

# The Effectiveness of Community- Based Sanctions in Reducing Recidivism

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Oregon Department of Corrections

# **Community Corrections Commission**

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# The Effectiveness of Community-Based Sanctions in Reducing Recidivism

## Executive Summary

The Oregon Legislature asked the Department of Corrections to evaluate the effectiveness of community-based sanctions in achieving the outcomes envisioned in the Community Corrections Partnership Act, including reducing recidivism and protecting public safety. It is important to recognize that the local criminal justice system encompasses multiple policy goals, including punishment and incapacitation. Carrying out each of these goals is an important function of the system, even when they do not reduce recidivism.

### **Recommendations**

The response to violations of supervision should include sanctions other than jail in order to be both effective and cost-effective and it should include services aimed at changing offender behavior over the long-term in order to reduce recidivism. At the same time, jail remains an important part of the sanctioning continuum. There is anecdotal evidence from many counties in Oregon that having a jail bed as a back-up improves compliance with alternative sanctions, making them more successful.

- Have and use a range of interventions including but not limited to jail: There is anecdotal evidence from many counties in Oregon that having a jail bed as a back-up improves compliance with alternative sanctions, making them more successful.
- Use community service and/or work crews as an available sanction; it has the lowest rates of reconviction for high and medium risk offenders and is less expensive than residential or custody sanctions
- Adjust jail stay to gain greater efficiency: Shorter jail stays cost less than longer ones and have the same or better results in terms of recidivism.
- Pair treatment with sanctioning: The most effective sanctions include a rehabilitative component.

### **Description of the Oregon Review**

The review examines three different kinds of recidivism: re-conviction of a felony, re-sanctioning for a violation, and re-arrest for any reason (violation or new crime). Since offenders are not “randomly assigned” to sanctions, some difference in outcome may be the result of professional judgment about which sanction to use for which offenders. On the other hand, one can group together offenders with similar crime types and similar risks to re-offend and find patterns in outcomes within similar groups.

Offenders receiving their first ever sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001 were studied. These offenders were then followed for 12 months after that first sanction to measure the outcome of the sanction on several types of recidivism. Information from the Corrections Information System and the Law Enforcement Data System was also analyzed.

### **Oregon Criminal Activity**

Reconviction rates are based on conviction of a felony crime within that year. This indicator measures involvement in criminal behavior leading to conviction.

- Comparing groups of offenders who have the same crime type and same risk to re-offend for every group the reconviction rate is higher following a jail sanction than it is following a community alternative sanction. The differences are significant for all groups except medium risk person offenders and high and medium risk sex offenders.
- All community sanctions have lower rates of re-conviction than do jail sanctions
- Work crew/community service has the lowest rates for high/medium risk offenders (10%).
- Work centers have the lowest rates for low/limited risk offenders (6.5%)
- High risk offenders have similar rates of reconviction no matter how long they spend in jail.
- For medium risk offenders, the longer the jail stay, the higher the recidivism following jail.
- For all crime types, longer jail stays are associated with higher recidivism following jail release.

### **Oregon Compliance with the Conditions of Supervision**

This measure of recidivism is based on whether the offender was sanctioned again during the year following their original sanction. The indicator measures compliance with the conditions of supervision.

- There is no clear indication that either jail or community sanctions compel future compliance. Comparing groups of offenders who have the same crime type and same risk to re-offend, the differences are not statistically significant.

### **Oregon Re-Arrest**

This measure of recidivism reflects any arrest in that year, without distinguishing between misdemeanors, felonies, violations, or other types of arrests.

- There is no clear indication that either jail or community sanctions effect arrest rates. Comparing groups of offenders who have the same crime type and same risk to re-offend, the differences are not statistically significant.

## **Literature Review**

*For reducing recidivism*, treatment and rehabilitation are more likely to be successful than surveillance and enforcement. We would expect, therefore, that community-based sanctions, especially those that involve an appropriate treatment component, should be more effective at reducing recidivism than jail sanctions. In the absence of treatment services, alternative sanctions would likely result in no worse recidivism than jail for many offenders. Selection and assignment of appropriate offenders to appropriate sanctions, however, is the key.

## Introduction

The Department of Corrections has been asked by the legislature to evaluate the effectiveness of community-based sanctions in achieving the outcomes envisioned in the Community Corrections Partnership Act, including reducing recidivism and protecting public safety. The relevant outcomes envisioned in the Act are to:

- Provide appropriate sentencing and sanctioning options including incarceration, community supervision, and services;
- Provide improved local services for persons charged with criminal offenses with the goal of reducing the occurrence of repeat criminal offenses; and
- Promote the use of the most effective criminal sanctions necessary to protect public safety, administer punishment to the offender, and rehabilitate the offender.

The following review examines three different kinds of recidivism: re-conviction of a felony, re-sanctioning for a violation, and re-arrest for any reason (violation or new crime). Since offenders are not “randomly assigned” to sanctions, some difference in outcome may be the result of professional judgment about which sanction to use for which offenders. On the other hand, we can group together offenders with similar crime types and similar risks to re-offend and find patterns in outcomes within similar groups.

In addition to reviewing the outcomes of sanctions used in Oregon communities, the national research on the effectiveness of community sanctions is summarized. Additionally, an interview was conducted in each county with the community corrections manager to determine the local practices guiding the county’s response to violations of supervision.

It is important to recognize that sanctions are used for purposes other than reducing recidivism. The local criminal justice system encompasses multiple policy goals, including punishment and incapacitation. Carrying out each of these goals is an important function of the system, even when they do not reduce recidivism.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Comparison of the Effectiveness of Jail Sanctions and Community Alternative Sanctions

The objective of this literature review is to provide a context for the results of our own analysis of the Oregon sanction data comparing the effectiveness of community-based sanctions and jail sanctions. That context should allow us to address several questions that will provide a better understanding of our results: *Are the Oregon results typical of others reported in the literature, or are they different in some way? What practices have been successful elsewhere? What can we learn about the effectiveness of community-based sanctions in addition to what the Oregon data reflect? Are there general principles or trends in sanction effectiveness that may be widely applicable?*

We searched specifically for literature on the sanctions of work crew/community service, work release centers, and electronic house arrest and their effectiveness in reducing recidivism.

The most directly relevant literature was that dealing specifically with responses to violations of parole and probation, the primary topic of this report. In addition, we tried to take advantage of the larger body of knowledge on the effectiveness of alternative sanctions handed down directly from the courts as initial sentences. These would be community-based sentencing alternatives to either jail, prison, or probation. Several of these studies were especially information rich because they themselves were literature reviews or meta-analyses based on comprehensive data and detailed analysis. Broadly based studies may reveal broadly applicable results that can be generalized to Oregon.

#### **Responding to parole and probation violations**

In a study of 7500 felony and misdemeanor probationers, Clear et al. (1992) specifically analyzed post-sanction probationer behavior. A total of 1923 offenders received an initial sanction, but, of these, only 644 were given one or more subsequent sanctions. The results for these repeat violators showed that there was no indication that the application of more severe sanctions (e.g. fairly substantial jail terms) were more effective at discouraging future serious misbehaviors than the application of more lenient sanctions (e.g. written or verbal warnings, modification of conditions). For example, offenders who received a severe initial sanction were no less likely to subsequently commit a violent offense than offenders who received a lenient initial sanction; both were 17.6%. The authors also refer to unpublished results that indicated that when a period of detention is called for, brief periods were as effective at curbing new violations as more costly prolonged detention. They concluded that slight differences in the impact of sanction severity on subsequent misbehaviors suggested that severe controlling sanctions would be excessive for most violations.

A group of new felony probationers in northern Virginia were the subject of a study by MacKenzie et al. (1999). They used offender self-report data to determine levels of



criminal activities. Their general conclusion was that probation itself reduced the number of offenders who committed crimes, as well as the rate of offending for those who continued to offend. Their more specific conclusion regarding the effectiveness of responses to offender violations, however, was that there was little evidence that parole officer response had any effect on either subsequent criminal activity or violations of supervision conditions. In other words, there was little that parole officers could do to influence future behavior. Instead, they determined that criminal activity appears to be predicted solely by past criminal behavior and involvement in risky behavior.

Burke (2001) presented a literature-based discussion of several broad issues related to parole and probation violations. Addressing the topic of responses to violations, she emphasized both the importance of timeliness of the response and the importance of including a rehabilitative component in the response. She found that it was treatment and the application of rehabilitative resources to probation or parole, not surveillance or enforcement alone, that had the effect of reducing recidivism. From her view of the available literature, Burke concluded that the empirical evidence regarding sanctions was decisive and that without a rehabilitative component, reductions in recidivism would be unlikely to be realized.

### **Community-based sentencing alternatives**

#### 1. Work crew / community service

Community service was included in a broad review of intermediate sanctions compiled by Tonry (1997). He reported that community service is the most underused intermediate sanction in the United States. In many other countries it is used as a mid-level penalty in lieu of short prison terms for moderately severe crimes. In those countries, community service is perceived as a burdensome penalty that meets with widespread public approval. In addition, he reported that it is inexpensive to administer, produces public value, and can be scaled to the seriousness of crimes.

In terms of effectiveness, Tonry (1997) concluded that community service is most appropriate for offenders who do not present unacceptable risks of future violent crimes because it costs much less than prison or jail to implement and will likely result in comparable recidivism rates. He did not conclude that recidivism would be lower following community service vs. prison or jail, but that it would likely be no higher. In terms of public safety, this would be an argument in favor of community service. It would be an even stronger argument if the cost of community service was lower than the cost of jail.

A study by McDonald (1989) directly compared the effectiveness of community service and jail. The study was conducted in New York City and evaluated the deterrent effects of community service vs. jail by tracking rearrests following each type of sanction. He found that there was no difference in future criminality. Being sentenced to jail instead of community service produced no significant decrease in subsequent criminal behavior. He hypothesized that offenders' calculations of risks and gains involve assessing the

odds of getting away with the crime as opposed to getting caught; consideration of what kind of punishment might be received if caught was not a factor. McDonald (1989) observed that the punishment for getting caught entails much more than the sentence received in court. He referred to an “entire gauntlet of punishments”: the arrest itself, pre-trial detention, raising bail money, hiring and financing a legal defense, often using up credit with family and friends by leaning on them for help, and the whole psychological cost of arrest and prosecution and the future uncertainty that they entail. He thought it was risk of suffering these punishments, not a later sentence of jail vs. community service, that offenders weighed against potential gains. Nonetheless, two reports relevant to the present review were located.

## 2. Work release centers

There appears to be a fairly small body of literature on the use of work release as a sanction for misconduct during supervision or as a court ordered sentence. Most of the literature pertains to work release as a form of post-prison custody preceding full parole, a much different situation.

Sherman (1997) included work release centers/halfway houses in a broader evaluation of what he referred to as community restraints. His findings were mixed. In comparison to probation, he cited literature-based evidence that sentences to work release centers resulted in lower recidivism, better recidivism, or no difference when compared to a probation control group.

Results more favorable to the use of work release centers were reported by Aos et al. (2001). They completed an exhaustive and very detailed evaluation of a broad range of programs intended to reduce crime. Although their main focus was on the economics of crime reduction, they needed to estimate program effectiveness as a component of the economic analysis. They determined that work release programs reduced crime by 3% compared to prison incarceration.

In a broad discussion of work release and integrated corrections policy, Parent (1990) expressed the opinion that placement in a work release center has limited deterrence application. The context of his remarks seems to imply that he means limited application compared to revocation to prison. He acknowledges that placement in a work release center inflicts punishment by infringing offenders' liberty, but he apparently believes that the level of punishment is not severe enough to deter criminal behavior. In his view, the major benefits to be derived from the use of work release centers are in their potential for both incapacitation and rehabilitation, the latter depending on the delivery of appropriate treatment.

## 3. Electronic house arrest

There is a relatively more extensive body of literature about the use of electronic house arrest. It comes from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Drawing on limited early research, Cullen et al. (1996) concluded that it was not clear that electronic house arrest was more effective in reducing recidivism and technical violations than less intrusive interventions, such as regular probation, or than more intrusive interventions, such as jail or prison. They speculated that the greatest value of electronic house arrest may be in providing a community-based program within which treatment services may be delivered.

At the time of his review, Tonry (1997) also stressed the scantiness of available information on recidivism and cost-effectiveness of electronic house arrest. His informed expert opinion, based on the theory of criminology, was that electronic house arrest was unlikely to result in better recidivism than probation. In addition, he speculates (based on a single case study) that the costs of electronic house arrest programs will be more than costs for probation.

More data were available for a meta-analysis involving over 1400 offenders in six studies performed by Gendreau et al. (2000). They found that electronic house arrest actually resulted in a 3% increase in recidivism compared to traditional probation. The authors did not elaborate on this finding.

Bonta et al. (2000) compared recidivism for three groups of offenders across Canada: a group sentenced to electronic house arrest, a group of released prison inmates on parole, and a group sentenced to probation. They found that the electronic house arrest group had significantly lower recidivism than both the parole and probation groups: 26.7% vs. 37.9% for parole and 33.3% for probation. Further analysis, however, revealed that these differences could be totally explained by differences in offender risk level. The authors concluded that it was not the use of electronic house arrest itself that resulted in lower recidivism, but the selection of low risk offenders for participation.

A similar result was found by Courtright et al. (1997). They compared the recidivism of DUI offenders that received sentences to electronic house arrest to those that received jail sentences. Although the results were not statistically significant, they found that 20% of the electronic house arrest group was rearrested compared to 33% of the jail group. What is interesting in light of the results from Bonta et al. (2000) is that Courtright et al. (1997) also attribute this difference to the selection process that determined which offenders were assigned to each group. They concluded that the electronic house arrest group did not pose a risk to the community, but that risk appeared to be controlled by the selection process itself.

In a study in the U.K., Sugg et al. (2001) compared reconviction rates for electronic house arrest compared to probation. They found no difference between the two groups and concluded that electronic house arrest had no impact on reoffending.

### **Evaluations of community-based sanctions overall**

A few studies sought to compare community based-sanctions, generally, to jail, prison, or probation. One of these was a meta-analysis cited earlier by Gendreau et al. (2000).

It was related to an earlier study that is also relevant here (Gendreau and Goggin, 1996). To compare the effectiveness (i.e. recidivism) of brief periods of prison incarceration to community-based sanctions they collected the results of 103 studies involving over 250,000 offenders. Their analysis found no difference in recidivism between the two groups and they concluded that incarceration had no deterrent effect on subsequent criminal behavior. This same study also compared community-based sanctions to traditional probation based on 140 reports that included over 50,000 offenders. Of the eight alternative sanctions evaluated, only monetary fines resulted in lower recidivism than probation. Sanctions that failed to reduce recidivism were intensive supervision, arrest, restitution, boot camp, scared straight, drug testing, and electronic monitoring. Taken in the larger context of the 'what works' debate, the authors concluded that, in terms of reducing recidivism, their results support the need for appropriate treatment.

Earlier reference was also made to Sherman et al. (1997). Theirs was a literature-based study that evaluated the effectiveness of intensive supervision, house arrest, electronic monitoring, and halfway houses. The study was based on a large body of research that included statistically powerful random assignment studies. They concluded that, in general, these programs did not reduce recidivism compared to traditional probation. Restraining offenders in the community by increasing surveillance and control over their activities did not reduce their criminal activities. They were arrested as often as other offenders who received less surveillance. The authors went on to observe, however, that if sanctions include appropriate treatment, the recidivism of offenders receiving treatment may be reduced. They contended that criminal activities of these offenders may be reduced through the treatment they receive, rather than the restraints placed on them.

### **Conclusion: What works?**

The overall conclusion from a broad reading of the available literature is that, *for reducing recidivism*, treatment and rehabilitation are more likely to be successful than surveillance and enforcement. Several of the studies cited above reached this conclusion (Gendreau et al 2000, Burke 2001, Sherman 1997, Cullen et al 1996, Gendreau & Goggin 1996, Aos 2001). Several additional publications also reinforce this conclusion (Andrews and Bonta 1994, Petersilia 1997, 1998, Gendreau 1996, Latessa and Allen 1997, Cullen and Gendreau 2000). We would expect, therefore, that community-based sanctions, especially those that involve an appropriate treatment component, should be more effective at reducing recidivism than jail sanctions. In the absence of treatment services, alternative sanctions would likely result in no worse recidivism than jail for many offenders. Selection and assignment of appropriate offenders to appropriate sanctions, however, is the key. A certain core of incorrigible offenders will likely never respond to treatment or other alternative sanctions and will continue to pose a danger to the community.

## COUNTY BY COUNTY REVIEW OF ACTUAL PRACTICES

This report reflects the community sanctions found in each county's community corrections plan, as submitted to the Department of Corrections under O.R.S. 423.535.

\*The county plan shows how the state funding for community corrections will be used and does not reflect all the sanctions available to the county. For example, all counties do use jail as a local sanction, but not all counties spend state community corrections dollars for jail beds.

\*The plan shows the capacity for various sanctions in the community corrections plan but does not reflect the actual usage, which may be higher or lower than the budgeted capacity.

\*Some community corrections plans include sanctioning capacity for misdemeanors as well as felons.

\*Caseload numbers are from July 1, 2001.

\*Community Service and Work Crew are combined on the chart as CSW/WRK CRW. Some counties show only the capacity of supervised work crews in their plan and some counties have included capacity for both unsupervised community services and supervised work crews.

To further understand actual practices, the director of community corrections was interviewed in each county to better understand the agency's approaches governing the use of sanctions in that county.

**Baker County** offers a life skills and cognitive change programming along with jail sanctions that then continues after their release and into the community. They believe this combination of sanction and treatment works the best to change behavior, and they support the integration of corrections and treatment as a general approach.

<b>BAKER</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/WRK CRW
	128	20	0	30	15	8

The primary intervention and first step when compliance problems occur is day reporting.

**Benton County** uses jail sanctions to reinforce compliance with non-jail sanctions. They also use jail to stabilize offenders prior to referral to addictions treatment.

BENTON	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	396	12	0	100	10	447

**Clackamas County** uses their work release center and community service as alternatives to jail sanctions. They offer alcohol and drug treatment from the work center and also pair electronic monitoring with intensive addictions treatment as an effective approach.

CLACKAMAS	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	1,427	20	114	0	100	128

Currently, **Clatsop County** is using the jail as their primary sanction but they plan to use the work release center for most custody sanctions once construction has been completed.

CLATSOP	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	309	15	30	0	15	30

**Columbia County** uses electronic house arrest, work crew, and work release as alternatives to jail. They are also experimenting with “court confinement” as a sanction (i.e. offender is required to sit in court for a specified number of days and watch the proceedings).

COLUMBIA	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	358	20	41	25	20	74

**Coos County** uses graduated community sanctions prior to recommending a jail sanction. They have a day reporting center that can be used for both services and sanctions.

COOS	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	621	59	0	0	5	40

**Crook County** uses work crew and community service as an alternative to jail sanctions.

CROOK	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	152	28	1	0	0	109

**Curry County** uses their work center as an alternative to jail sanctions. They also use work crew and community service.

CURRY	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	178	0	16	0	10	32

**Deschutes County** uses a graduated sanctioning approach that begins with cognitive programming, then work crew, and finally jail as a sanction. They have just opened a day reporting center that will be used both for services and sanctions.

DESCHUTES	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	1020	15	15	30	37	500

**Douglas County** uses shorter sanctions in preference over local control sentences. Their approach is to pair a sanction with treatment. They do use electronic home detention along with work crew as a non-jail sanction. They have integrated cognitive change programs into their interventions in both jail and community settings.

DOUGLAS	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	1020	8	0	0	20	80

**Grant County** relies on jail sanctions to hold offenders accountable for violations. Cognitive change and addictions treatment services are offered in the jail.

GRANT	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	45	0	0	0	0	0

**Harney County** relies on jail sanctions to hold offenders accountable for violations.

HARNEY	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	66	10	0	0	0	10

**Hood River County** has a systematic approach to the use of graduated sanctions. Community service is the first and preferred intervention, followed by forest work camp, home detention combined with work crew, and then jail. They tend to use short-term jail sanctions when they do use jail.

HOOD RIVER	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	137	10	0	0	9	20

**Jackson County's** approach with sanctions is to send every non-compliant offender to jail first, and then to transfer them to a community alternative when possible. They use their work center, forest work camp, and community service as alternatives and integrate cognitive programs throughout their system.

JACKSON	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	1,672	260	87	96	20	800

**Jefferson County** opened a new jail in October of 2001. They believe having jail sanction beds available will improve compliance with conditions of supervision and reduce the need to sanction.

JEFFERSON	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	170	12	0	0	4	20



**Josephine County** developed community sanctioning alternatives out of necessity before they were able to expand their jail capacity. They use home detention, day reporting, and work crew as their main alternatives. They offer life skills and cognitive change programs at their day reporting center.

JOSEPHINE	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	799	170	0	45	30	265

**Klamath/Lake Counties** use electronic house arrest and residential alcohol/drug treatment as alternatives to jail sanctions. In addition, they are building a work center that will provide other sanctioning options: a non-jail custody option and also they will operate work crews from the center.

KLAMATH/LAKE	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	828	27	0	10	25	50

**Lane County** uses work crew as an alternative to jail, as well as some electronic home detention. They will be using their day reporting center as an alternative once it is opened. The sheriff's office operates the work center and a forest work camp, both of which are also used as alternatives to traditional jail time.

LANE	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	2,709	122	170	10	42	375

**Lincoln County** uses work crew, electronic home detention, curfew, cognitive classes, and day reporting as sanction alternatives to jail. They do have a five-week addiction treatment program offered in the jail.

LINCOLN	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	443	125	0	0	28	31

**Linn County** uses a graduated sanctions approach, starting with work crew/ community service, or electronic home detention. They provide an addictions treatment and cognitive change program in jail that continues into the community. They do use graduated intensity in treatment as a response to drug related violations. They have a sanction review team to review use of jail and community sanctions.

LINN	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	1,049	96	0	0	25	115

**Malheur County's** philosophy is to use swift and sure application of community sanctions in response to non-compliance. Their primary alternative to jail is their work center, where they focus on employment. They believe work must come before programs in community corrections interventions.

MALHEUR	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	451	0	36	150	20	50

**Marion County** manages resources in community corrections by focusing on the highest risk offenders and providing no service to the low risk group. They use day reporting as both a sanction and a service, running community service work crews from that setting.

MARION	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	2,507	60	150	150	75	745

**Multnomah County** has available every type of community-based sanction available in Oregon. (Note: The county does operate a work release center but they do not use community corrections funds to do so.) In addition to alternative community sanctions, the county began to manage its offenders differently in May of 2001 in response to jail overcrowding. They shortened the average length of stay for sanctioned offenders while continuing to sanction the same number of offenders and began using sanctions rather than revocation more often in response to violations. They were able to reduce jail bed use by local control offenders by 30% with these adjustments while continuing to respond to the same number of violations.

MULTNOMAH	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	8,637	511	0	180	70	700

**Polk County** uses electronic monitoring, community service and offender accountability boards as alternative sanctions to jail. Offender accountability boards are used for minor violations. They consist of several PO's who meet with the offender, focus on conditions of supervision, and require a follow-up meeting. They have used the newspaper to publicize repeat violators.

<b>POLK</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	412	30	0	0	15	25

**Tillamook County** relies on their jail for sanctions. They also offer cognitive and pre-treatment programs in the community to improve compliance with supervision and are increasing their use of residential addictions treatment.

<b>TILLAMOOK</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	211	18	0	0	0	8

Due to the large geographic area and the small caseload, **Gilliam/Sherman/Wheeler Counties** provide basic supervision and do not have a variety of alternative sanctions available. They do rely on the entire community to assist them in supervising each offender.

<b>GILL/SHER/ WHEELER</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	37	6	0	0	6	0

**Umatilla/Morrow County's** philosophy is that effective treatment is a necessary part of the response to violations. They do use jail, but do not believe that is enough. They offer an array of programs that are offender-specific and designed to break the offender's crime cycle.

<b>UMATILLA/ MORROW</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	775	50	30	0	35	300

The approach to supervision in **Union/Wallowa Counties** is close supervision to assure compliance along with life skills/cognitive change programming. House arrest and work crew are used as jail alternatives.

<b>UNION/ WALLOWA</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	240	36	0	0	20	8

**Wasco County** uses jail as the primary response to violations. They use community service as their alternative sanction to jail but no longer have a work crew available.

<b>WASCO</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	248	50	0	0	5	90

**Washington County** operates a work center that can be used as an alternative to jail. Often, appropriate offenders are transferred from the jail to serve the remainder of their sentence in the work center. Cognitive programs are available in both settings, and addictions treatment is available in the work center.

<b>WASHINGTON</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	2,512	155	167	0	55	900

**Yamhill County** commonly uses jail as a sanction, but they do use work crew sanctions before jail sanctions for some offenders. They offer an addictions treatment program in the work center.

<b>YAMHILL</b>	FELONY POPULATION	JAIL	WORK CENTER	DAY REPORTING	HOUSE ARREST	CSW/ WRK CRW
	585	45	30	20	3	56

## EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNITY BASED SANCTIONS IN OREGON

### **Description of the Study Population**

All offenders receiving their first ever sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001 were included in the study. These offenders were then followed for 12 months after that first sanction to measure the outcome of the sanction on several types of recidivism. The study group totaled 13,219 offenders from throughout Oregon.

### **Data Sources**

Data from the Corrections Information System was used to identify the study population, determine the type of sanction imposed, the crime type and risk level of offender, and to determine incidence of re-conviction and re-sanctioning. The Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS) was the source of re-arrest information.

Limitations of the data include the inability to separate arrests for new crimes vs. arrests for supervision violations in LEDS. Only sanctions with complete data in CIS were used. Some sanctions under 30 days are not entered in some counties. Also, counties are more likely to enter complete data on jail sanctions than community sanctions, so the sample includes a greater proportion of jail sanctions than were probably imposed. However, since we look at the results of each alternative separately, the overall proportion does not affect the analysis of sanction effectiveness. And finally, we cannot determine the degree to which professional decision-making is used to sort which offenders are referred to which kinds of community sanctions. Some difference in the effectiveness of various sanctions is undoubtedly impacted by this selection process.

## **RESULTS**

### **Criminal Activity**

Reconviction rates are based on conviction of a felony crime within the study year. This indicator measures involvement in criminal behavior leading to conviction.

1. Comparing groups of offenders who have the same crime type and same risk to re-offend for every group the reconviction rate is higher following a jail sanction than it is following a community alternative sanction. The differences are significant for all groups except medium risk person offenders and high and medium risk sex offenders. (Table 3)
2. All community sanctions have lower rates of re-conviction than does jail
3. Work crew/community service has the lowest rates for high/medium risk offenders (10%).
4. Work centers have the lowest rates for low/limited risk offenders (6.5%)
5. High risk offenders have similar rates of reconviction no matter how long they spend in jail.

6. For medium risk offenders, the longer the jail stay, the higher the recidivism following jail.
7. For all crime types, longer jail stays are associated with higher recidivism following jail.

### **Compliance with the Conditions of Supervision**

This measure of recidivism is based on whether the offender was sanctioned again during the year following their original sanction. The indicator measures compliance with the conditions of supervision.

1. There is no clear indication that either jail or community sanctions compel future compliance. Comparing groups of offenders who have the same crime type and same risk to re-offend, the differences are not statistically significant.
2. There is no clear pattern relating length of jail stay to rates of re-sanctioning.


### **Re-Arrest**

This measure of recidivism reflects any arrest in the study year, without distinguishing between misdemeanors, felonies, or violations.

1. There is no clear indication that either jail or community sanctions effect arrest rates. Comparing groups of offenders who have the same crime type and same risk to re-offend, the differences are not statistically significant.
2. Restitution/work centers have the highest rates of re-arrest for high and medium risk offenders. This is likely a function of the close supervision and opportunity for non-compliance inherent in these settings.
3. For high and medium risk offenders, assignment to work crew as an alternative to jail has the lowest rates of re-arrest.
4. No community sanction is clearly more effective at reducing the rates of re-arrest for low and limited risk offenders.
5. There is no clear pattern relating length of jail stay to rates of re-arrest.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM FOLLOWING A SANCTION

## Re-Conviction




Percentage convicted of a new felony within 12 months of a sanction

Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was convicted of any felony at any time within 12 months following the end of the first sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM FOLLOWING A SANCTION

## Re-Sanctioned




Percentage re-sanctioned within 12 months of a sanction

Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was sanctioned again at any time within 12 months following the end of the first sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.



# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM FOLLOWING A SANCTION

## New Arrest




Risk to Re-Offend

Percentage arrested within 12 months of a sanction

Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was arrested for any reason within 12 months following the end of the first sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM FOLLOWING A SANCTION

## Reconviction



Risk to Re-Offend

Percentage convicted of a new felony within 12 months of a jail sanction

Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was convicted of any felony at any time within 12 months following the end of the first jail sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.

## DISCUSSION

The intended purposes of the Community Corrections Partnership Act, as listed in ORS 423.505, are to:

- (1) Provide appropriate sentencing and sanctioning options including incarceration, community supervision, and services;
- (2) Provide improved local services for persons charged with criminal offenses with the goal of reducing the occurrence of repeat criminal offenses;
- (3) Promote local control and management of community corrections programs;
- (4) Promote the use of the most effective criminal sanctions necessary to protect public safety, administer punishment to the offender, and rehabilitate the offender;
- (5) Enhance, increase and support the state and county partnership in the management of offenders; and
- (6) Enhance, increase and encourage a greater role for local government and the local criminal justice system in the planning and implementation of local public safety policies.

This review relates to (1), (2), and (4). Oregon and national data support the notion of providing a range of sentencing and sanctioning options along with services. The way that community alternative sanctions are being used in Oregon results in lower recidivism than using jail as a sanction. The national research concludes that sanctions do not successfully reduce recidivism if they do not include some aspect of rehabilitation. So, our system should include sanctions other than jail in order to be both effective and cost-effective and it should include services aimed at changing offender behavior over the long-term in order to reduce recidivism.

Multiple purposes for criminal sanctions are described in item (4) above: *Promote the use of the most effective criminal sanctions necessary to protect public safety, administer punishment to the offender, and rehabilitate the offender.* Thus, sanctions are used to incapacitate and to punish offenders, as well as to rehabilitate. From this review, we can conclude that jail and the other community alternative sanctions may do a good job incapacitating and providing a range of punishment options. Community alternatives have lower rates of re-offense than jail, and according to the national research, sanctions paired with rehabilitation would probably have the greatest effect on reducing recidivism.

Since offenders are not “randomly assigned” to sanctions, some difference in outcome may be the result of professional judgement about which sanction to use or which offender to place in which type of sanction. One could assume that jail sanctions have higher rates of recidivism because the correct choice has been made about which offenders go to jail for a sanction, and that those are the most likely to re-offend. In the study group, 84% of the high and medium risk offenders were sanctioned to jail, and

76% of the low and limited risk offenders were sanctioned to jail so there is some support for this interpretation.

On the other hand, some counties use a variety of sanctions and some counties do not. Most counties do not have the array of alternative sanctions they would like to have and would use. In fact, some smaller counties do not have alternatives to jail. The choice of jail sanctions for local control offenders ranges from 50% to 100% depending on the county. The choice of sanction can be more reflective of county practice and the resources available than to some thoughtful choice about which sanction to impose.

While we cannot determine the judgement used by an individual judge or officer in imposing a particular type of setting, we can group together offenders with similar crime types and similar risks to re-offend and find patterns in outcomes within similar groups. For like groups of offenders—i.e. same crime type and risk to re-offend—and for every group, we find that community alternative sanctions have lower rates of recidivism than jail sanctions (Table 3). The differences are significant for all groups but medium risk person offenders and high and medium risk sex offenders.

Re-arrest and resanctioning were also reviewed, as was the effect of various lengths of jail stays. There is no evidence that any particular sanction, whether it be jail or a community alternative, either reduces future arrests or encourages future compliance with the conditions of supervision. Longer jail stays either have no effect on recidivism or they result in increasing recidivism. It would appear that we could continue to carry out the functions of punishment and incapacitation with shorter (and thus less expensive) jail sanctions without putting the public at greater risk.

## **FINDINGS: OREGON OUTCOMES AND NATIONAL STUDIES**

### **Reducing Recidivism**

For reducing recidivism, treatment and rehabilitation are more likely to be successful than surveillance and enforcement. In a meta-analysis involving 53,614 subjects, the addition of a treatment component to an intermediate sanction produced a 10% reduction in recidivism (Gendreau, Goggin, et al, 2000).

### **Alternative Sanctions**

In the absence of treatment services, alternative sanctions would likely result in no worse recidivism than jail for many offenders. Alternative sanctions compare favorably to jail in terms of cost in that they are almost always less expensive to deliver.

Selection and assignment of appropriate offenders to appropriate sanctions is key to the effective use of jail and alternative sanctions.

Comparing groups of offenders who have the same crime type and same risk to re-offend for every group the reconviction rate is higher following a jail sanction than it is following a community alternative sanction. The differences are significant for high-risk

person, property and statute offenders, for medium risk property and statute offenders, and for all low risk offenders. (Table 3)

Neither jail nor community alternatives significantly effect future compliance with conditions of supervision or future arrests. Length of a jail sanction does not effect either future compliance or future arrest.

**Length of Jail Stay:**

Brief periods of incarceration are as effective at curbing new violations as more costly prolonged detention. In Oregon, length of jail stay made no significant difference in curbing new violations. In addition, high risk offenders have similar rates of reconviction no matter how long they spend in jail. For medium risk offenders, the longer the jail stay, the higher the recidivism following jail.

**Community Service:**

Community service is the most underused intermediate sanction in the United States. It is inexpensive to administer, produces public value, and can be scaled to the seriousness of crimes. In national studies, recidivism following a community service sanction is no higher than recidivism following jail. In Oregon, work crew/community service has the lowest rates of re-conviction for high and medium risk offenders (10%) of any community sanction including jail.

**Restitution/Work Centers:**

Findings on work centers were mixed in terms of recidivism. The major benefits derived from the use of work centers are in their potential for both incapacitation and rehabilitation, the latter depending on the delivery of appropriate treatment.

**Electronic Home Detention:**

The findings on electronic house arrest were also mixed in terms of recidivism, with most of the outcomes more the result of the selection process than on the intervention. It may be that the greatest value of electronic house arrest is its lower cost and that it may be used as a community-based program in which treatment services can be delivered.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is important to recognize that the local criminal justice system encompasses multiple policy goals, including punishment and incapacitation. Carrying out each of these goals is an important function of the system, even when they do not reduce recidivism. However, reducing recidivism is certainly one important function of community corrections activities. As a result of this review, the Department recommends that the response to violations of supervision should include sanctions other than jail in order to be both effective and cost-effective and it should include services aimed at changing offender behavior over the long-term in order to reduce recidivism. At the same time, jail remains an important part of the sanctioning continuum. There is anecdotal evidence from many counties in Oregon that having a jail bed as a back-up improves

compliance with alternative sanctions, making them more successful. To that end, it is recommended that community corrections agencies:

- Have and use a range of interventions including but not limited to jail
- Use community service and/or work crews as an available sanction; it has the lowest rates of reconviction for high and medium risk offenders and is less expensive than residential or custody sanctions
- Adjust jail stay to gain greater efficiency: shorter jail stays cost less than longer ones and have the same or better results in terms of recidivism
- Pair treatment with sanctioning: the most effective sanctions include a rehabilitative component

An additional recommendation concerns funding formulas and their impact on best practices. It is important not to create funding formulas that provide incentives for practices that are contrary to a safe, effective and efficient community corrections system. It is equally important that the funding formula does not create a disincentive for moving toward best practices.

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# APPENDIX

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 1**  
**DISTRIBUTION OF THE TYPE OF SANCTION USED FOR A FIRST-TIME**  
**VIOLATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION**  
**1999-2001**

SANCTION TYPE	RISK LEVEL (CALCULATED) <sup>1</sup>				TOTAL
	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	LIMITED	
JAIL	3,619	2,887	2,893	1,123	10,522
Work Crew (WKCR)	125	225	320	182	852
Restitution/Work Center (REST)	275	247	199	88	809
Community Service Work (CSWK)	1	88	125	105	319
Day Reporting (DAYR)	72	77	74	41	264
Electronic House Arrest (ELHA)	40	48	81	48	217
Forest Project (MCFP)	12	10	7	4	33
In-patient Treatment (INTX)	5	11	4	1	21
Non-Electronic House Arrest (NLHA)	10	4	4	3	21
Secure Treatment (SCTX)	3	1	1	1	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,162</b>	<b>3,598</b>	<b>3,708</b>	<b>1,596</b>	<b>13,064</b>

*Source:* DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

*Notes:*

1. Includes both Probation and parole/PPS.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 2  
CONDITIONS LEADING TO FIRST SANCTION  
AND SANCTION TYPE  
1999-2001**

## High / Medium Risk Offenders

	Conditions Violated <sup>1</sup>					
	Drug Related (3,288)	Failure to Pay Fees (87)	General Conditions (3,449)	Violated the Law (967)	Program Failure (129)	Sex Offender Conditions (569)
<b>Resulting Sanction</b>	%	%	%	%	%	%
Jail	76.7	73.6	89.7	85.2	87.6	78.6
Restitution / Work Center	9.8	12.6	5.7	6.0	8.5	9.5
Work Crew	13.5	13.8	4.6	8.8	3.9	12.0

## Low / Limited Risk Offenders

	Conditions Violated					
	Drug Related (1,108)	Failure to Pay Fees (127)	General Conditions (1,194)	Violated the Law (356)	Program Failure (34)	Sex Offender Conditions (118)
<b>Resulting Sanction</b>	%	%	%	%	%	%
Jail	74.8	91.3	90.6	78.7	79.4	86.4
Restitution / Work Center	4.4	2.4	2.6	3.4	0.0	5.1
Work Crew	20.8	6.3	6.8	18.0	20.6	8.5

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

**Notes:**

1. Each "condition" category encompasses a variety of supervision conditions. The *drug* category ranges from the failure to pass a breathalyzer to the possession of a controlled substance. The failure to *pay fees* represents a variety of supervision fess such as court ordered restitution or community service fees. The category for *general conditions* represents the widest variety obligations, ranging from failure to meet curfew to an inability to maintain employment to the association with gang members. The *law* category constitutes actual violations of the law like weapons possession or failure to obey the law. *Program* failure includes an inability to stay or complete a program associated with the terms of an offender's supervision like mental health treatment or domestic violence programming. Finally, a separate category represents the conditions associated with *sex offenders*. This can range from a contact with a minor to a failure to complete a treatment program.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 3**  
**RECIDIVISM AND SANCTION TYPE:**  
**COMPARISON OF RISK LEVEL AND CRIME TYPE**

## High Risk Offenders

*Percentage Convicted of a New Felony within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Sanction Type				t	Probability
	Jail		Alternative			
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	31.5	657	22.3	103	2.05*	.0419
Property	32.5	1,072	24.0	196	2.52*	.0121
Sex Offense	25.2	111	14.3	21	1.26	.2168
Statutory	27.5	905	20.1	169	2.17*	.0316

## Medium Risk Offenders

*Percentage Convicted of a New Felony within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Sanction Type				t	Probability
	Jail		Alternative			
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	21.1	483	15.4	117	1.49	.1376
Property	27.2	762	16.6	193	3.40***	.0008
Sex Offense	14.9	154	11.9	42	0.52	.6054
Statutory	26.8	814	8.6	221	7.45***	.0000

## Low Risk Offenders

*Percentage Convicted of a New Felony within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Sanction Type				t	Probability
	Jail		Alternative			
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	18.7	423	4.4	137	5.54***	.0000
Property	19.4	614	10.3	184	3.31***	.0010
Sex Offense	14.2	190	4.4	69	2.77**	.0062
Statutory	18.8	894	12.5	279	2.66**	.0081

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was convicted of any felony at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the first sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.
2. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 4**  
**SUCCESS OF FIRST-TIME SANCTIONS AND SANCTION TYPE:**  
**COMPARISON OF RISK LEVEL AND CRIME TYPE**

## High Risk Offenders

*Percentage Receiving a New Sanction within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Initial Sanction Type				t	Probability
	Jail		Alternative			
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	34.0	630	32.3	99	0.34	.7373
Property	33.1	1,032	35.8	187	-0.71	.4773
Sex Offense	37.7	106	20.0	20	1.75	.0930
Statutory	35.8	854	45.0	140	2.04*	.0429

## Medium Risk Offenders

*Percentage Receiving a New Sanction within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Initial Sanction Type				t	Probability
	Jail		Alternative			
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	39.2	441	37.8	98	0.26	.7966
Property	32.1	676	39.2	176	1.73	.0843
Sex Offense	31.3	144	48.7	37	-1.92	.0608
Statutory	31.1	717	34.0	188	-0.75	.4532

## Low Risk Offenders

*Percentage Receiving a New Sanction within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Initial Sanction Type				t	Probability
	Jail		Alternative			
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	30.0	343	23.3	103	1.38	.1684
Property	26.1	479	27.9	140	-0.42	.6756
Sex Offense	35.0	163	29.8	57	0.73	.4639
Statutory	26.9	706	30.5	220	-1.02	.3082

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. A sanction failure is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that received a new sanction at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the first sanction. The offender pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2000. The analysis was also confined to offenders who had least 12 months of supervision to serve at the time of their first sanction.
2. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 5  
 RECIDIVISM AND SANCTION TYPE:  
 COMPARISON OF RISK LEVEL AND CRIME TYPE**

## High Risk Offenders

*Percentage with a New Arrest within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Sanction Type					
	Jail		Alternative		t	Probability
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	26.2	657	35.0	103	-1.76	.0817
Property	28.0	1,072	31.6	196	-1.00	.3170
Sex Offense	24.3	111	28.6	21	-0.40	.6860
Statutory	24.8	905	24.9	169	0.00	1.000

## Medium Risk Offenders

*Percentage with a New Arrest within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Sanction Type					
	Jail		Alternative		t	Probability
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	29.8	483	30.1	117	-0.06	.9495
Property	26.5	762	24.9	193	0.46	.6475
Sex Offense	20.8	154	40.5	42	2.39*	.0205
Statutory	25.8	814	19.9	221	1.91	.0572

## Low Risk Offenders

*Percentage with a New Arrest within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

Crime Type	Sanction Type					
	Jail		Alternative		t	Probability
	%	Total	%	Total		
Person	21.3	423	28.5	137	-1.66	.0980
Property	22.2	614	23.4	184	-0.34	.7353
Sex Offense	19.5	190	23.2	69	-0.63	.5280
Statutory	20.8	894	22.6	279	-0.63	.5280

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was arrested at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the first sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.
2. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 6**  
**RECIDIVISM AND SPECIFIC SANCTIONS BY RISK LEVEL**

*Percentage Convicted of a New Felony within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

**SUPERVISION LEVEL**

<b>HIGH / MEDIUM</b>	%	N	Percentage Point Difference with Jail	<i>t</i>	Probability
<b>SANCTION TYPE</b>					
<b>JAIL</b>	<b>25.5</b>	<b>5,548</b>			
Restitution/Work Center	18.4	539	7.1	4.01***	.0000
Day Reporting	17.4	155	8.1	2.61**	.0097
House Arrest	13.1	122	12.4	3.99**	.0001
Work Crew	10.0	632	15.5	11.66***	.0000
Other	17.7	51	7.8	1.45	.1498
<b>LOW / LIMITED</b>					
<b>SANCTION TYPE</b>					
<b>JAIL</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>2,446</b>			
Restitution/Work Center	6.5	108	13.8	5.51***	.0000
Day Reporting	10.3	68	10.0	2.65***	.0009
House Arrest	7.9	76	12.4	3.88***	.0002
Work Crew	8.0	352	12.3	7.41***	.0000
Other	18.2	11	2.1	0.18	.8416

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . \Community Corrections Study • Monroe

*Notes:*

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was convicted of any felony at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the first sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2000.
2. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 7**  
**RECIDIVISM AND SPECIFIC SANCTIONS BY RISK LEVEL**

*Percentage Receiving a New Sanction within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

**SUPERVISION LEVEL**

<b>HIGH / MEDIUM</b>	%	N	Percentage Point Difference with Jail	<i>t</i>	Probability
<b>SANCTION TYPE</b>					
<b>JAIL</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>5,548</b>			
Restitution/Work Center	37.2	539	-2.5	-1.15	.2513
Day Reporting	28.6	155	6.1	1.66	.0995
House Arrest	34.0	122	0.7	0.16	.8722
Work Crew	36.6	632	-1.9	-0.94	.3472
Other	23.1	51	11.6	1.95	.0566
<b>LOW / LIMITED</b>					
<b>SANCTION TYPE</b>					
<b>JAIL</b>	<b>23.5</b>	<b>2,446</b>			
Restitution/Work Center	28.4	108	-4.9	-1.10	.2692
Day Reporting	21.6	68	1.9	0.38	.7086
House Arrest	28.3	76	-4.8	-0.92	.3628
Work Crew	23.5	352	0.0	0.0	1.0000
Other	14.3	11	9.2	0.87	.4083

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . \Community Corrections Study • Monroe

*Notes:*

1. A sanction failure is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that received a new sanction at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the first sanction. The offender pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000. The analysis was also confined to offenders who had least 12 months of supervision to serve at the time of their first sanction.
2. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$



# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 8**  
**RECIDIVISM AND SPECIFIC SANCTIONS BY RISK LEVEL**

*Percentage with a New Arrest within 12 Months of the First Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

## SUPERVISION LEVEL

<b>HIGH / MEDIUM</b>	%	N	Percentage Point Difference with Jail	<i>t</i>	Probability
<b>SANCTION TYPE</b>					
<b>JAIL</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>5,548</b>			
Restitution/Work Center	34.5	539	-8.3	3.90***	.0001
Day Reporting	21.3	155	4.9	1.47	.1445
House Arrest	22.1	122	4.1	1.08	.2831
Work Crew	21.8	632	4.4	2.52*	.0119
Other	19.6	51	6.6	1.18	.2438
<b>LOW / LIMITED</b>					
<b>SANCTION TYPE</b>					
<b>JAIL</b>	<b>19.1</b>	<b>2,446</b>			
Restitution/Work Center	19.4	108	-0.3	-0.08	.9388
Day Reporting	25.0	68	-5.9	-1.11	.2708
House Arrest	19.7	76	-0.6	-0.13	.8970
Work Crew	20.2	352	-1.1	-0.48	.6299
Other	18.2	11	0.9	0.08	.9403

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . \Community Corrections Study • Monroe

*Notes:*

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was arrested at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the first sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.
2. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 9  
 RECIDIVISM AND LENGTH OF STAY BY RISK LEVEL**

*Percentage Convicted of a New Felony within 12 Months of a Jail Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

SUPERVISION LEVEL	LENGTH OF JAIL SANCTION					
	0 - 30 Days		31 - 60 Days		60+ Days	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
High	29.0	69	30.4	496	29.9	318
Medium	20.0	105	23.0	244	29.5	173
Low	12.8	141	22.8	197	15.2	138
Limited	13.3	75	3.8	53	9.3	43

$\chi^2 = 67.96, p < .0001, df = 6$

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was convicted of any felony at any time within 12 months following the *end* of a jail sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2000.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 10**  
**RECIDIVISM AND LENGTH OF STAY BY CRIME TYPE**

*Percentage Convicted of a New Felony within 12 Months of a Jail Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

CRIME TYPE	LENGTH OF JAIL SANCTION					
	0 - 30 Days		31 - 60 Days		60+ Days	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Person	16.4	73	31.3	246	21.8	170
Property	22.0	118	26.8	358	36.7	218
Sex Offender	4.8	21	17.0	100	15.8	101
Statute	17.1	175	22.2	279	20.3	177

$$\chi^2 = 27.66, p < .0001, df = 6$$

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was convicted of any felony at any time within 12 months following the *end* of a jail sanction. The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2000.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 11**  
**RECIDIVISM AND LENGTH OF STAY BY RISK LEVEL**

*Percentage Receiving a New Sanction within 12 Months of a Jail Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

SUPERVISION LEVEL	LENGTH OF JAIL SANCTION					
	0 - 30 Days		31 - 60 Days		60+ Days	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
High	35.5	69	27.9	496	31.8	318
Medium	26.1	105	33.3	244	29.8	173
Low	28.6	141	27.2	197	25.2	138
Limited	15.4	75	21.6	53	41.9	43

$$\chi^2 = 88.85, p < .0001, df = 6$$

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. A sanction failure is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that received a new sanction at any time within 12 months following the *end* of a jail sanction. The offender pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2000. The analysis was also confined to offenders who had least 12 months of supervision to serve at the time of their first sanction.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 12**  
**RECIDIVISM AND LENGTH OF STAY BY CRIME TYPE**

*Percentage Receiving a New Sanction within 12 Months of a Jail Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

CRIME TYPE	LENGTH OF JAIL SANCTION					
	0 - 30 Days		31 - 60 Days		60+ Days	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Person	34.4	73	31.7	246	26.3	170
Property	27.2	118	28.3	358	28.2	218
Sex Offender	22.2	21	28.4	100	31.1	101
Statute	22.6	175	26.4	279	38.7	177

$$\chi^2 = 112.04, p < .0001, df = 6$$

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. A sanction failure is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that received a new sanction at any time within 12 months following the *end* of a jail sanction. The offender pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2000. The analysis was also confined to offenders who had least 12 months of supervision to serve at the time of their first sanction.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 13**  
**RECIDIVISM AND LENGTH OF STAY BY RISK LEVEL**

*Percentage with a New Arrest within 12 Months of a Jail Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

SUPERVISION LEVEL	LENGTH OF JAIL SANCTION					
	0 - 30 Days		31 - 60 Days		60+ Days	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
High	23.2	69	26.4	496	25.2	318
Medium	31.4	105	26.2	244	25.4	173
Low	17.7	141	18.3	197	18.8	138
Limited	17.3	75	18.9	53	9.3	43

$$\chi^2 = 23.33, p < .0007, df = 6$$

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was arrested at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the jail sanction.

The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.

# OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

**TABLE 14**  
**RECIDIVISM AND LENGTH OF STAY BY CRIME TYPE**

*Percentage with a New Arrest within 12 Months of a Jail Sanction<sup>1</sup>*

CRIME TYPE	LENGTH OF JAIL SANCTION					
	0 - 30 Days		31 - 60 Days		60+ Days	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Person	16.4	73	24.8	246	18.8	170
Property	25.4	118	25.1	358	24.3	218
Sex Offender	33.3	21	21.0	100	19.8	101
Statute	21.1	175	23.7	279	27.1	177

$$\chi^2 = 12.72, p < .0477, df = 6$$

Source: DOC Research and Evaluation • d:\ . . .\Community Corrections Study • Monroe

Notes:

1. Recidivism is defined as the total percentage of a sanctioned group that was arrested at any time within 12 months following the *end* of the jail sanction.

The recidivism pool consists of those who received their first sanction between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000.