Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Introduction - page 1):

The 2^nd and 3^rd bullet points are both titled as “Absentee”. Each have a clarifying statement, however, the term “Absentee” gives the connotation that the voter must be “Absent” and unable to vote at the polls on election day in order to request this type of ballot. Because of this, Arizona modified this term many years ago to “Early Voting” with the notation that the voter does not need to provide an excuse or reason to vote “Early”. Our recommendation would be to standardize, for uniformity and clarity, this term for no excuse voting to “Early Voting”.  At the very least, possibly modify the title to “• Early Voting/Absentee (Voter does not have to provide a reason or excuse)”.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Ballot Preparation and Printing - page 3):

There is a typo in the “Ballot Preparation and Printing” section, first sentence of this section, following the bullets. Should read as “Once the timeline…” instead of “One the timeline…”.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Ballot Preparation and Printing - page 4):

Second bullet point reads “Identify staffing needs at all stages of the process (on-site supervision is required)”. This should state that “(on-site supervision may be required)”.  On-site supervision is not required at all phases of ballot printing process. As an example, when a vendor is contracted to print the actual ballots, permanent staff member on-site supervision is not required.

Second set of bullet points, 1^st bullet sentence, on this same page, uses the word “stuffing” and the connotation of the word “stuffing” is likened to “stuffing the ballot box”. Our preferred choice of words is “inserting” instead of “stuffing”. The term “Inserting” is used elsewhere in this document when refereeing to this project.

Second set of bullet points, 2^nd bulleted sentence, on this same page, seems to be written incorrectly. I believe it should read “Implement bar code technology for easy updating of voter history when…” instead of “Implement bar code technology for ease updating voter history when…”

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Ballot Mailing - page 5):

Second paragraph, third sentence uses the word “stuffed” and again, the connotation of the word “stuffing” is probably not the best choice of words for the election industry. Our preferred word is “inserted” instead of “stuffed”. Recommendation is that this sentence should read “… should also be printed and balanced to the number of envelopes printed, inserted, and delivered to the post office every day.”

The “NOTE” paragraph, second sentence, uses the term “will require” which is not true of all post offices. Some post offices do not weigh the trucks if they do not have that capability. Instead they weigh each postal cart coming off the truck to establish a piece count. Recommend that either this is clarified or changed to “If delivery is by truck, the Post Office may require the truck to be weighed…” instead of “will require”.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Ballot Reception - page 6):

There is a typo in the first paragraph, second sentence of this page.  Delete the word “is” and sentence should read “They should be located in an area that can be viewed and monitored by authorized personnel.”

The second paragraph, first sentence seems to infer that the “drop site” should be accessible by key when I think the intended statement is that the “mailbox” should be accessible by key and not necessarily the site itself. Recommend that the sentence should read “If you plan to use outdoor mailboxes for drive-by or walking traffic, the ballot drop site mailboxes should only be accessible by a key that is in the possession of two authorized election staff members.” We changed the term “personnel” at the end of this sentence to remain consistent with the next sentence that references “a team of two election staff”. Also, it may be wise to add a sentence, after this particular sentence, that indicates that if outdoor “mailboxes” are going to be used, that these mailboxes should be secured (e.g. bolted to the ground) so that they cannot be removed easily and also that these mailboxes must be tamper proof so that the ballots deposited within them cannot be accessed without the designated key.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Initial Envelope Sort - page 7):

Second set of bullet points provides the possible options that can be provided to a voter who has returned a “no signature” packet. Our recommendation would be to add another paragraph following these bullets points that would clarify some options that a jurisdiction may want to consider when it comes to “no signature” packets. The below options are currently used in Maricopa County, Arizona, when it comes to “no signature” packets that are received.

PROPOSED PARAGRAPH AND OPTIONS:

If, in accordance with State law, the jurisdiction is required to notify the voter that the ballot cannot be counted without their signature, the jurisdiction may consider these options as a method of making contact with the voter regarding the missing signature on the returned packet:

·   Automatically re-mail (if time permits) the unsigned and unopened envelope back to the voter in a separate outgoing envelope. This mailing would be accompanied with a return envelope for the signed affidavit to go back into and a letter explaining to the voter that their envelope was received unsigned and cannot be counted without their signature.

·   If time does not permit for the re-mailing of the envelope, the election’s department may want to attempt to call the voter, using the information in file, to inform them that they have the option of voting a provisional ballot at the polls on Election Day or coming to a central office location, where the envelopes are kept, to sign their unsigned envelope.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Ballot Review Process - page 9):

Second paragraph in this section indicates that board members determine voter intent and it is inferred that this should be done before tabulation since it appears before the “Ballot Tabulation” section of this guide. The review process itself is acceptable and probably standard, however, there should be some notation here that the stage of this review can be before tabulation or after attempted tabulation, based on State law. In other words, in Maricopa County, Arizona, ballots are not reviewed for voter intent at the two member ballot possessing stage. They are only looking, at this stage, for obvious damaged ballots (i.e. torn, mangled, etc.) that will not read. What we use to determine mismarked ballots is the actual tabulation equipment. If a ballot is marked incorrectly, the equipment will out stack the ballot as a misread, unreadable or as a blank ballot. These out stacked ballots are then sent to a two member citizen board, made up of opposite political party affiliation, to begin the process of reviewing the out stacked ballots to determine voter intent.

Our recommendation would be to clarify and reword this Second paragraph to read “Based on State law, determine whether your jurisdiction is responsible for determining voter intent and at what stage of the process is this to be done (before tabulation or after attempted tabulation). Most optical scan tabulation equipment can be setup to out stack ballots that are marked incorrectly as misread, unreadable or as blank ballots.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Ballot Review Process - page 10):

There is a typo in the first paragraph, second sentence of this page. The sentence should read “Each worker must initial both ballots and complete a duplicate ballot log (example below).” instead of lot.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Managing Absentee ballots at the Polls on Election Day - page 14, FLOW CHART):

The flow chart presented here has a scenario where a “VOTER WANTS TO VOTE AT THE POLLS” and it indicates that if the “Voter has Absentee Ballot but wants to vote at polls” that ultimately, if the absentee ballot is surrendered, that the voter is issued regular ballot and it is placed in the scanner. This is not an acceptable practice for jurisdictions that issue replacement ballots (per page 8 of this guide) to voters who request another early/absentee ballot (lost, spoiled, etc.).  Instead, in a jurisdiction that allows for replacement early/absentee ballots to be issued, a voter that wants to vote at the polls (that has requested an early/absentee ballot) should still vote a “provisional ballot”. This is to ensure that they have not voted already. As an example, a voter can surrender their early/absentee ballot to the board worker but it does not mean that the packet surrendered was the only packet issued.

To allow them to cast a regular ballot through the scanner means that if it is determined later that the voter surrender issue 1 but actually already voted issue 2, then that ballot cast at the polls, through the scanner, cannot be backed out of the totals and the voter has subsequently voted twice. There are of course legal consequences that can be pursued to prosecute the voter who voted twice, but it does not resolve the fact that a invalid ballot was cast which could have been prevented, in this circumstance, through the use of a provisional ballot at the polls.

Our recommendation is to add a note, at the bottom of this flow chart, which indicates the following:

NOTE: This flow chart is specific to jurisdictions that do not issue replacement early/absentee ballots. If a jurisdiction does issue replacement early/absentee ballots, then the surrendering of an early/absentee ballot at the polls may still require the voter to vote a provisional ballot. The reason for this is that multiple ballots may be in a voter’s possession and there is no way (outside of real time electronic poll books) for a board worker to know if one of those other replacement ballots had already been cast.

Comments on Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail (Voter Education - page 16):

The second bullet point provides a “Tip”. It is our recommendation that this tip include the suggestion to allow a voter to request an early/absentee ballot from the web site. Recommended change would be to have the sentence read “Tip: Consider including a link that allows the voter to confirm their registration status and to request an early/absentee ballot on your web site.”

General Comment:  Incorporate all absentee voting information into one document or reference other documents for additional absentee voting information.  Currently, absentee information is also mentioned in Developing an Audit Trail and UOCAVA.

Comments on Ballot Reception

Ballot Reception (page 6):

• Typo in second line of first paragraph. 
• In list of bulleted items of statistical information, recognize that you will not yet know some of the bulleted information (i.e., number of envelopes that do not contain a ballot, etc). 
• The two paragraphs under this list are duplicative.  The text and the bulleted information are not both needed.

Initial Envelope Sort (page 7) – Amend 1^st sentence of 2^nd paragraph to “If signature verification is required by State law, it is important to provide your staff with signature verification training.”  Introductory language is important to clarify that text only applies if State law requires signature verification.

Replacement Ballots (page 8) – Amend 2^nd sentence of 1^st paragraph to “If required, the voter must complete and sign a replacement ballot request form.”  Not all jurisdictions require this form.

Comments on Ballot Preparation and Mailing:

Staffing Needs (page 2) – Recognize that the same employees may need to serve on multiple teams if there are not a sufficient number of employees.  Teams should be supervised by regular staff. 

Ballot Preparation and Printing (page 3) –

• When considering security issues, consider security at printing facility.  Reminder that there are two types of absentee envelopes – one for domestic, civilian voters and one for military and overseas voters. 
• Under examples listed on page 4, suggest mailing to the pre-printed mailing address several absentee envelopes once the ballots have been received from the printer.  This verifies that the mailing address on the envelope is proper and that the mail is timely delivered.

Ballot Mailing (page 5) – Conducting logic and accuracy testing on the ballot styles before mailing is not always possible.  Any delay in the printing and delivery of the ballots may result in simultaneous logic and accuracy and mailing of the ballots.

Acceptance Tests (page 2) – The 1^st sentence in the 2^nd paragraph states that “acceptance testing must be conducted on every unit . . . every time a unit leaves your control and is returned.”  Does deploying a voting unit to a polling place constitute “leaving an election official’s control” and therefore trigger the acceptance testing requirement?

Documentation (page 5) – The recommendation specifies the type and content of the label that should be used.  It appears that the intent of this recommendation is to document that a specific voting unit was tested, the date of the testing, and the testers.  As this can be accomplished in other ways (i.e., State inventory asset tag number and documentation showing the unit number, date of testing, and testers), it seems that the intent of the recommendation should be provided but not how it should be accomplished.  The same comment applies to the recommendation on pages 7 and 10.

Acceptance Test for Touch-screen Voting Stations – The picture on page 7 shows election officials working with electronic pollbooks, not touch screen voting units.  As a result, the photo should be removed.

Conclusion (page 10) – Include recommendation that acceptance testing triggers the start of the warranty. 

Touch Screen Ballots Consideration (page 5):

• The recommendation to print instructions and post them in the voting station is not necessary if the instructions on the touchscreen are readily available to voters at any point in the voting process.  This recommendation seems most appropriate if a voter is unable to return to the instructions once he or she advances from that screen. 
• There is a typo in the 2^nd sentence of the paragraph above the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines for touch screen voting systems (“form” should be “from.” 
• Remove references to Voluntary Voting System Guidelines until guidelines are finalized.

General Comments:

Clarification between "redistricting" which might only happen after the Census verse "re precincting or new precincts being added".

Notice no mention of Design by Democracy and their work for the EAC.

Page 9 for Verifying the Ballots--would recommend more then two. Especailly, if your doing multi-language ballots. Need members who can proof each language required.

General Comments:

Hurricanes in the Gulf and Atlanta Coast states.

Page 19--second bullet--we have used the reverse 911 call system to notify voters of poll changes at the last minute. Many counties already have this service.

Page 22--are there "guidelines for line management"? Know about a pending federal bill.

General Comments:

Page 5--End of the Pre-Election Audit Trail section, last line speaks to "initaled by at least two staff members". FL law requires the County Canvassing Board to sign off on the pre and post L&A test. Might chage reference to the approperiate persons based on state law.

General Comments:

Need to emphasis "blended systems" throughout the document.

Add refernce to Absentee Counting Equipment.

Testing of the modeming capibility, if used.

For the test decks in Orange County, FL we also include an over voted ballot, an under voted ballot and a ballot from a previous election. Demostrates that these features have been activated. We have had voters return primary election ballots in their General Election Absentee Envelopes.

Pre-election testing (page 2): Hand-marking test deck ballots is very time-consuming.  If a jurisdiction uses a printer who is not the voting system vendor, pre-printed ballots should be sufficient.