

# **Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism? Evidence From Local Broadcast News**

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## **Abstract**

In the interest of pursuing localism, the FCC chose to locally license and encourage local ownership of television stations, sacrificing channel capacity and diminishing diversity and competition. To assess some of the gains of such a policy, we estimate the impact of broadcast television station characteristics on the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, local on-location news seconds, and the ratio of local to total news seconds. We find that local ownership adds almost four minutes of local news, almost three minutes of total news, and almost three minutes of local on-location news. Moreover, local ownership increases the ratio of local to total news seconds by over 6%. If the relationship between local ownership and localism also holds for radio, then expanding low power FM radio will increase localism, diversity, and competition.

## 1. Introduction

The allocation of broadcast licenses (both television and radio) by the Federal Communications Commission had at least some intent of promoting localism. However, this localism objective, and the assignment of television to local communities, had at least one significant opportunity cost: a greater number of national networks and hence a greater number of VHF channels for residents of most locales. Given the constraints imposed by available spectrum and power, every resident in the US could have accessed six national VHF channels; instead the available frequencies were assigned to local channels, precluding additional national networks and limiting residents of many localities to far less than six VHF channels.<sup>1</sup> This illustrates a tension between the FCC's three policy objectives of localism, diversity and competition. Specifically, promoting localism diminished diversity and competition, by reducing the number of VHF channels available to most US residents. What localism benefits did the FCC's policy provide in return for this trade-off?

In this paper, we construct a measure of localism and analyze the actual *output* of local broadcast news stations using a highly-granular database of local broadcast news content. We then relate our measure of local content in broadcast news back to variables of interest, including ownership structure. We find that local ownership of television stations adds almost four minutes of local news; almost three minutes of total news; and almost three minutes of local on-location news. Finally, local ownership increases the ratio of local to total news seconds by over 6%.

We organize the paper as follows. In Section Two, we briefly summarize the regulatory history and literature relating directly to the question of localism. In Section Three, we introduce our measure of localism. In Section Four, we discuss our data and methodology. In Section Five, we present our results. In

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<sup>1</sup> Some may contend that the modern MVPD universe makes irrelevant the concern over an additional one-to-six VHF channels. However, because a single VHF channel can be subdivided into several digital channels, the upcoming transition to digital increases the opportunity cost of each lost VHF channel.

Section Six, we make some concluding remarks and discuss directions for future research.

## 2. Localism and the Federal Communication Commission

Adopted on April 11, 1952, the FCC's Sixth Report and Order, in Docket 8736 and 8975, assigned television spectrum using "five priorities."<sup>2</sup> The five priorities were: (1) provide at least one television station to all parts of the United States; (2) provide each community with at least one television broadcast station; (3) provide a choice of at least two television services to all parts of the United States; (4) provide each community with at least two television broadcast stations; (5) assign any channels which remained under the foregoing priorities to the various communities depending on the size of the population of each community, the geographical location of such community, and the number of television services available to such community from television stations located in other communities.

The five priorities were originally expounded in the March 22, 1951, Third Notice of Proposed Rule Making. Interestingly, these principles may be based on a facially innocuous misquoting of the 1934 Act. The Third Notice said that it had "...endeavored to meet the twofold objective set forth in Sections 1 and 307(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, to provide television service, as far as possible to all people of the United States and to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of television broadcast stations to the several states and communities." However, Section 307(b) of the 1934 Federal Communications Act states that "...the Commission shall make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio **service** to each of the same" (emphasis added).

This may have implications for policymaking. Had the FCC licensed the television spectrum nationally, then all viewers in all localities could have

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<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 63.

received 6 VHF channels, which would have carried 6 national television networks. By licensing stations locally, the FCC created a less equitable distribution of service for viewers: due to spectrum scarcities viewers in smaller localities received fewer VHF channels. Thus, changing a single word in the quotation of Section 307 (b) of the 1934 Act may have committed the FCC to pursue a licensing policy that violated the text of the Act.<sup>3</sup> Aside from legal issues, in pursuing priority (2) to guarantee at least one channel to each locality and (4) to guarantee at least two channels to each locality (in combination with rules capping ownership at five VHF stations), the FCC traded channel space, which would have provided more competition and diversity, for locally-licensed and locally-owned channels.

Our study suggests that local ownership of broadcast television stations appears to promote greater localism in local news content than non-local ownership, and especially network owned-and-operated stations. We suggest that there is a simple reason for this: economies of scale in program distribution favor non-local content. Given a fixed cost of producing news content, multi-station owners can spread those fixed costs over more stations by distributing the same content across many localities. This content will be non-local for most localities. Single-market local owners cannot capture these efficiencies, and thus a local owner has a higher cost of providing non-local content. This higher cost, *ceteris paribus*, induces the local owner to favor local content. Moreover, a single-market local owner can only access local advertisers, which may lower the opportunity cost of providing programming. Therefore, the local owner may provide more local programming.<sup>4</sup>

The literature relating to political rationales for localism includes the works of Briffault (1988, 1990), Collins (1980), Pateman (1970), Frug (1980), Cook (1998), McChesney (1993), and especially Napoli (1997a, 1998a, 2001). Hamilton (2003) deftly summarizes the literature relating to the political

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<sup>3</sup> In fairness to the FCC, this interpretation may have been motivated by their reading of Congressional intent. Given the FCC's reliance on annual Congressional appropriations, Congressional intent may motivate the FCC more than the text of Congressional statutes.

<sup>4</sup> There is a possibility that some of this non-local content may be more appealing to viewers than some local content.

economy of news production. Much of this literature explores the relationship between localism and the diffusion of political power, and posits media organizations as critical political institutions. In particular, this literature suggests that local media provide incentives for political participation as well as information that is voter-relevant. In a novel study, George and Waldfogel (2002) find that an increase in local penetration by the New York Times decreases local penetration by the local newspaper, which in turn reduces participation in local elections. This finding provides empirical evidence that consumption of local media may confer positive externalities. The literature relating to cultural rationales for localism includes the works of Briffault (1988), Frug (1980), Bernard (1973), Donner (1998), Neuman (1991), Morgan (1986), Emig (1995) and Napoli (2001). Much of this literature focuses on distinctive cultural values and traditions within local communities, and the function media plays in reinforcing or diminishing these values and traditions.

### **3. A Definition and Measure of Localism**

As we noted above, we utilize a new database of actual news stories broadcast on local television news and establish a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for defining a given news story as local. Our definition and measure of localism is determined, in part, by the delineation of designated market areas (DMA) as determined by Nielsen Media Research, an independent, third-party audience measurement system. According to Nielsen, "In designing the DMA regions, Nielsen Media Research uses proprietary criteria, testing methodologies and data to partition regions of the United States into geographically distinct television viewing areas, and then expresses them in unique, carefully defined regions that are meaningful to the specific business we conduct."<sup>5</sup> The "specific business" referred to above is the sale of advertising time and space to advertisers. According to the California Newspaper Publishers Association:

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<sup>5</sup> Federal Communications Commission document, Letter from Nielsen Media Research to the Commission, April 3, 2003, 98-206. Geographic continuity is a standard feature of all 210 DMAs except three.

DMA is a term used by advertising agencies to define specific geographical areas where groups of people tend to live, work and conduct their normal day-to-day activities similar to others in the same general region. DMA boundaries are often defined by significant geographical changes in a region's landscape such as mountain ranges, deserts, or sparsely populated areas. These "natural barriers" often tend to create different and unique lifestyles among entire populations of people, creating unique and identifiable designated market areas. Each DMA generally has its own unique market characteristics and measurable consumer media usage patterns used by media buyers to help identify the newspapers, TV and radio stations most likely to reach the audience targeted by the client.<sup>6</sup>

In what follows, we base our measure of localism on the conceptual framework established by the construction of designated market areas. Thus, the "necessary" part of our necessary and sufficient conditions for localism is that the story takes place within the DMA.

A second element of localism, our "sufficient" condition, concerns the news stories themselves, i.e., when is a story reported by a station within the DMA a "local" story? Our decision rule is that the story is local if the story is of at least marginally greater importance to the mean individual residing within the DMA, and if we believe the mean individual within the DMA would identify the story as local. Thus, it is the value of the story to the individual within a DMA, and that individual's perception of the story as local relative to individuals in other DMAs, that gives the story its "sufficient" local context.<sup>7</sup> For example, Federal budget negotiations in Washington, D.C., take place within that DMA and, given the large population of local interested parties, the mean individual in the Washington, D.C., DMA is likely more interested in the Federal budget negotiations than the mean individual in other DMAs. However, even the mean individuals in the Washington, D.C., DMA would likely perceive the Federal budget negotiations as a national issue. Hence, Federal budget negotiations are

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<sup>6</sup>California Newspaper Publishers Association, [http://www.cnpa.com/snap/dma\\_map.htm](http://www.cnpa.com/snap/dma_map.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Everyday weather and sports were not included in the original data set, and are not reflected in our analysis. However, exceptional weather events (e.g., tornado, avalanche, heat wave, sandstorm, blizzard, fire, flood, earthquake, hurricane, typhoon, tsunami, meteor impacts), were covered as news.

classified as non-local even within the Washington, D.C., DMA. Note that these “hard cases” are the exception rather than the rule.

#### 4. Data and Methodology

Our database consists of 4,078 individual news stories from five different days, with length measured in seconds, drawn from over sixty stations across 20 DMAs.<sup>8</sup> We categorized each story as either local or non-local, based on the criteria given in Section 3.<sup>9</sup> We also categorized the stories as to whether the station utilized live location reporting on those stories. This yielded 285 station-level observations on the number of total news seconds, the number of local news seconds, and the number of local live location seconds.<sup>10</sup>

We adjust for all “circumstance of time and place” by creating a series of 97 dummy variables that interact the day and the DMA.<sup>11,12</sup> This allows us to adjust for all unobserved heterogeneity created by events on any particular day in any particular DMA (e.g., a fire in Wichita on March 9<sup>th</sup>).

We regress the number of seconds of total news, local news, and on-location local news on thirteen station characteristics, which we list and describe

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<sup>8</sup> The data, all from 1998, were gathered by the Project for Excellence in Journalism, and a comprehensive description can be found at <http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/ownership/default.asp>. According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, “market selection was performed based on Nielsen Media Research market rankings. Markets were grouped into four quartiles on the basis of the number of television households in each. Markets were then chosen randomly within each quartile, after stratification in order to ensure geographic diversity. Within each market, the highest-rated half-hour timeslot for news was studied.” <http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/ownership/methodology.asp>.

<sup>9</sup> We classified the news clips before we observed the station characteristics (or even the stations) that comprise our set of independent variables. So long as researchers generate the dependent variables before the researchers observe the independent variables and before the researchers design the experiment, then the researchers have not introduced bias into the experiment.

<sup>10</sup> Not every station was in the sample on every day, which is why we obtain 285 (not 310) station level observations. Appendix A displays the list of stations, their DMAs, and their owners. In addition, Appendix A lists the means, minima, and maxima of the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, and local live location news seconds.

<sup>11</sup> Not all DMAs are present in every sample day; therefore we have a total of 98 DMA day pairs (rather than 100).

<sup>12</sup> These dummies adjust for all DMA characteristics, including market size. Because we have DMA day dummies and all of the stations in a given DMA on a given day share the same time slot, our DMA dummy completely accounts for all time slot variation.

in Table One.<sup>13</sup> We derive the data on station characteristics from the May 1998 BIA Television Database and the website Business.com.

**Table One: Independent Variable Names and Descriptions**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>
Owned & Operated	Dummy Variable Indicating O&O
Own Cities	Total Number of DMAs in Which the Station Owner Owns a Station
Local Owner	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner is Headquartered Within the DMA
Owns Newspapers	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner Owns Newspapers in Other DMAs
Cross Radio	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner Owns a Radio Station Within the DMA
UHF	Dummy Variable Indicating Channel Above 13
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	The Total Number of DMAs in Which a Local Station Owner Owns a Station
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	Interaction Dummy Indicating a Local Owner That Owns Newspapers in Other DMAs
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	Interaction Dummy Indicating a Local Owner That Owns a Radio Station Within the DMA

## 5. Estimation and Results

We estimate four models: two OLS models estimating the effect of station characteristics on total news seconds and local news seconds; one Tobit model estimating the effect of station characteristics on local on-location news seconds, and a fractional logit model estimating the effect of station characteristics on the fraction of local to total news. Specifically, we estimate:

$$(1) \text{ Total News Seconds} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \alpha_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \alpha_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \alpha_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \alpha_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \alpha_6(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \alpha_7(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \alpha_8(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\alpha$$

<sup>13</sup> Our sample consists of stations from a stratified random sample of markets. We can therefore consistently estimate the effect of our exogenous variables on localism, because any possible sample selection takes place on an independent variable, and our independent variables are exogenous. As Wooldridge (2002, p.555) notes: "When x is exogenous and we apply OLS to the selected sample...we can select the sample on the basis of explanatory variables." Since the selection indicator does not correlate with the dependent variable (which means that  $E(u|x,s)=0$ ), our estimates are consistent.



$$(2) \text{ Total Local News Seconds} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \beta_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \beta_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \beta_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \beta_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \beta_6(\text{Local Owner * Own Cities}) + \beta_7(\text{Local Owner * Owns Newspapers}) + \beta_8(\text{Local Owner * Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\beta$$

$$(3) \text{ Total On Location Local News Seconds} = \varphi_0 + \varphi_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \varphi_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \varphi_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \varphi_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \varphi_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \varphi_6(\text{Local Owner * Own Cities}) + \varphi_7(\text{Local Owner * Owns Newspapers}) + \varphi_8(\text{Local Owner * Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\varphi$$

$$(4) \frac{\text{Local News Seconds}}{\text{Total New Seconds}} = \vartheta_0 + \vartheta_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \vartheta_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \vartheta_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \vartheta_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \vartheta_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \vartheta_6(\text{Local Owner * Own Cities}) + \vartheta_7(\text{Local Owner * Owns Newspapers}) + \vartheta_8(\text{Local Owner * Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\vartheta$$

Table Two reports the results of Regression 1 relating the number of total news seconds to station characteristics. Column 2 in Table Two reports the coefficient of each variable, which is the number of seconds of total news added or subtracted by a station characteristic. Interpreting the statistically significant results, we find that local ownership adds almost 173 seconds (almost three minutes) of total news to the local broadcast.<sup>14</sup>

When the owner is local, within-DMA cross-radio ownership subtracts over 120 seconds (over two minutes) of total news to the local broadcast. Finally, the number of total news seconds declines almost 9 for each additional DMA in which the owner has a television station.

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<sup>14</sup> We obtain 172.93 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner \* own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

**Table Two: Number of Total News Seconds to Station Characteristics**

Variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic
Owned & Operated	-28.72	-1.42
Own Cities	-1.12	-0.89
Local Owner	181.66**	2.26
Owens Newspapers	-4.07	-0.18
Cross Radio	-8.87	-0.43
UHF	-5.59	-0.19
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-8.73**	-1.99
(Local Owner) * (Owens Newspapers)	15.07	0.26
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-120.18*	-1.83
Observations = 285	R <sup>2</sup> = 0.70 (Robust Standard Errors)	

\* = Significant at the 10% Level; \*\* = Significant at the 5% Level; \*\*\* = Significant at the 1% Level

Table Three reports the results of Regression 2 relating the number of local news seconds to station characteristics. Interpreting the statistically significant results, owned and operated stations air almost 76 fewer seconds (over one minute) of local news. The number of local news seconds declines by almost three seconds for each DMA in which the owner has a television station. Local owners air almost 237 more seconds (almost four minutes) of local news.<sup>15</sup> The number of local news seconds increases by over 72 (over one minute) if a non-local station owner also owns a radio station within the DMA. Finally, if the local owner also owns a radio station within the DMA, the number of seconds of local news declines by over 257 seconds (over four minutes).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> We obtain 236.93 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner \* own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

<sup>16</sup> We obtain 257.37 seconds by adding the estimated (local owner\*cross-radio) effect to the cross-radio effect.

**Table Three: Number of Local News Seconds to Station Characteristics**

Variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic
Owned & Operated	-75.64***	-2.66
Own Cities	-2.55*	-1.73
Local Owner	243.04***	3.33
Owens Newspapers	-6.03	-0.23
Cross Radio	72.17**	2.45
UHF	-38.19	-1.15
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-6.11	-1.34
(Local Owner) * (Owens Newspapers)	-29.91	-0.51
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-329.54***	-5.27
Observations = 285	R <sup>2</sup> = 0.67 (Robust Standard Errors)	

\* = Significant at the 10% Level; \*\* = Significant at the 5% Level; \*\*\* = Significant at the 1% Level

Table Four reports the results of Regression 3 relating the number of local on-location news seconds to station characteristics. Local ownership adds almost 179 local on-location news seconds (almost 3 minutes).<sup>17</sup> If the local owner also owns a radio station within the DMA, the number of seconds of local news declines by over 205 seconds (over three minutes). Finally, UHF stations air almost 53 seconds (almost one minute) more local on-location news seconds.

<sup>17</sup> We obtain 178.91 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner \* own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

**Table Four: Tobit Regression, Number of Local On-Location News Seconds to Station Characteristics**

Variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic
Owned & Operated	3.28	0.11
Own Cities	-0.23	-0.21
Local Owner	180.31***	3.55
Owens Newspapers	-5.34	-0.26
Cross Radio	37.22	1.16
UHF	52.84**	2.17
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-1.40	-0.29
(Local Owner) * (Owens Newspapers)	10.25	0.15
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-205.04***	-3.66
Observations = 285	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.07	

\* = Significant at the 10% Level; \*\* = Significant at the 5% Level; \*\*\* = Significant at the 1% Level

Table Five reports the results of fractional logit Regression 4, relating the ratio of local news to total news to station characteristics.<sup>18</sup> Interpreting the statistically significant coefficients, the fraction of local news is 5% less on owned and operated stations. Local ownership increases the fraction of local news by over 6%. Ownership of a radio station within the DMA increases the fraction of news seconds devoted to local news by almost 6%. Finally, if a local owner owns radio station within the DMA, the fraction of news seconds devoted to local news decreases by almost 18%.<sup>19</sup>

*fractional logit CEF is nonlinear*

<sup>18</sup> Papke and Wooldridge (1996) detail the fractional logit estimation technique. Papke (2004) outlines the Stata command for implementing the fractional logit technique. Stata 8 users should add the command "IRLS" following the comma in the GLM command to employ maximum quasi-likelihood estimation.

<sup>19</sup> We obtain 17.66% by adding the Cross-Radio marginal effect to the [(Local Owner) \* (Cross Radio)] marginal effect.

*wrong unless  $\beta$ 's are the same. It's a simple application of the chain rule.*

**Table Five: Local News as a Fraction of Total News**  
(In Column 2, Percentages are Expressed as Whole Numbers)

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Marginal Effect</b>	<b>Z-Statistic</b>
Owned & Operated	-5.04%**	-2.42
Own Cities	-0.14%	-1.50
Local Owner	6.41%**	2.19
Owens Newspapers	-0.64%	-0.38
Cross Radio	5.74%***	3.44
UHF	-3.56%	-1.39
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	0.04%	0.15
(Local Owner) * (Owens Newspapers)	-3.15%	-0.76
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-23.40%***	-4.58
Observations = 285		

\* = Significant at the 10% Level; \*\* = Significant at the 5% Level; \*\*\* = Significant at the 1% Level

## 6. Conclusion

We estimate station characteristics' impact on the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, local on-location news seconds, and the fraction of total news seconds devoted to local news. We find that local ownership adds almost four minutes of local news, almost three minutes of total news, and almost three minutes of local on-location news. Local on-location news seconds reflects a greater degree of actual investment in local news coverage, since on-location reporting requires the dedication of specific assets (e.g., camera crews, reporters, vehicles, etc.).

Ownership of a radio station by a local owner attenuates the effect of local ownership on news coverage. Specifically, we find that radio cross-ownership by the local owner decreases local news coverage by over four minutes, and decreases local on-location news coverage by over three minutes. Multi-station ownership across DMA's also diminishes the effect of local ownership. For each

additional DMA in which the local owner owns a television station, the amount of total news decreases by almost 9 seconds.

As we suggested in this paper, the ownership rules that have emerged from recent FCC rule-makings and subsequent Congressional action do not appear to have promoted localism.<sup>20</sup>

Interestingly, there may be a broadcast policy that promotes localism without diminishing diversity and competition: if the observed relationship between local ownership and local news coverage holds for radio, then expansion of low power FM would enhance localism. In addition, because such expansion would increase the number of radio stations, then listeners would also enjoy enhanced diversity and competition. A recent FCC study conducted by the MITRE Corporation suggests that the FCC could license more low power FM radio stations without causing interference with extant signals. Thus, an expansion of low power FM may represent a rare "free lunch" opportunity for regulators, allowing the FCC to expand localism, diversity, and competition simultaneously.

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<sup>20</sup> This finding has no clear implications for consumer welfare, since there is no clear relationship between localism and consumer welfare.

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# Appendix A

City	Station	DMA	Statistic	Total News Seconds		Local News Seconds		Local On-Location	Channel	Owner	Total Owned	Within DMA Cross-Ownership	Within DMA Newspaper Ownership	Cross-Other DMA Newspaper Ownership	O&O (1, Yes)	Affiliate (1, Yes)	Network
				News Seconds	Local News Seconds												
Albuquerque	KOAT	49	mean	922	674	335	7		Hearst-Argyle TV	30	0	0	1	0	1	ABC	
Albuquerque	KOAT	49	min	863	589	190	7		Hearst-Argyle TV	30	0	0	1	0	1	ABC	
Albuquerque	KOAT	49	max	969	755	633	7		Hearst-Argyle TV	30	0	0	1	0	1	ABC	
Albuquerque	KOB	49	mean	839	669	379	4		Hubbard Broadcasting	5	0	0	0	1	0	NBC	
Albuquerque	KOB	49	min	787	553	109	4		Hubbard Broadcasting	5	0	0	0	1	0	NBC	
Albuquerque	KOB	49	max	911	864	669	4		Hubbard Broadcasting	5	0	0	0	1	0	NBC	
Albuquerque	KRQE	49	mean	853	649	340	13		Lee Enterprises	9	0	0	1	0	1	CBS	
Albuquerque	KRQE	49	min	662	462	144	13		Lee Enterprises	9	0	0	1	0	1	CBS	
Albuquerque	KRQE	49	max	948	799	591	13		Lee Enterprises	9	0	0	1	0	1	CBS	
Atlanta	WGXX	10	mean	941	638	315	46		Tribune Broadcasting	18	0	0	1	0	1	CBS	
Atlanta	WGXX	10	min	844	569	250	46		Tribune Broadcasting	18	0	0	1	0	1	CBS	
Atlanta	WGXX	10	max	1034	700	484	46		Tribune Broadcasting	18	0	0	1	0	1	CBS	
Atlanta	WSB	10	mean	911	627	371	2		Cox Broadcasting	9	1	1	1	0	1	ABC	
Atlanta	WSB	10	min	823	441	274	2		Cox Broadcasting	9	1	1	1	0	1	ABC	
Atlanta	WSB	10	max	1040	773	465	2		Cox Broadcasting	9	1	1	1	0	1	ABC	
Atlanta	WXIA	10	mean	891	698	406	11		Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC	
Atlanta	WXIA	10	min	728	486	285	11		Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC	
Atlanta	WXIA	10	max	1022	904	525	11		Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC	
Boston	WBZ	6	mean	754	470	333	4		CBS Station Group	17	1	1	1	1	0	CBS	
Boston	WBZ	6	min	595	260	177	4		CBS Station Group	17	1	1	1	1	0	CBS	
Boston	WBZ	6	max	830	719	550	4		CBS Station Group	17	1	1	1	1	0	CBS	
Boston	WCVB	6	mean	806	479	140	5		Hearst-Argyle TV	30	1	0	0	0	1	ABC	
Boston	WCVB	6	min	664	299	0	5		Hearst-Argyle TV	30	1	0	0	0	1	ABC	
Boston	WCVB	6	max	920	634	310	5		Hearst-Argyle TV	30	1	0	0	0	1	ABC	
Boston	WHDH	6	mean	869	477	148	7		Sunbeam Television Corp	2	0	0	0	0	1	NBC	
Boston	WHDH	6	min	837	424	0	7		Sunbeam Television Corp	2	0	0	0	0	1	NBC	
Boston	WHDH	6	max	933	559	311	7		Sunbeam Television Corp	2	0	0	0	0	1	NBC	
Buffalo	WGRZ	44	mean	670	640	451	2		Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC	
Buffalo	WGRZ	44	min	575	528	312	2		Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC	
Buffalo	WGRZ	44	max	790	790	507	2		Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC	
Buffalo	WIVB	44	mean	668	636	458	4		LIN Television Corporation	8	0	0	0	0	1	CBS	
Buffalo	WIVB	44	min	586	426	285	4		LIN Television Corporation	8	0	0	0	0	1	CBS	
Buffalo	WIVB	44	max	720	720	577	4		LIN Television Corporation	8	0	0	0	0	1	CBS	
Buffalo	WKBW	44	mean	940	809	592	7		Granite Broadcasting	9	0	0	0	0	1	ABC	
Buffalo	WKBW	44	min	662	389	300	7		Granite Broadcasting	9	0	0	0	0	1	ABC	
Buffalo	WKBW	44	max	1404	1282	951	7		Granite Broadcasting	9	0	0	0	0	1	ABC	







