

1995

**Annual Posture Statement
Washington, DC
8 February 1995**

I am pleased to be here today to share my views about the state of our Armed Forces.

Last year, I remarked that our discussions were set against the backdrop of a serious debate. At that time, some believed that our defense budgets were still too high, while others were convinced we had already cut too much. Twelve months later, the debate seems to have gained added stridency. It also appears to have found a new center. The question we seem to be asking this time is whether we've added enough back in.

Ever since we began this still ongoing round of reductions, all have been mindful that every time in this century America has drawn down, we blundered and did it badly. This happened after the First and Second World Wars, after Korea, and after Vietnam. Each time, after ignoring the warnings of past failures we repeated the same remorseful cycle: we cut too deep and we reduced too fast. Not long afterward we regretted it dearly.

So we need this debate and it should be vigorous. We must not repeat the tragedies of the past. I only hope that what I have to offer is helpful as you make decisions on the issues before you.

Looking back over the past year, at events in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the challenges in the Gulf and Korea, and everything else that our forces have been involved in, it has been a difficult and demanding year. What have we learned from this year? I think there are three distinct lessons worth your attention today.

What stands out foremost is the caliber of men and women in our Armed Forces. There is no need to chronicle everything they've accomplished in all of the places just named. You know what they've done and you know how extraordinarily well they've done it. They remain our most precious asset.

But dwell for a moment on the great magnitude and complexity of tasks we asked of them. In the last year, the Transportation Command executed the equivalent of five Berlin airlifts. At one time or another, four nations depended on our forces for humanitarian supplies. At Guantanamo Bay and Panama, we constructed tent cities and kept their populations clothed and fed. In Rwanda, it took our forces less than three weeks to build an air bridge into one of the world's most remote and underdeveloped regions and deliver enough clean water, food and medicines to push back the flood of dying.

Many of these operations were dangerous. Twice, we deployed major forces for combat operations. The first was to Haiti, when in a tense evening we launched an invasion just as a last-ditch diplomatic effort seemed stalled. In a remarkable and welcome turn of events, our envoys negotiated away three years of defiance and a bloodless transition to democracy was promptly arranged. This was the first time in our history that we launched an invasion and then recalled it in midstream. As the Secretary of State remarked the next morning, it would be hard to imagine a more exquisite marriage between diplomacy and force. It would be even harder to imagine a more suspenseful marriage.

Then, only three weeks later, we detected three of Saddam's divisions bolting from their garrisons and maneuvering toward Kuwait. Without hesitation, we alerted a large combat force and almost overnight began deploying that force with orders to fight, if necessary. Again, in a dramatic turnabout, as the first of our forces moved swiftly into theater, we watched Saddam's divisions first slow, then halt, and then hurriedly reverse direction and return to their garrisons. It was a striking illustration of successful deterrence at its best; swift decisions, a powerful response by ready forces, and such rapid execution that we were there before the breach was made.

Not since the Second World War have we engaged in so many operations in such a condensed period. At times, up to six separate Joint Task Forces were in the field. To make this happen took an unprecedented degree of decentralization. As well, the unique character of many of these operations diluted the advantages normally afforded by our superior equipment and advanced technology. What separated success from failure came down to one vital ingredient. That was the remarkable qualities of our people: superb and thoughtful leadership; and courage, grit, and improvisation at all ranks.

We often talk about how great our military is. It is indeed great, in fact, the very finest in the world. This past year, our men and women demonstrated precisely why they deserve this reputation.

Then, there was a second lesson. Several years ago, when we first referred to uncertainty as a threat, one member of Congress pointedly asked, "And just how many tanks does uncertainty have?" It was a shrewdly couched question that penetrated to the core of our quandary. Every year, for half a century, we grew used to generals and admirals

coming here to the Hill and pointing with complete confidence at the same habitual threat, a threat we grew to know and understand in great detail.

Yet, even with such complete confidence and clarity, we still debated at length about what we needed to defend ourselves. How could we possibly measure and agree on our needs against something as shadowy and fathomless as uncertainty?

We still may not be any closer to knowing how many tanks uncertainty has, but the past few years have shed some light on its shadows. It is unstable, violent, and dangerous, with a large arsenal of exploding nations, ethnic outbursts, and clashing nationalisms. Caught in its grip are several powerful nations struggling to remain on a path of reforms, right beside dozens of smaller, newly founded, and threadbare nations simply struggling to survive. And from this uncertainty are other nations building, or trying to build, weapons of mass destruction. We also now understand that this uncertainty is not going to go away quickly; it is going to be with us for a while, perhaps well into the next century.

For Americans, there is this reality: out of the stream of events unfolding around us, an entirely new world order is being forged. We are experiencing the kind of enormous upheaval that comes only once every few generations.

And from this comes the third lesson. The profusion of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has elicited a stream of ideas about how to restructure or reorient our forces specifically for this purpose. This would be wrong. We cannot become confused about the fundamental purpose of our Armed Forces. That purpose is their readiness to fight and win our nation's wars. No other purpose is as vital to our security. As we reshape and train our forces, it must be for this purpose above all others.

It is an often quoted fact that throughout our nation's history no man or woman has ever completed a 20-year military career when this nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once. In the past eight years, no man or woman has even completed a term of enlistment without this happening.

The warning is clear. Our forces must stay ready to fight and win.

THE FUTURE FORCE

Since 1991, we have been through four exhaustive assessments of how many and what kind of forces we need. Most recently, the size and mix of our conventional forces was established through the Bottom Up Review, and the even more recently completed Nuclear Posture Review established our strategic force posture for entering the next century.

While the process of finding a new endpoint attracted the lion's share of the public's attention, a great deal more has been done to reorient our forces and to reorder the other elements of our defense. A new military strategy was developed and is now in its second stage of refinement. New approaches to readiness, sustainment, and modernization have been implemented. All of the Services have adapted their doctrines and are well on the way toward adapting their forces to the challenges of a different world. And the progression of jointness has accelerated.

Within the strategic nuclear area, we have already cut our investment by some 75 percent, made major changes in our alert posture and weapons targeting, and are well into a major force reduction as we move toward START limits.

Driving these changes is our response to three revolutions that are sweeping us into the next century. The first of these is the changing world order set in motion by the end of the Cold War. This has caused profound changes to our strategy, our military posture, our missions, and our doctrines.

We have shifted from a global strategy against a global foe, to a global strategy focused on regional threats. We are nearly done repositioning large numbers of our forces and are still in the process of prepositioning equipment and war stocks to align with this new strategy. Significant numbers of forces have returned home from their overseas Cold War garrisons to support a new global power projection strategy. Our force building priorities have been reordered to meet our new needs. At the same time, we are adjusting our overseas force — around 100,000 in the Pacific and approximately 100,000 in Europe — to help preserve stability in these two vital regions as well as retain forces an ocean closer to potential trouble spots. We have begun reorienting our alliances to new challenges. For example, in NATO, we have developed and implemented the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program, an active program to reach out to our former adversaries through military-to-military contacts, and have opened International Military Education and Training (IMET) to foreign militaries of many of the same nations. These programs are invaluable for building new security architecture in a Europe that was divided for forty-five years and in emerging democracies worldwide. All of this is being done in response to this first revolution: the changing world order.

The second revolution is the result of defense budget outlays that have been shrinking for eight consecutive years. It is not just the fact that our budget has been shrinking. This revolution is framed by the fact that by 1999 our force will

be one third smaller than it was in 1988, but in real terms our budget will be around 40 percent less than what it was that same year.

What these figures suggest is that we are going to have to be revolutionary in our thinking and in finding new ways to lead and manage our forces. We are going to have to look for every feasible way to do our business more efficiently, whether that is how we procure our equipment, how we house and care for our forces, or even how we use our forces to accomplish our missions.

In response, we are pursuing a number of initiatives, mostly through greater jointness. The joint reforms that Congress ordered back in 1986 have been implemented. Due largely to assistance from the Congress, another proven tool for maintaining and improving our joint warfighting capabilities is the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Program. Our Unified Commands are now staffed with the best-educated men and women we can offer, fully versed in the joint arena, and able to effectively combine the unique capabilities that each of our Services has to offer. JPME has become one of the foundations of our joint operations capabilities by producing officers who can respond rapidly to short-notice crises as well as develop visionary strategies — leaders who think creatively and critically.

This year, we established the Joint Warfighting Center as the locus of worldwide joint exercises and joint simulations. This new center will support our CINCs in continually refining joint exercises and training through the use of joint simulations that improve the readiness of our commanders and staffs.

We are now carrying the same spirit embodied in Goldwater-Nichols to spearhead new ways of looking at our warfighting responsibilities. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Vice Chiefs of the Services meet weekly as the expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC cuts across compartmentalization and traditional service turf to examine every battlefield and strategic function, to look for ways to employ our forces more efficiently and effectively, and to determine the best way to spend our precious research, development, and acquisition dollars to modernize and improve our existing forces.

One of the most important products of this expanded JROC is the sharing of ideas and technologies and the imposition of joint interoperability standards. Another product is that our Services are working together to build common and mutually supportive approaches. The result will be a future force that is more and more streamlined by jointness.

In the Gulf War in 1991, our forces had very few joint manuals to guide their efforts. Today, we are publishing new doctrinal manuals at a rate of four per month. In the Haiti operation, our invasion force included Army forces and Army helicopters poised on Navy carriers. Remembering back to Grenada, where Army helicopters were at first not even permitted to land on Navy carriers, you can appreciate the magnitude of cultural change. But it remains, and I suspect it always will remain, a work in progress.

Another way we are adding effectiveness is to continue to examine how we divide the roles, missions, and functions between our forces. By next summer, the Congressionally mandated Commission on Roles and Missions is scheduled to report back to Congress. As news accounts have accurately reported, the Services, the CINCs, and the Joint Staff are working with this commission and providing candid views and analysis about what should and should not be changed.

Then there is the third revolution, which runs counter to all of the downward pressures exuded by the second. This one is the battlefield revolution that we ourselves ignited with our doctrinal and technological innovations. The Gulf War showed a snapshot of this revolution in progress.

What we set in motion is an entirely new era in warfare. It is not a quick-fire revolutionary change catapulted by any one invention or one idea. Instead it is a quickly moving progression of advances across a broad front of concepts, technologies, and functions. The radar evading technologies of a few squadrons of stealth aircraft are spreading to other systems. Our inventories of long-range precision weapons are growing. Faster, more capable computer chips, digital systems, and other advances are creating staggering improvements that affect every function of modern battle. The combination of what is being done in military research and development in our partnership with civilian industry and their laboratories is creating a host of promising technologies. Our improving capabilities to fight at night and in poor weather, and our dominance in space that ensures that our commanders have extraordinary situational awareness, are giving our forces the ability to drive the tempo and depth of battle beyond the endurance and capability of any potential enemy. What is changing is the very nature of modern battle.

As we proceed into the next century, in one way or another, it is these three revolutions that drive our every effort.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The force recommended in this budget bases its size and capabilities on the National Security Strategy. That strategy calls for a triad of strategic nuclear forces, and a mix of strategic and non-strategic nuclear systems positioned

at home and deployed overseas, of sufficient size and capability to deter any future hostile nation with access to nuclear weapons from using these weapons against our interests. That strategy also requires us to be able to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous, major regional conflicts. The past year has thoroughly validated this “two MRC” requirement.

Each time when we were on the verge of committing forces to a contingency, foremost on our minds was looking over our shoulders to ensure that the remainder of our forces were ready and postured in the event a conflict erupted elsewhere. Early in the year, tensions with North Korea rose to such a point that they could only be described as edging toward war. Later in the year, we actually had to deploy forces against Iraq. Aside from validating that we were right to select these two nations as the current adversaries for our two contingency force, this past year also validated the plausibility that we could find ourselves enmeshed in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. Many times, we were balancing tensions in two or three different regions at once. Even though Haiti was not a major conflict, we were in the midst of that operation when we sent our forces to protect Kuwait. Anybody who sat in my chair this past year wouldn’t have any reservations whether or not the requirement for “two-MRCs” is the right strategic choice. We cannot afford less.

But even as you accept that this is so, you might still question whether the force size is right. Should it be larger? Could it be smaller?

I am confident that the force and capability objectives we are building toward are about right. Once we reach the force and capability objectives, and field the enhancements that came out of the Bottom Up Review, we will be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts at an acceptable risk.

On the other hand, I am convinced that a smaller, less capable force would most probably suffer unacceptable casualties, our forward deployed forces would be extremely vulnerable, the allies we are committed to protect could experience far greater damage, and a great deal more time and mobilization would be required to build to the force levels needed to win.

These are “risks” that I believe we must avoid. The force recommendations that emerged from the Bottom Up Review, with its programmed enhancements, decreases these “risks” and I would not recommend anything smaller.

With the previous, larger base force, the Joint Chiefs, the CINCs, and I were convinced we could support a reasonable number of Operations Other Than War, such as peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations, and still have enough additional forces to fight and win two MRCs. But the smaller force that emerged from the Bottom Up Review eliminated this latitude. Under ordinary conditions, there will be enough forces to perform Operations Other Than War. But in the event we become involved in a major conflict, we will have to withdraw our forces committed to Operations Other Than War in order to restore our posture to respond to a second major conflict. That is about as lean as I believe we can afford to be.

This past year we also completed the Nuclear Posture Review, that thoroughly examined our strategic and non-strategic forces, and the capabilities needed to support the maintenance of an effective and credible nuclear deterrent. It reaffirmed the importance of a strategic Triad, the need to keep some non-strategic nuclear forces deployed overseas to protect our allies, and it outlined an affordable and sustainable strategic nuclear force structure which will be in compliance with the expected future implementation of START II. It also identified cost-saving changes in our non-strategic nuclear force posture, necessary improvements to our C4I infrastructure, and a series of measures to promote the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear stockpile.

While our nuclear forces are substantially smaller than they used to be, no other part of our forces is as vital. We must continue to make the investments needed to maintain these forces at the right levels and with the right capabilities to deter the worst threats to our nation. There are still tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the hands of other nations today. Over the long term, both our survival, and our ability to contend with conventional threats to our interests depend on a strong and well-maintained nuclear force.

The key watchword of our force plans is balance. All of the key elements of our forces — people, readiness, modernization, force structure, sustainment, and our infrastructure and industrial base — must be maintained at the right scale to support the whole force. The sum will be no stronger than its weakest part. For example, readiness without adequate sustainment sentences any operation to a very short half-life. As we continue toward the future, we must maintain balance among the critical elements of our forces. But we also have to balance today’s readiness needs against tomorrow’s, and modernization is the linchpin of this future readiness.

PEOPLE

Of all the elements of our force, none is more important than our people. It is never the best tank that wins wars, it is the best tankers.

Today, we have extraordinary people in our ranks. It was their ingenuity that overcame the obstacles that were defeating the relief agencies in Rwanda; their discipline and intellect that have made the Haiti operation far more successful than many anticipated; and their courage and fighting prowess that caused Saddam's divisions to turn back north to return to their garrisons.

But we can't afford to be sanguine. In the past few years we have put great strains on our people. The pressures and separations of so many operations have been hard on them and hard on their families. At the same time, we were "downsizing," through a combination of voluntary and involuntary separations that proceeded by the thousands nearly every month since we started. Since 1991, we have reduced by some 625,000 uniformed military and nearly 177,000 civilians.

Fortunately, the Congress has broken the cruel pattern of past drawdowns by offering our people better separation benefits than in the past. Between separation allowances and early retirement packages, this time around we have been able to at least soften the blow to the men and women who served this nation so very well for so many years and then suddenly had to be told that their service was no longer needed.

What we need to do now is focus our attention on keeping the million and a half men and women who remain with us today, and attracting people of the same quality for our force of the future. This is our highest priority.

The President's decision to request 25 billion dollars more over the next six years will help fix some of the problems that I believe are most troublesome. It will fund pay raises that slow the growth of the pay gap. But it will not bring military pay to levels of "comparability" with the civilian sector. The increase also begins correcting another key concern: our obligation to ensure our people live in safe and affordable housing. For those forced to live off-base, this means fixing another pay problem: the Basic Allowance for Quarters. Our policy is to reimburse our people 85 percent of the costs of their off-base housing; today, we fail to reimburse even 80 percent of those costs. I fully support the legislation that will allow us to begin reducing this gap, starting with a 1 percent reduction this year. For those living on-base, we are taking steps to reduce the large backlog of deferred housing and barracks maintenance. Part of the 25 billion dollar increase will go toward renovating some 5,000 barracks spaces most in need out of the over 600,000 barracks spaces we own.

Today, we are dipping into the pockets of our men and women, and their families, by making those who are forced to live off-base absorb more of the costs than they should, and by failing to ensure that some of our military bases and facilities are maintained at proper standards. As we anticipate future spending increases, we must continue to put additional funds into the programs that benefit our people; adequate and fair compensation, steady and dependable medical benefits, a stable retirement system, and safe and affordable housing. If we continue the long decline that we started in these areas over a decade ago, we will find it more and more difficult to attract and retain the remarkable people we have in our force today.

READINESS

In the last quarter of 1994, in order to find funds to support our forces deployed to contingencies, the Army leadership took operations and maintenance funds from three later-deploying divisions. This forced the commanders of these three divisions to make hard choices. They canceled some major training events and imposed constraints on repair parts. As a result, these three Army divisions reported that their readiness had degraded to the point that they would need additional time to train to acceptable standards before they could be deployed.

Aside from the fact that this was an undesirable way to learn this point, among other things this incident proves that our readiness "checks and balances" are working. First, as I promised you in last year's testimony, our commanders will honestly apprise you when readiness problems develop. That is exactly what happened in this case, and I was gratified to see that the Administration and Congress responded with speed, concern, and the necessary resources to address the problem.

Secondly, last year, I pointed out the pitfalls of diverting from service operations accounts to pay for contingencies. I also promised you that we would do our best to predict readiness issues before they become a problem. Months before these division commanders submitted their reports, we did warn that unless the Army's operations account was supple-

mented in a timely manner, before the fourth quarter, there would be readiness problems. Again, our systems for tracking and reporting readiness worked properly.

If we divert funding from Service readiness accounts, as we have had to do for FY94 and FY95 to support unplanned contingencies, the price is paid in canceled training events, needed repair parts not purchased, and ultimately, degraded wartime skills. Even if the money is later replaced, many times the opportunity to go back and reschedule canceled training events is lost. And, it may take longer to rectify the readiness problem than it did to create it in the first place.

To help resolve this problem, Secretary Perry has asked Congress to establish a readiness preservation authority. It will help prevent a recurrence. On top of other systemic fixes, it will provide the Department with standing authority to mitigate the impacts on readiness from funding contingencies that arise late in the year.

But this is not all we have to do. The Joint Chiefs, the CINCs and I are watching readiness more closely and in more ways than any time I can remember. We are also building new safeguards. One of these safeguards is a Joint Readiness Review that meets monthly to examine the state of our forces. In addition, and following up on last year's testimony, I stated that we intended to create a new system to assess joint readiness. The Services' readiness systems, as you know, track unit readiness. What we have always lacked is a clear picture of how ready our forces are to engage in joint operations.

Over the past year, we designed such a system and it is now in being. We assess and report both the readiness of our forces to conduct joint operations, and the readiness of selected critical systems and capabilities. This system is still at an early stage and considerable refinement is needed. But it is already affording us greater visibility and a more complete picture of the state of our forces.

Another readiness trend we are trying to correct is the problem caused by today's high operations tempo and the corresponding effect on personnel tempo. Selected units and capabilities, particularly in some of the support forces, have been overextended — we recognize that and are working to correct it.

In some cases the solution is to add more of the capability or type units that are in high demand. But it takes time to build and train, for example, more AWACS crews. As well, when we add more of something, we have to take something else out. We have to be sure that what we are adding to make us more capable of managing our peacetime and Operations Other Than War commitments doesn't come at the expense of a capability we need in war. Other approaches to address this problem include making more effective use of our Reserve Component in augmenting units committed to these Operations Other Than War, spreading the burden of these commitments and operations among nearly all of our commands worldwide, simply adjusting our exercise requirements, or combinations of all three approaches.

However, the key point is this: in the final analysis, continued readiness to fight depends on adequate, stable funding of readiness accounts; commitment to a well educated, highly trained, quality force; investments in force enhancements; and rapid restoration of funds and resources expended for unplanned contingency operations. If we stay on this path, our near-term readiness will not suffer.

MODERNIZATION AND ENHANCEMENTS

A problem I am equally concerned about is protecting our long-term readiness. In the past eight years, continuing budget reductions have caused us to cancel, stretch out, or revert to prototype many modernization programs. The end of the Cold War justified many of these actions, because it left us with a rich inventory of modern systems and equipment large enough to see us through the end of the century. But the end of the century is now approaching, when we will no longer be able to rely on what we built in the early eighties.

Recently, we've begun practicing what our corporations call recapitalization: part of which is the process of terminating or diverting funding away from programs that are either less promising or less valuable so that we can re-invest the funds into programs that have more punch. This has driven us to thoroughly reconsider old R&D efforts and modernization programs to see if they still offer the value we once thought was there. On the whole, it is a good practice and we will continue to pursue it. But, recapitalization must be fed with new funding as well.

When the Bottom Up Review was done, we reformulated the entire basis of our modernization plans to fit the future. The core philosophy that guided this effort was to balance our future strategic requirements against a still shrinking force. The counterweight was the combination of planned service modernization programs and selected force enhancements, the sum of which would make our forces faster to deploy and more effective and lethal when they go to battle. The idea is to "grow our force down" without allowing the force to become too weak.

But as we do this, we must carefully watch two trends. The first trend is one of pushing modernization programs down the road year after year through a process of new delays, stretch-outs, and schedule changes. This could cause an unsupportable swelling of the modernization funding needed early in the next century. Second, some of the systems in our inventory are approaching their expected life span. Our modernization plans are structured to upgrade or replace old systems before they become obsolete or worn out. These plans must be supported. We must bring replacement systems on line before the systems they are designed to replace or upgrade reach the point where problems begin to occur.

I can think of no programs more vital than those that are designed to enhance the strategic deployment of our forces. To fit our new strategy, we planned for a combination of pre-positioned equipment in strategically vital locations, additions to our Ready Reserve Fleet, and the procurement and fielding of the C-17, or a mix of Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft, that would expand our airlift and replace our aged C-141 fleet. In making these decisions, we drew on the lessons we learned from the Gulf War that showed how seriously deficient we were in our ability to move our forces quickly to that conflict. When that conflict ended, the strain that had been put on our C-141's forced us to ground significant parts of that fleet for major structural repairs. It took well over a year before those repairs were completed. Some of our sealift broke down en route also, causing some units and capabilities to arrive late. The awareness that these problems caused at the time has dissipated somewhat and needs to be rejuvenated.

In order to respond to a major regional contingency, most of our Armed Forces will be deployed from the United States. Units will rely on airlift, such as the C-17, C-5 and C-141 to deploy their personnel and limited amounts of equipment, while the major portion of their combat equipment will move by fast sealift ships and large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships. However, sealift alone cannot meet the required response times for Southwest Asia. To do so requires us to deploy our initial forces by air to link-up with equipment pre-positioned in theater. Already we have one pre-positioned site with an armored brigade set of Army equipment in Kuwait. Plans are proceeding to position a second brigade set in the region. I urge you to support this requirement.

Some of the enhancements that I mentioned earlier include those that are needed to keep our forces ahead of the third revolution that I described; the revolution on the battlefield. There are three broad parts of this revolution that we must push ahead on.

The first two of these three, sensor systems and command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems (C4I), with their supporting space systems, are intertwined. Sensor and C4I systems enable us to detect and evaluate threats to our security and to then maintain effective command and control over our forces through every phase of our operations. Our stunning victory in the Gulf War showed the extraordinary effects these systems can have on the battlefield. They enabled our commanders to see the full depth of the battle area, to "sense" what the enemy was doing long before contact was established, and to prepare their forces accordingly. No one should doubt the value these systems gave our forces.

MILSTAR is one of the key programs in our evolving C4I architecture. Although we have access to commercial systems, MILSTAR provides secure, survivable, and protected support, from the tactical through the strategic level. It is a crucial part of our Global Command and Control System that ties together our deployed forces in our overseas theaters, those outside the theater that provide their support, and the National Command Authorities.

The third area of this revolution we are emphasizing is the fielding of more long-range, advanced, precision strike air, ground, and sea delivered munitions. Just as our sensors and C4I afford our commanders the ability to see to much greater depth, these systems complement this advantage by allowing our forces to strike at greater depths and with greater accuracy and lethality.

Finally, we also need to stay on track with the development and fielding of a Theater Missile Defense system. The Gulf War underscored our vulnerability to proliferating missiles, even in the hands of less developed nations. All of us remember the searing image of our forces scouring the remnants of a destroyed building, looking for American survivors after a SCUD missile made it through our Patriot defenses. We must prevent this, or worse, from happening again.

CONCLUSION

Some twenty years ago, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, our military was at its lowest state since before the Second World War. Readiness was languishing, morale was low, recruiting and retention goals were habitually missed, and disciplinary problems were evident all around. From this poor state, with the support of Congress and the American people, we built the finest Armed Forces in the world.

Protecting that excellence depends on our firm commitment to our people, on adequate and stable funding of

readiness accounts, investments in force enhancements and modernization, and balance in how we fund operations, infrastructure, depot maintenance, modernization, and force structure.

Our challenge now is to balance readiness today with tomorrow's modernization. To accept the force decreases that have been enacted over the past five years, but fail to purchase the enhancements and modernized systems upon which the reduction decisions were based, would invite great risks early in the next century.

I am confident that our goal to maintain this balance is the right way to proceed. We must provide the resources to achieve this goal.

Let me close by again emphasizing how very proud I am to represent the truly magnificent men and women of our Armed Forces. Looking back on this past year, I have never been prouder.

The Officer Magazine
"The Guard, The Reserve, and The 21st Century"
February 1995

In last year's special edition of the Reserve Forces Review, I wrote about the newly emerging roles of the Guard and the Reserve in our new National Military Strategy. In that article, I used the term "Active Reserves" to emphasize how very much the roles of the Guard and Reserves are increasing from Cold War years and that today's citizen-soldier must be more prepared than ever before. Looking back a year later, it was a warning that proved more true than I anticipated. From Somalia, to Bosnia, to Rwanda, and today in Haiti — our citizen-soldiers have in reality become "the Active Reserves."

So let me begin this year's article by telling you how very superbly our Guard and Reserve forces performed in every one of these operations I mentioned, and dozens more as well. Whether it was bringing life to starving and disease-plagued Rwandans, or providing police forces to patrol Haiti's dusty streets, or most recently, streaming reinforcements to the Gulf to confront Saddam's latest foolishness, American Guardsmen and Reservists have been all around the globe accomplishing important missions for our nation, very often with no more than a moment's notice before deployment. Despite the severe demands on our citizen-soldiers, the nation could not have asked for more.

This year, I would like to share my views of the great challenges that lie ahead as we prepare our Armed Forces for the next century. There can be no doubt that the Guard and Reserve have vital responsibilities in conquering these challenges. So I believe it is very important that I offer my views on these challenges and what they mean to you.

THE NEW WORLD

Five years have passed since the Cold War ended, five years in which we have learned a great deal about the character of this new era. It is true that America no longer faces the terrible dangers that were with us throughout most of our adult lives. The shadow of a huge nuclear arsenal aimed at American cities is gone. The old border town of Fulda, which for generations of military planners was to be the opening clash if the Cold War suddenly turned hot, is today a bustling and peaceful town in the center of unified Germany. Russian forces are serving beside our own in former Yugoslavia and there are a mix of strange new uniforms in the halls of our military schools; Romanians, Czechs, Poles, and dozens of other nationalities that were our adversaries only a decade ago. All of this is enormously gratifying.

But other aspects of this era are more troubling. A famous philosopher once warned that those who forget history are destined to repeat it. Ironically, what we have seen in this era is a tragic reversal of this sage advice: Very often it is those who remember history that are condemned to repeat it. In Yugoslavia, and all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union a number of ancient feuds have been revived by the swift changes that ushered in this new era. In addition to these, a fair number of other conflicts and tensions survived the passage of the Cold War fully intact. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba remain very dangerous, just as they were in the Cold War. And, of course, in Africa we have seen one tragedy after another unfold, most recently when Rwanda erupted in bloodshed and misery.

So in the place of a huge global adversary, we now face a hard-to-predict family of smaller threats and instabilities, strewn around nearly every corner of the world. None are as menacing as the Soviet Union was, but each could inflict unacceptable damage to our interests and undo the vast opportunities that we struggled for so long to create.

CHALLENGES

In the face of this vastly different global environment, our Armed Forces face two great challenges.

First of all, we are still reducing our budgets and our forces. By 1999, our defense budget will shrink to the point where it will be less than half what we were spending in 1988 when our Cold War defense spending reached its peak. At that point, we will be spending a lower proportion of our gross national product on defense than at any time since the years before WW II. So one challenge is how to preserve the excellence of our Armed Forces in the face of these declining budgets, and at the same time to prepare our force for the demands of the 21st Century.

Our second challenge emerges from the fact that there is a revolution in military affairs, in the way that we fight, a revolution that we sparked with the extraordinary technologies we put into our forces in the eighties and early nineties, and in the way that we use these capabilities in battle. The effects of that revolution were put on display for the entire world during DESERT STORM. In less than 100 hours of lightning warfare our forces crushed the world's fourth largest army.

Even as recently as twenty years ago, we were still amazed by the wire-guided technologies packaged in Tow and Dragon missiles, by infrared night vision devices, and by laser-guided bombs. By today's standards these technologies seem ancient. There are now dozens of types of smart and long-range precision munitions in our land, sea and air forces; computers, digitalization and other technologies have carried our C4I to an extraordinary level of capability, and; in all of our services we have fighting systems that operate, day and night, with lethality, maneuverability, and survivability that would have staggered anyone's imagination two decades ago. So there is a revolution afoot that continues to leap ahead and our challenge is to stay on its leading edge.

What makes these two challenges even more difficult is that they push against one another. On the one hand we are reducing and economizing; on the other hand, we are on the crest of an entirely new way of fighting, but a way that is very expensive to develop and field.

It is these two imperatives that are shaping the outlook of our senior military leaders and the recommendations on every aspect of our future force.

DIRECTION

The conflicting pressures of these two challenges mean that we have to fundamentally change the way we have been doing business. We have to reassess everything, from how we train, organize, man, and equip our forces, to how we fight. The numbers say it all. We will have an active force structure that is one third smaller, a budget less than half what it was ten years before, and a growing range of demands for the use of American forces.

Today we have the strongest, most powerful, and most technologically advanced military force in the world. To keep it that way, we must protect the essential elements that have kept our force strong, and continually look for innovative ways to sustain those strengths.

We are convinced that we have the right overall strategic equation for our future force. We must have the capability to fight and win two major regional contingencies that occur nearly simultaneously. Today that requirement is premised on the need to be able to fight and win against North Korea and Iraq. But this is not a prediction. Nor do we expect North Korea and Iraq to remain our adversaries into the next century.

We are concerned that other threats may emerge in the future, threats that we cannot foresee today. Just look at our experience over the past 40 years. In 1949, the year before the Korean War broke out, Korea was viewed as one of the least likely places where we anticipated we would have to commit forces to combat. Again, in 1960, nobody envisioned that we would become involved in a long and costly struggle in Vietnam. Or, even more recently, as late as 1988 our Southwest Asia contingency force was oriented at countering Iranian expansion, not an Iraqi attack against Kuwait. We have learned to respect this lesson of history: It is a rare instance when we know who our future adversaries will be.

As a result, we view this two contingency force as about right. It is the right size to ensure we do not fall into the predicament of dispatching a contingency force to one theater and then awaken to find that another adversary is exploiting our vulnerability to attack elsewhere. And it is the right size to give us a hedge against the uncertainty of tomorrow's threats.

We have already made the decisions on our future force structure, and I do not expect any great changes from our current plans. There will be 10 active Army Divisions, 13 active Fighter Wings, 11 active aircraft carriers, and 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces. When the reductions are complete, the total strength of our Active forces will be only 1.4 million, the smallest number since before the Second World War.

The only way that such a vast reduction could be palatable is because beside these Active forces will be 8 National Guard Divisions, 15 National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigades, one Reserve Carrier, 7 Reserve and National Guard Fighter Wings, and one Reserve Division/Wing/Logistics Team. But, this only tells part of the story. Beyond this combat structure we also depend on our Reserve and Guard for Combat Support and Combat Service Support forces to make the Active forces deployable. In small and large contingencies alike, the Guard and Reserve will be on the frontline.

In fact, in this world in which we have multiple Joint Task Forces operating simultaneously in several places around the world nearly continuously, the involvement of Guard and Reserve forces has proven necessary simply to sustain our daily missions.

Considering all of this, we have to protect three vital elements of our forces. The first of these is people. Today the men and women who wear our nation's uniform — those who wear it full time and those who wear it part time — are the finest in the world. Our people are the true source of our military excellence. And as much as all of us recognize that nobody expects to become wealthy from military service, it is imperative that we protect the pay, benefits, and quality of life that have attracted such outstanding people to our ranks. Fortunately, this fact is recognized by President Clinton and Secretary Perry, and the members of Congress, all of whom are committed to keeping our pay and benefits at adequate levels.

The second element of our force that must be protected is our readiness. Again fortunately, this fact appears widely accepted and supported. The events of the past few years have left no doubt in anyone's mind that our military forces are seeing a lot of use. But protecting our readiness is no simple task. And as difficult as it is for the Active forces, the challenge for the Reserve and Guard is even more difficult. In today's military, the intellectual and physical challenges of readiness are immense.

So, preserving the readiness of our Reserve and Guard is going to require an unrelenting commitment to provide the resources and the right kinds of training opportunities to Guard and Reserve forces. But it also demands that we apply available technology more effectively, such as in training simulations, and that we assign the right people to help Guard and Reserve units to meet their responsibilities. Today I am encouraged that these steps are being taken and that we are on the right path.

Third we must protect the enhancements and modernizations that are necessary to ensure that we can perform the mission of fighting and winning two, nearly simultaneous, major regional contingencies, and also that ensure our forces stay ready in the future. In a world of shrinking resources and competing demands this will be no easy task.

Frankly, even in 1990 we could not have deployed to two major contingencies with the speed and the kind of capabilities that we need in the future. We lacked sufficient strategic lift, our strategic C4I was inadequate, and we did not have enough of the right kinds of combat systems. So even as we are shrinking the size of our forces, we are also having to improve and expand selected capabilities. The term we have been using to describe this process is growing our forces down.

Just since the Gulf War, we have greatly expanded the numbers of long-range precision weapons systems; we have expanded our strategic lift and placed prepositioned equipment sets in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia; and we have made significant improvements in our strategic and operational C4I.

But if we are to continue these programs, the fact is that we are going to have to make some significant changes. And the path we are going to have to follow is jointness.

Before ten years ago, jointness meant that the members of each service had to be familiar with the capabilities, cultures, and habits of other services so that when the time came to operate together we could fit our forces together, make a few adjustments, and then perform our mission. Unfortunately, this long engrained way of creating jointness led to problem after problem. In the midst of conflict we would discover that our service forces had different communications systems, different doctrines, and different approaches. At times these differences led to tragedy.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987 was designed to rectify these problems and it succeeded magnificently. In the Gulf War, we fought as a single, synchronized joint force and the result was extremely gratifying to everybody but Saddam Hussein and his forces.

But today we must go further. A little over a year ago, we stood up a joint command here in the United States — the United States Atlantic Command — which is responsible for the training and preparedness of joint forces here in the United States. This is in itself is a bold leap because it gives us the capability in peacetime to continually train our forces here as a joint team.

In addition, starting three years ago, we began the process of producing a new joint doctrine, from the broadest principles of how we fight at the strategic and operational levels, down through the technical, training and procedural

manuals needed to tie together every level and function of our joint forces. Currently the Joint Staff is producing four manuals a month and these are being distributed to the field as rapidly as possible. But as every military man and woman knows, it is one thing to publish a manual, it is another thing entirely to ensure that the manual is read and put into daily practice.

We have also formed a Joint Warfighting Center in Norfolk. The center will assist the CJCS, the CINCs, and the Service Chiefs in their preparation for joint and multinational operations by developing and assessing joint simulation and wargaming systems and providing support to joint warfighting commanders for their exercises. The center will also provide analysis and recommendations on the effectiveness of joint doctrine and how it is being accepted in the field.

But there is one other area where jointness must expand. And that area is in the very business of how we train, organize, man, and equip our forces. Until recently, the Service staffs would once a year recommend to the Secretary of Defense exactly how many forces, and what kind of capabilities each Service needed to perform the missions and tasks assigned to our Armed Forces. The Air Force would say it needed X numbers of fighters, the Navy would say it needed X numbers of fighters, and the Marine Corps would say it needed X number of fighters. Today, and for the future, that system has been reversed. We now go to the joint warfighting commanders and ask each of them how many fighters or tanks or Aegis Cruisers they need in the event of a contingency. The Joint community then turns to the Services and tells each how many fighters or tanks or cruisers it needs to build and field.

But today we are exploring whether it is feasible to expand this same approach even wider, into how many military bases and commissaries we need, how many ground training areas we need in California, or whether we can't train all chaplains or lawyers at the same schools. In part, our purpose is to try to use jointness as a way to economize, but without damaging any of the elements of our forces that are important to our warfighting effectiveness. And in part, we are trying to find ways to improve on jointness so that we will be more effective on the battlefield.

So far I am very encouraged by the progress we are making along each of these paths. Throughout the Armed Forces, I sense that there is a broad awareness that we must change and adapt; that we must embrace rather than fight the needs that need to be taken. And I also believe that we have the talent and leaders to reinvent this force for the future.

WHERE TO NEXT

I have intentionally departed from the normal practice of submitting an article for this journal that describes what the Reserve and Guard are doing around the world today. I have done so because you, the Guard and Reserve, must understand and appreciate the challenges that lie before us, and how much we depend upon you.

We are long past the point of debating the importance or responsibilities of Guard and Reserve forces to our national defense. Your role is vital today, and will be even more vital when our reductions are completed in 1998. These challenges and directions that I have described will shape the future of our entire force, Active and Reserve. The sweep of jointness embraces every element of our future force and all of us must work now to prepare for the next century. I thank you for your extraordinary performance over the past year. As I have believed from the day I entered the service, no nation in the world can match the American Guard and Reserve forces.

Oral Testimony on START II
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
1 March 1995

Since the late 1950's, we and the former Soviet Union engaged in a series of protracted and labored arms control negotiations always with the goal of trying to find a way to make our nation safer from the threat of nuclear destruction. For decades we pursued this course, first avoiding a new incentive to an even more frantic arms race when we obtained an agreement to forgo antiballistic missile systems designed to protect our national territories and then later, when we signed treaties that limited the growth of our nuclear forces. These treaties primarily arrested the expansion of our arsenals, but always it was our hope that we could eventually accomplish something much more meaningful.

The START I Treaty that entered into force last December, the result of ten years of difficult and exhaustive negotiations, was such an accomplishment. For the first time we actually agreed to reduce our arsenals. But the end of the Cold War opened the opportunity for even more profound reductions.

This was the spirit that permeated the START II negotiations, some of which I attended as the Assistant to then-

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell. From my firsthand perspective, I can attest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted every step of the way and that their views were accommodated in the Treaty.

This Treaty, START II, builds on the progress of START I but goes beyond it because it will restructure our nuclear forces to eliminate instabilities that have always been matters of great concern to military planners and to our citizens alike. By this I am referring to the elimination of all land-based missiles with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles or MIRVs as well as all land-based heavy ICBMs. As Secretary Perry mentioned before, we have always been convinced that these particular systems are intrinsically the most dangerous and unstable elements of our strategic arsenals. Because they are vulnerable to a first strike from the other side, they impose a "use or lose" instinct that would be a very unstable factor in a crisis. Eliminating these systems makes both of our nuclear forces more stable deterrents.

Again as the Secretary mentioned, the Nuclear Posture Review that we completed last September resulted in the design for a post-START II nuclear force that preserves a mix of U.S.-based and forward deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons and a balanced triad of land-based ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs that is survivable and maintains rough equivalence against Russia's post-START II forces. From extensive analysis the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I agree that this future force will remain an adequate deterrent against the only nation that foreseeably threatens our national existence, Russia, and that it will provide extended deterrence over our allies as well.

The verification procedures that will be used for START II build upon the same interlocking and mutually reinforcing methods and procedures that we have been using under START I, but with an even greater degree of intrusiveness. Again, the other Chiefs and I are confident that these levels of verification are sufficient to alert us to significant violations and that adequate hedges will exist to respond should the Russians not comply with the treaty.

When both the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces are reduced to the levels established by this treaty, our forces will remain roughly equivalent but without the unstable pockets that have troubled us for decades. This, beyond even the considerable reductions to our nuclear forces, is the beneficial hallmark of this treaty, a security gain that is as positive for the Russians as it is for Americans.

The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have no reservations toward this treaty about the strategic force reductions it entails or about our ability to properly verify that the Russians are complying with its provisions. I encourage the Senate to promptly give its advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty.

**Brazil's Escola Superior De Guerra
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
7 March 1995**

Let me begin by telling you how very pleased and honored I am to be here today and to have this opportunity to share some thoughts with the very distinguished faculty of the Escola Superior de Guerra and the local commanders who have been kind enough to take time away from your very important duties to come here today.

We are as all of you know, in a very new and a very different era than we have known over the past fifty years; indeed a very different era than we have known in our lifetimes.

The combination of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the bipolar world order that were such dominant features of the international landscape for the past half century, have given way to something remarkably different. We are in a rare period of unparalleled opportunity when with the right decisions we have the chance to make the future safer than the past. We have at our feet great opportunities, opportunities that far surpass anything the generation of Brazilians and Americans that fought World War One or World War Two together could ever have imagined.

And truly this is why I am so pleased to have this chance to spend some time with you today, for this war college has long had a great reputation for brilliant and original thought and for influencing the fate of Brazil and the fate of this hemisphere.

For tomorrow your vision and your responsibilities are going to have to grow to keep your country and the rest of us in this hemisphere ahead of our own remarkable evolution.

Just a few months ago, President Clinton sent me to Europe to visit several of the newly liberated Eastern European nations to discuss with them the future of Europe and the roles they wish to take to help shape a new destiny for that continent, a continent which for the past century has suffered through two world wars and then fifty years of division and tension. I went to Poland, the newly created Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary. These four nations perhaps suffered more cruelly than any from the great events of this century. But what I saw in each nation was truly heartening.

In Warsaw, a city once known as one of the handsomest cities in all of Europe but also the city that suffered greater destruction in the Second World War than any other, what you see today are block after block of gray and oppressive buildings built by the communists. Where once stood such great beauty there is now in its place a very dark and foreboding looking city. But the people bustling about in the streets stand in great contrast to their surroundings. There is no darkness or gloom in their faces, but instead these wonderful expressions of hope and confidence in their future and the joyousness of new found freedoms. And you see the same kinds of sights in the other three nations that I visited as well. Side by side with the leftover evidence of the decrepit communist dictatorships that ruled these nations for four decades are millions of people bursting with hope who are cherishing the freedoms they were denied for so long.

Not long thereafter, the President sent me to visit Sarajevo the city which looked so beautiful and idyllic when it hosted the 1984 Olympic games. Today it looks neither beautiful nor impressive, rather it is a grim picture of tragedy and hopelessness. Although by land Sarajevo is only a short distance from the four European capitals I visited earlier, emotionally it is on the other side of the world from the others. One group of nations are looking to the future filled with great ambitions and hopes, earnestly trying to make sure that their children will not know the suffering they have known, the other nation has trapped itself in the past unable to break itself free from the stranglehold of old hatreds and passions. And in the process they have sentenced their children to terrible futures.

By now I would expect that some of you are wondering why I am here in Brazil talking about the problems and challenges of Europe. Actually, it is to make several points.

The first point is to elaborate the struggle that all of us are facing, to leave behind the challenges and perceptions of the era we should happily regard as the past and then redirecting our focus and our energies to the future we want to create.

What does this mean for this hemisphere which is home for the 30 nations that make up the Americas? Within the past decade, a very large number of countries in this hemisphere committed themselves to very bold reforms, very fundamental changes in the way they are governed, in the economic models they have adopted, and very serious attempts to redress some of the social problems and inequities that have plagued us for a very long time. If you think about this, you realize that within this hemisphere a very great shift is still underway, a shift that is changing the way that hundreds of millions of our citizens live.

In the history of the world, never before has there been a time when such an overwhelming number of nations in a single hemisphere shared common ways to govern their nations, when literally the fate of this hemisphere is no longer decided by a few leaders, rather it will be decided by the many millions every time they go to the ballot boxes. Truly history offers no precedent for this. And the question we must all be asking ourselves is what advantages and opportunities this opens up for each of us, independently, and for all of us as the common inhabitants of this hemisphere.

Already we have realized that the growing similarities in our economies, nearly all of us are now swimming in free markets, opens great opportunities. Today's predictions are that by the end of this century, the Gross National Product of this hemisphere will exceed over 13 trillion dollars a year. Outside of East Asia the world's fastest growing economies are now here in Latin America.

But I think we recognize all of us that there are even greater economic opportunities, such as wider integration of the North American Free Trade Agreement, opportunities that in the next century could very well propel both the northern and southern halves of this hemisphere so much further.

And I have no doubt that we will take advantage of these opportunities, that our economies will grow closer together, that the gaps in national wealth that used to so strongly characterize the differences between the northern and southern halves of this hemisphere, that these gaps will continue to disappear. And this will usher in so many other changes that it is nearly impossible to estimate the full effects.

So from the economic perspective of this hemisphere I am confident that we are allowing our imaginations to push us toward a better future. But I wonder if the same can be said for how we think about our future security. We have today the same hemispheric security bodies that have existed for many decades, unchanged in any significant way despite our passage into a new era. Perhaps this is as it should be, but I still wonder.

When General Leonel and I were young officers, we both were associated with the Inter-American Defense Board that meets in Washington and I suspect that if he were to go visit one of its meetings today as I have had occasion to do in the past few years, he would be surprised how very little that organization has changed. Is it time to consider a new approach? I don't know the answer but I do think that the brightest minds in our defense communities such as you gathered here in this room that we need for you to be thinking about this.

For decades it has been a precept of security relations in this hemisphere to keep our ties very loose and very informal. Compared to NATO for example, the security dynamics here are very, very different. There are obvious

reasons why this has been the case that all of us here understand, but should it be different in the future? Again I don't pretend to have the answer to that question but it would seem that our commonalities are much greater today than ever in the past. And certainly we do share the same half of the world.

This comes to the second point that I wanted to discuss with you. Ever since I was a very young child I have always heard stories of this great nation of Brazil, truly a wondrous nation endowed with vast resources and courageous and energetic people, a nation that would one day become a giant on the world stage.

Today Brazil by every measure has very clearly crossed the threshold into regional and world leadership. In population, this nation is the second largest in this hemisphere and the 5th largest in the world. Brazil has the 9th largest economy in the world and is rapidly approaching the 8th and accounts for 40 percent of the entire economic output of Latin America. And as your country has grown so have your interests. Like the United States you are a major force in the international marketplace which for Brazil is largely good, but partly bad. Just as is the case for the United States this means that Brazil will flourish as other international markets grow but also that again, like the United States, Brazil is now hostage to events in other corners of the world where you have economic interests.

It means something else as well and I am sure that this is the major issue that many of you have been contending with over the past few years. And that is what role Brazil should assume as it continues its evolution. Again this is an issue I don't pretend to have the answer to and it is very much up to the Brazilian people themselves to provide the answer in any regard. But I do want to offer the perspective of the United States on the partnership between our countries, because we are now the two largest powers in this part of the world. And when two giants must live so closely together it is essential we understand and trust one another.

Americans appreciate Brazil's great power and view it as a very positive force. Americans also appreciate Brazil's independent views and, again, we view this independence as a constructive force for this region.

Although we may not always agree on some key issues from our perspective, these are like arguments between brothers. Let me add that I am very glad that I have not heard any mention lately of the old suspicion that the United States has designs on the Amazon region. If you have ever lived in the United States you would know how very absurd that theory would be to most Americans. So while here, I would like to put to rest any remaining residue of this old suspicion or assertion that the United States covets this region. You would be surprised at how shocked we were when we learned that we had been accused by some of harboring designs on the Amazon. It would be like accusing Brazil of wanting China's Gobi Desert.

But it is not enough to just share trust between our nations, because trust will not accomplish what we must ensure together. As our hemisphere grows more closely together it is important for us to recognize that this results in ever increasing interdependency and that the openness of our borders makes us more and more vulnerable to common problems. By this I am talking about the host of threats that we have been referring to as transnational issues: spreading diseases; illegal immigrants; and drugs. If we all closed our borders to one another then we could deal with these problems, independently building barriers between ourselves to ensure that some other nation's problems are kept in isolation. But that approach is neither possible nor desirable.

Our only recourse is to find ways to approach these challenges together. For years, as you know, the United States and Colombia have been waging a common war against drugs. In Colombia are the suppliers and in the United States are the consumers. About a decade ago both of us realized that this presented each of our nations with an equal dose of problems. The drugs coming into our shores kill thousands of Americans each year, even as the trade breeds crime problems that make many of our communities frightening places to live. But being a producer nation left Colombia with equally serious problems. One day the Colombian government woke up to realize that the cartels were contesting it for rule of their entire nation.

Yesterday, I had the great pleasure of witnessing the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding authorizing a joint U.S.-Brazilian Army Medical Research activity. The purpose of this activity is to perform research and to explore new ways to combat some common diseases such as resistant malaria, dengue fever, cholera, and others that afflict all of our populations. If you think about it nothing could make more sense for the benefit of both our countries and the world.

And of course I cannot overlook the common effort that we are taking together to help end the fighting between Ecuador and Peru. With Brazil's leadership and bold diplomacy, I am confident that this effort will be successful.

Indeed, I am very confident that the partnership between our two countries will continue to grow and to prosper. I know that from the United States' standpoint we very much need Brazil's leadership and active engagement in managing the problems of this hemisphere. I suspect that from Brazil's standpoint, your need for our partnership is equally great. And as we move into the next century, just around the corner, the world will need Brazil's vision and energy.

In this region we cannot afford to have a tragedy such as Yugoslavia occur. We must all of us ensure that old hatreds and angers remain buried in the past where they belong. Our commitment today is to our children and to their children, not to the arguments between our great-grandparents. Again this is why I am so very appreciative of Brazil's crucial role in ending the fighting between Ecuador and Peru because all of us must keep our eyes to the future.

Now I have probably said far too much. I only hope that I have not spoken so long that I dulled any enthusiasm you came here with. But I wanted very much to share these challenges with you because all of us, Brazilians and Americans alike, need to be thinking about these challenges and generating the ideas and the vision to make the next century so much better than the last. I was very much struck by one of the things that President Cardoso said in his inauguration address at the beginning of this year. He said that for him, like so many other Brazilians, hope has become an obsession. I think that this true for all of us in this hemisphere today, that hope has become our common obsession. And I am confident that we will act on this obsession to turn our hopes into reality.

So now I turn the floor back over to you so that I may hear your views.

**The Lancers Boys Club
Baltimore, Maryland
7 April 1995**

Your very kind introduction brings to mind a famous story of the Second World War that involved Admiral Chester Nimitz, the commander of all of our naval forces in the Pacific, and General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of all our ground forces in the Pacific Theater.

Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur were trying to formulate their strategy and they wanted a little privacy. So they found a small dinghy and they pushed off shore where they couldn't be bothered. As they were working, they failed to notice the winds pick up. Soon after, the seas got terribly rough and before they knew it the dinghy had overturned, dumping both of them into the water.

Well they weren't very far from shore so General MacArthur decided that they would just swim in, but he noticed Admiral Nimitz struggling; the commander of our naval forces couldn't swim. So he swam over to Nimitz and helped him to the dinghy where Admiral Nimitz could hold on.

Just then Nimitz turned to MacArthur and said, "Douglas you have to promise never to mention the fact that I can't swim to my sailors because it will completely destroy my credibility in the fleet." And General MacArthur responded, "Chester, I promise. I won't tell your sailors you can't swim. But you have to promise not to tell my soldiers that I can't walk on water."

So I will agree to continue my remarks but you have to promise not to tell anyone that I am not a very good speaker.

But truly, I simply can't begin to tell you what a very great pleasure it is for me to be here tonight. This is an evening I have been looking forward to for quite some time and I really appreciate this chance to meet with you and share some of my thoughts with you.

The reputation that the Lancers Boys Club has in this area is absolutely tremendous and the activities that you are involved in and your many accomplishments are remarkable. And I think it is very important for me to take just a moment to thank you for your commitment and to congratulate you on the many contributions you make to the community and to urge you to continue, because you really do make a tremendous difference. So when I received your invitation, I couldn't have been more pleased.

By now, you are probably wondering where I got my accent. I got it from John Wayne. It's true. But it is kind of a long story.

You see, I was born in Poland. I was three years old when the leader of Germany, Hitler, and the leader of Russia, Stalin, made a secret pact to attack Poland. You will recall that it was their joint attack on Poland that began the Second World War.

For the next six years until I was nine years old, one army after another marched and fought through the cities where my family and I lived. By the time the war ended, one beautiful city after another had been destroyed and millions of people across Europe had died or were left homeless.

The entire country was prostrate, its economies ruined, and its people impoverished. On top of trying to dig out from that, the world faced a new threat, the threat of another even more destructive war because when the Second World War ended the Cold War began.

Several years after the war ended my family and I came here to America to look for a new start. With the help of our church we were given the chance to come here to America.

Looking back, it is easy to say that we made the right decision. But when I was sixteen and moving to a new land where I couldn't even understand the language, well that was pretty scary. So of course I wanted to learn English as quickly as possible and the best way I found to learn English was to go to the movies. John Wayne was a very popular figure in those days and his movies were constantly playing at the theater near my home. So he very literally taught me how to speak English.

But the funny thing about learning English that way is that you never get to talk back. And so I never shook this accent that you hear.

Well, with the help of our church and John Wayne's English lessons, we began a new life in Peoria, Illinois. I went to high school at Peoria High and then I went on to college right there in Peoria at Bradley University. Six years after we had arrived in this wonderful country, I graduated from Bradley University with a degree in Engineering.

Within a few weeks I had it all — a degree in hand, a job, and a brand new convertible that I bought as soon as that first paycheck hit the bank. At this point I should add one other thing. Just about a month before I graduated, I was granted the most valuable thing I could have wished for — citizenship. So the world looked pretty good from where I was sitting, which was mostly in the front seat of my new car.

Then a strange twist occurred because one of the things that citizenship made me available for was the selective service system, the draft. And sure enough, that summer I received my draft notice. I still had my degree and I had a job, although it was a much different one than I had anticipated upon graduation. But someone else was driving my new convertible because I simply couldn't afford it on a private's pay.

But when that draft notice came I felt an obligation to serve. This nation had offered me some tremendous opportunities already and I was more than willing to now offer my service in return. But I have to tell you, I had no designs on the army. I was going to serve my two years and that was going to be the last of it. Then I was going to return to civilian life, get that job I had lined up after college, and find that guy that had my convertible and buy it back.

But as it turned out I absolutely fell in love with the Army on my very first assignment. I have never had any desire to return to that job I had after graduation and I have never sought out that convertible, although I have to admit that I have thought about it from time to time.

A year and a half ago I was in Europe, in Mons, Belgium, where I was serving as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe. What that means is that I was the Commander of all U.S. forces in Europe and that in time of war, I would also serve as the commander of all of the forces of the 16 nations that form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. I was enormously proud and honored to have been appointed to that job and with all of my previous experience in Europe, I hoped to offer a lot to NATO.

But President Clinton had something else in mind and he offered me this job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was something I had to think long and hard about because I really felt that I was making a difference in Europe. As SACEUR, I was a commander, and for an Army officer there is simply nothing better than being a commander of troops, surrounded by smart and talented young men and women dedicated to serving their nation. Well you know the decision I made.

Now, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am the senior officer of the United States Armed Forces. But I am not the commander of the Armed Forces — the President is the commander of the U.S. Armed Forces. That is why you hear President Clinton referred to as the Commander-in-Chief.

My job is to advise the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. My job is to give my best recommendations as to how big the military should be, where the men and women of our Armed Forces should be stationed, and what kind of capabilities our military should have to be able to do the kinds of operations we have been seeing over the past few years and the kinds of operations we may be asked to perform in the future. When the President thinks we need to use our Armed Forces to perform one mission or another, it is my job to recommend to the President the best way to do that mission. So my job is truly to serve as an advisor.

I could not have asked for a more challenging role because truly, the end of the Cold War placed this nation in the most difficult and complex period of our history.

The Cold War was a tense a period in our history, but that tension lent an enormous degree of stability to the world to the nation and certainly to our Armed Forces. Throughout the Cold War there was always a firm understanding of what our mission was, to contain the communist designs of the Soviet Union. There was no great debate like you see today about the purpose of our Armed Forces. There was no revolution in the shape or size of our forces. Once the

Vietnam War ended, the size and position of our forces and the way we were expected to fight remained pretty stable. For the most part, the decisions that had to be made concerning our Armed Forces were marginal issues.

But the end of the Cold War changed all this because it so very fundamentally changed the face of the world. The Soviet Union fell apart and dissolved into 13 new nations. East Europe became free. The Berlin Wall that had gone up overnight and separated families and friends from each other for almost thirty years, came tumbling down.

And today there is only one Germany, where there were two just a few years ago, and China is slowly opening its doors trying to find its niche in the new world.

One after another, new nations are adopting democracies and becoming members of the free world and building free market economies. They are looking to the United States as their model. They are striving for the kinds of things that many of us simply take for granted.

We are pretty lucky when you think about. How wise the colonists were to choose the form of government they did. And how lucky you and I are to have the kinds of opportunities that hundreds of millions of people around the world can only dream of today.

But for many of them, this is a difficult journey. These enormous contortions and changes that these nations are going through are causing a tremendous amount of instability.

Since the end of the Cold War more nations have been born and more borders have changed than what occurred after the Second World War.

And what you have been seeing these past few years is the United States as the most powerful nation in the world, today, doing its very best to lend some stability to these difficult processes. Since 1990, the Armed Forces of the United States have conducted more operations than we performed throughout the entire Cold War period. So we have placed some enormous challenges and demands on our nation's military and on the men and women that serve in uniform.

And in the face of these many challenges we have also been making some very fundamental decisions about the size and the shape and the capabilities of our Armed Forces.

In the absence of the kind of threat the Soviet Union once posed, we have reduced greatly the size of our budget. As you can imagine, that has affected every facet of our military; our size the number of bases we have, the kinds of equipment we buy, everything.

We have realized that we no longer need and that we can no longer sustain a force of 2.2 million men and women and so we are in the process of reducing that number to 1.4 million. That has meant a tremendous amount of turmoil within our ranks. We have had to tell an awful lot of very good people who had served our nation well that their services were no longer needed.

That has been one of the toughest challenges I have had to face. But today we are just about through with these reductions and are well on our way to building the force that we will need in the future — a force of the right size and the right mix of capabilities to meet our security requirements of the future.

So you can see how very fundamentally this new world has affected our Armed Forces and my role as Chairman, but what does this new world mean to you?

As democracy continues its march across the globe and as new nations join the global marketplace, the world, our nation, and each of you will benefit enormously. Just consider what we have witnessed over the span of my adult life and your parents'.

When I was your age very few families had a television and if you can imagine, what computers we did have were huge ugly monstrosities that filled rooms and did less than what some wristwatches today can do.

Advancements in science and technology, as rapid as they have been over the past 40 years, seem to be moving faster than ever before.

It is easy for me to say with great confidence that your lives will be longer, healthier, and more productive than you or I can even imagine. This new world has opened an entire new era for your generation an era filled with more hope and more possibilities than the world and our nation have ever witnessed before.

But what we must now be careful to ensure is that we secure these hopes and dreams for you and for your children. We have to maintain our ability to prevent anyone from threatening our nation, from threatening our allies, and from taking away from us the opportunities that we have worked so hard to achieve.

And today we can do that very well. America has the finest fighting forces in the world. We must keep it that way because we will continue to need it and your generation will need it when you take over leadership of this country.

This is the world that is waiting for you; this is the task that you will one day help us undertake. So all of you hurry, study, finish school, and come join us. I think you are going to find it tremendously exciting.

As you think about how you will contribute to this new world, I urge you to consider the military. 1.6 million men

and women wear America's uniform today and are having a tremendous impact on the world. It's a great feeling to be part of that.

But regardless of what you do in the future please remember what Judge Hammerman and your experience with the Lancers has taught you about service to your community and continue to do the kinds of things you are doing today with this wonderful club.

Now I am sure that I have already spoken for too long. Thank you for having me here tonight. It has been a great pleasure and I hope I have at least given you a couple of things to think about and a little more information to base your future decisions on. Now what is on your mind? What questions can I answer?

**The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation
George Washington University
Washington, DC
4 May 1995**

It is a particular pleasure to see so many representatives from our humanitarian organizations. I know that Fred Cuny, who was also invited, has been reported as missing while leading an aid mission into Chechnya. I know that you join me in praying for his safe return, but it is a reminder to all of us how very fortunate we are to have such courageous people in our midst.

Ever since I commanded that operation that was just referred to, that humanitarian effort in northern Iraq back in 1991, I have had a number of occasions to watch and admire the invaluable work being done by humanitarian organizations all around the globe. And it has always struck me as unfortunate that their work is not better known, for I know of no finer role models for our young people in this country than these extraordinary men and women who run from one tragedy to the next, often at great risk to themselves, to bring, literally, the miracle of life to so many.

I think you have chosen a most interesting topic for this conference, although the public debate on this issue seems to have lost a few decibels since that tragic October day in 1993 in Mogadishu. Putting our arms around the issue of employing our forces — and sometimes having to use force — in operations short of war, such as humanitarian operations, and peacekeeping, and peacemaking remains nevertheless a very tough challenge for us all.

Nothing could have dramatized this better than the revival of the Vietnam debate that Mr. MacNamara's book resuscitated just last month. In skimming the many scorching editorials and commentaries that his book attracted, you can only conclude that as a Nation we still do not have a consensus about limited wars, much less about operations short of war.

And it is not just a matter of the Cold War being over, for many of the mistakes that Mr. MacNamara wrote that he recognized as early as 1965 had really nothing to do with the Cold War.

It would be just as possible today, I submit, to find ourselves drawn too deeply into a conflict where our interests prove too thin for our commitment, to find ourselves trapped in a quagmire, as Mr. Halberstram termed it, where we have no commitment to achieve victory, to find ourselves at the wrong place and at the wrong time. But, conversely, ever since that conflict, there has always been an equally great danger that, with Vietnam in mind, we could become too timid; that we may imagine parallels from Vietnam where in fact no parallels exist. And in many ways, I tell you, this would be a much worse failure for our Nation, and for the world.

But the debate has changed in one way. During the Cold War, it was those on the left criticizing the Cold Warriors for taking too many risks, for over-committing our lives, our treasures, and our morality, for over-extending our power and our commitments for the purpose of containing communism. Today of course, that is different. It is those on the right who are castigating those on the left for allowing their humanitarian and their moral impulses to places where our interests, in fact, are thin or nonexistent. So the core debate has not ended at all. The real issues have not been resolved. Only the tables have been turned.

And the experience of the past four to five years is a warning; i.e., the kinds of tragedies we have seen, the exploding nations, the humanitarian disasters so catastrophic that they overwhelm the world's relief organizations, the floods of refugees from wars and oppression that can be numbered in the millions, and the near-certain knowledge that there will be more of these in our future.

So I think this conference is very timely, indeed — for the media, for the policymakers, and for the military — for we are all in this together. And while some might regard us as a very unholy trio, all three of our institutions must search for better clarity about the challenges that exist in the netherworld between war and peace.

Now I don't pretend to have that clarity with me at this podium. For that matter, I'm not sure that anyone does today. But the experience of the past several years has taught us a thing or two, and I thought that I might spend a few minutes sharing some loosely-connected ideas that you might want to explore further in the panel discussions you will be holding tomorrow.

We should start by recognizing that while these kinds of challenges are certainly not a phenomenon of this era, the growth of our involvement in these kinds of operations is, in fact, something rather new. As you well know, during the Cold War we rarely used our military forces for peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. After Vietnam — and the Nixon Doctrine that resulted from that conflict -- we even sought to avoid military involvement in limited conflicts altogether.

We learned that we had to be most selective, that we had to be very clear where our vital interests lay, that we needed to preserve and to concentrate our abilities to be ready to defend those vital interests against the massive forces of the former Soviet Union.

Today we are asking ourselves, "what has changed?" I would start by answering that in some ways not as much has changed as some might have suggested. First, we need to understand that our Nation still has vital interests and we retain dramatically large responsibilities around the world.

True, there is no longer a global threat from the Soviet Union. But neither our interests around the globe, nor regional threats to those interests, have disappeared. In Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and here in this hemisphere, we are still very much interested in stability and in the security of our friends and allies.

And when you see Iraq, Iran, the North Koreans, the Bosnians, the nationalist reflexes we are witnessing in Russia, and the opportunity for peace in the Middle East, there remains a most important role for our military power in each of these places as well.

And it is our continuing and effective engagement in these regions, and against these challenges, that is most meaningful and beneficial to ourselves and to the world. And I think that the realists in our country understand this.

And it should carry equal weight among the moralists as well. For it can be argued that the greatest victory for human rights the world has ever witnessed was the peaceful termination of the Cold War. For in that termination, billions of the world's people were released from near-slavery and oppression.

And it was an unequaled victory for world peace as well. But for these victories to be sustained, the gains that were made must, of course, be protected.

As well, a new world order must be formed to replace the bipolar order that is gone, and what that order will look like will have an incalculable impact on every nation in the world. As the world's leading and most influential nation, that must be a primary issue for our policy and for our military forces. The simple fact is, of course, that no other nation in the world has the power or the reach to perform this role.

Just like during the Cold War, we must have a clear sight of what today constitutes the main events. And no matter what else we do, we must not allow ourselves to neglect or to forfeit what is required to manage these main events.

Now, I must tell you that some, at least in my profession, would prefer that we put a sign outside the Pentagon that says, "we only do the Big Ones." That is because we feel comfortable with yesterday. We understand terms like "overwhelming force" and like "decisive victory." But as strong as the temptation may be to do this, the fact is that we cannot lead, we cannot remain that most influential Nation if we turn a blind eye to tragedies where millions are at risk, or if we try to ignore the Bosnians and the Haitis. Nor do I believe the American people would ever allow this to happen, for I do not believe that our Nation is morally capable of watching tragedies of the scale of a Somalia or Rwanda and of remaining a silent bystander. Surely, there are some things that are so morally reprehensible or so inhumane that we as Americans, when we see them, must act.

But, the difficulty lies in distinguishing between helping — narrowly defining our interests and our involvement — and on the other hand, getting caught in someone else's hatreds, prejudices, and intrigues.

And even when we enter with the best of intentions, if we are not extraordinarily cautious, there is always this impulse to try to bring more than relief — in fact, to bring solutions.

Largely, it becomes a matter of expectations. In war we expect victory. But in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, what do we expect? At what point do we declare an endpoint and return home?

All of us remember a time when the word "Nation-building" gained great currency in this town. Perhaps our successes in the military occupations of Japan and Germany and our successes in rebuilding Western Europe led some to believe that we could reconstruct other nations. I submit to you, if that was so, we drew false confidence and we drew false analogies from what happened after World War Two.

The fact is that we cannot rebuild or restructure other nations. Such an undertaking is the work of decades and of

sustained efforts by generations. When you go to Haiti today, you will find that our forces are not attempting to rebuild that nation. We are trying to give the Haitian people the chance to rebuild themselves. We cannot police their streets.

But we can help them to rebuild and retrain their own police force. We cannot build for them a new government. But we can offer stability while their own leaders rebuild their government and create the means to maintain stability for themselves. And we cannot rebuild their economy. But we can help them to create conditions that begin that process. But don't expect to see an instantaneous success.

It may take years before Haitian streets are modern and paved, before the kind of poverty we see today is considerably lessened, and before democracy is so firmly rooted that Cedras and his people are just a bad memory.

So the issue remains one of expectations and of perseverance. And when a tragedy has great humanitarian proportions, when our hearts are most affected, then perseverance becomes all the more difficult, but also all the more necessary. There will always be this tug to do more than we set out to do, to find the source of the tragedy and to try to cure it for all time. But that is a very different undertaking than providing relief.

In the Orient, there is this old Confucian saying that when you save a person's life, you are responsible for that person for the rest of their life. If that rule were actually practiced, I suspect that very few people would ever want to become doctors.

And we must understand that in helping other nations as well, that there are limits to the help we can offer, that if we are to go beyond offering relief, then we must have interests strong enough to sustain a much greater commitment.

I think we stayed within these guidelines in Rwanda last year, and that was the key. We went in when the situation was so hopeless that it was overwhelming most relief organizations. We helped to restore the relief effort and then, when a degree of stability was restored, we left the humanitarian operations back in the hands of the professionals.

But there are situations much more complex than this, and the situation in the Balkans today illustrates this better than any other. Clearly, we have a great interest in the stability of that entire region. From the beginning, we recognized that this is the traditional flashpoint of European wars. We must be clear that that conflict has the potential to embrace other nations and to drag others into its cauldron of hatred and of violence. And so our very strongest interests are endangered by that conflict — interests such as the stability of Europe, the future health of NATO, and our ability to shape a new Europe free of competing power blocs and new dividing lines.

But more germane to our topic, Bosnia is as well a great humanitarian tragedy, one brought about and fueled by barbarous kinds of human behavior.

But it has proven terribly difficult to solve. Hans Morganthau, the great realist, wrote that "Nations have three tools to influence others: logic ... riches ... and force." We have tried the first two in great abundance, and limited amounts of the third, and have failed to achieve the full effects we want. We have learned that there are very powerful passions in play there ... and that all sides are willing to lose a great deal in order to gain — or maintain — that which they want.

For our part, and on the part of our allies, there is great dissatisfaction that we have not done enough, that we failed to stop the disintegration of that nation in the first place, and that we have failed to end the fighting ever since. Notwithstanding all of our efforts — and even our limited successes — at providing humanitarian assistance, at having saved hundreds of thousands of lives, and at limiting the scope and the intensity of the fighting, still we feel a sense of frustration and of anger because we feel we have not done enough.

Regardless of our disappointment, we should not allow this dissatisfaction to cause us to overlook what are in fact some extraordinary developments. At least for now, for the first time in this century — or before — a conflict in the Balkans has not unleashed the worst in the other nations in Europe.

To the contrary, it has led instead to the very finest of motives from all parties. Nearly every nation on the continent is involved, in one way or another, in trying to end the fighting rather than to seek some gain from it, as they did in the past. For the first time I can remember, nearly every nation in Europe is working collectively to bring peace. For any student of European history, this is quite a remarkable achievement, one that probably would not have been possible at any time before Gorbachev came to power.

A number of our European partners have had soldiers killed in that effort, and all of us have spent considerable resources to reduce the misery and to protect the innocent. We should not overlook the significance of that fact.

Let me add that much of the anger directed at the UNPROFOR has been entirely unfair. They were sent — and have been organized and equipped — not to end the fighting, but rather to keep alive as many innocent victims of this tragedy as possible. And the Nations and forces of UNPROFOR deserve our appreciation and admiration for what they have done and what they continue to do. Let me add that they also deserve every ounce of our support, both because

they are accomplishing much on the ground and because as long as they are there, they are contributing to keeping that conflict from growing out of control.

And let us be crystal clear. If UNPROFOR were to leave, either because the level of fighting on the ground were to become intolerable, or because the United States Congress were to pass a unilateral lift of the arms embargo, the humanitarian situation on the ground will most likely turn to a much worse tragedy yet — as a minimum, in the Eastern enclaves, and most likely in Bihac as well.

Our goal, therefore, must be to keep UNPROFOR in place. Until a negotiated end to the fighting can be hammered out, UNPROFOR remains the best hope we have to keep the conflict contained and the level of suffering down.

But should it become necessary for UNPROFOR to withdraw, we must be a part of NATO's effort to safeguard their departure. For the United States to fail to stand with our allies on this issue could very well prove fatal to NATO and put enormous strains on our transatlantic partnership.

But the larger issue that Yugoslavia has taught us is that the most successful humanitarian and peacekeeping operations are those that prevent a conflict from ever occurring in the first place. And this returns us full circle. It reminds us that our greatest contribution lies in ensuring that peace and stability are maintained in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and in this hemisphere.

We can never undo what has happened in Yugoslavia, but I am certain that our active military involvement through military-to-military contacts, through combined exercises, through innovative outreach programs, through forward stationing and forward-deployed forces, and every day helping maintain stability is doing its part to prevent other conflicts from occurring.

And, what of the role of the media in these events? Are we in fact being forced into these situations by the "CNN effect" that your panels will be discussing tomorrow? Is media coverage forcing us to alter our approach to these operations? And, perhaps more basically, what ought to be the relationship between the media and the military during these Operations Other Than War?

Let me try some random thoughts on you. The CNN effect: surely it exists, and surely we went to Somalia and Rwanda partly because of its magnetic pull. Surely the world's actions — or inaction — and political leaders' pronouncements are greatly influenced by this effect. Since instant, global, constant information is here to stay, and if anything will become even more widely available, how will governments be able to make choices if those choices are different from those suggested on our television screens? What if our country had wanted to go to the Sudan instead of Somalia, although only Somalia was on our screens?

I surely don't have the answer, but while these decisions will be harder in the future, they might prove not as difficult as we might imagine. Governments and publics will become more sophisticated as they become more used to this phenomenon, and all of us, most probably, will have our senses dulled by overexposure to pictures of starving children and atrocities committed by one group upon another. Either way, your discussions on this should prove most useful.

Is media coverage forcing us to alter our approach to Operations Other Than War?

The answer is a near-certain "yes" when it comes to peacemaking operations, a more tentative "yes" in the case of more benign peacekeeping operations, and probably "no" in humanitarian operations, unless we talk of places like Bosnia, where all three are intertwined.

The answer is "yes" in peacemaking operations because operational security and safety of our troops are more at stake, and in these operations an all-intrusive press tends to aggravate the natural tensions between these two organizations — the press and the military — organizations with essentially very different missions.

We all know the cases: the bright lights on a beach off Mogadishu, as Marines are attempting a night amphibious landing; the hundreds of reporters awaiting in Port au Prince the night an airborne assault was called off just hours before the sky was to have been filled with paratroopers, and the fear that the sky would have been illuminated with a thousand white lights, making floating ducks of our soldiers.

What is less well known is that all major U.S. networks had agreed to use night vision devices and to delay broadcasting for some time after the troops were safely on the ground. So perhaps we are more tolerant of each other's needs than is generally believed. But we must continue to work this issue.

I submit to you, a young sergeant leading a squad to clear a narrow street will not show the same caution when he notices his progress being filmed by a TV crew. He will be embarrassed to slip from doorway to doorway and could thus become a more likely casualty. But when more benign, less-dangerous operations such as peacekeeping or humanitarian operations are involved, the tensions between media and the soldier are much less present. From my experience in the Kurdish operation following the Gulf War, the tensions were practically non-existent and we not only were

able to give the press total freedom to roam the operations area, but we gave them maximum support to get around and be better informed. The result was a more factual story filed, a better-informed public, a better-informed Washington, and thus better support for us in the field.

By the way, we used the same model in Rwanda, and once we got on the ground in Haiti and received, with very few exceptions, excellent press and the operation — and the country — benefited.

In fact, I am convinced that the press should be free to go and do its job with restrictions only where safety and operational security are truly of concern and that these restrictions be lifted just as quickly as possible.

Well, what about these disjointed thoughts? What about the media, the military, and peacekeeping and humanitarian missions? An unlikely combination? Not really! Of course, when speaking of humanitarian operations I would add another unlikely ingredient—humanitarian organizations—to this mixture.

You see, the media, the military, and humanitarian organizations can be the perfect combination, particularly for dealing with large humanitarian disasters, but only if they draw on each other's unique strength and not on the fears and the prejudiced views they sometimes have of each other.

The media, in a responsible and balanced way, must alert and educate the public and the decision-makers and then keep all informed of the progress.

The humanitarian organizations must provide the real expertise of how to deal with the tough, heart rendering challenges of a Somalia or Rwanda.

But only the U.S. military possesses the resources, the strategic lift, and the long-range communications to be able to deal quickly with large-scale, rapidly-developing tragedies that simply overwhelm the traditional humanitarian organizations. And so yes, these three strange bedfellows can be a very good combination.

And who knows? If we are selective and only engage when our interests are very clear, when we have agreement on the limits of our involvement and the conditions of our withdrawal, and we go in when we can make a difference and have the support of an informed public, then maybe in time we will view such missions as supportive of our interests and not as damaging to our security.

With that let me close and thank you all for letting me share my thoughts with you.

**Town Hall of California
Los Angeles, California
11 May 1995**

As you know, this year we are commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. Starting with last summer's D-Day celebrations at Normandy, I have had an opportunity to attend a number of these World War II commemorations, in the U.S. and overseas.

As you might imagine, these are immensely inspiring events. But at each one of these commemorations, unquestionably the greatest sights are the veterans who fought the battles and campaigns of that war so very long ago. They were remarkable men and women, so I was wondering if we could just digress for a second and see if there are any World War II veterans with us here today? If there are, please stand, so we can thank you. I think they are remarkable, not only because they won that war, but perhaps just as importantly, because after that war, they worked so very hard create a better world, to exploit the opportunities their sacrifices created for all of us.

President Clinton perhaps said it best when he spoke to the veterans at Normandy. He told them that we were the children of their sacrifices and of their struggles. He told them that because of them, in our lives we have known nothing but freedom and liberty, and that we shall never forget; and that we shall forever be grateful.

And of course, this makes me wonder what our children will think when they look back 50 years from today, when they look back to see what we created for them. Here in this room are some of those young people; we were just introduced to them. What great events will they look back on half a century from now? What will they be thankful for?

Now, I have no doubt that they will in fact look back at this time in history because we are now in one of those pivotal moments that occur only once every few generations when the world is in the grips of revolutionary change. This really is what the end of the Cold War created — a time of vast challenges and of vast opportunities, one that rivals in every way what the end of World War II had created.

And we must wonder: what will be on the minds of these young people when they look back on us? What will they see as our Marshall Plan, a plan that for all of the controversy that it evoked at the beginning we now recognize was a brilliant vision and a great effort, one that pulled an entire continent out of the ashes of a terrible war and that gave hope

and freedom and prosperity to hundreds of millions of people around Europe? And it created for future generations powerful democratic allies, without whom we could not have won the Cold War. Or what will they see perhaps as our Yaltas, where because of wrong choices we could leave them instead problems and conflicts that could bedevil their lives and perhaps the lives of their children?

Right now as we are gathered here in this room, thousands of our men and women in uniform are deployed around the world on actual operations. They operate over northern and southern Iraq, in and around Bosnia, in Macedonia and Croatia, in the streets and alleys of Haiti, and along the border of Peru and Ecuador. Even as we are still negotiating the nuclear issues with North Korea, our forces are staring across the DMZ at a million-man army, one that is clearly equipped and positioned for attack, not to defend. On the other part of the world, Iran is building up its military capability and has recently begun to fortify its ability to block international shipping into the Gulf. And as all of you know, these are only some of the world's trouble spots. There are the conflicts around the periphery of the former Soviet Union, and within Russia itself, of course, there is Chechnya. Turkey is fighting the Kurdish PKK, Algeria is caught in a terrible civil war, and several nations in Africa face the risk of imploding into the same kind of tragedy as we witnessed not long ago in Rwanda.

Who could have predicted that the world would be like this, when back in 1990 and 1991 we were flushed with the crumbling of the Wall, and of Boris Yeltsin climbing on that tank, and with that single act bringing to an end an empire that had lasted for three quarters of a century? And that in itself is a warning to us all, not to confuse what we hope will happen with the realities of what could happen, and often without any warning.

This explosion of conflicts and tragedies has led to the debates that we are now seeing in places like Washington, DC; debates about Somalia, about Haiti, about expanding NATO, about the need for a national missile defense, and about so many other vital issues. And certainly I don't pretend to have all the answers to these very difficult questions, but I would offer one suggestion, and that is that we must learn to take the long view. We must understand what the main events are. We must not let ourselves become trapped in the events of the moment, without understanding their relevance to the future. As we make our decisions today, always we must think about tomorrow and "how do today's decisions affect our tomorrow?"

In that regard, I will tell you that, first and foremost, this means that we must maintain our international leadership. This, after all, is what the generation that fought World War II gained for us and in the past 50 years we have used our leadership to extraordinary benefit: for our Nation, for the welfare and prosperity of our people, and for billions of others like them around the world. Looking backward, I think it would be obvious to us all that there is no other nation that would have — or that could have — produced the results that we created. No other nation could have produced GATT or the Bretton-Woods agreement, and then turned these visions into reality. No other nation could have successfully led the west through the Cold War. No other nation but ours could have successfully engineered and built the United Nations. No other nation could have built NATO. All of this we can see clearly. But what we see less clearly is what our leadership could mean for our future.

Nor are we very clear what it means to lead in a world that is not divided into two camps, a world where the focus of international leadership is much more opaque, and where the kinds of problems that a leading nation must address are far less focused, are far more ambiguous and messy than what we experienced during this last half century. Very rarely, for example, did we ever become involved in such things as peacekeeping, or in "Operations Other Than War," if we even understand that term. Our consuming purpose was to deter the former Soviet Union and if deterrence failed, to fight and win that one big war. Smaller problems were simply left for others to handle.

As well, it has become more difficult and more frustrating to lead in an international environment where neither we nor our allies are pressed by the kind of urgencies and stakes that the Cold War kept over our heads for so many years. And this has not been helped by the fact that many of the challenges that we face simply are not built for black-and-white, clear-cut solutions. What do you do about a Bosnia, where passions that are centuries old smother any form of reason? And how to handle a Russia that, even while it is careening through reforms and problems that are vital to all of our futures, can suddenly turn with such force on its own citizens? And how do you expand NATO without again dividing Europe, and in the process perhaps isolating and adding to the insecurities of those who are not immediately included? These are very difficult questions for us all. And the more you look at these questions, the more reasonable it becomes that we might differ in our views.

But as we have learned from our experience of the past half century, you cannot be the world's leader by only talking about the things you are unwilling to do. Ultimately, our unequaled national power will always ensure that we have a seat at the table. But staying at the head of that table means that we must stay involved in the world's most truculent problems and that we commit ourselves to their solutions.

This raises the second thing we must do, and that is to be selective. With all of the conflicts and tragedies that I described earlier, we need to recognize that some of these are critically important to our interests and to our futures, and others are less so. And as the world's most influential nation, the problems that most require our sustained attention and commitments are those that have global impact, or that will shape the futures of regions where we have, in fact, important interests.

And so although North Korea is a very serious near-term threat, and South Korea is an important ally that we must help defend, we also need to recognize that North Korea will not be the moving force that shapes the future of that part of Asia. It is an isolated nation with a disproven system that no nation in the world wants to emulate. Rather, I submit to you, it is Beijing and Tokyo that are propelling that region's future; it is in those capitals where we must sustain and enlarge our influence.

The same is true in Europe, whose future is being molded in Bonn, Moscow and Kiev, not in the bloodstained mountains and cities of what used to be known as Yugoslavia. For all that, we cannot ignore what is happening in that conflict, or allow it to expand beyond its current borders, and we also cannot afford to allow it to undermine what we must do on that continent that is so much more vital to our long-term interests. We cannot allow it to unravel NATO for, despite the debates you see about this alliance today, maintaining the vitality and the coherence of our Trans-Atlantic partnership is vital to our future. Certainly we as part of NATO must be prepared to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. forces from former Yugoslavia if it becomes necessary to do so, and should we be asked to do so. We must not allow that conflict to destroy either the confidence or the trust that we and our NATO allies have shared through so many dangerous trials. If we allow this to happen, if we allow NATO to be marginalized or damaged, then we will have compounded a tragedy with an unforgivable blunder.

And in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we are finally seeing the fruits of what for so long we tried to bring about — the hope of peace between Israel and its neighbors. We must not forget just how very crucial this is to our future, or how very dangerous the conflicts in that region were to our past. And while we must preserve our guard against Iraq — as Saddam Hussein reminded us last fall — we must also recognize that the growing danger in that region of the world is Iran.

And in this hemisphere we must grasp the opportunities now before us. Today, democratic institutions and market economies are at a historic high. And this offers us — at last — the chance that has been sought for two centuries: to build within this hemisphere a zone of peace and prosperity and mutual cooperation.

It is these challenges and these opportunities that will shape the world that our children will inherit. Those of you involved in international business know very well that economically the world today is multipolar. The time is long past when the dollar alone could propel the global economy out of a slump. To create that kind of a force today would take, at the very least, the combined efforts of the dollar, of the yen, and of the German mark. And this same multipolarity is spreading to diplomacy and security. I suggest it will be a feature of the security order of the coming century. What this order will look like, and how stable it will be, depends very much on what we do today.

Finally, the third thing we must do is to protect the unequalled excellence of our Armed Forces — the ultimate protector of our interests and of our way of life — both because we are using our forces more frequently today, and because I am convinced that what we are seeing will be, most likely, the wave of the future.

Look, in the past year alone, we dispatched our forces to be prepared to fight on at least two occasions. First, to Haiti when, just as our last-ditch diplomatic effort had stalled and seemed on the verge of failure, we launched an invasion. Fortunately, once Haiti's military rulers learned that our forces were actually in the air, an agreement was hastily reached and the invasion was turned into an unopposed landing. And only three weeks later, last October, after we detected Saddam Hussein's divisions bolting south to Kuwait, again we dispatched a force with orders to fight. And once the first of our forces began arriving, we watched Saddam's divisions change their minds and return to their garrisons. In the same year, by the way, in Korea, the tensions over the nuclear issue grew so severe that they could only be viewed as edging toward conflict. And so we reinforced that peninsula and prepared ourselves for a military clash.

So, if you recall last year, and these events that I just mentioned, it becomes clearer why it is necessary that we maintain the ability to fight and win two nearly-simultaneous regional conflicts. After all, at several points in the past year, we were very close to just such a scenario.

And I believe that we now have a consensus on that issue. But what I worry about is our ability to maintain all of the parts of this force that must be sustained. We have — I believe — strong political support to protect our near-term readiness, the training and maintenance and preparedness to respond to today's challenges. And I think there is also a firm appreciation that the backbone of our military excellence — our people — must be protected; their pay and their quality of life must be protected, or we will find it increasingly difficult to retain them, or to attract more like them. But

I am not nearly as confident that there is as much support for our long-term readiness: modernizing our force where necessary, and just replacing the many items of equipment as they grow old and simply wear out.

By 1999, our force will be over one-third smaller than it was in 1991 when the Gulf War ended. And our budget will have shrunk by over 40 percent in real terms from what it was in 1988. In fact, our budgets have now been declining for ten straight years. If you add this up, an awful lot of swords have been pounded into plowshares and an awful lot of great soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have been asked to leave the military — nearly 700,000. But I think that we have reached the point where we must stop looking backward — trying to judge whether we have cut enough from the past — and instead turn our eyes to the future, to decide whether we are building the best possible force to protect interests in a new century, with all the new challenges that century offers. We must make this turn very quickly, because that future is just around the corner. And we have learned to stop thinking about peace dividends as well, because what we are witnessing in so many corners of the world bears very little resemblance to the peace we had hoped for.

If you return to the question of what we want our children to think when they look back in fifty years — at what we did with the opportunities and the challenges that grew out of the end of the Cold War — their judgments will weigh on how well we kept our focus on the future. Did we preserve our global leadership and use it productively and wisely. Did we understand what was truly important to the future, expending our energies where it was important? Did we preserve our military strength, avoiding the mistake that our Nation made so many times in our own past, after both world wars, after Korea, and after Vietnam, where each time our hunger for peace dividends outweighed our cautions and left us poorly prepared for future conflicts? If we do these things I just mentioned, I think we have every reason to be confident about our future.

After all, we are in fact today the dominant, leading nation in the world. It is probably the first time in modern history that a leading nation has been challenged so little by another power as we are today.

And as the last 50 years have shown, we do have the wisdom and the skill and a vast capacity to do good. From where I stand, the glass is a lot more than just half empty.

Let me tell you that I have probably spoken too long already, as I look at my watch. And between the earthquakes you have suffered here, and floods, and the O.J. Simpson trial that is occurring just a few blocks from here, I should not subject you to another hardship!

So let me stop, and thank you again for giving me the opportunity to share these thoughts with you. And if I haven't suppressed your enthusiasm for questions, I would more than happy to try and answer some of them.

Thank you very much.

**“This Week with David Brinkley,” ABC-TV
Remote Interview from Vienna, Austria
4 June 1995
(Excerpts)**

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, General, the president said a day or so ago that we cannot leave our allies in Bosnia in the lurch. Now, what did that mean? What does it mean now?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I think it means that if our allies under NATO's leadership and under NATO's rules of engagement were to embark on one of three possibilities, we should be with them and we should assist that effort, subject to consultations with Congress. The first of these is that if in fact eventually there is a peace agreement, a fair peace agreement that can be implemented, that the United States, together with its other NATO allies, should be prepared to help implement that agreement.

Secondly, that if despite our very best efforts, UNPROFOR does have to withdraw from Bosnia, that the United States under NATO, NATO's rules of engagement, NATO's command and control, should then be prepared to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia, again subject to consultations with Congress.

It was during the planning for this operation and the consultations that are now ongoing with Congress on this issue that an option came up which was that it might be necessary, again under NATO leadership, to in an emergency — on an emergency basis, to help UNPROFOR relocate from some location that is no longer tenable, for instance, one or more of the eastern enclaves.

It is on this matter that we are now consulting with Congress as well, but I need to make a point that no one has asked NATO to do that, nor is there a likelihood that this will come up. After all, our allies, particularly the French and

the British, have in the last few days been talking and acting in a belief that they can and should stay in the enclaves, and certainly that UNPROFOR should stay in Bosnia.

MR. WILL: General, the Europeans seem to be determined now to put in more troops in a multinational force, and I'm curious as to what the United States' involvement might be. There are reports that we would be involved in close air support and transportation, and they have mentioned attack helicopters and gunships.

But I gather Americans would not fly those. Can you tell us what our role would be?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Yes, and let me be very specific. The United States will not participate on the ground in either the normal UNPROFOR operation or this quick reaction force that is now being established by the British and the French and the Dutch and others. What we have stated is that if our allies need assistance with strategic lift to get them to the area, we would be prepared to provide that.

Secondly, if they needed some equipment — helicopters to be flown by them, not by us, or any other equipment, to let us know. We would do our level best to provide that.

Thirdly, we said that as part of NATO, we would be prepared to provide close air support to such a quick reaction force, as we are to all the other UNPROFOR forces.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me press you on the use of U.S. forces. As I understand it, on Friday the president approved the use of 25,000 U.S. combat troops within a 50,000 NATO force, if necessary, for the extraction, should it come to that, of U.N. forces. Is that correct?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Well, it is — the president was briefed on that plan and is aware of it, and the discussion has always been that, subject to consultation with Congress, the United States ought to participate with NATO in the extraction of NATO. And the U.S. contribution would in fact be 25,000, and the president was briefed on that.

MR. DONALDSON: All right. If I may, then, sir, if it comes to that, the extraction of NATO forces, I take it that we would have U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: For that specific purpose of withdrawing, helping to withdraw UNPROFOR, providing that operation is a NATO operation under NATO command and control and NATO ROE. And we have been saying that for quite some time.

**Oral Statement on Bosnia
Senate Armed Services Committee
and the House National Security Committee
Washington, DC
7 June 1995**

I would like to begin by discussing the two events of the past few weeks that I know are matters of great concern to this committee: the airstrikes that occurred on 25 and 26 May and the 2 June downing of our F-16 participating as part the NATO force enforcing the no-fly zone.

Following that I would like to brief you on NATO OPLAN 40104 the plan for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.

NATO AIRSTRIKES

Let me start with the events that led to the airstrikes on 25 and 26 May. You are all aware that NATO has agreed to provide close air support to protect UNPROFOR personnel and to provide airstrikes in support of the enforcement of U.N. mandates.

Throughout the winter of 1995 the fighting in Bosnia was at a low level due to the cessation of hostilities as well as the traditional winter refitting and reposturing of forces that we have repeatedly seen conducted by both sides. In early spring the fighting intensified when a stronger Bosnian Government force opened limited offensive actions. At the same time the Bosnian Serbs intensified their own attacks and began what appeared to be a systematic harassment of UNPROFOR forces as well as stepped up artillery attacks against civilians in the safe areas.

On 8 April, the Bosnian Serbs announced that they would no longer guarantee the safety of flights in and out of Sarajevo Airport in effect closing the airport. Throughout the month of May, Bosnian Serb harassment and restrictions of ground convoys grew so severe that only 38 percent of that month's scheduled humanitarian aid was able to be

delivered to Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs used the same tactics to limit humanitarian aid deliveries and UNPROFOR re-supply to other enclaves as well.

Then in mid-May the fighting in and around Sarajevo increased dramatically. In one day alone more than 1,000 artillery rounds rained down on the city of Sarajevo.

Between 22 and 24 May, the Serbs entered weapons control points outside of Sarajevo and withdrew four heavy weapons. On 24 May the Commander of UNPROFOR issued an ultimatum giving 24 hours for both sides to cease firing heavy weapons and for the Serbs to return four heavy weapons taken from a Weapons Control Point, and within 48 hours, to remove all heavy weapons not inside approved heavy weapons control points to locations outside the exclusion zone outside Sarajevo.

On 25 May, in response to the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the first part of the ultimatum, the UNPROFOR Commander requested a NATO airstrike against the Pale Ammunition Depot.

At 2:33 that afternoon, a strike was launched in response to that request. NATO attack aircraft struck the Pale Ammunition Depot and destroyed two bunkers. Later that day, most probably in response to the strike against a purely military target, the Bosnian Serbs shelled a public market square in Tuzla. 70 civilians died.

The next day, on the 26th of May, the Serbs still had failed to comply with the first ultimatum. The UNPROFOR commander requested NATO to conduct an additional airstrike against the Pale Ammunition Depot. At mid-morning this second strike was launched against the six remaining bunkers.

When UNPROFOR requested the airstrikes, all were aware of the possibility that the Serbs would indeed retaliate and very likely take hostages.

The procedure for requesting airstrikes runs from the United Nations commander requesting the strike directly to the NATO commander, CINCSOUTH, currently U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith.

On this occasion, as has been the case every time in the past when the option of an airstrike has been raised, the risk of retaliation was considered.

But that risk had to be weighed against the consideration that if NATO airpower were not called in then the Bosnian Serbs would continue to shell the civilian population.

Furthermore, UNPROFOR judged it impractical to consolidate its forces before the airstrikes because that act itself would have been a clear signal that airstrikes were imminent and would very likely have provoked the same preemptive hostage taking.

The belief was that accepting the risk of Serbian retaliation was preferable to allowing the shelling to continue and the violations to go unchecked.

E-16 SHOOTDOWN

Now let me turn to the shootdown of the F-16 that occurred on 2 June just one week after the second airstrike.

The F-16 was part of a two-ship formation that took off from Aviano Air Base at around 7 o'clock on the morning of 2 June. They were on a combat air patrol mission over Bosnia and they were armed as well to conduct close air support in the event that the need arose.

The two aircraft were orbiting at 21,000 feet when a track-mounted Bosnian Serb SA-6 fired two missiles at the flight. The first missile exploded between the two fighters who were flying some distance apart. But the second missile struck the underbelly of the number two aircraft. The flight lead observed his wingman's aircraft as it began its descent but lost sight when the aircraft entered the cloud cover below.

Search and Rescue missions commenced immediately and have continued ever since but the status of the pilot remains unknown. A number of conflicting reports have appeared, but frankly we still have no confirmation on the status of the pilot. We are vigorously continuing our search efforts.

In the meantime our sympathies are for his family and we continue to work for his safe return.

Because the fighters were orbiting in an area that had no history of known or suspected surface-to-air missile activity, these two F-16s were not accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses.

Other flights that day, those that were operating over areas where there were known or suspected surface-to-air missile threats, were accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses.

The command was practicing a standard tactical procedure of tailoring their air packages for the expected missions and threats. Tactical judgments like this have been made for over 2 years and for 69,000 sorties, which is a remarkable testimony to the command's operational acumen.

In light of this incident, Admiral Smith has directed that all operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina must assume a

surface-to-air missile threat and must be accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses in order to limit the future risk to NATO aircraft.

NATO OPLAN 40104

Now I would like to brief you on the purpose and details of NATO OPLAN 40104 to answer any questions and then to listen to your views and concerns.

Let me start with a brief description of the area and the scale of this plan. I am confident that you are all very familiar with the territory of the former Yugoslavia. United Nations Peace Forces are located in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.

Of the 38,500 forces from 35 contributing nations, 22,500 are the UNPROFOR force located in Bosnia-Herzegovina in positions stretching throughout the breadth of that nation. They are distributed in many pockets including those in and around the various enclaves and safe areas.

The road network and logistics infrastructure are rugged and very limited. Much of the terrain is mountainous and many of the UNPROFOR units are in isolated and vulnerable positions.

So a secure withdrawal of all of these forces presents many obstacles and difficulties in part because of UNPROFOR's widespread distribution, in part because of the logistics and intelligence difficulties, and in part because a withdrawal could become vulnerable to harassment and disruption.

The plan that has been shaped could be used to withdraw U.N. forces from either Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, but today I will focus on plans to handle the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is right now the most volatile area of U.N. operations. The plan is flexible in that it is designed to accommodate either a deliberate withdrawal of UNPROFOR's forces or an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR forces.

The most likely scenario for an emergency extraction involves the eastern enclaves where the situation has always been most tenuous.

The execution of the deliberate plan would have to be triggered by a UNPROFOR request to the United Nations Security Council to withdraw UNPROFOR forces. This would then be followed by a U.N. Security Council request to the North Atlantic Council to support the withdrawal.

I should note that the plan is limited to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces. It does not provide for humanitarian or refugee support either during or after withdrawal operations.

Nor does it include planning for any subsequent operations by U.S. or NATO forces once a withdrawal has been completed.

This plan will be executed under a single chain of command under NATO command and control using robust NATO ROE and there will be no dual-key arrangement for NATO forces. At execution all forces UNPROFOR included will fall under and will remain under NATO command and control until released back to the U.N. or their national command authorities.

The operation will be conducted sequentially in five phases and if executed as I will brief today, which is the most robust option, could take up to 22 weeks to complete.

First is the preparation phase. The purpose is to establish the theater communications and logistics architecture and, where possible, to secure support for staging bases and needed facilities. While these initial steps are being taken the forces designated for the plan will conduct training and other preparatory actions.

Second is the Theater Opening and Deployment Phase. In this phase the logistics elements will deploy to establish logistics bases and to open port facilities for follow-on units. Following the establishment of the logistics structure, the main body forces which will conduct the withdrawal will deploy into theater and assemble outside Bosnia.

The third is the execution phase. This is the critical phase of the operation. The combat forces will deploy into the interior of Bosnia to conduct withdrawal operations that will facilitate and safeguard the movement of UNPROFOR units.

In the fourth phase, Reorganization, UNPROFOR units will be moved to holding areas near ports of embarkation and released from NATO control back to U.N. or national command and control.

In phase five, Redeployment, NATO units will depart the staging locations to return to their home bases.

In the event a situation arises that requires an emergency extraction the plan has a Quick Response Option using selected NATO forces that are in close proximity to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

American participation and support for this plan are essential. The plan is built to a large degree on capabilities that only we possess. But just as importantly our European allies who are even now in the process of increasing their

contributions to UNPROFOR feel it is essential that there is a viable workable and supported plan capable of assisting the withdrawal of their forces in the event that becomes necessary.

Because it will be executed under NATO command and control using NATO ROE and there will be no dual-key for NATO forces, the right arrangements will be in place. Let me add that I believe it is extremely prudent for NATO to have such a plan on the shelf and to be prepared to execute it.

It is never a good idea to wait until an unwelcome contingency arises before beginning preparations.

The approval of this plan is the best insurance possible that it will not have to be carried out. It gives the UNPROFOR contributing nations the assurance that they must have to sustain their commitments to that very important mission.

**Naval War College Graduation
Newport, Rhode Island
16 June 1995**

What a great pleasure it is to be here today, to share in this very special ceremony. It would be pleasure enough, just to return to Newport, which holds so many fond memories from the year I spent here as a student. And who could imagine a more wonderful place to spend a year? But to that is added the honor of addressing this graduation. So this is truly a special occasion for me. And the band, and the Newport Choirsters, make it all the more enchanting and stirring.

Now, I am afraid that this ceremony has been designed so that all I do is give a speech, and then sit down. There will be no question and answer period afterward. And I have been told that this will rupture what has become a well-honed tradition of your class.

So before I begin, I want to first apologize to Darrell Jenks, for denying him the chance to ask another of his brilliantly composed questions, that so many speakers from this past year, have warned me about.

Let me begin by congratulating all of you. You are here because you are the best. And I am confident, after this past year at the Naval War College, that now you are even better prepared to serve our Armed Forces and our nations. And that we owe to the extraordinary faculty and staff here at Newport, for keeping this as one of the finest, and the most stimulating schools of national security in our country.

And we owe it to Admiral Joe Strasser, who for the past five years has dedicated his life, his great intellect, and his remarkable leadership to improving what was already a great college.

Joe, I know that I speak for everyone here today, when I offer my deepest thanks for your service, and for your leadership. In a few weeks, when you retire, you will be leaving behind a great legacy. The Joint Chiefs thank you, and so do I.

And a special thanks, as well, to the wonderful families gathered here today, for enduring all of the consequences of yet another one year assignment, for suffering through the trials and ordeals of having one more student in your homes, and of course, for adding such a delightful atmosphere to this school. Thanks to each of you.

Now, as Admiral Strasser mentioned, 25 years ago I was sitting where you are today, waiting to graduate from the College of Naval Command and Staff. It was a different era then, but there were some very striking similarities to what you face today. It was 1970. The Vietnam War was just winding down. As a matter of fact, I, and most of my fellow students, had come here straight from that war.

During the time we had been absorbed in that war, the Soviets had spent the decade very energetically rebuilding their Armed Forces. Their army, a force that had entered the sixties as a mostly light infantry force, had by 1970 been transformed into a heavy, fast-paced, nearly fully mechanized force, one we believed was far more capable of rapidly overrunning Europe.

And while the bulk of our surface ships and carriers were of World War Two vintage, the Soviets were still laying the keels of a shiny new, very modern blue-water fleet.

While Vietnam had monopolized our resources and focus, the Soviets had greatly expanded their ability to challenge us in more vital areas, in Europe, and on the high seas.

So as we sat in these chairs, my class saw what we believed were very considerable challenges ahead. We needed to refocus our efforts, and our thinking, and our training and preparations, away from Vietnam, and back to other missions.

And in that sense, I think there is a resemblance between that era and today. Yes, the challenges are different, and

the adjustments are certainly different, but you also face the need to guide our forces toward new tasks, and new missions.

And as I thought about how I would try to step up here to talk about your challenges, I thought back to my own graduation 25 years ago. By that time of the school year I had heard more about challenges than I cared to remember. And as I tried to recall what our graduation speaker had to say, while I am sure that he was very eloquent and wise, I can't remember a single word he said. And that, of course, is a warning to me, for, undoubtedly, my own thoughts will prove equally perishable and fleeting.

But, if I had to gather all of these challenges that I wish to discuss with you, under one single heading, it would be to turn your focus to the future.

For fifty years, all of us have been accustomed to a great strategic consistency. Although the cause of the consistency was deplorable, the fact of the consistency was reassuring, and oddly comfortable.

We lived in the era of Containment, and it was thoroughly understood; it was uniformly accepted, it was as unchanging as the environment that dictated that strategy. Ironically, for although it proved to be perhaps the most strikingly successful strategy of its kind in history, we never envisioned what would happen if it succeeded. For as long as it lasted, you would expect that we would have given some thought to what its success would create. But we didn't.

The lesson that I hope we have learned is that our strategies must extend beyond their own successes, or their failures, to envision and prepare for the consequences that could be created.

For when in 1991 our strategy did succeed, the result was surprise, and an absence of thinking and preparation for the very conditions and consequences we had struggled for so long to create. As we should have anticipated, the culmination of containment caused a great deal of motion in a global environment that had been unused to much motion for many decades. An empire disintegrated, the bipolar global order collapsed, and more new nations were born, and more borders changed than we witnessed even after the Second World War. Any one of these three events would shake the world. All three combined have been like putting an eggbeater into a pool of still water.

During the year that you have been here, there have been continuously six to seven joint task forces in the field. Twice we have deployed forces to fight, once to Haiti, and then only a few weeks after our peaceful entry there, we went to the Gulf, to prevent another Iraqi attack against Kuwait.

We went to Rwanda, and we had a tough, but very well run operation that safely withdrew the last of the U.N. forces from Somalia. And of course in the no-fly zone over Bosnia, our aviators have been involved in several skirmishes. All of this in only one year. And of course, we are even now in the midst of yet another crisis in Bosnia. Some suggest that our world has become like a football game, with no halftimes and no end in sight. Although, very clearly, our forces have performed magnificently. They have risen to every challenge with toughness, with skill, and with determination.

And this was certainly on display in last week's daring rescue of Scott O'Grady. Whether it was Scott O'Grady's inspiring heroism, or the courage and commitment by those who desperately searched for him, or the skill and daring of those who went in to get him, America saw once again the spirit, and the remarkable qualities of the men and women in our Armed Forces. And they saw, as well, the very human concern for and commitment to one another that is such a hallmark of our people.

But these kinds of challenges that we have experienced in this past year, these kinds of challenges are going to remain with us. For you here, this is, in all likelihood, the nature of the world you will be contending with, for much of the rest of your careers.

Many of you are going to find yourselves, either as commanders, or as staff officers, on Joint Task Forces, even as I am sure many of you have already experienced, deployed to perform one or more of the missions arising out of this era.

And this is true not only for the American officers here today, but it is equally true for the international officers. For, if you look back on the operations of the past several years, they have nearly all been multilateral, coalition operations. In nearly every operation that I just mentioned, including the search for and rescue of Scott O'Grady, it was not just American forces, but the forces of many nations that were, or are still involved.

And you are going to have to be able to explain to your people, and to their families, the grander, overarching purpose of what you are doing. It is one thing, to say that you are going to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia or Iraq; it is another thing to explain why. It is one thing, to say that you are going to bring democracy to Haiti, or to enforce nonproliferation in North Korea; but another to explain why. And it is one thing, to say that the reason we are training and preparing is to deter the worst nightmares that could grow out of today's uncertainties; but yet another thing to explain why.

One administration called it shaping a new world order, even as this administration refers to it as Engagement. The

fact is that our engagement does have a very real, and a very vital, purpose. Our underlying, but clearly our manifest purpose in the Cold War, as should be true of any conflict, was to create new possibilities and opportunities.

And the end of the Cold War created opportunities of a far grander scale than any other in history.

In Europe, for 45 years, even as we were engaging in containment, we were just as engaged building a new order in Western Europe, where so many of Europe's past wars emanated. The vision we helped to sow, was of an integrated Europe, a condominium of nations whose security, whose economics, and whose political systems were so intertwined, that conflict between them would grow more and more unthinkable.

It was the work of generations, but it has succeeded wildly. And now, we must protect that order, even as we spread this same vision and reality of constructive integration to those in the eastern half of Europe.

We must draw these nations into the same webs, because it is the surest manner of limiting conflicts on that continent, which has fostered two world wars and a global cold war in this century. That is the cycle we must ensure is not repeated.

And today this means that two challenges must be met; the first, is to help ensure the success and stabilization of the reforms underway in Russia, and Ukraine, and the other former Soviet republics. While much of that challenge rests on the shoulders of the people of these nations themselves, we can and we must offer them political and economic support along the way. We must never forget that their success is critical to our interests as well as theirs.

But the second, and equally critical challenge, is to reduce the fears, the insecurities and the instabilities in Central Europe. That region, after all, was precisely where both world wars and the Cold War of this century began, and an even longer litany of wars in the century before. The best, and probably the only approach to this, is to expand NATO into Central Europe, bringing in new members that are committed to democracy, and committed to becoming members of a defensive alliance. Many nations of Central Europe believe this is essential, and the members of the alliance are convinced of this as well.

But today, there are some in Russia who oppose this expansion. They argue that if NATO were to take this step, that it would represent a threat to Russian security, and that it could unhinge Russia's reforms, by exciting a nationalist backlash from its people.

Yet both NATO's members and the Central Europeans find such arguments confusing, in fact contrary to what they perceive as being Russia's own security interests. Other than the Central European nations themselves, no nation has suffered more perilously than Russia from Central Europe's volatility, or its dreadful flair for igniting larger European wars. It is very strongly in Russia's favor to see Central Europe made more stable, by a regional security structure, one that reduces insecurities, and instabilities, and the chances of conflict, either from within or from without. Nor has anyone argued that expansion would fail to improve Central European stability. It very clearly would improve stability. Opposing views find their roots in a fear that Russia would find itself isolated, and encircled, by a threatening alliance.

Yet, I am convinced that these fears are founded on a misperception of NATO, and the interests of its members. Very clearly, the Trans-Atlantic partners want Russia engaged in Europe in every sense, politically, economically, and militarily. It is a great power that has so much to offer the rest of Europe. And the alternative to this has been tried for the past fifty years, and no NATO nation looks back on those days with any sense of fondness. As we and our European friends have discovered since the Second World War, the path to peace and prosperity lies in an integrated continent. We all want Russia and the other former Soviet states as peaceful and content members of this community, and we also want what is best for NATO and the Russians alike, a safe and secure Central Europe.

And there are opportunities in Asia that are equally great. No region of the world was more violent or more scarred by the bipolar confrontation of the past. But unlike Europe, where the Cold War brought even the staunchest of traditional enemies together into common camps, Asia's historical distrusts remained entrenched and palpable.

Now, as this entire region is pulsing with economic growth, it is being propelled toward a different, and a far more hopeful future, a future where Asia's economies are becoming more and more integrated, where Asia's factories and markets seem poised to become the most powerful engines of global economic growth in the next century. But here also, progress depends on a stable security structure, one that preserves the security of our allies, but also one that integrates China's growing power as a constructive force, and that integrates Russia's power and influence equally constructively.

And just as we are looking for ways to keep Europe from splitting again into camps, we must work toward the integration of Asian security, creating an order built on trust and cooperation, and mutual interests, and interdependencies, rather than on ancient competitions, and old scars.

Here in this hemisphere, every nation save one is now a democracy practicing free market economics. And that is an extraordinary evolution, one that opens up a commonality of interests that has never existed in the past.

A new world is shaping to our south, and we must all understand that this will dramatically transform this hemisphere in the next century. The nation with the fastest growing economy in the world is in Latin America. And there are several others not far behind it, even as there are others joining the queue.

Or you can look to the Middle East where, for forty years, we expended enormous diplomatic capital in an effort to negotiate a region-wide peace, but with only very limited success. In the past few years, we have helped achieve a stream of successes, and the last few steps to a broader, more enduring solution, seem realizable, perhaps, even near at hand. We must sustain this commitment. We must never forget, that peace in the Middle East is of vital importance to our nation. And it could become a landmark of the next century.

Finally, there is one other critical region, and that is the troubled Gulf, which will remain the oil reservoir needed to lubricate the economies of the industrialized nations for the foreseeable future. While the situation in that region remains divided and tense today, we must sustain the long-term commitment that convinces those who would wish to destabilize the Gulf that this is both a self-defeating and, ultimately, a hopeless quest.

And today we have a strong base of friends and allies, both within the region and from outside of the region who are equally committed to this common purpose. And that is far more than we thought we could rely on in the later years of the Cold War.

None of these are short-term propositions. Some of them may require decades. And they will require imagination in addition to perseverance. Nor do they come without risk. But these are the opportunities we struggled to create through the long years of the Cold War. It is a more complex purpose than containment ever was. It is more ambitious. But it is just as necessary and vital to our security.

And, of course, none of this will come to fruition without American commitment and leadership. And while we must continue to do the Bosnias and the Rwandas, when our interests are affected, we must always keep in mind that our purpose and the implications are much larger than the event itself.

Our purpose is the creation of a much more peaceful and stable world order than the one we have known in this century. And that will be determined by how successful we are in Europe, in Asia, in this hemisphere, and in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. For in these regions lie the powerful economies that are the engines of global prosperity. And in these regions lie much of the material and human resources upon which these engines depend. Our purpose is to re-integrate those nations that for nearly half a century we so successfully contained, for the world will be safer and more prosperous if they are engaged constructively. And we do not want a return to the past.

I am very envious of you sitting here today. And I say this from the bottom of my heart. When I was sitting in your seats 25 years ago, our challenge was to protect the status quo, to ensure containment, to restore a military balance that we felt was eroding, for a struggle that we were convinced was going to last beyond our lifetimes. We measured our accomplishments as reducing the risks in a global confrontation. Your generation, on the other hand, confronts an extraordinary array of opportunities that are so much more tangible, and so much bolder. Your accomplishments will be measured in much grander terms than ours.

If you can safely usher in the dozens of nations, and the billions of producers and consumers who are trying to convert to democracy and free markets, you will be creating the conditions that will lead to what may be the greatest explosion of prosperity the world has witnessed.

If you can create the stable regional security orders that I spoke of, you will make the world much safer than it has been in our lifetimes. While the accomplishments of this century have been measured in wars won, yours will be measured in wars averted and nuclear stockpiles diminished.

But for this to come to pass, our military must remain the very finest in the world, for ultimately our nation's influence and our leadership rest on our military excellence. Nor should there ever be any doubt that the most vital purpose for our forces will remain that of fighting and winning our nation's wars. The security of our most vital interests, and our allies, depend on this.

But this cannot be the only task we are willing to undertake, nor the limit of our military excellence. We must be selective. We must always be cognizant that the main events of the world, the truly vital challenges that require the greatest energy and power to overcome, can only be accomplished by our continuous commitment. But when our interests are affected, or our leadership is at stake, we must be just as adroit at humanitarian or peacekeeping operations as we are on the battlefield. For it is a fact, that once our forces are committed to an operation, and our people are at risk, our interests grow immediately, and so do the stakes.

And as I close, I must tell you that I am very confident that we will realize the opportunities that I have spoken of. I am confident that the American people have the wisdom and will to sustain the commitment that is needed. And I am confident in our allies, that they also have the wisdom and the commitment.

But I am most confident in our Armed Forces, in the men and women who wear our nation's uniform. When I look back on all that our forces have accomplished since the Cold War ended, from the Gulf War, to Haiti, from Somalia to Rwanda, from Korea, to last week's rescue of Scott O'Grady, it is impossible not to be confident.

And I also know that you are part of the finest, the best trained, and the most experienced corps of military leaders in the world. I know that you are up to the challenges of this era, and of keeping our forces the very finest. Although I know that the Narragansett Bay behind me is a grand sight, I must tell you that the sight from this stage is much grander, and much more inspiring. In hands such as yours, it is impossible not to be optimistic about our future. Now, once again, I want to congratulate each of you, and wish you luck in your next assignments. I know you will do them superbly. God Bless all of you, and God Bless America.

Joint Force Quarterly Magazine
"A Word from the Chairman"
Summer 1995

The First World War was the last time that any nation equated war with glory. What caused the war remains debatable today because the quarrels that ignited it were questionable and shallow even then. But once the spark was lit and Europe's armies began marching, there was, throughout Europe, a mood of euphoria, an anticipation of romance and adventure. When the fighting finally ground to an end, when its fighters were drowning in mud, stupefied and exhausted by its unending slaughters, when the full, staggering toll of the Marne, Ypres, Verdun, the Somme, Mons, and Gallipoli were finally totaled, the world was stunned. The efficiency of the industrial age had reached the battlefield. Whatever false vestige of glory had been there at the beginning had long since been extinguished by the murderous fires of machine guns, by the mangling fury of modern artillery, by the suffocating barbarism of poison gas, and by the strategy of attrition — the general's incomprehensible response to these new tools. When it was over, the only way to confront the carnage was to label it the war to end all wars.

The Second World War was in so many respects even worse than the First. Many more millions perished. But in the most primary sense it was different; it was not senseless. Its causes were genuine, compelling, terrifying. For hundreds of millions it was a battle for survival, a desperate struggle between good and bad. Its causes were forged in the angry, raw mind of a murderous maniac, and in response, it brought out the best in most of us. Unlike the First World War, when this war was over, when the death camps were opened for the whole world to see, when the corpses of thousands of innocents were unearthed from the killing fields of Nanking, when the survivors of Manila finally finished counting the women and children murdered in the last vengeful rampage of its conquerors, any last lingering doubts about why we fought were washed away. Eisenhower had been right. It was a crusade and a very righteous crusade at that.

If there is a sense of fondness about this war that is why. If it spawned legions of heroes, that is because their courage and prowess went to such a noble purpose. If there is a special place in our hearts for its veterans, that is because we are so certain that their cause was just.

But, in so many ways, we would never be the same. Just as WW I wiped away our innocence about the horrors of battle, WW II eliminated any shard of innocence about man's potential for barbarity, about the ruthless motives of dangerous nations, about the price of naiveté, about the costs of appeasement. Nobody emerged from this war murmuring foolishly that it was a war to end all wars.

We learned a lot about others. We saw firsthand the astonishing character of the British people, watching for two years as Britain refused to succumb when even its staunchest admirers conceded that it's cause was hopeless. We developed an infatuation with Churchill that continues to this day. He seemed so quintessentially English; delightfully wise and principled, dogged, urbane, courageous without limits. We watched the British stoically endure night after night of terror bombing, devastating losses on land and at sea, and one military setback after another, never giving in to the slightest doubt or hesitation. We fought beside their soldiers, so very different from our own with their nonchalant valor and dry acceptance of success and failure alike.

We saw France humbled more terribly than ever before in its history, swiftly defeated by a kind of war it had drastically failed to anticipate. Yet there sat in exile this stubborn, irascible colonel, one of the few French soldiers who had seen what was coming, who predicted it and tried valiantly to get his country to listen, who then led his forces in their last battle with great courage, which many did, but also with great skill, which all too few did. That was DeGaulle, the epitome of French character; noble, proud, unyielding, a patriot whose all-consuming faith in his people was com-

pletely untainted by their defeat or the shameful collaboration by their Vichy leaders. As he argued so vehemently and so often during his years of exile, the defeat was only a temporary setback; within France were millions of patriots who would resist with all their might; and once France was free, he passionately argued, France would bounce back completely, its pride and power more intact than ever before.

We watched the Soviets begin the war in league with the Nazis, cutting bargains for their own selfish gains. Then we saw their shock when Hitler betrayed them, and the terrible price they paid for having so foolishly made a deal with that particular devil. But once that episode passed, we could only admire them, the mystical devotion of this tough people who accepted the worst punishment the Nazis could offer them, accepting millions, then tens of millions of casualties, until we wondered if there would be any Soviets left to fight back. But fight back they did. They swallowed one Nazi division after another, destroying each with whatever was at hand, the harshness of their winters, with tides of poorly armed but courageous men and women, and soon enough, with battle toughened, well led units armed with thousands of tanks and cannons. And several months after Europe found peace, the same skillful forces attacked Manchuria hurtling Japan's forces backward in a lightning attack. Sadly, no sooner had the war ended, then the Soviets returned to the same selfish designs that brought them into the war in the first place.

Then, of course, there were Germany and Italy and Japan, our enemies during those terrible years. While we were fighting we convinced ourselves they were inhuman. But when we became their occupiers, watching them struggle to survive the miseries of defeat, living in the wreckage of cities and towns pounded into rubble, trying to care for their refugees and families torn apart by the war, all the while enduring severe impoverishment and scarcities with courage and sacrifice, we were reminded that they were very human with a great capacity for goodness, indeed that it had been their very human failings that had carried them to such a terrible fate. Soon new leaders and new faiths took root that brought forward the best in them as well. In fact, as we watched them recover and rebuild we gained precious insights about their strengths, about their very formidable qualities. Soon all three were among our closest allies, nations we could and proudly did serve beside.

But we learned a lot about ourselves, as well. And we had our own quintessential leader, FDR, whose magnificently broad grin, characteristic aplomb, and unforgettable rhetoric all together captured our minds and our hearts. He had such a vision for this nation, and for this world. He was a Brahmin but he loved the common man and he loved democracy with all his heart, and it was these two passions that were the cornerstones of his vision. That is where he differed from Europe's leaders who were schooled to think about the world with their minds, not their hearts. And that is precisely why our alliance was such a great marriage, combining the old and the new, practicality and idealism, barnyard common sense and ivy league intellectualism. It took all of this to win, and it took all of this to prevail so successfully after the war.

This is the second issue of JFQ devoted to the Second World War. Truthfully we could devote many more and still fail to do credit to all that we learned and experienced. It was an outsized war fought by outsized personalities. At one time or another, either during or after the war, it really did bring out the best in all of us. We need to remember the remarkable character of the nations we today call our allies. They are magnificent in adversity. And we need also to renew our faith in ourselves. Neither we nor our allies have changed a wit. Were another war like it to erupt today, we would be just as persevering, just as valiant, just as noble. That is our strength.

**Annual Convention of the American Legion
Indianapolis, Indiana
6 September 1995**

I have just returned from Hawaii and the 50th commemoration of the end of the Second World War. And what a moving and inspirational occasion that was. Just like being here with all of you it makes your heart beat faster.

And it was particularly thrilling to have been in Hawaii among so many thousands of veterans from that war; men and women like you who served our nation in a time of extreme peril and performed so magnificently.

In fact as you know the American Legion was there in full force, proudly filling the ranks at each and every event of that moving commemoration.

Those proud veterans there and the World War Two veterans here this morning, you are the living monuments of a remarkable moment in our history. But unquestionably the most moving event of all was the remembrance ceremony in the Cemetery of the Pacific a few days ago. You know when you stand among the hundreds of rows of gray silent tombstones, each one marking the resting place of an American patriot, one thought cries out for all Americans to hear;

it is the same stark imperative we have learned time and again in our history, and it is that, "We must keep our defenses strong," we must never again allow our military to become weak or unready.

Standing here this morning and looking at your faces I know that you, you above all others, understand that lesson well. After all you were and still are the true guardians of America's security; you are great patriots all.

I knew that if there was one place in America that I could come to where there are men and women who appreciate the need to keep our defense strong, men and women who have observed this lesson firsthand, it is right here! That's why it is so great to be among you.

But there is another group of men and women who understand this as well. And they are the men and women who are following in your footsteps those who so proudly wear our country's uniform today.

As I travel around the world to visit them, no matter where they are, from the DMZ in Korea where they are still standing guard over the nation so many of you fought to keep free, to Haiti, or to Kuwait, or to Germany, wherever they are I see the same thing again and again. I see courage and spirit and toughness. They are by any measure our most precious asset.

There are one and half million of them following in your footsteps and carrying on the march that you started. For after all, it was you here in this hall who fought and bled to protect our freedom and to give us our hope for the future and we will, we must not let it slip through our fingers. And I know you would be proud to see the job they are doing. For I must tell you from one soldier to another they are magnificent!

And it is on their behalf that I wanted to talk to you today about our future challenges.

It was not long ago that many Americans were talking about peace dividends and the need to cut our forces deeper. But we were fortunate. There were many cooler heads and certainly the American Legion was at the head of that list, who were arguing that the days ahead could prove turbulent and that we must at all costs preserve our military strength.

And you were right! For you have only to look at the past month to make that judgment. We began the month by deploying combat forces to Kuwait the moment that we learned that Saddam Hussein was planning to attack that country again and possibly Saudi Arabia as well. And we ended the month with our aircraft flying combat missions over Bosnia as they still are today!

When you add to that our people serving in places like Haiti, Macedonia, and Korea, and Germany, and mention to them the words "peace dividend," you get a hearty chuckle. They like you know that if you want peace, you must pay for it.

The nation must pay for it by keeping our Armed Forces the very best in the world. And our men and women in uniform must pay for it with their dedication, with their skill, with their courage, and if need be even with their very lives. They know what you know that there is only one peace dividend and that is peace itself.

So we have after all found ourselves in an era of great challenges. The Cold War may be over, but what has taken its place is anything but the well-ordered and peaceful world that some imagined would come about. And it is long past time for us to be looking backward and wondering what we can afford to cut. Rather it is time for us to be looking forward to the future and asking ourselves what we must build.

I am convinced that there are two great challenges that we must meet if we are to protect all that you here fought so hard to gain for our country. The first of these is the global challenge posed by the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, the challenge of managing the enormous changes unleashed by the end of the Cold War. And the second challenge is to reshape our Armed Forces to ensure that we have the right force with all of the right capabilities to confront the uncertainties of the next century and to protect America's worldwide interests.

Certainly the end of the Cold War set in motion a wholly new era in world affairs. For 45 years we lived in a world that was tense and divided. Over time we grew used to that struggle, we understood it and its twists and turns, even settled into a reasonably predictable pattern.

All of that has now changed. We have been cast into a surging sea of great change and uncertainty. Just think in the past few years we have created more new countries and more international boundaries have been changed than even as a result of the end of World War Two.

We have already seen enough of this era to appreciate the measure of our challenge. We have seen first that it is far more complex and dangerous than many thought. You have only to look back on the list of military operations we have been engaged in to understand that.

Second we have seen that this new world is filled with great unpredictability. You never know when or where the next Saddam Hussein will raise his head. But I guarantee you that he is out there lurking amidst the uncertainty and that it is only a matter of time before he will challenge us. We must stay ready!

But third, it is also an era filled with incredible opportunities, opportunities that can make the next century so much more peaceful and stable than the bloody century we are leaving behind.

Just think over two billion new citizens are laboring to try to join the global free marketplace, a huge expansion that if it succeeds will make America vastly more prosperous in the next century.

As well dozens of nations are enmeshed in dramatic political reforms. They are struggling to shed old habits of tyranny and to embrace democracy and to join the ranks of democratic allies that you built after the Second World War.

Just imagine what it will mean if these hopes are met. Think back to the end of World War Two when you struggled to help our former enemies recover and rebuild and eventually organized a single global market that encompassed some one billion of the world's people. Look what that accomplishment has given us over the past 50 years. But the opportunity at our feet today, to reach out beyond the old walls of containment, the opportunity to bring several billion former adversaries into the community of democratic nations with free and open markets is so much greater by comparison.

If we succeed for our children and our grandchildren just imagine what their world will be like.

And I am convinced that there is only one key that will unlock these hopes. That key is American leadership. We must be the architects of the next century. But leadership demands strength. You cannot lead from weakness. After all it has been our strength that created these opportunities and it must be our leadership that seizes them. And while we cannot be the world's policemen only we have the resources the power and the reach to help mold a better world. To shape the world of tomorrow thus demands that we stay engaged in the world today.

You here in this room set this example for us. You did not shrink from your challenges we will not shrink from ours.

We must always stay focused on the future even as we are tending to the challenges of today. While today's challenges might be in Bosnia and in North Korea ... and in Iraq or even in Haiti, the future is being shaped in places like Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo.

And while today's challenges deserve our attention and at times our intervention we cannot ignore the main events that could directly threaten our vital national interests.

And we must never, never lose sight that the fundamental purpose of our Armed Forces is to fight and win our nation's wars. We must not let events drive us but we must have the vision and the strength to shape events. We owe that to our children.

And that leads me to the second challenge. That challenge is to shape our Armed Forces to ensure they are prepared to meet the challenges of the next century, a century that is only a short five years away. We must make sure that our forces remain unequalled by any other in the world.

And that means that we must avoid the rueful cycle of this century, the same cycle we followed after the First World War and after the Second and after Korea and yet again after Vietnam, when we thought our struggles were behind us and as a result we allowed our strength to atrophy; we neglected to modernize; we permitted our readiness to dry up; and in the end we paid dearly for our mistakes. We must not allow that to happen again.

For it is a fact that in the history of this country's Armed Forces no man or woman in uniform has ever completed a 20-year career that was not marked by American involvement in armed conflict.

And the force we build must be powerful enough to protect our worldwide interests even if a dictator were to challenge us in a place like Korea; we must be strong enough to simultaneously stop another dictator half way around the world.

Certainly our experience in the past two years has validated the need for a force with this capability. In June of last year we were reinforcing our forces in Korea when the tensions over North Korea's nuclear programs became so serious that it could have led to conflict.

And by October, only weeks after our forces began entering Haiti, we had to dispatch yet another force to Kuwait after we detected several of Saddam's Republican Guard divisions bolting south toward our ally's border.

In light of this experience, anything less ignores the world we are already in much less the world that may develop out of the uncertainty of the future. You, the ranks of the American Legion, can attest that you do not build a military force on wishful thinking; you build it on reality.

With the ending of the Cold War, our military budget has been reduced by nearly 40 percent. And I say enough is enough. This nation's security demands that we cut no more.

For this nation's security requires that we replace our equipment as it wears out and that we modernize even as we protect our near-term readiness. For that is the seed corn of future readiness.

I believe that our experiences of the past two years has shown that the quality of our men and women has remained

every bit as high as it has ever been. You can see this everywhere that our men and women have been in the superb way that they have handled the many missions we have sent them to perform.

You can see this in Haiti where for a year now they have performed magnificently and where results today have exceeded our most optimistic expectations.

And you just saw it two months ago when a young Air Force pilot named Scott O'Grady was shot down while helping to enforce the no-fly regime over Bosnia. From the moment his plane went down his comrades mounted an around the clock effort to find him. For nearly a week, Captain O'Grady eluded capture using the first class training he had received and through an extraordinary amount of pluck and courage.

And the moment he was found a textbook rescue operation was executed, one that flew through dangerous skies to pull this young hero to safety.

Or you could see it just five months ago, off the shores of Somalia where our marines led an international force to ensure the safe departure of the last of the United Nations contingent still in that troubled land. It was a very dangerous and risky operation, but it was performed so flawlessly and in such a textbook fashion that the entire departure was accomplished without the loss of a single allied or United Nations soldier. Just as importantly, we showed by this action that we stand by our commitments.

It is these men and women who have been and are performing these missions who make our Armed Forces the very finest in the world.

And if we wish to keep them in uniform and continue to recruit more like them then we must protect their pay and their benefits, and the quality of life that they and their families so richly deserve. I like to say that they are a Super Bowl team but without Super Bowl wages. And the last place to look for savings is in their paychecks and in their benefits. No High-1s for them!

Let me close by noting that since the start of the Second World War, it was our nation that has been the architect of this past century. Many of you here in this hall you were the builders. You produced the victories upon which our freedoms were secured and upon which the Cold War was won.

The challenge today is to ensure that our nation is the architect for the next century as well. If we are to do so then we have to continue to lead and we are going to need men and women in uniform every bit as good as you have been.

And today they are. If you go to Aviano Air Base and watch them launch plane after plane into the skies over Bosnia, if you see the cool determination in their eyes and the silent courage of those performing that dangerous mission, it gives you the confidence that we will meet all of our challenges.

As I said earlier they are a Super Bowl team. And we must never allow that to change. But if we are to keep our defense strong we need your support and assistance. And that is what I have come here to ask of you. We need you, our country's veterans, to continue to maintain your stand for a strong national defense. You must continue to be our people's standard bearer on this message. Nothing less than a strong defense will do.

And we also need your help in finding and attracting young men and women with your outstanding qualities who are willing to spend a few years or even a career serving our country. Spread the word through your communities: Uncle Sam is hiring; your country needs you; and the rewards are beyond measure.

Now on behalf of the men and women of the Armed Forces I salute you, and I again thank you for the remarkable service you have given to our country. In our times of trial you were there. And thank God you were. God Bless you and God Bless the United States of America.

**Marshall Center
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
14 September 1995**

Although you have already been here for a month, let me begin by welcoming all of you to the Marshall Center. The fact that you are here attests to the confidence of each of your nations in your abilities and so I congratulate you. This center is a most special enterprise, something unique in the history of Europe. Among other things it is a melting pot for ideas and views because all of our nations are contending with a wholly new Europe and none of us have a monopoly on wisdom or experience.

When I was the NATO commander, I was honored to have had a role in the establishment of this center. And it was with no small sense of irony and delight that we converted a center once used to train intelligence officers into a center for building cooperation and understanding among our European community.

I know that Minister Ruhe spoke at your class opening about George Marshall's vast contributions to Europe. While I do not wish to repeat what he said, I would be remiss if I did not add my own footnotes on why it is so fitting that we gave his name to this center.

It was not so much because Marshall was a remarkable wartime leader, which he certainly was, but more so because he proved to be such a remarkable leader in peace. Marshall was without question one of the great generals of the Second World War but he was one among many great generals from all of our nations. Had that been his singular contribution, we would still remember him fondly, but I don't believe we would be idolizing him.

It was in his role as the architect of recovery here in Europe that he rose above the other great generals and above nearly all of the great statesmen of his era. For winning a war is one thing, but building a peace out of the ashes of a world war and preventing future wars — therein lies his genius.

He was a visionary a man who cast his gaze far into the future, who saw beyond the trials and tribulations of his day, one who saw the opportunities to build a far better world than the bloody one he had known; a more peaceful and prosperous world for the generations to come.

Although it is often remembered differently, it is useful to remember that in his time, the Marshall Plan was a matter of great controversy. It had strong opponents those who argued that our former adversaries needed to be punished. But it was Marshall who argued that we must put the past behind us and that we must build for the future.

As the passage of time has shown Marshall's was the enlightened foresight. So it comes as no surprise that today many want a second Marshall Plan, a second reconstruction of Europe that re-weaves the eastern half of this European tapestry of nations just like Marshall did for its western half 45 years ago. I am convinced that the foundation for that has already been laid. And it is up to us today to make it work. That is the great opportunity we have been given.

We have great challenges but we also have vast opportunities, opportunities unparalleled since Marshall's time, and if we are to build throughout all of Europe the peace and security that we have known throughout NATO, then we must embrace Marshall's spirit.

If we do this right, then 45 or 50 years from today future generations will look back on our accomplishments with the same admiration and awe that we reserve for Marshall and his generation. And I want to charge you here, when you return to your countries after this course is over, to pursue this vision. Each one of us has a part to play in spreading Marshall's vision and spirit no matter how small we think our part might be.

And there are three pillars upon which we are building a new Europe: the pillars of security; stability; and of democracy. At the base of all three of these pillars there is a very vital role for all of us in uniform or who are associated with our nation's security.

The very basis for all future progress is the creation of a transformed security architecture for the European continent. For without peace nothing else is possible. As Minister Ruhe said at your class opening, there is a radical restructuring in progress; an effort to shape a new European-wide security arrangement to replace the one that had been in being for most of our lifetimes. Under the old structure, Europe was like a pair of distrustful Siamese twins armed against each other. There was no way to separate, but to strike a blow meant devastating injury for both. Survival depended on a line etched through the heart of Europe. Today there are no more lines nor does any nation wish to see any new lines drawn in the future.

The foundations of the new security order have already been laid a structure that integrates rather than divides. The building blocks are a reinvigorated North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Partnership for Peace, and a strategic partnership between Russia and NATO.

Let me start with the first. In 1991, at the Rome Summit, the NATO members revised the alliance's strategic concept for the first time since 1967. Before 1991, NATO was not an alliance prone to swift or dramatic changes. However the changes made in Rome were more dramatic than any in NATO's history. They were designed to reverse Containment.

From my perspective as a member of the U.S. delegation in that meeting at Rome, Marshall's spirit carried the day. Recognizing that the Cold War was over, the alliance made a pact with the future. The leaders of the alliance nations gave us a clear mandate to use the alliance to build cooperation with our former adversaries, cooperation built on outreach and on dialogue. Recognizing that military forces cannot operate without an understanding of the threat, our political leaders told us to put the past behind us and to focus on a new threat, the threat of instability.

And in keeping with this challenge they recognized that new skills, practices, and a new military structure would be needed. So they told NATO's militaries to develop the skills and practices that would allow us to manage crises even beyond NATO's national borders. That was only four years ago. And NATO is today a vastly different alliance than the one that I knew before 1991.

The second building block of the new security architecture is the Partnership for Peace, which has already proven much more successful than even our most optimistic expectations. This initiative provides the most effective means to develop patterns of cooperation between the militaries of the alliance and our new partners, thus helping to build a safer and more secure continent and for those interested, it provides an important stepping stone to eventual NATO membership. Judging by its large ranks, which now include some 26 nations, it has received an overwhelming vote of confidence. And so it should.

And there are practical benefits already. If you go to Yugoslavia today, there are soldiers from most of our nations on the ground side by side performing the same mission together. But if you were to look back to 1991, when the unraveling of Yugoslavia began, I think it is clear that we were all of us as the European community institutionally unprepared for a challenge of that nature. That only underscores how vitally important it is that we use the Partnership for Peace to expand our ability to work together and to manage common security challenges together.

And again the Partnership for Peace carries the spirit of Marshall. It is a coalition of the willing. We invite your participation and we need it. For it is in this partnership that we practice the routine involvement between the militaries of this continent that creates the kinds of cooperation that we will need in a crisis.

You have only to go back to the Gulf War to see how successful that can be. Although that conflict occurred outside of Europe, we looked upon it as a NATO operation using the relationships we had built over the previous 40 years, even using the NATO infrastructure, but also using the alliance doctrines and procedures. It could not have been more successful.

The third building block of the new security architecture is the strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. Having such a partnership recognizes Russia's power and the key role it must play in Europe.

As we have already seen on issues such as Bosnia and NATO enlargement, there are going to be differences in outlook between NATO and Russia. That is a natural consequence of differences in our history culture and geography.

For that matter, over the 40 odd years of NATO's existence there have often been differences in view and outlook between the United States and between many of the European members of NATO.

Our habit for this past half century has not been to dictate to one another but to instead work on what we can agree and to minimize our differences. And that must be the pragmatic spirit of the partnership between NATO and Russia as well. For peace and stability in Europe must be built with Russia not against Russia.

That brings me to the pillar of stability. For 45 years we existed in one kind of stability. It was a terrifying kind of stability because we all knew what could have occurred at the first instance of instability. Europe was like a dry forest in a long hot summer. We can only be thankful that nobody lit a match. It would have been like grabbing each others' hands and walking off a cliff together.

Now we have one conflict raging in the very heart of Europe and fires breaking out throughout the former Soviet states. It is a strange pass. In one half of Europe, people are seeking to erase the lines that separate them. In the other half, some are fighting to do just the opposite. One half is seeking integration while the other half faces threat after threat of disintegration. The challenge these ethnic and nationalistic passions present is twofold. How do we keep these hatreds from spreading, from intoxicating others, and how do we as the community of Europe as responsible and moral nations contribute to defusing or ending the kinds of conflicts that may result?

Part of the answer is economic, for poverty breeds hatred, where prosperity can cure many ills. And part of the answer lies in the third pillar, or democracy, where no matter the race or religion everybody has a voice and a vote. Clearly the other part of the answer lies in the security framework of cooperation and integration.

But there is another half to enhancing stability and that half is carrying out the arms control agreements that came about at the end of the Cold War, both the conventional arms control agreements and the nuclear arms control agreements. None of these agreements was designed to leave us disarmed or vulnerable, but instead they were designed to eliminate instabilities such as START II's agreement to eliminate the last of the land-based ICBMs with multiple independently targeted warheads, because these systems are inherently vulnerable to destruction by an adversary's first strike. In a crisis, the vulnerability of these systems pressures the owner to use them first or risk losing them. And that is a terrible shadow that hangs over our heads still today.

The same may be said for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty that increases transparency and reduces and repositions our conventional forces so that all sides feel secure that they cannot be overrun by a surprise attack. When these agreements were reached right at the end of 45 years of hostility, the fears of the preceding 45 years were still fresh in all of our minds and we all breathed a great sigh of relief. We cannot afford to lose the sense of urgency concerning the importance of these agreements. If we fail to eliminate these instabilities while we have a chance, it would be like leaving a loaded gun around a house filled with children. We owe this to future generations.

And the third pillar of the future Europe is that of democracy. It was Winston Churchill who observed that democracy is the worst form of government, except for any other forms of government that have so far been tried.

Not only is that true for the contentment of people within a nation, it is equally true for international peace. For it is a fact that democracies have a habit of resolving their disputes peacefully.

When you take the decision of whether to go to war out of the hands of a few and put it into the hands of the many, into the hands of those whose sons and daughters will be sent to fight, then war is so much less likely to result. The record of the Western European democracies since the end of the Second World War makes that point very handsomely.

But producing democracy is no easy task as even those who have lived under democracy for centuries will admit. And the most common ailment that has unhinged democracies are military forces that trespass into the politics of the nation. Notwithstanding that their motives are very often paternalistic, to try to set straight what they perceive to be poor governing, they inevitably inflict ruinous damage on their nations. The very strength of a democracy is that its people will make needed challenges at the ballot.

Perhaps the greatest challenge of all, the one that overarches all of these, is having the patience and forbearance to see them through.

I was a boy living in Germany when the Marshall Plan was instituted. It took a decade before the fruits of that wonderful scheme really began to materialize. Throughout Western Europe there were severe housing shortages, food shortages, islands of poverty, and tremendous economic uncertainty. Germany still had severe housing shortages for 15 years and its legendary economic miracle, or the Wirtschaftswunder that pulled it out of the depths of poverty, its benefits did not truly appear until the late fifties. The great recoveries of Italy, Germany, and France — these were the result of long and very tenuous struggles that were measured in decades not years.

And even as late as the sixties, there were many in Germany and elsewhere who openly wondered whether democracy was firmly rooted in their country or whether it was a phenomena that had worked only because the "Grand Old Man," Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, had headed the German government until 1962.

So the path ahead of us is perhaps longer and rockier than some anticipated. But we must build on these three pillars of security, stability, and democracy. Between all of our nations we have great strengths to put into the effort. Not the least of these is that we share the memory of this past century a time torn by two world wars and half a century of cold war.

I will end by telling you a final story. I left Europe for America in 1952. At that time, it was still a continent very much in ruins from the war and filled with great uncertainty about the future. When I returned as a captain in the American Army, ten years or so later, Western Europe had been transformed. And each time that I returned afterward I have marveled at the progress that has continued to this very day. But what an opportunity we now have before us. We cannot let this pass through our fingers. And so I charge each of you to take from this center all that you can and then hurry back to your countries and let's get to the business of rebuilding Europe for our children and our grandchildren, so that their lives will be richer and safer than ours have been.

**Re-Confirmation Hearing
Senate Armed Services Committee
Washington, DC
21 September 1995**

Let me begin by thanking all of you for your unwavering support to keep America's military the very finest and the strongest in the world and for the care you have shown for our men and women in uniform. And let me thank you as well for your support and counsel during my past two years as Chairman. For our military this period has been a succession of crises and difficult military operations.

I was sworn in as Chairman only a few weeks after that tragic firefight in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, and our first task was to stabilize the situation and to organize an orderly and measured disengagement of American forces from Somalia. The commanders on the ground accomplished that superbly and without precipitating a collapse of the humanitarian effort.

When tragedy struck Rwanda, a tragedy that quickly overwhelmed the capability of civilian humanitarian organizations, our military moved in quickly and within days helped to dramatically reduce the death toll and when the specific tasks were done, departed ahead of schedule.

And since last September, our Armed Forces have been performing equally well in Haiti, where everyone who has

visited them from the first day to today, has had nothing but the highest praise for their performance. The same is true for those who have performed so magnificently handling the difficult Cuban migrant situation at sea and on Guantanamo.

And when last October three of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard divisions bolted for Kuwait, our troops responded rapidly and decisively and within days, Saddam Hussein recognized the futility of his efforts and turned back. Still today, combat forces remain in the Gulf to make it clear that we are not distracted by other crises.

And of course throughout this period American forces have been operating in and around former Yugoslavia, where at last there is the possibility that we along with our NATO allies have helped create conditions that might lead to a settlement.

Whatever our individual views are on this tragedy, I think we stand united in our praise for the skill and bravery with which our service men and women have carried on this mission and all of the many other difficult missions of the past two years. Not once have our men and women in uniform failed to accomplish all that we asked of them and I am proud to represent them before you.

The experience of the past two years has highlighted a number of important lessons:

The first is that we were correct in our earlier decision to reshape our Armed Forces to be able to fight and win nearly simultaneously against two major adversaries. What better reminder than last year when in June, in anticipation of potential hostilities on the Korean peninsula, we began to deploy forces to the Pacific. In September we deployed to Haiti and in October found ourselves rushing troops to Kuwait to stop Saddam Hussein who apparently thought that he could take advantage of our preoccupation elsewhere.

That sequence of events should have dispelled any last thoughts about whether preserving this capability is a luxury or a need. Our global interests demand no less.

Second, we learned that the demands upon our forces these last two years have reinforced the wisdom of putting readiness first. And with your help, near-term readiness today remains at historic highs. This must continue.

But now it is time as well to focus on future readiness by more fully resourcing needed modernization and by more vigorously replacing equipment as it wears out, and I thank this committee for your support in this critical area.

At the same time, these last two years have shown us once again that the main source of our military excellence is our people. And if we wish to retain them and to recruit more like them, then taking care of them and their families must remain a top priority. And here too, I owe you our appreciation.

The last lesson I wish to emphasize concerns the wisdom of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The unmistakable pattern of superb military performances since 1986, from Panama and the Gulf War through the different tasks of these past two years, both large and small, has demonstrated that Goldwater-Nichols has it right.

Now we must ensure that the spirit of that act is firmly institutionalized. And that is the process we have begun in the past several years by creating joint doctrine, by strengthening joint training, and exercises by imbedding jointness into our force planning and materiel development processes, by adding new facilities such as the Joint Warfighting Center, and by continuing to expand the influence of warfighting CINCs.

But let me assure you that in our pursuit of jointness, we have not nor ever intend to turn the Joint Staff into a General Staff. Those who are concerned otherwise must recognize the neither the Joint Staff nor I can exercise command authority.

The role of the Joint Staff is to provide advice and make recommendations to me, so that I in turn can best advise our civilian leaders on military matters. That is a carefully and wisely crafted law that fully prevents the Joint Staff from ever evolving into a General Staff.

In each of these lessons there is a challenge. We have today, by any measure, the finest and most ready Armed Forces in the world. They have met the threats and needs of this post-Cold War era head on and have performed superbly. And as we look to the future we must all remember that the foundation of this force was laid many years before.

One set of challenges today is to use wisely and well the excellent force we have. But there is a second set of challenges, to prepare for the threats and needs of the next century as well. That includes making the right decisions today about caring for our people and their families, about investing in the right technologies, about modernization, about building our force for future threats, and about continuing to shape our force in the wisdom of Goldwater-Nichols. And if I am confirmed with your help I intend to make these challenges the guiding purpose of my next two years.

With that Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to make these brief remarks and I look forward to your questions.

Poland National Defense Academy
Remberton, Poland
29 September 1995

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is to return to Poland and to have this chance to share some views with you here at the National Defense Academy. As a son of Poland, there is no sight more grand than to see the country of my birth again free and independent. Through two world wars and a long cold war, there is no nation that has struggled more fiercely and stubbornly nor one that paid more dearly for its freedom. Never again can we allow Poland to lose what cost so very much to gain.

I often tell people who are still bewildered that the Cold War ended so peacefully that the cause of that miracle was here in Poland. It began in the shipyards of Gdansk, where Polish courage and resistance began unraveling the world's most powerful dictatorship. It was here in Poland, where the world learned that 45 years of terror and repression had failed dismally to extinguish the love for freedom that beats so strongly in the breasts of the Polish people.

It was Polish courage and passion that led us peacefully out of the Cold War. It was the irrepressible spirit of Poland's people that signaled to those in the Kremlin that change was inevitable. I would tell you here that it was the events in the shipyards and factories of Gdansk that paved the way for Boris Yeltsin to one day stand on a tank and declare that the Soviet Union existed no more.

And that same Polish leadership and courage are needed today to help guide Europe through the era we are now in, an era filled with great challenges certainly but also with vast opportunities, opportunities far greater than any this continent has known in the bloody century now behind us.

For those of us here in this room, the Europe that we have known for most of our lives has been like a pair of angry Siamese twins, each with a hammer poised in their hands ready to strike the other. It was impossible to separate, but if either of them actually struck the other it would have meant devastating harm to them both.

For 45 years we managed to survive an era that was like a dry forest in a long hot summer. We should all be thankful that nobody was foolish enough to light a match. It would have been like grabbing each other's hands and walking off a cliff together.

Today we have the opportunity to create a new Europe, the same kind of opportunity that existed when the Second World War ended but this time the opportunity is even grander. We can reweave the entire tapestry of European nations along the same lines that we did so very effectively to the Western half of Europe 45 years ago.

I am convinced that we are already on the right path to accomplish this vision and that today we must have steady perseverance and firm leadership if we are to reach that goal. And you here in this academy and the people of Poland have a pivotal role to play if we are to get there.

And it is that, which I would like to spend the next minutes discussing with you.

The path ahead must be built on three pillars: the pillars of democracy; stability; and security. These are the three pillars upon which we raised Western Europe from the ashes of the Second World War; they are the very basis of the integration enjoyed in the West, and they are the three pillars which we must extend across all of Europe.

If you look at the NATO alliance today, what is most striking is not just that our alliance has survived intact for so extraordinarily long but that every member of the alliance shares one virtue. All are democracies. It is that single feature that has made this alliance so successful and lasting.

It is one of the peculiarities of history that democracies seem to have a habit of resolving their disputes peacefully. Thus the institutionalization of democracy in Western Europe has brought a longer reign of peace to that half of Europe than ever before in its history. But secondly, the fact that every NATO nation is a democracy rallies its members to a common moral purpose upon which to commit to one another.

So that is one pillar of the future continent the protection and nurturing of the new democracies that sprang out of the Cold War.

The second is the pillar of stability. For 45 years we all grew used to one kind of stability. But it was a devilishly dangerous form of stability, one that teetered on a line drawn through the heart of this continent and that succeeded only because the first instance of instability would have been catastrophic for us all. I know of no nation that wishes to recapture that form of stability.

Yet today, as we see the terrible events that have unfolded in the shattered nation that used to be Yugoslavia or the fires that have erupted around the borders of the former Soviet Union, these are the evidence that we must build the bulwark for future stability.

In part the answer lies in economic progress for nations that are impoverished and are poor gardens from which to

grow peace or stability. And the signs of economic progress are already becoming evident, certainly here in Poland, which has experienced nearly continuous economic growth for the past few years and in a number of other reforming economies as well.

But I would caution that nobody should expect an instantaneous leap from the inefficiencies and troubles that beset the former communist economies to become like the modern prosperous economies that exist in the Western half of Europe. Remember that their prosperity was not built in a year or even a decade. The prosperity you see in those nations today was the work of a generation. And that progress could not have been achieved in the absence of peace and stability.

And that leads to the third pillar that of security. It is the construction of this pillar that depends so heavily on the efforts of you here in this room and others like you in war colleges around Europe and America. This was the challenge that was given to us with the end of the Cold War the challenge of building from the old to create a new security order for this continent. That challenge itself relies on three building blocks, each of which has already been laid.

These three blocks are a reinvigorated NATO alliance, the Partnership for Peace, and a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. Let me start with the first. In 1991, NATO's political leaders met in Rome and they ordered a complete reorientation of the military features of the alliance.

The changes made in that Rome conference were more dramatic than any in NATO's history. They were designed to reverse containment NATO's strategy from the beginning of its existence.

From my perspective as a member of the U.S. delegation in that meeting at Rome the alliance made a pact with the future. The political leaders of the alliance nations gave us a clear mandate to use the alliance to build cooperation with our former adversaries cooperation built on outreach and dialogue. They told us to put the past behind us and to focus on a new threat the threat of instability.

In keeping with this challenge, they recognized that the alliance would need new skills and practices that would allow us to manage new forms of crises even beyond NATO's borders. That was only four years ago. And NATO is already today a vastly different alliance than the one I knew before 1991.

And the alliance leaders have met since then and made equally profound decisions that will bear on the security architecture of this continent. They decided to set in motion the process of enlarging the alliance of accepting new members from Central Europe. Without a doubt leading the charge for NATO to make this decision was Poland.

Let me be very clear on this point the alliance is definitely going to expand. The NATO study outlining the criteria for expansion was briefed to partner nations in Brussels just yesterday.

It is significant to note that this process will not be made in blocks or groups but rather, it will be on a country-by-country basis. And let me assure you, NO country outside of NATO shall, in any way, have a veto in this process.

I am well aware of the frustration of those who feel membership should be immediate. However, it is important to realize that the reason for the alliance's success has been that each member has developed specific attributes which make it a viable and valuable partner.

For example, all NATO members must be willing and able to defend the alliance. Likewise, they must be willing to seek consensus even on the most difficult issues.

Membership also requires that in the development of plans and budgets and in the acquisition of equipment NATO doctrine and procedures must play an integral role.

That is where Partnership For Peace comes in. It is through PFP that participants learn the hundreds of standard operating procedures that are a necessary part of successful NATO operations. I saw first hand how this works when I visited the Cooperative Nugget Exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana. There were many procedural lessons learned from all participants including current NATO members.

But I hardly need mention the importance of the Partnership for Peace to Poland, for no nation has embraced this vital initiative more energetically. Poland has been unmatched in its support and enthusiastic participation in Partnership for Peace exercises. But it is important for us all to recognize that the Partnership for Peace is far more than an exercise program.

For 45 years the militaries of the two halves of Europe developed on very different patterns. We evolved different doctrines about how to fight and how to operate.

Our weapons systems, our communications systems, and nearly every implement of our military forces were designed and built quite intentionally to be different from another. We stared at one another distrustfully and to the degree that we sought to understand one another it was through espionage work to learn about each other's plans and capabilities in the event that we might one day have to meet in battle.

The spirit underlying the Partnership for Peace is to eliminate the vestiges of that old distrust and confrontation to put the past behind us and through a partnership of the willing to create together a new future for all of Europe.

I would point to two examples to show why it is so very vital that we take these actions. If you look back to 1991 when the unraveling of Yugoslavia first began I think it is clear that we were, all of us, the European community and NATO alike, institutionally unprepared for a challenge of that nature.

Had we been better prepared had we had a universal understanding that our moral and pragmatic sensibilities would eventually demand action the years since may have been very different. That only underscores how vitally important it is that we use the Partnership for Peace to expand our ability to work together and to manage common security challenges together.

But the second example I would underscore was the Gulf War that was fought in the deserts of Southwest Asia. Although that conflict occurred outside of Europe we looked upon it as a NATO operation using the relationships we had built over the previous 40 years even using the NATO military infrastructure and also the NATO doctrines and interoperability procedures. It could not have been more successful.

There also is a vital purpose for the Partnership for Peace for those of us in our nation's military forces to be prepared to operate together to be able to communicate smoothly to share logistics to cover each others flanks to refuel each other's planes to join our ships in fleet operations and to take orders from one another.

All of this is much more than a matter of military exercises. It is the product of ever-enlarging contacts between our forces, of learning new forms of cooperation, and of educating each other about the ways that we operate.

It is also a process of building trust, for the Partnership will ensure that no nation feels excluded from having a voice or a role in the future of Europe whether they are a member of NATO or not.

Finally, there is this third block to our security that I mentioned and that is a partnership between NATO and Russia. You will remember that at the end of the First World War all of our statesmen made a crucial mistake, a mistake that was terribly repaid only two decades later with the outbreak of another even more catastrophic war. When the terms of peace were created their minds and emotions were on the past and they sought to punish and isolate their former enemies.

When the Second World War ended Western Europeans did not repeat the same mistake. They thought of the future and they built a security structure that integrated their former enemies.

And this must be the spirit with which we approach Russia today and tomorrow. The Cold War is over and good riddance to it. We must now help the Russians to forge a new more integrated role on this continent. It is to all of our benefits to integrate Russia in our community of nations and that requires a partnership between our alliance and Russia.

And that I am convinced is key to the security of Poland and to the other nations of Central Europe as well for the alternative would be to simply slide the old division of Europe a little bit to the east and to build a new line of confrontation perhaps on Poland's eastern border. Certainly I do not think that any of us would wish to see that happen.

Now I have probably already spoken too long and really I would like to hear about your concerns and questions. But before I close I would like to tell you what a wonderful event it is for me to return here and to have this chance to visit with you to share with you my views on what lies ahead.

I left Europe for the United States in 1952. When I left, Western Europe still lay in shambles from the war, its nations were poor and hungry, its cities still lay in ruins with millions of homeless, and its people were grappling with the uncertainties of trying to adapt to the trials of democracy. It was more than a decade after that, that I returned to Europe again and it had taken that long before the seeds that were sown right after the war had finally taken firm roots, that prosperity had finally started to return, and those nations trying democracy for the first time had finally evolved to the point that it was firmly imbedded.

We should all of us be aware that the new Europe we are building will not be fully realized for some time to come. It will require a decade or more of tending before the same kind of garden that now exists in the west shows its flowers here in the center of Europe. But it will come. And I envy you sitting here for you will be the ones who tend to this growth so that Poland's future children shall know only freedom liberty and security. And as I look at the faces and into the eyes in this room today there is no doubt in my mind that this will come to pass.

Now I again thank you for this wonderful opportunity and I look forward to any questions that you may have.

**German Federal Armed Forces Commander's Conference
Munich, Germany
17 November 1995**

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is for me to join you here and to have this chance to share some thoughts with you about this very special relationship between the United States and Germany. Let me add as well that I am deeply honored to be only the second foreign military chief to have this opportunity to address this conference.

But then I feel not in the least uncomfortable, for I am among so many old friends and comrades here in this room.

As you know, although not born here, Germany was the land of my childhood. When my family was uprooted by the communist takeover of eastern Europe it was here where we came. It was here where I began my schooling and where I formed my first childhood friends. Here among the German people, we found a new home and lasting friendships as well.

And of course the United States is the land of my adulthood, the country I chose as my final destination. As I have told General Naumann before, it has been the great fortune of my life that I have been able to spend my military career protecting both of these nations that I care for so deeply.

Yet still, when General Naumann suggested that I come here today and that I might wish to touch on the topic of German-American relations, I thought surely everyone in this room has heard enough about German-American relations during their careers to fill libraries. I have always thought of this very special relationship between our countries like an old beloved house that we have lived in together for a very long time; we know every room and corner; we each have our favorites chairs at the dinner table; and we have chosen our furnishings to match and complement one another's tastes.

Is our special relationship unhealthy or troubled today? Certainly not! In fact it has just been strengthened and enlarged by the unification of Germany and by the end of the Cold War. At the same time it has weathered the withdrawal of two-thirds of American forces here and it has risen and adapted to the new kinds of trials and perils of these past few years. If you think about it, these have been very severe and trying tests for our partnership. Yet we have passed each of them with flying colors. Indeed as you look back, you appreciate that this very special relationship has been extraordinarily durable and expansive long outliving and outgrowing the very narrow designs that its inventors initially intended.

I think back to the Cold War years at all of the times that some were predicting that we would split, usually as a result of some crisis in our larger alliance, that so many Trans-Atlantic experts made their livelihoods writing about.

For some, there was always a distrust that America's commitment to Europe was conditioned by a weather vane that as long as the weather was fair so was America's commitment. But that the moment the weather turned truly nasty, that were we ever to face the peak of strategic brinkmanship, at that moment of decision the United States would peer over the edge and experience a change of heart. For some that distrust was always there throughout every decade of the Cold War.

Yet among Americans we always knew that the Germans understood. We and you — we always knew better. When DeGaulle challenged the rest of the NATO alliance to forgo their strategic trust in the United States, Germany was foremost among those arguing otherwise.

When the nights of the Cold War grew chilliest, our two nations every time responded by making the NATO alliance stronger and by improving our defenses. When the Korean War erupted in 1950 and all of our nations believed it was a Soviet diversion to make Europe vulnerable to attack, it was the United States that rushed in some 180,000 reinforcements and it was Germany that gave them bases. When the Berlin crisis erupted nearly ten years later, the United States brought in another 46,000 reinforcements and again Germany opened her arms and gave them housing and bases. Then once again after the Vietnam War ended and we all grew alarmed at the expansion and modernization of the Warsaw Pact forces, again the United States brought in more forces even as the German Armed Forces expanded as well and again Germany offered more housing and facilities. From a constabulary force that in 1949 numbered only some 65,000 soldiers, through to the end of the Cold War when American strength in Europe had grown to 356,000, never once did the United States flinch from its commitment to Europe and never once did Germany deviate from its commitment to Europe. Indeed, at the moments of greatest crisis it was very often the same critics who doubted American resolve who suddenly began warning that the United States was too aggressive and too unrelenting.

Yet the prospect of nuclear confrontation here in Europe was so menacing that the doubters never disappeared. No amount of confidence building could stave them off. Some here in Europe continued to believe until the very end of the Cold War that the Atlantic Ocean was an insurmountable crack in the solidarity of the alliance, that when the critical

brink was reached the United States would recoil and would leave its allies stranded and ruined. But never here never in Germany were those doubts embraced.

How ironic it is that today, even after the threat that was the very source of the accusations for so many decades has now become no more than a chapter in the history books, we find there are still those who are saying that America's commitment to Europe is limited. More ironic still, the doubts come from the same dubious voices who were proven so wrong during the Cold War. They have merely turned their old discredited arguments on their head.

Now they are saying that America's commitment to Europe has been weakened by the very absence of a powerful threat. Now those same voices are arguing that America has stronger interests elsewhere and that our interests in Europe will continue to wane and that we will further withdraw our forces.

Those who would say so do not understand how Americans view their security as permanently and inextricably linked to stability and security here in Europe. The doubters fail to comprehend how deeply or universally this understanding runs in the American people that it has been consistently reaffirmed every time that the American electorate has been measured. We are first and foremost a European nation, even as we claim to be a Pacific nation as well. Nor do the doubters seem to want to appreciate the fact that our continuing commitment of some 100,000 forces forward-stationed here in Europe — every one of whom is a volunteer — that this makes ours the eighth largest standing military force on this continent. And of course backing up these 100,000 are the full might and capabilities of the rest of the American military. This is a firm commitment that has been reaffirmed time and again. It is not going to recede.

Happily or unhappily, it has not just been the United States that has born the brunt of those who doubt for a living. We had a partner and that partner was Germany. Throughout the Cold War for many there was this uncomfortable paradox of the two Germanys, a nation of Siamese twins sharing a common heart but ruled by two different heads, separated by misfortune but obviously still joined. There were always some who believed that Germany's yearning for unification would outweigh its other loyalties and perhaps damage or compromise our alliance.

And just as America always found that German faith in us was unyielding so too did you find that America's faith in Germany was unbreakable. Never in America was there any doubt about Germany's ultimate unification nor that this would be best for the Trans-Atlantic community. Never was this a problem. And how proud we were to have had the opportunity to be the first nation to have had the opportunity to applaud and endorse your unification.

Now that unification has been achieved, you find just as we have, that the old doubts have been replaced by new ones. Now there are some who predict that Germany's interests and loyalties will shift from the west to the east. Now there are those who worry that Germany will acquire new habits of unilateralism or unwelcome assertiveness or that you may lose your appetite for a communitarian vision for Europe.

So it seems to me that we share this common ailment that no matter what our nations do, no matter how steady our course, that it is our common fate to give birth to misgivings in others. I am not sure if we can ever dispel this ailment of ours, this extraordinary ability to make others worry and fret; but I know that the strongest medicine as it has been over these past fifty years is the close and binding relationship our two nations share and the unyielding faith and trust we have always shared toward each other.

And so it is that I found myself agreeing with General Naumann that we should devote our time and attention to this very special relationship that exists between us. Unquestionably we are living in a new era and it is necessary for us to ensure that we are preserving our bonds and that we are continually building the basis for future generations to enjoy that which has meant so very much to us. And this does take introspection and vision.

Just as it was the role of the generation that survived the Second World War to create this remarkable relationship in the first place, it is our role today to ensure that it will still be there vigorous and intact tomorrow and that it will shape Europe in the 21st Century every bit as powerfully and productively as it has shaped the last half of this century.

And I think that means that we must continually examine our relationship and friendship at all three levels where our nations have great external roles: here within the Trans-Atlantic alliance, to see what we must do together to ensure stability and peace on this continent; on a larger global level, where Germany's role is enlarging; and then at the very core of our relations at the bilateral level.

On the Trans-Atlantic level, I think we face three great challenges. First there is today a debate about the future of our alliance. The French have spoken of altering our alliance and carving it into two distinct pillars, one a European pillar that manages the day-to-day challenges of European security and stability and the other half an American pillar that joins with the European half only in the event that there is a direct threat to NATO territory.

There is great danger in this vision. Even if it could work, and it can't, it would ultimately lead to America's disengagement from this continent. I am convinced that if America started to play a part-time role in the affairs of Europe, that if we accepted a division of labor no matter how appealing and logical, some might find that arrangement

would become a recipe for fragmentation and the re-nationalization of our security policies. I don't believe that the American Congress and people could sustain our involvement here unless we remain fully engaged in the day-to-day security issues of Europe. So this alternative vision is a siren's song. For a marriage to be successful, the partners must live together and share their daily chores. Separation is the first step to divorce.

But for Germany this opposing vision presents unique problems. Since the Second World War, the heart of German foreign economic and defense policies has been the formation of two equally indispensable grand partnerships, those with the United States and with France. Among the many interlocking bilateral partnerships that form our larger alliance this triangle, with Germany at its base, has always been vital to European stability and today it lies at the heart of Europe's security political and economic architecture. The Franco-German partnership has been the engine that has driven European integration and the economic vitality of this continent. At the same time Germany is the host for American participation in Europe.

Germany's challenge is to strike a balance between these two grand partnerships. Neither can be allowed to slip away or to disintegrate. Both are vital to the intricate balance of this continent and of NATO. Certainly you recognize this need, for I am sure it is no coincidence that Admiral Lanxade and I have been the first two foreign defense chiefs to speak in this distinguished forum.

Germany is the hinge that must keep both the United States and France energetically involved in managing the security environment of Europe. I could not imagine how European security would work if the Trans-Atlantic partnership were severed, but neither can I imagine not having France's irrepressible wisdom, courage, and vitality for our most difficult challenges.

But there is a second challenge as well in which Germany is already playing and must continue to exert a strong leading role. That challenge is to broaden the integration of Europe to eliminate the vestiges of the curtain that hung from Stettin to Trieste by helping to spread our institutions, those of democracy, of economic prosperity, of stability, and security, into the eastern half of this continent.

This is a great task and one that will require great perseverance, wisdom, resources, and energy. You know this better than any from the miracle that the German people have accomplished in unification. Germany has also provided the intellectual spark for the enlargement of NATO and you have helped convince the rest of the alliance that this step must be taken.

But I think that we must all recognize several imperatives. First, it will not be possible to just throw a blanket over all of Eastern Europe, simultaneously giving to these nations what it took us decades of trial, turmoil, and struggle, to plant and harvest for ourselves. It will be by necessity an incremental evolution country by country. We should fully anticipate that there will be successes and there will be failures. We cannot be discouraged and we must not take a short view.

Second, Germany deserves great credit for leading Europe and the world in offering these new nations economic assistance, investment, and economic partnership and America deserves credit for being the second greatest contributor. But we must be careful. We must also work hard to encourage the larger European Union into incorporating the new eastern economies into this larger satellite. If only one or two nations develop substantial economic interests and relations in the east, then the bond between east and west will be frail and vulnerable.

The third great Trans-Atlantic challenge is managing a Russian nation that is still reforming and still in search of its new identity here in Europe. The importance of this task certainly doesn't need to be underscored to anyone in this room. And Germany and the United States, both individually and as members of the larger alliance, have perhaps the most influential roles in helping to guide the evolution of new security relations with Russia. It is vital that we two do so in harmony.

Then there is this second level where our special relationship has such a vital role and that is at the international level. In the past this interaction has been more or less limited to the diplomatic and economic planes. But we must all recognize that your recent constitutional rulings open a new era for Germany certainly on the continent but also internationally. I am convinced that this is the right direction. And just as America had no doubts or hesitations about unification, similarly we welcome Germany to as large a role as the German people want for themselves. That is why the United States has placed its enthusiastic support behind a U.N. Security Council seat for Germany.

Indeed in Italy and Bosnia today, where there are already 1,500 German military serving superbly, we are finding that the very strengths of partnership that we developed here in the past half-century are of course transferring to that operation. And I applaud the recent decision by the German cabinet to approve sending another 3,000 forces in the event of a NATO implementation force. Among soldiers there is no greater compliment than to say that you are

welcome on my flank. And certainly among American commanders there is no more reassuring sight than to see a German unit on their flank or a German fighter on their wing.

I also anticipate that as Germany's international security involvement grows that the special relationship between us will gain a new dimension that will cause it to further grow and broaden and that it will become even more valuable to both of us. In fact that process has already begun and among the points I wish to make today is to offer my appreciation to Generals Reinhardt and Bagger for offering the assistance and support of the Central Region in the event that American forces must deploy to Bosnia. It is an offer that is as appreciated as it is needed. Thank you.

And this leads to the third level of our special relationship and that is the bilateral level. It was this level that we could always take for granted in years past that it would always stay healthy and vigorous. A few years ago when I served as the American commander here in Europe, there were some 356,000 forces that were part of my command, a quarter of a million of whom lived here in Germany. When you added their families to the list there were nearly three-quarters of a million Americans living in Germany. Throughout the years of the Cold War well over 10 million American service men and women lived here in Germany and with their families that number grew to perhaps 20 million. Our presence was unmistakable, distinct, and omnipresent.

There were never enough American quarters to fully house our people, so large numbers of American families lived in German homes, shopped in German stores, learned German culture, and a little bit of the German language, and along the way acquired a deep and lasting affection for the German people. I have never met an American service man or woman who served here who did not carry away the fondest of memories.

There was no other in country in the world Americans knew so well or so intimately. In no other nation could you find such vast numbers of Americans not just visiting but actually living among the German people.

The withdrawal complete today, there are some 100,000 American service men and women living here. With the drawdown we were able to keep as much American housing as we needed and the result is that a vastly larger percentage of American families now live in American housing areas here in Germany. And the strength of the Deutschmark restricts their activities off-base. There was a time when you could not drive 10 minutes on an autobahn without seeing an American forces license plate. Now I suppose you can drive for hours.

This presents us with a special challenge. We must not allow that closeness that was there between our forces and the local German communities nor between our units and yours to wither or erode. We must find ways to energize and invigorate the programs and activities that have kept our bonds so very strong in the past. We must be constantly looking for new initiatives to accomplish this. Because there are less of us we must work more at German-American relations.

And the same holds true for our military contacts. At the senior ranks of our military we meet frequently. But we must all of us work hard to ensure that our younger people are involved in German-American organizations and friendship activities. Through constant interaction we want them to see what we have found out about each other. We must look for every opportunity to train together, not just at the high levels but also at the lower unit levels.

Some of these initiatives are already taking place. When the German 4th Corps held a series of briefings for USARAEUR in which they discussed their experiences with forging a force with easterners and westerners, it added greatly to our understanding of and our appreciation for what you have accomplished. When the German II Corps was kind enough to include the U.S. 1st Armored Division in the Proud Lion Exercise, that was an excellent chance for the American unit leaders to see how the German Army conducts its large-scale exercises. For you and I, for officers of our generation, that may not sound unique but to our younger officers it was very unique. And even such a small contribution as having a German OPFOR company at Hohenfels, helping to train and prepare our forces for Bosnia, has had a far larger impact than perhaps many of us appreciate. Aside from the admiration that unit has earned it is also a vital contribution to our preparation.

Let me add that there are today some 3,000 German military men and women stationed in the United States. Soon a complete Air Wing will be established, building on the base of a squadron that is already there. And I am very pleased with this development and I hope that the German forces stationed in America are getting the same benefit and hospitality that Americans have enjoyed here so very much.

Actually, I am very encouraged at the health of this very special relationship between us. It is evolving and responding to the changes surrounding it and in response to the changes internal to our own nations. This is not to say that there are not disagreements, misunderstandings, and tensions. Yet it has always been my view toward partnerships that it is precisely when they have grown quiet, tranquil, and completely untroubled — that is when they are in greatest danger. Those are the surest symptoms that it has either grown stagnant and moribund or that its purposes must have become very narrow and unimportant.

I would remind you of the words of Helmut Schmidt, who remained a steadfast supporter of our relationship even after his own political fortunes were harmed by his staunch efforts to support his American partner. He was once asked to comment on what seemed to some Germans to be incomprehensible and unpredictable behavior on the part of the United States. He answered with a heavy sigh and said, "They are what they are. But they are the only Americans we have."

Today our two nations are the largest in NATO. Within our two borders live nearly half of the citizens of this alliance. We are the alliance's largest stockholders. We have before us great challenges and grand purposes. We must for the sake of our combined futures ensure that we hand this very special partnership, which has been such a treasure to our generations, fully intact, still vibrating with warmth, with tension, with vitality, and with great purpose, on to the next generation.

And now let me close and thank you for this very great honor and the opportunity to share my views with you.

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Ten years ago, a group of military historians published a book titled "America's First Battles: 1776-1965." After studying the opening fights of ten different conflicts that involved America's Armed Forces, the authors demonstrated that in between wars our nation had a very sad record of keeping our forces ready to fight. In every one of our first battles, from the Revolution through Vietnam, American forces came to their first fight unprepared. It had become a terrible tradition.

Not until the early 1980's was the tradition shattered. First in Panama and then in the Gulf War, American forces fought so superbly that the first battle became the last battle. In both of these victories, very clearly, our forces were ready to fight from the first shot.

There was an incident in the Gulf War when an M-1 tank crew in the heat of battle roared over a hill and found itself right in the middle of four Iraqi tanks arrayed in an ambush. The tank commander was a young sergeant. The moment he sensed his predicament he gave the order for his driver to accelerate. Within a split second he then traversed the turret to lay it on the first Iraqi tank, which the gunner then destroyed. As soon as this was done the tank commander spun the turret and acquired another target, the gunner reloaded, and a second tank was destroyed. By this time nearly out of the ambush, the tank commander and the gunner repeated the same drill, destroying a third Iraqi tank with an engagement over the rear deck, just as the M-1 cleared the enemy's kill zone. All of this took less than half a minute.

Thinking about this incident there were four variables in favor of that remarkable tank crew; outstanding leadership, superbly oiled teamwork, the best equipment fully operational, and the kind of instinctive, split-second reactions that come only from constant, demanding training. In short, remarkable people and readiness.

By 1999, the defense budget is scheduled to shrink to less than half of what we paid for defense in 1985. But our force will be only one third smaller. This is not an encouraging equation. Our problems become even more severe when you look at all of the operations our forces are prosecuting in so many corners of the world. Operationally, we are doing far more than we were in 1985.

If we are to maintain our readiness, we are going to have to make some difficult choices and we are going to have to make some bold changes in the ways we have been doing business; in the management of our forces; by innovative approaches to equipment development and procurement; by carrying jointness into our requirements process and how we support and school and train our forces; and by making whatever changes in roles and missions that make sense operationally.

In the next few years we are going to have to break some china. But if broken china protects our readiness, then it is worth the cost.

In the history of our nation there has never been a twenty-year period uninterrupted by conflict. There will be other first battles. We must build on the new tradition established in Panama and the Gulf — the cost of failing to do so is too high.