



**The U.S. EPA's Oil Program Report**

October 2003

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**Protecting Freshwater Resources through Revised Contingency Planning**

Preventing, preparing, and responding to oil and hazardous substance spills is one of EPA's most critical missions. Contingency planning is a crucial element of this mission and is mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Developing and maintaining area and sub-area contingency plans serve to assure pre-planning of joint response efforts, including appropriate procedures for mechanical recovery, dispersal, shoreline cleanup, protection of sensitive environmental areas, and rescue and rehabilitation of fisheries and wildlife. EPA Region 5 shares the responsibility for providing contingency planning for the Great Lakes and Mississippi River with adjacent Regions.

In meeting the requirement to keep plans up-to-date, Region 5, in collaboration with state and local agencies, has recently revised several sub-area contingency plans: the Peoria County Oil Annex to the Peoria County Hazardous Materials Plan, the Quad Cities Sub-Area Contingency Plan, the Greater St. Louis Sub-Area Contingency Plan, and the Minneapolis/St. Paul Sub-Area Contingency Plan. These plans provided updated details on the most current response resources such as jurisdictions, lists of oil spill response organizations, roles and responsibilities, notification and incident command procedures, and response operations and

exercises. Additionally, the sub-area plans identify their critical place in the planning hierarchy extending from area planning to regional planning and up to national contingency planning.

These plans can be viewed in their entirety at [www.freshwaterspills.net/new.htm](http://www.freshwaterspills.net/new.htm). For more information on area contingency planning in EPA Region 5, visit <http://www.epa.gov/region5oil/plan/acp.html>.

**Unannounced FRP Drill Finds Facility in Full Compliance**

An unannounced Facility Response Plan (FRP) drill was conducted at the Amerada Hess oil storage terminal in Bogota, New Jersey during the summer of 2003. EPA Region 2 On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) Christopher Jimenez and Steve Touw lead the exercise. The drill was designed to test the facility's FRP, and determine whether the facility had adequate response equipment in place to contain a potential oil spill. The drill involved a hypothetical spill scenario in which 2,100 gallons of #2 fuel had been released into the Hackensack River. Jimenez and Touw were assisted in the exercise by a visiting OSC from Region 8, and by the FRP contractor.

During the drill, Amerada Hess personnel made all the proper notifications to the appropriate agencies, and deployed their response equipment well within the acceptable time range set forth in FRP guidelines. They were able to

successfully boom their bulkhead and outfall, and position a vacuum truck for oil recovery within one hour. A review of the facility's exercise and training records was conducted, as was an additional inspection to ensure the facility was meeting requirements under the Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) rules. Both reviews found the facility to be in full compliance with applicable regulations.

For additional information, please contact Christopher Jimenez, EPA Region 2 at 732-906-6847.

## USCG Maritime Security Regulation

Under the authority of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has issued temporary interim maritime security regulations that became effective when they were published on July 1, 2003 (68 FR 39240). USCG plans to publish the final rules shortly so they become effective when the interim rules expire on November 25, 2003. These rules will affect some facilities which are regulated under both the USCG and EPA oil spill response regulations (33 FR 154 and 40 CFR 112.20).

The series of rules addresses security assessments and plans as well as other security standards, measures, and provisions that will be codified in the new Subchapter H of Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The six rules consist of: (1) General provisions; (2) Area maritime security; (3) Vessel security measures; (4) Facility security; (5) Outer continental shelf facility security; and (6) Vessel carriage requirement for the automatic identification system (AIS).

Facilities which are required to prepare Facility Response Plans under 40 CFR § 112.20 may find that they must also comply with the USCG security regulations regarding facility security. The USCG rules require security measures for facilities in order to reduce the risk of and to mitigate the results of an act that threatens the security of personnel, the

facility, and the public. Facilities that are not required to prepare security plans, including facilities regulated by EPA, may also be visited by USCG as part of port security planning.

Questions regarding the MTSA regulations may be posed to the MTSA Help Desk at 202-366-9900 or emailed to [uscgregs@comdt.uscg.mil](mailto:uscgregs@comdt.uscg.mil). A toll-free number will be established for inquiries in the near future.

## Recent Incidents

### Colonial Pipeline Company Nokesville Road Spill

On March 16, 2003, an anonymous caller to the Colonial Pipeline Company's emergency hotline to reported dead vegetation along Colonial's right-of-way near the intersection of State Routes 28 and 609 on the border of Prince William and Fauquier Counties in Virginia. That same evening, Colonial representatives investigated the land near the intersection and confirmed dead vegetation and stained soil in the area. In response, Colonial shut down pipelines serving the affected area, though up to 10,000 barrels of gasoline may have still been in the lines. Two petroleum product pipelines were running parallel in this area.

Colonial representatives contacted local response officials from several neighboring fire departments who formed an unified command (UC) system. The incident was also reported to the National Response Center and an EPA One-Scene Coordinator (OSC) was dispatched to investigate the situation. Colonial reported one barrel of oil spilled because the actual release was unknown.

The EPA OSC arrived on site and met with Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VADEQ) representatives, who informed EPA that a UC was being established. Colonial contractors and Fire Department personnel initiated excavation of the suspected leak area. The site safety plan required that the area be blanketed with foam if the lower explosive limit (LEL) exceeded 10%.

Route 28 remained open during this time, but a contingency plan for road closure was in place if readings at the road reached 25% LEL or free product reached the road. Heavily contaminated soil was excavated during these operations. Air monitoring was performed by both Colonial and Fire Department personnel. Operations continued on a 24-hour basis. A Joint Information Center was established for the residents surrounding the spill site. Colonial representatives went door-to-door within a half-mile radius of the spill site to talk with residents. The EPA OSC determined that with the presence of gasoline-contaminated soil, there was a threat of discharge of petroleum products to surface waters, lakes, and streams. Additional contingency plans were put into place. 25,000 gallons of water, foam, and oil were recovered. The stream conditions were continually monitored and no visible sheen developed in the waterway. For more information, contact Raj Sharma, EPA Region 3, 215-814-3260.

### Buckeye Pipeline Rupture the Result of Incorrect Maps

Over 6,000 gallons of diesel fuel were released from a Buckeye Pipeline Company pipeline in New Haven, Connecticut on July 9, 2003 after the pipeline was accidentally struck by excavators working to install a waterline. The area had been reported as safe for digging by Dig Safe, Inc., a regional communication network concerned with underground facilities. The location of the pipeline had been incorrectly reported to Dig Safe by Buckeye, which had misidentified the pipeline by 26 feet on company maps. The excavation was being performed by Massey Brothers Excavating of Branford as part of construction activities for the new Circle of Life transfer station.

Massey reported the pipeline rupture to Buckeye when it was discovered at 7:00 p.m. Buckeye immediately closed the valves to isolate two-and-a-half miles of affected pipeline, and dispatched emergency response employees to the scene. Buckeye responders worked



Buckeye Pipeline Rupture

together with Massey excavators to insert a wooden plug into the four square foot hole in the pipeline, slowing the release of fuel. Buckeye hired an environmental contractor to contain and recover the spilled product. The contractor immediately responded by stopping the fuel line and notifying local authorities.

At 8:00 p.m., the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) notified EPA On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) Tom Condon of the release. Condon reported to the scene immediately and joined a Unified Command with representatives from DEP, the U.S. Coast Guard, the New Haven Fire Department, and Buckeye. By 2:00 a.m. responders succeeded in installing a clamp on the damaged pipe, which slowed the release to a trickle. The pipeline was then reopened to purge over 75,000 gallons of fuel from the damaged section of the pipe. The empty line was filled with nitrogen gas the following day, to allow the pipeline to be cut for the placement a permanent patch. The pipe was pressure tested and returned to service on July 11, 2003.

Initial estimates of the spill were up to 15,000 gallons, but Buckeye's final estimate placed the total release at 6,100 gallons. The area impacted was a rail yard north of New Haven's Middletown

Avenue, adjacent to a landfill, and to wetlands and drainage swale that flows into the Little River. Response efforts recovered 2,400 gallons of diesel, which was recycled. Another 800 tons of contaminated soil was removed and shipped off site for incineration. Approximately 60,000 gallons of contaminated groundwater were treated with activated carbon and released.

The spill was the third Buckeye Pipeline release to occur in New Haven during the past ten years. Over 20,000 gallons of oil were released in a 1994 spill, and 3,500 gallons in 1996. Both prior spills were caused by corroded pipes. Buckeye agreed to pay for cleanup and recovery expenses. For more information, please contact Tom Condon, EPA Region 1, at 617-918-1206 or Catherine Young, EPA Region 1, at 617-918-1217.

### Oil Seepage in Cut Bank, Montana

Since the 1930s, when oil and gas were first discovered in the region, Cut Bank, Montana has attracted large influxes of workers and their families to the area. To this day, Cut Bank's gas and oil fields are one of the largest overall oil and gas production areas in Montana and have contributed significantly to the city,

county, and state economies. However, taking advantage of these resources presents environmental hazards that must be addressed responsibly in order to maintain the health and safety of the community and the surrounding areas. The most recent threat to the environment in Cut Bank was caused by oil seepage first spotted in August 2002.

At a location southwest of Cut Bank is a steep cliff face that is composed of sandstone, shaley siltstones and shales of the upper Cretaceous Two Medicine Formation. A mixture of black oil and water was discovered seeping from the cliff face. Lab results indicate that the oil is similar to that of Canadian Crude oil. Although the quantity that was discharged is unknown, the seepage was considered a substantial threat to the Cut Bank River.

Initially, the Cut Bank Fire Department installed straw bales to absorb the oil, and the river was boomed in order to contain the oil sheen. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality requested support from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Subsequently, a Pollution Funding Authorization for \$15,000 was issued to Glacier County for the purposes of controlling the oil seepage at Cut Bank and preserving the river from oil contamination. In order to stabilize the area, several actions had taken place between August 24-26, 2002, once EPA became involved. The actions consisted of digging into the surface of the cliff face in order to install tin sheeting that directs the water-oil mixture into two 126 gallon stock tanks. PVC piping was also installed to separate and drain the water from the oil, and the oil was then removed using sorbent pads stored in on-site barrels. While this system proved effective, collecting over 2 gallons of oil a day and eliminating the oil sheen seepage from that particular flowage, another seepage was discovered, entering Cut Bank River downstream from a small drainage basin, not far from the initial seepage. A third tank was installed at the river's edge, and since September 25, 2002, the seepage at this location became the major source of oil, although it was not entering the river or flowing down the slope. In order to control and contain the

oil during the winter months, systems were installed to pump the oil and heat the tanks in late October. Since December, oil seepage into the tanks has been minimal.

Through May 3, 2003, 1,427 gallons of oil were collected in the three tanks and sent to an oil recycler. The plan for future oil containment activities include the development of a system that collects the seeping crude oil before it reaches Cut Bank River following further investigation that will involve attempts to determine the oil's migration path through drilling and coring the cliff sandstones and siltstones. As of July 17, 2003, \$60,600 have been expended on containment efforts. EPA increased the initial funding from \$15,000 to \$150,000. For more information, contact Al Lange, On-Scene Coordinator, EPA Region 8, 303-312-6987.

### USCG Spills of National Significance Exercises

How do we know whether responders are adequately prepared for a catastrophic oil spill like the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster? Every few years, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) holds a "Spill of National Significance" (SONS) drill to test preparedness and practices response procedures. SONS are considered those spills that are so severe, large, or threatening to the public or the environment, that they require an extraordinarily complex response and call for more resources than local area responders can provide. Responding to SONS requires the coordination of multiple groups of federal, state, local, and industry responders. SONS exercises

have been held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Valdez, Alaska; and New Orleans, Louisiana. This year, California was selected by USCG to host the exercise.

A major portion of California, and possibly Mexico will be affected by the 2004 SONS exercise. In order to test the preparedness of both regional areas and the nation's response system, a simulated spill scenario is being designed to overtax the resources of the local area and cause

SONS Exercise 2004 is sponsored by USCG, the California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), and the American Petroleum Institute (API). For more information, please visit the OSPR Web site at [www.dfg.ca.gov/ospr/](http://www.dfg.ca.gov/ospr/).

### EPA Officials Discover Spill During Spill Meeting

EPA officials were in Fargo, North Dakota on August 13, 2003, for a "lessons learned" meeting regarding a recent spill. Twenty-five officials from state, local, and federal governments attended the meeting seeking to determine why the Red River Valley Contingency plan had failed in response to a spill at a Flying J Travel Plaza. Problems with the response included lack of communication, public confusion distinguishing

between agencies, and ill preparation for the worst-case scenario.

Just outside the meeting location, construction was underway on a new Stamart convenience store. Unaware of its contamination, workers had begun pumping water out of the ground around buried gas storage tanks in preparation for moving them. After the conclusion of the day's meeting, EPA officials walking to a local restaurant noticed a hose discharging water from the Stamart property and detected the odor of diesel fuel. Suspecting the water's contamination and seeing that it was reaching a storm sewer,

#### Significant Spills Since OSPR's Inception

Date	Location	Source	Product	Estimated Barrels
11/24/01	Bolinas to Carmel	SS Jacob Luckenbach	bunker fuel	unknown
12/30/00	E. Walker River	tank truck accident	#6 fuel oil	86
2/28/00	Ventura County	tank truck accident	crude oil	143
9/6/99	Eureka	M/V Stuyvesant	bunker fuel	48
11/10/98	Port of Long Beach	M/T Neapolis	crude oil	150
9/26/98	Half Moon Bay	M/V Command	bunker fuel	72
2/14/98	Ventura	Texaco pipeline	crude oil	200
1/24/98	Bardsdale	Torch pipeline	crude oil	500
11/5/97	Eureka	M/V Kure	bunker fuel	108
3/1/97	Donner Summit	SFPP pipeline	gas, diesel, jet	unknown
2/26/97	Norden	UPRR transfer pipe	red diesel	405
10/28/96	San Francisco	Cape Mohican	bunker fuel	200
3/11/95	Arroyo Passejero	Chevron pipeline	crude oil	6,000
12/94	San Diego River	fuel transfer line	jet aviation fuel	1,000
10/94	Guadalupe Bch.	Unocal pipelines	diluent	120,000-476,000
1/27/94	Martinez	Shell pipeline	diesel fuel	1,200
1/94	Santa Clara River	ARCO pipeline	crude oil	4,607
12/25/93	McGrath Lake	Berry Petroleum pipeline	crude oil	2,000
4/93	Grapevine Creek	ARCO pipeline	crude oil	6,200
1992	Avila Beach	Unocal tank Farm	crude oil	2,100
3/91	El Segundo	Chevron pipeline	crude oil	238
1/31/01	Santa Clara River	Mobil pipeline	crude oil	1,000
1/8/91	Los Angeles Harbor	M/V Sammi Superstar	bunker fuel	308

Source: "The OSPR News", Spring 2003 edition, Issue 1, Vol. 10.

the National Response System to be activated. The multi-day drill will involve setting up command posts, moving and deploying cleanup and containment equipment throughout California, and importing response resources from outside California. The scenario developed for the exercise will test multiple oil spill contingency plans, including the State of California's plan; the EPA Region 9 Contingency Plan (which includes the states of Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Nevada, the tribal nations of the Southwest, and the Pacific Islands); the National Contingency Plan; and the international Mexico-U.S. Response Plan (MEXUSPAC).



Flying J Travel Plaza

EPA notified local officials. The local fire department response to the discharge using absorbents to soak up contamination.

The Flying J spill occurred when more than 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel was released from a punctured fuel line. The spill was discovered by employees of the truck stop. Fuel may have been released when employees pumped rain water out of the recovery wells, which are designed to detect contamination. Rain carried the fuel to the Red River, subsequently forcing the shutdown of the Fargo and Moorhead water plants for two weeks.

Cleanup and water rerouting costs to the Flying J totaled approximately \$60,000. Approximately 2,500 gallons of fuel was recovered. The origin of the leak is still unknown, and the fines are still pending.

The truck stop immediately contacted the state health department, but failed to comply with their legal obligation to notify the National Response Center of the spill. Flying J employees may not have known it was illegal to pump run-off water into the sewer systems. The law that made this illegal was enacted several years ago. For more information on these incidents, contact Martha Wolf, On-Scene Coordinator, EPA Region 8, 303-312-6839

### Tanker Truck Driver Crashes after Falling Asleep at the Wheel

The driver of a tanker truck admitted to falling asleep while transporting 11,300 gallons of unleaded gasoline to a Wal-

Mart in Marysville, Washington, resulting in an fiery crash on I-5 in the town of Lynwood. Gary Brammer, 32, of Tukwila, showed no signs of having drugs or alcohol in his system, nor were there signs that he intentionally swerved to avoid an obstacle.

He escaped with only a

minor foot injury just moments before the truck exploded.

The crash occurred just north of Seattle at the 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue West Overpass at 12:30 p.m., July 12, 2003. After extinguishing flames that could be seen for miles, fire crews cleared the remaining debris and checked for structural damage to the bridge overpass. Dave McCormick, the state transportation department's Assistant Regional Administrator for Maintenance and Traffic, declared the bridge safe to drive on. The only damage occurred to the surface of the roadway. Southbound lanes reopened about three hours after the crash, but temporary repairs on the northbound lanes were not completed until 6:30 a.m. the following day, about 18 hours after the initial crash. Apparently, the top layer of the bridge separated from the rest of the structure, which may have helped the heat to dissipate more effectively and ultimately prevented the overpass from being structurally damaged.

In addition to \$30,000 in department staff time and materials costs, 100 feet of guardrail will have to be replaced and the overpass resurfaced. All repairs are expected to be completed by the fall of 2003. The area was inspected for environmental damage by the Department of Transportation, but no problems were discovered. Water samples from Scriber Creek and area soil samples

were taken for further testing.

Harris Transportation of Portland, the trucking company Brammer works for, has been cooperating with the investigation, the aftermath of which has resulted in Brammer's termination of employment. Though Brammer was considered a good driver and employee, the trucking company wants to emphasize to other drivers that this type of behavior is not acceptable.

## Current/Coming Events

### Fifth Biennial Freshwater Spills Symposium

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency will host the Fifth Biennial Freshwater Spills Symposium (FSS) in New Orleans, Louisiana, April 6-8, 2004. The FSS offers an opportunity for local, state, federal, and industry responders; natural resource trustees and managers; facility response planners; and additional stakeholders to exchange information on the unique problems of freshwater oil spills. The symposium continues to emphasize the importance of addressing spills in inland water bodies. Threats to human health and the environment from a freshwater spill can be significant because



Tanker Fire on I-5 (photo credit - Lynwood Police Department)

these spills often occur close to populated or biologically sensitive areas, placing resources we value and depend on, such as drinking water, wildlife, and habitats, in jeopardy.

The symposium's design team is excited about the speakers and topics planned for the upcoming event. New faces, new research, recent lessons-learned, and a great location promise an exceptional experience for attendees. Topics anticipated in FSS2004 sessions include:

- Aboveground Storage Tanks and Industry Standards
- Barge Response
- Chemical and Biological Countermeasures
- Cold Weather Prevention and Response
- Emergency Response and Counter-Terrorism Issues
- Equipment and Contract Management
- Facility Security
- Fast Water Response
- Infrastructure: Collection, Transportation, and Production
- Inland Rivers: Salvage and Firefighting
- Mississippi River Topics
- Overview of State Approaches to Regulating ASTs
- Pipelines and Production Areas
- Response and Prevention Technologies
- Sediments and Toxicity
- Toxicity Testing
- Unannounced Drills
- Unusually Sensitive Areas

The 2004 symposium will be held at:

The Hilton New Orleans Riverside  
Two Poydras Street  
New Orleans, LA 70140

To make hotel reservations, call 800-774-1500 or visit the Hilton web site at [www.hilton.com](http://www.hilton.com). For more information, or if you are interested in presenting a paper at the symposium, visit the FSS2004 web site at [www.freshwaterspills.net/fss2004](http://www.freshwaterspills.net/fss2004). You may also contact the FSS2004 Coordinator:

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USEPA Oil Program  
1235 Jefferson Davis Hwy.  
Crystal Gateway 1, 12 fl.  
Arlington, VA 22202  
[oilinfo@epa.gov](mailto:oilinfo@epa.gov)

### EPA Region 3 - 2003 Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Conference

This year's EPA Region 3 Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Conference will be held November 16-19, 2003, at the Norfolk Waterside Marriott in Norfolk Virginia. The main conference hotels will be the Marriott Waterside, the Sheraton Waterside, and the Renaissance Portsmouth. Hotel rooms are \$55 a night, plus taxes, and conference registration fees are \$185.

The 2003 conference theme 'Stay the Course', emphasizes the continued importance of diligence and focus on emergency planning and preparedness efforts. The four-day conference will offer training, workshops, general sessions, networking opportunities and an exhibit hall for a broad range of audiences including: local committee planning representatives, state emergency response commission members, emergency managers and planners, Hazmat response teams, and counter-terrorism professionals and specialists. Some of the numerous training sessions available include: Hazmat Awareness Level Course, Hazmat Operations Level Course, Getting Started with CAMEO, ALOHA, and MARPLOT, CAMEO WMD, and Street Smart Chemistry.

Participants may register online or print out the registration form and fax or send it by mail to the address below. For more information, visit [www.2003conference.org](http://www.2003conference.org) or contact:

Attn: Katrina Harris  
2003 Conference  
General Physics Corporation  
500 Edgewood Road, Suite 110  
Edgewood, MD 21040

Conference Hotline 800-364-7974  
Fax 410-676-8545

### Unannounced PREP Exercises in Region 3

During the week of September 29, 2003, the EPA Region 3 Oil Program conducted unannounced exercises in southeastern Maryland following the guidelines of the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP). EPA had notified thirty-two facilities in the Washington, DC area of the exercises. Providing notice to facilities of the possibility of an exercise ahead of time improves overall response readiness among the facilities not visited. The US Naval Warfare Center in Indian Head, Maryland, and Burch Oil Company in Hollywood, Maryland, were each selected to respond to a scenario involving a 2,100 gallon discharge of oil to a navigable water.

The objective of PREP exercises is to test notification procedures, equipment deployment, and other actions associated with a response to an oil spill as identified in the Facility Response Plan (FRP). EPA's On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) responsible for planning in the DC area along with EPA personnel from headquarters participated in each exercise. Both exercises concluded with an assessment of the response and a discussion of lessons learned. For more information contact Eduardo Rovira, EPA Region 3, at 215-814-3436 or Patricia Fleming, EPA Region 3, at 703-603-0262.

### EPA Region 8 Unannounced Drills

As an integral part of EPA Region 8's Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP), Regional personnel travel to facilities to conduct unannounced drills. The goals of drilling are threefold: 1) to conduct proper notifications to respond to an unannounced scenario of an average most probable discharge and to demonstrate that the response is timely; 2) to conduct the drills with an adequate amount of equipment for a scenario in



Deploying boom during a drill

accordance with 40 CFR 112.20 Appendix E, Section 3.0; and 3) to activate the facility's Spill Management Team (SMT) and Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO).

Drills generally last two to three hours. EPA explains the objectives, scenario, and scope of the exercise and answers all questions the facility operators may have before beginning a drill. Following the conclusion of a drill, EPA meets with facility personnel to provide feedback on their performance during the simulation and to discuss lessons learned during the exercise. Successful completion of the exercise allows a facility to receive credit for meeting PREP exercise regulations and a respite from unannounced drilling for three years.



PREP exercise site in Colorado

Region 8 conducted five drills in the month of August and four drills in September 2003. A PREP exercise in August at an Air Force base in South Dakota went very well. The fire department was on scene within 20 minutes and had containment equipment deployed in not more than an hour. An environmental sampling team and public information unit arrived within one hour and an Incident Command System was established and operating within 30 minutes. At a pipeline terminal facility, response equipment arrived within 30 minutes of the start of the exercise; however, access to the equipment was not available for nearly another half-hour. A large, bankrupt steel facility failed their PREP exercises. Due to their current financial situation, they have only a skeleton maintenance crew on-site and no response capabilities. This facility will require monitoring for future use, but presently, its storage tanks contain only residual materials. At another drill, a refinery proved very well prepared for exercises. Their Incident Command System was fully established within 10 minutes and responders had equipment deployed in 30 minutes.

For more information on PREP exercises in Region 8, contact Martha Wolf, On-Scene Coordinator, 303-312-6839.

### About The Update

The goal of the EPA Oil Program Center *Update* is to provide straightforward information to keep EPA Regional staff, other federal agencies and departments, industries and businesses, and the regulated community current with the latest developments. The *Update* is produced quarterly, using a compilation of several sources. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the US EPA.



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