Office of Administrative Law Judges 36 E. 7th Street, Suite 2525 Cincinnati, OH 45202
(513) 684-3252 (513) 684-6108 (FAX)
Issue Date: 07 March 2003
Case No: 2001-ERA-33
In the Matter of
CRAIG H. FRITTS
Complainant
v.
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY
Respondent
APPEARANCES:
John T. Burhans, Esq.
BURHANS LAW OFFICES
St. Joseph, Michigan
For Complainant
Thomas A. Schmutz, Esq.
MORGAN, LEWIS, & BOCKIUS LLP
Washington, D.C.
For Respondent
BEFORE: RUDOLF L. JANSEN
Administrative Law Judge
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
This case arises out of a complaint of discrimination filed pursuant to Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 et. seq. The ERA affords protection from employment discrimination for employees of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees who engage in activity that effectuates the purpose of the ERA or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et. seq. Specifically, the law protects "whistleblower" employees from retaliatory or discriminatory actions by the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1).
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that follow are based upon my analysis of the entire record, arguments of the parties, and the applicable regulations, statutes and case law. They are also based upon my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses who testified at the hearing. Although perhaps not specifically mentioned in this decision, each exhibit and argument of the parties has been carefully reviewed and thoughtfully considered.
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References to "CX" and "RX" refer to the exhibits of the Complainant and Respondent respectively. "JX" refers to Joint Exhibits, and "ALJX" refers to Administrative Law Judge Exhibits. The transcript for the hearing is cited as "Tr." and by page number.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Craig H. Fritts (hereinafter "Complainant" or "Fritts") contends that internal complaints to his supervisors were "protected activity" under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 et. seq. He also alleges that Respondent discriminated against him because of his protected activity by terminating him on December 8, 2000.
It is Respondent's position that Complainant did not engage in protected activity. If Complainant's activities are found to be protected, Respondent asserts that no nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action as Complainant was terminated solely for poor performance.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant was employed by Indiana Michigan Power Company (hereinafter "Respondent" or "I&M"), a subsidiary of American Electric Power Company, from April 1999 until his termination on December 8, 2000. Fritts filed a complaint with the Department of Labor alleging that he was discriminated against for raising safety concerns regarding the schedule to achieve compliance with NRC regulations. His complaint was denied on June 25, 2001 by the Office of Safety and Health Administration (hereinafter "OSHA"), and Fritts appealed that ruling and requested a formal hearing on June 27, 2001. The complainant's allegation of discrimination under Section 211 of the ERA was then referred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a hearing. A formal hearing was held in South Bend, Indiana, from March 12, 2002 until March 14, 2002, and from April 30, 2002 until May 3, 2002.
ISSUES
1. Whether Complainant engaged in protected activity by:
(a) Concurring in a September 1, 2000 Condition Report regarding deficiencies in the plant's Maintenance Rule Program preventing compliance;
(b) Bringing concerns to supervisors that the scope represented in the Condition Report was too narrow;
(c) Expressing quality concerns to management about an inadequate schedule and lack of resources to produce a quality Maintenance Rule Program;
(d) Creating and sending a memorandum which expressed concerns about inadequate budget and resources for the Maintenance Rule Program;
(e) Requesting expansions of time and content in the log review for the Maintenance Rule access database; and
(f) Removing the Maintenance Rule access database from usage in order to correct the database due to concerns for quality;
2. Whether Complainant was discriminated against by Indiana Michigan Power Company as the result of his having been fired on December 8, 2000; and
3. Whether Complainant need only demonstrate that his protected activity was a contributing factor in his termination either alone or in connection with other factors.
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CREDIBILITY FINDINGS
I have carefully considered and evaluated the rationality and internal consistency of the testimony of all witnesses, including the manner in which the testimony supports or detracts from the other record evidence. In so doing, I have taken into account all relevant, probative, and available evidence, while analyzing and assessing its cumulative impact on the record. See, e.g., Frady v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 92-ERA-19 at 4 (Sec'y Oct. 23, 1995)(citing Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1979)); Indiana Metal Products v. National Labor Relations Board, 442 F.2d 46, 52 (7th Cir. 1971). An administrative law judge is not bound to believe or disbelieve the entirety of a witness's testimony, but may choose to believe only certain portions of the testimony. See Altemose Constr. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 514 F.2d 8, 15 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1975).
I have based my credibility findings on a review of the entire testimonial record and associated exhibits with regard for the reasonableness of the testimony in light of all record evidence and the demeanor of the witnesses. Probative weight has been given to the testimony of all witnesses found to be credible. The transcript of the hearing contains the testimony of eleven witnesses.
I find the testimony of Joel P. Gebbie, Patricia A. Phoenix, Martin Dixon, and James A. Kobyra all to be credible.
I find the testimony of Lawrence Bossinger to also be entirely credible. Bossinger's testimony regarding employee evaluation and termination procedures in general and specifically in reference to Complainant was honest and thorough.
I find Eric Ballon's testimony to be credible. He testified about the technical aspects of the work he performed with Complainant as well as the expectations and operations of plant management. He was a forthright and independent witness.
I find Dominick So's testimony to be credible. Although he appeared to harbor animosity toward I&M over his own adverse personnel action at the same plant, his testimony was consistent and honestly given.
Lanny Thornsberry testified as to his recollection of the events from October to December 2000 and the work performed in furtherance of Maintenance Rule compliance. I find his testimony to be honestly given and credible.
William S. Lacey testified as to his recollection of the events from October to December of 2000 and his interactions with and observations of Complainant in working with the Maintenance Rule. I find Lacey to also be an honest and credible witness.
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I find the testimony of Randy F. Ebright to be credible. He recounted his memory of the events as one of Complainant's supervisors. He also testified as to the circumstances surrounding Complainant's termination and the procedures followed for the termination. I find Ebright to be a forthright, consistent and thorough witness.
I also find the testimony of Craig H. Fritts to be credible. I find him to be articulate and knowledgeable, and found no indicia of dishonesty in his testimony. Fritts holds strong convictions concerning the circumstances surrounding his termination and he expressed his opinions cogently. Differences of opinion may exist as to the interpretation of events, but for the most part, I did not find that Fritts embellished the facts as they pertained to the events leading up to and surrounding his termination.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
In April of 1999, Fritts was hired as a Plant Engineering Director's Technical Assistant to work at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant (hereinafter "Cook"), which is operated by Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M), a subsidiary of American Electric Power Company, and located in Bridgman, Michigan. Cook had two nuclear reactors, and at the time of Complainant's hiring both were shut down. In September of 1997, I&M elected to shut down both of Cook's nuclear reactors in response to findings from a NRC inspection in August 1997. (JX 6). The inspection led the NRC to be concerned about the "operability of safety related systems and components."1 (JX 6). I&M had apparently not been exercising proper control over design and licensing bases. (Tr. 929).
Id. at 249. The Court noted that since the case concerned a claim filed prior to the effective date of the amendments that "before the 1992 amendments allocating the procedural burdens...in a whistleblower discrimination claim...the Secretary consistently utilized the burden shifting taxonomy for ERA retaliation actions set forth in McDonnell Douglas." Id. at 250.
In this case, I shall apply the evidentiary framework as prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(C) and (D) and as interpreted by Trimmer, Stone & Webster, and Doyle. Therefore, Complainant has the initial burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) Respondent was aware of that conduct; (3) Complainant suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel decision. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(C); Trimmer, 174 F.3d at 1101-02; Stone & Webster, 115 F.3d at 1572; Guitierrez, 98-ERA-19 at 5. If Complainant proves his burden by a preponderance, then Respondent can avoid liability if it can prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action in the absence of Complainant's protected activity. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(D).
On brief, Complainant cites to Stone & Webster for the proposition that the 1992 ERA amendments created an evidentiary paradigm independent of Title VII. Complainant argues that he has the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and if he does so, then he "need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that protected activity was a ‘contributing factor' in the termination. (Complainant's Reply Brief at 27). Regarding the 1992 amendments to the ERA, Complainant argues that Congress lowered the complainant's burden of proof in changing the causation standard from proving that the protected activity was a "significant" or "motivating" factor to a "contributory factor." (Complainant's Brief at 131). Complainant argues that in establishing his prima facie case, "proximity in time is sufficient to infer causation." (Complainant's Brief at 125). Then the burden shifts to Respondent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the adverse employment action in the absence of the protected activity. (Complainant's Brief at 132).
Respondent argues that the 1992 ERA amendments did not lower the Complainant's burden of proof. (Respondent's Brief at 4). Respondent sets out the burdens of proof during the investigative and post-hearing stage as in Trimmer. (Respondent's Brief at 5-6). However, Respondent argues that it must provide clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action in the absence of the protected activity only if Complainant has proven that Respondent had both legitimate and non-legitimate reasons for the adverse action. (Respondent's Reply Brief at 6-7). Respondent argues that the burden is shifted from the Complainant only in a dual motive case.
1 On September 19, 1997, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter detailing the issues with which the NRC was concerned:
a. To demonstrate that the recirculation sump level is adequate to prevent vortexing or make appropriate modifications;
b. To re-install venting in the recirculation sump cover;
c. To demonstrate the capability to cool down the units consistent with design basis requirement and make necessary procedural changes;
d. To change existing emergency procedures used in switching from the emergency core cooling to the recirculation sump so as to demonstrate adequate sump volume;
e. To provide overpressure protection within certain specifications;
f. To change the technical specifications to allow for certain operations of the Residual Heat Removal Suction Valve Interlock and acquire approval thereof by the NRC prior to restart;
g. To demonstrate that leakage of the Refeuling Water Storage Tank Mini-flow Recirculation Lines do not exceed the regulatory allowances; and
h. To review emergency procedures to account for instrument uncertainties.
2 See infra at 10-13 for explanation of Maintenance Rule.
3 The regulations provide that if a nuclear power plant has shown that it is effectively controlling "the performance or condition of a structure, system or component" through "appropriate preventative maintenance," such monitoring under 50.65(a)(1) is not required. 10 C.F.R. 50.65(a)(2).
4 For example, under the checklist entitled "Discipline for Poor Productivity or Below Quality Job Performance" the following questions appear:
(a) Can specific examples/incidents be documented and was the employee made aware of the deficiency at the time?
(b) Is there an incentive system or bonus system in effect? If so, what effect will the corrective action have on the incentive/bonus payments?
(c) Is the employee a union officer or steward? Is there a possible "union animus" appeal for the employee?
5 For purposes of this decision, I will refer to these files as MARC files.
6 The record does not reveal the exact date of the Unit 2 restart. Dixon, Ebright, Fritts, and So all testified that Unit 2 restarted sometime in June of 2000. (Tr. 79, 283, 358, 381, 382, 1330).
7 Fritts maintained a private notebook which he used as a planner or diary. (Tr. 810-13). In the notebook, Fritts recorded actions taken or needing to be taken in either the MRP, Preventative Maintenance Program or Predictive Maintenance Program. (Tr. 810). He used the notebook for his own personal benefit to remind himself of actions he needed to take with his various responsibilities at Cook. (Tr. 810-812).
8 "Expert panel" refers to an oversight organization within the plant responsible for reviewing the depth and direction of the various programs for establishing and maintaining performance standards. Tr. 1048-49).
9 Those employees not actual employees of American Electric Power or I&M, but of Sargent & Lundy or another engineering service company who had been used by I&M on a temporary basis only.
10 Recent cases from the Administrative Review Board (Board) reveal inconsistencies in its application of the burdens of proof in ERA whistleblower claims. Although the Board appears to be in agreement with Trimmer and Stone & Webster in interpreting the burdens of proof in these cases, the Board has not been consistent in its application of the burdens of proof in later decisions. I say this because in Gale v. Ocean Imaging, 97-ERA-38 (ARB July 31, 2002), the Board applied a Title VII burden-shifting framework, where Trimmer indicates that the 1992 ERA amendments replace the Title VII framework with a distinct framework of its own. However, the Board recently issued Guitierrez v. Regents of the University of California, 98-ERA-19 (ARB Nov. 13, 2002), in which the Title VII framework is not mentioned and application of the proof burdens is in a manner consistent with the requirements of Trimmer and Stone & Webster. The Board had not employed a Title VII framework in Bourland v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 98-ERA-32 (ARB Apr. 30, 2002) or Parker v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 99-ERA-13 (ARB June 27, 2002).
11 Section 210 was the former employee protection provision. The section was changed to Section 211 with the 1992 amendments.
12 In Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1993), interpreting the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1), the Court, interpreting a similar provision, observed:
The words "a contributing factor"... mean any factor, which alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision. This test is specifically intended to overrule the existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove that his protected conduct was a "significant," "motivating," "substantial," or "predominant" factor in a personnel action in order to overturn that action.
Marano, 2 F.3d at 1140 (citations omitted).
13Bourland v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 98-ERA-32 (ARB Apr. 30, 2002); Parker v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 99-ERA-13 (ARB June 27, 2002); Guitierrez v. Regents of University of California, 98-ERA-19 (ARB Nov. 13, 2002).