

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON THE
LESSONS LEARNED AS A RESULT OF THE
U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN GRENADA

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE LESSONS LEARNED AS A RESULT OF THE U.S. MILI- TARY OPERATIONS IN GRENADA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 24, 1984.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:55 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Melvin Price (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now resume its sitting.

The first witness this morning will be the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary for Policy for the Department of Defense. Secretary Ikle.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, all of us—

The CHAIRMAN. You have a hard act to follow, Mr. Secretary, but, go ahead.

Mr. IKLE. Indeed.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission all of us at this table would like to associate ourselves with the tribute to John J. Ford.

Many of us had the privilege of working with him for many years.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you and make a very brief statement concerning last year's events in Grenada and describe our present role for the security of that country.

Just to recapitulate briefly, basically there were three precipitating events; the murder of the deposed Prime Minister Bishop, and members of his government, followed by the collapse of all governmental authority, violence, and the prospect for further violence.

We, the U.S. Government, became increasingly concerned about the safety of about a thousand of our citizens endangered by the breakdown of law and order, by shoot-on-sight curfew, and by a totally unpredictable ongoing power struggle.

The second main event was the developments in Grenada caused the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to call an urgent meeting at Bridgetown, Barbados, and through unanimous vote by these states decided that the conditions in Grenada required action under the 1981 treaty which established that organization.

The organization asked the United States and Jamaica and Barbados for help. We received a formal request October 23 and agreed to assist.

Third, the Governor General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, the sole remaining legitimate authority on Grenada, made a confidential appeal to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and states of the region to help restore order on the island.

Based on these three considerations, as well as discussions with Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados and Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica, President Reagan decided that U.S. Forces should join with forces of the OECS nations and Barbados and Jamaica to take action on the island.

The collective action which began on October 25 was successful. The safety of all the American citizens was restored. The threat from the extremists was removed and Governor General Scoon was able to assert his legitimate authority.

Hostilities were declared over on November 3 and U.S. Combat Forces were withdrawn by December 15.

A small noncombat U.S. group of about 300 strong as of mid-January now remains on Grenada to provide support and augment the Caribbean Peace Force.

As of January 19, this peace force consists of approximately 430 troops and applies from the Eastern Caribbean States as well as Barbados and Jamaica.

Once the Grenadian Government has reconstituted and trained its own police force, both U.S. troops and the Caribbean Peace Force can be withdrawn.

I don't think I need to take your time, Mr. Chairman, to recapitulate in detail what the rescue mission for Grenada revealed about the conditions and the situation on that island, such as the secret military agreements; the almost 900 Cuban, Soviet, Korean, Libyan, East German, and Bulgarian personnel; all the weapons found there, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, armored personnel carriers, rocket launchers, thousands of infantry weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition; and, of course, the information about the Grenadians imprisoned and tortured, occasionally tortured in the presence of Cubans; and the tons of documents and other evidence of a concerted attempt to transform Grenada into a totalitarian Communist dictatorship linked to Cuba and the Soviet Union.

This successful operation was not without costs, however. Eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed in action, 116 were wounded.

Grenadian casualty figures were 45 killed, 337 wounded. Of the Grenadian dead, 24 were civilians, including 21 killed in the unfortunate accidental bombing of the mental hospital.

Among the 784 Cubans on the island, 24 were killed in action, another 59 wounded.

U.S. forces lost equipment; 7 helicopters destroyed, 11 helicopters damaged.

Apart from that, there were no other major equipment losses for our forces.

We have not yet calculated with sufficient accuracy the total dollar cost of the operation.

We realize questions have been raised regarding access by the media during the initial days of this operation. Let's put this in some perspective.

A group of reporters, 15 chosen from a pool, went in 2 days after the operation began. This number was increased immediately the following day and unrestricted access was allowed and made possible as of the fifth day.

Access for the press was not arranged during the very first hours and couple of days of the operation because of the very compressed planning time for the operation and the important need of maintaining secrecy, and it was decided not to burden the planning and preparations effort and burden combat elements with the additional task of providing access for the media at the very outset.

For the current security needs as distinct from the economic needs, as security needs we have allocated \$15 million to train, equip, supply, and provide logistical support for the Caribbean Peace Force.

The Caribbean States are small and have neither the money nor the equipment to carry out the security responsibilities on Grenada on their own.

These U.S. funds are being used to train and equip the peace contingent from the OECS and from Barbados and Jamaica. Conditions on Grenada now are favorable for restoration of a genuine democracy.

Thus we can say that the rescue mission has been a clear success in every major aspect; the security of U.S. citizens; the safety and welfare of the Grenadians; and the long-term political developments of the island.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. We would be pleased to answer any questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE

Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you and make this brief statement concerning last year's events in Grenada. Also, I am prepared to describe our present role for the security of that country.

The precipitating events were the murder of deposed Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and members of his Government on October 19, 1983, the collapse of all Governmental authority, the violence and prospect of further violence. We in the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the safety of the approximately 1,000 of our citizens endangered by the breakdown of law and order, by a shoot-on-sight curfew, and by a totally unpredictable ongoing power struggle. Grenadian Army officers had raised impediments to the evacuation of Americans during discussions on October 23 and 24 with State Department officers.

The developments in Grenada caused the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to call an urgent meeting in Bridgetown, Barbados, on October 21, at which time these States agreed by unanimous vote that conditions in Grenada required action under the 1981 treaty which established the organization. Grenada did not attend, as it did not have a functioning government at the time. The OECS asked the United States, Jamaica and Barbados for help. The formal request was received on October 23 and we agreed to assist. Both the OAS Charter, in Articles 22 and 28, and the UN Charter, in Article 52, recognize the competence of regional security bodies to ensure regional peace and stability.

The Governor General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, the sole remaining legitimate authority on Grenada, made a confidential appeal to the OECS and States of the region to help restore order on the island. An invitation by lawful government authority is a valid legal basis for foreign states to provide requested assistance.

Based on these three considerations, as well as discussions with Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados and Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica in Barbados on October 23, President Reagan decided that US Forces should join with forces of the OECS nations, Barbados and Jamaica to take action on the Island.

The collective action which began on October 25 was successful. The safety of all of the American citizens was restored, the threat from the extremists was removed,

and Governor General Scoon was able to assert his legitimate authority. Hostilities were declared over on November 3 and U.S. combat forces were withdrawn by December 15, 1983.

A small non-combat U.S. group (253 strong as of January 19), remains on Grenada to provide support and augment the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. As of January 19, this Peacekeeping Force consists of approximately 430 troops and police from the Eastern Caribbean States as well as Barbados and Jamaica. Once the Grenadian Government has reconstituted and trained its own police force, both the U.S. group and the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force are to be withdrawn.

It may be useful to recapitulate here what the rescue mission for Grenada revealed about the situation on that Island and the previous regime:

Five secret military agreements had been concluded—three with the Soviet Union, one with North Korea, and one with Cuba;

Almost 900 Cuban, Soviet, North Korean, Libyan, East German and Bulgarian personnel, including permanent military advisors;

Artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, armored personnel carriers and rocket launchers, with thousands of infantry weapons with millions of rounds of ammunition;

Grenadians imprisoned and tortured, occasionally in the presence of Cubans;

Documents and other evidence of a concerted attempt to transform Grenada into a totalitarian Communist dictatorship, linked to Cuba and the Soviet Union;

This successful operation was not without its costs however; eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed in action; and 116 wounded. Grenadian casualty figures were 45 killed and 337 wounded. Of the Grenadian dead, 24 were civilians including 21 killed in the accidental bombing of a mental hospital located next to an anti-aircraft installation. Among the 784 Cubans on the Island, 24 were killed in action and another 59 wounded.

U.S. Forces equipment losses were seven helicopters destroyed and eleven helicopters damaged. Apart from that, there were no other major equipment losses. We have not yet calculated the total dollar cost of the operation.

Questions have been raised regarding the access by the media during the initial days of this operation. It should be noted that a group of reporters, 15 chosen from a pool, went in two days after the operation began. This number was increased the following day and unrestricted access was allowed as of the fifth day.

Access for the press was not arranged during the first couple of days of the operation. Given the very compressed planning time for the operation, and the need to ensure necessary secrecy, it was decided not to burden the combat elements with that task of providing access for the media at the outset.

For the current security needs in Grenada, we have allocated \$15 million to train, equip, supply and provide logistical support for the Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces. The Caribbean States are small and have neither the money nor the equipment to carry out the security responsibilities on Grenada. These U.S. funds are being used to train and equip peacekeeping contingents from the OECS States, Barbados and Jamaica.

Conditions on Grenada now are favorable for the restoration of a genuine democracy. Thus, we can now say that the rescue mission has been a clear success in every major aspect: the security of U.S. citizens, the safety and welfare of the Grenadians, and the long-term political development of the Island.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a question of the Chair on procedure. Is it the wish of the Chair that we question Dr. Ikle, Secretary Ikle, now or wait until the other witnesses have testified?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be preferable to wait, if you would.

Mr. DICKINSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you proceed? Then we will go back to questioning.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. While we have a quorum here, if I might, I would like to move that the Chair be authorized to close the hear-

ing today and on five additional consecutive days for the purpose of receiving classified national defense information when, in the opinion of the Chair, it might be necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. That motion requires a rollcall vote.

The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Price.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Whitehurst.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Nichols.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mrs. Holt.

Mrs. HOLT. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Daniel.

Mr. DANIEL. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Hillis.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Montgomery.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Badham.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Aspin.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Stump.

Mr. STUMP. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Dellums.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Courter.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mrs. Schroeder.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Hopkins.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. KAZEN. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Davis.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Won Pat.

Mr. WON PAT. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Kramer.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mrs. Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Hunter.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Mavroules.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Hartnett.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Hutto.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Crane.

Mr. CRANE. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Leath.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Kasich.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. McCurdy.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Foglietta.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mr. Dyson.

Mr. DYSON. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Hertel.

[No response.]

Mr. FORD. Mrs. Lloyd.

Mrs. LLOYD. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Britt.

Mr. BRITT. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Darden.

Mr. DARDEN. Aye.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Courter votes aye.

This vote was 27 ayes and no nays.

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is agreed to.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. This session was billed as the "Lessons Learned From Grenada," but I notice that we have before us a resolution of inquiry, H. Res. 383, which is primarily a document presented to us by the Black Caucus, which is in effect challenging the statement that there were U.S. citizens who were in jeopardy in Grenada and making some demands with regard to whether something other than military action could have solved the problem there.

As one who visited Grenada when the operation was still going on, as a member of the Speaker's bipartisan task force, I think we ought to give General Trobaugh, for example, an opportunity to explain in detail the efforts that were undertaken by the Rangers to rescue the medical students.

I know as a fact that the medical students who were constituents of mine in my congressional district were extremely grateful for the rescue that was undertaken at some considerable risk by the Rangers and I think that is one of the most meritorious operations that was carried out.

I think if we are going to try to get material to respond to this resolution of inquiry, I think we have the people here that can present that.

I think we ought to nail these things down very clearly.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, could I comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Just to clarify, the chairman said he wanted to lay this resolution out just to make the members aware of it.

You don't have to act on it today, but it is a privileged resolution you will have to act on within 14 legislative days. It has been jointly referred to our committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. STRATTON. I just hope we will touch on these things that they want us to respond to.

Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to be recorded aye on the recorded vote to go into executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. Dickinson, do you have anything?

Mr. DICKINSON. No; I did have some questions but I will withhold questioning until the admiral and the other witnesses, and the general, get through with their presentation, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone else desire to ask questions at this point or wait until we hear the others?

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. Who could respond to this? Maybe the Secretary, but everybody I think feels that America courageously acted—personnel courageously acted. I think the question some people have is whether or not the only way to have done this was the way in which it was done in view of the constitutional provisions that Congress is supposed to declare war.

This was essentially a war. Is there something that the administration would like to put on the record with regard to its position with regard to why Congress was not involved in the decision to have this operation?

Mr. IKLE. Congressman, the Members of Congress, of course, were informed as soon as possible of the operation by the President and then briefed and kept abreast of every development.

A declaration of war, as you know, was not involved. Indeed, we have not had a declaration of war since World War II.

Mr. BENNETT. My question is, Why not?

Mr. IKLE. It was not considered appropriate or necessary. There has been a shift since World War II from using declarations of war only for more limited instances and, indeed, in the war in Korea

and other conflicts since 1945, there never has been a declaration of war; conflicts that were of much greater scope and much longer duration.

This short rescue mission did not fall appropriately under a situation where a declaration of war would be considered.

There was also no party really that was constituted a government that was opposing us.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Schroeder.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I don't know that it is a proper question to ask, but I know it is not in the resolution and I don't see anyone directing themselves to it; maybe the following witnesses could talk about it also.

But I am curious if a different command structure was used for Grenada. We have heard so many times that many problems occurred in other actions that were not as successful and a lot of it was a command problem. I think it would be very interesting to know what the command structure was and whether it was the same as other ones?

Mr. IKLE. Admiral McDonald will respond.

Admiral McDONALD. Mrs. Schroeder, we will go into some detail in my statement and in conversations with the two commanders that are here. If you concur, we could discuss that later.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you. That may be a very important lesson.

Admiral McDONALD. It is.

Mr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, we have some very brief additional opening statements.

Did you want to hear those now or proceed with the questions?

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness then will be the Honorable Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. Motley.

STATEMENT OF HON. LANGHORNE MOTLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MOTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

I want to thank you for the opportunity to come and testify before you. I have submitted for the record written testimony; also working with Mr. Ford and the members of the staff, we have provided a stack of documents in which they requested we cover most of their questions and also Mr. Stratton, I think, addressed the body of the resolution, either in the written statement or in these documents we have provided.

I also had the privilege to accompany Mr. Stratton and two other members of the committee to Grenada a week after the operation there. I just want to close by telling you that I think that overall it was a well conceived and executed operation. There was a very close level of coordination between the Department of State, the Office of Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Chairman of the JCS.

We had a State Department officer participate with CINCLANT at headquarters in the brief preplanning that took place there. There was an officer from State that was with the 82d Airborne and one with the Marine Amphibious Forces.

So there was close coordination throughout.

In fact, there was one young foreign service officer who went in very early in the operation and probably the first State Department officer to go in that early in an operation since Robert Murphy landed in North Africa in 1954.

Overall, there was a very close coordination.

There is one element, Mr. Chairman, that I addressed in the testimony, but I won't dwell on it here, but there appeared to be some misunderstanding as to when the Cubans were told or when the Cubans were not told. Let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, that nobody in the U.S. Government communicated with the Cuban Government or any other government of that nature other than Great Britain prior to the operation being underway.

I would be happy to address further questions on that matter, but I wanted to make the record clear on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LANGHORNE A. MOTLEY

I am pleased to be able to discuss with you and with the members of this distinguished committee the circumstances which led to U.S. participation in the collective security and rescue operation on the island of Grenada last October.

In mid-October, the island of Grenada exploded in violence. On October 19, the Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, who had been under house arrest, was freed by thousands of his supporters. Together they and other members of his cabinet went to Fort Rupert to attempt to free yet another government leader. Shortly thereafter, People's Revolutionary Army troops separated Bishop, three members of his cabinet and two labor leaders from the crowd, brought them into the fort and summarily executed them. The troops at the fort also fired into the crowd, causing as many as 50 casualties.

To put an end to the turmoil and dangers unleashed by these events, combined forces from the United States and seven Caribbean nations landed on Grenada early in the morning of October 25, 1983. U.S. units made up the majority of the landing force and provided virtually all sea and airlift. They were joined by units from Barbados, Jamaica, and five member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (O.E.C.S.).

By October 28, virtually all significant military objectives had been secured, including the two airports, the campuses of the St. Georges University School of Medicine, the Governor General's residence, the radio and power stations, Forts Frederick and Rupert, and the Richmond Hill prison.

Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, rescued from his residence by U.S. troops on October 26, immediately assumed control of the government's administration. On October 28, he broadcast a message of reassurance to the nation, promising establishment of a democratic, interim government until elections could be held.

Final pockets of resistance ended on November 3. The last U.S. combat soldier had departed Grenada by December 15.

U.S. and Caribbean forces tried to minimize the use of lethal force. But the resistance led by Cuban military and construction personnel, which was unnecessary since they were not the targets of the operation and had been guaranteed safe treatment, increased the number of casualties. All told, 45 Grenadians were killed and 337 wounded. U.S. casualties totalled 18 killed in action and 116 wounded. Of the roughly 800 Cubans on Grenada, 24 were killed in action and another 59 wounded.

The reasons for U.S. participation in the collective security and rescue operation make clear that there was no alternative to the President's decision.

I. THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

In a letter dated October 25, advising the Speaker of the House and the President *pro tempore* of the Senate of U.S. participation in the collective security and rescue

operation, President Reagan explained our action in the following words: "Although it is not possible at this time to predict the duration of the temporary presence of the United States Armed Forces in Grenada, our objectives in providing this support are clear. They are to join the OECS collective security forces in assisting the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, and to facilitate the protection and evacuation of United States citizens. Our forces will remain only so long as their presence is required."

In addition to these reasons, there was a third which could not be publicized at the time. Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, who functions as head of state of Grenada, had appealed to Grenada's Caribbean neighbors for assistance in restoring civil order to the island. His request was made through confidential channels, to Prime Minister Adams of Barbados, who informed us. We could not publicly reveal the Governor General's request until his safety had been assured.

We had long been concerned about Grenada and the unstable security situation in the Eastern Caribbean. Inter-agency assessment meetings had reviewed developments in Grenada several times during 1983. Nevertheless, the action of October 25 was an unexpected emergency response to sudden drastic deterioration of conditions on the island.

On October 13, an inter-agency group discussed the growing unrest in Grenada and the possible dangers it might pose to U.S. citizens, of whom roughly one thousand were living or studying in Grenada.

On October 14, after receiving unconfirmed reports of the arrest of Prime Minister Bishop and of other disruption on the island, the State Department began to review the standard evacuation plan for Grenada. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked to review contingency evacuation plans.

On October 17, I chaired a special inter-agency meeting to review all available information and examine preparations for a possible evacuation of U.S. citizens. From that day forward, our planning took place in an interagency forum with representatives of all relevant agencies participating on a daily basis. The President and the Vice President were kept personally informed of all developments.

October 19, the day that Prime Minister Bishop was murdered, marked the beginning of serious planning for the possibility that a non-permissive evacuation—one in which the host government impedes the departure of foreign citizens—would prove necessary. Because a non-permissive evacuation would have required the use of military assets and the securing of military targets on Grenada, the precautionary measure was taken on October 20 to divert toward Grenada some U.S. ships carrying troops to Lebanon. But our primary focus remained on the protection and removal of U.S. citizens from the zone of danger.

Thus, until October 21, although aware of international and regional concern at events in Grenada, we had been planning unilaterally, focusing on the safety of our own citizens. But when we were approached by the member nations of the OECS to assist them to restore peace and security to the Eastern Caribbean, we shifted into a multilateral mode.

On October 22, after receiving confirmation of the OECS request, the President signed orders to prepare for a broader mission to restore order in Grenada in cooperation with Caribbean forces. The widening scope of the crisis was confirmed on October 23 by a special mission to Barbados made by Ambassador McNeil and General Crist and then by the appeal of Governor General Scoon.

Although the contingency plans which included the use of military assets had been triggered as early as October 20, we retained the ability to halt final implementation until the last moment. Planning for a peaceful evacuation continued in parallel with other plans. On October 23, for instance, we explored the possibility of using a Cunard line cruise ship then in the vicinity to evacuate Americans. It became apparent, however, that conditions on the island would not permit evacuation by civilian carrier. (Subsequent information revealed that the same Cunard ship, when it appeared on the horizon off Grenada, was fired at by Grenadian anti-aircraft guns.)

Finally, on the evening of October 24, after informing the British Government and the Congressional leadership that immediate military action was necessary, the President ordered U.S. participation in the operation to proceed. In working with the OECS, we were coordinating with the appropriate regional organization. But our concern for the security of our citizens and for the success of the operation caused us to refrain from informing the O.A.S., the U.N. and our European allies of the decision to take action. And we carefully delayed informing Cuba and the Soviet Union until the next morning so they could not interfere with the success of the operation.

Let me review the key decisions in detail.

A. Safety of U.S. Citizens

First and foremost was our concern for the some one thousand U.S. citizens—mostly students and retired persons—living on Grenada.

Our concern about conditions in Grenada sharpened following Prime Minister Bishop's house arrest. On October 18, we sent Grenada a formal request for assurances of their well-being. As is customary in our dealings with smaller, geographically isolated nations, we did not have an embassy located in Grenada; our relations were handled through our Embassy in nearby Bridgetown.

The operative part of the Grenadian response, received on October 19, read in its entirety, "... the interests of U.S. citizens are in no way threatened by the present situation in Grenada which the Ministry [of External Affairs] hastens to point out is a purely internal matter." This answer contained no assurances, no concrete measures to safeguard foreign residents, just a bland assertion and a blunt slamming of the door.

On October 19, the same day we received the reply to our diplomatic note, our embassy in Bridgetown attempted to send two foreign service officers to Grenada to make an on-the-ground assessment. Their plane was turned back. Not until three days later were U.S. officials permitted to travel to the island.

That same day, October 19, Prime Minister Bishop, three of the members of his cabinet, and numerous civilians were executed in the alarming circumstances I have already described.

Also that day, Ambassador Bish sent a warning to the State Department, by the most urgent means of telecommunication we possess, that the necessity for a sudden evacuation might arise at any time. The State Department provided the Chairman of the Committee with a copy of that message yesterday. I quote: "There appears to be imminent danger to U.S. citizens resident on Grenada due to the current deteriorating situation, which includes reports of rioting, personnel casualties (possibly deaths), automatic weapons being discharged, Soviet-built armored personnel carriers in the Grenadian streets, and some loss of water and electricity on the island. . . . Embassy Bridgetown recommends that the United States should now be prepared to conduct an emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens residing in Grenada."

We stepped up planning for such an evacuation. Embassy Bridgetown redoubled its efforts to monitor developments on Grenada. And on October 20, the next day, U.S. ships carrying troops to Beirut were diverted to assist in the event a non-permissive evacuation proved necessary.

After October 19, our primary task regarding the safety of U.S. citizens was to determine whether the situation on the ground was likely to improve of itself. Without clear indications of a return to civil stability, an evacuation would be prudent.

Evidence of turmoil increased steadily. A 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew was declared. Journalists and other officials of the Bishop regime were jailed. Telephone and telegraph communications to outside the island were closed down. The airport, in spite of official Grenadian denials, remained closed to general commercial traffic. U.S. officials, at last able to reach the island on October 22, unanimously assessed the position of those officials they were able to meet as obstructionist and uncooperative. No coherent government seemed to be functioning or even forming. Conversations of Embassy officers with American citizens indicated that more than 300 wished to leave the island. In short, the potential for violence even greater than that of October 19 was high, with concomitant risk to U.S. citizens. An evacuation, permissive or not, would have been fully justified.

In the event, for reasons I will turn to next, we did not limit our efforts to an evacuation of our citizens. But their safety remained our paramount concern. Evacuation of American citizens on the island began on October 26, one day after initiation of the collective action. During the hostilities, we evacuated some 599 Americans who wished to leave and safely returned them to the U.S. In addition, we also evacuated on official U.S. aircraft, or assisted in the voluntary evacuation of, citizens of Canada, the United Kingdom, East Germany, and other nations. The testimony of those evacuees overwhelmingly supports our actions.

B. The OECS Request

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is a regional association which, under its establishing treaty, has responsibility for regional security. In a meeting on October 21 in Barbados, the OECS resolved unanimously that the deterioration of conditions in Grenada required action under the treaty. (Grenada, without an apparent government, was not invited to participate.) Five members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Montserrat, and Dominica, participated in the collective security

and rescue operation. Newly independent St. Christopher and Nevis did not have appropriate security forces immediately available; they sent support units later on.

Because of their inability to confront the military strength of Grenada alone, on October 21 the OECS nations requested assistance from the U.S., Jamaica and Barbados. Their formal request to us, transmitted on October 23, cited: "the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada."

The OECS states viewed the breakdown of civil order in Grenada and the island's movement toward still more violent and undisciplined behavior to be an imminent threat to regional security. They were aware of the rapid military buildup which had been taking place under the Bishop regime. This assessment by the OECS was amply borne out.

Our forces found Grenadian agreements with Cuba, the Soviet Union and other communist countries which promised to furnish enough military supplies to provision a force of 10,000 men, including some 10,000 automatic rifles, more than 4,500 submachine and machine guns, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, howitzers, other field guns and cannon, armored vehicles and coastal patrol boats. The nations of the OECS together possessed defense forces totalling fewer than 500 men, with no heavy weaponry.

C. The Governor General's Request

Our collective resolve to protect the security of the Eastern Caribbean democracies and restore stability to the region received additional stimulus when we received the appeal from Governor General Scoon to assist him in stabilizing the situation in Grenada.

Reflecting its British heritage, Grenada recognizes Queen Elizabeth as its head of state and her representative, the governor general, as her legal surrogate. Sir Paul Scoon was named by the Queen in 1978. The role of the governor general was specified in the constitution of 1974 which governed Grenada when it became independent. When Prime Minister Bishop suspended that constitution in 1979, he explicitly reaffirmed that role. Thus, the legal status of the governor general has been continuous, dating from Grenada's pre-independence days to the present. The Bishop regime did attempt, however, to circumscribe the governor general's activities. The minutes of the New Jewel Movement Political Bureau meeting on April 20, 1983, report a decision that the governor general "cannot contradict the Government's line," and that "periodic sessions should be held with him so that he would be in line."

From all reports, the Governor General had grown increasingly concerned at the situation on Grenada, especially following the arrest and subsequent murder of Prime Minister Bishop.

On October 24, Prime Minister Adams of Barbados informed us that he had received a confidential appeal from the Governor General for assistance to restore order on the island. On October 27, after the Governor General had been rescued by our forces, we received a copy of a letter, from him to Prime Minister Adams, dated October 24 confirming his request. It read, in part, "I am . . . seriously concerned over the lack of internal security in Grenada. . . . I am requesting your help to assist me in stabilising this grave and dangerous situation. It is my desire that a peace-keeping force should be established in Grenada. . . . In this connection I am also seeking assistance from the United States, from Jamaica, and from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States . . . in the spirit of the treaty establishing that organization to which my country is a signatory."

The entire text, already released by the Government of Barbados, was included in the package sent to this Committee yesterday.

On October 28, the Governor General broadcast a radio message to the population of the island reassuring them that the crisis was almost over and noting: "The people of Grenada . . . have welcomed the presence of the troops (of the U.S./Caribbean security force) as a positive and decisive step forward in the restoration not only of peace and order but also of full sovereignty."

II. CONCLUSION

By any standard, the collective security and rescue operation in Grenada was a success. American citizens were protected. American interests were preserved. The island democracies of the region are safer today than they were three months ago. And the people of Grenada have spoken clearly of their happiness and relief at the restoration of legitimate, humane, democratic government.

Grenadian views have just been reconfirmed by the first scientifically-structured public opinion survey conducted in Grenada since the operation—a poll taken during the last week of December and the first week of January by St. Augustine Research Associates of Trinidad and Tobago. As reported in the January 20 edition of the Barbados newspaper, NATION, 86 percent of Grenadians queried agreed that the multi-national operation was “a good thing.” In the end, the big winners have been the people of Grenada.

We will continue to work with our friends of the Eastern Caribbean. The President's Caribbean Basin Initiative exemplifies the importance we attach to the region and to our neighbors in this hemisphere. In the Eastern Caribbean, at least, the future looks good.

Thank you.

ANNEX

STATEMENTS BY U.S. STUDENTS AND FACULTY

“I fully support President Reagan's move. . . . He really did save our lives. . . .”
Student Grace Brooke, quoted in *The Washington Post*, October 27.

“I spoke with a lot of Grenadians and asked if they had faith in the government. They said they were afraid of it. I don't see how [the U.S. Government] could have gotten us out [any other way].”

Student Randall Tressler, quoted in *The New York Times*, October 28.

“We the students of St. Georges University School of Medicine at Kingstown Medical College, St. Vincent, would like to express our appreciation of your concern for the safety of our fellow students in Grenada. . . . Having spent the past two years in Grenada and being in almost daily contact with American students there during the recent unrest, we support your decision. . . .”

Letter from 65 students to President Reagan, October 27.

“Now that I have a fuller assessment of the situation that existed in Grenada over the past week—that the control of the military council was not as I had thought . . . that the military authorities were in fact making it virtually impossible for me to accomplish getting aircraft on the island to get you off safely. . . . There is no question, in conclusion, that your safety could not be guaranteed and the action of the President did have a sound basis regarding that issue.”

Statement by Charles Modica, Chancellor of the St. Georges University School of Medicine, to evacuated U.S. students, October 26.

The CHAIRMAN, Thank you.

The next witness is Adm. Wesley McDonald, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WESLEY McDONALD, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Admiral McDONALD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure for me to appear before the committee this morning to review the recent military operation which was code named “Urgent Fury,” which was conducted by U.S. Forces and the Caribbean Peace Force on the island of Grenada.

Accompanying me today is Vice Adm. Joseph Metcalf, who is serving as the commander, U.S. Second Fleet and who, as commander Joint Task Force 120, was initially the on-scene commander, of the entire operation.

Also with me is Maj. Gen. Edward L. Trobaugh. Major General Trobaugh is the commanding general of the 82d Airborne Division and was commander of the ground forces in Grenada. He relieved Vice Admiral Metcalf as on-scene commander when Vice Admiral Metcalf returned to his duties in Norfolk.

I would like to very briefly present an overview of the operation. A classified statement has been submitted which I can discuss in detail with the members in closed session.

Grenada is within the geographic area of responsibility assigned to the commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command.

We had been very interested in developments on the island because of the Soviet and Cuban involvement in general and particularly because of the airfield development project which was taking place on the southern end of the island.

The nearly 10,000-foot runway seemed to far exceed the requirement to support the small tourist industry on the island, which the Grenadian Government claimed to be its purpose.

That airfield is strategically located and capable of handling aircraft which could be used to support Cuban resupply of thousands of its troops overseas, as a fueling base for aircraft transporting military supplies to Central America, or an an operating base for tactical aircraft which could threaten our vital sealanes of communications in the Caribbean.

We started preliminary planning for the evacuation of U.S. citizens after Prime Minister Bishop was arrested on October 13, 1983.

Detailed planning did not commence, however, until after he was killed on October 19. Our plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 23d and the operation began on October 25, so you can see that the planning time was indeed very compressed.

It was fortunate that the U.S.S. *Independence* carrier group and the amphibious ready group, containing a marine phibious unit, were at sea en route to the Mediterranean.

I diverted them toward Grenada on the 20th before we knew that the plan would be executed.

The execution closely followed the plan and began predawn on the 25th to seize and secure the airfield at Port Salines and key targets in the St. Georges area.

Determined opposition was encountered from the People's Revolutionary Army, or the PRA, and Cuban forces.

Simultaneously, the marine amphibious unit conducted a helicopter borne assault against Pearls Airfield in the northeast against less intense opposition.

Later in the day 82d Airborne Forces began arriving. By the end of the day, U.S. Forces and the Caribbean Peace Force were lodged securely in Grenada and the buildup of forces was adequate to assure success.

During this first day of operations, 250 Cubans were captured. Most importantly, 130 grateful U.S. citizens were rescued by U.S. troops at the True Blue Campus of the medical college.

Additional U.S. citizens were located at the Grand Anse Campus on the west coast of the island just south of St. Georges and evacuation operations for these civilians were planned for the next day.

During the night of the 25th, the amphibious force, having received very little opposition in its assigned area, was moved around the northern tip of the island to the western side where a surface assault was conducted at Grand Mal Beach, a few miles north of St. Georges.

This movement placed this force in position to participate in operations in the St. Georges area the next day.

Operations on the second day consolidated positions at the Port Salines Airfield, rescued the American civilians at the Grand Anse Campus, and completed the relief operations at the Governor General's residence, as well as neutralizing the opposition at Fort Frederick which has been present the previous day.

By the end of the fourth day, organized resistance ended.

On the 1st of November, Task Force 124, the marine amphibious unit, conducted amphibious operations on Carriacou Island, north of Grenada, where PRA forces had been indicated. No resistance was encountered.

Hostilities ended on the second day of November. Commander joint task force 120 was disestablished, and the naval and marine forces which had been diverted to support the operation, resumed their journey to the Mediterranean 8 days after the operation commenced.

With the disestablishment of Joint Task Force 120, COMUSFOR-GRENADA assumed command of all U.S. Forces in Grenada. He conducted operations in cooperation with the Caribbean Peace Force to locate and secure arms caches around the island and to neutralize any remaining pockets of resistance.

The objective of his operations was to turn security responsibilities on the island over to the Caribbean Peace Force and to reduce the U.S. Forces presence in Grenada as rapidly as possible; of course, consistent with the maintenance of peace and stability.

The largest number of U.S. Forces present on the island at any one time during the intervention was approximately 6,500.

Commander U.S. Forces Grenada completed his assignment on December 15, when his organization was disestablished and he was replaced by Commander U.S. Military Support Element Grenada.

This much smaller command, consisting of about 300 U.S. Forces, was organized around a military police company whose mission is to support the Caribbean Peace Force.

In summary, history should reflect that the operation was a complete success. All phases of the assigned mission were accomplished. U.S. citizens were protected and evacuated. The opposing forces were neutralized. The situation stabilized with no additional Cuban intervention, and a lawful, democratic government is being restored.

U.S. students are returning to resume their studies at the medical school.

Of course, as Dr. Ikle has said, there were costs. The fiscal price tag is still being documented. Seven helicopters were destroyed and 11 others damaged. As in any armed conflict, the greatest cost was in human lives, but we did meet the objective of keeping casualties on both sides to a very low minimum.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. We stand ready for your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. WESLEY L. McDONALD

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you to review the recent military operation, codenamed "Urgent Fury", conducted by U.S. forces and the Caribbean Peace Force on the island of Grenada. Accompany-

ing me today is Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, who is serving as the Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and who, as Commander Joint Task Force 120, was initially the on scene commander of the entire operation, and Major General Edward L. Trobaugh. Major General Trobaugh is the commanding general of the 82d Airborne Division and was commander of the ground forces in Grenada, relieving Vice Admiral Metcalf as on scene commander when VAdm. Metcalf returned to his duties in Norfolk.

I would like to very briefly present an overview of the operation. A classified statement has been submitted which I can discuss in detail in closed session.

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We started preliminary planning for the evacuation of U.S. citizens after Prime Minister Bishop was arrested on 13 October 1983. Detailed planning did not commence, however, until after he was killed on 19 October. Our plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the operation began on 25 October—so you can see that the planning time was very compressed.

It was fortunate that the U.S.S. *Independence* carrier battle group and the amphibious ready group, containing a Marine amphibious unit, were at sea enroute to the Mediterranean. I diverted them toward Grenada on the 20th, before we knew that the plan would be executed.

The execution closely followed the plan and began pre dawn on the 25th to seize and secure the airfield at Pt. Salines and key targets in the St. Georges area. Determined opposition was encountered from People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) and Cuban forces. Simultaneously, the Marine amphibious unit conducted a helicopter borne assault against Pearls Airfield in the northeast against less intense opposition. Later in the day 82d Airborne forces began arriving. By the end of the day U.S. forces and the Caribbean Peace Force were lodged securely in Grenada and the buildup of forces was adequate to assure success. During this first day of operations, 250 Cubans were captured. 130 grateful U.S. citizens were rescued by U.S. troops at the True Blue campus of the medical college. Additional U.S. citizens were located at the Grand Anse campus on the west coast of the island just south of St. Georges, and evacuation operations for these civilians were planned for the next day. During the night of the 25th, the amphibious force, having received very little opposition in its assigned area, was moved around the northern tip of the island to the western side where a surface assault at Grand Mal Beach, a few miles north of St. Georges, was conducted. This movement placed this force in position to participate in operations in the St. Georges area the next day. Operations on the second day consolidated positions at the Pt. Salines Airfield, rescued the American civilians at the Grand Anse campus, and completed the relief operations at the governor general's residence, as well as neutralizing the opposition at Fort Frederick which had been present the previous day. By the end of fourth day, organized resistance ended.

On the first of November, TF 124 conducted amphibious operations on Carriacou Island, North of Grenada, where PRA forces had been indicated. No resistance was encountered.

Hostilities ended on the 2nd of November, CJTF 120 was disestablished, and the naval and marine forces, which had been diverted to support the operation, resumed their journey to the Mediterranean, eight days after the operation commenced. With the disestablishment of Joint Task Force 120, COMUSFORGRENADA assumed command of all U.S. forces in Grenada. He conducted operations in cooperation with the Caribbean Peace Force to locate and secure arms caches around the island and to neutralize any remaining pockets of resistance. The objective of his operations was to turn security responsibilities on the island over to the Caribbean Peace Force and to reduce the U.S. force presence in Grenada as rapidly as possible, consistent with the maintenance of peace and stability. The largest number of U.S. forces present on the island at any one time during the intervention was approximately 6,500.

COMUSFORGRENADA completed his assignment on 15 December, when his organization was disestablished and he was replaced by commander U.S. military sup-

port element Grenada. This much smaller command, consisting of about 300 U.S. forces, was organized around a military police company whose mission is to support the Caribbean Peace Force.

In summary, history should reflect that the operation was a complete success. All phases of the assigned mission were accomplished. U.S. citizens were protected and evacuated. The opposing forces were neutralized. The situation stabilized with no additional Cuban intervention, and a lawful, democratic government is being restored. U.S. students are returning to resume their studies at the medical school.

Of course, there were costs. The fiscal price tag is still being documented. Seven helicopters were destroyed and eleven others damaged. As in any armed conflict, the greatest cost was in human lives. But we did meet the objective of keeping casualties on both sides to a minimum.

We are ready to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. It is my understanding that the committee specifically requested of the witnesses that they comment on lessons learned. Staff tells me that the portion of the presentation addressed to what we learned, both what we learned good and bad, is in the classified session.

I wonder when the Chair would like to go into classified session because the most important part will be classified, I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would be in a position to do that at any time any member so wishes.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, before we---

The CHAIRMAN. Would you yield to the gentleman from Mississippi?

Mr. DICKINSON. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I would like to request by unanimous consent I be recorded aye for going into executive or closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Chair then at this time to declare us in executive session so that we might go into classified portions of the presentations this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the previous authority given by recorded vote to the Chair, I declare the committee in executive session.

Those who are not qualified to receive classified information must leave the room.

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the committee proceeded in executive session.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, are all the remaining people in the room with your group?

The Chair will reserve Mr. Dickinson's time until he gets back.

Admiral McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for the delay in setting the prop up. The reason we had that covered during the unclassified session is the source from which it was [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. My feeling about this hearing is somewhat like that expressed by Mr. Stratton in that time since we do have a resolution, although we are not specifically addressing it here, it might be well—do you have a copy of this?

Mr. IKLE. We have the resolution, sir.

Mr. BENNETT. That you sort of go through it and address the paragraphs so we will have the background information even

though we repeat it later on. This has been organized in the best way, I guess by those people who are critical, wanted to organize it. Therefore, I think it would be productive if we follow it.

The first question was they want to have information about the security of those people that—the American people that were there.

Now, you addressed that somewhat, but maybe at this point you might be able to give us a little bit more information about the reality of the fact that there was danger to the people who were there.

That seems to be the first issue that is struck on page 1 and page 2 of this resolution.

Mr. IKLE. We have submitted, Mr. Bennett, the detailed answers for the record. We have already submitted these for all of the questions of the resolution.

As you stated, in our opening statements we covered some of the key questions briefly.

Now we could, of course, go through the questions one by one and give answers here that we have submitted for the record, or we could just briefly answer questions that you might have—whatever you prefer.

Mr. BENNETT. I guess the one I really have is the one I addressed earlier on in the meeting. I would like to have you spell out why you feel it was necessary not to address this matter to Congress, because just because we did not declare a war in Korea, which was a U.N. action, and was covered by legislation previously passed, and just because we didn't have a paper with a blue ribbon on it, we in fact passed a Gulf of Tonkin resolution which any member of the Supreme Court, I think, would declare to be a declaration of war. It very clearly says that the Commander in Chief can use troops any way he wants to for the purposes set out in that resolution.

So to say that is not a declaration of war seems to me to be saying something I don't understand because there is no particular language required to have a declaration of war, but the Constitution does say that Congress is the group that is supposed to declare war, and I just think for all our purposes we ought to look at this to see whether we are in a position now where that has become archaic, and we are just glossing that over.

I have grave concern about going to war without having the elected officials of the country make that determination.

Mr. IKLE. Mr. Bennett, let me try to add to my earlier remarks, and then Secretary Motley may want to make additional points.

We were guided in our actions toward Congress by the War Powers Act. Even though there is, as you know, a question about the constitutionality of that act, like previous administrations, we sought to not enter into the questions of the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, but to see whether it would be possible without answering that question yes or no to comply with the act.

We carefully followed, as our lawyers analyzed the implications of the act, for the rescue mission in Grenada, and I think by all we did in informing Congress and keeping Congress informed afterward, and the duration of the operation, we did comply with that act.

Mr. BENNETT. Are you saying that regardless of whether or not it might have been constitutional or nonconstitutional to have done this, if there wasn't a War Powers Act, now having passed a War Powers Act, you look at that act and that is an act of Congress, and it tells you what you can and cannot do, the executive can or cannot do, and that that act gave substance to the idea that the President could move in military personnel regardless of whether the Constitution originally gave that solely to Congress.

Is that what you are saying?

Mr. IKLE. Yes. Let me put it differently. That the War Powers Act in a way gives a more detailed interpretation than the Constitution as to what period and at what stage and what magnitude of combat operations Congress ought to be involved, and how it ought to be involved.

Mr. BENNETT. I believe that is the only question I have. I think that the military people did a wonderful job in their performance. It was a very spectacular success for the military.

I want to congratulate them on it.

I did have that intellectual problem as a former lawyer, and I think it may well be that the passage of the War Powers Act gave powers to the President which he might not have had if we hadn't passed that law. That is the reason I voted against it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. MOTLEY. Mr. Chairman, just to be responsive to Mr. Bennett, tab 6 is what we provided for the committee, the legal basis; but this does not necessarily directly address your question with regard to the consultation with Congress; it just provides the legal basis for the action.

Let me just add to that, there was an overwhelming sense of urgency in that compressed period of time. We were dealing with obviously what was tantamount, the safety of U.S. citizens.

We were dealing with an unknown government; we didn't know if there was a government per se, and as this time was compressed, initially we looked at a surgical type action, and then a decision was made, properly so by the military, that the situation was such that you could not have a surgical action per se.

So the operation became more expanded and then the President made the final decision on Monday night at approximately 1800 hours, and the leadership of the Congress at that time was informed shortly after that of the President's decision.

But I think the time compression factor, was one of the guiding ones.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am anxious to get into the general's presentation here.

I would just like to observe that throughout the history of this country we have inserted troops without a declaration of war from the shores of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli.

I was almost right.

Eisenhower put troops in Lebanon. President Johnson put troops in the Dominican Republic. There is nothing unusual about that. You don't have to declare war, the country doesn't, and hasn't—over 200 years every time they have to go in and protect American citizens.

I think whatever justification was necessary was certainly present at that time.

Secretary Ikle, in your statement you said, "It was decided" in dealing with the President, about the press not go in initially, and let me say I applaud the decision.

I think it is ridiculous for the press to run this country, to run military operations, and to make military decisions or political decisions. Nobody elected them. One of the nicest things, warmest glows I got out of the whole thing was to see Dan Rather squirming and squawking. He felt that the press had been ignored. I think we in the Government and in the military tend to overreact every time the press frowns. I think you should make it more clear who made the decision.

It was Admiral Watkins made the decision, as I recall.

Would you like to comment on that? It was not the President. He left it up to the military. At least that is what he told us.

Would somebody comment on that?

Mr. IKLE. It was done in the senior group involving State, Office of Secretary of Defense and the chairman's office, and then the recommendation was approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, and I believe the Secretary of State.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thought I remembered seeing the admiral on television saying it was his decision.

Mr. MOTLEY. Mr. Dickinson, I think there is an element in both of these. The original decision, when the senior members of the Government, including the President, were briefed on an action time line. Included in that was the recommendation that for the initial part of the operations the press, for security reasons, not be included in military transport.

It was left to a certain degree to the latitude of the on-scene commander to decide when it was safe for them to come in, but the decision was a conscious one on the part of the senior members of the Government, limited to the initial part of the operation.

Mr. DICKINSON. I want to make a point—if it is a fact. It was not a political decision.

Mr. MOTLEY. No, sir.

Mr. DICKINSON. It was a military decision. The President didn't make the decision. Those in charge of the operations made the decision. Is that right?

Mr. MOTLEY. That is correct. Based on the military aspects of security, the recommendation was made that the operation of the action would go along in that direction; that is correct.

Mr. DICKINSON. All right. Well, I still want to hear from the general.

No marines present here today? The marines are represented by the Navy?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir, the marine task force commander is represented by Vice Admiral Metcalf, the on-scene commander in charge.

General Trobaugh is here because he was the ground force commander when he relieved Admiral Metcalf as on-scene commander.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. I don't have any specific questions, Mr. Chairman, but I do want to underscore what I said earlier.

I think General Trobaugh has given to the members of the Speaker's committee a detailed explanation of what was involved in the rescue of the medical students, and that I think ought to be understood by everybody, that this was not just a joke.

In fact, the consular officers from Barbados who testified before our group indicated that the students were in a state of panic and individual accounts also underscored the fact that they were hunkered down in a number of houses, mattresses against the windows, in an effort to prevent being hit by the fire that was going on in various areas. And to suggest that, as Professor Schlesinger suggested in the Wall Street Journal, that the only danger to the American students was from the invasion is a total falsehood, total distortion of what went on.

I think that the critique of the operation as focused by those who have been critical on the fact that nobody was in danger—but that certainly was not the case. I don't know whether the submissions that have been made to the committee staff would bear that out. If not, I think it would be helpful if General Trobaugh outlined just briefly some of the steps that the Rangers had to take, including going in with helicopters, one of which was shot down and the hulk of that helicopter is still embedded in the beach, I think.

Admiral McDONALD. They are not covered in detail, Mr. Stratton.

With your permission, General Trobaugh will discuss that if the committee is interested.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. EDWARD TROBAUGH, COMMANDING GENERAL, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION, U.S. ARMY

General TROBAUGH. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to step to that board. I think it will help in the explanation.

I think probably the first thing in regard to the rescue of the students that we were really concerned with that evolved over the first 3 days was that students were located in three areas that we could identify and then there were sort of what I would call stragglers.

We really did not know where they were. In fact, the stragglers, they sort of collected and were in fact moved out of the area by the marines down to us.

But initially the first day of the operation, we knew that students were located at True Blue Campus, which is about 75 meters off the end of the runway at Port Salines Airfield.

So the first group was at that location, and there was some intensive fighting down there. The Rangers initially jumped on to Port Salines Airfield, as you know, and moved out to the northeast and encountered Cuban forces down in the vicinity of True Blue Campus. In fact, the fighting was going on between Cuban forces, PRA forces, and the initial Ranger contingent just to the east of the campus when the 82d Airborne Division arrived on scene.

Within 1 hour after we were on the ground, my first rifle company had married up with the Rangers at that location, assisted in repelling a Cuban counterattack during which two VTR 60's, which

is a light Soviet armored car, were knocked out, and at that time the students at True Blue really and truly were secure.

We knew we had the students at True Blue under our control. It was late in the day.

We opted not to move them out that night under darkness simply because we still had some Cuban forces, about 400 meters from the terminal at Port Salines located about here. So, really, we had Cuban forces at that point, and other Cuban forces at about this location, all of whom had been in contact with the Rangers during the day.

We secured those students that night, and, in fact the final count that we carried out of there the next morning was 138 American students.

We learned that night because the students informed the U.S. Forces, that over at Grand Anse Campus, which was another part of the medical school, there were reported to be 180 American students over there. In true American innovative fashion, one of the Ranger officers picked up the telephone and dialed the campus and a student picked it up and we confirmed, yes, they really were there. So we established communication with them over the commercial telephone lines. By using that means, we were able then to determine what the situation was, direct them to move to specific areas in the campus and informed them that we were going to come over and evacuate them out.

The next day, at 1100 hours, I received a mission to secure and evacuate the students from the Grand Anse Campus, which although it very much resembles a motel type arrangement, on the beach, clearly a medical school. The students had assembled in the building nearest the water, and the beach at that point is about 25 meters wide. They were, in fact, in one room nearest the exit to the waterside, and we told them, and they had complied, to put up mattresses at each of the windows, to protect themselves from fragments. We had an intelligence report that there were three anti-aircraft weapons in the vicinity, that PRA were digging in, and fortunately they were digging in to face inland, in this direction. At that point in time I had moved a battalion up to this location, and I really believed they thought that we were going to rescue the students from the landward side.

It was a very good operation. We used Air Force AC-130 gunships, U.S. Marine helicopters, to include Marine Cobra helicopters. We used 82d Division artillery, which was located down on Port Salines Airfield and able to fire in that location.

We also used Navy A-7 attack fighters. We tied all that together, and in a 26-minute operation from the time the first helicopter landed until the last one took off we had evacuated 224 American students back to Port Salines Airfield. None of the students were injured in the operation.

As the admiral stated, we did lose one helicopter. The beach was narrow, and he took some ground fire, and had a blade strike and, of course, the helicopter went down right at the water's edge. A little bit of humor in that. We told the Rangers ahead of time if they got in trouble we were not really going to worry about them because I knew I could get a battalion down there and take care of the Rangers. That wasn't any problem.

So the Rangers in good Ranger fashion jumped out of the helicopter and immediately disappeared into the jungle right there at the school. And the marine crew calmly got off and walked over to another helicopter and were immediately evacuated back out to the carrier.

So what we really had at the end of 26 minutes was 11 Rangers on the ground, we knew they were there, 2 of them had a couple of band-aid wounds, and they laid low that night, found a boat along the island there and rowed on out to sea and Admiral Metcalf's navy picked them up.

So by the next morning we thought we had all of them. That accounted for 138 on day 1 at True Blue, 224 on day 2 over at Grand Anse. Then we learned from the students that we also had students living out on these peninsulas along in these areas right here, along the major roads. I had forces by that time moving in this direction, and it became a question of literally going down each of the peninsulas.

We had portable public address systems so we could talk to them, tell them what we wanted to do. And basically that was stay low, and we will move on through and uncover you, and then come on out.

So on day 3 we picked up an additional 200 and some students in that fashion, and concurrently the marines up in this vicinity had also some students reporting to them. That was some 35 people as I recall.

Once we linked all this up we transported them down to Port Salines. In sum, we moved 595 students out over that 3-day period. And that pretty well accounted for them. I believe that is, sir, unless you have any other questions.

Mr. STRATTON. Admiral, as I remember, there was a story, as you indicated, a lot of the students didn't live on the campus, they were living in individual homes. And that when the Rangers first moved in, they actually utilized the telephone lines in the True Blue Campus and in some cases called back to the States the parents of the students to find out where they were living. And then they called the locations where they were living and brought them in as you indicated to the True Blue campus.

General TROBAUGH. Sir, that was generally down along these areas in the peninsula here. That is true. There were students that then came in on their own, on foot, after the Cuban and PRA forces had moved out of the area. They knew where to come and assemble. It was a pretty simple process.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes Mr. Hopkins for a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. HOPKINS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to be recorded as voting "aye" on going into executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. DICKINSON. I want to ask a followup question.

General, last year this committee and others approved the purchase of, I believe, two C-130's to be made into gunships. This was not given any publicity, which is what we wanted. We are in executive session now anyway. These were to be assigned to the Special Forces. Were these the ships that you were talking about using

down there, that were able to suppress fire and keep the Cubans buttoned up. Could you discuss that.

It is so seldom we actually see the results of the actions of this committee. And it was this committee that kept it in conference, for that matter. If you would comment on that and how effective they were.

General TROBAUGH. Sir, I could not be quoted as saying those were the specific two gunships. But those two do have some very fine both day, night, and foul weather capability, to include a 105-millimeter gun mounted on that platform. And it was one that in the early stages gave us a 24-hour capability. In fact, we kept one of those birds on station all the time for approximately the first 4 days that we were there. But I don't know that specifically it was those two.

Mr. DICKINSON. Were those two assigned to the Rangers? Special Forces? Are they just regular Air Force ships that you borrowed?

Admiral METCALF. Well, it is difficult to say—they were assigned to the operation, and they were under my general control and I assigned them as they were required, and I assigned them to the 82d and the Rangers. They were very effective. Very fine weapon system.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Whitehurst.

Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, you have heard, or read I guess, in the press about the lack of intelligence, good intelligence, using British roadmaps and these kinds of things, tourist maps. Could you comment on whether or not you considered the intelligence that you received sufficient.

Admiral McDONALD. Let me start that if I may, and then I will turn it over to the on-scene commanders.

We had basic intelligence sufficient to start the noncombat evacuation operation. We knew the buildup that was taking place in Grenada, as far as the runway and the support facilities were concerned. We knew about how many Cubans were there. I think the estimate was about 600. We knew about the number of People's Revolutionary Army which was estimated to be about 1,200. That turned out to be a reasonable figure.

And so in a general overall sense the national intelligence agencies provided us with an adequate overview of Grenada [delete].

The operation was very time compressed, as everyone has testified here this morning. And so from that standpoint, we were lacking. But I do not want to cast an aspersion on or decry the inadequacy of the intelligence. Basically, given what the collection sources were and the timeframe we were operating in, the intelligence was adequate to plan the operation.

You are exactly right. The Army, particularly the troops on the ground, were operating initially from roadmaps or other types of maps which made it very difficult for them to determine in their grid coordinates. That is one of the lessons learned, Congressman Stratton [delete].

Let me turn it over to General Trobaugh or Admiral Metcalf.

Admiral METCALF. You know, the on-scene commander never has enough intelligence. It is one of the propensities of the profession. It is the area where the amount of resistance—particularly in that first 4 or 5 hours, the amount of resistance in St. Georges, which was obviously being coordinated from one central site, which turned out to be Fort Frederick, that surprised us.

Furthermore, it also appears that in the day before, immediately preceding the operation, that a very smart military officer had organized defenses around Salines and other places we didn't know about. But those are the breaks of Navy Air as they say. We would like to have had it better. But that is what we went for. [delete]. Ed and I got together yesterday on this thing and we both compared notes on what we are doing about it at our levels to make sure we are ready to go if we have a problem in that area again. It is a serious lesson learned. It is one of the ones we are working on.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Daniel.

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

While you are on that subject, address the quality of the Cubans there. The press reports have said they were construction workers. Others have said they were trained troops.

Who did you confront down there?

Admiral McDONALD. Again, intelligence sources indicated there were about 600 construction workers, Mr. Daniel, who were possibly trained quasi-military personnel. We found in the barracks that General Trobaugh's troops overran that they really were organized construction workers. They had gunracks assigned to them: there were platoon organizations, and I believe there were rifles beside each of the cots, and that type of thing. I think General Trobaugh might add to that.

General TROBAUGH. Sir, I would pick up on that. That is exactly right. In the barracks area that the Cuban airfield workers lived in immediately above Port Salines Airfield, that was about 250 meters away, they did have a small, I would say arms room at the end of each of the buildings, and they had constructed wooden racks where the AK would fit, and had a roster above it with their name and the number of the weapon so—it looked like one of our arms rooms.

It just wasn't as secured and organized as ours are. And in respect to how well trained they were, I think you can best determine how well trained and disciplined a unit is when in a firefight if you are attacking frontally and supporting from the flanks, which we like to do, because it brings a lot more fire to bear, if you find out he is trying to suppress your supporting fire at the same time he is trying to take on your frontal attack, you have a soldier that pretty well knows what he is doing.

And we experienced that the second morning we were there. I personally talked to my battalion and company commanders on the ground, and that is precisely what they did. They knew what they were doing.

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you.

One other question, Mr. Chairman. I would like to address this to both the operational officers, Admiral Metcalf and to General Trobaugh.

To what do you attribute the success of this operation as opposed to some of the fiascos we have been involved in in recent years?

Admiral METCALF. Well, I haven't been involved in some of those others.

Mr. DANIEL. I withdraw the last part of the statement. To what do you attribute the success of this operation.

Admiral METCALF. One thing, we kept it simple. When we put the plan together, we had the various combat elements fighting as they trained to fight. The 82d operated as they operate, and the Marines did their thing the way they do things, and the Air Force did theirs.

Furthermore, I was in charge. There wasn't any doubt about who was involved. I was getting very little guidance from Admiral McDonald. I felt that I had the responsibility. I felt that I could tell the various command elements, whether it was the Army, Air Force or anybody else, what I wanted to do. I stayed out of the "how" just like my seniors stayed out of the "how" with me.

They told me what they wanted me to do. They gave me guidelines, very general. I went down there and we had no mucking around from on high.

I felt a very real responsibility to keep people advised up the line, and we did that in a very, very deliberate fashion. It was really an operation in which there was a clear military mission. I understood that and so did Ed, we just went out and used the force that was necessary to carry on.

I really think that had as much to do with it as anything else.

Mr. DANIEL. General, would you comment on it, including the command structure.

General TROBAUGH. I am sorry, sir.

Mr. DANIEL. Including the command structure, the question asked by the lady from Colorado.

General TROBAUGH. Let me start with the command structure as I saw it, because I reported directly to Admiral Metcalf. I really wasn't concerned about what Admiral McDonald was telling him. When he told me what he wanted done, that was a clearcut mission. And so on the ground we really had from day 1 the Ranger organization commanded by an Army two star, the 82d commanded by an Army two star, and the marines commanded by the normal marine amphibious group commander, all reporting directly to Admiral Metcalf, so there wasn't any problem as to who was in charge down there.

And we had sufficient support assets, either afloat or en route from the United States in order to make all that happen. So the command structure was very, very clear, as Admiral Metcalf said, it was very, very simple. Of course within our own organization we simply went in the way we trained every day, as did the marines. So that even made it simpler. We only had to cut boundaries which ensured that I did not fire into the marine area, and they didn't fire into my area without coordinating it.

And that is the most simple way of coordinating fires that I know.

So I think organizationally it was a very simple way to operate.

I guess I would say there are about two or maybe three other things that I thought were key.

First, the rules of engagement were very simple. We knew that we were to use the minimum force to accomplish the mission. On the other hand, we knew also that we were to accept minimum casualties to accomplish the mission. And that is not a dichotomy. That really gave me the authority to do what I saw necessary in order to accomplish that mission without losing American lives.

The next thing we were told is create the very minimum disruption in the economy down there, because ultimately we wanted to restore stability. So we did that as we went along. So the rules of engagement were very clear, and they were understood well by the soldiers.

I think two other things. I think the fact that we had the ability—I don't want to use the term—I won't even mention it—we were able to continue to put forces in there as we saw it on the ground to meet the requirement was, and that had to be a demoralizing influence in my view for the Cuban who could not go anywhere. He had no way of getting out of there. About every 50 minutes a 141 landed, and in between those C-130's would land, and it was very clear to anyone around we were putting forces on the ground to get that job done as rapidly as we could.

I think finally I would just highlight the fact, as I highlighted in the Ranger raid on Grand Anse, the ability of the services to come together and in very short order get the planning done that is required among services, using all the assets available, in order to accomplish a mission.

You know, when you consider we had really 4 hours—I am sorry—5 hours less 45 minutes from the time we were notified until we had 224 students out of there, and we used every service, I think it is a testimony to the joint training that we are trying to do in the services.

The CHAIRMAN, The Chair recognizes Mr. Kasich for a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent I be recorded as voting "aye" in moving into executive session.

The CHAIRMAN, Without objection.

The Chair will declare a recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN, The committee will be in order.

This afternoon, the committee continues its hearing on the lessons learned in Grenada. The Chair recognizes Mrs. Holt.

Mrs. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Ikle, it bothers me that we don't have the kind of intelligence that it seems we could have had in a situation such as Grenada. I remember 4 or 5 years ago being in Panama and General Nutting telling us this was one of the really serious shortcomings that we had, our lack of intelligence in that part of the world.

I remember when Mr. Casey came before the committee 3 years ago, he acknowledged the fact that we had done a lot of things to diminish our intelligence-gathering capability and that it was going to take time.

You couldn't do it overnight. [Deleted.]

Are we doing anything to try to improve that kind of intelligence gathering?

Mr. IKLE. This is a very important question, Mrs. Holt. As you said, our capability for human intelligence has been permitted to deteriorate during the last decade and Director Casey has made a strong effort to rebuild it, which, as you indicated, takes time to get the right kind of people.

We probably could have marshaled more resources over a half-year or so on Grenada, but that would have meant taking people away from other important places—[deleted] what have you.

Focusing on Grenada, while you are right, it was important for the long run, we couldn't anticipate the crisis until the few days when it became full-blown.

Mrs. HOLT. [Deleted.]

Mr. IKLE. The story is a question of whether the glass is half-empty or half-full. We knew a great deal. We knew where the Governor General was. We could find our students. We knew the main threats to our people.

We had a pretty good intelligence on what was going on in the Bishop government, as it fell apart, and we had information, certain information [deleted]. The maps could have been produced but they would have taken time, longer than we had for a few days to prepare the operation.

Mrs. HOLT. [Deleted.]

Mr. IKLE. We would agree with you, and Director Casey, I am sure, would agree with you, we want to increase our intelligence resources, particularly people on the ground, human intelligence, that can report.

On Grenada, the Cubans kept their installations closed off and separate. We have pictures. I think I testified half a year before about the Cuban installations near the airport, on the Senate side.

But to know how many people and what those people are trained for would require rather close access.

Last, worth keeping in mind is the fact there has been the attitude in this country opposed to strengthening the CIA and opposed to letting them play their proper function as our intelligence agents.

On university campuses, some have refused recruitment by the CIA for them to hire personnel. In some ways, maybe there is an ironic lesson here in the way the safety of the students would have better ensured if there had not been this opposition in academia to letting the CIA do its work.

Mrs. HOLT. Is this administration committed to improving that situation? Are you really making efforts as a policymaker to improve that?

Mr. IKLE. To get a full appraisal of what is being done and what moneys are being allocated, I would refer you to Director Casey. It is he that is in charge of building up the human resources.

Mrs. HOLT. I would hope you would be expressing some concern on that.

Mr. IKLE. Indeed.

Mrs. HOLT. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Schroeder.

Mr. Kazen.

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no questions at this time except for one.

Mr. Secretary, why is it that the British took such a dim view of what we did in Grenada?

Mr. IKLE. Not all the British took a dim view. There were important newspapers in Britain fully supportive of what we did.

Mr. KAZEN. I am talking about the official Government position.

Mr. IKLE. Many members of Parliament were quite supportive of what we did. Prime Minister Thatcher was critical about certain aspects of the operation, and it may have been because of the Commonwealth relationship with Grenada and the feeling that maybe the United Kingdom had a special role here.

Other factors of domestic politics may have been involved, I wouldn't want to speculate on here.

Mr. MOTLEY. Can I add something to that, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. KAZEN. Yes, yes.

Mr. MOTLEY. I think Secretary Ikle put his finger on it. Probably Mrs. Thatcher's first reaction publicly was an overreaction that many of her advisers didn't feel was justified, but then she had trouble backing down from that.

As to the real reasons as Fred says, we can speculate, but whatever it was, she got over it fairly quickly and it is certainly not a bone of contention in our relationships with Great Britain.

Mr. KAZEN. I am glad to hear that, because after the results and what we found out and what was there, 10,000-foot runway, they were not going to fly model airplanes out of it, you know.

Mr. MOTLEY. I would agree, and it was equally puzzling to us as to why her initial reaction was so strong. [Deleted.]

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Won Pat.

Mr. WON PAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to know what is the size of that island, Grenada?

Mr. MOTLEY. Eight by eighteen miles, I believe.

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. WON PAT. My island is still bigger than that. I am talking about Guam, of course.

Now, what is the population of Grenada?

Mr. IKLE. 100,000.

Mr. WON PAT. Indigenous population. Well, Guam is more than that. Anyway, I have read that the students were informed that they are in no danger—that is according to an interview of Castro by some writers. How true is that?

Mr. MOTLEY. Well, the majority of Americans on that island were students at the medical college, at the two campuses. The medical college has the president and treasurer almost living full time in the United States, one in New York, one in Chicago.

Prior to October 25, they had been in communications with the college campus. They had a teletype setup.

The president of the college, in his judgment, felt they were never in any kind of danger. And he kept feeding that information there.

Subsequently, and we have chatted with him, of course. Subsequently, when he was informed after the October 25—of some of the things that occurred, he turned around in his evaluation. There has been some speculation as to why his statements may have been that way or not, and it is nothing we can certainly put our fingers on.

But definitely, I think that you may be referring to statements—in fact, he was on TV every day there for a couple days until he saw the light—to the effect there wasn't any danger. He finally changed his view.

Mr. WON PAT. Well, I have no doubt about our—in other words, our coming to the rescue or liberation of our own citizens there. I am just, of course, doubtful with respect to our being there for no other reason than just to take over the island, in other words, contrary to the state of the condition over there, presumably under Communist influence.

Are we now settled for good over there, that is, we are not established whereby we exerted adequate influence to have these people to be thinking or rather organized according to our system of democracy?

Mr. IKLE. They have their approach to a democracy which existed before, which was inherited in a way from Great Britain as the colonial power. They are moving to restore the democratic process.

We have only a small unit there, I mentioned this morning some 300 people, to help provide security, that is to say to assist maintaining of the peace. There is police training going on. There is restoration of the judicial system going on.

Secretary Motley might want to elaborate.

Mr. MOTLEY. As far as the political process goes, Mr. Won Pat, they are going through phases. They have an interim government [deleted] that will supervise elections, and then be replaced by a permanent elected government. It is hopeful they will be able to get all this done this year.

There has been a political vacuum there for 4 years because of the "New Jewel Movement," which was the Communist-dominated party, but they are starting to rebuild toward a democratic process.

They have, as Secretary Ikle said, a tradition of democratic ideals and functioning. So, it is not that you have to teach them about a concept of democracy.

Mr. WON PAT. I think you ought to be commended for that. I thank you for the explanations. They have been very illuminating.

Admiral McDONALD. May I add one thing, Mr. Won Pat. As I testified this morning, the greatest level of troops at any one time in Grenada was approximately 6,500. The President had indicated that we were to withdraw the combat troops as quickly as possible consistent with the threat and the stabilization of the unrest on Grenada.

By December 15, we had all the combat troops out of Grenada. The only forces that are there now, as Dr. Ikle and Ambassador Motley have stated, are military police and support elements of the U.S. Army.

There are no other combat troops in Grenada today.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Whitehurst.

Mr. WON PAT. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The gentleman just answered all the questions I had. This is a military question, just a curiosity. I ask it. We lost [deleted] helicopters, that were shot down, and 11 damaged.

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHITEHURST. How do you rate that loss in terms of the resistance that you suffered? Did you expect to suffer that kind of a loss? Is [deleted] an average number for an operation of this kind, would you say, in estimating what you would run into, or not?

Admiral McDONALD. It is a difficult question to answer, Mr. Congressman. I think [deleted] was a little high based on what we anticipated the resistance would be.

The reason I say that is that we were not aware of the accuracy or the intensity of their anti-aircraft fire. [Deleted] when they were directing fire against the helicopters, we seemed to absorb more fire than we had anticipated.

I would defer on anything more specific than that to General Trobaugh. There were two Marine Cobras lost, one Marine CH-46 that was lost and the other [deleted] losses were Army Black Hawks. General Trobaugh may be able to give you specifics.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Let me ask another question before you answer, General. Were they lost or could you determine they were lost to Grenadian or Cuban fire? Who shot the aircraft down, do you know?

General TROBAUGH. No, sir, I could not answer that. I don't know.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Did you want to amplify on that?

General TROBAUGH. I could amplify as regards the Black Hawk helicopters. I lost [deleted] on the operation in the Caligny barracks, which was a military complex down there that we learned about on the third day and we put one Ranger battalion, reinforced, in there.

Of the [deleted] helicopters that went down there, [deleted] of them took small arms fire, ground fire, in an anti-aircraft role.

As luck would have it—and I would classify it as pure luck—they took the gear box out of [deleted] of those helicopters and that controls the tail rotor which precludes a helicopter from spinning.

They took out the [deleted] and [deleted] helicopters so as they went to depart to come out of the landing zone having let the Rangers off, I am told the pilot does not know that he does not have that tail rotor control until he lifts off the ground, and at that time, as soon as he lifts off, the helicopter then spins.

As they came out in the flight, the [deleted] spun and the [deleted] literally flew into it because they were coming out in a formation as they should and [deleted] had also taken a hit in the gear box and he also spun and crashed, not into [deleted] but into the ground.

Those are [deleted] of the [deleted] and I would say that that was probably more lucky marksmanship than good marksmanship.

As far as the losses, I would have to defer to Admiral Metcalf because he has more information on that.

Admiral METCALF. Well, the two Marine Cobras lost, in my judgment, definitely were the result of controlled fire which was very well coordinated, very well done, [deleted].

In the harbor is where they went down. It was well-directed fire and the fire happened to be coming, we believed, from Fort Frederick. When we took out Fort Frederick, that was the end of it.

Mr. WHITEHURST. The 18 Americans killed, of that number, how many were in those helicopter crashes?

Admiral METCALF. There were three killed in the Marine helicopter crashes, one escaped [deleted].

I don't know what the casualties were in the Black Hawks.

General TROBAUGH. Of the ones into Calivigny, none of the crew members of any helicopters were killed, however four Rangers were killed in the collision of the helicopters. They had left the helicopters and were on the ground and when the helicopters crashed they physically landed in among the Rangers so we lost four Rangers at that particular accident.

Mr. WHITEHURST. So [deleted] of the 18—

The CHAIRMAN, Without objection, you may proceed for 1 additional minute.

Mr. WHITEHURST. I didn't know I was out of time. Thank you.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN, Mr. Hutto.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Trobaugh, do you know Capt. Tim Howard, the fellow that lost his arm, had it severed when the helicopter was shot down?

General TROBAUGH. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. HUTTO. I was going to ask you where that happened, but, OK.

Admiral McDonald, earlier you indicated today that your statement mostly dealt with the things that we learned down there. I know a time or two you mentioned that we learned this or that. Could you kind of enumerate how many items, how many things did we learn?

Could you tell us a few of them from this experience?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir, Mr. Hutto.

We exposed significant areas that we need to explore, or we have uncovered significant areas that need to be further explored. Command and control is one of them. We found that in the command and control area, although put together very quickly with Admiral Metcalf and his fly-away staff, the effectiveness could have been bolstered with a few more representatives of the services had we had time to include them in the planning.

Bringing in other commanders into the planning, if we had the time to so do, would have been very helpful.

As an example, General Trobaugh didn't get into the planning until about 2 days before he was designated to participate and to lead the Ranger battalion.

General TROBAUGH. That is right.

Admiral McDONALD. [Deleted.]

We think one of the lessons learned was the way that the commander of the joint task force, Admiral Metcalf, kept everyone in the chain of command informed of what was happening by SITREPS, either through voice communications or by hard copy message communications. Additionally, he had a daily meeting with his commanders to discuss what the next day's operations were going to be. These are some possible lessons learned.

[Deleted.]

Rules of engagement, I think we have learned as Admiral Metcalf articulated this morning, to keep them as simple as possible.

I think this factor proved very successful for us. We did not complicate it.

The chairman's guidance to me was "do it right." That is why we tried to get that word to the commanders, certainly to Admiral Metcalf, and I am sure that he worked the same sort of situation with General Trobaugh as you heard him state this morning. He had no problems dealing with the rules of engagement nor knowing who his boss was.

[Deleted.]

Those are just a few of the lessons learned, Congressman Hutto.

[Deleted.]

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUTTO. [Deleted.]

We had not declared hostilities to be at an end at that time.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dyson.

Mr. DYSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, gentleman, you know, I think one of the things that probably amazes me the most and my colleague from Maryland, Mrs. Holt touched on it, was our lack of intelligence.

About the time we were in the middle of the whole Grenadian adventure, I, along with Chairman Sonny Montgomery, was a part of a trip to Lebanon that occurred about 5 days after our headquarters was blown up there.

It was apparent to me, in talking to people on the ground there that clearly a lack of adequate intelligence was apparent.

We learned later through the investigations of Chairman Nichols and DOD's own commission on this, that in fact the military was about, I think, what, 2 or 3 days behind in getting that communication to the ground commanders there in Lebanon.

I have the same impression about this situation here in Grenada. We almost went into it blindly. We heard reports in this country that our ground people in Grenada were using tourist maps to find their way around the island.

I don't know whether it is true or not, but I think one of you did indicate that in the time required to put this together—I think you said, Admiral McDonald, 96 hours you say—it seems to me that essentially that is probably one of the key things to ensuring an adequate or a successful campaign.

Now, obviously every little island in the world you can't have the proper intelligence. Who makes the decision as to where these people ought to be located?

I think back to the Cuban missile crisis and I remember as a young man the kind of projections just like this that we were able to see on national TV the day that President Kennedy announced that this kind of—these kinds of missiles were located on the Island of Cuba. Yet we received a lot of this sometime after the whole Grenada invasion.

Did we send our troops in there blind? If we did, is that why we didn't have the press go along with them?

If I was President of the United States and the whole Grenada invasion has been quite a feather in our cap, I mean image-wise, certainly for the military, it made us look very good, if I was an image-maker in this administration I would want everybody from the New York Times to one of my local newspapers going in there to show what a good job we did.

Were we afraid that would not happen? Is it possible we were afraid this could have bombed out on us?

Mr. IKLE. Congressman Dyson, while I agree with your overall thrust regarding the importance of intelligence, and the desirability in every operation, or indeed even when you don't have an operation, to know more, find out more, as you indicate it is a question of allocating limited resources.

The intelligence community has a limited budget, it has to be allocated [deleted]. The human intelligence, analytic effort that goes on, mostly here, Langley and so on. And then you have to allocate, as you indicate, among different target areas, countries, how much you want to focus on in Nicaragua, on Cuba, on other parts of the Caribbean, on the Middle East, and so on.

There is another problem you referred to, by alluding to the tragedy in Beirut, and the report by Admiral Long indicated what you had there was in part a problem of prioritizing intelligence and giving weight to rumors about possible attacks, and taking appropriate action in light of uncertainty, because this whole flood of rumors that you get in a Beirut-like situation has to be sorted out in order to get proposals that can be acted on.

That was not the problem in Grenada. We had several rumors, of course, but we didn't have an excuse of those. It wasn't a matter of prioritizing intelligence. Nor should too much be made out of the maps. I don't know the exact details, but I imagine the tourist map of downtown St. Georges might have been a very good thing for finding certain houses where our students were located, much as a map of Washington might serve the purpose well.

The production of maps is something that is a lesson learned, and I think more can be done in preparation here.

As to the photographs, you mentioned the photos which became available right after the Cuban missile crisis. The reason you didn't see much of the photographs of Grenada is that we have shown them months before. The President, in his televised speech in April, showed pictures of the Cuban installations next to the Port Salines airport to alert the Nation of the danger.

Regarding the media, the concern was as I mentioned this morning, not that their observations would be troublesome, but the compressed time we had to plan the whole operation. Allusion was made to the fact that some selected members of the wartime correspondents were taken along, even for the Normandy invasion. But that invasion was planned over a much longer period of time. And these were wartime correspondents in the war, maybe by that time, a couple of years. So, you had an ongoing working relationship in which General Eisenhower and others could really rely on and fix it right in.

Mr. DYSON. Admiral McDonald.

Mr. McDONALD. May I just add that we have highlighted intelligence shortfalls or perceived shortfalls. As the overall commander,

had I not felt comfortable with the intelligence we had to accomplish the mission that was assigned. Then I certainly had the flexibility to say we need more; that we have to have more before I can assure you we are going to be successful.

And I want to assure you, Mr. Dyson, we did not exclude the press for fear that we thought we were going to fall short of our goals there. I was confident, based on plans, and discussing it with all the commanders, that this was an executable operational plan that could be carried out with success. The amount of time it would take would depend on the resistance encountered.

But it was something we planned on winning from the time we planned it. And there was adequate intelligence to plan the mission.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you.

Gentlemen, I am not sure who wants to take a crack at my statement or my question, because I am not sure what it is going to be. And I want to make sure that you take it in the spirit in which it is given, to be constructive here.

I think the general thrust of what I gather is that you are persuading us that the operation was a heralded success. And I have no doubt about the fact that the mission was accomplished. I think it was—the cost in materiel and the personnel might have been marginally higher than anticipated.

But there was a success.

My problem is that I have spoken to a number of critics during the past few weeks, during the long recess that we had ample time to go into these things at almost our leisure—was that we are lucky that it was a success, that there were some severe deficiencies in our operation.

You have touched on basically, I guess, all of them. Some of them I had in my mind, and had I been given an opportunity to ask a question at the very beginning, you would have responded. Over the course of this morning and this afternoon, you touched on the helicopter problem.

It is my understanding that there was much larger anti-aircraft capabilities on the island, than you had anticipated. [deleted.]

The maps that were alluded to, the problems of intelligence, you indicated you felt there was enough.

And also, I remember during the operation, there were some stories that were coming out, all of which may be false, that you started to place a good deal more force as far as the levels of personnel and equipment there than you anticipated, and had it not been basically for the fact that we could just overwhelm the defenses on the island, we would have really had a protracted situation.

And these things to me, these operations are really unique, because they provide, I think, this committee with an opportunity to very dispassionately and very critically observe a real-life situation.

And we don't get very many of these. And maybe it is a good thing. We don't want to have a lot of these things going on. But when we do, I think we are mature enough to recognize that the mission was a success. We are mature enough to take our hats off to all of you gentlemen who had something to do with it because it was a success.

And I would like you to be more forthcoming in our own self-criticism. I wonder if you could just generally answer my question that we were lucky in a few instances and that our shortfalls were quite shocking in some areas and were extremely disappointing. But generally, I guess we had enough firepower, enough troops to overcome the situation.

Admiral McDONALD. Well, let me attempt to answer those questions, Mr. Courter. We are trying to be forthcoming. We are analyzing the operation, and I have asked the commanders to submit to me, and I will provide to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the lessons learned which will include the self-criticisms. These lessons are in the process of being formulated right now.

And this book is the first cut at that, a cut at those lessons in minute detail. There are shortfalls and/or lessons learned, but all lessons learned do not necessarily have to be counter to moving ahead or contradictory to planning.

The statement that we were lucky, I think, is really an overstatement. We were not merely lucky. I am not trying to again restate the military capabilities. But we did, as General Trobaugh indicated earlier this morning, just overwhelm the Grenadians and the Cuban workers and paramilitary personnel who were on the island with the number of forces that were committed to do so. And that was part of the plan.

[Deleted.]

As far as some of the details you addressed, I do not mean to try to drive this into individual explanations, but I will be glad to talk to you, sir, after the meeting or answer any of your questions for the record. But we were not lucky. There were some decisions that were made from a professional viewpoint by people on the scene as to how to accommodate some of the problems that arose that morning.

[Deleted.]

Once they took the airfield, they then air-landed troops. As General Trobaugh said, they secured the field. Securing, in Ranger terms, was a little less than he would have liked to have seen, because when he landed and got out of his airplane, the battalion commander for the Rangers was only about 50 meters down the road from where he got off the airplane.

But those things fit into an operation. There are lessons as to how much force is to be applied. And it all fits into the picture that you are addressing. We would like to answer those. And we are looking to see how we can improve, because we are at the pointed edge of the sword, and it is our troops that are going to be faced with this in the future. So it behooves every one of us to go back and see what was done there.

But to say it was severe constraints or shocking or lucky, really is not true, sir.

Obviously—Admiral Metcalf was in day-to-day contact with one. [Deleted] he can probably give you a better feel for the minute-by-minute occurrences that took place.

Mr. IKLE. Let me make one more point. the question of good luck

and bad luck. Of course, in every military operation it is mixed together. We had some bad luck, too. The general mentioned the gear boxes being hit, the wingtip that was grazed, the helicopter pilots. The real point of good luck is that none of the students were killed.

A very important factor in the operation was the timing. Point No. 5 of House Resolution 883 asks about communications with the United Nations for the purpose of addressing a concern we had. Well, we could have gone on for 6 weeks or 6 years in the United Nations addressing concerns. But within 6 days the island would have been much more fortified.

On the Monday before the operation, we saw some Cubans going in, organizing the resistance. Another day or so and our losses would have probably much more severe. Another 2 days and perhaps students would have been kidnapped, held ransom, or held hostage. The timing you might say was luck. But perhaps it was also the President's courage and decision to do it correctly and do it at the right time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hertel.

Mrs. Lloyd.

Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions.

My question comes back to communications. It really bothers me, Admiral.

With all of the joint operations we do, and I quote from your testimony here—"Although these problems have been previously identified and programs are in effect for correction"—we have been doing joint maneuvers and operations for years, have we not? Is the money from this committee or is it just hardheadedness of the services to want their own equipment.

You know, you know what the problem in an absolute war is now. Maybe that is the difference between a wartime scenario and operation. But what have we learned from operations if we don't learn that? And before you answer that, I just want to ask Secretary Ikle, you mentioned about five secret military agreements.

When we found these, were these written agreements that you found in Grenada?

Mr. IKLE. Yes, they were written agreements. We have photostatic copies. We will be publishing some of those. Some have already been published in a small booklet. I will make sure your office has a copy of it, in addition to the copies that will be published.

Admiral McDONALD. In response to your earlier question, Congressman Sisisky, we have to really go to school on ourselves on the way we conduct joint exercises. We do exercise as you indicated, at least annually, more often in other areas—but in the Atlantic Command annually in a major joint exercise called "Solid Shield." We use Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine assets to accomplish this joint training [Deleted].

When we plan this, because there is so much money and resources tied up in an exercise, we try to get the utmost from the exercise itself. One of the things we know that there are problems. How do we fix that?

[Deleted.]

Mr. SISISKY. That is the key word, fix them, not just identify them.

Admiral McDONALD. No, sir, fix them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent that I be recorded as voting yes on the vote to go into closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I have two questions. One question—perhaps you answered it earlier—pardon me if you did—I understand you used a substantial number of Black Hawk helicopters in this operation. Is that affirmative?

Admiral METCALF. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. You mentioned the number of helicopters that were disabled or shot down. Could you give a brief description of what happened—I am sure some of the other Black Hawks took some rounds but were not disabled or shot down. Could you give us a brief summary of what you think the demonstrated durability of these Black Hawks were and maybe a comparison between the Black Hawk durability and the old Hueys.

Admiral METCALF. The real guy to answer that question is the general here. But I just think that airplane is a superb airplane—two engines, enormous lift. Of course I looked at it in my Navy eyes, because it is the same thing that is going to be our ASW helicopter. Just seeing them come back full of holes, pilots seriously wounded, and the way the aircraft handled is just absolutely superb.

In fact, one of those we lost had to be shut down with a firehose. The thing didn't want to stop fighting.

General TROBAUGH. Sir, I will just go down the type of damage and the comments for each of those and capsulize those.

One Black Hawk that went down had both main rotor blades hit, tail rotor drive shaft hit, two tail rotor blades hit, 45 bullet holes in the airframe, the avionics on the left side shot out, fuel tanks damaged, five rounds in the right side of the cockpit, and the type of round included both small arms and anti-aircraft. That airplane was still in Grenada at the time this report was written, which meant we hadn't backhauled it out yet. We had five WIA's on board that bird.

Another Black Hawk took two rounds in the stabilator, the thing on the back of it, several holes in the tail boom, engine control unit was damaged, VHF radio shot out, and the rounds included both small arms and anti-aircraft. Had no KIA's and WIA's in the aircraft.

UH-60, holes in the cockpit. That particular one had five WIA's, which sounds like he took really more personnel casualties.

Another UH-60, transmission shot out, No. 1 engine damaged, six holes in the pilot's window, and that one we took casualties. The aircraft crashed, burned, and the wreckage remained in Grenada.

Mr. HUNTER. That is one of the crashes you mentioned earlier.

General TROBAUGH. No, sir, this was a separate crash. It occurred out on the ocean on the very first day of the operation.

Another Black Hawk had the pilot's side plexiglass shot out, auxiliary fuel tank damaged, intermediate transmission hit, holes in the tail boom tail rotor, and shaft. One WIA. Another one, small holes through the belly and small arms damaged to the stabilator. No casualties.

Another one, UH-60 also, small arms anti-aircraft damage to the tail rotor drive shaft, stabilator inoperative, main rotors and tail were hit, all radios inoperative, except the frequency modulating radio, all gyros inoperative, engine control unit was inoperative, holes in the belly and the collective, which is what you use to lift off with, and had no casualties.

And the remaining three Black Hawks are the ones that I addressed earlier.

Mr. HUNTER. The ones you mentioned, those helicopters were not shot down except for the one you said that crashed?

General TROBAUGH. That is correct.

Mr. HUNTER. So they managed to stay aloft or get back.

General TROBAUGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. Would you say that that compares very favorably to if we were using the old Hueys?

General TROBAUGH. Sir, I am not an aviator, but I had a lot of time in the First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam. I would say if you get the tail rotor shot out you will lose the aircraft. But I would think that the survivability--the attitude among my aviators at Fort Bragg now, in both my aviation battalion and the cavalry squadron is they believe the Black Hawk to be a much more survivable aircraft. It has two engines, and that is a plus in itself.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, gentlemen, thank you for coming today. Taking into consideration that the Cubans had considered Grenada to be a very strategic location, had great use for it, do you think there is a chance we are going to consider keeping a strong presence there simply because of the strategic location, in the future?

Mr. IKLE. We are not intending to keep a military presence on Grenada. Indeed once the indigenous police and security forces on Grenada are built up we don't expect to have any security related forces there. We would hope to deter any Cuban attempt to use violence against the island again by our forces throughout the Carib-

bean, and we have to use political means to deter political attacks by Cuba.

Mr. MOTLEY. One of the things we found, Mr. Ray, was that the eastern Caribbean especially is vulnerable to even small types of Cuban type or Communist insurgencies. And so with the Eastern Caribbean States we are helping them build up a regional security system, made up of the Caribbean States that could be mobile and go to any one of the islands rather than each one of the islands to try to build up some kind of army.

Mr. RAY. Do we feel comfortable in the formation of the government that has taken place there, and has it fallen in place in a proper manner?

Mr. MOTLEY. Yes, sir; it is going through a phase. It has a history of democracy. I think they are going through a very deliberate stage leading to elections and permanent government. The first government that was appointed by Sir Paul Scoon is made up of what can be called technicians, not politicians.

Mr. RAY. For quite some time we have been concerned about the construction of that landing strip, its ability to take large aircraft. What is happening there. Has that been completed?

Mr. IKLE. It is not completed yet. The decision has not yet been made whether to seek the funds necessary to complete it. I think indications are it might be.

Mr. MOTLEY. Yes. There is a study underway now being commissioned by AID as to the airport project and what it would require to take it to different levels. Obviously just finishing the runway won't require as much money as building hangars and installing all the instrumentation that goes to make it a fully instrumented runway.

Mr. RAY. Just as an observation—we should have strong confidence in the government if we want to assist in completing that long strip there.

Mr. MOTLEY. Yes, sir; I think that would be a precondition.

Mr. RAY. Two other questions.

The SEAL team that came in as I understand took some unexpected casualties. Can you comment on that?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir. As part of the operation we always use SEAL's [deleted].

Mr. RAY. [Deleted.]

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. You attribute that to weather conditions.

Admiral McDONALD. [Deleted.]

Mr. RAY. General, according to the Wall Street Journal, it mentioned when our Special Forces first attacked the prison, that they were kind of driven back because of some heavy activity there and then later came back, and there was nobody there. Was that a correct report? Do you remember seeing that?

General TROBAUGH. Sir, I pass that to Admiral Metcalf. I wasn't on the island at that time.

Admiral METCALF. [Deleted.]

Mr. RAY. Any special comments—a strong contingency of Cubans or somebody?

Admiral METCALF. That gets into the issue of security, and did they know we were coming. What did that colonel do when he came aboard the day before? I just felt—my view is they took a pretty good guess at where we would attack first. They just took a guess.

Mr. RAY. The report also went on to say several of the prisoners were killed and their bodies disposed of.

Admiral METCALF. It appears to us that the prison was empty.

Mr. RAY. In the beginning?

Admiral METCALF. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. As I understand it, the new governing counselor wants essentially the same airport? Is that true?

Mr. MOTLEY. It is an article of faith in the Caribbean that everybody would like to see that runway finished, and especially the people on Grenada. They feel it would be a great boost to their economy, specifically from a tourism point of view.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Some months ago Mr. Bishop was here in conference with several of us and we talked about that airport. I think Mr. Bishop handled himself very well, subjectively speaking. I don't know what was going on in his mind—as to the real need for that airport, particularly the statements endorsed by British Airways and so forth.

I guess what I am asking is, is the size factor really any different, whether this could be an airport that would handle tourist jets, or problems with perhaps the Soviets or the Cubans?

Mr. MOTLEY. Mr. Bishop may have sung the praises of that airport, but runways don't know the difference when an airplane lands on it, where it comes from, whether it is carrying arms or not.

The issue he failed to point out to you was the tremendous military buildup alongside that was going on, including ack-ack guns the general faced going in there. These are two different subjects.

There are in the Caribbean several other runways 10,000 feet long, but they don't have as envisioned in this case all of the instrumentation that would make a zero zero runway for instrument landings and night landings and the rest of it.

The key to tourism is twofold—and that is part of what an AID study is addressing—one is the airlines and the other is hotels.

Obviously if you can take a jumbo jet out of Europe nonstop into Grenada, it is a lot better than transferring at Barbados to smaller airlines to get to Grenada.

So that is a function of the need for it.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. In retrospect, is there any observation as to—I don't know—whether or not Mr. Bishop could have been handled differently by us over time.

In many ways he comes off as the moderate or the relatively good Marxist.

Mr. MOTLEY. He was received by the then national security adviser, Mr. Clark, and by Ken Dam, the Deputy Secretary of State, and for a first brush that is pretty helpful for a first visit.

I think he was handled correctly.

Mr. IKLE. It would not be correct to call him a moderate. We do have, among the captured documents, documentation of his meetings with Judge Clark and Secretary Dam, and it is quite clear that he understood the message that was given to him. It is not quite so clear, but it is possible that he tried to indicate a somewhat less hostile position toward the United States by a slightly less hostile tone in his radio broadcast. It is also not clear whether if, indeed, he wanted to move toward a less hostile stance toward us and eventually work with us; whether that had something to do with his downfall.

Mr. MOTLEY. Let me add one point on that. That is not an isolated event with regard to contact with this government. What happens on occasions, and I can give you two or three other examples of governments of individuals who represent governments, usually not elected, that have a Cuban or Soviet influence, then for one reason or another they decide they want to get the home run ball and make everything all right with the United States, so they seek this high level meeting.

We have had similar meetings with people from other governments. Our line we took with Bishop is the same. We take the things a step at a time.

"If you knock down your anti-American rhetoric internally, then we can possibly talk about some other things."

So it is kind of a steppingstone approach.

I think what we did with Bishop is totally consistent with what we do with others.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. How does the department feel about the possibilities of Mr. Gary coming back? Does that raise a concern?

Mr. MOTLEY. In the open or closed session, either way, that is a matter for the Grenadians to decide. I can just tell you in talking to the people in Grenada they are almost unanimously against him. It has been a long time since he has been there. A lot of people have forgotten who he is, and those who have not apparently don't have good feelings about him.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Were there any women in the landing aspects of this operation?

General TROBAUGH. Yes, sir, there were, from the 82d Airborne Division, women that went down and participated in the operation as well as in the follow-on combat support, combat service support units. They did exactly what they would have been expected to do down there under the circumstances.

You may well be alluding to the one instance where I sent two women MP's home on the first day they arrived in-country. But, being mindful of the fact that at that point the fighting was 400 meters forward of my division CP and there wasn't anything to my rear, I felt that was probably the prudent thing to do consistent with our policy, and so I sent them home and 2 days later we introduced them back in.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Were there airborne women separated from their units upon landing?

General TROBAUGH. No, sir. To begin with, the only personnel that parachuted in were Rangers. They have no women assigned. That is a pure infantry unit. Within the 82d Airborne Division I do have women that are in combat support and service support military occupation specialties. But they were not separated from their units, and they are, by the way, parachute qualified. They do jump.

In that particular case, we air landed everything from the 82d.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Britt.

Mr. BRITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the things that has concerned me in crises is the overload on our communications systems. You hear about in the Cuban missile crisis of messages being hand-delivered to ships because of the overload. Recently the Investigations Subcommittee has heard of the overabundance of communications pouring into the field in Lebanon. How did our system work?

Is that now under control? Were the systems overloaded with communications, admiral?

Admiral McDONALD. From my standpoint, they were not, Mr. Britt. [Deleted.]

As far as record communications were concerned; that is, messages and hard copy, we came nowhere near saturating the capabilities.

There were very few hard copy messages from me to Admiral Metcalf and from him to his commanders.

We really think we did very well from that particular standpoint with the exception of the statements that have been made.

I would defer to Admiral Metcalf to give you just a quick view from his standpoint.

Admiral METCALF. Well, the communications back up the line with Admiral McDonald were all right. [Deleted.]

Things were quiet. Parkinson's law is hard at work in the communications world. When you take charge, you just make people understand what has to be transmitted and they all get off the circuit.

[Deleted.] One of the things I did to assure we had communications is before we started off, before we left Norfolk, I appropriated, shall we say, from the Army, some of their COMM gear. I knew if their [deleted] COMM gear would connect with each other, that—if everything else went down, we would be able to communicate.

[Deleted.]

We simply made it work through experience and a little bit of ingenuity. That is one of the strengths that we have.

Mr. BRITT. You feel confident in a crisis European level or broad scale in the Atlantic area, based on your experience with this limited engagement, that our communications control is satisfactory from overload and that sort of problem?

Admiral METCALF. I don't worry so much about communications overload because the overload issue can be disciplined. We have demonstrated that. You just order the routine stuff off. It is very quick. People in the military organization salute "Aye, aye" and off they go.

Mr. BRITT. It sounds like in some of the instances you had to improvise a bit.

Admiral METCALF. Yes. I suspect we always will. There will always be such circumstances.

Now, do I feel confident in a large crisis? Yes, I feel confident in a probabilistic sense. There will be times when we won't communicate because of sunspots, if you will, or what-have-you, Murphy is there hard at work, and the terrain problem.

[Deleted.]

Mr. BRITT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Ikle, I was just wondering—this matter of declaring war and the need for it and the relations with the press and so forth, in answering that type question you answered all around. Why doesn't someone come flat out and say you do not declare war in these type situations?

No. 1, they are not wars in the accepted sense of the word. They are operations. You cannot let your opponent know what you are going to do. Then you lose all kinds of people, the students involved and everyone else.

No. 2, it is not a war.

No. 3, you cannot go out and play this game like you do football, blow the whistle and kick off. You jeopardize your whole operation.

Just say that instead of hinting all around it.

This press business, I remember when the press was so upset because I think, as I remember, somebody asked Larry Speakes at the White House, "Are you going to invade Grenada tomorrow? Is that right?" And you said no, and that was all right.

But, if he had known, they expected him to say yes, and then everybody runs down there—the Cubans and Russians and everybody else, and gets on the beach ready to oppose us when we are coming in. Do they really expect us to tell them ahead of time in open press conference what we are going to do and jeopardize more American lives in the doing?

If so, you should tell those people in the press, "You are irresponsible for even asking that type question."

Put it back on them and nobody ever answers these questions that way and the press was still trying to make some hay out of this. Fortunately, the American people, I think, can see through it, but I don't know why you don't answer those kinds of questions that way when you are dealing with them, because the American people are sitting there listening to all this stuff and wondering why don't they just tell them you cannot tell somebody ahead of time what you are going to do in a military operation.

I think it is one of our finest hours. I think the military have really come through. It points up the point very vividly—if you keep the press out of an operation that way, the chances of success are enhanced immeasurably.

And keep politicians out of it. The same thing applies.

Hurray for that success. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first of all say that we have spent heavens knows how many hours today discussing Grenada and I have just come back

from a fairly extensive district tour, as have my colleagues, and I hate to tell you gentleman but I never heard it mentioned once.

The questions I heard on district tour day in and day out were on Lebanon. I never heard anyone discussing why we had gone in, whether we had gone in, if we should have gone in or what the outcome was because it was in most people's minds a book that is closed.

It was an operation that most people felt was necessary; it was done; when it was over with, we left; and we will not discuss that any more because there is something more current on the front burner.

Let me ask, asking questions last, you end up with fragments of eight different questions you had, but the one thing that comes to my mind is whether we really went to overkill or whether we did not.

Putting it a little further, we spent a lot of time talking about the press and I have to agree with the congressman from South Carolina, what I think we have lost with the press is a code of honor that we saw in World War II, a very extensive code of honor within the press.

I have a little personal knowledge on that. On the basis of that, there was a trust there that was never observed. It was one you could always depend on and the press was a very good sounding board and a good source of information and I think we have lost some of that currently.

Admiral McDONALD. Yes.

Mrs. BYRON. Is that equipment currently available, or is it in—

Admiral McDONALD. [Deleted.]

Mrs. BYRON. [Deleted.]

Admiral McDONALD. I will get back to you on that, Mrs. Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. One of the things we talked about last summer and early fall is what the scenario would be if we lost an aircraft over Lebanon as we have seen.

Mr. IKLE. In that connection, we are looking at drones and introducing drones for action.

Mrs. BYRON. Because my basic real question is, and the fact that we have spent a lot of time discussing what we learned from this mission and what were the good points and what were the bad points, in the timeframe—and I think I have jotted down dates—of the October 17 timeframe is the first time the mission was really discussed in any reality.

I think, Admiral McDonald, you were brought into it. Everybody has contingency plans, but you look at those plans with a realistic view that they are going to be used 1 day. I think what concerns me is that we have gotten to the point where we have so many contingency plans and yet when we have to activate one of those contingency plans, can we really do it?

I think that is the best lesson we can learn from this involvement. Did we have enough of a timeframe from, say, the 17th or 18th, or really not until the 21st, to activate a plan such as this with contingencies to put all the operational forces in that were necessary, including the correlation of the four different military units with integration of the Rangers, and Air Force, and with the

lift capacity necessary, and the fact that we had a naval fleet in the area to pull together.

Do you feel that we have learned a lesson that it can be done when necessary because we don't always have the luxury of being able to sit back and pull the strings when we find it is necessary to go in because of the surprise aspect of any operation such as this is so vital?

Admiral McDONALD. Let me try to address in the order in which you proposed them, Mrs. Byron.

Overkill, yes, we did overkill and we did it deliberately as General Trobaugh mentioned. It was a conscious decision to convince the opposition that there was little, if any, opportunity to carry on the fight and I think that contributed significantly to terminating the fighting on the 4th day when resistance basically ended.

We had rounded up almost all the prisoners in the first 2 days; that continued a little longer, but effectively the fighting was over on the 4th day and it was because of the significant advantage in numbers and equipment we put in there.

Mrs. BYRON. You also meant business.

Admiral McDONALD. Absolutely.

As I said earlier, the chairman said, let's don't underestimate. If we have to err at all, let's err on the positive side, was the guidance he gave me and we did plan heavily.

We used the marine amphibious unit with its tanks and heavier equipment specifically to give us that overkill capability. Yes, we did plan it that way, but we immediately started pulling people out as soon as we found we could do so.

Unfortunately, a lot of support equipment was en route and it is difficult to turn some of that off. So we had a force that was on scene and, as we started bringing it out, unfortunately we had more stuff coming even though we kept trying to turn it off. Nevertheless, we met the President's desires to get our combat forces out by December 15. [Deleted.]

Contingency plans, yes, we have contingency plans, but they don't cover everything for the individual areas we have established for these contingency plans. We started planning Grenada as a noncombatant evacuation. When Prime Minister Bishop was murdered on the 19th of October and the government deteriorated even further and they then went into the 24-hour shoot-on-sight-if-you-are-on-the-street situation, that Dr. Ikle pointed out, then of course, we changed the planning so that we were probably going to have to get our people out and put forces ashore to do that in a nonpermissive environment.

As Ambassador Motley stated, there were contacts trying to establish whether we could do this in a permissive environment which unfortunately seemed not to be forthcoming.

The decision was then made to put forces in. We updated that plan as we went along and changed it from just an evacuation in a permissive environment to one which meant putting troops ashore and making sure they were in fact protected.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that completes the session for this afternoon.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your cooperation and your openness in responding to the questions of the committee. Thank you very much.

Mr. MOTLEY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will meet tomorrow morning for the Defense Intelligence Agency briefing.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

