Belarus: OSCE Presence in MinskDouglas Davidson, Deputy Chief of U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropeStatement delivered to the OSCE Permanent Council Vienna, Austria October 17, 2002
Released by the U.S. Mission to the OSCE Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We welcome your decision to place this item on the PC agenda. At the Permanent Council meeting on October 3, Ambassador Gaisenak made the point that delicate negotiations over an OSCE presence in Minsk would enjoy better prospects of success if conducted in private. We would agree with that sentiment, if Belarus were negotiating in earnest and good faith. However, from the disparate positions presented by Belarus over the last ten months and taking into account the fact that Belarus remains unprepared to negotiate with the Chair substantively, it is apparent that such an approach is impossible. Further, Belarus' deliberate efforts to bring the AMG's activities to a halt through the expulsion of international mission members contravenes the decision that this Permanent Council adopted in 1997. This fact makes this matter a concern to all of us within the Permanent Council today. We in the United States delegation share the view expressed by you and the European Union’s representative here that the Advisory and Monitoring Group’s mandate, as laid out in the decision we adopted in 1997, remains in effect until this Permanent Council adopts a decision to change or amend it. Mr. Chairman, Belarus has made frequent calls for Permanent Council consideration of its complaints about the work of the AMG in the past. The Permanent Council has already heard those complaints many times, and it will no doubt hear them again today. More to the point, however, negotiations over the future of the AMG provide Belarus an avenue to address those concerns and move forward; yet, it has rejected every effort to do so. Mr. Chairman, there is not a host State within this Permanent Council that has not had, at one time or another, concerns about the work of the OSCE field presence on its territory. Sometimes those concerns have been brought before this Permanent Council. However, from FYROM to the FRY, from Tajikistan to Ukraine, each has found a way to address, and to resolve, those concerns in a constructive manner, either through consultations with the Chair or through negotiated decisions adopted by the Permanent Council. Belarus, alas, serves as the only exception. Thus, with regard to Belarus, we reject the notion that this matter is about respect for the views of a host State. Instead, it is about the overriding lack of respect of one participating State for the principles of this organization and the decisions of this Permanent Council. Mr. Chairman, your personal efforts to negotiate a resolution of this matter have been impressive and overwhelmingly apparent to us all. It is equally apparent that it is not possible to resolve this matter here in Vienna. We join the EU in calling upon Belarus to demonstrate a minimal gesture of good faith in return by extending the accreditation of the last remaining member until a resolution is reached. However, we also call upon the Chair to consider dispatching a senior-level team to Minsk to negotiate a resolution there. Absent a decision by Belarus to demonstrate such good faith and to enter conclusive negotiations, and lacking an OSCE mission to address effectively concerns in Belarus, we also call upon the Chair to consider placing Belarus on the PC agenda on a regular basis for the purpose of providing dates on relevant developments in Belarus and on the progress of negotiations. In closing, a decision by Belarus to expel the last member of the AMG and block negotiations will bring the AMG's activities to an effective halt. Such conduct in contravention of OSCE principles and decisions and undermines the integrity of this organization. It is unacceptable. As such, this issue would need to be addressed by Ministers in Porto. Furthermore, in view of the extraordinary precedent this would set, we believe that it will be necessary to consider appropriate concrete measures to adopt in response on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. |