Written Testimony
Acting Under Secretary of State John C. Rood
Agreement Between the United States and Russia for
Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
House Foreign Affairs Committee
June 12, 2008
Mr. Chairman:
Thank
you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee in support of the
U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation or so-called 123
Agreement, which is required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended.
As
you know, President Bush submitted this agreement to Congress on May 13 for
review. This
agreement satisfies all U.S. legal requirements as set forth in section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act and elsewhere in U.S. law for an agreement of this type
with a nuclear weapon state as defined by the Nonproliferation Treaty. In particular, this agreement contains all of
the required nonproliferation measures and controls,
including a requirement that adequate physical protection measures be
maintained on U.S. exports,
a U.S. right of prior
consent to retransfers from Russia,
and a requirement that no U.S.-origin nuclear material can be enriched or
reprocessed without the prior approval of the United States.
The
United States has 123
agreements with almost all countries with major nuclear energy programs,
including China, Japan,
and the European Atomic Energy Community, which permits cooperation with the 27
EU Member States.
The Administration
believes it is important to have a 123 agreement with Russia both to build a closer
relationship as well as to improve our ability to address major challenges we
face in the 21st century, such as growing energy needs, nuclear
nonproliferation, and combating nuclear terrorism.
Growing energy
needs and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions have increased international
demand for nuclear power, which in an increasingly globalized nuclear industry
places a premium on working with foreign partners. In addition, nuclear nonproliferation and the
need to prevent nuclear terrorism are at the top of the U.S. national security agenda, including with
Russia, generating strong interest in the development of more
proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies and approaches to the fuel cycle
that can be advanced through cooperation between the U.S.
and Russia.
Upon entry into
force, this agreement would establish a legal basis for what we expect to be mutually
beneficial peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United
States and Russia.
Some U.S.-Russia
cooperation is already ongoing on nuclear safety and security, and Russian
commercial nuclear fuel sales to the United States under the HEU Agreement. We believe that this existing cooperation
will be enhanced by having this agreement in place.
At the same time,
the agreement looks to additional possibilities in the future, both commercial
and government-to-government. It
establishes a framework of nonproliferation conditions and controls for
transfers of civil nuclear commodities between the two countries, but in itself
it does not deal with specific projects.
Implementation of this agreement would take place on the basis of export
licenses issued in conformity with the requirements of U.S. law and policy at the time the
license is applied for.
For the United
States, having the agreement in place will provide a framework for potential
commercial sales of civil nuclear commodities like reactor fuel and major
reactor components to Russia by U.S. industry.
Under Russia’s export
system such commodities may be transferred to the United States without such an Agreement
(and in fact are taking place right now).
Having the Agreement in place will rectify an imbalance between the two
countries in terms of the legal structure available to accommodate commercial
opportunities for the United States.
The Agreement
would facilitate greater U.S.-Russia cooperation in developing technologies
that are important to advancing our nuclear nonproliferation objectives under
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), where we are seeking to cooperate
with other nations to develop new technologies like advanced reactors that
would consume plutonium and new forms of recycling spent fuel that would reduce
the risk of proliferation by not separating plutonium that could be diverted
for use by rogue states or terrorists for nuclear weapons. In areas like advanced fast burner reactors
and advanced nuclear fuel and fuel cycle facilities, Russia possesses experience
and facilities not widely available in the United States. For example, the Department of Energy would
like to send advanced fuel for testing in Russian fast neutron reactors, but
can only do so with a 123 Agreement in place.
The Agreement
also advances mutual nonproliferation goals by facilitating the transfer of
nuclear materials for forensic purposes in potential nuclear smuggling cases.
The
Administration views this agreement as an important achievement. As Ambassador Burns stated when he signed the
Agreement in Moscow on May 6, the United States and Russia – once nuclear rivals –
today nuclear partners – at last have a basic framework to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes and to advance nuclear energy worldwide while
enhancing our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. By expanding the ties between our
governments and our nuclear industries, this agreement will add to the strength
and stability of the U.S. -Russia
relationship as we confront important global challenges of the 21st
century.
Conclusion of the
proposed Agreement with Russia
has been a high U.S.
priority over the past year. The
President’s commitment to finalizing it was highlighted in the Declaration on Nuclear Energy and
Nonproliferation: Joint Actions, issued together with then-President Putin
on July 3, 2007, and more recently in the Strategic
Framework Declaration that they issued at the Sochi Summit on April 6 of
this year.
The July 2007
Declaration makes plain how concrete, wide-ranging and ambitious the
U.S.-Russia partnership is in this area so crucial to national and global
security. In the Declaration, the United
States and Russia jointly state their
determination to play an active role in making the advantages of peaceful use
of nuclear energy available to a wide range of interested countries, and in
particular developing countries, provided that the common goal of prevention of
proliferation of nuclear weapons is achieved. The two leaders state their common vision of
growth in the use of nuclear energy, including in developing countries, to
increase the supply of electricity, promote economic growth and development,
and reduce reliance on fossil fuels, thus leading to a decrease in pollution
and greenhouse gasses.
They
state their firm belief that the expansion of access to nuclear energy should
be conducted in a way that strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime. They also voice their strong support for the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as for the
International Atomic Energy Agency and in particular the IAEA Additional
Protocol.
They further state their readiness to support
expanded access to civil nuclear energy, consistent with national law and
international legal frameworks, by working together and with other nations in
the following ways:
·
Facilitating
the supply of a range of modern, safe, and more proliferation resistant nuclear
power reactors and research reactors appropriate to meet the varying energy
needs of developing and developed countries.
- Facilitating and supporting financing to aid
construction of nuclear power plants through public and private national
and multinational mechanisms, including international financial
institutions.
- Providing assistance to states to develop the
necessary infrastructure to support nuclear energy, including development
of appropriate regulatory frameworks, safety and security programs to
assist states in meeting international standards, and standards for
training of personnel.
- Developing solutions to deal with the
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, including options for
leasing of fuel, storage of spent fuel, and over time development of new technologies
for recycling spent fuel.
- Ensuring that the IAEA has the resources it
needs to meet its safeguards responsibilities as nuclear power expands
worldwide.
- Supporting expanded IAEA Technical Cooperation
to help states build the necessary infrastructure for safe, secure, and
reliable operations of nuclear power plants.
- Assisting development and expansion of
regional electricity grids, to permit states without nuclear reactors to
share in the benefits of nuclear power.
- Providing nuclear fuel services, including
taking steps to ensure that the commercial nuclear fuel market remains
stable and that states are assured of reliable access to nuclear fuel and
fuel services for the lifetime of reactors, including through
establishment of international nuclear fuel cycle centers, and provision
of nuclear fuel cycle services, including uranium enrichment, under IAEA
safeguards, as an alternative to developing indigenous capabilities.
- Supporting negotiation of long-term contracts
for power reactors and research reactors, including assured supply of fuel
and arrangements for management of spent fuel.
This
is the ambitious civil nuclear partnership agenda that the United States and Russia have set for themselves as a
common undertaking. The proposed
U.S.-Russia Agreement for Cooperation will serve as the cornerstone of the
U.S.-Russia civil nuclear relationship across the whole range of these
activities for many years to come.
The 123 Agreement
provides a comprehensive framework for U.S.
peaceful nuclear cooperation with Russia based on a mutual commitment
to nuclear nonproliferation.
·
It has a term of 30 years, and permits the
transfer of technology, material, equipment (including reactors), and
components for nuclear research and nuclear power production, subject to stated
nonproliferation conditions and controls.
·
The agreement does not permit transfers of any
Restricted Data, and permits transfers under the agreement of sensitive nuclear
technology, sensitive nuclear facilities (such as facilities for enrichment or
reprocessing), and major critical components of such facilities only by
amendment of the Agreement.
·
The Agreement permits enrichment of uranium
subject to the agreement to less than 20 percent. It permits reprocessing of nuclear material
subject to the Agreement only by further agreement of the Parties. For the United States, giving such consent
would entail a “subsequent arrangement” pursuant to section 131 of the Atomic
Energy Act, including an opportunity for Congress to review the intended
approval for 15 continuous session days under ordinary circumstances.
·
In the event that the proposed Agreement is
terminated, key nonproliferation conditions and controls continue with respect
to material and equipment subject to it.
Please
allow me to enumerate a few of the many areas where the United States and Russia are working together in a
concrete way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. These areas include:
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: The United States and Russia are working with a wide
range of other states to develop the next generation of civil nuclear
capability that will be safe and secure, improve the environment, and reduce
the risk of nuclear proliferation.
GNEP is aimed at accelerating the development and deployment of advanced fuel
cycle technologies, including recycling, that do not involve separating
plutonium. Such advanced technologies,
when available, will substantially reduce nuclear waste, simplify its
disposition, and draw down existing inventories of civilian spent fuel in a
safe, secure and proliferation resistant manner.
International Uranium
Enrichment Center: Russia
has announced, and the United
States has expressed support for, an
initiative to create a global nuclear energy infrastructure that will provide
for effective access to the benefits of nuclear energy without need on the part
of aspiring countries to acquire their own enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities. As a first step, Russia and Kazakhstan
have established on the territory of Russia the International
Uranium Enrichment
Center.
Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel: Recognizing the need for an assured fuel
supply as an incentive for countries that do not currently possess enrichment
and reprocessing capabilities to forgo acquiring them, the United States and Russia are committed to measures
aimed at establishing reliable access to nuclear fuel. Russia is working on the
establishment of a stockpile of low enriched uranium to be available to the
IAEA for ensuring reliable nuclear fuel supply.
The United States
is downblending 17.4 metric tons of excess HEU from its defense programs for
use as an enriched uranium reserve to support reliable fuel supply, and is
pledging $50 million to the IAEA to support establishment of an international
fuel bank for this purpose.
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: The Global Initiative launched by the United
States and Russia in July 2006 has grown to include 71 partner nations, ranging
from all EU member states to, more recently, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia. Partner nations are cooperating in
strengthening their individual and collective capabilities to prevent
terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials, to deny them safe haven and
financial and other support, to share information on terrorist activities, to
cooperate on law enforcement matters, and to deal with the consequences of an
attack. The United
States and Russia are committed to expanding and
strengthening this initiative and to fully implementing the agreed program of work.
Nuclear Security: The United States and Russia expect to complete agreed-upon
nuclear security upgrades under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative by
the end of 2008. The two countries look
forward to these upgraded systems continuing to serve their purpose reliably for
years to come. A Senior Interagency
Group will report annually on implementation of the agreed actions under the
Bratislava Initiative on emergency response, best practices, security culture,
research reactors, and nuclear security upgrades. The United
States and Russia will continue to work together
to share nuclear security best practices with other nations, including through
international fora.
Proliferation Security Initiative: The United
States and Russia remain committed to the
Proliferation Security Initiative, which constitutes an important means to
deter and prevent trafficking in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,
their delivery means, and related materials. Our two countries are working cooperatively to
prevent and disrupt proliferation finance in furtherance of the objectives of
UNSCR 1540.
Mr.
Chairman, let me address concerns that some have raised
about how the United States
and Russia are working
together to deal with nuclear challenges like those posed by North Korea and Iran.
With respect to North Korea,
the United States and Russia fully support the Six-Party Talks and
will continue to cooperate in accordance with the agreements reached at them as
well as the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 in
order to achieve the ultimate goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
With respect to Iran,
Russia and the United States are both committed to political
and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution under which Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for
peaceful purposes and which prevents Iran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons. Both Russia and the United
States agree that Iran must comply with its NPT, United
Nations Security Council, and IAEA obligations.
In particular, both our governments agree that Iran must suspend its
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities as required by UN Security Council
Resolution 1737 and reiterated in Resolutions 1747 and 1803. Both countries are committed to a dual track
strategy with respect to Iran of offering negotiations and incentives, and
increasing pressure on Iran to take the steps necessary to begin those
negotiations as expressed in the March 3, 2008 statement by the P5+1 Foreign
Ministers.
As is the case with any two nations, the United States and Russia can and sometimes do differ
on the means for accomplishing these shared goals.
With respect to
the Bushehr issue in particular, which some have raised as an objection to
bringing this agreement into force, the Administration examined this issue
closely and determined that the steps Russia has put in place in its agreement
with Iran mitigated our concerns. These
measures included Russia’s
supply and take back of spent fuel from Iran. These measures underscore the larger point
that Iran
does not need to possess the complete nuclear fuel cycle – including the
proliferation risks posed by enrichment and reprocessing – to take advantage of
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Moreover, the
Administration has reason to believe that U.S.
willingness to enter into negotiations that Russia
had long sought, as well as the U.S.
decision to carry them forward to a successful conclusion, had a definite and
positive impact on the way Russia
came to regard certain nonproliferation issues and take steps to deal with
them. I cannot go into the details here,
but would note that the classified annex to the Nuclear Proliferation
Assessment Statement, which the President has submitted to Congress together
with the Agreement, covers these matters thoroughly.
In conclusion, let me say
that this is a good, solid agreement. It
contains all the necessary nonproliferation conditions and controls that
Congress has written into law. This agreement
helps us build a stronger relationship and areas of cooperation with Russia in
mutually beneficial ways, advances our ability to combat the critical
challenges of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism in the 21st
century, aids development of new nuclear energy technologies, and allows commercial
opportunities for U.S. industry.
Mr. Chairman, thank you
again for the opportunity to testify before the Committee. I would be happy to take any questions you
have.