The Impact of Coup-Related Sanctions on Thailand and Fiji: Helpful or Harmful to U.S. Relations?Glyn T. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific AffairsStatement before House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Washington, DC August 1, 2007 Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Manzullo, and Members of the Subcommittee, like my colleague Deputy Assistant Secretary John, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. In my case, I will briefly address Fiji and the impact of Section 508 sanctions on that country.
Traditionally, Fiji has been a close and valued U.S. ally in the Pacific. It has a long history of contributing troops to multilateral peacekeeping missions, including those in Lebanon, the Sinai, the Solomon Islands, Kuwait and East Timor. Fiji was quick to condemn the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States and has been a staunch supporter of our efforts to build an international coalition against global terrorism. The military coup of December 2006 leading to the overthrow of the lawfully elected government of Fiji has strained our relationship. Unlike in the case of Thailand, Fiji’s coup leaders have taken no credible steps to quickly restore democratic rule, other than a vague promise to hold elections in 2009. The United States responded to the Fiji coup by publicly denouncing the military’s actions and imposing a number of sanctions, including a cessation of military and other assistance to the Government of Fiji in accordance with Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, visa bans against coup leaders, suspension of lethal military sales, and restrictions on bilateral engagement. Australia, New Zealand and the EU have authorized similar sanctions. We are working to ensure that a legitimate government is restored in Fiji. The United States supports the initiative by the Pacific Islands Forum to help Fiji return to democracy at an early date. The U.S. has consistently called for the immediate restoration of human rights protections and civil liberties, and early elections. I would like to emphasize that our sanctions are targeted against the coup government. The United States, however, continues to provide assistance to the people of Fiji. For example, the Department of State approved a $25,000 grant to support a program designed to strengthen Fiji’s democratic traditions. We are also looking at ways in which we might provide assistance to Fiji in support of a return to democracy, including by supporting early elections. Fiji continues to participate in UN and multilateral peacekeeping operations, including the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (where Fiji troops provide security for UN headquarters). Although the United States decided that it will not impede Fiji’s continued participation in ongoing deployments, we have made clear to the interim government, and announced publicly, that we will not support any new military deployments absent measurable progress in returning Fiji to democratic rule. Moreover, legally mandated restrictions on U.S. military assistance to Fiji preclude the United States from providing training, equipment, and other material support to the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to assist any overseas missions until a democratically elected government has taken office. The U.S. announced sanctions against Fiji on December 5, 2006. Since then progress toward democracy has been unsatisfactory. However the interim government has said that it supports “in principle” the recent Pacific Islands Forum-Fiji Joint Working Group report stating that elections could be held by March 2009 or even as early as November 2008 if the international community provided assistance to help prepare for elections. The U.S. is willing to support the interim government in this effort if the interim government takes concrete steps to hold elections according to the Forum-endorsed timetable. We continue to maintain full diplomatic relations with Fiji and have made exceptions to our visa restrictions to allow senior officials of the Fiji government to come to Washington to meet with U.S. counterparts. We believe that sanctions offer the clearest message that restoration of military assistance and closer relations between the U.S. and Fiji can only resume when democracy returns to that country. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have. Released on August 1, 2007 |