MARAD ADVISORY 2009-04

VIA NOTICE TO MARINERS
US SHIP OPERATOR EMAIL DISTRIBUTION

GULF OF ADEN AND SOMALI A BASIN TRANSIT

ALL OPERATORS OF U.S. FLAG AND EFFECTIVELY U.S. CONTROLLED VESSELS, AND OTHER MARITIME INTERESTS

1. THIS MARAD ADVISORY UPDATES AND SUPERSEDES MARAD ADVISORY 2009-01 WHICH IS HEREBY CANCELLED.

2. SINCE AUGUST 2008 THE NUMBER OF PIRATE ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPS THROUGHOUT THE GULF OF ADEN (GOA) AND OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, PARTICULARLY SOMALIA, HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. THE MAJORITY OF THE PIRATE ATTACKS ARE CLUSTERED ALONG THE SHIPPING LANES IN THE GOA BUT MORE RECENTLY IN 2009, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS WELL TO THE EAST OF THE HORN OF AFRICA INCLUDING ATTACKS 500 NM OR MORE OFF THE COAST. IT IS CLEAR THAT ANY VESSEL TRAVELING BETWEEN THE SEYCHELLES AND THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA IS SUBJECT TO AS MUCH OF A THREAT AS A VESSEL TRAVELING THROUGH THE GOA AND SHOULD TAKE AS MUCH CARE IN PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR POTENTIAL ATTACKS. VIGILANCE SHOULD BE HIGHEST AT FIRST LIGHT AND LAST LIGHT AS THE MAJORITY OF ATTACKS OCCUR DURING THESE PERIODS. ATTACKS HOWEVER, HAVE TAKEN PLACE AT ALL TIMES OF THE DAY AND MORE RECENTLY DURING NIGHT HOURS, PARTICULARLY WITH MOONLIGHT; THEREFORE VIGILANCE MUST BE MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES. ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS CONTINUES TO INDICATE THAT THE FOLLOWING COMMON VULNERABILITIES ARE EXPLOITED BY THE PIRATES: LOW SPEED, LOW FREEBOARD, INADEQUATE PLANNING AND PROCEDURES, VISIBLY LOW STATE OF ALERT AND/OR EVIDENT SELF PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND WHERE A SLOW RESPONSE BY THE SHIP IS EVIDENT.

3. ON 22 AUGUST 2008, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES (CMF) DIRECTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MARITIME SECURITY PATROL AREA (MSPA) IN THE GOA. THE MSPA WAS ESTABLISHED IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION’S (IMO) ONGOING EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF SHIPS AND MARINERS AT SEA. THE MSPA IS A NAVAL MILITARY TERM FOR USE BY WARSHIPS WHEN COMMUNICATING WITH EACH OTHER AND IS A GEOGRAPHIC REGION IN THE GOA UTILIZED BY CMF AND POSITIONED TO MAXIMIZE DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE FORCES IN AREAS OF HIGH RISK. COALITION FORCES PATROL THE MSPA ON A ROUTINE BASIS. THE MSPA IS NOT MARKED OR DEFINED BY VISUAL NAVIGATIONAL MEANS.

4. ON 01 FEBRUARY 2009, CMF IN COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE (EUNAVFOR) “ATALANTA” AND THE UNITED KINGDOM MARITIME TRADE ORGANIZATION (UKMTO) ACTIVATED THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOMMENDED TRANSIT CORRIDOR (IRTC) THROUGH THE GOA. THIS REVISED CORRIDOR WAS INTENDED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF COLLISION BETWEEN VESSELS UTILIZING THE PREVIOUS CORRIDOR, PROVIDE A MEASURE OF TRAFFIC SEPARATION, AND ALLOW MARITIME FORCES TO CONDUCT DETERRENT OPERATIONS IN THE GOA WITH A GREATER DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY.

5. THE IRTC INCLUDES SEPARATE EAST BOUND AND WEST BOUND TRANSIT LANES. EACH LANE IS 5 NM WIDE, SEPARATED BY A 2 NM BUFFER ZONE. THE EAST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 045 EAST BETWEEN 11 48 NORTH AND 11 53 NORTH. THE LANE IS ORIENTED ALONG A STRAIGHT LINE COURSE OF 072 DEGREES AND TERMINATES AT 053 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14 18 NORTH AND 14 23 NORTH. THE WEST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 053 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14 25 NORTH AND 14 30 NORTH. THE LANE IS ORIENTED ALONG A COURSE OF 252 AND TERMINATES AT 045 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 11 55 NORTH AND 12 00 NORTH. THE IRTC IS NOT MARKED OR DEFINED BY VISUAL NAVIGATIONAL MEANS, NOR IS IT INTENDED TO BE A DEDICATED TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME BUT IN ORDER FOR WARSHIP PATROLS TO BE EFFECTIVE, VESSELS TRANSITING THE GOA ARE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO ADHERE TO THESE GUIDELINES REGARDING USE OF THE IRTC.

6. THE MSPA SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE GOA IRTC. THE IRTC IS THE RECOMMENDED PATH THROUGH THE GOA TO ALLOW MINIMAL RESPONSE TIME TO ATTACKS. MSPA PATROLS ARE INTENDED TO MONITOR ACTIVITY BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE IRTC.

7. CMF, IN COOPERATION WITH FORCES FROM NATO, THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU), CHINA, INDIA, MALAYSIA, RUSSIA, JAPAN, KOREA AND INDONESIA CONTINUE TO PATROL IN THE MSPA AND HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN DETERRING ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING. A FAR GREATER NUMBER OF ATTACKS HAVE BEEN THWARTED THROUGH DEFENSIVE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY COMMERCIAL AND CIVILIAN SHIPS PRIOR TO ENTERING AND DURING TRANSIT THROUGH THE AREA. DESPITE THE INCREASE IN PRESENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE REGION, AS WELL AS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSIVE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES, PIRATE ACTIVITY HAS CONTINUED AND A NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL AND CIVILIAN SHIPS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED AND SEIZED. THERE ARE INDICATIONS
THAT PIRATES IN THE AREA CONTINUE TO ADAPT THEIR TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN CAPTURING VESSELS, BOTH IN THE GOA AS WELL AS IN THE OPEN OCEAN OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, PARTICULARLY IN THE INCREASED DISTANCES THAT THEY ARE ABLE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY OFF THE EAST COAST OF SOMALIA POTENTIALLY UTILIZING MOTHER SHIPS. NAVAL VESSELS PATROLLING THE MSPA PROVIDE A MEASURE OF DETERRENCE THROUGH THEIR PRESENCE, BUT THIS IS LIMITED DUE TO THE VAST AREA OF THE GOA AND EVEN LESS EFFECTIVE IN THE OPEN WATERS EAST OF SOMALIA. GIVEN THE HIGH VOLUME OF SHIPPING IN THE REGION, THE SAFETY OF ALL SHIPS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED DUE TO THE OFTEN LONG RESPONSE TIMES DUE TO THE CONSIDERABLE DISTANCES INVOLVED. MASTERS ARE THEREFORE RECOMMENDED TO CONTINUE TO EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO MAKE THEIR VESSELS LESS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK WHEN OPERATING IN THE GOA AND OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA.

8. IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT INCREASED THREAT TO VESSELS TRANSITING
OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, ADVICE TO MASTERS IS THAT UNLESS THEY SPECIFICALLY HAVE BUSINESS TO CONDUCT ON THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA THEY ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO REMAIN EAST OF SIXTY DEGREES EAST AND AT LEAST 600 NM OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA BUT EVEN AT THAT RANGE THEY SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID, DETER AND DELAY POTENTIAL PIRATE ATTACKS.

9. DUE TO THE PIRATES’ INCREASED RESOLVE AND ADAPTABILITY,
ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS ARE ENCOURAGED. VESSELS SUCH AS PASSENGER LINERS, LUXURY YACHTS, PLEASURE CRAFT, SAILBOATS, AND SHIPS CARRYING DANGEROUS CARGO OR OTHERWISE DEEMED TO BE HIGH VALUE ASSETS SHOULD CONDUCT A FULL RISK ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO PLANNING TRANSITS THROUGH
HIGH-RISK AREAS, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE SPEED AND MANEUVERABILITY LIMITATIONS AND LOW FREEBOARD MAKE A SHIP
PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE. IN CONDUCTING SUCH AN ASSESSMENT, OWNERS AND MASTERS OF SUCH VESSELS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE ATTACK AND BE PREPARED TO EMPLOY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE DEFENSE. ALL PASSENGERS AND CREW SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSITING THESE AREAS AND BE FULLY BRIEFED ON THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO PROTECT THEMSELVES IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK.

MASTERS SHOULD REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THE UKMTO AND THE UNITED STATES MARITIME LIAISON OFFICE (MARLO) TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. MASTERS ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE DETAILS OF THEIR TRANSIT, AS WELL AS THE TYPE, NATURE AND NUMBER/QUANTITY OF PASSENGERS AND CARGO AT LEAST 96 HOURS PRIOR TO ENTERING HIGH RISK AREAS. THE EU, IN COOPERATION WITH LLOYDS REGISTRY, HAS ESTABLISHED A WEB-BASED RESOURCE FOR SHIPS TO RECEIVE THE LATEST ALERTS, AND REGISTER THEIR VESSELS PRIOR TO TRANSITING HIGH RISK AREAS IN THE REGION. OWNERS AND OPERATORS ARE ENCOURAGED TO REGISTER WITH THE MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE - HORN OF AFRICA (MSC-HOA), AT WWW.MSCHOA.ORG.

10. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR ALL VESSELS:

A. DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND YOURSELF. DO NOT PRESENT AN ATTRACTIVE TARGET FOR ATTACK AND DO NOT SURRENDER IMMEDIATELY AT THE FIRST SIGN OF A THREAT.

B. EMPLOY SPEED AND MANEUVER TO AVOID ATTACK. CONDUCT TRANSIT OF HIGH THREAT AREAS AT MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE SPEED AT ALL TIMES. MAINTAIN A FULL VISUAL AND RADAR WATCH THROUGHOUT TRANSIT. PROVIDE EXTRA LOOKOUTS IF POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. LOOKOUTS SHOULD BE POSITIONED TO ENSURE A 360 DEGREE UNOBSTRUCTED FIELD OF VIEW WITH FULL VIEW OF ALL FREEBOARD AREAS. AVOID TRANSITING NEAR SMALL BOATS WHENEVER POSSIBLE. DUE TO THE SHEER NUMBER OF SMALL BOATS IN THE REGION, MOST OF WHICH ARE FISHING BOATS IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM PIRATE VESSELS. TRANSITING NEAR SMALL BOATS MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE AT TIMES. ACTIVELY WATCH FOR DEVELOPING RULES OF THE ROAD SITUATIONS AND TAKE EARLY ACTION TO INCREASE CPAS. AFT LOOKOUTS MUST BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT FOR SMALL
BOATS APPROACHING FROM ASTERN. MANEUVER AGGRESSIVELY IF UNDER ATTACK. MANEUVER TO REMOVE ANY LEE FROM EITHER SIDE OF SHIP (SEA STATE DEPENDENT). IF ENGINEERING OR OTHER TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CAUSE REDUCED SPEED, IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY.

C. ADOPT PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES. TAKE ALL PRECAUTIONS DETAILED FOR SPEED AND MANEUVER. TAKE DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS PRIOR TO ENTERING HIGH THREAT AREAS, INCLUDING RIGGING FIRE HOSES, AND RAISING OUTBOARD EQUIPMENT AND/OR POSITIONING INBOARD. CONSIDER OTHER NON-LETHAL MEASURES SUCH AS FOCUSED SONIC DEVICES AND FLARES. CONDUCT TRANSITS IN GROUPS WITH OTHER VESSELS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS PROVIDED BY MSC-HOA.

D. ACTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED, INCLUDING EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SECURITY TEAMS. PROPERLY TRAINED SECURITY TEAMS, WITH EXPERIENCE IN MARITIME DEFENSIVE PROCEDURES, ARE KNOWN TO BE AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURE. IF EMPLOYING SECURITY TEAMS, CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE POTENTIAL FOR THE RISK TO HUMAN LIFE DURING ANY PIRACY ATTACK. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, AND QUALIFICATION OF ANY PRIVATE SECURITY FORCE BE VERIFIED. LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FLAG STATE, SHIPS OWNERS, MASTER AND THE SECURITY TEAM SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AND CONTRACTUALLY AGREED UPON.

E. IF A SHIP COMES UNDER ATTACK, REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO UKMTO,
BROADCAST ATTACKS IMMEDIATELY ON ALL AVAILABLE RADIO CIRCUITS, ADJUST SPEED AND MANEUVER, AND ACTIVATE ALL AVAILABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES. DO NOT IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER UPON APPROACH OF SUSPECTED PIRATE BOATS. ATTACKS HAVE BEEN THWARTED IN MANY CASES WHERE DEFENSIVE MEASURES WERE USED AND THE VESSELS BECAME DIFFICULT TARGETS. AN ATTACK HAS EVEN BEEN SUCCESSFULLY THWARTED WHERE PIRATES WERE ABLE TO BOARD A SHIP BUT WERE UNABLE TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE SUPERSTRUCTURE DUE TO THE CAREFUL PREPARATIONS OF THE CREW IN SECURING ALL ACCESS POINTS.

F. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING PRACTICES RECOMMENDED FOR MARINERS OPERATING IN VICINITY OF HIGH RISK AREAS HAVE BEEN
PUBLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) REVISED
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE (MSC) CIRCULARS. THESE DOCUMENTS CAN BE ACCESSED VIA IMO WEBSITE AT THE FOLLOWING INTERNET ADDRESS: HTTP:/WWW.IMO.ORG/SAFETY/MAINFRAME.ASP?TOPIC_ID=1147

ALSO IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER PIRACY IN THE GOA AND OFF THE EAST COAST OF SOMALIA, INDUSTRY BODIES INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU HAVE PUBLISHED QUOTE BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO DETER PIRACY IN THE GOA AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA (FEBRUARY 2009) UNQUOTE. THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE ACCESSED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
WEBSITE AT THE FOLLOWING INTERNET ADDRESS:
HTTP:/WWW.ICC-CCS.ORG/IMAGES/STORIES/PDFS/BMP.PDF

11. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT MARITIME LIAISON OFFICE (MARLO) BAHRAIN, TELEPHONE +973-1785-3929, OR BY E-MAIL TO
MARLO.BAHRAIN (AT) ME.NAVY.MIL, OR THE UK MARITIME TRADE ORGANIZATION (UKMTO) AT +971-50-552-3215 OR BY EMAIL TO UKMTO (AT) EIM.AE., OR MSC-HOA AT +44-0-1923-958545 OR BY EMAIL TO
POSTMASTER (AT) MSCHOA.ORG.

12. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ADVISORY, CONTACT MR. DOHERTY, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY, CODE: MAR-420, ROOM W23-312, 1200 NEW JERSEY AVE, S.E., WASHINGTON, DC 20590, TELEPHONE 202-366-1883, FACSIMILE 202-366-3954, TLX II 710.822.9426 (MARAD DOT WSH), OR EMAIL: OWEN.DOHERTY@DOT.GOV

13. CANCEL ADVISORY 2009-01.