

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385



AUG 2 2002

Docket No. 50-423
B18695

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3
Reply to Request for Additional Information
Related to NRC Bulletin 2002-01

In a letter dated April 2, 2002,⁽¹⁾ Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) submitted information on the Millstone Unit No. 3 vessel head inspections to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in response to Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity." On June 3, 2002,⁽²⁾ the NRC requested some additional information related to the April 2, 2002, submittal. The purpose of this letter is to provide that additional information.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained within this letter.

Should there be any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Rav: G. Joshi at (860) 440-2080.

Very truly yours,

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.



J. Alan Price
Site Vice President - Millstone

Attachment (1)

cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator
V. Nerses, NRC Senior Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3
NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3

⁽¹⁾ J. A. Price letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Response to NRC Bulletin 2002-01, Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity," dated April 2, 2002.

⁽²⁾ U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission facsimile from V. Nerses to R. Joshi, "Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Facsimile Transmission, Draft Request for Additional information (RAI) to be Discussed in an Upcoming Conference Call (TAC No. MB4556)," dated June 3, 2002.

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Attachment 1

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3

Reply to Request for Additional Information
Related to NRC Bulletin 2002-01

Reply to NRC Request for Additional Information

NRC Question 1

1. *Your 15 day response to Bulletin 2002-01 stated that Millstone Unit 3 had one leak that could have resulted in boric acid reaching the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head. Discuss whether or not there was any evidence that the boric acid did, in fact, reach the RPV head. Discuss the magnitude of the leak and the amount of boric acid deposits that were found on the insulation.*

DNC Response:

The leak that occurred at Millstone Unit No. 3 that could have resulted in boric acid on the RPV head was from a canopy seal weld above one control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzle. A review of the plant records indicates that the leak was identified by a visual inspection (Generic Letter 88-05 inspections) during a refueling outage in 1993. A clamp was placed around the leaking canopy seal weld as well as one other weld that was suspected of leaking during the refueling outage. The record does not provide a detailed description of the magnitude of the leak, other than to say it was small and below detectable levels. The clamp installed is a permanent repair. This area of the vessel head will be inspected during the upcoming refueling outage, as described in the answer to Question 2.

NRC Question 2

2. *Clarify whether or not the bare metal visual inspection for Millstone Unit 3 will include 100% of the vessel head penetrations (and the corresponding surface area of the RPV head).*

DNC Response:

Millstone Unit No. 3 is planning a visual inspection of all 78 CRDM penetrations and one head vent on the reactor vessel head. This inspection will be performed with a remotely controlled crawler equipped with a video camera. The crawler has been used at other commercial Westinghouse designed plants with a similar insulation configuration to Millstone Unit No. 3. The crawler inspection will be supplemented with a fiberscope inspection of areas that the crawler can not adequately inspect. Based upon discussions with the inspection contractor and review of performance data from other inspections, it is anticipated that the crawler will be able to inspect 360° around all but a few outer penetrations. Experience indicates that it might be difficult to obtain an unobstructed view 360° around some of the outer periphery penetrations. A fiberscope will be used around these penetrations to attempt to complete the 360° inspection.