#### LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

# Remedies for Monopolization

Tad Lipsky
Washington, D.C.
March 28, 2007

# **Essential Facilities and Mandatory Access**

## No Sense Pretending

- If the "essential facility" and "inability to duplicate" elements of the EFD are met, a classic declining-cost situation is likely presented
- The viability of any and every regulatory alternative becomes debatable – including "do nothing"
- Likely EFD flaw lack of capacity could be marker for benefits of intervention
- Essential IP where "inability to duplicate" is imposed by IP law, antitrust intervention is in tension with reward rationale

# **Essential Facilities and Mandatory Access**

## Access Remedies – Costs and Complications

- Complexities of access pricing
   Concepts and measurements debatable return, cost, etc.
- Endless evasion possibilities
  - Reluctance to build capacity and make it available
  - Reluctance to offer and transact
  - Reluctance to install, repair, etc.
- Sacrifices economies of integration
- Specific problems of administration through judicial/executive consent-decree enforcement
- Strategic behavior litigate rather than innovate

## **Essential Facilities and Access Remedies**

#### Nevertheless . . .

Mandatory access has benefits and deserves consideration

 Can access be dealt with through an established regulatory mechanism?

United States v. Terminal Railroad (1911) (ICC)

United States v. AT&T (1982) (FCC)

But see *United States v. Otter Tail Power* (1973) (FPC lacked authority to impose access obligation at the time)

Is access already defined by commercial practice?

Gamco v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building (1952)

United States v. Associated Press (1945)

Are there likely dynamic efficiencies?

*United States v. AT&T* – necessary for mobile/IP/broadband?

## **Institutional Aspects of Antitrust Remedies**

## The Need for Speed

Identified sound goals are essential to success

United States v. IBM Corp.

Expanding/shifting theories and questionable procedural approach doomed possibility of much narrower but quickly successful case

United States v. Microsoft Corp.

Per-processor license phase: complaint to decree in one year (not counting FTC phase) – provides flexibility and minimizes error cost

Broader "platform software" phase: lessons complicated by shifts in theory/remedy fit and procedural developments

United States v. Western Electric Co./AT&T Co.

Theories shifted from long-lines to equipment to local monopoly Ultimately, coherent approach suggested workable remedy

# **Institutional Aspects of Antitrust Remedies**

### Legislative Role

A perennial challenge where economic regulation is concerned

## Administrative Regulation Role

Reflection of the legislative challenge – unclear mandate means incoherent regulation

#### Executive Role

Traditionally somewhat better directed in terms of policy coherence Not immune from distractions and other agendas

#### Judicial Role

Capacity for targeted change under specific conditions

Not immune from weaknesses of administrative regulation,
distractions and other agendas

## **Conclusions**

Successful antitrust case must have three characteristics

- Legally sound
- Based on sound economics
- Identifiable remedy that is both capable of effective administration and likely to improve consumer welfare

Identifying good candidates for structural cases

- Importance
- Long-term performance issues
- Balanced assessment of policy alternatives do nothing, apply antitrust, "other"