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Whatever has happened in Libya in the past few days – with the US claiming that the United Arab Emirates and Egypt were behind several airstrikes on Islamist militias – it is clear that America’s traditional allies in the region are looking for new ways to protect themselves against a spectrum of threats that they think the US is not taking seriously enough.
In the future there will be greater military co-operation between the well-financed and well-equipped Gulf militaries, and the armies of poorer and more populous Arab states, especially Egypt and Jordan. Even as the US becomes less dependent on Gulf oil, these two Arab states are becoming more dependent on Gulf financial assistance. Other Muslim countries, such as Pakistan – already a source of recruits for some Gulf security forces – may play a growing role. And when it comes to regional conflicts, their impatience with the US may encourage a degree of unilateralism.
The Gulf countries still depend on the US to underwrite their security, a relationship that was made explicit with the US liberation of Kuwait in 1991. But for their pro-western Arab rulers (with the exception of Qatar), the uprisings of 2011 were a major blow. They indicated that the US would not necessarily secure friendly leaders like Hosni Mubarak against a domestic revolt.
More recently, the Obama administration’s rapprochement with Iran, at a time when Iran has been sponsoring the brutal crackdown in Syria, has made Gulf rulers fearful that the US will fail to protect them against what they see as Iranian hegemonic expansionism.
Such complaints are familiar in western capitals, where diplomats are highly sensitive to the risks that these perceptions may pose to trade links. But it is still quietly assumed that although Gulf militaries will be major consumers of western defence exports, they will not be significant military actors.
Look at the debate that dominated western discussions about conflict risk in the Middle East for most of the last decade: war with Iran. Much energy was spent debating whether Israel could carry out airstrikes on Iran unilaterally, or whether it would have to involve the US. There was no debate at all about whether the Saudi or Emirati air forces would be the ones to carry it out – although these countries are probably as worried as Israel about an Iranian nuclear bomb.
The Gulf countries certainly want to reduce their dependence on the US for security. In 2013 the then head of Saudi intelligence said his country would be forging security relationships with other Muslim countries in a bid to diversify its alliances. Gulf military spending has been soaring; Saudi Arabia now has the fourth largest defence budget in the world, after the US, China and Russia.
And whereas Gulf countries are traditionally consumers of western-made military technology, the UAE’s Mubadala is now investing in an Italian aeronautics firm, Piaggio, which is developing drones.
Although the Gulf states have a broadly pro-western political orientation, they sometimes act as a counter to western policies. There was always going to be a clash of interests between the elements of western foreign policy that supported democratic transitions, and the Gulf states, who preferred the status quo.
In 2011, most of the Gulf states signed up to the Deauville Initiative, a G8 project to give aid to Arab countries deemed to be undertaking democratic transitions. But the initiative stalled. Meanwhile, in 2013, when the Egyptian military carried out a popular coup against the elected Muslim Brotherhood government, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE rewarded the new Egyptian government with $12bn of aid – eight times the annual aid the US gives to the Egyptian military. US threats to suspend aid therefore had little weight.
There has also been mistrust both between Gulf and Western powers, and between the UAE and Qatar, over support for different rebel groups in Syria, although the covert nature of much of this activity makes certainty elusive.
Certainly, it seems that Saudi and Qatari support has gone to various groups of rebel fighters who are against the western-backed Syrian National Coalition – though accusations that this includes al-Qaida-linked groups are fiercely denied by Saudi Arabia, who points out that jihadis like al-Qaida and Islamic State threaten its own national security.
The Gulf states want to maintain their alliances with the US, and will continue to support critical US interests such as the free flow of oil and support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
But on issues such as supporting democracy, they will probably judge that the US simply does not care much, while their fighting Libyan militants may actually suit the US. They’ve seen Israel at times go against US wishes – notably when Obama called for a settlement freeze in his first term – and still maintain a close working relationship with the US. It seems likely that they too will take a more assertive position on issues in what they see as their own backyard, though their growing role will also encounter increasing opposition.
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