{H7673} Mr. UDALL.  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to correct an
error which occurred at page H7587 of the House RECORD of yesterday in
connection with the conference report on H.R. 2.

    H7673 In colloquy between the gentleman from Ohio and myself, my answer was 
omitted; certain material of his was omitted; and I ask unanimous consent that
the correction of the colloquy appear in today's RECORD and in the permanent
RECORD.

    H7673 Mr. SEIBERLING.  Mr. Speaker, I join in the gentleman's request.

    H7673 The SPEAKER pro tempore.  Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Arizona?

    H7673 There was no objection.

    H7673 The correction referred to is as follows:

    H7673 Mr. UDALL.  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. SEIBERLING) 2 minutes.

    H7673 Mr. SEIBERLING.  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Arizona for
yielding.

    H7673 Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate the chairman of the Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee, who also acted as chairman of the conference on
this bill.  It has been a real privilege to work with him over the long years it
took to get a meaningful, workable strip mining law.  His leadership, skill, and
patience through numerous hearings, markup sessions, two Presidential vetoes,
and three House-Senate conferences are finally bearing fruit in an outstanding
piece of legislation.  While it represents the collective effort of many people,
if it is a monument to any one person, that person is the gentleman from
Arizona, our distinguished colleague, Mo UDALL.

    {H7674} Mr. Speaker, I would like to address a question to the gentleman
from Arizona to clarify what I believe could be a misleading impression created 
by the explanatory statement accompanying the conference report.

    H7674 Subsection 510(b)(6) of the bill contains an important provision
covering situations where land is in private ownership but the surface is owned 
by one person and the subsurface coal is owned by another.  In many cases,
subsurface rights were purchased for a pittance, generations ago, when strip
mining of coal was hardly known.  The result has been much injustice, hardship, 
and inequity to the owners of the surface, who have been ousted from their farms
or homes and their land laid waste by huge earthmovers.  Many others have found 
themselves unable to sell land on which they have paid taxes over the years.

    H7674 Let me quote from a letter I received from a resident of Stoney Fork, 
Ky., shortly after the conference committee completed its work.  It graphically 
illustrates the kind of situation that has arisen for hundreds of small property
owners:

    H7674 DEAR SIRS: I wholeheartedly applaud your stand in the "Broad-Form"
deed issue.

    H7674 We have some property in Harland Co.Ky. that's been in my family since
1853, through grants from the then governor.  Unfortunately, great grandfather
sold the mineral rights around 1897.

    H7674 That old deed didn't mean much up until recently and now we find
ourselves in the strange position of owning a few hundred acres of land that
we've paid our taxes on (I don't think the mineral owners have ever paid any)
and yet we find that we don't really "own" it; we are afraid to improve any part
of the land or build a house since you never know which way the bulldozer might 
come.

    H7674 We have a housing shortage in Harlan Co. but I can't sell anybody a
house seat, they too are afraid of the uncertain future under the broad-form
deed.

    H7674 I just hope and pray that enough of your honorable colleagues will
understand the logic you are trying to establish.  We will in the meantime
continue to pay our property taxes and hope that the rights of the surface owner
are made equal to the rights of the mineral owner prior to the coming of the
bulldozer.  Best regards.

    H7674 To remedy this kind of situation, I offered the amendment that was
incorporated in the House version of section 510(v)(6), the purpose being to
require the owner of the subsurface coal, before he could get a permit to strip 
mine, to show that he had the express written consent of the surface owner or an
instrument clearly evidencing that the deed under which he owned the coal was
intended to permit mining of it by the strip-mining method.

    H7674 In the conference, I agreed, after considerable debate, to modify
subparagraph (C) of this subsection to incorporate the language shown on page 42
of the conference report which reads as follows:

    H7674 (c) if the conveyance does not expressly grant the right to extract
coal by surface mining methods, the surface-subsurface legal relationship shall 
be determined in accordance with State law.

    H7674 I understand this to mean that conveyance will be construed in
accordance with State law.  However, the explanatory statement on page 106 of
the conference report does not follow the terminology of the bill.  Rather, it
states that in such cases, "the determination of whether or not the private
mineral estate owner or a successor-in-interest has the right to mine the coal
by surface methods shall be made in accordance with applicable State law."

    H7674 By not mentioning the word "conveyance," the explanatory statement
places an unfortunate gloss on the language of the bill and implies that the
right to mine by the subsurface method need not be based on the construction of 
the conveyance but only on the general law of the State.  While the conferees
did not intend to override State law as to the effect of such instruments, I
believe that they did intend to require a showing that there is a deed or other 
instrument of conveyance and that, under the applicable State law, it is
construed to authorize surface mining.

    H7674 Does the chairman agree with my statement of the intention of the
conferees on this point?

    H7674 Mr. UDALL.  Yes, the gentleman has made a correct interpretation and, 
while it may not make any practical difference in many cases, the language of
the explanatory statement does lend itself to an interpretation diffrent from
the intent of the conferees on this one point.

    H7674 Mr. SEIBERLING.  I thank the Chairman, and am gratified that his
understanding accords with my own on this point.  I would like to note, however,
that the language in question could make a significant difference.  In the case 
of Commerce Union Bank  v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (1976), the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky concluded that conveyances which granted the right to mine coal under
the land and gave grantees the right to such surface space as necessary for
mining did not grant the right to mine by the surface mining method nor did they
indicate that it was intended by the parties to the conveyance that the mineral 
owner's right to use the surface would be superior to any competing rights of
the surface owner.

    H7674 As pointed out by Justice Stephenson in a concurring opinion, the
court's decision constituted a basic departure from an earlier Kentucky Supreme 
Court ruling, Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (1956), even though the decision
did not formally overrule the Buchanan case.  Justice Stephenson states that
Buchanan was part of a line of cases basing the right to surface mine on a
doctrine of dominance of the subsurface or mineral estate.  He states, "Buchanan
clearly holds that if strip mining is the only feasible means of removing the
coal, then the mineral owner has the right to strip unless the mineral deed
prohibits strip mining," 540 S.W.2d 861 at page 865.

    H7674 It is apparent, in view of the conflicting approaches exemplified in
these Kentucky Supreme Court opinions, that the language on page 106 of the
explanatory statements, if construed so as to refer to general State law rather 
than to the State law governing mineral conveyances, might, in some cases, make 
a significant difference.  That is why I feel it important to point out that the
intent of the conferees was more precise than the language of the explanatory
statement seems to imply.

    H7674 (Mr. SEIBERLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)