Cause and Norm
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Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
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Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
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Darrell Rowbottom
Constantine Sandis
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
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Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Gabriele Contessa
Rafael De Clercq
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Seth Lazar
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Constantine Sandis
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
John Wilkins
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612 (2009)
Abstract |
Much of the philosophical literature on causation has focused on the concept of actual causation, sometimes called token causation. In particular, it is this notion of actual causation that many philosophical theories of causation have attempted to capture.2 In this paper, we address the question: what purpose does this concept serve? As we shall see in the next section, one does not need this concept for purposes of prediction or rational deliberation. What then could the purpose be? We will argue that one can gain an important clue here by looking at the ways in which causal judgments are shaped by people‘s understanding of norms.
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Keywords | Causation Norms | |||||||||
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Citations of this work BETA
David Danks, David Rose & Edouard Machery (2013). Demoralizing Causation. Philosophical Studies:1-27.
David Rose & David Danks (2012). Causation: Empirical Trends and Future Directions. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):643-653.
David Rose & David Danks (2013). In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.
Joshua Knobe (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
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