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USDOL/OALJ Reporter
Veasaw v. Texas Hydraulics, Inc., 1998-CAA-5 (ALJ Oct. 5, 1998)


U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
Heritage Plaza Bldg, 5th Floor
111 Veteran's Memorial Boulevard
Metairie, LA 70005

Case No. 98-CAA-5
Date Issued: October 5, 1998

In the Matter of:

JAMES B. VEASAW
    Complainant

    v.

TEXAS HYDRAULICS, INC.
    Respondent

APPEARANCES:

JAMES B. VEASAW, PRO SE1
    Complainant

JERRY P. CAMPBELL, ESQ.
KERRY L. HALIBURTON, ESQ.
    For The Respondent

Before: LEE J. ROMERO, JR.
    Administrative Law Judge

RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

   This case arises under the employee protection provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (herein the CAA or Act) and the implementing regulations thereunder at 29 C.F.R. Part 24. On February 20, 1997, James B. Veasaw (Complainant) filed an administrative


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complaint against Texas Hydraulics, Inc. (Respondent) with the U. S. Department of Labor (DOL) complaining of various alleged violations of the Clean Air Act, including his January 27, 1997 termination.2 (CX-6A). On April 30, 1998, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, DOL, advised Complainant that the evidence he submitted in support of his complaint under the Clean Air Act did not identify any instances of his engagement in activities protected by the Act. In dismissing Complainant's complaint, it was noted the enforcement of the Act "depends on whether the issue of protected activity concerns the safety of the workplace, or involves safety concerns which may have an environmental impact in the community." Complainant filed an "appeal" and timely request for a formal hearing.

   This matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a formal hearing. Pursuant thereto, a Notice of Hearing and Pre-Hearing Order was issued scheduling a formal hearing in Georgetown, Texas which commenced on July 15, 1998 and closed on July 16, 1998. All parties were afforded a full opportunity to adduce testimony, offer documentary evidence and submit oral arguments and post-hearing briefs. The following exhibits were received into evidence:3

Complainant's Exhibit Numbers: 1A and 1B, 3C and 3D, 5A, 5B, 5C and 5D, 5E, 5H, 5I, 5J and 5K, 6A, 6D, 6E, 7, 10, 11, and 12

Respondent's Exhibit Numbers: A-J

Administrative Law Judge Exhibit Numbers: 1-7

   Respondent presented an oral argument at the hearing but did not file a post- hearing brief. Complainant did not present any closing argument at the hearing or file a brief. Based upon the evidence introduced and having considered the arguments and positions presented, I make the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.

I. ISSUES

A. The applicability of the Clean Air Act.

B. Whether Complainant engaged in activities protected under the Clean Air Act.

C. Whether Respondent discriminated against Complainant in retaliation for his alleged protected activities.


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II. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

The Testimonial Evidence

James B. Veasaw (Complainant)

   Complainant testified that he is a U.S. citizen who lives in Humble, Texas. Although he attempted to secure an attorney to represent him in this matter, he was unable to do so and proceeded Pro Se. (Tr. 26-27).

   Mr. Veasaw was born on February 24, 1956 and has earned an associate degree as well as a bachelor's degree from Texas Tech University. His past work history reveals that he has worked as a programmer, systems analyst II, and systems analyst III. (Tr. 27). After his employment with Respondent in this matter, he began working for a television station in Austin, Texas, on August 11, 1997, performing miscellaneous computer work. (Tr. 27-28, 146). Mr. Veasaw is presently unemployed. His employment with the television station ended on October 30, 1997. (Tr. 29, 146). He testified that he quit his employment to devote more time to a complaint he filed against the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, a former employer. (Tr. 30).

   Complainant began employment with Respondent on or about July 27-28, 1996. (Tr. 28). Complainant testified that during the Thanksgiving holidays in 1996, he went on a snow skiing trip, during which he developed a cough. He stated that it was not a serious cough, but he suspected that he had breathed some moisture from snow-blowing equipment. (Tr. 31). Upon his return from the holiday, he informed his supervisor, Skip Carruth, that he had picked up a cough. He stated that the coughing problem seemed to be going away, and by lunchtime of the first day back at work, his coughing problems had subsided. (Tr. 31).

   Mr. Veasaw testified that, as an Information Systems Specialist with Respondent, he maintained all the computer systems in the plant. (Tr. 32). His job duties required him to sporadically enter and work in the production plant environment. His primary complaints to Respondent centered around his perception that a lack of proper ventilation existed in the production area of the plant.

   Complainant testified that Jim West, the Environmentalist for Respondent, had problems with employees turning off the environmental fans in the plant which were purportedly designed to remove or eliminate welding fumes and other alleged contaminants from the plant work area. Complainant testified that in December 1996 a cold front came through the area and employees in the shop shut the plant doors to stay warm. With the environmental fans off and the doors shut, all the vapors that were produced in the plant remained within the plant. He stated that he could only describe the environment as "like breathing broken glass." (Tr. 33-34).


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He further testified that if the fans were operational and the doors were closed, proper ventilation was still not achieved. (Tr. 34). He affirmed that when the fans are operating and the doors were open, plant fumes were displaced from the work air. Conversely, when the doors were shut, the fans did not remove the plant air. (Tr. 35). To work at its optimum, according to the Complainant, the plant doors must remain open.

   He reported to Mr. West that the Respondent needed some type of vent in the building to allow air to be exchanged because the current design was not adequate to remove the air when the door was shut. (Tr. 35-36). He mentioned this same problem to Mr. West several times before December 1996. (Tr. 36). Mr. West's response was that the haze in the plant work environment was created by employees turning off the fans and that he was going to have to install a "lock-out switch" to keep employees from actually throwing the breaker and turning the fans off. This conversation occurred prior to Complainant's Thanksgiving vacation. (Tr. 37).

   Complainant testified that while working on a welding machine terminal, he spent "a couple of hours" in the plant.4 (Tr. 38). In a normal 40 hour week, however, he was present in the plant work area "very rarely." (Tr. 38).

   Complainant's office was located in a building which was within the plant, however, it had air conditioners which filtered the air. (Tr. 39). He testified that dust still accumulated in the offices and that when a new white filter was exchanged from the air conditioner, it was usually black after use. (Tr. 39-41). Complainant testified that from his office he could not actually see the plant work area "haze," whereas when in the plant, contaminates could be physically seen in the air of the work area. (Tr. 41).

   Complainant testified that he was written up on December 11, 1996, for failing to solve the welding machine terminal problem. (Tr. 43; RX-B).5 He reported to Mr. Carruth that he was having problems with the air in the plant from the dust and the oils. Mr. Carruth informed him that the Respondent had performed air quality tests and the air was safe; Complainant was most likely having a problem caused by his recent skiing vacation. (Tr. 43).

   Complainant prepared a response to his reprimand (and apparently about certain comments and ratings reflected in his October 1996 appraisal) which was delivered to Dee Banes, an assistant to the President of Respondent, on December 12, 1996. (CX-6A, pp. 8-10). The following day, Complainant spoke with Mr. Carruth, during which he taped their conversation. (Tr. 44-45; CX-10). Complainant commented in his "amendment" or response that he might not have been performing at his normal operating efficiency because he had been sick because of the conditions in the plant environment. (Tr. 49).6


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   On Friday, December 13, 1996, Complainant went to the Austin Diagnostic Urgent Care Clinic to be examined by a physician for his cough. The physician gave him a steroid inhaler to relieve some of his coughing symptoms. (Tr. 50). Mr. Veasaw subsequently delivered a physician's note to Mr. Carruth indicating that he had been treated at the clinic. (Tr. 51; RX-D; CX-6A, p. 17).

   Claimant returned to work the following Monday, December 16, 1996, and began working on the welding machine terminal problem, at which time he was paged to meet with Mr. Carruth, Dee Banes and Vernon Pontes, whose position is not reflected in the record, in the conference room regarding his response or amendment to the written reprimand. He recalled that during this meeting a discussion ensued about the problems he thought were present in the plant with the air quality and its conditions. They also talked about his career ladder within the company. The meeting lasted about 30 to 45 minutes. (Tr. 55). It was during this meeting that Complainant presented to Mr. Carruth the December 13, 1996 clinic note that revealed he did not have an infection from his coughing symptoms. (Tr. 56).

   He next returned to the doctor on January 7, 1997, at which time he was not having any coughing symptoms. He requested that the doctor write a specific note as to what caused his cough and the physician wrote "exposure to unknown environmental allergen or irritant caused cough, now resolved." Complainant acknowledged that this notation was made based upon his history as reported to the physician, and that the physician had no independent information upon which to base that conclusion. (Tr. 57; CX-6A, p. 17).

   Complainant initially testified that after Christmas 1996, he observed an employee electroplating a chrome rod with some unknown substance on the second shift, which was not Complainant's normal shift. He alleges that this process was taking place without any ventilation and/or vapor recovery and was being performed out in the open of the plant. (Tr. 63). He testified that a chromium product is a very carcinogenic and hazardous product.7 (Tr. 64). Complainant informed Jim West that electroplating was taking place in the plant, however, Mr. West explained that Respondent was not doing anything wrong. (Tr. 65). His conversation with Mr. West took place after his visit to the doctor on January 7, 1997. (Tr. 66). Complainant subsequently testified that the incident involving the electroplating occurred during the first week of December 1996. (Tr. 67).

   Complainant testified that the air in the location of the welding machine terminal computer "really wasn't all that bad, but when I went over to where the welders were - - had their terminal (30 to 40 feet away), they were asking me some questions, and I do remember that the air was very caustic." (Tr. 67). He further stated that he "felt my lungs being burned and I tried to not - - tried to breathe as little as possible at that point." (Tr. 68).

    Complainant also testified that on January 20, 1997, he had problems with his sinuses which were clogged up and he could not breathe. He made an appointment with his physician who prescribed antibiotics for his sinuses. He delivered the Urgent Care Clinic note to Mr. Carruth thereafter. (Tr. 68-69).


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   Complainant testified that when he visited the doctor at the Care Clinic on December 13, 1996, he had a chest x-ray taken and the physicians indicated they wanted to do a chest CAT Scan.8 The CAT Scan was performed on January 24, 1997, and the following Monday, January 27, 1997, he was terminated from his employment with Respondent.9 (Tr. 70-71; CX-5J; CX-5K).

   On January 27, 1997, Complainant was brought into the Human Resources Office and met with Skip Carruth for an exit interview. Mr. Carruth opened the meeting by informing Complainant that he was terminating Complainant's employment with Respondent. The only reason presented for his termination was that "I was not what they were looking for and that I would have to seek my opportunity somewhere else." (Tr. 71-72; CX-6A, p. 18). Complainant testified that no other explanation was forthcoming and he did not ask Mr. Carruth any questions regarding his termination. He did not receive anything in writing memorializing his termination and did not ask for any written discharge slip. (Tr. 72).

   Mr. Veasaw received a right to sue letter against the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, a former employer, around December 27, 1996. He informed Mr. Carruth that he had received such a letter and would need time to meet with attorneys. (Tr. 75). Complainant testified that he did not believe he was discharged from Respondent because he filed a lawsuit against Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission. (Tr. 76). He further testified that, although it was his belief he was not discharged because of the lawsuit, his discharge by Respondent affected his finances, which diminished his ability to hire an attorney, and thus weakened his efforts against Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission because he was unable to properly prosecute that case. (Tr. 78-79). His complaint against Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission was dismissed for his failure to comply with discovery requirements in that matter. (Tr. 80).

   Complainant testified that after filing his complaint with the Secretary of Labor on or about February 20, 1997, he also filed a complaint with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission because he believed he incurred a respiratory injury while employed with Respondent. (Tr. 90; CX-6A, p. 19). He testified that he filed the claim because he was interested in improving the air quality at Respondent's plant. He also testified that he wanted to document his injury with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission as a protective filing in the event he was later diagnosed with "lung cancer from being exposed to extremely hazardous materials." (Tr. 94).

   He acknowledges that on or about May 15, 1997, OSHA reported the results of an inspection of Respondent's plant conducted on April 10, 1997. (CX-6D). Health and safety violations were cited relating to employer's failure to provide personal protective equipment for phosphorus acid and lack of eye wash stations, but it was concluded that electroplating was not performed at that site. (Tr. 87-88). On June 2, 1997, Complainant wrote to OSHA disputing their findings. (Tr. 89; CX-6E).


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   Complainant testified that his understanding of "ambient air," as raised by Respondent in its Motion To Dismiss, was air quality that causes a public concern or affects the safety of the public which is covered by the Clear Air Act, whereas environmentally inclosed areas, such as a working environment, are regulated by OSHA and are not covered by the Clean Air Act. (Tr. 113). He further stated it was his belief that, if the quality of air at issue was outside the building, it came under the Clean Air Act. (Tr. 114).

   He testified that not only was the Respondent affecting its own employees with what he believed to be highly carcinogenic materials without a permit, but "when the doors were opened, various gases or vapors are being expelled into the general public." As an example, Respondent painted the interior of its north plant and thereby exposed employees to vapors that could not be breathed. (Tr. 114). He stated that the painting occurred in December 1996 or January 1997. He complained to Jim West who attempted to alleviate the vapor problem by setting up fans to evacuate the air from the building. (Tr. 115). He further stated that when the fans evacuated the vapors from the work area, the vapors were blown out of the door where the "general public" had access. He definitely remembered being sick on that particular day of painting. He, however, did not go to a dispensary or clinic for his symptoms. (Tr. 116).

   On cross-examination, Claimant testified that he had mentioned the welding fumes and air environment to Mr. West and Mr. Carruth informally prior to the Thanksgiving 1996 vacation. (Tr. 117). He also mentioned his displeasure with the quality of air to employees Sherry Morgan, Dee Banes and Lenelle Mercioski before and after his Thanksgiving ski trip. He testified, however, that his complaints regarding the air quality were not the reason for his termination. (Tr. 118). He stated that he believed he was fired because he "started to document what was going on" in the plant. He stated that he had not made any reports to the EPA before his discharge because he was collecting evidence. (Tr. 118). He mentioned the EPA and the Clean Air Act to Dee Banes and Sherry Morgan "in passing" because he believed they were more of an ally than an adversary and "just fellow employees." (Tr. 119).

   He testified that he believed Respondent was conducting illegal activities and engaged in an attempt to cover up those illegal activities, such as electroplating. (Tr. 119). He admitted, however, that the electroplating he observed on one occasion was performed on a regular shift, out in the open of the plant, in the presence of 30 to 40 other employees working on the second shift. (Tr. 120). He believed that when he complained about the electroplating he "set off alarm flags," and when he began looking around and found "copper sulfate and the nickel sulfate," Respondent knew he was "looking around and trying to document what was going on." (Tr. 120-121).

   He testified that before Thanksgiving 1996 he did not become ill or seek any medical attention because of the exposure problems about which he complained. Before


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Thanksgiving, temperatures outside had not fallen dramatically low so the plant doors remained open. It was only when a real "heavy cold front" occurred that Respondent would actually shut the doors all the way. (Tr. 121). He testified that before October 1996, he mentioned to Mr. Carruth several times that it was "kind of dusty out there [in the plant]" to which Mr. Carruth would respond with his "classic thing that they had tested the air." (Tr. 121). Claimant acknowledged that Respondent's standard response was the air had been monitored, reviewed by both the workers' compensation carrier and tested by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission or under their supervision, which was his prior employer, and that the results had been sent in and the air quality was found to be well within acceptable limits. (Tr. 122).

   Complainant testified that he received an Employee Performance Appraisal on October 28, 1996 from Mr. Carruth. (Tr. 123; RX-A). He received both good ratings and poor ratings for the various characteristics of performance. Mr. Veasaw denied that he had problems maintaining and servicing computers, which was part of his job responsibility. (Tr. 124). He testified that he solved every problem "that came my way." He disputed the ratings received from Mr. Carruth regarding his skill level in Novell Netware as well as his organizational skills, for which he received a rating of 2 and 1, respectively, on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the highest rating. (Tr. 125). Mr. Veasaw testified it was not his position that his employee appraisal performance ratings were in response to his complaints about the quality of air. (Tr. 127).

   Complainant conceded that his termination in January 1997 followed a problem that existed with the mail server which is part of the computer process that was his responsibility as an Information Systems Analyst. (Tr. 127). The server permitted Respondent to communicate with its parent company, Dover Industries, in Chicago and allowed Dover to communicate with Respondent in Temple, Texas. He attested that the mail server was a very important piece of equipment. Complainant was able to verify that the mail server last worked on January 13 and remained inoperable through the day of his discharge on January 27, 1997. He acknowledged that he was not able to fix the problem with the mail server. (Tr. 128).

   Mr. Veasaw attributed his inability to repair the mail server to Mr. Carruth's "tampering with the system" and failing to notify Mr. Veasaw that he had done so. (Tr. 129). He confirmed that Mr. Carruth fixed the mail server within a matter of hours because "he knew what he did." (Tr. 129). Mr. Veasaw testified that the mail server continued to have problems because other people were tampering with the system. Mr. Veasaw testified that he was terminated shortly after the mail server was ultimately fixed by Mr. Carruth. (Tr. 135). Although he stated that his termination date was closer to the date when he underwent a CAT Scan than to the mail server problem, he admitted that he did not present the results of the CAT Scan to Respondent before his termination.10 (Tr. 135). It was his understanding that after his termination Respondent hired a minimum of three people to perform the same jobs he performed for Respondent. (Tr. 149).


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   With respect to Mr. Veasaw's coughing symptoms, Mr. Carruth informed him initially to go see a doctor and that "we want to get you well. Go to a doctor. Find out what's bothering you. We want to get you fixed." (Tr. 136). He further acknowledged that Mr. Carruth did not criticize, reprimand him or fuss at him for going to the doctor. (Tr. 137).

   Mr. Veasaw agreed that his job involved responsibility for maintaining and securing the Respondent's computer system. (Tr. 137). He also stated that he could have fixed the mail server, but he was more interested in "finding out what was going on first." He waited a period of almost two weeks during which time this critical piece of equipment was inoperable so that he could document the usage by various operators. (Tr. 138). Mr. Veasaw testified that when he was terminated, he was not told he was terminated because of a problem with the mail server. (Tr. 138).

   Complainant testified that his primary complaints about air quality were concerns affecting himself, his fellow employees and the general public, in that order. His complaints related to conditions in the plant which, in his opinion, were hazardous. (Tr. 140). Complainant believed it was his duty to report the air handling system and its failures to management. (Tr. 142-143). He stated that, although he was given the standard response by Mr. Carruth regarding the air being monitored, he was not certain that it was actually being monitored. (Tr. 143). He confirmed that OSHA inspected the plant and rendered a report in which they did not find any complaint or citation regarding the exposure to fumes as raised by Mr. Veasaw. Mr. Veasaw claims that the inspection occurred after a two week notice to clean up the plant and Respondent was on its "best behavior." (Tr. 143-144). He affirmed that, although numerous health and safety violations were noted, they related primarily to the spray paint booths. (Tr. 144).

   Mr. Veasaw acknowledged that Respondent manufactures and sells hydraulic cylinders which are used in any kind of lifting operation, such as a bulldozer, elevator or fork lift. (Tr. 144). He further stated that the hydraulic cylinder is a piston or rod which is chrome-plated. The electroplating of these rods is performed at a facility in Waco, Texas and any electroplating performed in Temple, Texas is patch or touch-up work on rods which may have been damaged or blemished in transit or in handling. (Tr. 144-145).

   Mr. Veasaw testified that he did not threaten to report the electroplating because he was then investigating what was going on. He began investigating and documenting events after he received the December 11, 1996, written reprimand and when it became obvious that Respondent was not concerned about his safety. (Tr. 146). He stated that he wanted to know what he was being exposed to as well as to what other employees and the general public were being exposed.


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Glenda G. Williams

   Ms. Williams began working for Respondent in August 1996 as a computer operator and voluntarily terminated her employment on or about July 1, 1997. (Tr. 156). On March 11, 1997, after Complainant's termination, she wrote a letter to DOL complaining about the air quality in Respondent's facility. (Tr. 155-156). Ms. Williams was concerned about the air quality in the plant during her entire tenure with Respondent and stated many employees complained to each other about the air quality conditions in the plant. (Tr. 160).

   Ms. Williams testified that during cold weather or inclement weather, when the doors to the plant were closed, there was no ventilation and "the exhaust and everything just hung in the air," which the employees were breathing. (Tr. 160). She stated that it was difficult to breathe "sometimes" and she experienced a burning sensation in her nose and throat "sometimes." (Tr. 161). She experienced "a lot of respiratory problems and sinus problems." (Tr. 161).

   Ms. Williams confirmed that after Mr. Veasaw's termination Respondent hired other employees to perform computer work. (Tr. 164). She was unfamiliar with the training or expertise of any of the employees hired, although she stated that one employee was hired to be trained on the system. (Tr. 166). She testified that the computer work "crashed" once or twice a week after Mr. Veasaw's termination. (Tr. 168).

   On cross-examination, Ms. Williams testified that she mentioned her concerns about air quality to management "in discussion in passing." She never made a formal complaint to management. (Tr. 169). She mentioned her concerns of air quality to her supervisor, Sherry Morgan, and talked about air quality in the plant at meetings. She acknowledged that she was not fired because of her expression of such concerns. (Tr. 170).

   Ms. Williams sought medical care and treatment for her respiratory and sinus problems during her employment with Respondent. She did not report to her doctors that the air quality in the plant caused her respiratory or sinus problems. (Tr. 172). She further acknowledged that she did not report her medical treatment to Respondent while employed with Respondent. (Tr. 173).

   Ms. Williams recalled an occasion in December 1996 or January 1997 when the employees had to evacuate the building because the interior walls of the computer office were being spray painted. (Tr. 179). Because the fumes were strong inside the office, the employees went out into the parking lot. Respondent set up fans and opened the doors after the employees left to move the air out of the offices. (Tr. 180). She suffered a headache as a result of this event, but did not receive any medical attention therefor. (Tr. 181).

   She acknowledged that most of her complaining was made "hopefully to raise the consciousness of management. I did not go and complain directly that I thought the air was bad." She further stated that she did not do so because she did not want to lose her job. (Tr. 181). Ms. Williams could not attest that the evacuation of the office because of paint fumes had anything to do with Mr. Veasaw's termination. (Tr. 187). Ms. Williams testified there were "constantly complaints about not being able to get onto the server." However, she could not recall whether or not that situation existed when Mr. Veasaw was employed by Respondent. (Tr. 185).


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Wybert (Skip) Carruth

   Mr. Carruth testified that he began employment with Respondent in 1985 as an engineering and quality manager. He worked for Respondent until 1994 when he left for approximately one to one and one-half years to work for another company. Upon his return he has been responsible for quality programs, information systems and the development of an Information Systems Department. (Tr. 199).

   Mr. Carruth hired Mr. Veasaw and it was his decision to terminate Mr. Veasaw. (Tr. 200). Mr. Carruth testified that Complainant was terminated because he had not demonstrated an ability to support the systems that were in place, an ability to solve problems and respond in a timely manner, as set forth in his October 28, 1996 Employee Performance Appraisal.

   With respect to the Employee Performance Appraisal (RX-A), Mr. Carruth testified that knowledge and skills were characteristics which Mr. Veasaw needed to improve and that his organizational skills were very poor. Because of poor organizational skills, Mr. Veasaw had problems getting things done in a timely manner, "working to meet deadlines." (Tr. 202). Mr. Carruth testified that these same shortcomings were the cause of Mr. Veasaw's termination in early 1997.

   Mr. Veasaw was given an unsatisfactory performance notice on December 11, 1996 as a result of a problem in the welding area with a terminal that had become inoperable and was not printing documents. The problem began on December 2, 1996 according to Mr. Carruth and Mr. Veasaw was asked to fix the problem. On December 10, 1996, Mr. Carruth received a call from the welding supervisor asking him to intervene because Mr. Veasaw was not solving the welding terminal problem. (Tr. 203-204). After looking into the issues, he concluded that Mr. Veasaw was demonstrating the same problems he had exhibited in his pre-October 1996 performance, which were responding in a timely manner, staying focused and problem solving skills. He documented those shortcomings in the unsatisfactory performance notice which Mr. Veasaw received on December 11, 1996. (Tr. 204; RX-B).

   Mr. Carruth concluded that Mr. Veasaw needed to develop a method of prioritizing his time and, if he was using a prioritization method, it was not effective. He placed a deadline on Mr. Veasaw to develop a system of prioritization and to place that system into effect by December 20, 1996. He also asked Mr. Veasaw to identify, at a minimum, the top five issues, to a maximum of ten issues, that he was then facing in an attempt to assist Mr. Veasaw determine what priority to place on each issue. (Tr. 204-205). The prioritization of issues was given a deadline of Friday, December 13, 1996. (Tr. 205). According to Mr. Carruth, as of Mr. Veasaw's date of termination, January 27, 1997, he had not complied with either deadline. (Tr. 206).


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   Mr. Carruth testified that the problem which existed with the mail server required repair because a mail server is used to communicate with the headquarters of Dover Industries in Chicago, Illinois. The mail server was used as a method of transferring information between Dover Industries and all of its subsidiary offices, including Respondent in Temple, Texas. (Tr. 207). Mr. Carruth testified that, at some point in January 1997, the mail server quit working and its repair was a duty or responsibility of Mr. Veasaw. The controller of the company, Sherry Morgan, may have asked that the mail server problem be fixed. Later, Ms. Morgan reported to Mr. Carruth that the problem wasn't being fixed; that Mr. Veasaw had been working on it, but Respondent was unable to communicate with Dover Industries and Dover Industries was not happy because they were not getting the information they needed on a timely basis. Ms. Morgan indicated that the problem had to be solved. (Tr. 208-209). Ms. Morgan asked that Mr. Carruth take charge and resolve the mail server problem.

   Mr. Carruth testified that he spoke with a Dover Industries consultant who provided suggestions and direction which Mr. Carruth followed to resolve the mail server problem within a matter of one-half hour. (Tr. 210). Mr. Carruth testified that the last transmission prior to the mail server becoming inoperable occurred on January 13, 1997 and the server was fixed on Friday, January 24, 1997. (Tr. 211). Mr. Carruth testified the mail server problem was another example of Mr. Veasaw's skill levels not matching what Respondent thought he possessed in terms of skills. Mr. Carruth's concern was that Mr. Veasaw was not demonstrating appropriate urgency, knowing what was important and did not spend enough time on this particular problem, thus, a prioritization problem remained prevalent as late as January 1997. Based on the foregoing, Mr. Carruth decided to terminate Mr. Veasaw. (Tr. 211).

   On Monday, January 27, 1997, Mr. Veasaw met with Mr. Carruth, at which time Mr. Carruth informed him that his skills sets,

    "the abilities that he had did not intersect with the problems, . . . the things that we needed at [Respondent]. He didn't--he was not able to meet the requirements for [Respondent] in terms of his performance. And that based on those reasons, he was being terminated." (Tr. 212).

   Mr. Veasaw did not make any comments about the termination nor ask any questions. (Tr. 212). Mr. Carruth hired only one person, Tim Wilson, to replace Mr. Veasaw subsequent to his termination. (Tr. 213). He testified that no complaints or threatened complaints or hearsay complaints about air quality or Mr. Veasaw's illness or the conditions in the plant played a role in his decision to terminate Mr. Veasaw. (Tr. 214).

   On cross-examination, Mr. Carruth was presented a document which purported to be a response to his request for prioritization of issues, but testified that he was neither familiar with the document nor did he ever remember seeing such a document. (Tr. 215-216). Mr. Carruth


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testified that he consulted with Mr. Veasaw prior to initiating his unsatisfactory performance notice in December 1996. (Tr. 223-224).

   Mr. Carruth testified that he was aware that electroplating was being conducted at the facility to repair chromium devices. (Tr. 230). He further stated that electroplating occurs on a regular basis on both shifts. He acknowledged that before December 13, 1996, Mr. Veasaw reported problems he was having with the air quality in the plant. (Tr. 231). He attested that Mr. Veasaw raised air quality problems with him on December 2, 1996 after returning from a Thanksgiving ski trip. Mr. Veasaw returned with some respiratory problem and coughing symptoms and made a comment to Mr. Carruth that he thought the ski resort was blowing snow, and the lake water probably had something in it which caused his infection. He further stated that, because his lungs were raw from breathing clean air, the smells in the shop bothered him. (Tr. 232). Mr. Carruth stated that was the substance of Mr. Veasaw's complaint. He further stated that Mr. Veasaw did not ask him to do anything about his complaint.

   On December 13, 1996, Mr. Veasaw telephoned Mr. Carruth and again reported he was sick; that he had been working out in the shop and the air in the welding area bothered him. (Tr. 233). Mr. Carruth informed Mr. Veasaw that he needed to see a doctor and get to the bottom of his problem and that he needed to have a doctor "clear him" before returning to work. (Tr. 234). Mr. Carruth again affirmed that Mr. Veasaw never asked him to do anything to resolve the air quality in the plant. Mr. Veasaw never suggested that a different ventilator system was required in the plant to clear the air, nor did he complain that the shop ventilator system was not properly working. (Tr. 235). Mr. Carruth acknowledged that Mr. Veasaw may have mentioned "the thing about the doors being closed and the fan not drawing, which was why . . . he was breathing in the welding area." (Tr. 235). Mr. Carruth testified Mr. Veasaw did not mention to him that he was going to file any complaints about the air quality in the plant with an outside agency nor did he indicate that he wanted to file an internal complaint concerning the ventilator system in the plant or about his illness. (Tr. 235-236).

   Mr. Carruth testified that the written termination notice reflecting the reasons for Mr. Veasaw's termination was not signed, dated or presented to Complainant (RX-F) and the payroll change notice reflected Mr. Veasaw was "terminated for insufficient skills to meet job requirements." (Tr. 244; RX-G).

The Contentions of the Parties

   Complainant contends that he engaged in protected activity under the employee protection provision of the Clean Air Act when he voiced concerns about the air quality in the Respondent's facility.

   Complainant further contends that he was subjected to adverse employment action when Respondent reprimanded and subsequently discharged him for engaging in protected activities under the Act.


[Page 14]

   Respondent asserts Complainant's contentions that he was terminated because of "a report or threatened report, or complaint or threatened complaint under the Clean Air Act" is baseless. Respondent avers that nothing in Complainant's complaints about the plant's ventilation system was "a cause, or contributing cause or producing cause of his termination." Respondent contends that Complainant was terminated because his "skills did not match what [Respondent] needed" in terms of "prioritization, urgency, staying on task, [and] being focused."

   Moreover, in its pre-hearing Motion To Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (ALJX-4), which was renewed at the conclusion of Complainant's case-in-chief, it is contended that the Clean Air Act "seeks to prevent and control air pollution by regulating emissions into the atmosphere. Regulations implementing the Act establish ambient air quality standards. 40 C.F.R. Part 50." Therein, ambient air is defined as "that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has access." 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e).

III. DISCUSSION

   Prefatory to a full discussion of the issues presented for resolution, it must be noted that I have thoughtfully considered and evaluated the rationality and consistency of the testimony of all witnesses and the manner in which the testimony supports or detracts from the other record evidence. In doing so, I have taken into account all relevant, probative and available evidence and attempted to analyze and assess its cumulative impact on the record contentions. See Frady v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Case No. 92-ERA-19 (Sec'y Oct. 23, 1995)(Slip Opinion at 4).

   Credibility of witnesses is "that quality in a witness which renders his evidence worthy of belief." Indiana Metal Products v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 46, 51 (7th Cir. 1971). As the Court further observed:

Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source, but must, in addition, be credible in itself, by which is meant that it shall be so natural, reasonable and probable in view of the transaction which it describes or to which it relates, as to make it easy to believe . . . Credible testimony is that which meets the test of plausibility.

442 F. 2d at 52.

   It is well-settled that an administrative law judge is not bound to believe or disbelieve the entirety of a witness' testimony, but may choose to believe only certain portions of the testimony. Altemose Construction Company v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 8, 16 and n. 5 (3d Cir. 1975).


[Page 15]

   Moreover, based on the unique advantage of having heard the testimony firsthand, I have observed the behavior, bearing, manner and appearance of witnesses from which impressions were garnered of the demeanor of those testifying which also forms part of the record evidence. In short, to the extent credibility determinations must be weighed for the resolution of issues, I have based my credibility findings on a review of the entire testimonial record and exhibits with due regard for the logic of probability and the demeanor of witnesses.

A. The Applicability of the Clean Air Act

   Although commonly known as the Clean Air Act, the statute was passed by Congress as the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), amending the 1967 Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). The 1970 legislation was later amended in 1977 and 1990.

   The CAA only gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to regulate "air pollutants," and defines "air pollutant" as "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)(emphasis added). The CAA establishes National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) applicable on a nationwide basis. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(u). These standards are referred to as "harm-based" because the mandated quality levels are set by reference to ambient levels of pollutants that would limit harm to human health and the environment to acceptable levels.11

   The NAAQS regulations define "Ambient air" as "that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has access." 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e)(emphasis added). Moreover, the EPA's regulations governing air pollution define it as "the presence in the outdoor atmosphere" of pollutants. 40 C.F.R. § 35.501-1 (4th Ed. 1972)(emphasis added).

   Indoor pollution has been the subject of recent comment in which it was recognized that the "impact of individual pollutants depends on a number of factors such as toxicity, concentration, duration of exposure and sensitivity of those exposed . . . Over time, these emissions, called "off-gassing" gradually decrease." "Insufficient ventilation, resulting in poor air exchange, can intensify indoor air pollution." 12 However, the "CAA provides very little protection for those exposed to indoor air pollution. The CAA improves indoor air indirectly through its programs to lower the concentrations of air pollution in the outdoor or ambient air." "Indoor air in the workplace is subject to regulation under the OSH Act. The OSH Act applies


[Page 16]

to most private sector businesses." 13

   It has been observed that "the EPA . . . has consistently limited itself to regulating outdoor air quality under the Clean Air Act . . . because ambient air has universally been construed to mean the outdoor air." 14 Moreover, it has been recognized that the EPA "has never attempted to regulate indoor air quality under the auspices of the Clean Air Act and no statute currently grants it unambiguous authority to do so. The CAA gives the EPA authority to regulate any pollutant that enters the ambient air." 15 Yet, EPA regulations interpreting the CAA are specifically tailored to addressing only problems in outdoor air. 16

   Complainant's complaint alleges poor air quality exclusively in the manufacturing and office areas of Respondent's facility. See Paragraphs 7, 8(a), 8(c), 8(d) and 10 (ALJX-2). At the hearing, Complainant expanded the scope of his allegations to include some undefined area outside the plant into which gases or vapors may have been dispelled by ventilation fans and open doors. Assuming arguendo, that any amounts of gases or vapors escaped into the outdoor atmosphere, there is no evidence as to the toxicity involved in such materials, whether such gases or vapors constituted measurable or just negligible amounts of "pollutants" or whether such "contaminants may have caused any adverse effects on the health of the general public. 17

   Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, I am constrained to find and conclude that the Clean Air Act is inapplicable to the indoor air quality complaints and the alleged speculative, residual outdoor contamination which form the basis of Complainant's complaint. Consequently, I further find and conclude that Complainant's actions do not conform to the activities protected by the employee protective provisions of the CAA.

   Notwithstanding the foregoing, arguably Complainant's claim may come within the purview of the Clean Air Act if he reasonably believed Respondent violated the Clean Air Act. See Menard v. Nerco Delamar Co., Case No. 92-SWD-1 (Sec'y Jan. 25, 1994). Accordingly, I shall consider hereinbelow whether Complainant is entitled to a finding and conclusion that Respondent discriminated against him for his alleged activity based on this perception.

B. Complainant's Prima Facie Case

   The protective employee provision of the Clean Air Act in pertinent part provides:

No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee . . .


[Page 17]

1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this chapter or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this chapter. . .

2) testified or is about to

testify in any such proceeding, or

3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

   The Secretary of Labor has repeatedly articulated the legal framework under which parties litigate in retaliation cases. Under the burdens of persuasion and production in whistleblower proceedings, the Complainant must first present a prima facie case of retaliation by showing:

1) that the Respondent is governed by the Act;

2) that Complainant engaged in protected activity as defined by the Act;

3) that the Respondent was aware of that activity and took some adverse action against Complainant; and

4) that an inference is raised that the protected activity of Complainant was the likely reason for the adverse action.

See Hoffman v. Bossert, Case No. 94-CAA-4 @ 3-4 (Sec'y Sept. 19, 1995); Bechtel Construction Company v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 933 (11th Cir. 1995).

   The Respondent may rebut the Complainant's prima facie showing by producing evidence that the adverse action was motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Complainant may counter Respondent's evidence by proving that the legitimate reason proffered by the Respondent is a pretext. See Yule v. Burns International Security Service, Case No. 93-ERA-12 (Sec'y May 24, 1994)(Slip Op. at 7-8). In any event, the Complainant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was retaliated against in violation of the law. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993); Dean Darty v. Zack Company of Chicago, Case No. 82- ERA-2 (Sec'y Apr. 25, 1983) (Slip Op. at 5-9) (citing Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981)).


[Page 18]

   Since this case was fully tried on its merits, it is not necessary for the undersigned to determine whether Complainant presented a prima facie case and whether the Respondent rebutted that showing. See Carroll v. Bechtel Power Corp., Case No. 91-ERA-46 (Sec'y Feb, 15, 1995)(Slip Op. at 11, n. 9), aff'd sub nom. Bechtel Power Corp. v. U. S. Department of Labor, 78 F.3d 352 (8th Cir. 1996); James v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., Case No. 94-WPC-4 (Sec'y Mar. 15, 1996). Once Respondent has produced evidence that Complainant was subjected to adverse action for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,18 it no longer serves any analytical purpose to answer the question whether Complainant presented a prima facie case. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the Complainant prevailed by a preponderance of the evidence on the ultimate question of liability. If he did not, it matters not at all whether he presented a prima facie case. If he did, whether he presented a prima facie case is not relevant. Adjiri v. Emory University, Case No. 97-ERA-36 @ 6 (ARB July 14, 1998).

   The undersigned finds that as a matter of fact and law, Respondent has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

   In the present case, there is no dispute that Complainant was an employee of Respondent, the party charged with discrimination. Respondent concedes that Complainant voiced complaints about the air quality in the plant on several occasions upon his return from a Thanksgiving skiing trip. However, the Complainant has failed to establish the remaining elements of a prima facie case.

   There is no record evidence of any hostility or animus towards Complainant for voicing internal complaints about the ventilation system or the air quality in the plant. Complainant did not file any external complaints about the air quality, ventilation, health hazards from noxious fumes, vapors or gases with EPA or any other agency before his termination. Moreover, Complainant candidly admitted that his complaints to Respondent about the air quality were not the reason for his termination. He believed his efforts to document "what was going on" was the impetus for his termination. However, Complainant has not shown by the weight of the evidence that Respondent had knowledge of his alleged investigative efforts. The record is woefully lacking in evidence of Respondent's knowledge about such "documentation." Complainant asserted that his documentation efforts were a precursor to commencing a proceeding or "causing" a proceeding to be commenced. Since I have previously found that the CAA does not apply to this matter, and, for reasons explicated below, that Complainant could not have reasonably believed Respondent violated the CAA, I also find and conclude Complainant's argument that his "documentation" was a precursor to protected activity is specious.

   Furthermore, Complainant admitted that his October 1996 employee


[Page 19]

performance appraisal was not in response to his pre-Thanksgiving complaints about the air quality in the plant which may have arguably shown animus toward Complainant.

   The earliest date on which Respondent may have been on notice of Complainant's external filing of a complaint was subsequent to February 20, 1997, well after his January 27, 1997, termination.

   I find and conclude Complainant failed to establish by the weight of the record evidence that he was subjected to adverse action by Respondent because of his alleged protected activity. The weight of the probative, credible evidence compels a conclusion that Complainant was not terminated because of his alleged protected activities. Contrary to Complainant's assertions, he was unable to "fix" all the problems that came his way. Admittedly, the welding machine terminal computer remained unrepaired from December 2 through December 10, 1996, when the welding supervisor requested Mr. Carruth to intervene. Complainant was unable to repair a faulty notebook computer used by a sales manager. More importantly, he was unable to repair the mail server, a vital communication link for Respondent. He professed that he could have fixed the mail server, but was more interested in "finding out what was going on first," by documenting its usage by various operators.    Complainant was terminated by Mr. Carruth because he had not demonstrated an ability to support Respondent's computer systems or to solve repair problems in a timely and efficient manner. The foregoing failings are the examples proffered by Mr. Carruth as motivation for his actions against Complainant. I find and conclude that Mr. Carruth had legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons, as abundantly detailed in his testimony, for taking adverse action against Complainant. Additionally, Complainant failed to exhibit the expectations sought by Respondent in terms of knowledge and skills and organizational abilities. The written warning issued to Complainant on December 11, 1996, was based upon his failure to repair the welding machine terminal computer. Complainant admitted he did not fix the problem. He further demonstrated a lack of urgency or focus in failing to respond to deadlines set to devise a prioritization plan and compose a list of his five to ten most important ongoing tasks.

   The burden is on the Complainant to establish that adverse action was meted out because of his protected activity. He clearly has not shown by the weight of the evidence that his written warning and termination were imposed because of his internal complaints regarding air quality, ventilation or health hazards emanating from noxious fumes, vapors or gases. I so find and conclude. Moreover, it is noted that Ms. Williams, who also complained to Respondent about the plant air quality, was not similarly disciplined or terminated.

   Lastly, I find Complainant could not have reasonably perceived Respondent was in violation of the Clean Air Act since he admittedly knew the Act was not applicable to indoor air quality. He further acknowledged that only "outside" air was regulated by the CAA. Since he has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the plant air displaced into the atmosphere through open doors may have had an environmental impact on the general public, I find his alternative theory of a violation expressed at the hearing is also without merit.


[Page 20]

IV. CONCLUSION>

   For the reasons discussed above, I find and conclude that the Clean Air Act is inapplicable to the extant circumstances of this case. I further find and conclude that Complainant failed to present any evidence to establish he was subjected to adverse employment actions because of his protected activity or that Respondent's proffered reasons for issuing a written warning and terminating his employment were a pretext for discriminatory retaliation. Thus, I find and conclude, based on the foregoing analysis, that Respondent terminated Complainant for legitimate business reasons and not because of his alleged protected activity.

   Accordingly, I find and conclude, based on the record evidence, that Complainant has not met his burden of proof to demonstrate Respondent's proffered reasons for terminating him were pre-textual rather than motivated by his alleged protected activity. I further find and conclude that Respondent lawfully terminated Complainant for legitimate business reasons.

V. ORDER

   Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and upon the entire record, Respondent has not unlawfully discriminated against James B. Veasaw because of his alleged protected activity and his complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

   ORDERED this 5th day of October, 1998, at Metairie, Louisiana.

       LEE J. ROMERO, JR.
       Administrative Law Judge

N O T I C E

   This recommended Decision and Order will automatically become the final order of the Secretary unless, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 24.8, a petition for review is timely filed with the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, Room S-4390, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20210. Such a petition for review must be received by the Administrative Review Board within ten (10) business days of the date of this Recommended Decision and Order, and shall be served on all parties and on the Chief Administrative Law Judge. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.8 and 24.9, as amended by 63 Fed. Reg. 6614 (1998).

[ENDNOTES]

1 Initially, I expressed concerns that Complainant should seek legal representation and urged that he do so. Complainant readily sought accommodations for "several [documented] learning disabilities." He advised that he had an inability to perform listening, speaking, reading, writing and math skills at levels considered normal. I found Complainant to be a bright, articulate individual who needed little, if any, assistance during the hearing and who exhibited speaking, reading and writing skills. As exemplaries, see Complainant's Complaint (ALJX-2), his Objections to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (ALJX-6) and his Objections to Respondent's Motion to Exclude Evidence and Documents (ALJX-7). I further found Complainant's case presentation to be substantively appropriate.

2 The parties stipulated that Complainant's complaint was timely filed with DOL. (Tr. 19).

3 References to the record are as follows: Transcript: Tr.___; Complainant's Exhibits: CX-___; Respondent's Exhibits: RX-___; and Administrative Law Judge Exhibits: ALJX-___.

4 The welding machine terminal problem surfaced on December 2, 1996. By December 10, 1996, no resolution had occurred. The welding supervisor complained to Mr. Carruth. (RX-B).

5 The written warning reaffirmed difficulties noted in Complainant's October 1996 employee performance appraisal of prioritizing his work tasks based on "relative urgency and importance." Complainant's failure to resolve a "faulty notebook computer used by one of the regional sales managers" was cited as a further example of his lack of prioritization. The warning established corrective action, i.e., the need to establish a prioritization plan by December 20, 1996, and the identification of the top (minimum 5, maximum 10) most important and urgent items on which Complainant was working by December 13, 1996. The consequences for failure to improve his performance was "disciplinary action up to and including termination."

6 Complainant introduced Respondent's "Injury/Illness Log" for 1996 reflecting 46 incidents, of which most were traumatic in nature and none revealed respiratory problems. (CX-6A, pp. 11-16).

7 Complainant introduced the Material Safety and Data Sheets (MSDS) which he represented disclosed all of the various chemicals used in Respondent's facilities. ( CX-1A and 1B). The MSDS sheets generally reflect the ingredients, physical data and properties, fire and explosion hazard data, health hazard data, reactivity data, safe handling and use information and special precautions for 41 paint products, 7 chemicals, 22 lubricants and coolants, 15 steels, 4 miscellaneous cleaning solutions and 10 gases. Complainant alleges that "some of the chemicals" used by Respondent caused the respiratory symptoms he was experiencing in December 1996. Complainant was informed by the undersigned at the time the MSDS sheets were received into evidence that unless he identified specific materials to which he was exposed or delineated the extent of its involvement in his complaint, the MSDS sheets would not be given any probative value or meaning in this matter. Complainant has failed to identify any potentially hazardous materials to which he was directly exposed that are contained in the MSDS sheets. Accordingly, no probative weight has been given to the MSDS sheets in resolving the issues presented herein.

8 The doctor's note of the visit reveals that Complainant's cough was "probably allergic in nature." (CX-5I).

9 The x-ray was interpreted as revealing no acute disease. The CAT Scan was read as "no adenopathy (enlargement of glands) in the mediastinum or hila and minimal scarring and a few emphysematous blebs in the apices . . ." No remarkable findings attributable to Complainant's alleged symptomatology or exposure to hazardous materials were noted. Complainant does not contend that the CAT Scan or its results, which were never presented to Respondent, contributed, in any way, to his termination.

10 Such an admission eliminates the CAT Scan and its results as an impetus for Respondent's motivation to impose adverse action upon Complainant.

11 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law and Society, at page 441 (2d Ed. 1998). Therein, the authors validate that the Clean Air Act does not address indoor air quality. Id., n. 1.

12 The federal government currently has no standards for ventilation, and it is therefore regulated by local building codes which may address concerns other than indoor air quality. See Office of Air and Radiation, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: Ventilation and Air Quality in Offices. (April 2, 1997).

13 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. and Sheryl-Lynn Carof, The Legal Control of Indoor Air Pollution, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 247, at 249-250, 254, 258 (1998).

14 Laurence S. Kirsch, The Status of Indoor Air Pollution Litigation, C432 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 317, 358-359 (1989).

15 Steve Kelly, Indoor Air Pollution: An Impetus for Environmental Regulation Indoors?, 6 BYU J. Pub. L. 295 (1992).

16 See Grace C. Guiffrida, The Proposed Indoor Air Quality Acts of 1993: The Comprehensive Solution to a Far-Reaching Problem?, 11 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 311 (1993).

17 Although the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), provides minimal control over indoor air, it is concerned primarily with the control of releases into the environment which includes the ambient air. However, the term "release" excludes "any release which results in exposure to persons solely within the workplace . . . ."

18 The Respondent must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the adverse employment action. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the Respondent. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra., at 253, 256-257. Respondent does not carry the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons for the adverse employment action. Id.



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