL and

LNP leadership, on addressing the police performance gaps that have become very obvious over the past few years.

Police Performance.

While UNPOL has gauged success by the number of recruits who have graduated from the Police Academy, the GRC rightly feels that there is a need to measure and emphasize police performance rather than training output.¹⁰⁰ However, it is difficult to measure police performance in a country where there was no police service to speak of 3 years ago; where the new police service is still being recruited, trained, and equipped; where there are no authoritative statistics to measure crime trends over time; and where there is no coherent national security policy, never mind a national crime prevention strategy. Given these limitations, first impressions of the LNP are positive. Patrol officers look fairly sharp in their new uniforms, and they no longer have a predatory approach to policing. Individual police officers still solicit bribes, but the practice is no longer condoned by the authorities. According to the Liberian Vice President, Liberia and the LNP need “people with new attitudes who can make a difference. This Government wants to break with tradition, we want rule of law, freedom of movement, and freedom from fear.”¹⁰¹ The LNP is clearly not quite there yet.

It cannot be said that the LNP is an effective police agency for the prevention and prosecution of crimes. Mention has already been made of the widespread sense of insecurity that prevails in Monrovia, and of unacceptably high rates of armed robbery and gender-based violence. UNPOL has been working with the LNP to improve police responses to calls for assistance

by the public. A 911-type emergency response system (using a 355 call-in number) has been established at the Liberia National Police headquarters. The system is manned by an UNPOL-trained staff of LNP officers. Emergency calls are relayed for response by joint patrols, composed of LNP officers (who have received provisional training), UNPOL, and FPU officers. However, the system is not yet working. Every local resident interviewed by the author in Monrovia complained that the LNP members either do not respond, or respond far too slowly, to calls for assistance. Sometimes complainants are asked to pay police transport costs to the scene.

Even when arrests are made, successful prosecutions are few and far between. Crime scene investigation and case preparation are extremely poor, not surprising given the poor state of the forensics laboratory in Monrovia and the total absence of forensics laboratories and expertise in all the counties of the area. While UNPOL presents a basic course in crime investigation to all recruits at the Police Academy, there is no advanced forensics training for specialists. Moreover, according to the Montserrado County Attorney, Samuel Jacobs, victims of armed robbery are unwilling to go to court and provide evidence for the prosecution out of fear of reprisal if they confront those accused in court. This is major factor in the state's failure to indict alleged armed robbers. Criminal Court D, which is responsible for trying cases of armed robbery, has not heard a single case for more than three terms of court, and the state has had to release a number of persons arrested due to lack of evidence.¹⁰² A U.S. State Department official in Monrovia was particularly harsh in her judgment of the police, saying that "the LNP, as it currently stands, is a disaster. Aside from weaknesses in selection, training,

and equipment, there is no connection between the LNP and the prosecution personnel within the Ministry of Justice.”¹⁰³

The LNP is also struggling to perform effectively in the rural areas. Lofa County is the largest of Liberia’s 15 counties. Thanks to a concerted resettlement program from 2005 to the present, the county is now inhabited by about 400,000 people, most of whom were displaced from their homes at least once during the war.¹⁰⁴ There are 110 members of the LNP currently deployed in Lofa County; the numbers in the county’s six districts are: Voinjama, 46; Zorzor, 18; Salayed, 12; Kolahun, 14; Foyd, 16; and Vahun, 4. There are currently only two female police officers in the county; two more will be deployed when the current all-female class of 110 completes its basic training at the Police Academy.¹⁰⁵

Although security has improved dramatically since 2005, rape is still a prevalent crime in Lofa County, especially the rape of juveniles.¹⁰⁶ According to Lofa County crime statistics for the period January-June 2007, there were 53 cases involving sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): 12 reported cases of rape, 20 of aggravated assault, and 21 of simple assault. When questioned on these seemingly very low figures relative to the many reports that rape and other forms of SGBV are on the increase in Liberia, the county police chief explained that most incidences of rape and sexual assault are reported to NGOs rather than to the LNP.¹⁰⁷

However ineffective the LNP may be, the fact that it is actually deployed and doing some visible policing without instilling fear in communities may be considered major progress. Individuals within the LNP are doing their best to be good police officers, despite systemic handicaps. When a performance deficit is

noted in any organization, it is often attributed to lack of resources, poor leadership, and/or poor training.

Leadership, Resources, and Training.

The LNP currently has no line supervisors bearing rank, i.e., sergeants, inspectors, chief inspectors. With the restructuring of the police, all officers and supervisors were reduced to the rank of patrolman and sent back to the Police Academy to undergo basic training. There is no Manual of Police Procedure or general handbook for the LNP. There are also no promulgated rules and procedures for internal discipline within the LNP. UNPOL has developed about 35 policy documents in isolation from LNP management, and only 12 have been adopted by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) thus far.¹⁰⁸

According to the UNMIL/UNPOL Training Coordinator, the biggest problem with the LNP at present is low morale and poor discipline, on the one hand, and extremely poor leadership and management, on the other.¹⁰⁹ Recent errors of judgment by the country's most senior police officer, IGP Beatrice Munah Sieh, provide tangible support for this assertion. On July 9, 2007, during a visit by the IGP to the Freeport in Monrovia to investigate reports about the theft of fuel, violent clashes broke out between the Liberia National Police and the Liberia Seaport Police, which resulted in injuries to 50 persons.¹¹⁰ The incident began with a LNP patrol seizing a barrel of fuel oil from a community on Bushrod Island and removing it for investigation to the premises of the National Port Authority. The LNP suspected that the fuel was smuggled from the port and offloaded from a canoe by officers of the Liberia Seaport Police. When they called the matter in to their

headquarters, Sieh drove to the Freeport and ordered the arrest of two LSP officers. When LSP officers surrounded the IGP's vehicle, she called Headquarters for assistance, stating that she had been detained by the LSP. This act provoked a violent confrontation, with a contingent of LNP officers reacting angrily to the IGP's distress call.¹¹¹

On the same day, the President directed that a board of inquiry be convened to investigate the incident. The board called for Sieh's dismissal, in reaction to which the President announced that the IGP had been placed on a 3-month probation. She would also be required to undertake a 1-month leadership and strategic management course (in China) "to enable her to carry out her senior management responsibilities with much more sensitivity and effectiveness."¹¹²

While Liberia's top cop may not have covered herself in glory, even the most experienced police boss would face enormous challenges in maintaining morale and providing effective oversight, lacking the financial and material resources to do so. Unlike the AFL, regarded as having state-of-the-art clothing and equipment, logistical support to the LNP has been extremely poor. LNP members have no I.D. badges that display their service numbers, and they have no rain gear whatsoever (a serious oversight in a country where it rains for half the year). Except for the police academy, there are no police barracks for LNP members.¹¹³

In Lofa County, the sole means of police transport is one motorcycle in Voinjama and one mobile unit (pickup truck) that must service the entire county. The Lofa police headquarters and police station at Voinjama have one typewriter and no computers. Stationery is in extremely short supply. There is a generator, but no fuel to run it. Fuel has to be begged from NGOs. No

official sleeping accommodations are provided; some patrolmen sleep in the police station, including in the Commander's office. The Voinjama police station and LNP county headquarters are without windows and otherwise incomplete, the result of an UNMIL Quick Impact Project that was supposed to be completed in 10 weeks. After 8 months, it is still far from finished.¹¹⁴

The implications of such resource scarcity for police performance are obvious, and it is misleading to isolate on poor training as the key reason for underperformance. The UNPOL training team has also been criticized for being too multinational in composition, that is, having too many countries with diverse policing traditions, cultures, and practices involved. This has been observable, for example, in the different ways that different classes of recruits have learned to drill and salute, reflecting the differing customs of trainers from different countries. Far too few local and regional instructors have been used, and the duration of initial basic training has been far too short – 3 months versus the 6-month period previously allocated by the LNP.¹¹⁵

There are also doubts about the efficacy and wisdom of setting a quota of 20 percent for female members of the new LNP, a target which has led the LNP to accept female high school dropouts who were put through a fast-track high school equivalency course. As a result, they are perceived by their male counterparts as hewing to a lower standard, which may lead to victimization when male and female classmates from the Academy are deployed alongside one another on operational duty in Monrovia and in the counties.¹¹⁶

Despite these criticisms and challenges, an examination of the process of police training reveals that UNPOL and its LNP counterparts have made

remarkable progress with training development and delivery at the Police Academy.

National Police Training Academy.¹¹⁷

UNPOL established the National Police Training Academy (NPTA) in 2004, with a mandate to provide a proper basic police training program for 3,500 law enforcement personnel. It would have a curriculum and instructional method that emphasize human rights, democratic policing principles, and modern policing techniques. This target was achieved by June 2007, by which time 3,522 (3,319 male and 203 female) LNP personnel had graduated from basic training at the NPTA. The Academy is the only institution in Liberia capable of providing training to law enforcement officers, including those of the Corrections Service. In addition, 358 SSS members and 210 LSP personnel have graduated from the basic training program.¹¹⁸

With the mandated target for the basic training of 3,500 LNP officers having been met, the handover of primary responsibility for the Basic Training Program from UNPOL to the LNP began in June 2007— including responsibility for administration (budget, personnel, records, dismissals, logistics, intakes, and procurement), course planning and scheduling, and presentation of training. At the end of August 2007, there were 166 LNP members in basic training at the NPTA, with instruction provided by LNP trainers closely supported by UNPOL trainers. They are in two classes, numbered 31 and 32. Class 32 is an all-female class of 110 candidates. Throughout 2007, the Academy also provided special police training as needed to develop expert skills, fill gaps in core competencies, and reinforce current standards. These courses, together

with numbers of graduates, are as follows: Airport Security, 55; Major Crime Investigation, 50; Traffic Accident Investigation, 21; Basic Computer Skills, 19; Motorcycle Training, 67; Women and Child Protection, 104; Basic Driving Program, 132; Basic Crime Investigation, 72; Traffic Management, 59; and Media Press Training, 20.¹¹⁹ In addition, a basic computer training program has been instituted, and a specialized training program has been designed for Police Training Instructors and Field Training Officers (FTOs). Of those who successfully completed training, 57 were LNP Instructors (49 male/8 female) and 64 LNP FTOs.

The LNP basic training program currently presented includes 9 weeks at the Academy, 16 weeks in-service training under supervision of an FTO, and 4 more weeks at the Academy prior to graduation as a LNP patrolman. The program for the LSP includes only an initial 3 weeks at the Academy, 1 week with FTO, and 2 weeks back at the Academy. The course for the SSS requires 9 weeks of training at the Academy. Corrections personnel undergo a lengthier training program: 12 initial weeks at the Academy, 32 weeks under FTO, and 4 weeks back at the Academy. There are 64 LNP FTOs currently supervising Probationary Police Officers (PPOs) in 26 police zones and depots in the greater Monrovia area, as well as at the PSU headquarters. The field trainer-to-student ratio is a fairly healthy 1:8. The current basic training structure, as applied to Classes 1 to 32, begins with basic academic training of 9 weeks, including subjects such as general policing; democratic policing principles; crime investigation; Liberian legislation; tactical training; and use of force (theory only). Students are required to take eight examinations during this phase. Those

who fail to achieve the requisite 70 percent pass mark are provided with 2 weeks of remedial training. Those who fail exams thereafter are dismissed from the LNP. Successful candidates become PPOs.

All PPOs undergo 16 weeks of field training at the Police Support Unit, which includes civil disturbance training, Joint Task Force patrolling, and Traffic Division duties. Subsequent field training for all PPOs in the seven Zones and 18 Depots includes Charge of Quarters (police station procedures), as well as criminal investigation, community policing, traffic control, and patrol duties. On completion of field training, PPOs return to the Academy for 4 weeks of Competency-Based Training on practical aspects of police work. Attrition and failures for students in Classes 1 - 32, at a relatively low rate of 8.1 percent, have been encouraging: 72 academic failures; 139 absent without leave; 17 charged with crimes; 23 dismissed for disciplinary reasons; 14 voluntary resignations; and 20 personnel lost through other causes such as death, injury, or illness.

Of the total of 3,691 trainees enrolled in Classes 1 - 32 (from 2004 to date), 352 (9.6 percent) are female and 3,339 are male. The importance (in terms of striving towards the gender target) of retaining the 110 female members of Class 32 is not lost on these trainees. But UNPOL instructors report that discipline and fitness have been particularly problematic with this class, with members arriving late or absenting themselves from instruction and otherwise behaving at a lower standard than previous male or integrated male-female classes.

Moreover, it is clear that the present basic training program is far too short to produce the quality of police expected by those who live in Liberia; it is also of much

shorter duration than comparable police training programs in most African countries. The UNMIL/UNPOL Training and Development Coordinator, Dag Dahlen of Norway, therefore led a development process that has culminated in a new 52-week-long LNP basic training program designed to produce “qualified Probationary Police Officers capable of operating independently and ready for permanent assignment.” The curriculum provides for a progressive training regime that starts with basic recruit skills and ends with the graduation of qualified patrolmen. The new program, which was approved for implementation in January 2008, requires a consolidated initial 26-week academic training course at the NPTA, followed by a 26-week probationary period of field training. The most recent NPTA group graduated in December 2007. In January 2008, a class of 280 new recruits began training under the new curriculum. The next class will begin in July 2008, with the NPTA planning to schedule two basic training classes per year thereafter.

The pressing need for first-line supervisory capacity within the LNP has been recognized, and a new Career Development Plan has been approved in order to address the shortcomings and fill the current leadership and supervisory vacuum that exists between senior LNP management and patrolmen on the beat.¹²⁰ The new career progression and qualification scheme mirrors the LNP operational structure and deployment. It is essentially as follows, broken down by position:

- Patrolman – Recruit Skills Program (and Field Training), 52 weeks;
- Corporal/Sergeant Supervision Course (Shift/Team Leader level), 2-3 weeks;¹²¹
- Inspector/Chief Inspector Officers Develop-

ment Program (Zone/Depot level), 2-3 weeks;¹²²

- Superintendent/Chief Superintendent Mid-Management Course (County level or equivalent), 4 weeks;¹²³ and,
- Assistant Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner/Commissioner/Deputy Inspector General Senior Management Course (Regional/HQ level), 9 weeks.¹²⁴

Further details of the Career Development Program and various courses mentioned above will be developed by LNP staff at the NPTA in close cooperation with UNPOL. In addition, the new basic recruit program will be reviewed on a regular basis and changes or adjustments made as necessary.

All training programs have been based on research and training needs analyses in an attempt to ensure quality and sustainability in course design and delivery. As far as local institutional capacity building is concerned, there was a process of integration of LNP Training and Development Personnel at all levels of the Academy through 2007, with a view to LNP assuming full local ownership in the first half of 2008. With this aim in mind, UNPOL continues to downsize its presence at the NPTA—from 75 international police officers in January 2006 to 20 UNPOL officers in April 2007. The LNP is advising UNPOL on training compatibility and standardization issues, and has taken over responsibility for graduation ceremonies and record keeping. In the process, LNP administrative and personnel routines have shown considerable improvement. The LNP has assisted in drafting NPTA policies and procedures, analyzing current training needs, and modifying programs to reinforce areas of

identified shortfalls. The LNP has also produced a plan and budget proposal for year 2007/2008, including NPTA operational costs and salaries.

Plans are well underway to create permanent facilities through renovations and construction of buildings capable of sustaining long-term training courses with a daily capacity of 250 students, 180 of whom can be accommodated on campus in permanent structures. The construction of a male dormitory and a classroom building, as well as the renovation of the female dormitory and office space, is proceeding apace and was due for completion by the end of 2007.

As is evident from the brief overview of police performance, there are many reasons to criticize the training and performance of the LNP. However, remarkable progress has been made by the NPTA, considering the base line from which it started the training program in July 2004. Bilaterally coordinated donations, including U.S. funding, for refurbishment and reconstruction of the Police Academy for creating a temporary capacity of 600 trainees were clearly insufficient; students have to date been housed in rudimentary refugee camp style tents, and have had to use temporary shower, latrine, and mess facilities. While these shortcomings should be largely addressed by the new building projects before the 2008 classes began, the NPTA still has major transportation and equipment shortfalls (including training aids), and has yet to be assured of a regular budgetary allocation.

One of the major short-term challenges is to get the costs of running the Police Academy and the planned training courses—including organization and maintenance and personnel costs—incorporated into the LNP national budget, i.e., to be funded by the Government of Liberia. Other challenges relate

to addressing disciplinary concerns such as the poor attendance record of the LNP members of the NPTA leadership, as well as that of LNP instructors. There is also a lack of instructors with sufficient appropriate police experience to provide credible instruction, and there is a perennial need to enhance the quality of recruits who are admitted to the basic training program.

The Police Quick-Reaction Unit.

The rationale behind the Quick-Reaction Unit (QRU) was explained in the section of this monograph dealing with “the conceptual framework” for SSR, which has been heavily informed by the RAND report. Unlike the PSU, which is meant to deal with civil unrest (e.g., riot control), the QRU is supposed to be capable of countering organized armed threats. Recruits for the QRU will be selected from the existing LNP Police Support Unit (PSU) whose members have already received some training in the use of force and firearms.¹²⁵ According to a U.S. State Department official, the planned QRU will “be based on a U.S. model, and grounded on law enforcement doctrine and concepts—rather than a gendarmerie force.”¹²⁶ Training for the QRU should ideally be provided by a single country (most appropriately, the United States), because the extreme multinationalism that has characterized the UNPOL training team is ill-suited to the requirements of the QRU. The quirks that have emerged in the LNP as a result of different policing styles and procedures among a diversity of nations involved in its training would be potentially disastrous in a QRU. A single uniform paradigm is needed for managing and implementing the training of a unit that is mandated to use lethal force.¹²⁷

This assertion has been questioned by UNPOL, which insists that the Police Academy has ultimate responsibility for all LNP training, and that trainers from the LNP and UNPOL (such as Norway, Czech Republic, Sweden, Serbia, and Ghana, as well as the United States), will be involved in establishing the QRU, together with five U.S. trainers. Moreover, a first draft training curriculum for the QRU has been revised by UNPOL and LNP trainers, to include provision for human rights and democratic policing standards. It excludes the paramilitary police training component. The basic QRU course as revised, now pending approval by the IGP, will be 3 months long. The QRU will require, *inter alia*, side arms, sub-machine guns, other specialty weapons, ammunition for training and deployment, uniforms, and at least 20 vehicles. Additional training and barracks facilities (beyond those already under construction at the Police Academy) will also have to be built.¹²⁸ The \$5 million allocated by the United States is clearly insufficient to meet such needs, and it is unclear as to where the additional funding will come from.

The aim is to have 200 QRU members trained and operational by July 2009. The first class of 100 recruits is scheduled to begin a 3-month training course in April 2008, with a second class of 100 expected to commence at the end of June 2008. Elements of the QRU will deploy to duty stations throughout the 15 counties. UNPOL estimates that it will take approximately 5 years to build the QRU to its full strength of 500 members.¹²⁹

Bilateral Donor Support.

To meet pressing vehicle and equipment needs, UNPOL approached various donors for help through

the UNMIL Donor Support Unit. The donor response has been significant, but it has been piecemeal, uncoordinated, and unprioritized. Norway has been a major donor, providing funding for the purchase of 54 pick-up trucks, refurbishment of female sleeping quarters, and kitchen and dining facilities, as well as the building of an impressive barracks that will be able to house up to 150 male trainees. Norway is also funding the training and equipping of the Women and Child Protection (W&CP) Headquarters as well as W&CP Units that will be deployed to all 15 counties. China has donated 30 motorcycles, and Nigeria 50 pistols for use by the LNP. The United States has provided U.S.\$5 million towards the establishment of a police Quick-Reaction Unit. In addition, UNMIL has provided some QIP money for the refurbishment of police stations and facilities. All in all, there are some 40 police infrastructure projects ongoing countrywide.¹³⁰

Despite this significant level of support, the fact remains that UNPOL has had to beg for essential facilities and equipment that are needed to implement its mandate under Resolution 1509. The support that has been received or pledged thus far has depended on the goodwill of a limited number of donor countries, resulting in a slow, erratic, haphazard provision of essentials. For example, it took 3 years for the new LNP to be issued new uniforms, donated by the United States some 2 1/2 years after the first class had graduated from the Police Academy. Many of the NPTA building projects are yet to be completed 3 years after the police restructuring program began and after more than 3,500 LNP officers have graduated from training.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion.

The discrepancy between the conceptual framework for SSR and the practical realities in Liberia, among other reasons, is due to the framework's emphasis on perfecting the governmental *process* rather than producing a tangible *outcome*. Ridding citizens of their sense of insecurity and providing them decent law enforcement seem to get lost in the shuffle, when what is truly needed are resources. Grand holistic approaches to SSR, as in Europe, may be conceptually valid but unworkable in Africa. Donor countries have generally not had the persistence and will to see comprehensive processes through, while recipient countries have not had the financial and human resource capacity to implement or sustain ambitious, overarching SSR programs. Nevertheless, much more can be done to actually mitigate insecurity within a more practical and modest program that focuses primarily on military and criminal justice reform. It is clear that both the UN and the United States have made a start with police and military reform, but they have not done nearly enough towards accomplishing the SSR goals laid out in Resolution 1509 and the CPA respectively.

UNMIL/UNPOL rightly point to the lack of resources as an inhibiting factor in the accomplishment of their policing mandate. Such resource starvation is unacceptable because progress on development in Liberia will not be sustainable if there is no rule of law. However, UN doctrine for peacekeeping operations (DPKO) has a standard cop-out caveat that can be applied to all missions, as set forth in its draft Capstone Doctrine:

Given their relatively short lifespan and limited access to program funds and specialist expertise, UN peacekeeping operations are neither mandated nor resourced to engage in the long-term peace-building activities required to achieve the objectives identified above. Other actors, both within and outside the UN system, normally undertake the bulk of this work.¹³¹

However, the doctrine also acknowledges that UN peacekeeping operations are nonetheless “frequently mandated by the Security Council to support Security Sector Reform.”¹³² Again, this acknowledgement is qualified: “As a general rule, while a UN peacekeeping operation may be required, in the short term, to engage in capacity and institution building, its role should be limited to preparing the ground for those actors who are able to support such activities over the long term.”¹³³ The most important section of the Capstone Doctrine related to SSR is as follows: “Where peacekeeping operations are mandated to engage in such short-term institution or capacity building activities, it is essential that they are adequately resourced to do so.”¹³⁴

This sage recommendation has been ignored by the UN time and again; SSR continues to slip into a systemic funding vacuum, while the Security Council continues to mandate missions to do SSR work, hoping that a “lead nation” will step up to the plate and provide both the leadership and resources to fulfill what it has prescribed as an essential task of UN peacekeeping (UN Charter, Chapter VII).

Unfortunately, there is no such “lead nation” for Liberia, and the country is in many ways less fortunate than neighboring Sierra Leone, a former British colony, which faced similar if not much larger and more urgent SSR challenges. Here, the United Kingdom took a clear

lead, supporting the enhancement of short- and longer-term security in Sierra Leone through a program aimed at training, equipping, and advising government security forces. This program involved the actual integration of UK military advisors—serving British officers—into Sierra Leone forces; close coordination with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the Sierra Leone Police; and the enhancement of the combat effectiveness of the forces through ongoing advice and training. The UK advisors made sure that the armed forces were operationally proficient and capable of conducting effective joint patrols with UN forces before UNAMSIL withdrew. The UK also provided a senior British police officer, Keith Biddle, to take charge of the police as IGP; it set up an effective Office of National Security, and helped to produce a comprehensive national security strategy and defense policy.

In Liberia, the American contribution to the SSR Program is provided through private contractors. While contractors may be good at providing basic and even advanced infantry training, they answer to private sector bosses whose bottom line is profit and are therefore not the ideal role models to instill in the AFL the notion of duty to country and military subordination to a democratically elected government. Indeed, in a country and region where recent history has been shaped by warlords and mercenaries, the U.S. Department of State has shown remarkable insensitivity by sending in contractors to shape the new army.

It may be accepted that U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations determine that the details of the contracts with DynCorp and PAE may not be revealed to the Liberians or otherwise made public. However, the remuneration of contractors on the U.S. Government

payroll is surely the concern of the American taxpayer, and these concerns should be addressed through the democratic congressional oversight process. Congress should also be concerned with the potential power of a well-trained and well-equipped Liberian army to usurp the democratically-elected government if true army professionalism does not take root. Finally, Congress should be prepared to support a long-term program of assistance to SSR in Liberia.

Recommendations.

The UN should ensure that future benchmarks for the drawdown of UNMIL police officers and military forces are determined by qualitative criteria, not based on numbers trained. This will require, among other things, enhanced efforts to produce reliable crime statistics and the conduct of victimization surveys among the population of Monrovia and the rural areas. It should also entail a shift in mindset from quantity to quality of human resources, including the development of personal performance appraisal systems.

The UN DPKO drafters of the Capstone Doctrine should revise the section on SSR, providing guidance on how resources may be found to match future SSR mandates authorized by the Security Council.

The UN and the U.S. Government, in close consultation, should robustly advise and support the Government of Liberia during the process of drafting and adopting a comprehensive national security strategy and policy. This should be a matter of utmost priority within the wider governance reform agenda.

The U.S. Government should enhance efforts to get the AFL fully operational without further time slippage so that it can conduct operations alongside

UNMIL before the final drawdown and exit of the UN force. Congress should therefore provide supplemental funding to the SSR Program as early as possible in order to keep on track the AFL buildup, UN planning for the phase-out of its Liberian mission, and ultimately the peacebuilding process in Liberia.¹³⁵ Congress should insist on credible measures to ensure that civic consciousness and human rights are included in the curriculum at all levels of training as a central element of the professional development of all AFL personnel. The inculcation of civic consciousness and respect for human rights requires more than classroom instruction by civilian specialists. Indeed, these topics should underpin military socialization itself, serving as cornerstones of the corporate culture and leadership ethos of the AFL.

The U.S. Government should move beyond the current short-termism of the SSR Program; it should transform the current assistance package into a program that embodies a “sustained injection of technical and financial support” and includes the presence of active duty U.S. military advisors with the AFL, as well as closer coordination with and support to UNMIL and the LNP.

The U.S. Government should lead efforts to widen and deepen support and funding for the LNP (including the QRU) and take a greater interest in and responsibility for the creation of a credible police service in Liberia, all in close cooperation, rather than competition with, UNMIL and local and international partners.

The U.S. Government should also establish a multidonor funding mechanism, in cooperation with UNMIL and the MOJ, to implant and nurture the rule of law in Liberia, with an emphasis on the justice sector and corrections services.

Finally, it is recommended that the UN and the United States, as well as other significant donor partners, stay the course with Liberia as they have done in Kosovo. SSR is a long-term process, not an ephemeral happening. The consequences of failure to recognize and act on this common wisdom have become evident in places such as East Timor and Haiti.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AIT	Infantry Advanced Individual Training Course
AQM	Office of Acquisitions Management
ATU	Anti-Terrorism Unit
AU	African Union
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
BIN	Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
BNOC	Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course
BTC	Barclay Training Center
BTU	Brigade Training Unit
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPAC	Civilian Police Analysis Cell
DAC	Development Assistance Commission
DDRR	Disarmament/Disbandment/Restoration/Reform
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DfID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DPKO	Doctrine for Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EUCOM	(United States) European Command
FP	Forest Development Authority Police
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FSD	Financial Security Monitoring Division (Customs)
FTO	Field Training Officer
GOL	Government of Liberia

GRC	Government Reform Commission
ICGL	International Contact Group for Liberia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IET	Initial Entry Training
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPRS	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
IRC	International Red Cross
JPB	Joint Personnel Board
JSSR	Justice and Security Sector Reform
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LFF	Liberian Frontier Force
LINLEA	Liberian National Law Enforcement Agency
LNG	Liberian National Guard
LNP	Liberia National Police
LPRC	Liberia Petroleum Refining Company Security Force
LSP	Liberia Seaport Police
LTC	Liberian Telecommunications Cooperation
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MCP	Monrovia City Police
MNS	Ministry of National Security
MOD	Ministry of (National) Defense
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
NBI	National Bureau of Investigation
NDA	National Defense Act
NFS	National Fire Service
NGO	Nongovernment Organization

NIDC	National Inter-Ministerial Drug Committee
NPA	National Port Authority
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPTA	National Police Training Academy
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OCS	Officer Candidate School
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PPO	Probationary Police Officer
PSU	Police Support Unit
QIP	Quick Impact Project
QRU	Quick-Reaction Unit
RIA	Roberts International Airport Base Safety
S/CSR	State Department's Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SDA	Senior Defense Advisor
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SOD	Special Operations Division
SSR	Security Sector Reform (UK DfiD and UN usage)
SSR	Security System Reform (OECD usage)
SSS	Special Security Service
UNAMSIL	UN Aid Mission to Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPOL	UN Police
VOA	Voice of America
W&CP	Women & Child Protection
WHO	World Health Organization

ENDNOTES

1. The initial estimated case load of ex-combatants to go through the DDRR process was 34,000. The program ended with 103,000 having been processed. While the UN Development Program (UNDP) provided training and schooling opportunities for 75,000, 9,000 former combatants have yet to benefit from skills training programs promised as part of DDRR; they are still awaiting training opportunities. The UNDP has long since closed the DDRR program, and it is unclear what training programs are now envisaged, and who is going to fund and present them.

2. Paul Ohia, "Coup Scare in Country, Ex-Army Chief Arrested," *All Africa*, July 20, 2007.

3. During the period September 9-29, 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) supported Liberian transitional government efforts to carry out sexual and gender-based violence surveys in four counties. The preliminary findings indicated that 91.7 percent of 1,216 women and girls interviewed had been subjected to multiple violent acts during Liberia's conflict.

4. More than three times the number of "combatants" initially assessed by UNMIL were demobilized, creating consequences for safety and security in the country. The reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants are acknowledged as a necessary condition for security in Liberia.

5. Peter Albrecht and Mark Malan, "Post-conflict Peacebuilding and National 'Ownership': Meeting the Challenges of Sierra Leone," *Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze*, Berlin, February 2006.

6. The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social, and environmental challenges of globalization. OECD member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Commission of the European Community also takes part in the work of the OECD.

7. The OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice, OECD, Paris, 2007. Full text available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf.

8. For the sake of simplicity, the term Security Sector Reform (SSR) is used in this monograph as it is used by the UN in Liberia. It is also the name of the U.S.-led defense transformation program.

9. Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 07/60, February 2007, p. 32, available at imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0760.pdf.

10. The U.S. approach to SSR is *conceptually* comprehensive in nature, and is consistent with the definitions promulgated by the OECD. The approach embraces reform of the Ministry of Justice, supporting criminal justice system mechanisms, police, and other law enforcement agencies, in addition to reform of MOD and the Liberian military. However, the United States simply has not funded the nondefense, nonmilitary components at a level commensurate with their importance to the overall reform process.

11. OECD/DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance*, OECD, Paris, 2005, pp. 59–60.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 64–65.

14. Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, "To Arrest Insecurity: Time for a Revised Security Sector Reform Agenda," *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2005, p. 296.

15. In an electoral process monitored by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) pursuant to the September 1995 Abuja Accord.

16. Nicole Itano, *Liberating Liberia: Charles Taylor and the rebels who unseated him*, ISS Occasional Paper No. 82, November 2003.

17. See www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/lnp.htm.

18. David C. Gompert *et al.*, "Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector," Report prepared for the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, RAND Corporation, 2007 (hereafter referenced simply as the "RAND Report"), p. 42.

19. Government of Liberia, An Act to amend the Executive Law with respect to the National Police Force, June 6, 1975.

20. Government of Liberia, An Act repealing sub-chapter D of Chapter I, Part 1 and sub-chapter B of Chapter 22, Part II of the Executive Law in relation to the Executive Action Bureau and the National Bureau of Investigation and creating the National Security Agency, May 20, 1974.

21. Government of Liberia, An Act to amend the provisions of the New Executive Law to provide for the re-establishment of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), December 1998.

22. Government of Liberia, An Act to amend the Executive Law to create a Special Security Service, February 23, 1966.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Government of Liberia, An Act to amend Chapter 22 of the New Executive law to provide for the addition of sub-chapter F creating and establishing the Drug Enforcement Agency, December 23, 1998.

25. The Liberian Criminal Justice System, A Report on the structure, functions and problems, and a survey of the public's perception of the operations and effectiveness of the criminal justice institutions, Center for Criminal Justice Research and Education, December 31, 2002, p. 67.

26. Government of Liberia, An Act to Repeal Chapter 2, Sub-chapter B of the Executive Law Establishing the Office of National Security and to Amend The Executive Law to Create and Establish in the Executive Branch of Government a Ministry to be known as The Ministry of National Security, September 6, 1979.

27. Government of Liberia, An Act to establish the National Security Council of the Republic of Liberia, March 12, 1999.

28. Thomas Jaye, *An Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia*, Governance Reform Commission of Liberia, September 23, 2006, p. 9, available at www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/Lib_Assess_Rep_on_SSR.pdf.

29. RAND Report, pp. 41-43.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

31. Article VII, Section 1 (b) of the CPA, 2003, p. 15.

32. Article VII, Sections 2 (a–d) and 3 of the CPA, 2003, p. 16.

33. Article VIII, Section 1 of the CPA, 2003, p. 16.

34. Article VIII, Section 2 of the CPA, 2003, p. 16.

35. United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1509, S/RES/1509*, September 19, 2003, p. 4.

36. Article XXXV, Section 1(b) of the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)*, August 18, 2003, Accra, Ghana, p. 27.

37. Article XXXV, Section 1(e) of the CPA states: “All suspended provisions of the Constitution, Statutes, and other laws of Liberia affected as a result of this Agreement shall be deemed to be restored with the inauguration of the elected Government by January 2006. . . .”

38. Articles 51 and 54 (e) of the *Constitution of the Republic of Liberia*, 1986.

39. Article 34 (b) and (c) of the *Constitution of the Republic of Liberia*, 1986.

40. Jaye.

41. However, a meaningful, long-term process of security sector reform must consider the extent to which the constitution too must be reformed. The issue of overlapping responsibilities of

security institutions highlights the need to provide constitutional backing and clarification for all statutory security institutions. Moreover, the present Constitution encourages abuse of power, especially by the President, who appoints virtually all the leaders of the security apparatus.

42. RAND Report, p. 41.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

44. On the positive side, the legislature is functioning as an independent branch of government for the first time in Liberia's history, however imperfectly. The legislative committees on national security in both houses of the legislature are holding hearings and encouraging public debate on security issues that previously could not be discussed in any kind of public forum without running the risk of arrest. That the Minister of Defense has been called to testify before legislative committees on security issues, and has done so, is a critical watershed in Liberia's security sector reform process.

45. "Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper," *IMF Country Report* No. 07/60, February 2007, p. 32, available at imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0760.pdf.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

47. Dr. Amos Sawyer was the President of the Interim Government of National Unity in Liberia from November 22, 1990, to March 2, 1994. He left Liberia in 2001 after the militiamen of President Taylor attempted to murder him and his colleague, Conmany Wesseh of the Center for Democratic Empowerment.

48. Dr. Amos Sawyer, Chairman of the Liberia Governance Reform Commission, Monrovia, August 21, 2007.

49. The withdrawal of the National Defense Act (NDA) by the Johnson-Sirleaf Administration actually illustrated the administration's willingness to consult with the legislative branch in a substantive and meaningful way.

50. Thomas A. Dempsey, "Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Restructuring the Ministry of National Defense," unpublished

information paper, June 17, 2007. Dempsey, a retired U.S. Army colonel, served on the SSR Program team as Director of Ministry of Defense Reform and Training. In correspondence with the author on October 30, 2007, Dempsey expressed the view that the greatest mistake in promulgating the new NDA was the closed process in which it was drafted, i.e., behind a veil of secrecy imposed primarily by the ODC and the U.S. Country Team, rather than by the Liberian Government.

51. Sawyer.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. The national budget for 2006 was a paltry U.S. \$123 million; for 2007 it is \$199 million. Even if Liberia were to attain and sustain an economic growth rate of 10 percent per annum, the baseline is so low that it would take 25 years for the Liberian economy to return to the level it was at in the 1980s.

56. RAND Report, pp. 25-26.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-28.

58. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Article V11, sub-paragraph 2. c., Accra, Ghana, August 18, 2003.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

60. Sean McFate, "The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments," *Military Review*, July-August 2007, p. 82.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

62. DynCorp uses the same physical fitness standards and tests for female soldiers as those applied in the U.S. military;

they are necessarily different from those used for male soldiers because of differences in body structure, etc. However, there is not yet a policy similar to that of the U.S. military regarding height-to-weight ratios, and the need for the MOD to promulgate such standards has become evident.

63. According to *CIA World Factbook* estimates for 2003, only 57 percent of Liberians of age 15 and over can read and write. The literacy rate for males is 73.3 percent; for females, it is 41.6 percent. In 2004, the Interim Government of Liberia estimated the literacy rate at a scant 28 percent.

64. At present, no single ethnic group makes up more than 15 percent of the AFL.

65. McFate, pp. 84-85.

66. The AIT course builds upon the squad-level training provided in the IET and is focused on platoon-level skills.

67. While the U.S. Army OCS is 12 weeks long, the 6-week course for the AFL is deemed sufficient, given the fact that all candidates had just completed three consecutive prior phases of training, including the BNOC.

68. Two candidates were placed on probation for disciplinary transgressions during the course. It is expected that they will both be commissioned on completion of their probationary period.

69. Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wyatt, Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Monrovia, August 28, 2007.

70. Sergeant Major Spike Roberts (USMC, retired), Director of Training, Camp Ware, Monrovia, August 30, 2007.

71. Wyatt.

72. The course has been designed by Colonel Elliott, the U.S. Senior Defense Advisor (SDA) in Liberia. It is a modular program of instruction, parts of which can be led by the SDA at appropriate stages of officer development.

73. Jaye, pp. 12-13.

74. The Government of Liberia (MOD) is responsible for paying the monthly salary of all members of the AFL, according to agreed salary scales ranging from U.S.\$90 for a private to \$170 for a Sergeant Major. This compares well with the basic monthly salary for civil servants, which is \$50 per month. Interestingly, all members of the Band are paid at a rate of \$140 per month, regardless of rank. Recruits undergoing basic training receive a salary of \$40 until such time as they graduate as riflemen.

75. Wyatt.

76. *Ibid.*

77. Telephone interview with Andy Michels, former head of DynCorp's Security Reform team in Liberia, August 7, 2007.

78. DynCorp took up assignment in Liberia in August 2005. According to DynCorp, delays in the start of the program were caused by certain actions of the national government, including the slow pace of voluntary relocation of civilians living in what was then called Camp Schefflin.

79. Wyatt.

80. According to Lieutenant Colonel Wyatt: "The AFL is not replacing UNMIL. That is the job of the police. The AFL can assume the UNMIL border responsibilities, but that does not [require fielding] 15,000 peacekeepers." Similarly, Jacques Klein, the former UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Liberia, suggested shortly after taking up his post that Liberia should abolish its army altogether, and that Liberia could make do with a decent police force and a well-trained border security force of 600 to 700 men.

81. Once soldiers have completed their training, they are formed into units by PAE; this is an administrative procedure that takes about 1 month to complete. Units are activated when they are joined by commanders who are under PAE mentorship. The first three companies of the 1st Battalion will be activated

in December 2007. Battalions become operational after they are activated and have successfully completed an 18-month collective training cycle, which, for the 1st Battalion, will begin on March 12, 2008. At the end of this cycle (September 2009), the battalion will be evaluated for combat readiness and, if it passes muster, will be declared operational.

82. According to the latest UN assessment, the pace of the drawdown process should be linked to the following core benchmarks: (1) completion of the basic training of 3,500 personnel of the Liberian National Police by July 2007; (2) completion of police operating procedures by December 2008; (3) completion of the formation of the 500-strong Police Quick-Response Unit by July 2009; (4) equipping of police personnel and their deployment to the counties, as well as building of police infrastructure by December 2010; (5) finalization of the national security strategy and architecture and their implementation throughout the country by December 2008; and (6) training and operationalization of the 1st and 2nd Battalions by September 2008 and September 2009, respectively. UN Security Council, Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2007/479, August 8, 2007.

83. For example, there are controversies around DynCorp flying missions to eradicate coca fields in Colombia. However, the company really shook the peacekeeping community in 2001, when Kathryn Bolkovac, a UN Police Officer, filed a lawsuit in Britain against DynCorp for firing her after she reported that DynCorp police trainers in Bosnia were paying for prostitutes and participating in sex trafficking. Many of the DynCorp employees were forced to resign under suspicion of illegal activity. But none were prosecuted since they enjoyed immunity from prosecution in Bosnia.

84. Ezekiel Pajibo and Emira Woods, "AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, July 26, 2007, available at fpif.org/fpiftext/4427.

85. Sawyer.

86. *Ibid.*

87. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1509 (2003), S/RES/1509 (2003), September 19, 2003, p. 4.

88. Article VIII, Section 1, of the CPA, 2003, p. 16. UNMIL concluded the registration of statutory security agencies in April 2005—including the Liberia National Police, SSS, DEA, MNS, NBI, FDA, BIN, LPRC, MCP, RIA, LTC, LSP, and NSA.

89. RAND Report, pp. 25-26.

90. Available at www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=civpol.

91. Mohammed Al Hassan, Police Commissioner, UNMIL, Monrovia, August 30, 2007.

92. Joint patrols have continued to the present; LNP still lacks the vehicles and capacity to patrol independently in mobile units. According to Al Hassan, the Government of Liberia allocated only U.S.\$269,000 for police vehicles in the 2006 national budget (last year's total national budget was a mere U.S.\$129 million).

93. Al Hassan.

94. *Ibid.*

95. Bruce Baker, *Policing in Liberia*, Coventry, UK: Coventry University, March 2007.

96. *Ibid.*

97. UNMIL has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Liberia that defines obligations and cooperation on training, demobilization, salary, stipend, and hiring of Police Academy graduates.

98. Al Hassan.

99. *Ibid.*

100. Sawyer.

101. Vice President Joseph Boaki, Monrovia, August 30, 2007. Ironically, it is mainly the presidential security detail (the SSS), many of whom have been trained in the United States, who are still regarded by the general public as arrogant thugs and are most visible when escorting the President or Vice President and other dignitaries through the streets of Monrovia. It seems that there is no “democratic” or “community friendly” way of providing close protection. SSS convoy escorts do not hesitate to force pedestrians and vehicles off the crumbling streets if their wailing sirens are not heeded in time.

102. Anonymous, “Several Armed Robbers to be Release [sic],” *Liberian Express*, Vol. 4, No. 66, August 23-26, 2007.

103. Deborah S. Hart, Active Response Corps, S/CRS, Monrovia, August 28, 2007.

104. There has been no national census since 1984; according to UNMIL estimates, the total population of Lofa County is 350-450 thousand.

105. Chief Inspector Koli, General Commander LNP, Lofa County, Voinjama, August 25, 2007.

106. Although the IRC has no recent rape or SGBV statistics, based on their work in the communities they say these crimes have increased significantly from prewar levels. Amos Yarkpawolo, IRC, Voinjama, August 25, 2007.

107. Koli.

108. Griffiths.

109. Dag R. Dahlen, Training and Development Coordinator, UNMIL/UNPOL, Monrovia, September 2, 2007.

110. UN Security Council, Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2007/479, August 8, 2007.

111. Webster D. Cassell, Charles Yates, and Sebo Daniel, “Liberia: Chaos at Freeport,” *The Inquirer*, July 10, 2007, available at allafrica.com/stories/200707100512.html.

112. Anonymous, "Liberia: Following Findings of Freeport Incident – Police Boss Placed On "Probation," *The Inquirer*, August 10, 2007, available at allafrica.com/stories/200708130179.html.

113. Griffiths.

114. Koli.

115. *Ibid.*

116. *Ibid.*

117. Dag R. Dahlen, Training and Development Coordinator, UNMIL/UNPOL, National Police Training Academy, Paynesville, September 1, 2007.

118. Members of the SSS also received 3 months training in the United States. Al Hassan.

119. In Ghana, 30 LNP officers also received specialized training in traffic management, operations, and crime investigation.

120. The process of developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and a Duty Manual for the LNP is now complete. This task should have begun in earnest during 2004, and have been completed long ago. This oversight by UNPOL and the LNP senior management is largely to blame for the lack of supervisory training to date, and the resultant "crisis in command" at LNP zones, depots, and police stations countrywide.

121. The first class, comprising 275 select candidates, will commence early in 2008.

122. The first course was scheduled to begin at the end of September 2007.

123. Forty-three LNP officers have graduated from the course (38 male/5 female). There are currently 28 LNP officers in the Mid-Management Course at the NPTA. Two more classes, each of 20, were scheduled for completion by the end of 2007.

124. The Senior Management Course has been finalized; a total of 64 LNP officers have already graduated at this level, 14 of them female. With respect to BIN officers, 43 (34 male/3 female) have also completed this course.

125. Due to attrition, there are presently 256 members remaining in the PSU. The existing vacancies, plus those arising from envisaged QRU recruiting and selection, will be filled by serving and recruited LNP general duty officers.

126. Hart.

127. *Ibid.*

128. Dahlen.

129. Al Hassan.

130. *Ibid.*

131. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, Capstone Doctrine Draft 3, UN DPKO, June 29, 2007, par. 54.

132. According to Decision No. 2007/11 of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, "The objective of a UN approach to SSR is effective, accountable, and sustainable security institutions operating under civilian control within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. . . . The focus should be on executive security agencies, armed forces, police and law enforcement agencies, relevant line ministries, and judicial and civil society oversight bodies.

133. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, Capstone Doctrine Draft 3, UN DPKO, June 29, 2007, par. 56.

134. *Ibid.*

135. According to calculations made by the ODC Chief, the amount required to keep the program going until FY09 funding arrives is U.S.\$44 million.