

1 member center, Blood Systems, performed an  
2 anonymous survey of donors in an attempt to  
3 estimate the donor loss related to the vCJD  
4 travel deferral.

5 This work is being presented at  
6 the upcoming meeting of the American  
7 Association of Blood Banks, and the authors  
8 are Doctors Murphy, Connor, McEvoy,  
9 Hirschler, Busch, and others. They have  
10 allowed me to present their major findings.  
11 They distributed 10,000 anonymous  
12 questionnaires to donors earlier in 2002.

13 Two thousand surveys were allotted  
14 to each of five geographic groupings of  
15 blood centers. They received 84 percent  
16 responses, or 8,400 responses. Overall, 3  
17 percent of the donors responding to the  
18 survey met Phase 1 or Phase 2 vCJD criteria  
19 for deferral. However, there were marked  
20 differences in predicted deferral rates  
21 between northern California, in which they  
22 reached 7.7 percent, and other geographic

1 areas combined of 1.8 percent.

2 Northern California deferrals were  
3 for U.K. travel and European residence or  
4 service at a military base, and the other  
5 geographical areas deferral was almost  
6 exclusively for service at a European  
7 military base. This survey documented our  
8 major surprise with the travel deferrals.

9 In the past we focused our  
10 concerns on the impact on donors in large  
11 U.S. cities on both coasts. We now realize  
12 that military deferrals constitute a major  
13 component of the deferrals. This should not  
14 have been a surprise because traditionally  
15 military personnel and their families have  
16 been dedicated contributors to the civilian  
17 blood supply.

18 Some ABC centers are seeing  
19 substantial deferrals of high school and  
20 college students because they were military  
21 dependents and were born or lived in Europe  
22 for extended period of time. Other blood

1 centers have told us that they have seen  
2 significant attrition of donors at corporate  
3 blood drives with multi-national companies  
4 whose employees and families routinely are  
5 posted in Europe for extended periods of  
6 time.

7 I'd like to go to the next slide  
8 and talk now a little bit about the status  
9 of blood supply among ABC member centers.

10 The implementation of new  
11 deferrals came at a time when almost  
12 one-third of the ABC blood supply has been  
13 at critically low levels, as shown by the  
14 results of what we call our Stop Light  
15 Program. In the Stop Light Program, ABC  
16 member centers report their red cell  
17 inventories daily via an internet program;  
18 an ABC posts its daily summary report on its  
19 web site. It's not nice looking, but it's  
20 informative. The web site is  
21 [www.americasblood.org](http://www.americasblood.org), and it's public.

22 This figure summarizes the current

1 data, and what we have seen agrees entirely  
2 with the picture that has been shown by both  
3 Dr. Page for American Red Cross and  
4 Dr. Jones for New York Blood Center. That  
5 is, we classify -- or, the centers classify  
6 their inventories as green when they have  
7 three days or more of their average  
8 distribution in inventory and are  
9 comfortable with that; the yellow is two  
10 days of inventory; and red is one day or  
11 less of inventory. So, as you see, in the  
12 weeks of June close to 30 percent of our  
13 centers had one day or less of inventory.

14           So that there is no confusion with  
15 the nice but complex graphs that  
16 Dr. Nightingale showed to us, what most  
17 blood centers tend to do is to shift their  
18 inventories to the hospital to have the  
19 inventories available at the hospital level,  
20 so the complete picture is more difficult  
21 today. But the way the inventories get  
22 supplied is by requests to blood centers.

1           So blood centers with one day or  
2 less of inventory have fulfilled the  
3 hospitals. The hospitals may be doing okay,  
4 but that's where the situation at the blood  
5 center is more complex.

6           The next slide, please. It's  
7 clear -- and this is the percent of the ABC  
8 blood supply at the code red, one day supply  
9 or less, as of June 19th. It is clear that  
10 the current supply is less than optimal and  
11 that the trend is for a continuous decline.

12           This past Tuesday, all donations,  
13 blood banking, and public health leaders  
14 have joined together to issue a call for  
15 eligible Americans to give blood this  
16 summer. I'd like to extend this appeal to  
17 the members of the committee, and please  
18 donate blood. The appeal comes in face of  
19 increasingly significant blood shortages.  
20 Last in a one-day supply in certain parts of  
21 the country. The appeal was issued by the  
22 American Association of Blood Banks,

1 America's Blood Centers, American Red Cross,  
2 the American Hospital Association, and the  
3 American Public Health Association.

4 Now, I'd like to make a request to  
5 the committee. We all share a common  
6 purpose -- the availability of a safe blood  
7 supply. Concerns about the possible  
8 transmission of vCJD by transfusion have led  
9 us to implement strict donor deferral  
10 policies. They are having an impact, a  
11 serious impact on the blood supply.

12 They are not the only cause for  
13 these shortages, but I believe they are an  
14 important element of the shortages. While  
15 we recognize that the data about the  
16 potential for transmission of TSEs in animal  
17 models continue to develop, we still lack  
18 evidence of such transmission among patients  
19 that receive transfusions in the U.K. -- and  
20 I would like to hear more from our U.K.  
21 colleague -- or even more elsewhere and  
22 patients that have received multiple

1 transfusions and ---- with concentrates for  
2 many, many years since the beginning of the  
3 BSE epidemic traced back to 1980.

4 The number of cases of vCJD has  
5 increased slowly. However we continue to  
6 add and maintain measures waiting for  
7 definite proof to determine whether TSEs are  
8 or are not transmitted by transfusion. We  
9 respectfully request that FDA and this  
10 committee discuss mechanisms and criteria  
11 for review of those decisions.

12 Our questions are how do we  
13 balance the theoretical risk of transmission  
14 with the real risk of blood shortages. Or,  
15 more specifically, what would be the  
16 criteria or the requirements, or what would  
17 be needed for a decision to lift some or all  
18 of the vCJD- related travel deferrals. We  
19 certainly are ready to participate of such  
20 effort and provide you with as much data and  
21 information we can gather.

22 Thank you very much for the

1 opportunity to comment.

2 DR. BOLTON: Thank you,  
3 Dr. Bianco. Questions? Comments?

4 I have one. It's curious to me  
5 that the south was a -- 48 percent of the  
6 southern centers were at one day, yet that  
7 didn't seem to correlate with your vCJD  
8 deferral.

9 DR. BIANCO: Actually, Dr. Bolton,  
10 you hit the nail on the head. That was a  
11 surprise. Those are the centers where the  
12 military collections, where the military  
13 deferrals affected. I realize only now  
14 that, for instance, one of our members is  
15 the large center in San Antonio, Texas.  
16 About 30 percent of their collections come  
17 from military bases, and that's true from  
18 several other regions. I believe that you  
19 saw that in the Carolinas, Peter, and in  
20 other areas.

21 DR. BOLTON: Did that also show up  
22 in the 8,000 surveys that came back from



1 that region for example?

2 DR. BIANCO: From that region?

3 The blood system is an interesting system  
4 that is more mid-west and West Coast. They  
5 cover -- they have 23 centers, is our  
6 largest members. But they do not have  
7 centers in the south.

8 DR. BOLTON: So, that survey was  
9 really a very remarkably good response, and  
10 even with what appeared to be very good  
11 data, you still could not tease out this  
12 effect in advance of the actual  
13 implementation.

14 DR. BIANCO: Well, it really  
15 emphasized the importance that the military  
16 have had as part of our donor base. We  
17 never -- we always called them volunteer  
18 blood donors. But now we are seeing the  
19 impact more clearly, and I hope Ron is going  
20 to help us more with that.

21 DR. BOLTON: Oh, Jay? Microphone,  
22 please. It's still not on. Why don't you

1 use one of these? Use the table mike.

2 MR. EPSTEIN: Again, I don't have  
3 the data in front of me but my recollection  
4 is that we did predict approximately a 2  
5 percent national loss due to the DoD-related  
6 deferral. What was not predicted was the  
7 fine geographic distribution, because the  
8 survey wasn't capable of that.

9 I think the surprise has been the  
10 extent to which the military-related donors  
11 contribute at certain centers. But it's not  
12 that we were particularly off in our  
13 estimate of magnitude.

14 DR. BOLTON: Right. I know that  
15 as the committee deliberated on this, we  
16 were well aware that the military personnel  
17 on active duty, as well as retirees, are  
18 regular and willing blood donors as part of  
19 the military culture. And I certainly, for  
20 one, expected that they would have a  
21 significant impact in this way.

22 The good side of that is that we

1 can look to that as a model for the change  
2 in culture that we need to establish to  
3 begin to increase the percentage of all  
4 citizens that donate, because I think within  
5 the military there is a recognition that  
6 blood is important. It's sort of a part of  
7 your duty to be a donor, and we just need to  
8 spread that throughout the rest of the  
9 population.

10 DR. BIANCO: I think that I tried  
11 to say that. It was a surprise, but it  
12 shouldn't have been a surprise.

13 DR. BOLTON: You did say that.  
14 Dr. Piccardo?

15 DR. PICCARDO: Well, I think that  
16 we knew that the military contributes  
17 substantially. But the point is that they  
18 did not respond or the percent of response  
19 to the survey was very low. So, maybe the  
20 numbers aren't there, but we knew that they  
21 contributed substantially.

22 DR. BOLTON: Well, I think what

1 Dr. Bianco said is that the survey didn't  
2 reflect that southern region, so even if  
3 they had responded in the mid-west and what  
4 have you, it didn't really reflect that some  
5 of the southern centers would be hit in that  
6 way, and I guess Jay was saying the same  
7 thing, that the regional distribution or the  
8 spottiness of the effect wasn't teased out.

9 DR. PAGE: Page, American Red  
10 Cross. I just have to correct a statement  
11 that Dr. Bianco made about the American Red  
12 Cross. The Carolinas region had a deferral  
13 percent related to CJD in March of '02 of .4  
14 percent, which is less than our system  
15 average of 0.6 percent. So, they were not  
16 amongst the highest.

17 DR. BOLTON: Yes, Dr. Gambetti.

18 DR. GAMBETTI: I assume that all  
19 of these data are based on the FDA  
20 recommendation for deferral rather than the  
21 Red Cross criteria.

22 DR. BIANCO: That is correct. Our

1 centers have adopted the exact  
2 recommendations of FDA for Phase 1 and  
3 Phase 2. The only thing that I should note  
4 again is that about 60 percent of the  
5 centers decided to implement both Phase 1  
6 and Phase 2 at the same time. But they are  
7 the exact FDA criteria.

8 DR. GAMBETTI: So, there is no  
9 room for correction.

10 DR. BIANCO: No, there is room for  
11 collection, not correction.

12 DR. BOLTON: Dr. Williams.

13 DR. WILLIAMS: Thank you. A very  
14 brief comment for the record on how the  
15 deferrals related to military went into the  
16 calculation. We were not totally dependent  
17 on the survey for those numbers.

18 We, in fact, got figures from DoD  
19 on the estimated proportion of military and  
20 ex-military residents in the states, did  
21 ---- calculations on the likelihood of  
22 donations by that cohort. In fact, ----

1 has 2 percent. In fact, in one site we did  
2 try to specifically survey the military  
3 population to see the proportion that it  
4 spent, the appropriate times in Europe and  
5 the U.K. that would result in deferral, and  
6 we got a less-than-10 percent response rate.

7 So while they like to donate  
8 blood, they don't like to do surveys, so  
9 that was a difficult measure. But I think  
10 the overall impact nationwide was probably  
11 on because of the way the data were  
12 obtained.

13 DR. BOLTON: Very good. Okay, I  
14 think we'll move on now. Our next speaker  
15 is in fact Maj. Ronnie Alford from the  
16 United States Air Force. Maj. Alford.

17 MAJ. ALFORD: Good morning. Can I  
18 have the next slide, please?

19 We in the Department of Defense  
20 implemented the additional vCJD deferrals in  
21 October of last year. We implemented the  
22 deferrals as recommended by the FDA with one

1 notable exception, and that is we combined  
2 the north of the Alps and the south of the  
3 Alps recommendations and applied the more  
4 restrictive south of the Alps  
5 recommendations for all of Europe.

6 One note of interest here is that  
7 from our assignment histories, we knew that  
8 we could expect 18 percent of those forces  
9 currently on active duty to be deferred  
10 based on the new deferrals. That on top of  
11 the historical 25 percent deferral rate that  
12 we experienced prior to vCJD deferrals, our  
13 No. 1 deferral was for piercings and  
14 tattoos. Of notable interest here, we do  
15 not include time aboard ship for naval  
16 forces that were on Mediterranean cruises.  
17 Only time ashore is accounted.

18 Slide, please. I put this slide  
19 in just to give the committee members an  
20 appreciation for where our donor centers are  
21 located. We only operate 18 donor centers  
22 in the continental U.S., and you can see

1 where they're concentrated with the huge  
2 void there.

3 Slide, please. In addition to our  
4 CONUS operations, we also operate six donor  
5 centers outside of the continental U.S., and  
6 you can see the locations. So, total of 24  
7 donor centers worldwide.

8 Slide. Our donor population. Our  
9 donor centers within DoD. We do not go  
10 outside of the gates of our installations,  
11 if you will, to collect blood. So, we're  
12 totally dependent upon our active duty  
13 population and family members and civilian  
14 employees on base. The lion's share of our  
15 collections comes out of that 1.38 million  
16 active duty personnel. Ninety-two percent,  
17 in fact, of our donations come from those  
18 people.

19 We only get 2 percent of our  
20 donations from family members. Even though  
21 that family member number is fairly large,  
22 two-thirds of those are children.



1           Our total donor operations within  
2 DoD are very small in comparison to the  
3 other speakers this morning. We only  
4 recruit about 130,000 donors a year, and we  
5 only recruit off of about one-tenth of major  
6 DoD installations worldwide. We only  
7 recruit from 32 DoD installations worldwide.

8           So, we're getting about 9 percent  
9 penetration into our active duty forces.  
10 They're actually getting out to donate.  
11 Major interest here is that the distribution  
12 of that 18 percent is not even. We have  
13 seen deferrals as high as 50 percent in some  
14 of our forces -- heavy armor units at Fort  
15 Hood, Texas, for instance, because of huge  
16 rotations to Bosnia over the past several  
17 years and also huge rotations to Germany.

18           Slide, please. It's very  
19 difficult to accurately determine the impact  
20 of the deferrals that we implemented. This  
21 may be news -- it certainly is big news  
22 within DoD and certainly I think it goes

1 along with the normal course of business for  
2 our civilian counterparts. We have not  
3 traditionally had access to donor  
4 recruiters.

5 We were successful in gaining  
6 funding and placing recruiters out into all  
7 of our donor centers this past year in  
8 October alone. So, as we implemented the  
9 deferrals, we gave the donor centers  
10 recruiters and we have had a tremendous --  
11 they've given us a tremendous boost in our  
12 collections.

13 Again, we've seen self-deferrals  
14 at command briefings, and that's -- command  
15 briefings are when we actually get a  
16 battalion or a company, a large group of  
17 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, together  
18 and we would generally get a small five- or  
19 ten-minute time frame to brief those people.  
20 We've seen deferrals as high as 50 percent  
21 among those units. Again -- and we've also  
22 some additional educational things from the

1 DoD level going down.

2           Although operation Enduring  
3 Freedom is not front-page news in The  
4 Washington Post every day, it's certainly  
5 front-page news at places like Fort Bragg  
6 because those are the places where those  
7 troops are coming from, the family members  
8 there, the soldiers remaining behind.

9           That's very much on the forefront  
10 of their minds, so we've seen recruitment  
11 being eased because of forces being pushed  
12 forward into a theater of operations. We  
13 have pushed about 15,000 units into  
14 southwest Asia and European evacuation  
15 routes as well.

16           Another complicating issue is that  
17 because our donor centers are typically  
18 staffed with the laboratory technicians from  
19 the hospitals, a lot of those lab techs were  
20 forward deployed, so our donor centers lost  
21 staffing. We did have reserves -- some  
22 reserve forces come in, but of course you

1 lose productivity with bringing them up to  
2 speed and training and you lose one of your  
3 valuable trained staff to do the training.  
4 But we have seen a major bounce-back.

5 Then probably the most important  
6 thing that we've done is expanded our  
7 collections at our basic training commands.

8 Slide, please. In a comparison of  
9 the year prior to implementation of the new  
10 vCJD deferrals to the six months afterward,  
11 we've actually increased our whole blood  
12 donations by 9 percent. We are averaging 12  
13 percent deferrals for vCJD, and that's,  
14 again, across DoD, again, with the greatest  
15 impact being with units with heavy European  
16 rotations. We're seeing less than 1 percent  
17 in some of our basic training units. That's  
18 actually basic training throughout all of  
19 the services.

20 So, our total deferrals for fiscal  
21 year '01 was 25 percent. Now we're down  
22 to 16 percent total. That is for

1 everything, including piercings and tattoos.  
2 So, we have actually -- we've made great  
3 strides here.

4 Next slide, please. Then just a  
5 graphical representation of our collections.  
6 Again, you can see the 9 percent increase.

7 Slide, please. So, in summary,  
8 although we did implement the additional  
9 deferrals in October, we took corrective  
10 steps to alleviate the increased deferrals  
11 by adding the recruiters and shifting  
12 collections to trainees. Again, we went to  
13 war, which I think definitely made  
14 recruiting easier, although we really did  
15 not see a way of quantifying that.

16 We've increased our eligible  
17 donations and the actual whole blood  
18 donations by 9 percent. The range of  
19 deferrals, again, as low as 1 percent, as  
20 high as 50 percent. Tremendous swings even  
21 though we do not see a clear geographical  
22 distribution, if you will, for those

1 deferrals. It's really more toward the  
2 mission of the units, and we pretty much  
3 have a good feel for the types of units that  
4 have heavy European rotations.

5           Again, we have decreased our total  
6 deferrals by 40 percent. That's clearly as  
7 a result of actually having donor recruiters  
8 and having effective donor education  
9 programs to let the people know -- the  
10 potential donors know -- if they are  
11 eligible to donate. So, in regard to CJD  
12 deferrals, put a checkmark there. We have  
13 certainly met that challenge and in fact  
14 increased our donations.

15           Any questions?

16           DR. BOLTON: Thank you, Maj.  
17 Alford. Questions.

18           I guess I have one. I'm the only  
19 one who has lots of questions today. I've  
20 completely forgotten about the piercings and  
21 tattoos, so, I mean, this is a little off of  
22 our subject but can you inform me is that a

1           lifelong ban or is it a year period of time  
2           from the time that the piercing or tattooing  
3           is done?

4                   MAJ. ALFORD:   It's a year.

5                   DR. BOLTON:   It's a year, okay.

6                   MAJ. ALFORD:   One of the things  
7           that we've noticed is that now that we're  
8           focusing on trainees, I guess it's the  
9           culture of the military I guess that many  
10          young men and women feel that you graduate  
11          from basic, "Let's go get a tattoo." So,  
12          we're collecting them before we let them go  
13          get the tattoos.

14                   DR. BOLTON:   It's a very good  
15          strategy. I was just going to ask -- not  
16          getting the tattoos so that they don't have  
17          to give blood, though, is that the --

18                   MAJ. ALFORD:   No.

19                   DR. BOLTON:   Other questions or  
20          comments for Maj. Alford?

21                   Very good. Thank you very much.  
22          It's nice to see something that can be done

1 in a positive way to deal with the  
2 situation.

3 Our next speaker is Kay Gregory,  
4 Director of Regulatory Affairs, the American  
5 Association of Blood Banks. Kay?

6 MS. GREGORY: I think the mike's  
7 on now. I want to begin by explaining who  
8 the American Association of Blood Banks is.  
9 We're a professional society, so we don't  
10 actually collect blood or transfuse blood  
11 but our members all do, and we  
12 represent 8,000 individuals involved in  
13 blood banking and transfusion medicine both,  
14 and approximately 2,000 institutional  
15 members, and these include blood collection  
16 centers, hospital-based blood banks, and  
17 transfusion services as they collect,  
18 process, distribute, and transfuse blood and  
19 blood components and hemapoietic stem cells.

20 Our members are responsible for  
21 virtually all of the blood collected and  
22 over 80 percent of the blood transfused in



1 this country. For over 50 years the AABB's  
2 highest priority has been to maintain and  
3 enhance the safety and the availability of  
4 the nation's blood supply.

5 The AABB believes that lack of  
6 appropriate data is a major barrier to  
7 determining the state of the blood supply in  
8 the United States. Although public health  
9 experts and the transfusion medicine  
10 community recognize the need for such data  
11 and committees such as this one routinely  
12 ask for this information, no agency is  
13 willing to fund a comprehensive ongoing  
14 collection and analysis of data about the  
15 blood supply.

16 Because there is no systematic,  
17 scientifically valid routine collection of  
18 data concerning supply and usage, there's no  
19 established baseline and thus it's  
20 impossible to measure the effect of policy  
21 changes, such as the new vCJD deferral. Any  
22 attempt to quantify the effect of the new

1 vCJD deferral will be difficult if not  
2 impossible.

3 At this point in time, it  
4 certainly is not possible to gauge the  
5 effect of a policy that was required to be  
6 implemented only on May 31st, 2002. Any  
7 decrease in donations is compounded by the  
8 well-known summer slump in donations.  
9 Moreover, the same difficulties in measuring  
10 the effect of new donor policies that were  
11 discussed at previous meetings of this  
12 committee with regard to the in initial  
13 round of vCJD deferrals are also applicable  
14 here, and you've heard some of these.

15 It may be possible to measure how  
16 many donors appear at the blood center and  
17 are deferred because of vCJD criteria.  
18 However, we cannot measure how many donors  
19 self-defer because of advanced publicity,  
20 including significant efforts on the part of  
21 many blood centers to notify donors about  
22 this change.

1           The committee should also keep in  
2 mind that the number of deferred donors does  
3 not equate to the number of blood components  
4 that are lost. Apheresis donors can donate  
5 more often than whole blood donors, and  
6 deferral of such donors increases the number  
7 of blood components that cannot be  
8 collected.

9           That said, AABB appreciates this  
10 committee's interest in the state of the  
11 blood supply. The National Blood Data  
12 Resource Center, an independent subsidiary  
13 of the AABB, continues to collect data that  
14 may be of interest. NBDRC captures data on  
15 a monthly basis from 25 blood centers in the  
16 United States. This geographically and  
17 statistically representative sample accounts  
18 for 32 percent of allogeneic, whole blood,  
19 and red blood cells collected by U.S. blood  
20 centers annually.

21           This slide illustrates the  
22 allogeneic collections for the most recent

1 six-month period from December of 2001  
2 through May of 2002. Although not apparent  
3 from the graph, December monthly collections  
4 were the lowest reported for the entire year  
5 of 2001 -- only 319,000 units. Thus far  
6 in 2002, monthly collections have averaged  
7 about 342,000, and that's not significantly  
8 different from the average for the same  
9 period in 2001, which was 338,000. The 3.1  
10 percent decline in collections experienced  
11 in May, however, is statistically  
12 significant when you compare April and May.

13 We also collect inventory data  
14 twice monthly, and until recently we had not  
15 seen any significant fluctuations in 2002.  
16 However, between the third Wednesday in May  
17 and the first Wednesday in June, the sample  
18 experienced a 5.6 percent decline in whole  
19 blood, red blood cell inventories. That is  
20 statistically significant.

21 The NBDRC's monthly analysis of  
22 collection data provides an important first

1 element of determining the true state of the  
2 nation's blood supply. However, as we have  
3 stated to various government agencies and  
4 advisory committees, additional data on  
5 blood usage are also needed if we are to  
6 understand long-term trends and forces  
7 affecting the nation's blood supply. The  
8 AABB strongly urges the Department of Health  
9 and Human Services to support this essential  
10 data collection and analysis.

11 Thank you.

12 DR. BOLTON: Thank you, Kay.

13 Questions? Steve?

14 DR. NIGHTINGALE: Thank you. I  
15 would like to make a follow-up comment on  
16 what Ms. Gregory said -- and if you'll show  
17 the -- it's slide No. 2 I want showed, if I  
18 could, please -- because I think we are on  
19 our way to getting to the point that  
20 Ms. Gregory and the AABB would like us to  
21 get to, and that is on a line that I  
22 neglected here.

1           I want you to look at this line  
2 here, at the bottom. This is the total  
3 usage of blood at the hospitals that are  
4 served by the three community-wide blood  
5 centers in Seattle, Pittsburgh, and  
6 Tampa-St. Pete. It is not representative of  
7 the United States but it is representative  
8 of a lot of hospitals. What I want to show  
9 you is that there is a lot of regularity in  
10 here where you see the two dips here.  
11 That's a Thanksgiving dip; that's a  
12 Christmas dip.

13           I can't tell you how many of these  
14 blood units went for obstetric care, how  
15 many went for cancer chemotherapy, how many  
16 went for trauma. But I can tell you over  
17 almost a year period this has been quite  
18 stable. I personally think it's up in the  
19 air, and it's going to be discussed when we  
20 review our program in September just how  
21 much more detail we need to get into, but we  
22 may be a little closer to it with efforts

1 like this than the people appreciate.

2 That leads me to the second of the  
3 two points. This stability -- this  
4 constancy of blood use -- this demand for  
5 blood has persisted over a time when the  
6 price of blood has gone up very, very  
7 substantially, and I think the committee  
8 should have an immediate appreciation for  
9 the fact that at least with the current  
10 supply and demand, the demand for blood at  
11 current prices is very, very inelastic.

12 Blood is somewhere  
13 between \$115-\$200 a bag right now,  
14 substantially more than what it was before  
15 and probably not at its peak. The question  
16 is how much more are hospitals willing to  
17 pay for blood and how much more are  
18 hospitals willing to pay for additional  
19 resources necessary to bring blood to the  
20 market.

21 A question before you is -- before  
22 us is: Whether or not the federal

1 government should embark in a \$10 million  
2 campaign to promote blood donation. I will  
3 speak as an individual here just for this  
4 sentence, is that the 10 million that has  
5 been proposed seems to me to be a low ball  
6 estimate of the cost that it's really going  
7 to pay. Ten million is less than one dollar  
8 per additional bag of blood, and I think  
9 it's going to take more than that, and when  
10 you make your recommendation, a little bit  
11 of economics should go into it.

12 DR. BOLTON: Steve, while you're  
13 up there, let me ask you this question.  
14 What would it take -- not thinking in terms  
15 of dollars but in terms of organization --  
16 to get all of the major blood collection  
17 organizations and centers and possibly the  
18 hospitals across the country to participate  
19 in a data collection system as you have  
20 established?

21 DR. NIGHTINGALE: I think that at  
22 this point if we wanted to -- I want to use



1 this word carefully -- bang on the door real  
2 loudly as opposed to kick the door down, I'm  
3 sure that ABC and ARC would cooperate. The  
4 information is available through back  
5 channels.

6 We talk on the phone all the time.  
7 I think we have to respect the fact that the  
8 responsibility for blood collection in this  
9 country is in a private sector and not in  
10 the government, and we would be much more  
11 aggressive if that were not the case.

12 We do not operate a Canadian  
13 system, and we try to get feedback from Red  
14 Cross and the ABC but how hard can we lean  
15 on you on this. Sure, I'd love to have the  
16 daily numbers from the Red Cross and the ABC  
17 for my particular project. The figures  
18 would look better.

19 But the reason for this project is  
20 not to get a better paid ---- transfusion.  
21 The reason for this project is to try to  
22 support the private sector -- do a very

1       difficult job better. That's why we tap on  
2       the door gently.

3               DR. BOLTON: Right, and my  
4       question comes from the assumption that the  
5       organizations that are actually doing this  
6       job in the private sector, and in the  
7       military as well, would benefit from having  
8       that global -- national picture to analyze  
9       and to really understand, for example, the  
10      effects of not only policy decisions that we  
11      might recommend, but other events that may  
12      occur.

13              DR. NIGHTINGALE: There are some  
14      realities in the business that we have here  
15      that are different, say, from Britain. We  
16      have a competitive environment, and an  
17      ongoing philosophic, political, even  
18      economic question is how much of that is  
19      good and how do we keep it from, you know,  
20      competition for the same high school  
21      students, for example. That's an area where  
22      I think a knee-jerk government response

1 could very well be counterproductive.

2 DR. BOLTON: Right. Well, I know  
3 there's a balance between how much that  
4 information would be useful and how much it  
5 would be scary in a sense to competitors  
6 sharing their information. But I would  
7 certainly ask the various blood collection  
8 organizations to think about this and see if  
9 there isn't some way that -- I don't know if  
10 we can preserve the proprietary nature of  
11 some of the data and yet still make it  
12 useful not only for us but for them as well.

13 Yes.

14 MS. GREGORY: If I could just add  
15 something. The difficulty is not  
16 necessarily getting the data from the blood  
17 collection centers. The difficulty is  
18 getting the data on the other end of it, and  
19 that is: The transfusion data is much more  
20 difficult to get than the collection data.

21 There currently -- as far as I  
22 know, Steve is the only one collecting any

1 kind of data, and as he -- we don't know  
2 whether blood's being used for cancer  
3 patients -- exactly what it's being used  
4 for. We would like to be able to have that  
5 information, but right now there is nowhere  
6 to get that from.

7 DR. BOLTON: Well, let Steve  
8 respond and then Dr. Bailar.

9 DR. NIGHTINGALE: Just last --  
10 last -- I mean, one of the reasons,  
11 obviously, that we might like to have that  
12 information is to identify how much waste  
13 there is in the system. I presented one  
14 piece of data: In our system there is  
15 essentially not waste at all in the centers.

16 We cover about 8 percent of the  
17 blood supply. We see 10 units of blood  
18 outdated a day in 8 percent of the blood  
19 supply and, anecdotally, that's all AB  
20 positive that you can't get rid of. That  
21 situation is different in Britain for  
22 several reasons.

1                   One possibility is the economic  
2 pressures are different. Blood's expensive  
3 here, and we don't outdate it.

4                   The second question is how much  
5 education till we recommend to change  
6 physician practices. I don't think it  
7 should be taken as received wisdom, but  
8 there is massive wastage of blood in the  
9 system right now.

10                  Harvey Klein, Director of the NIH  
11 Blood Center, and for that, my first  
12 resident when I was an intern -- said  
13 something that I feel is very wise and needs  
14 to be repeated here, which was HIV scared a  
15 lot of the slack out of the blood system  
16 right now, and the thing that I would follow  
17 up from Harvey is that the price of blood  
18 where it is right now -- if this hasn't  
19 scared the slack out of it, when blood  
20 hits 250, that's going to scare the slack  
21 out of it.

22                  DR. BOLTON: Dr. Bailar?

1 DR. BAILAR: I'm pretty convinced.  
2 As a committee member, I'd like to make a  
3 strictly informal request to FDA to work  
4 with the private agencies in considering  
5 whether FDA should actively promote a  
6 substantially expanded and improved data  
7 collection effort, related to blood supply  
8 and usage and, if so, to return to this  
9 committee with any specific questions or  
10 proposals where we might help.

11 DR. BOLTON: Okay, Dr. Wolfe?

12 DR. WOLFE: When Dr. Scott made  
13 her presentation this morning, she pointed  
14 out -- and this is, for starters, just a  
15 question -- that back when this committee  
16 made the recommendations for deferral, there  
17 was also some recommendation for a national  
18 recruitment campaign. Neither Dr. Bailar,  
19 who has raised this issue, nor I were there  
20 then.

21 Was there specifically a proposal  
22 to try and do something about the so-called

1 summer slump? I mean, I'm all in favor of  
2 more data collection, too, but the data is  
3 unequivocal that year after year there's a  
4 summer slump, and it happens this year to  
5 coincide with the initiation of the deferral  
6 program so it makes it look worse.

7 I would have liked to have seen  
8 seasonally adjusted data for some of the  
9 presentations that were made, but was there  
10 specifically a recommendation to try and do  
11 something about the summer slump?

12 Dr. Linden has pointed out that New York  
13 creatively initiated this motor vehicle  
14 registration reminder at the beginning of  
15 the summer, and it seems like to focus more  
16 on campaigns at the time when there is a  
17 predictable slump would at least take some  
18 of the edge off. Was there that  
19 recommendation, and what has been done by  
20 all the agencies that are involved?

21 DR. BOLTON: You're testing my  
22 memory, but my recollection is that there

1 was not a request to specifically address  
2 the summer slump, but there was a request to  
3 move to improve recruitment by a national  
4 education campaign, and there was also a  
5 suggestion that this data collection system  
6 be instituted -- some means of trying to  
7 track the blood collections and usage.

8 DR. WOLFE: I would then add to  
9 Dr. Bailar's suggestion in addition to  
10 getting more data that we should use  
11 existing data and here and now request that  
12 all of these agencies that are involved come  
13 back with a very specific plan for dealing  
14 with the summer slump. If, as suggested  
15 earlier, it will take yea number of  
16 months -- 12, 18 -- before that's  
17 implemented, we've lost already a year or  
18 whatever since the committee made a general  
19 recommendation but apparently did not focus  
20 on doing something about the summer slump.  
21 It seems like that would make it much more  
22 tolerable to implement this policy.



1 DR. BOLTON: Let's get Jay's  
2 input. Jay?

3 MR. EPSTEIN: Well, first, it's  
4 correct that there have not previously been  
5 proposals specifically directed to the  
6 summer slump. However, the concept of the  
7 government getting more involved with  
8 efforts to both monitor and increase the  
9 blood supply do date back several years.

10 When we first discussed the  
11 potentially large impact of precautionary  
12 policies directed toward variant CJD, it was  
13 recognized, particularly by Dr. David  
14 Satcher, then the Assistant Secretary and  
15 Surgeon General, that we would need to  
16 accompany any such policy by a program to  
17 monitor and increase the blood supply. The  
18 department did adopt in November '99 an  
19 element of what we called our blood action  
20 plan, which is a plan that dated back to  
21 March '98, an element specifically to  
22 address monitoring and increasing the blood

1 supply. We did build on previous efforts.

2           There was a period -- I think it  
3 was three years -- during which the NHLBI  
4 funded the NBDRC; you heard their report  
5 from Kay Gregory -- to produce monthly data.  
6 Up until that point in time, there were no  
7 periodic reports. There were only surveys  
8 that were done basically as retrospectives  
9 covering approximately every other -- I'm  
10 sorry, once every two years there were these  
11 reports that were looking back several  
12 years. And instead, effective roughly, the  
13 fall of '99 we had monthly data with a  
14 one-month lag.

15           It was then recognized that those  
16 data were based on the collectors and didn't  
17 give us the other side of the equation which  
18 was used, and after much dialog and debate  
19 over responsibility in funding and so forth,  
20 the department took on the challenge of  
21 creating daily monitoring of hospital  
22 inventories coupled with shortage reporting.

1 That's the system that Dr. Nightingale has  
2 been presenting.

3 Now, you know, are we where we  
4 want to be in terms of data collection and  
5 analysis? Well, I think the discussion  
6 today, and discussions that have gone on,  
7 you know, within the government and the  
8 blood industry, do suggest that much further  
9 progress could be made. But we are where  
10 are because of the deliberate effort to do  
11 the very thing that you're talking about  
12 recommending.

13 Now, there has also been a lot of  
14 talk about the relative role of the  
15 government versus the private sector in  
16 initiatives. It's not a trivial issue.  
17 There have been efforts to engage government  
18 officials in public service announcements  
19 coordinated with urgent blood drives. Some  
20 of that has been done. I mean, there  
21 actually were videotapes of public officials  
22 and there have been efforts to coordinate

1 the voice of the blood industry so that  
2 there are unified rather than competitive  
3 donor campaigns.

4 We have also taken on the  
5 scientific challenge of trying to remove  
6 unnecessary barriers to donation by  
7 re-examining the deferral criteria, as well  
8 as the use of tests. We've done that  
9 largely with the Blood Products Advisory  
10 Committee because many of those issues are  
11 not TSE related. So, for example, we've  
12 reviewed the deferrals for body piercing,  
13 tattoos, and acupuncture. We've reviewed  
14 the exclusions for males who have had sex  
15 with males. We've reviewed whether we  
16 should continue testing for syphilis and so  
17 forth. So we have been moving on all these  
18 fronts, but I certainly share the sentiment  
19 of the committee that more is needed in the  
20 current situation, that we're not yet on top  
21 of the problem, and I'm certainly  
22 appreciative of the remark that we need to

1 focus in particular on this periodic summer  
2 slump. Let me just say that December is no  
3 picnic either.

4 DR. BOLTON: Other questions or  
5 comments? Very good.

6 Well, that concludes our  
7 presentations on the blood supply of the  
8 revised guidance, and at this time I think  
9 we'll move to the open public hearing.

10 Bill, do you want to --

11 OPEN PUBLIC HEARING

12 DR. FREAS: Yes, Mr. Chairman. We  
13 have not gotten any requests to speak at  
14 this morning's open public hearing. Is  
15 there anyone in the audience who is not on  
16 the agenda who would like to address the  
17 committee on topics on the committee's  
18 agenda? If not, this will be a very short  
19 open public hearing.

20 I turn the microphone over to you.

21 DR. BOLTON: Okay, well, we're  
22 running about even with that short public

1 hearing. We are still running about 20  
2 minutes behind time. I would like to ask  
3 the committee members, sort of informally,  
4 would you like to take a 10-minute break and  
5 come back? Okay, that will put us a half  
6 hour behind but I think we'll still be able  
7 to conclude, so let's meet back here at 11  
8 o'clock.

9 (Recess)

10 DR. BOLTON: Would the members of  
11 the committee please take their seats and  
12 we'll resume our meeting -- as well the  
13 members of the public? I was obviously too  
14 lenient. I gave you a 15-minute break  
15 instead of a 10-minute break.

16 Okay, the final part of our  
17 meeting we'll have two presentations, also  
18 updates on some experiments with variant CJD  
19 and filtration. So, the first presentation  
20 is by Dr. Larisa Cervenakova, and she will  
21 be speaking on studies of the variant CJD  
22 infectivity in blood of experimental mice.

1 Dr. Cervenakova?

2 STUDIES OF vCJD INFECTIVITY IN BLOOD OF  
3 EXPERIMENTAL MICE

4 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Good morning. I  
5 would present studies in variant CJD  
6 infectivity in blood of experimental mice.

7 Slide, please. What I'm going to  
8 do -- I would like to compare our data,  
9 which are still in progress. We didn't  
10 finish experiment yet, but we have a  
11 sufficient amount of data to give you the  
12 idea what's going on with use of blood  
13 infected mice with variant CJD, and I would  
14 do comparison to our previous experiments,  
15 which were done in also mouse model, using  
16 Fukuoka strain.

17 At the end I will briefly show you  
18 one slide when I will compare these data  
19 with experimental data collected in hamsters  
20 infected with 263K strain, derived from  
21 scrapie in sheep.

22 Next, please. This is just to

1 show you how the experiment was set up. The  
2 brain tissue from the variant CJD 10 percent  
3 brain homogenate was inoculated in R3FADK  
4 (phonetic) mice by ICNAP route of  
5 inoculation, at the Institute for Animal  
6 Health in Edinboro. We get brain tissue  
7 material from a mouse which developed the  
8 disease at 336 days after inoculation from  
9 ---- and as well we got from the strain of  
10 mice susceptible to variant CJD, and we  
11 actually breed these mice in-house and  
12 inoculated them with 1 percent mouse brain  
13 homogenate, inoculated intracerebrally in  
14 group of mice.

15 In one group of mice, we  
16 euthanized at 17 weeks after inoculation, in  
17 order to see if we can produce the disease  
18 clinically, and later on we saw, after 157  
19 days, first thing was started to develop the  
20 disease. At this point we euthanized the  
21 rest of the animals, and we collected from  
22 both groups of animals blood, pulled it



1 together, separated it into components and  
2 inoculated the components. We also  
3 collected brain tissue and spleens for later  
4 detection of the presence of abnormal prion  
5 protein in brain and spleen.

6 Next, please. These data compare  
7 actually the incubation period in mice  
8 infected with BSE and variant CJD and  
9 secondary transmission from the same strain  
10 of mice, and you can see the shortening of  
11 incubation period was shrunk for both  
12 strains -- for BSE and variant CJD.

13 Next, please. Because we wanted  
14 to compare our data to Fukuoka strain, it  
15 was important for us also to see if Fukuoka  
16 strain would take in R3 mice and what will  
17 be the incubation period for R3 mice and for  
18 Swiss mice, in which experiments with  
19 Fukuoka strain were done. And you can see  
20 the incubation period for Fukuoka strain  
21 shown in yellow and for variant CJD is shown  
22 in blue and actually the incubation period

1 for Fukuoka strain in both strains of mice  
2 is shorter than for variant CJD.

3 Next, please. This is by chemical  
4 ----, if you wish, or from PrP 27-30 in both  
5 strains of mice for Fukuoka strain and  
6 variant CJD, and you can see that there are  
7 differences in the profile, and the profile  
8 stays the same in both strains of mice.

9 Next, please. This is data on the  
10 presence of abnormal PrP in spleens of mice  
11 infected with the Fukuoka strain and variant  
12 CJD as a clinical stage of the disease. And  
13 right now I would like to say that we did  
14 for clinical animals as well, we haven't  
15 done every animal, every single animal, but  
16 we actually can detect the presence of  
17 abnormal BRP in spleens of variant CJD  
18 infected mice at 17.

19 We're accepting inoculation at 23  
20 weeks after inoculation and very recently we  
21 inoculated another strain of mice with  
22 variant CJD strain just to propagate as the

1 infection in animals and have animals ready  
2 for other blood infectivity studies. And  
3 at 79 days after inoculation is 10 minus 4  
4 infectivity in inoculate, we detected the  
5 presence of abnormal PrP in spleens of these  
6 mice, and this is the answer probably to the  
7 questions which you addressed yesterday.

8 You can detect the presence of  
9 variant CJD agent 3 in no particular system  
10 clinically and, yes, we can but it is not  
11 very much different from what we know from  
12 other strains that in half the incubation  
13 period, approximately, we can detect the  
14 presence of PrP infectivity in spleens of  
15 the animals.

16 Next, please. This shows how the  
17 blood was separated into components, and we  
18 inoculated all of these components, but  
19 today I'll talk about buffy coat platelet  
20 rich plasma and buffy coat platelet poor  
21 plasma, because this is part of the  
22 experiment which is almost done, completed.

1                   Next, please. Here are the pulled  
2 data from mice infected with Fukuoka strain  
3 and with 310V mouse adopted BSE strain and  
4 the level of infectivity in blood components  
5 of these animals and you can see that this  
6 data correlates nicely together.

7                   Next one. This slide is very  
8 busy, but it gives you the idea about the  
9 incubation periods in mice which were  
10 inoculated with Fukuoka 1 strain by  
11 intracerebral intravenous route of  
12 inoculation. Buffy coat plasma, buffy coat  
13 in R3 mice inoculated with Fukuoka strain  
14 and various CJD inoculated R3 mice. And as  
15 well, you can see different routes of  
16 inoculation.

17                   If you look at the slide, actually  
18 you cannot see significant differences  
19 between incubation period in mice infected  
20 with GSS or in mice infected with variant  
21 CJD. This last blue across here shows that  
22 this animal was detected to be positive when

1 all animals were euthanized at 560 days  
2 after inoculation by Western Blot resulted  
3 in clinical science of the disease.

4 Next, please. This table  
5 represents the groups which we inoculated  
6 with different dilutions, a clinical phase  
7 of the disease, and this is for buffy coat,  
8 and here in yellow you can see that actually  
9 we completed this group and conformed -- did  
10 the Western Blots on the -- these animals  
11 were actually euthanized. All of them were  
12 euthanized at 560 days, and we were not able  
13 to perform Western Blot analysis on all of  
14 them, but this gives you a pretty good idea  
15 about what's going on.

16 Here you can see that the  
17 incubation period when the first animal  
18 showed signs of the disease. And here, as I  
19 told you before, the animal which actually  
20 was confirmed to have the disease only by  
21 Western Blot.

22 Next, please. This is data for

1 inoculation of plasma, platelet rich plasma,  
2 platelet poor plasma for 23 weeks and ----  
3 phase 17 weeks. These animals were already  
4 euthanized, these two groups, and this is  
5 still in progress. They will be euthanized  
6 very shortly, and these animals are still  
7 incubating. We saw a couple of those in  
8 both groups but as the animals were not  
9 confirmed yet to be positive for infection  
10 by Western Blot.

11 Next, please. This is data from  
12 the study which originated from Dr. Brown,  
13 and as you may remember that inactivity in  
14 buffy coat was found to be present during  
15 the incubation period and raised  
16 dramatically at the clinical stage of the  
17 disease. Almost zero infectivity was found  
18 in plasma, but, again, that's a clinical  
19 stage of the disease. You can see increase  
20 in the infectivity are present in plasma.

21 Next, please. This is data for  
22 variant CJD. This is not completed yet, but

1 I still put zero here right now. But you  
2 can see, again, the infectivity titers in  
3 animals, you know, if this goes to the  
4 clinical stage of the disease. But still  
5 you can see the difference, that the  
6 clinical stage shows infectivity is a little  
7 bit high, compared to the clinical stage of  
8 the disease. And suddenly this is present  
9 in buffy coat, and we found this infectivity  
10 to be present in plasma at the clinical  
11 stage as well.

12 Next, please. These data compare  
13 the level of infectivity between Fukuoka  
14 strain in Swiss mice and R3 mice, because we  
15 did this comparison again, and you can see  
16 that there is pretty good agreement between  
17 the infectivity in buffy coat of Swiss mice  
18 and R3 mice infected with Fukuoka strain at  
19 the clinical stage.

20 Next, please. This is data  
21 comparing variant CJD and Fukuoka strain.  
22 Buffy coat and plasma inoculated by

1 different routes of inoculation by IC and  
2 IV. IC is shown in yellow and IV is shown  
3 in red, and you can see that intracerebral  
4 route of inoculation is most efficient for  
5 both buffy coat and plasma compared to  
6 intravenous route of inoculation, but we  
7 were able to show that it is possible to  
8 transmit the disease by both routes, and  
9 this is in comparison to Fukuoka strain.

10 Next, please. This is combined  
11 data for Fukuoka strain in mice, variant CJD  
12 strain in 263K scrapie strain in hamsters,  
13 and in all three rodent models you can see  
14 the highest level of infectivities present  
15 in buffy coat, and this is per ---- buffy  
16 coat or per ---- plasma, and as well in  
17 plasma rich infectivity present as well at  
18 the clinical stage of the disease.

19 Next, please. This is  
20 experimental data on transfusion studies.  
21 You know about the experiments which were  
22 performed at NIH many years ago when



1 chimpanzees were transfused and no  
2 transmission of the disease occurred. This  
3 is data collected by Paul Brown in  
4 cooperation with us, and one transmission  
5 was achieved upon transfusion of 20 animals.

6 This is data from Dr. Rowher's lab  
7 and, as well, he got three animals out of  
8 more than 100 transfused, and this is data  
9 from Fiona Houston from the United Kingdom  
10 when actually 24 sheep were transfused  
11 from 18 donors and 2 animals developed the  
12 disease, and this is our data with variant  
13 CJD. We did also close to 100 transfusions,  
14 and we right now have three animals which  
15 developed the disease upon transfusion.

16 Next, please. Finally, I would  
17 like to acknowledge people who were my  
18 collaborators or my technical staff. Thank  
19 you.

20 DR. BOLTON: Thank you,  
21 Dr. Cervenakova. Questions? Steve?

22 DR. DeARMOND: We see tons of data

1 on mice and hamsters but absolutely nothing  
2 about human blood transmitted into any  
3 animal model. What's going on with that?  
4 It's now 7 to 8 years, 120 people, lots of  
5 blood available for analysis. What is the  
6 result of human blood into an appropriate  
7 animal model?

8 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Well, first of  
9 all I would like to say -- I haven't seen  
10 any published data, at least on blood  
11 transfusions from human to animal. Suddenly  
12 it is very difficult to address this issue  
13 because we know that conventional mice are  
14 not very susceptible to TSCs -- human TSCs.

15 In this case, what we have to hope  
16 for is that we have susceptible, maybe  
17 transgenic, mouse. Even so, Dr. Brown is  
18 saying that maybe it is over-representing  
19 something. But still probably it be  
20 valuable in order to test and inoculate if  
21 it proves to be a susceptible .

22 The problem is, in my opinion,

1 that when we were getting this sporadic CJD,  
2 in general we have very low level of  
3 infectivity in blood of animals. If you  
4 have some infectivity present in blood of  
5 human, it probably also is at very low  
6 level. If you look at the studies which  
7 were done -- and were done very recently --  
8 by Moira Bruce in the United Kingdom, when  
9 she inoculated buffy coat lymphocytes from  
10 human infected variant CJD, the problem is  
11 that she inoculated a very small number of  
12 animals.

13 Even if there is infectivity in  
14 the sample, she will be not able to detect  
15 it, because I forgot to mention that when we  
16 inoculated buffy coat only into five  
17 animals, we were not able, even with  
18 dilution 1 to 4, to 2, we were not able to  
19 see any infection. In this case, it is  
20 really necessary to have a large group of  
21 animals to be inoculated, and I have to say  
22 that Bob Rowher is completely correct about

1 it, that all his study points to the  
2 necessity to do these studies on the large  
3 scale.

4 There is no way how to do it  
5 otherwise because if you have, let's say, 10  
6 animals out of 100 to show the infection, it  
7 means that it will be one animal out of 10.  
8 And it's always a question: Is it a true  
9 result, or it is just some kind of  
10 contamination?

11 This is what you have to take into  
12 account, that once you work in the lab, you  
13 handle a lot of material, infectious  
14 material. You have to really have worked  
15 out very well all the profiles which I  
16 showed you, because we are aware that if you  
17 Fukuoka, variant CJD, or some other strain,  
18 you may get cross-contamination.

19 In this case, this is one of the  
20 way to prove that this is true result  
21 because the strain stays the same. It  
22 doesn't change during the time.

1                   But I think that it is necessary  
2 to do transfusion transmission studies using  
3 small animals and probably try to use  
4 different transgenic mice and see how they  
5 will perform.

6                   DR. DeARMOND: Well, everything  
7 you say is absolutely true and that's the  
8 way you would run the experiment, but the  
9 right experiment hasn't been done yet. And  
10 we keep getting this stuff which implicates  
11 blood, but we don't know the real answer in  
12 humans.

13                   As far as I know, the 11 variant  
14 CJD patients who gave blood and was  
15 transfused to other people, those  
16 individuals haven't come down with the  
17 disease. Intracerebral inoculation is  
18 certainly different than intravenous  
19 inoculation.

20                   So I don't understand, and Stan  
21 Prusiner I know is very upset because we  
22 haven't been able to get the blood for

1 animal models that we know are susceptible  
2 to variant CJD from humans. So, this is  
3 nice data, but does it have any relationship  
4 to the human condition, is what I'm saying?

5 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Well, there is  
6 probably -- what we can take from this, that  
7 we have to have our open minds, that if  
8 there's a possibility that low levels of  
9 infectivity are present in blood of  
10 people --

11 DR. DeARMOND: Well, our minds are  
12 open. For the last two years, we voted to  
13 ban any import of blood because of this.

14 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

15 DR. DeARMOND: We believe that  
16 there might -- that there's a real risk --

17 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

18 DR. DeARMOND: -- but no one has  
19 shown it yet. This kind of data doesn't  
20 help.

21 DR. CERVENAKOVA: I believe the  
22 group which actually had better good

1 opportunity to do that is Dr. Prusiner's  
2 group, because he has susceptible transgenic  
3 mice to do the experiments, and --

4 DR. DeARMOND: Well, put some  
5 pressure on the British government and  
6 European government to send us the samples.

7 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Well, I don't  
8 know, actually, if this is British  
9 government, because right now there is a  
10 problem from our government to import even  
11 antibodies from Prionics. You know, our  
12 antibody was kept on the border last time  
13 for three weeks without noticing, as if we  
14 have to have some kind of permit in order to  
15 get them.

16 In this case, it is really  
17 difficult situation, but what I'm trying to  
18 say that experiments -- some experiments are  
19 in place, and probably is the best  
20 experiment right now which is going on it is  
21 the best experiment using squirrel monkeys,  
22 which originated from Dr. Brown.

1           The experiment -- and I don't  
2 remember if it was presented here, but the  
3 experiment is set up in the ways that  
4 actually blood from patients with variant  
5 CJD patients infected with variant CJD was  
6 collected, separated into components, and  
7 buffy coat and plasma were inoculated in  
8 squirrel monkeys.

9           But the number of animals is so  
10 low that I even question if we are going to  
11 see the infection, because you have three  
12 animals and if you don't have any of them  
13 developing the disease, what are you going  
14 to say? There is no infectivity. In my  
15 mind, no, you are not able to draw this  
16 conclusion.

17           There is no money to expend this  
18 study to have significant number of animals,  
19 which will be sufficient in order to show  
20 that there is really nothing there. This is  
21 very susceptible animal model to use for  
22 these kind of studies.



1 DR. BOLTON: Sue.

2 DR. PRIOLA: I have two really  
3 easy questions for you, I hope. What's the  
4 infectious dose that you used? Do you have  
5 an idea of the titer you inoculated, both IC  
6 and IV? This was presumably a very high  
7 dose.

8 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Well, when we  
9 inoculated originally, we compared actually  
10 the dose which we inoculated and it is 7  
11 LD50s for both, for Fukuoka and variant CJD,  
12 because this was important for us to show  
13 that it is.

14 DR. PRIOLA: Seven LD50s?

15 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

16 DR. PRIOLA: That's not much.

17 The second thing is -- you alluded  
18 to this in part of your answer to  
19 Dr. DeArmond's question: Controlling for  
20 lab contamination when you have -- even in  
21 the positive experiments you have, you know,  
22 just a couple of animals coming up, and it's

1 obviously very low titer. I assume you look  
2 in all the brains to see if you have the  
3 shift in size between the GSS, the Fukuoka,  
4 and the vCJD?

5 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

6 DR. PRIOLA: Did you do a parallel  
7 mock infection going -- doing exactly the  
8 same thing but using --

9 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes, we did.

10 DR. PRIOLA: Those were all  
11 conclusive.

12 DR. CERVENAKOVA: They're  
13 negative. They're negative.

14 DR. PRIOLA: All negative. Same  
15 numbers of animals, etcetera.

16 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Well, we haven't  
17 done the same number of animals, certainly,  
18 but we do inoculate them, periodically, to  
19 have this control, because it is very  
20 difficult to produce a sufficient number of  
21 animals for this particular study, and this  
22 is why we switched to another animal, which

1 was showed, actually, is susceptible to  
2 variant CJD and has the same incubation  
3 period. And this is FVBn strain.

4 DR. BOLTON: Let me clarify. The  
5 inoculated dose was 7 LD50s or 7 log 10  
6 LD50s?

7 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Seven logs.

8 DR. BOLTON: Okay. There's a  
9 little difference there.

10 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

11 DR. BELAY: The BSE agent  
12 transmission in the experimental sheep model  
13 that you showed. There were two positives,  
14 right?

15 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

16 DR. BELAY: Now, the one positive  
17 that was published received blood obtained  
18 in the incubation period of the experimental  
19 sheep.

20 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

21 DR. BELAY: How about the second  
22 positive? Did it receive also blood

1 collected during the incubation period or at  
2 the clinical studies?

3 DR. CERVENAKOVA: I'm trying to  
4 remember it. I believe it was also from  
5 pre-clinical but very close to the clinical  
6 phase. Actually, I didn't include this data  
7 on transmission of scrapie from sheep which  
8 naturally develops the disease. And it was  
9 recently shown that they achieved  
10 transmission in four cases of natural  
11 scrapie. This data was submitted for  
12 publication and were present at the meeting  
13 in Bergen which I attended, but they are  
14 still not readily available.

15 DR. BELAY: How about the mouse  
16 transfusion study?

17 DR. CERVENAKOVA: Yes.

18 DR. BELAY: Was it also collected  
19 in the incubation to pre-clinical phase?

20 DR. CERVENAKOVA: No. When we did  
21 our transfusion studies, these were animals  
22 which developed the disease. At this point,

1 we euthanized them, and they are actually  
2 coming even from different strains, but I  
3 don't think so it is important.

4 What we did, we transfused into  
5 the same just to see because we tested a  
6 couple of strains and when the animals  
7 developed the disease we took the blood and  
8 transfused. This data will be presented  
9 later in a more subtle way.

10 DR. BOLTON: Would you introduce  
11 yourself from the floor?

12 DR. EGLIN: Yes. I'm Roger Eglin  
13 from the National Blood Service in England.  
14 If I could just make a few comments about  
15 the human cases of variant CJD we have:  
16 Although we've had 121 or 122 cases now,  
17 there are only 8 still alive, and it's  
18 proved very difficult to persuade the  
19 earlier cases to give reasonable amounts of  
20 blood.

21 Their families have been very  
22 protective of the cases. The cases tend go

1 on to die, and they really don't really want  
2 to give blood donations or even sizable  
3 volumes at all. So, that's proved a very  
4 difficult thing to do. There is a natural  
5 experiment going on in the blood donor's in  
6 England, in that some blood donors have  
7 subsequently developed variant CJD, and  
8 there are 20 or so recipients of those under  
9 those transmissions as well.

10 So, there's a natural experiment  
11 going on there with the longest incubation  
12 period of about 9 years so far. No signs of  
13 any of those implicated recipients going  
14 down with illness.

15 Thought I'd just make a comment on  
16 the sheep experiment as well. Although  
17 it's 2 out of 24, in total it's actually 2  
18 out of 2 of the ones that you would expect  
19 to be showing clinical signs at the moment,  
20 because the experiment was set up  
21 sequentially, they weren't all infected as a  
22 batch. So, that makes it somewhat more

1 impressive, and I believe there are some  
2 more suspects in that experiment. They'll  
3 becoming ill, too.

4 DR. DeARMOND: But while you can't  
5 get blood from the patients during life for  
6 various reasons. How about at autopsy? I  
7 know that some of them denied having  
8 autopsies.

9 DR. EGLIN: A lot of them -- most  
10 of them do, yeah, and they die at home, and  
11 it's just proving very difficult. They're  
12 not experimental animals.

13 DR. DeARMOND: There must have  
14 been at least a couple that will donate  
15 blood. Do you know the numbers who have  
16 allowed blood, or is it zero?

17 DR. EGLIN: I think it's very few,  
18 and I think some of the earlier cases, the  
19 blood was not stored in the most appropriate  
20 manner.

21 DR. BOLTON: Steve, Stan had a  
22 variant CJD patient at UCSF for treatment.

1 What about that individual?

2 DR. DeARMOND: That's being looked  
3 at. So, the patient was brought in and the  
4 blood was withdrawn from that patient and  
5 that's all under study right now. But we're  
6 talking about seven years of disease and no  
7 data yet.

8 DR. BOLTON: Bob? Would you  
9 introduce yourself, please?

10 DR. ROWHER: Yeah, Bob Rowher.  
11 Just to emphasize the last two points, that  
12 one of the biggest obstacles in making the  
13 demonstration which Steve is calling for is  
14 the lack of blood itself. It's not just at  
15 the level of variant CJD, but that's also  
16 sporadic CJD.

17 We have 300 and some cases of  
18 sporadic CJD in this country a year, and  
19 getting a unit of blood out of any of them  
20 has been extremely difficult. I think it's  
21 something that if this committee was going  
22 to do something useful, in terms of



1       advancing this idea and advancing the  
2       opportunities for these types of  
3       demonstrations, it would be to in some way  
4       facilitate, by virtue of a recommendation  
5       maybe, that some considerable effort go into  
6       making this possible. The logical place for  
7       it to come through is Dr. Gambetti's efforts  
8       as the CDC repository -- I mean, the  
9       CDC-sponsored CJD repository. So that's  
10      basically what I'm getting at.

11               The other point I wanted to make  
12      is that we also mentioned the Baxter  
13      experiment. This is an experiment that's  
14      going on at the cost of several million  
15      dollars a year, using squirrel monkeys, and  
16      it's main limitation was the monkeys were  
17      there and the blood wasn't. They inoculated  
18      everything they could get their hands on,  
19      but when you sit down and add it up, I'm not  
20      sure we could get a positive demonstration  
21      on the hamsters, using the volumes of blood  
22      that were available for that experiment.

1           The most promising aspect of that  
2 work, in my opinion, is that there is also  
3 going to be -- there have also been  
4 transmissions by the intracerebral route  
5 into squirrel monkeys and the blood from  
6 those monkeys will be used for subsequent  
7 transfusion experiments in monkeys, where  
8 there will be no species barrier.

9           I think it's important to realize  
10 that even humans to monkeys there are  
11 undoubtedly a species barrier effect also  
12 involved there, and you're not necessarily  
13 going to see it when you're looking at very  
14 low titers, such as those that are involved  
15 in blood, even with direct transfusion from  
16 humans into monkeys. So, the  
17 monkey-to-monkey experiment may be the most  
18 important one.

19           The last point is that at the EMEA  
20 meeting in London last week, Fiona Houston  
21 presented an update on her sheep  
22 transmission experiments. And she has now

1 seen four naturally infected,  
2 scrapie-infected sheep transmit the disease  
3 by transfusion to 90 sheep. This has been a  
4 missing link in this whole story.

5 All of the experiments that have  
6 been done to date have been done on  
7 experimentally infected animals. There's  
8 always been this question that was alluded  
9 to over here -- by -- I think it was Sue or  
10 somebody -- about whether we're just  
11 re-isolating the inoculum. That's what  
12 we're finding in the blood.

13 Those experiments that I showed  
14 you yesterday from our laboratory, we are  
15 now inoculating our animals and limiting  
16 dilution just to get around that effect. We  
17 know that that has to be de novo infectivity  
18 that we're seeing in those particular cases.  
19 But in the case of the natural infection,  
20 this is not a question anymore, and there is  
21 really I think very solid evidence now that  
22 the blood of naturally infected animals --

1 in this case scrapie-infected sheep -- does  
2 contain infectivity.

3 The BSE-infected animals are, by  
4 the way, experimentally infected, so they  
5 don't fall into that category.

6 DR. DeARMOND: Well, we seem to be  
7 successful at bringing a cohort of CJD  
8 patients to UCSF and getting blood from  
9 them, and for injection into mice you don't  
10 need a pint. You can use what you get  
11 derived from that -- unless you want to  
12 concentrate the protein. But we're taking  
13 multiple vials of blood from individuals and  
14 testing them for the CDI assay, which is the  
15 most sensitive -- at least that I know of --  
16 immuno assay for the prion protein plus  
17 injection into our susceptible animals.

18 So, I think the experiment can be  
19 done with humans, and one doesn't need to  
20 have high levels or huge quantities of  
21 blood. But I still think the final -- we're  
22 judging policy right now on animal models

1 without any evidence from human disease, and  
2 we really need to study the human disease.  
3 That's all I'm trying to say.

4 I'm not sure that we haven't  
5 proven that there's an infectivity titer  
6 high enough to infect another human in  
7 blood. There may be some there but is it  
8 infectible? Is the infectious agent,  
9 whatever you want to call it at this stage,  
10 in a state in the blood that can infect  
11 another human? That's all the data that we  
12 need. It's that simple.

13 DR. ROWHER: If I can just respond  
14 to that. We do need that data, but I  
15 disagree with you entirely that we need  
16 small volumes. The thing is we need large  
17 volumes, because if we're going to make this  
18 demonstration --

19 DR. DeARMOND: No question, we'd  
20 like to have large volumes, but in the  
21 meantime if we can get smaller volumes, two  
22 or three vials, 10 cc's, 20, 30, 50 cc's,

1 even a hundred cc's, which we are able to  
2 get from volunteers, CJD patients -- that's  
3 at least a good start. I wouldn't stop the  
4 experiment because we can't get a pint.

5 DR. ROWHER: Across the species  
6 barrier, you're going to have difficulties  
7 with that.

8 DR. DeARMOND: We don't have  
9 difficulties with some of the animal models.  
10 For instance, the bovinized PrP model is  
11 highly sensitive to both BSE prions and to  
12 variant CJD prions, and the MHU2M also with  
13 modifications of amino acids in the helical  
14 regions are highly sensitive to sporadic  
15 CJD.

16 DR. ROWHER: I will make an offer  
17 that I've made several times in the past to  
18 the Prusiner laboratory: If they'll provide  
19 us with these mice, we'll do the experiments  
20 the way we do them in hamsters, and we will  
21 be able to answer that question one way or  
22 the other.

1 DR. BOLTON: Therein lies the  
2 problem. Okay.

3 DR. DeARMOND: Well, we can do  
4 them also, and that's a political problem  
5 between Stan and --

6 DR. BOLTON: I agree, and we won't  
7 deliberate further on that here.

8 Yes.

9 MR. BARON: Henry Baron of Aventis  
10 Behring. I just wanted to bring some  
11 clarification to some of Steve's questions.

12 We actually did the experiment  
13 with Stan, Steve, at least once. We have  
14 already inoculated bloods from 13 CJD cases  
15 into the transgenic mice ----.

16 DR. DeARMOND: Sporadic --

17 MR. BARON: Twelve sporadics and  
18 one familial. Now, this wasn't large  
19 volumes. These were groups of 8 to 10 mice,  
20 each of which got 30 microliters of blood  
21 from a case.

22 We also did plasma, red blood

1 cells, and whole blood, and all these  
2 experiments were negative. Now, one can use  
3 the caveat that we didn't do the whole blood  
4 volume on a given patient in that one or two  
5 infectious units for ML we missed because of  
6 the volume question, but nonetheless it's  
7 data, and it's negative data, and we want to  
8 do the same thing with the bovine transgenic  
9 mice with variant CJD cases.

10 At Aventis Behring, we have the  
11 mice, as you know, and unfortunately, as he  
12 said, it's difficult to get the samples.  
13 What we are doing now is we're doing this in  
14 collaboration with a U.K. group, which has a  
15 grant, which gives them access to samples.  
16 So, we're trying very hard to address this  
17 question with the best possible models.

18 DR. DeARMOND: Hank, that's  
19 exactly right, and I think the current  
20 wisdom is that sporadic CJD is different  
21 than variant CJD and there's a large amount  
22 of data from transfusion studies that argues



1 that sporadic CJD doesn't transmit through  
2 blood. The question is whether variant CJD,  
3 which is the whole basis of this, all these  
4 regulations, whether it does.

5 MR. BARON: Yes. I mean, there's  
6 data on variant CJD, too, but it's very  
7 limited. But for 10 years now, there have  
8 been 30 million transfusions in the U.K.,  
9 and there's no evidence but it's early. You  
10 don't know what the incubation period would  
11 be --

12 DR. DeARMOND: That's right.

13 MR. BARON: -- in human-to-human  
14 transmission of blood. But, you know, data  
15 is continuing to be generated and I think  
16 that's all we can do, is work at it and  
17 generate data and hope that it continues to  
18 be negative.

19 DR. DeARMOND: So, what do you  
20 think of more mouse data, mouse transmission  
21 of Fukuoma and variant CJD?

22 MR. BARON: I think it helps, but

1 I agree with you that the real proof of the  
2 pudding is in demonstrating that there's  
3 something in humans, and that's why we've  
4 really got to use these highly susceptible  
5 models to human prions, whether it's variant  
6 CJD or sporadic CJD.

7 With respect to the sheep data,  
8 I'd just like to make one very brief  
9 comment, and I think we should all reserve  
10 judgement until the data is out and  
11 published. I think if we all had a chance  
12 to look at the data, we'd see some very  
13 unusual and paradoxical discrepancies in the  
14 incubation times by transfusion as opposed  
15 to intracerebral inoculation of brain  
16 homogenate from BSE. It's a study that  
17 merits some rigorous scrutiny I think.

18 DR. BOLTON: Point well taken.  
19 Dr. Piccardo will have our last comment or  
20 question on this subject.

21 DR. PICCARDO: Well, it's a  
22 question actually, Steve. Forgetting the

1       unfortunate human-to-human experiments,  
2       people have developed vCJD that donated  
3       blood, basically I don't have the update of  
4       what happened to the recipients. Are  
5       those -- what are we -- are they alive or  
6       dead? I mean, if they are dead, were they  
7       analyzed by an autopsy, etcetera, etcetera.  
8       So, it's an update; it's not a question.

9                 DR. BOLTON: Microphone.

10                DR. SCOTT: I can give you what  
11       little information I have, and this is what  
12       I heard at the World Federation of  
13       Hemophilia from some people in the U.K. in  
14       January. Apparently there are 12 living  
15       recipients of blood products from the people  
16       who came down with variant CJD, and the rest  
17       of the people died. I think there were 20  
18       or 22 recipients overall of non-CJD  
19       illnesses.

20                The other so-called "natural  
21       experiment" that appears to be going on is  
22       that there were recipients of factor 8 in

1 the U.K. in '96 and '97, which had a donor  
2 that had vCJD, and there are  
3 approximately 200 of those.

4 So there is a substantial amount  
5 of recipients that died. Did they specify  
6 what happened, how they were analyzed -- at  
7 autopsy or --

8 DR. PICCARDO: All we know is that  
9 their diagnosis was not CJD illness, and  
10 these were by death records I believe.

11 DR. SCOTT: So then the data is  
12 not precise.

13 DR. PICCARDO: Well, it's not  
14 precise, although we're assured from the  
15 U.K. that these people are believed not to  
16 have died of CJD, but they -- vCJD -- they  
17 could be incubating I suppose. I would just  
18 make the point that if transfusion is  
19 difficult, transfusion transmission is  
20 difficult or rare, this tiny number of  
21 people for this amount of time probably  
22 wouldn't be sufficient if detected and has

1 the same limitations in some of the animal  
2 studies that you're talking about. So, I  
3 think to rely on this kind of a look-back,  
4 unless we get a positive, isn't going to  
5 tell us anything that really helps.

6 So, the question is what happened  
7 with the people that remain alive? Is there  
8 a mechanism in place to try to get more  
9 information when they eventually die, or  
10 there's nothing going on --

11 DR. BOLTON: My understanding is  
12 the patients that are alive are being  
13 followed prospectively. Some of the  
14 recipients died, I think, before there was  
15 an awareness of a donation.

16 DR. SCOTT: Yes, the transfused  
17 people die a lot, and that was a limitation  
18 of the classical CJD look-back studies as  
19 well.

20 DR. BOLTON: I think we should  
21 move on. Do you have a brief comment,  
22 Dr. Bianco?

1 DR. BIANCO: I just wanted to  
2 place a number on Dr. Scott's statement that  
3 people that received transfusions die.  
4 Because of the underlying disease, our  
5 experience with HIV and other HCD look-back,  
6 over 50 percent of the people that received  
7 transfusions died within the first year  
8 because of the underlying disease.

9 DR. PICCARDO: There is important  
10 information that can come from that people,  
11 which is analyze the spleen, for example. I  
12 mean, if you're talking about people that  
13 died very shortly after they received  
14 transfusion, there is ---- which is not the  
15 brain, but it's the spleen, so that is  
16 important information.

17 DR. BOLTON: I think we'll move  
18 on. We can discuss this a little bit later.

19 Our final presentation for this  
20 morning and the meeting is retention of TSE  
21 infectivity by Planova nanofilters as a  
22 function of spike composition, and that will

1 be presented by Dr. Louisa Gregori.

2 RETENTION OF TSE INFECTIVITY BY PLANOVA  
3 NANOFILTERS AS A FUNCTION OF SPIKE  
4 COMPOSITION

5 DR. GREGORI: Thank you and good  
6 morning. This presentation will switch, I  
7 think, the topic of conversation to  
8 something completely different. I will be  
9 talking to you about our experimental data  
10 on the rotation of TSE infectivity by  
11 Planova nanofilters as a functional spike  
12 composition.

13 In the management of viral  
14 contamination for manufactured product, we  
15 have three classical methods of defense  
16 against contamination that's deferred for  
17 blood and sourcing for biologicals,  
18 screening of donated blood and testing of  
19 the raw material, removal and inactivation.  
20 Although all of these methods have provided  
21 to be very effective against conventional  
22 analysis, in the case of TSE they all have

1 presented challenge.

2 TSE is characterized by a long  
3 incubation time, which limits the effect of  
4 deferral. Also we don't have a rapid and  
5 sensitive assay to screen donated blood or  
6 test the raw material. Finally, the  
7 inactivation -- TSE inactivation requires a  
8 harsh condition so they are usually not  
9 applicable to biologicals. So, we're left,  
10 pretty much, with the removal methods.

11 This is a slide just -- Bob Rohwer  
12 has already talked about this yesterday.  
13 I'm not going to repeat, and basically what  
14 I'm showing here, in terms of inactivation  
15 that you see ---- we have either physical or  
16 methods that are rather harsh are also very  
17 harsh chemical conditions and usually we  
18 prefer to use a combination of both.

19 So, clearly inactivation is not a  
20 valid option in this case. As I said,  
21 removal -- methods of removal is where we  
22 are left for the TSE agent.



1 I have listed here just a few  
2 methods like in this chromatography  
3 filtration. Of course there are other  
4 methods, too. I just want to tell you that  
5 I'm going to focus on this filtration  
6 method. And whatever method we're going to  
7 use will have to be validated.

8 In the validation studies, the  
9 most critical question to address is the  
10 type of spike to use. If we are validating  
11 manufacturing product involved in blood or  
12 blood products, then we have two options:  
13 We can either start with infected ---- and  
14 infected blood like from animal models -- we  
15 have done this in ---- experiment -- or we  
16 can use brain spiked infectivity.

17 In the infected blood, the  
18 advantage is the high relevance. Of course  
19 we are removing the type of infectivity that  
20 might be present in the original material.  
21 The disadvantage is that we have low level  
22 of infectivity in blood, so we cannot

1 demonstrate many logs of removal by the  
2 process, and also the ---- is expensive  
3 because it requires animal assay.

4           If we use brain ---- infectivity,  
5 then the question, of course, is the  
6 relevance because brain infectivity might be  
7 present in a form and the characteristic  
8 that is different from the one present in  
9 blood. However, the advantage is that the  
10 we can spike with a very high level of  
11 infectivity and therefore we can demonstrate  
12 several logs of removal by this study, and  
13 also we have in vitro alternatives, and this  
14 with I'm referring to the assay involving  
15 the biochemical measurement of the TSE ----  
16 PrPs. Also, those are less expensive.

17           In terms of brain-derived spike,  
18 what we can see is that it's rather  
19 arbitrary. Each laboratory prepared their  
20 own spike in this large variation and often  
21 we cannot even compare the same study from  
22 two different laboratories, because the

1 spike is different. And also in a brain  
2 that are spike we can use whole brain.

3 This is, of course, we have  
4 probably all form of infectivity present  
5 there, in terms of size distribution. The  
6 question is: Is the distribution  
7 appropriate for what we want to validate.

8 Same thing is for clarify  
9 supernate (phonetic) and microsomes and  
10 --somes. They might be more homogenous, but  
11 it's still maybe not appropriate as a spike.

12 Finally, we can use purified  
13 fibrils. Fibrils are abnormal sectors that  
14 are present in the affected brain, and they  
15 can be purified and during the purification,  
16 basically, we prepare fibrils. The majority  
17 component is the PrP, the prion protein.

18 The problem with the fibrils is that they  
19 are insoluble and, again, they might be not  
20 even exist in the brain or in blood.

21 As I said, we're going to be  
22 looking at filtration. So, the advantage of

1 filtration are the relatively independent  
2 from buffer composition, the flexible  
3 placement in the process. The removal can  
4 be rationalized from particle size. Of  
5 course, if you look at particle size that  
6 you want to remove, then you can design a  
7 filter that will remove only that size.  
8 Therefore, a list of principles could  
9 provide an absolute barrier.

10 Of course, TSE presents a  
11 challenge also to filtration. The problem  
12 is that we don't know unit size of the TSE  
13 agent. However, we know the operational  
14 size is probably this purse. What I mean by  
15 that is that there is a wide distribution  
16 inside of the TSE infectivity and list in  
17 the brain homogenate. So, the question is  
18 what is the appropriate pore size?

19 This cartoon here represents, in  
20 scale, a ---- fibril. There's a sector, as  
21 I said, that's found in the brain, and they  
22 are associated with TSE infectivity by

1 electromacroscopy (phonetic). The size of  
2 these fibrils can go from 100 to more than a  
3 thousand nanometers. The one depicted  
4 here -- it corresponds to 810 nanometers.  
5 Just to give you orientation, this bar here  
6 corresponds to 20 nanometers, which is the  
7 size of a small virus, like a pavel virus.

8 In contrast -- I don't know if you  
9 can see this dot here -- but in contrast the  
10 prion protein, which is believe to be the  
11 TSE agent, is this dot here. That's drawn  
12 in scale with the fibril. This protein is  
13 at 27,000 dot molecular weight.

14 So the question now is: When we  
15 do a filtration study, what is it we're  
16 trying to filter? Are we trying to filter  
17 prion protein or are we trying to remove  
18 fibrils, or are we try to move something in  
19 between.

20 Even more important, what do we  
21 think is the -- what form do we think is  
22 present in your sample? This is just a

1 cartoon to introduce you to the Planova  
2 nanofilters that we used. There was a 75  
3 nanometer filter, the 35 nanometer filter,  
4 and a 50 nanometer filter. This is how they  
5 would behave with conventional viruses.

6 Large viruses are blocked by  
7 the 75 nanometer filter; the medium size  
8 virus by the 35 nanometer filter; and the  
9 very small viruses, like the pavel viruses,  
10 are blocked by the 15 nanometer filter. Of  
11 course if we would have a molecular product,  
12 we would expect this to go through all  
13 filters and to be found in the 15 nanometer  
14 filtrate.

15 This is a slide showing you the  
16 filter size versus the log removal for three  
17 conventional viruses -- the pavel virus, the  
18 BVD virus, and the HAE virus. I also added  
19 the Viax 174. This study was done by Elaine  
20 Elosikoff, and this is just to show you that  
21 these filters behave according to what you  
22 expect, according to their exclusion size.

1                   Now, this cartoon here. I'd like  
2                   to see some possible scenarios for the  
3                   traditional TSE agents. So if the TSE agent  
4                   is the prion protein, or even an aggregated  
5                   form of the prion protein, like for 5 or 10  
6                   molecules altogether, we would expect this  
7                   protein to go through all the filters and to  
8                   have infectivity recovered in the 15  
9                   nanometer filtrate. On the other hand, if  
10                  the TSE agent we are filtering is in the  
11                  fibril form, then we know that during  
12                  sonication and preparation fibrils, we are  
13                  breaking down the fibrils, and I want you to  
14                  know that the size, the unit size, of this  
15                  broke down fibril is not more than 15  
16                  nanometers.

17                         So, what we would expect is that  
18                         it's going to be some large fibrils that  
19                         will be blocked by the 75 nanometer filter;  
20                         some will be blocked by the 35; and  
21                         obviously if it's more than 35, it would be  
22                         blocked by the 15 nanometer filter and we

1 find no infectivity on the 15 nanometer  
2 filtrate.

3 On the other hand, as a hypothesis  
4 and as a model, we can also think of an  
5 additional component, a TSE agent that is  
6 not fibrils but is associated with fibrils,  
7 indicated here by the red dot. Now, how  
8 would -- if this component exists, how would  
9 that be filtered? Well, it depends on what  
10 kind of interaction it has with fibrils.

11 If the interaction is strong, then  
12 it would behave just like fibrils in this  
13 filtration experiment. On the other hand,  
14 if interaction is weak, or if we somehow can  
15 break this interaction, then this component,  
16 this TSE agent, then will be filtered  
17 according to its size. So it could be  
18 potentially also be smaller than 50  
19 nanometers and be found on the 15 nanometer  
20 filtrate.

21 So, the question now that we ask  
22 in this experiment is: What is the smallest



1 unit size of infectivity? If we cannot get  
2 to this question, then the next important  
3 question is what is, then, the operational  
4 ---- size of filtration? Do the  
5 filter-removed TSE infectivity  
6 stochastically and selectively? That's the  
7 spike composition ---- infiltrability.

8           There has been some early work on  
9 trying to determine the size of the TSE  
10 agent. There was some work done using ----  
11 filters, and they determined the particle  
12 size is between 30 and 50 nanometers. Also  
13 some other filtration studies in which they  
14 use 100,000 ---- filters, and what they  
15 found is that only 1 percent of infectivity  
16 passed the filter and 99 percent was  
17 retained in retentate (phonetic).

18           There were also two studies done  
19 by Tateishi's group in which they used the  
20 Planova filters for the removal of TSE  
21 agent. This is the first study they used a  
22 CJD mouse brain homogenate and the

1 infectivity titers measured by incubation  
2 time.

3 This is their results. I'm not  
4 going to show you everything because I don't  
5 have time. The studies here basically  
6 demonstrate that the TSE agent has a size  
7 between 60 nanometers and 75 nanometers.  
8 This is not what we found in our studies but  
9 that's what is showed here.

10 The panel that I'd like you to  
11 focus your attention on is this experiment  
12 here. When they challenged the 40 nanometer  
13 filter with a 50 ---- unit of TSE  
14 infectivity, they found only 23 that passed  
15 the filter. However, the same filter  
16 changed with the same spike but in the  
17 presence of sarkosyl.

18 They have complete -- the lost the  
19 removal and they have complete passages  
20 through filter of the TSE infectivity,  
21 clearly showing that sarkosyl has a  
22 solublizing effect. Then it appears to

1 reduce the apparent size of the TSE agent.

2 The same group also investigated  
3 farther the effect of sarkosyl. So, this is  
4 the second experiment that they did. They  
5 used the --- filter 35 nanometer, 15  
6 nanometer and 9 nanometer. The vehicle was  
7 human with or without .5 percent sarkosyl.  
8 This is the spike, the TSE spike, and,  
9 again, to measure the titers by incubation  
10 time.

11 The results are shown on this  
12 slide. So, when they looked at a 35  
13 nanometer filter, this is when they  
14 challenged it. This is the reduction factor  
15 that they found, almost 5 logs of reduction  
16 without sarkosyl.

17 The same identical experiment, in  
18 the presence of .5 percent sarkosyl reduced  
19 the reduction factor of 1.6. So, basically,  
20 they had demonstrated again what I just  
21 showed you on the 40 nanometer filter, that  
22 sarkosyl has a solublizing effect. It

1 reduces the size of infectivity.

2 They also looked at 15 nanometer  
3 system. That was a very interesting  
4 experiment. They challenged the same way  
5 without sarkosyl and with sarkosyl.  
6 Unfortunately, these data -- I'm not --  
7 well, what they found basically, they  
8 reached the detection limit of their assay.  
9 So all they can say is that this is more  
10 than 5.86 and this is a reduction factor  
11 more than 4.2. We cannot tell whether there  
12 is a difference in these two numbers or not.

13 So, we really don't know where  
14 there is a difference in the presence and  
15 without sarkosyl for the 15 nanometer  
16 filtrate. The same problem is for the 9  
17 nanometer filtrate.

18 When we designed our experiment,  
19 the objective that we had in mind was what  
20 is the operational filtration size of TSE  
21 infectivity, do 15 nanometer filters retain  
22 infectivity. These are what seems to be the