

ADDRESSING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE LOCAL EMERGENCY PLAN

The threat of terrorist incidents involving chemical and biological materials has increased. Local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) should consider the possibility of terrorist events as they review existing plans and consider how to incorporate counter terrorism (CT) measures into their plans. CT planning and preparedness is often an extension of existing activities, rather than a totally new effort.

This fact sheet discusses how LEPCs can incorporate CT issues when they review and update their local plans. This fact sheet builds on the National Response Team's Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1) and supersedes *Thinking About Deliberate Release Steps Your Community Can Take*.

Build on Current Activities. LEPCs, established under the Emergency Planning and Community Rights-to-Know Act (EPCRA), prepare and maintain comprehensive emergency plans. These plans address the extremely hazardous substances listed under EPCRA, as well as thousands of hazardous chemicals for which OSHA requires MSDS. Many LEPCs are already addressing CT, even if they do not use the word *terrorism*. If you have developed a plan for possible accidental release of chemicals in your community, you can use the same general planning principals for deliberate releases caused by terrorists. You may need to spend some time considering biological agents. This fact sheet includes some suggestions for how you can modify current activities to include deliberate chemical and biological releases.

Maintain Broad-Based Membership. LEPC membership includes a wide variety of stakeholders, such as elected state and

local officials; police; fire, civil defense, public health, environmental, hospital, and transportation officials; representatives of facilities where chemicals are stored or used; community groups; public works departments; and the media. Identify any specific roles each group might have in the event of a terrorist attack. In addition, you might add a few new members who would bring specific expertise during a release involving biological agents (e.g., the coroner, morticians, chemistry and biology labs, university experts.)

Update and Revise Plans. LEPCs should review their emergency response plans annually. Before you begin specific consideration of CT issues, ensure that your emergency plan is current. Simply adding CT materials to an outdated plan will not create an effective emergency plan. For example, review your plan for outdated contact information, unique hazards presented by facilities that may have been constructed after the emergency response plan was first written or new public works facilities. Also review the annual inventory reports filed under EPCRA Section 312 to determine whether new chemicals or hazards are present in your community. In addition, check risk management plans submitted by facilities in your community to ensure that you address the specific hazards identified by each facility.

After you have generally updated your plan, consider adding information and procedures related to potential terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Table 1 defines each type of WMD and explains the consequences and response difficulties associated with each.

One overall difference in dealing with a WMD incident is that law enforcement officials will be involved in the response as investigators. Officials from local, state, and Federal agencies will be on the scene of an incident to collect evidence and

TABLE 1. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Definitions, Consequences, and Response Difficulties

| Type of WMD | Definition (according to Title 18, USC 2332a) | Consequences | Response Difficulties |
|--------------------|---|---|---|
| Explosives | Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, rocket...missile...mine or device similar to the above. | Deaths, injuries, damaged structures | Similar to that of other explosions and large fires. |
| Chemical | Poison gas, blister gas | Deaths, injuries, possible contamination, possible long-term effects | Similar to accidents planned for in current LEPC emergency response plan, but could be more extensive in effect (e.g., VX release in a crowded convention center or school) |
| Biological | Any weapon involving a disease organism. | Deaths, injuries, contamination, long-term, far-reaching geographic effects | Agents may be unknown; locations may vary and multiply as people travel |
| Nuclear | Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. | Deaths, injuries, contamination, possible long-term, far-reaching effects. | Similar to that of other explosions and large fires |

interview survivors. Their priorities may create emergency response coordination challenges that the LEPC should address in its plan.

This portion of the fact sheet suggests changes you can make to specific portions of your emergency plan.

Emergency Contact Information. In the event of a terrorist incident, rapid and secure communications will be crucial to ensure a prompt and coordinated response. Your plan should include current contact information for fire, emergency medical services (EMS), law enforcement, medical, and other local departments and supporting organizations. Contact information for state officials, including those at public health agencies, the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), state police, and emergency management agencies should also be included.

The emergency assistance telephone roster in your emergency response plan should include regular phone numbers, cell phone numbers, pager numbers, and response actions. The NRC also provides reports and notifications to other Federal agencies as necessary. All local plans should also include contact information for the local FBI field office.

Response Functions Incident Command/Unified Command. Your emergency plan should address direction and control of responders in the event of a terrorist attack. Local responders respond to an incident scene and should notify local, state, and Federal authorities if terrorism appears to be involved. Local response authorities (such as a senior fire or law enforcement official) should establish control of the incident scene. The incident command system (ICS) that is initially established will likely transition into a unified command (UC). The UC structure used at the scene will expand as mutual-aid partners and state and Federal responders arrive to assist with response operations.

The FBI is the overall lead Federal agency for a domestic terrorist incident involving WMD and will lead the crisis management activities (including law enforcement activities) of the response. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for coordination of Federal support to state and local responders during consequence management activities of the response. Although the FBI is always involved in response to a credible terrorist threat or attack, FEMA support is provided only after presidential declaration, typically after state and local agencies request their assistance.

Consequence management includes measures to protect public health and safety after an explosion or release; restore essential government services; and provide emergency relief to government, business, and individuals. When crisis management activities have been completed, the U. S. Attorney General may transfer the overall lead Federal role to FEMA, EPA, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and DOD, which also have specific CT-related functions. EPA's role in CT activities is described in a fact sheet by that name, available at www.epa.gov/ceppo/ct-publ.htm#factsheet.

EPA's Role in the Federal Response Plan. The multi-agency response program that helps states during and after a disaster is the Federal Response Plan (FRP), which groups Federal assistance into 12 functional areas called emergency support functions (ESFs). EPA is the primary agency for ESF-10, Hazardous Materials, which provides for a coordinated response to large-scale releases of hazardous materials by incorporating the response mechanisms of the National Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA assists in determining what sort of hazardous substance may be or has been released in a terrorist incident, assistant with environmental monitoring, decontamination, and long-term site cleanup.

Public Information. Rapid and secure communications help to ensure a prompt and coordinated response to terrorist activities. Therefore, strengthening communications among emergency responders, law enforcement officials, clinicians, emergency rooms, hospitals, and mass care providers is extremely important. Your emergency plan should include the use of accurate and timely public notification measures and warning systems in the event of a terrorist attack.

Work in advance with local news media representatives to ensure their cooperation at the time of an incident. Ongoing communication of accurate and up-to-date information will help calm ears and limit the effects of the attack. The FBI will establish a joint information center (JIC) to coordinate the collection and dissemination of public information. Activities of human services organizations, such as the Red Cross, should be included in the emergency plan. Among other activities, these organizations may use public information systems to provide human services information the community, perform crisis counseling, provide insurance information and assistance, and provide translation services.

Public and First Responder Health and Safety. Your emergency plan should address public health and medical issues as they relate to terrorist events. The plan should include procedures to identify and treat victims, store and distribute antidotes, and handle fatalities. Mass care issues that may be different during a terrorist WMD event include decontamination, multi-hazard/multiagent triage, mortuary services, and notifying and working with families of any fatalities.

The emergency plan should also consider the personal safety of emergency responders in the event of a terrorist attack. A terrorist chemical, biological, or radiological release may not be immediately known or apparent. Caregivers, emergency response and law enforcement personnel, and other first responders are in danger of becoming casualties before anyone realizes that a crime has occurred. Incidents could escalate quickly from one scene to multiple locations and jurisdictions. The emergency plan should be flexible enough to accommodate evacuation or in-place sheltering. Evacuation may be required outside the perimeter of the scene to guard against further casualties from contamination by a released agent or from the possibility

of additional WMD. In-place sheltering may be required if the same area must be quarantined or if people are safer in a particular location.

Hazards Analysis. The hazards analysis section of an emergency plan should identify potential hazards, determine the vulnerability of an area as a result of hazards, and assess the risk of a hazardous materials release or spill. In the identification step, you should consider explosive, chemical, geological, and nuclear WMD as potential hazards. As you conduct your hazards analysis, identify potential targets and review their vulnerability to attack. Consider the population, accessibility, impact on daily life, economic impact, and symbolic value of areas at risk.

Terrorists and criminals who want to attack a particular group based on a conflict with their personal beliefs might target Federal, state, or local government offices and facilities, health clinics, or religious structures. Those who want to cause maximum casualties might target public gathering places (such as sports and entertainment complexes or tourist attractions), modes of transportation (such as buses and trains, including subways), routes of transportation (including bridges), or transportation facilities (such as airport terminals). To damage infrastructure and interrupt day-to-day functions, terrorists might target utilities or water and wastewater treatment plants. LEPCs should also consider emergency procedures in the event of multiple or simultaneous terrorist attacks. Terrorists might target first responders (e.g., fire houses, police department offices, response vehicles, and individuals) to hinder them from responding to another terrorist incident. Terrorists may seek to transform a target into a weapon by focusing on facilities that handle explosives, toxic, or volatile chemicals.

Because most public buildings and public areas must be accessible to everyone, they are highly vulnerable to attack. Other facilities, such as water treatment plants and industrial facilities, especially those with chemical or explosives storage, should have site security measures in place. You may want to discuss site security measures with these facilities to ensure that they are adequately protected. You may want to ask the facility the following questions:

- Is the facility or critical equipment and chemicals protected by fences of buildings?
- Are systems in place to detect intruders (e.g., patrols, video surveillance)?
- Are there alarm systems?
- Is access to the critical areas in the facility controlled?

Do not, however, include details of security systems in the emergency plan because it is available to the general public.

Public works facilities and workers will assume a support role, if so requested by state and local agencies. This support role might include damage assessment, debris clearance, search and rescue, traffic control, restoration of lifeline systems, building inspection, provision of potable water and sanitation services, and flood control.

For more information on site security, read CEPPPO's Chemical Safety Alerts Chemical Accident Prevention: Site Security (EPA K-550-F00-002) and Anhydrous Ammonia Theft (EPA-F-00-005), available at www.epa.gov/ceppo/p-small.htm#alerts.

Mitigation Procedures and Ongoing Assessment. Mitigation procedures and ongoing assessment involve consequence management activities to assist and protect the public from further exposure to hazards presented by terrorist activities. Public health officials, HazMat teams, coroners, and/or medical examiners and criminal investigators should work together to mitigate residual hazards as well as identify potentially large numbers of fatalities. Federal assistance should be available to support this task.

Ongoing assessment activities may include environmental sampling of air, water and soil, and insect and animal screening for chemical, biological, or radiological agents.

The criminal investigation of a terrorist attack will be a joint effort that includes many agencies. In the event of a biological attack, an epidemiological investigation may also be performed to assess the distribution of cases and sources of outbreak. The emergency plan could include a checklist of basic questions to ask when conducting interviews with victims in hospitals, sick officers, and other individuals in affected population groups. (It may be necessary to train people how to ask such questions appropriately in stressful circumstances.)

Equipment. Your emergency response should include standard operating procedures on when to use specialized WMD response equipment. Local responders should be trained to use, maintain, and calibrate this specialized equipment. The Department of Justice's Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support provides equipment grants and technical assistance to eligible communities. Visit its website at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/terrorism/funding.htm for more information and grant application kits.

Training. The 1996 Nun-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) legislation authorized funding to form a domestic preparedness (DP) training initiative. This initiative was recently transferred from DOD to the Department of Justice and includes a range of specialized courses, from basic awareness to discipline-specific advanced-level training and exercises. Training is available for identified cities and is directed at a broad spectrum of emergency responders from a variety of response disciplines, including fire, HazMat, law enforcement, emergency medical services, public health, emergency management, and public works. Additional advanced-level courses involving the use of real time experiences, live agents, and explosives are taught at cutting-edge training facilities. For more information, contact the DPCRA Hotline at (800) 424-9346 or (703) 412-9810. Visit CEPPPO at www.epa.gov/ceppo/.

The NLD DP program also includes three exercises: a chemical weapons tabletop, a biological weapons tabletop, and a chemical weapons full-scale exercise. These exercises allow participants to test their knowledge and training as well as increase the overall preparedness of responders across the jurisdiction.

FEMA independently offers the following information (Contact the training officer in your state Training Office of Emergency Services for information on course schedules and application procedures. A list of offices and contact information is located at www.fema.gov/emi/sttrgo.htm.)

- Course materials on WMD and preparedness and response for terrorist incidents that can be downloaded from www.fema.gov/mi/temng.htm.
- A terrorism consequence management course at its Mount Weather Emergency Assistance Center.
- Information on the incident command system training conducted by each state Training Office of Emergency Services. Visit www.fema.gov/emi/nrcrs.htm for details.
- In conjunction with the National Fire Academy, an independent study course in emergency response to terrorism, located at www.fema.gov/emi/crslist.htm.

Resources. LEPCs seeking assistance in terrorism-related emergency planning should begin with their SERCs. The SERC can direct LEPCs to appropriate assistance at the national and state level, and may be able to facilitate LEPCs in a given region working together to address possible terrorist activities. Many Federal agencies are involved in some aspect of counterterrorism. Many of these agencies support websites. Because of the continual changes in the world of CT, however, many websites become outdated or are even discontinued without warning. Therefore, LEPCs should consult EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) website at www.epa.gov/ceppo/cntr-ter.html. This address is updated every two months and includes the latest links to the following information: Federal departments and agencies, health and medical, technical information and resources, and international sources.

For more information, visit www.jacksonlewis.com; E-mail info@jacksonlewis.com; or call 800, 648-2551.

TERRORISM IN THE AIR: EVALUATING AND RESPONDING TO THE THREAT OF AIRBORNE CONTAMINANTS IN THE WORKPLACE

In cooperation with the newly formed Federal Office of Homeland Security (OHS), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has published a set of guidelines for the protection of commercial and governmental buildings from terrorist attacks via building ventilation systems. Employers that own or lease their buildings should be familiar with the information and recommendations contained in *Guidance*

for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks.

To address the workplace vulnerabilities revealed by the anthrax incidents in 2001, the guide focuses on identifying practical, "real-world recommendations" for relatively immediate protective action. As a result, building managers now have a model to follow in developing a comprehensive risk evaluation and response plan. The objective, however, is not to ensure the prevention of fatalities and injuries arising from a deliberate release of chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) contaminants, which the guide recognizes is an impossible task. Rather, the guide focuses on deterrence through "hardening" strategies designed to transform buildings into less attractive targets. The guide identifies three categories of these deterrents:

- those that increase the difficulty of introducing a CBR agent into a building's environment;
- those that increase the opportunity to detect terrorists before they carry out the release of a CBR agent;
- those that enhance the opportunity or ability, through mechanical or procedural measures, to mitigate the effect of a CBR release.

The crucial first stage for achieving these deterrents before any remedial measures are taken is to "know your building." Depending on the actual nature, age, operational requirements, and condition of a particular system, what seems an "obvious" solution may have disastrous results. Therefore, the guide advises building managers to conduct a thorough review of building system design and operations. This process should include a planned walk-through inspection of all relevant systems, starting with the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, and including the fire protection and other life-safety systems. The purpose is to establish a baseline understanding of the actual condition and function of the equipment, as opposed to relying on schematics and other records that may be out-of-date or simply inaccurate. The guide includes a list of considerations as examples of the nature of information that should be gathered.

Once the building manager has established the necessary baseline understanding of the building systems, the manager may proceed with consideration of the guide's "specific recommendations," which are organized into four general topics:

Things To Not Do. This section provides general guidance as to remedies that will likely do more harm than good, such as permanently sealing outdoor air intake vents.

Physical Security. This section addresses options for reducing unauthorized access to system features that can be exploited to release CBR agents into a building's atmosphere. Topics include methods to ensure controlled access to mechanical rooms, practical techniques for relocating or redesigning vents and out-

lets, and advice for establishing clearly demarcated security zones that increase the conspicuousness of unauthorized persons.

Ventilation and Filtration. This section advises building managers to evaluate mechanical air control systems from two perspectives: (1) to identify the extent to which weaknesses in the system contribute to the vulnerability of building occupants; and (2) to identify feasible means to minimize cross contamination from exposed areas and of means to filter, neutralize, or expel released CBR agents.

Maintenance, Administration, and Training. The final topic addresses: (1) incorporation of defined DBR release scenarios into general emergency response plans for the building's occupants, including regular practice drills; (2) focused training for HVAC maintenance staff regarding response procedures in case of a CBR release and regarding safety risks to both the building occupants and maintenance personnel; and (3) development of procedures for regular, scheduled maintenance to ensure constant, optimal performance of the HVAC system.

The guide recognizes that "physical security is the first layer of defense." It cautions, however, that reduction of a building's vulnerability to CBR attack requires a comprehensive approach. The practical usefulness of particular recommended measures will vary, depending on the "threat profile" and "security assessment" of any particular building and its occupants. For instance, the corporate headquarters of an internationally recognized corporation may warrant more intensive—and expensive—measures than would a retail store in a small town. The evaluation may change, however, if the retail establishment is frequented by soldiers from a nearby, well known military base, or if the business has potential significance as an internationally recognized American brand. Wherever an establishment falls on the spectrum of risk, "the goals are to make your building an unattractive target for a CBR attack and to maximize occupant protection in the event that such an attack occurs."

The complete guide is available at www.cdc.gov/niosh. Copies also may be obtained by calling 800, 356-4674, and requesting NIOSH Publication No. 2002-139. For more information, contact Jackson Lewis or members of its OSHA Practice Group: Edwin G. Foulke, Jr., Rogers S. Kaplan, or Robert M. Wood. (From *Perspectives*, public sector practice specialty newsletter of the American Society of Safety Engineers.)

CASUALTY MANAGEMENT AFTER A DELIBERATE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

This document contains recommended immediate actions for police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians who may be faced with a nuclear terrorist act.

The Situation. A conventional explosion has scattered radioactive material, saboteurs blew up a truck carrying radioactive material, or an aerosol containing radioactive material has been

spread over a large area. There may be some injured people and, in the latter situation, there may be hundreds of contaminated or exposed people.

Protecting Yourself

- Approach the release with caution. Position personnel, vehicles, and command post at a safe distance upwind and uphill of the site, if possible. Ensure your own physical safety. Look for fires, exposed high-voltage wires, sharp or falling objects, tripping hazards, or hazardous chemicals. Be alert for changing conditions.
- Wear a mask to reduce the dose from inhalation of radioactive dust. Ideally the mask should be a full face mask with a HEPA filter, but even breathing through a wet handkerchief or cloth will help. There will be little danger from radioactive gases, so a self contained breathing mask, while effective, is not necessary unless there are other gases or toxins present.
- Dust will collect on your clothes. Remove and discard them after you leave the area. Bag the clothing for later disposal. If you fail to remove them, you will continue to receive radiation and expose others. Wear loose fitting clothes covering as much of your body as possible. Any removable garment that will prevent the dust from coming into direct contact with your skin will suffice.
- Open wounds or abrasions must be protected from radioactive contamination.
- If running water or showers are available, full body rinsing with lukewarm water is advised. Even a fire hose may remove most contamination not already removed with the outer clothing.
- Do not eat, drink, or smoke while exposed to potentially radioactive dust or smoke. Drinking water may be necessary for people working in high temperatures with bulky protective clothing. If absolutely necessary to drink water, drink from a canteen or other closed container. Beware of heat strain.
- If radiation measuring instruments are available, place them in plastic bags to prevent their contamination and use them to map the areas leading up to the highest dose rates. Do not enter the areas of highest dose rate except to save lives, and then make the entry as brief as possible.

Protecting the Injured and Exposed

- Seriously injured people should be removed from the source of radiation, stabilized, and sent to hospitals first.
- After treatment of serious physical injuries, preventing the spread of the radioactive material or unnecessary exposure of other people is paramount. Carry out the following immediate response actions without waiting for any radiation measurements:
 - Establish an exclusion zone around the source. Mark the area with ropes or tape. Reroute traffic. Limit en-

try to rescue personnel only. Detain uninjured people who were near the event or who are inside the control zone until they can be checked for radioactive contamination, but do not delay treatment or injured people to transport to a hospital for this purpose.

- Take action to limit or stop the release of more radioactive material if possible, but delay cleanup attempts until radiation protection technicians are on the scene.
- Tell nearby hospitals to expect the arrival of radioactively contaminated and injured people.
- Everyone near the scene should be checked for radioactive contamination. As soon as you can obtain radiation measuring equipment, establish a decontamination area for this purpose. Decontaminate people whose injuries are not life threatening (broken arms, etc.) before sending them to hospitals. Do not send people without physical injuries to hospitals.
- Record keeping is as important for the long-term health of the victims as it is for the emergency responders. Use the form which may be downloaded from the following site: www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/casualties_radioactive.htm to record contact information for all exposed people so they can be given medical examinations later. The Department of Health and Human Services will request this information later.

For More Help. In the event of a radiation emergency, you should notify your state Radiation Control Program Director. Telephone numbers for each state may be found at www.crcpd.org/Map/map.asp. Notify the CDC Emergency Preparedness Branch at their 24-hour telephone number: (777) 488-7100.

Other Information. *The North American Response Guidebook* (Publication A70-010) and its *Pocket Edition* (A70-010P) contain supplemental information on dealing with radioactive material. These books may be ordered from: UNZ and Co., 700 Central Avenue, New Providence, NJ 07974; Phone: 800, 631-3098. For some important lessons learned regarding selection and use of protecting clothing from the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City disasters, see *Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks* (NIOSH Workshop Proceedings), ISBN: 0-8330-3149-X CF-176-OSTP, at www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF176/.

UNIVERSITIES GIVE AWAY BIOTERROR DETECTION SOFTWARE

On December 2, 2002, Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh stated that software that could provide an early warning of bioterrorist attack was being given to health organizations free of charge. The Real-time Outbreak Disease Surveillance software was created several years ago by the BioMedical Security Institute, which the schools jointly operate,

and is available on the Internet (www.biomedsecurity.org). Health professionals using the surveillance software enter the patients' symptoms, their ZIP codes, and dates of their visits. The system can alert medical and emergency officials of any spike in symptoms that could be related to a biological attack.

A year before the September 11 terrorist attacks, scientists at the universities began a project to track patterns of influenza, E. coli infections, and illness caused by common biological agents reported in Pittsburgh area hospitals. The goal was to have all health systems in Pennsylvania using the software in three years. Eventually, the system could be used nationwide.

FTA OFFICE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY BROCHURE

The Federal Transit Administration Office of Safety and Security has just released a new brochure, *"Standard Protocols for Managing Security Incidents Involving Surface Transportation Vehicles."* This brochure contains information on prevention, unknown substances and suspicious packages, and response. For copies, contact Alison Thompson, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Kendall Square, 55 Broadway, Cambridge, MA 02142-1093, or it is available on line at <http://152.122.8.162/Publications/Default.asp>.

PORTLAND, OREGON, TRANSIT OFFICERS RECEIVE COMMENDATIONS

Sergeant David Golliday, Officer Daryl Turner, Deputy Chad Phifer, and Deputy Robert Bianchi were all commended by the Portland Bureau of Police for their various roles in the arrest of a group who were noticed making apparent drug deals on October 16, 2002. All of the subjects were arrested and charged with various felonies. Congratulations to all four officers.

Meetings

1/8-12/03 Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Conference, Baltimore, MD, Environmental Protection Agency (800, 364-7974; www.2003conference.org)

1/9-10/03 Homeland Security 2002 Conference and Exhibition, Washington, DC (703, 876-5060, or 800, 846-0099; Fax: 876-5059; www.e-gov.com)

1/11-15/03 Transportation Research Board 83rd Annual Meeting, Washington, DC (202, 334-2934; Fax: 334-2003)

1/12-16/03 Transportation Research Board 82nd Annual Meeting, Washington, DC (202, 334-2934; Fax: 334-2003)

1/14/03 Substance Abuse Training Session: Regulatory Review and Best Practices, Worcester, MA, Federal Transit Administration (617, 494-3798; (whalley@volpe.dot.gov))

1/18-29/03 Terrorism: Threats, Tactics, Training, and Technology, Washington, DC, TRC Training hosted by Washington Metro Transit Police (TRC@terrorism.com)

1/22-23/03 Connecting Communities: Emergency Preparedness and Security Regional Forum, Newark, NJ, Federal Transit Administration (www.transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/training)

1/28-29/03 Transportation Safety and Security Workshop, Washington, DC, George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management and International Emergency Management Society (gshaw@gwu.edu; crubin@gwu.edu)

2/5-6/03 Connecting Communities: Emergency Preparedness and Security Regional Forum, Los Angeles, CA, Federal Transit Administration (www.transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/training)

2/11/03 Substance Abuse Training Session: Regulatory Review and Best Practices, Jacksonville, FL, Federal Transit Administration (617, 494-3798; whalley@volpe.dot.gov)

2/13/03 Substance Abuse Training Session: Regulatory Review and Best Practices, Orlando, FL, Federal Transit Administration (617, 494-3798; whalley@volpe.dot.gov)

2/26-27/03 Connecting Communities: Emergency Preparedness and Security Regional Forum, SanDiego, CA, Federal Transit Administration (www.transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/training)

3/11/03 Substance Abuse Training Session: Regulatory Review and Best Practices, Hickory, NC, Federal Transit Administration (617, 494-3798; whalley@volpe.dot.gov)

3/24/03 Substance Abuse Training Session: Regulatory Review and Best Practices, Philadelphia, PA, Federal Transit Administration (617, 494-3798; whalley@volpe.dot.gov)

5/7/03 Substance Abuse Training Session: Regulatory Review and Best Practices, Beloit, WI, Federal Transit Administration (617, 494-3798; whalley@volpe.dot.gov)

5/13/03 Substance Abuse Training Session: Regulatory Review and Best Practices, Fort Worth, TX, Federal Transit Administration (617, 494-3798; whalley@volpe.dot.gov)

6/2-6/03 Criminal Intelligence and the War Against Terrorism, Seattle, WA, American Association of Railroads Operations Center—Rail Alert Network (www.leiu2003seattle.org)

10/11-16-03 American Public Transportation Association Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, UT (202, 296-4800)

10/21-25/03 110th Annual International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference: Law Enforcement Education and Technology Exposition, Philadelphia, PA (800, THE IACP; www.theiacp.org)

Training

1/8-9/03 Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction El Paso, TX, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

1/13-16/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Baltimore, MD, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

1/14-15/03 Fatigue Awareness Seminars, Tampa, FL, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, or 405, 954-3682; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

1/15/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, Garden City, NY, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

1/16/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, Garden City, NY, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

2/19-20/02 Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York, NY, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, or 405, 954-3682; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/10-14/03 Transit System Security, Cleveland, OH, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, or 405, 954-3682; Fax: 405, 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/17-18/03 Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction, Pomona, CA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, or 405, 954-3682; Fax: 405, 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/19/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, Santa Barbara, CA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/20/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, Santa Barbara, CA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/20-21/03 Fatigue Awareness Seminar, Portland, OR, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, *or* 405, 954-3682; Fax: 405, 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/24-27/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Toronto, Ontario, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/24-27/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Atlanta, GA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

3/26-27/03 Substance Abuse Management and Program Compliance, Concord, CA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, *or* 405, 954-3682; Fax: 405, 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

4/7-11/03 Transit System Security, Toronto, Ontario, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

4/11/03 Fatigue Awareness Seminars, Tampa, FL, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, *or* 405, 954-3682; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

4/14-17/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, St. Louis, MO, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

4/16/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Rail Hijacking Seminar, Boston, MA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

4/17/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Rail Hijacking Seminar, Boston, MA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

4/23/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Rail Hijacking Seminar, Minneapolis, MN Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

4/24/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Rail Hijacking Seminar, Minneapolis, MN Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

5/5-8/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, El Paso, TX, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

5/5-9/03 Transit System Security, Detroit, MI, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

5/15-16/03 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Seminar, El Paso, TX, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

6/2-5/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Boston, MA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

6/2-6/03 Transit System Security, El Paso, TX, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

6/16-20/03 Transit System Security, Long Beach, CA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, *or* 405, 954-3682; Fax: 405, 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

6/17-18/03 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Seminar, Chicago, IL, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

6/25/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, South Bend, IN, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

6/26/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, South Bend, IN, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

7/7-10/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Long Beach, CA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

7/21-25/03 Transit System Security, Austin, TX, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

7/23-24/03 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Atlanta, GA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation

Safety Institute (800, 858-2107, or 405, 954-3682; Fax: 405, 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

8/5/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, Colorado Springs, CO, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

8/6/03 Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking Seminar, Colorado Springs, CO, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

8/11-14/03 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Fairfax, VA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

8/18-22/03 Transit System Security, Atlanta, GA, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

9/10/03 Transit Explosives Incident Management Seminar, Portland, OR, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

9/11/03 Transit Explosives Incident Management Seminar, Portland, OR, Federal Transit Administration and Transportation Safety Institute (405, 954-3682; or 800, 858-2107; Fax: 954-0367; www.tsi.dot.gov)

Let Us Hear From You. If you have any activities that would be of interest regarding transit security, a staff member whom you want to commend for some outstanding or heroic action, or just about anything dealing with transit security, please let us hear from you. Fax your material to the number below—we will find a place for it in the newsletter.

Address Corrections. If you note any inaccuracies on the address label, please fax or E-mail corrections to the number below along with your phone and Fax numbers and E-mail address.

Note: Information for this newsletter may be sent to Edith Rodano, Office of Safety and Security, Federal Transit Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D. C. 20590 (202, 366-0191; Fax: 366-7951) or Edith.Rodano@fta.dot.gov by February 15, 2003.