

1st Revision draft  
Completed

19 JAN  
1983

5-6-7-8-9-  
10-11-12-  
13-14-  
15-16-  
17-18-

INTERVIEW BETWEEN MR. RICHARD HELMS AND JOHN BROSS, 14 DECEMBER 1982

H: As you are probably aware, I was called to Camp David on November 20th -- that would have been 1972 -- in other words, 13 days after the elections. I frankly thought I was going there on this occasion to discuss some aspects of the Agency's and the Intelligence Community budgets, and why I thought that was the matter at hand I can explain later, because I am going to have to go back in order to make a couple of things clear. When I went up to Camp David in a helicopter with some other members of the Administration, and there were three men with clip boards that were sorting out the various people that would come up with me; there was Haldeman, Erlichman and George Shultz, and I was asked to wait in one of the houses for a few minutes, and then I suppose maybe 15 or 20 minutes later I was invited to Nixon's house, the name of which now eludes me, and there, he, and Haldeman and I had our conversation. Nixon introduced the conversation by simply saying that in the new Administration he was anxious to get some new ideas and renewed figures and felt that some people who had held a job in his first Administration, or even earlier than that, would do better to be changed around, that he felt that it was time for a new Director to be put into the Agency and just wanted my reaction to the state of affairs.

B: Was Haldeman present?

H: Haldeman, with the yellow pad in hand making some notes. So, I said well certainly I realized that I served at his convenience, one wants to be one to make these changes, we had a retirement policy in the Agency that you could retire at age 60 and I was getting on close to that at that point. And interestingly, Nixon expressed considerable

surprise that (a) that we had this policy and (b) that I was getting on towards 60. And, in short, it was abundantly clear that the center of this conversation.....

B: It's a remarkable little gadget

H: Isn't it. So, at that point, Nixon either refocused or focused for the first time, that is entirely unclear to me, on the fact that I had been in the Agency for a long time and was really an effective careerist and that therefore this was going to be the end of a career at age 60. So that he at that moment seemed to mentally switch/<sup>gears</sup> and said well, would you like to be an Ambassdor? And I replied that I wasn't at all sure that I wanted to be an Ambassador, that I wanted to have a look at maybe this was the time for me to leave the Federal Government and go on and do something else. So there was some conversation back and forth and he then said, well, look, wouldn't you like to go to Moscow as our Ambassador? And I said no, I didn't think that that would be a very good idea because I thought that the Russians might take a rather dim view of my presence there. And he thought a minute and then said, well, I guess maybe you are right. But where would you like to go, I mean hypothetically, I mean, he said, maybe you don't want to be, but if you were, where would you want to go? And it was put in such a way that it seemed to me that it was desirable for me to come up with an answer at that point. So I said well, I think that if I were to go as an Ambassador any place, I would like to go to Iran, where I think I could make a contribution. He said that's a good idea. Said we've got something else in mind for Joe Farland who's in Iran now and that will be fine. You try and make up your mind as soon as you can and let us know whether you will go to Iran or not. There was a little more desultory conversa-

tion and that was the end of the session, and I got back from the helicopter and came back to Washington. Now the reason that I mentioned earlier that I thought the purpose of my going to Camp David was different than it turned out to be was the following, was because on November the 7th, which was election day that year, I had lunch with Al Haig. I had been wanting to have lunch with him for some time; he was always too busy, too occupied and too much going on, and I called him up and said, look, this is election day, I know you don't have very much to do on election day, come on out and have lunch. So he came out to the Agency and we had lunch. And somehow or other the subject came up about the Directorship and so on. And he said something about retiring at age 60 and I said I didn't know how long I wanted to continue in the job and so on and he said well I would have thought the sensible thing for you to do would be wait until the Administration gets going in its second sitting, so to speak, and then decide to retire when you want to, and I think probably the chances are you ought to be able to have a lot of influence on who your successor is going to be. In short, Haig had no inkling at that particular time that the decision had been made that I should leave. The other indicator in this was that the day after I came back from Camp David, I was in Kissinger's office on some other matter and he came around his desk and said, what happened at Camp David yesterday? And I hesitated for a moment cause I was, you know, trying to figure out in my own mind exactly how to reply to his question. But in a rather wafflish way he said if you don't want to tell me I'll call Haldeman, because he obviously didn't know what had gone on at Camp David; he simply knew that I had been on the schedule

to go there but had no idea of the import of what was transpiring. So, it was clear that Kissinger and Haig, the people with whom I worked most closely in the White House, did not know about this. My own view is that the people directly around Nixon -- Haldeman and Erhlichman and certain others -- never wanted me in there in the first place. I think that this was a decision on Nixon's part which they were not very favorable to. I think that their feeling about it, despite my best efforts to get along, was that after the Watergate business and the famous smoking gun episode, I think they had even less use for me than they had before, and that, therefore, this was a closely kept feeling, right around Nixon, on the part of these domestic advisors, that Helms should be out as soon as they could conveniently do it. This also fitted in with a lot of criticism that Nixon had been getting, particularly from John Connally, about keeping on people from previous Administrations. He said we gotta, now we've got a Republican Administration not a Democratic Administration, why do you keep all these people that Johnson had here and so on. So I think that if you could have wrapped it all together there may have been a complex of reasons for getting rid of me which, whatever these various reasons were, they all came out to the same conclusion, whether it was Watergate, whether it was why I shouldn't have been there in the first place, whether it was the fact that Nixon thought that there was a better job to be done at the Agency, no matter how you looked at it from his standpoint, there were always things which added up to (a) getting somebody else in there. It was equally clear that he had not entirely made up his mind at the time of the session with me who was going to be the successor. If he had made up his mind at that time, and somebody was going to be it,

both he and Haldeman played a good game of pretending that they had not made up their minds. He said if you've got any suggestions, we'd be glad to have them, but we'll \_\_\_\_\_

~~whether you know any names.~~ I said I'd like to see somebody from inside get the job. Well, he didn't know if it was a good idea to have somebody from inside; maybe someone could be brought in from outside, you know, new blood, re-invigorating, new ideas and so forth.

B: Did he set a date ~~on which the effective~~ \_\_\_\_\_ ~~of your~~ resignation or was this *left up in the air?*

H: No, as a matter of fact that turned out to be a bit of a shambles afterwards, because I got a couple of calls from Haldeman, subsequently, asking me if I had made up my mind about the Ambassadorship, and when I finally did make up my mind and called and he said fine, it was my understanding that I was to stay quite a bit longer. In other words, maybe to about my ~~six-year's program~~ *with a bit longer*, if not then, at least for a couple of months. Then, as everybody was working away, all of a sudden, Schlesinger's appointment was announced.

B: Dick, ~~on assignment~~, I can't remember when your birthday is.

H: The 30th of March.

B: The 30th, that's right.

H: ~~So, this was kind of hanging in limbo, and then, lo and behold, one day, apparently Nixon made some decision just wherein all the new appointees on the same day suddenly were swept up in this, and I had about three hours notice that this subject was going to take place about which I was going to have to attend. But~~ I was obviously very surprised that it should be happening in early February when I thought

I was going to be staying on at least probably into March. So in effect I was out of a job, ~~just being like that because~~ <sup>but</sup> there wasn't all that long a time between that and my being picked up by the State Department as Ambassador to Iran, and some arrangements were made to sort of keep me going at least in between, ~~and that I should be mentioning this if not~~ ~~as not of great historical interest but that~~ ~~simply~~ In the chaos of Government, all of a sudden something happens you never anticipated and when I called up and asked about it, they said, oh God, we forgot all about that. So you know I don't know whether they forgot or didn't, and it's not important to history, I'm simply trying to convey the idea that what looked like a plan maybe to wait for my 60th birthday turned out in the bureaucratic hurly burly to have been jettisoned. Now I don't know whether that gives you a full enough statement surrounding these circumstances or not, it's about all I remember; I think it's reasonably accurate. Whether my ~~conjections~~ <sup>were</sup> are correct or not, I don't know. I think that maybe, although it possibly doesn't belong in an Agency history, a comment worth making is that serving with President Nixon had a difficult aspect in the sense that he constantly disparaged everybody in the Executive Branch, almost everybody. He would describe the State Department people as a bunch of pin-striped cookie pushers who really didn't have America's interest at heart, that they were accommodationists with the Russians and so forth. He would criticize the Air Force, they couldn't bomb anything that they were supposed to bomb in North Vietnam, they couldn't hit the targets and, in short, there was nobody that came out unscathed.

B: He was criticizing the Air Force to the Air Force, or was he criticizing

*To describe really a fact?*

H: He was always criticizing somebody else to somebody else. I mean it wasn't one of these things where he criticized the Agency to me; he criticized the Agency to somebody else. And he was constantly disparaging the Executive Branch, which after all by law he was supposed to be the head of. It was probably an extraordinary thing, it was like a father constantly criticizing children, you know. So, he netted this once, as you remember at the beginning of the second Administration, he pulled almost everything into the White House and then he appointed a (tape cuts off)

B: There is some damned little button here that (tape goes blank for the rest of the tape).

SIDE 2 OF TAPE -- First portion blank and then it picks up here

H: I think the best thing we can do is just to continue on.

B: Dick, as I remember it, I worked on the case, the White House

H: Ah wait, excuse me, there was one, I was going into this business of Nixon and the Executive Branch, sort of just let me just finish, because I, to the extent that there is any interest in my reaction to all this, let's put it, record it. You will remember, therefore, that in the second Nixon Administration, he brought everything in the Executive Branch, in a sense, into the White House. Those things that weren't handled by either Haldeman, Ehrlichman, or Kissinger were put in the hands of a White House Counselor, of whom I said *at least* were at least two more, one was George Shultz, who sort of handled certain financial aspects of Government, another was James \_\_\_\_\_, who had housing and things of that kind. At the same time, Nixon put his men from inside the White House, ~~and~~ in positions of

seniority in various departments around town, like Egil Krog was sent to Transportation, I think, and somebody else was sent to some other department. In short, he was sending his own people out, from the White House, to be sure that he had people on location who would know about what was going on in these departments that he could trust. And in the meantime, he had pulled the whole Government, through these Counselors, and Kissinger and various others, into the White House, so that he felt that he had more of a control over this vast, sprawling bureaucracy which he so distrusted. And the ultimate irony it always seemed to me was that here he was disparaging everybody else, the implication being the only smart fellow in town was Nixon and if there were any other smart fellows, they were right around him in the White House. But along comes Watergate, where he uses the most terrible judgement in the world and this to me is the crowning irony of his Administration. That here he thought he was such a bright guy and he pulls the dumbest trick that anybody could pull and loses the Presidency. I mention this because it has always appeared to me that by being so insecure as he was and not properly appreciating the difficulties, and at the same time the contribution, of others, that he in his own mind came to think that he was the only fellow that could figure out anything straight and made this fatal mistake, <sup>of inability</sup> ~~whereabouts~~ to see the total flaws of his Administration. This by way of explaining that I figured his second Administration, he was really reaching out to control the Government through his people that were beholden to him, known to him, and believed loyal to him. And that he wanted to



get rid of anybody around that didn't fit into that particular pattern. And he ~~was~~, by and large, he went through with this pretty well. I mean there were some deviations, <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ there were some exceptions, probably, but by and large, he did it.

B: Dick, there was some evidence <sup>from the case</sup> ~~in the case where or elsewhere~~, that ~~extraneous others~~ that the President seemed to do just as you said, clean ~~the~~ house and establish his own personal control. There also <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ punitive elements <sup>in at least some of his remarks</sup> ~~that related~~ ~~to the public~~, that were made available somehow. Was there any indication of that in his demeanor or the way he talked to you or the way he appeared?

H: No, interestingly enough, in the introductory part of our talk, as he was telling me that he wanted to make these changes, he went out of his way to say that I had done a very good job in the Agency and that he appreciated it. Now whether he believed this or didn't believe this, he at least said it and he was sort of putting it on the record, and there was no criticism of my performance either by implication or directly, either from him or Haldeman.

B: He made no reference to any specific areas or activities in which he had been dissatisfied?

H: No.

B: Well, obviously, there was a lot of speculation around town <sup>and the real reason for</sup> ~~if you~~ <sup>decisions</sup> could believe it, ~~real or not~~ ~~One of the~~ ~~decisions~~

~~Well, let me ask you this.~~ There was also an impression in town, amongst some of your friends, that the White House was putting out ~~these~~ things, alleging bad performance

in certain areas. Had you any evidence that this was taking place, that Colson, for example, was peddling rumors about?

H: No. I have no doubt that it was true that they were being peddled around, that was a Nixonian way of doing business on various occasions, but it didn't come to my attention.

B: One of the alleged reasons for Nixon's alleged dissatisfaction was in the coordinating field, in the management of the Community. You received a memorandum from Schlesinger, as I remember it, in the fall of '72. Do you remember that memorandum?

H: Yes, I remember it very well.

B: Did you take that as an expression of Presidential dissatisfaction with the area of community things in general?

H: No, at the time, perhaps I should have viewed it differently, but the way I did view it at the time, <sup>correct</sup> ~~once~~ that it was a -- what is the right word -- an entitlement or constitution, or statement or whatever the proper legal word is, to me to exert greater influence because at that time theoretically I didn't have <sup>adequate authority</sup> ~~it~~ so I regarded this as an invitation to step out and do more coordinating to the extent that I was capable of doing it. It seemed to me at the time that they were asking the Director to go too far because I certainly recognized, as I think most everybody else did, that the idea of a Director of Central Intelligence telling a Secretary of Defense what he could do with his budget in certain areas was one of those things that was going to be a non-starter, and that one was <sup>gonna</sup> ~~gonna~~ have to do this more through persuasion than ~~one was gonna be able to do it~~ through force majeure. Now whether Nixon ever focused on these problems or not, I honestly don't know,

*Lead back clearly  
write these things*

because it became clear to me that Nixon really didn't know very much about the Intelligence Community, never had, never did. He didn't understand the complexities of how we were going to get into relationship with anything else, ~~and it's just that he had~~ a referenda on this with Jim Schlesinger over in the Office of Management and Budget and I imagine ~~he~~ <sup>accepted</sup> what Schlesinger told him about these things, probably. But, the document that I got, I didn't regard as a criticism, I regarded it as an invitation to do more ~~and~~ that it was an authority over the President's signature to do more in the coordinating field.

B: As ~~we~~ <sup>I</sup> read Schlesinger's memorandum and the Presidential Directive which resulted from the ~~President and~~ Schlesinger proposals ~~and~~ it seemed to me that Schlesinger had dredged up and identified all ~~his~~ <sup>the</sup> problems in the coordinating field, particularly <sup>at that time</sup> various relationships between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, but had found no indication ~~for~~ <sup>of</sup> understanding what had been done the Presidential Directive made ~~three~~ a number of recommendations, all of which really were completely compatible with what you were doing already. There were three recommendations that called for either an extension of your authority or for you to do things a little differently. Two of these <sup>recommendations</sup> ~~authorities~~ involved the Secretary of Defense exclusively <sup>One involved a proposal for not authorized</sup> ~~in that estimate being warranted which he wanted or he~~ ~~ordered~~ and the other had to do with a cryptographic command which you also <sup>do very things</sup> ~~could not~~ ~~understand~~ about. The third recommendation, however, I would appreciate your comments on. I am sure you remember it, it's not a new recommendation, and that is that you

*John (C) 2011*

should delegate your authority over the Agency, over CIA, the management of CIA, to your Deputies <sup>where</sup> ~~where~~ you, yourself, assumed responsibility for the Community. ~~You remember that Schlesinger~~

H: Yes, I do remember it, and I must confess that my private, in other words my own reaction, without ~~being, without~~ <sup>it</sup> my ever having given any oral expression, was that as far as I was concerned that was not on, because I knew a lot more about the Agency, having worked there for ~~the about~~ <sup>about</sup> twenty years, than my Deputies who were brought in from the outside and it wouldn't seem to me to make an awful lot of sense for those fellows to take over running the Agency and me running the Community when I thought that the obverse ought to be the case because if there was anyone that was going to be interested in the Community, it ought to be the generals, the admirals and so forth that were my Deputies who did understand something about the military in the Community and ~~they~~ were much better geared to do that kind of coordination, probably, than I was.

B: Well, won't the public and the Congress, <sup>and</sup> the other branches of the Government, hold the Director of Central Intelligence accountable, <sup>after</sup> after all he is by statute the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency? And can he absolve himself of responsibility for these highly complex and sensitive operations, <sup>?</sup> ~~as well as~~ ~~Government~~ procedure.

H: Certainly not. There was no question in my mind that even if the Director attempted to spend most of his time coordinating in the Community and turn the running of the Agency over to his Deputies, that the minute something went wrong it would be he who was held responsible by the Congress and that it would be he who would have to go up and

testify and he couldn't possibly prod or palm this off on his Deputies. ~~In other words, he was coming out of a disastrous thing.~~ And therefore the thing, in its raw form, is not a very sensible way to try and organize the Intelligence Community.

B: I believe a somewhat similar recommendation was made to Allen Dulles. And as I remember it, he had the same reaction as you have, and I think ~~he probably would.~~ That raises another philosophical or mythological question -- ~~the current and much of the discussion of the Director's~~ responsibility for the Community <sup>involved</sup> the concept of two hats. You are supposed to wear a hat for the Community and a hat in your capacity as the Director of the Agency. What is your reaction to the two-hat theory?

H: I've never had any problem with the two-hat idea. I think it's a good idea. I don't think it's beyond human endeavor for a man to try and run an organization in a command sense and at the same time walk aside from that and look at his own organization in the context of other relationships, such as the Intelligence Community, and make reasonably objective judgements. I see no reason why that can't be done. I think it's far more practical, and actually far more effective, to try to solve the Community and the Agency problems in that fashion than it is to try and set up some intelligence czar who sits down in the White House with no staff and attempts to make all of these judgements sort of in vacuo. ~~and~~ I realize that that concept has a lot of articulate supporters in Washington, but I don't think it's a good concept. And I would submit that if we have to find out these things by trying all these different kinds of experiments in order to demonstrate that this doesn't work,

or that doesn't work, the other thing doesn't work, it's gonna be a very expensive kind of organizational procedure and that the way the Community is organized now, it seems to me that it's the way it ought to stay organized. Have a Director and Deputy Director out there and have them divide all these chores between them in whatever fashion that seems to be <sup>most</sup> ~~more~~ compatible with their personality, their knowledge, the <sup>ir</sup> ~~background~~, and all the rest of it.

B: Of course, you can argue that the Director really only needs one hat <sup>is</sup> ~~if~~ the Head of the Central Intelligence Agency, he is the head of the Agency which is the ultimate consumer of intelligence by statute and in that capacity the appropriate person to provide guidance to the Community. ~~So if, I agree entirely with what you said, it could be argued, I think that the two hats arrangement~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ I think the important things is to recognize the basic responsibility of the Agency to see that the kind of things are going on that are necessary ~~in order~~ to provide ~~an~~ adequate intelligence ~~service~~ <sup>coverage</sup>

H: I think where the question of the Director's objectivity when it comes to Community affairs arises, it's not so much in that ultimate estimate function, or the ultimate analytic function, but much more in the nitty gritty of operations where people are involved, money is involved, who's gonna do what chore, is the Agency gonna collect codes and cyphers, or is NSA gonna go out and collect codes and cyphers, it's in these matters, I think, that the question of the objectivity arises much more than in the position of the ultimate user and the ultimate consumer.

~~B: Well, that establishes that.~~

B: So, as I understand it, there <sup>is</sup> no expression, specifically, of dissatisfaction with the way you were managing the Community or coordinating ~~in~~ the Community, either directly from the President or from individuals ~~like the President, or other~~ members of the White House staff?

H: It was never mentioned to me.

B: Do you remember ~~where~~ <sup>where</sup> there were any commendations when you were managing the Community or <sup>was</sup> anybody either wrote to you or spoke to you? <sup>favorable</sup>

H: I don't recall any. I don't recall any.

B: It sticks in my mind that I heard somewhere that Weinburger had commented, when he was Director of the, I guess you would call it the Bureau of the Budget, at that time, did comment favorably on your performance.

H: Well, this I, my memory is not sharp on this. I do recall that Cynthia and I were down at Cape Canaveral to watch the last Apollo launch, that Weinburger happened to be down there, and if you recall the launch was delayed and there was plenty of time to sit around with various people, <sup>and</sup> ~~who~~ were visiting with him and his wife, <sup>and</sup> it was then that I told him that I would be leaving the Agency and he expressed great surprise and said that he was literally astonished at this, that he thought things had been going very well at the Agency, that the coordination was going well, and the Bureau of ~~Management and Budget~~ <sup>Management and Budget</sup> had been ~~changed~~ <sup>changed</sup> and the way things were moving and so forth and <sup>and</sup> was, therefore, <sup>he was</sup> hardput to explain why it was that I was leaving. Now, this could have been genuine, it could have been politeness, ~~because he was known in, reasonably well in the Nixon Administration.~~ I don't know what it was, <sup>(5)</sup> but seemed spontaneous. ~~I think we've probably got the other part of this too on the other side.~~

B: ~~I hope so.~~ Another area which has been alleged to involve dissatisfaction on the part of the White House is the estimative process. I think you discussed that thoroughly ~~that night.~~ *with Jack*

H: ~~I believe so.~~

~~B: The bottom lines as I remember it is that there were a lot of~~  
~~tape goes blank~~

SECOND TAPE -- SIDE 1

B: I gather that in the estimating field, although this again was alleged to have been a source of dissatisfaction on the part of the White House generally, you did have rather specific indications of ~~approval~~ *approval* ~~part.~~ I think you received a letter from Kissinger saying this new format ~~is~~ what we needed.

H: I think that's right. At least that's my recollection. In the beginning, I think that Kissinger found that some of the estimates were too general, that they did not have in them sufficient supporting material to convince the reader that the conclusions were the proper conclusions to draw. So over a period of the time of the first Nixon Administration, he gradually developed the idea that the most useful kind of an estimate, particularly having to do with the Soviet military strength and such matters, was to put a great deal of data and findings into the estimate so that a reader who didn't like the conclusions had enough supporting material there to come to a conclusion of his own. And that was the way the estimate was changed during his tenure in the White House. And once it was changed in that fashion, I think he was quite satisfied with it. So after all, what we were doing here was going through an



evolutionary process of attempting to adapt the important estimates on the Soviet Union and Soviet military strength to an Administration that simply wanted a different product than had been given to the Administration prior to that. And it did strike me at the time that this was a useful thing to have happened because it took us out of a mold that we <sup>can</sup> sorta of gotten into as to the format of these estimates and broken some new ground. I don't know how they are done today, but at least that was quite a change and I think it was an interesting one. As far as criticisms of the Agency was concerned, I am sure that President Nixon was critical of various things and continued critical long after he left office, so that I don't think these were things that he necessarily changed his mind about. You know, he did blow <sup>up</sup> on the Sihanoukville affair, and there was no question about it that there was a mistake ~~that was made~~ in the matrix that they used to make judgements about what materiel was going into Sihanoukville. I have no doubt that there were other mistakes made during this period. But as Kissinger observed many years later, intelligence operations and estimates and analysis are done by human beings and there is no guarantee that just because a fellow is suddenly made into an intelligence officer he's gonna become either ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ or infallible. So, I think that every President will have something to criticize in his intelligence organization and intelligence operations because some things are bound to go wrong and somebody's bound to make a mistake.

B: Sihanoukville was a mistake, a mistaken judgement, ~~also~~ there is no reason ~~why~~ by Nixon, Kissinger, or somebody else in <sup>the</sup> executive, <sup>decided</sup> decided

that other estimates or conclusions of the Agency were mistaken, when in fact they weren't mistaken. Is that right?

H: You know I think that there is a point that should not be overlooked. And that was that during the Vietnamese War, particularly during the last couple of years of the Johnson Administration and most of the Nixon, or <sup>clearly</sup> his first Administration, the Agency was constantly in a position of bringing in findings and doing analyses which the Administration didn't like, ~~because~~ <sup>it</sup> it was an unpopular war with the public, and, therefore, both those Administrations felt rather beleaguered, and therefore when anybody in the Government came up with a paper or an estimate or whatever the case might be which indicated that the war was not going well, or it was not achieving the objectives which they had in mind, or whatever the case may have been, that this caused rancor and I think probably an attitude which was best described by Secretary of Defense Laird one day when he said to me, "Which side are you fellows on?" -- meaning that we were really almost undercutting the war effort by bringing out analyses and estimates of the kind that we were. So the Agency was not a popular instrument during this period because of this Vietnamese factor and it turns out, I think, that the Agency was probably more right than wrong in its estimates on Vietnam and more right than anybody else in either Administration. So that the record, objectively, is a good one. But it certainly ~~does~~ <sup>did</sup> not help ones popularity with either President Johnson or President Nixon. I think President Johnson took these criticisms or negative analyses, ~~in part that are part, interestingly enough~~ <sup>rather</sup> than Nixon did. But then Nixon had a background of complaining that estimates on Soviet strength

over a period of years by the Agency had been wrong. Well, I mean these were sort of flat and sort of broad brush statements that were very hard to ~~counter~~ because none of those estimates actually came down on one single figure or one single element of truth that ~~is~~, with ~~we~~ ranges and ~~with concepts that~~ they might do this, <sup>or</sup> they might do that, ~~we think they'll do this~~, so that ever since the so-called "Missile Gap controversy" of the 60s campaign, which Nixon felt contributed to his defeat by Kennedy, the CIA was not a good number in his book, ~~and he was~~ ~~was~~ distrustful of it. And he was made additionally distrustful by comments that he used to hear, particularly, I think, in the days of Allen Dulles and John McCone, that the Directors of the Agency had gotten into the policy business and I believe Kissinger mentions this in one of his books, in a rather quieting way, that it was Nixon's intention originally, according to Kissinger who told me this, that the Director of the Agency was to do briefings on intelligence matters in NSC meetings and then he was to leave the meeting when they got down to the policy discussion. This is what I was told was to happen by Kissinger but oddly enough it never transpired; I never walked out of one single meeting in the whole Nixon Administration. So exactly why this was not enforced or why Nixon didn't go through with it, or whether he thought it would be embarrassing, or what, I don't know, but I was certainly on notice that he was ~~on the~~ <sup>clearly</sup> ~~on the~~ ~~policy~~ <sup>concern</sup> familiar policy contributions from me and my own concept of the job as Director of Central Intelligence was to stay out of policy, because once you get involved in that, it seems to me that you contaminate the product of your Agency. In other words, I did not agree with John McCone and his view on how you go about this. But, in any event, that was my

view. I don't know whether anybody pays any attention to these matters anymore, but I tried to conduct myself as an intelligence officer and not a policy maker.

B: It seems to me, I got the impression that your relations with Nixon, personally, or the President personally, and with the White House, ~~it seemed to me you're gonna survive, have improved and~~ were better and more effective towards the end of the first Nixon Administration than they certainly were at the beginning.

H: I think that's true. That was my impression also.

B: Which was one of the things that is puzzling and confusing about Nixon's decision to include you as a professional, you were a professional intel-

ligence officer, in his housecleaning, in his efforts to seize personal control over the Government as a whole. And it brings back the question of what would be an impossible assignment, <sup>and that's in the data available</sup> what was really going on in Nixon's mind when he ~~did make his attempt~~ <sup>launched to not leave you</sup>. Now it is conceivable that people had given him the impression that the management of the Community could be improved, that the estimating process could be improved, that he really believed this but as you have said there is no evidence of this, ~~in other~~ <sup>\_\_\_\_\_</sup>. It is a fact that he distrusted the Agency but <sup>this was true</sup> ~~it was especially~~ at the time that he originally appointed you, ~~his distrust was~~ presumably therefore increased during the four years of his Administration. Is that a legitimate conclusion?

H: I'm sorry. I'd like you to restate that because I'm not sure <sup>that's</sup>

B: Well, the question is if, recognizing that Nixon had held the Agency responsible for the Missile Gap, ~~obviously~~ which he felt contributed or

led to his defeat, ~~whether~~ whether he came into office with a prejudice against the Agency and its professional staff, why at that point did he appoint a ~~special~~ <sup>professional</sup> intelligence officer as head of the Agency?

H: Well, it may be, then, that he rather thought as had other Presidents had thought before him, such as Kennedy, that it was desirable to keep the head of the FBI and the head of the CIA, at least for a period of time, so that those jobs in the public's mind remained apolitical. In other words, out of politics. And that this may have been one of the contributing factors to keep me on as a professional intelligence officer. I think you probably have to ask Nixon himself about that one.

B: OK. But my <sup>other</sup> question is ~~in what way did the fact of the~~ <sup>general line of work about your relationship about your appointment?</sup>

H: Strangely enough you know, ~~he was~~ J. Edgar Hoover, as you will recall, died before the Nixon Administration, so he had an opportunity to actually appoint another Director of the FBI. ~~but I found that, but, in fact, I don't know the reason for it, but I do know that at the time at the meeting, that~~ I insisted that Erhlichman arrange with Nixon so that I could find out from <sup>him</sup> personally if he wanted those three studies from the Agency about the demise of Diem, the \_\_\_\_\_ affair, and I forgot what the third was, maybe it was Lumumba, I don't know. But, in any event, you will recall Erhlichman came out to see me and he wanted these, this material for the election campaign and so forth and I insisted to him that I wanted to please Nixon and I put it to him this way, and I said do you want these, I mean I want to be sure that he personally wants them because ~~to~~ <sup>with</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ other Presidents watching him, if you want to put it that way, the only person

that had a right to ask for any material like this was the President himself. Now whether his assistants \_\_\_\_\_ so that what he asked for \_\_\_\_\_ and then when he assured me that he would not use them for political purposes or to embarrass the Agency or anything else, I had no alternative except to send them over. Before we got into that, on this particular day in the meeting in the oval office, Ehrlichman was there, Nixon and myself, Nixon asked me if I had any ideas of how he could get rid of J. Edgar Hoover. He wanted him, he wanted his resignation. And that they had been working on this and trying to find some means of doing it without causing a lot of political upheaval and so forth, and Ehrlichman got into the conversation and said well he didn't offer \_\_\_\_\_ any new ideas \_\_\_\_\_ Government done that and so on, so that nothing could have been clearer that he wanted him out too.

B: In a curious way many of your friends took the fact that Nixon decided to relieve you, at the beginning of his Administration, as a refutation of the statements in the Rockefeller Committee Report that you have to have somebody in the office of DCI who had an independent power base, ~~independent name, independent status, because people concluded that if you individually in the Agency would be responsible, that, indeed, being independent, if this~~ <sup>you</sup> independence manifested itself in a number of ways, by maintaining estimates for an example <sup>that</sup> prudent ~~and that~~ <sup>you</sup> meant you were not wholly acceptable to the Administration, also by this incident which you just described ~~that~~, refusing to hand over sensitive material to ~~your~~ subordinates, which is the way, as I understand it, Nixon liked to operate. You had to deal with his immediate

rather small coterie of subordinates. The Agency didn't do this, therefore, it did manifest <sup>it</sup> a commendable and ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ level of independence. ~~And as I say, \_\_\_\_\_~~.  
~~Have you any feelings about that?~~

H: Well, as you probably are personally aware, there was nothing about the Rockefeller Commission Report which I resented as much as that particular assertion in there that I lacked ~~a~~ independence and lacked the courage to stand up to the President. In other words, I was trying to hold on to my job, because there were various inferences to that because not only \_\_\_\_\_ of estimates but of analyses, and reports, and then there were a few things about the assassination papers and so forth, where I think it is abundantly clear that I stood up to the President and the White House and that it should be clear that I felt one could reasonably do so. When he asked for these papers, after all the way the Government was organized, it was quite clear in the law that the President or the National Security Council simply fought with the Central Intelligence Agency. Consequently, he was the one man in town who had the statutory authority to ask of me anything he wanted. I can't imagine that one would interpret the National Security Act of 1947 as denying the President the right to have access to anything in the CIA that he wanted. So, at least that was always my interpretation of it. The Congress didn't have the right to these things but he had a right to them, under the terms of the statute. So, to have made an issue of resignation, or to storm around over this particular matter didn't seem to me made any sense, particularly when he personally assured me that he just wanted it for his own information and, so that he could protect the Agency during the campaign if anybody <sup>accused</sup> ~~attacked~~ us of

being involved in these things. That was what he told me. And, I said, after all you have to accept the President's word for this.

B: The question then of Watergate and whether or not the President resented the role which <sup>you</sup> ~~he~~ personally played in some of the alleged, on some of the Watergate coverup, have you any, have you any new impression of what the reaction of the President was? Surely, he must have seemed thoroughly aware of pressures that perfectly obviously were pushing in the direction of involving the Agency in various aspects of the Watergate coverup, payment to people in jail, the use of the Agency's activities in Mexico as a way of ~~expressing~~ <sup>suppressing</sup> further investigation which ~~was believed~~ <sup>the implication</sup> which might lead to an indication of individuals associated with Nixon, all those things certainly came out in public view and how did you feel about it at the time that they were going on?

H: Well, I think the best example to take is that of the emphasis to get bail money to the Watergate burglars. You will recall that this was done by John Dean calling down Dick Walters on three different occasions to press this matter with him. And when he came back from the meeting the first time, I sat down with Walters and then I sat down with him regularly in the next few days while these meetings were going on we had several talks. <sup>At</sup> ~~It~~ was on these occasions <sup>that</sup> ~~where~~ I made it abundantly clear to him that I would not stand for our funds being used for any purpose like this, and that he was to stand absolutely firm, and that if the going got too tough that he could tell John Dean that we were obligated to only use money from special funds for any purpose outside of the normal ones, that we had to report to both the Senate and the Congress and that I intended to abide by this, if I was ordered, in fact, to come up with any money,



which obviously I wasn't going to be. And I was rather intrigued, therefore, when I came back in '73 from Tehran to be testifying in connection with some of these Watergate matters to be told by the Senate Armed Services Committee Staff that Walters had been taking credit for having stood up to the White House in these matters, whereas he hadn't been having any position of Walter's own at all, he was making the Agency's position which I was dictating to him, and this was what he was going to do. So why it was that he seemed to feel that he wanted to put on the red badge of courage when my back was turned is not entirely clear to me. It's always occurred to me why it was the President gave him a medal for standing up to the White House.

B: The President gave him a medal?

H: The Distinguished Intelligence Medal for having been so firm with the White House over Watergate. That's what they say.

B: \_\_\_\_\_ . This I didn't know.

H: Well, this is what I was told. In any event, as for the other aspects of it, the famous June 23rd meeting and so on, the problem which existed at the time, of that meeting, was that no information within the public domain as to exactly what had happened in Watergate except for the burglary itself. And the idea that money was being laundered in Mexico had never been mentioned to me, I never heard of money being laundered in Mexico. That came somewhat later, so that when the President sent Haldeman to mention that something might affect our on-going operations in Mexico, I didn't know what he was talking about. But it seemed to me only prudent to see if I could find out what he was talking about or find out what was going on ~~if~~ \_\_\_\_\_ ; otherwise,

I might have my tail over the bag for it. So, it was for this reason, the instructions I gave to Walters was an order to go down to the Director of the FBI, he was to stay very carefully on the basis that we had this definition of roles, sort of delimitation agreement between the two Agencies, we intended to stick by it, that I didn't know what was behind all this, but that was our position and so on. Walters came down to my car with me and we talked there on the sidewalk on West Executive Avenue. So he was very clear how far he could go, which was nowhere, and if it involved anything peculiar, he was to come back and find out if some of our operations were being worried about. I think Walters realized too at the time that his ticket was being punched, after ~~I had been Director only~~, having <sup>been</sup> a Deputy Director only, two or three months and they were really checking out to find out how loyal he was going to be, there wasn't any doubt and that was why he was picked to talk to John Dean and so on.

B: Well, then, by implication, at least ~~that~~, a consensus of persons in the White House ~~that~~ had perhaps developed, or I should think definitely developed, that you were not totally loyal in the sense of being totally subordinated to Nixon.

H: I think that's fair. Otherwise, I would have been picked for the chore myself.

B: Well, I suppose so ~~(?)~~, and this obviously could have been a factor in Nixon's decision to include you in his housecleaning operation. I think that there is no legal reason, there is no legal reason, no practical reason, why the President of the United States can't run secret operations himself. I have in mind the Howard Hunt approach to

the Agency and his request for support for some kind of clandestine paraphernalia and your decision if this was what the President wanted, to have it, was something that you ~~were~~ really, would not either legally or officially, try to oppose.

H: That was my position, ~~but it~~ <sup>and there</sup> was with a great deal of criticism obviously of me and the Agency that we should have acquiesced to any of these requests that were made by the White House. But even in retrospect I say to myself, what basis did we have for refusing the request? ~~in mean, you tell a Sunday representative of the President that this day represents~~ ~~was something which Ehrlichman wanted done or somebody wanted done and~~ I think that ~~his~~ <sup>with</sup> hindsight, if something like that ever came up again, probably the wise thing for any Director to do would be to put on his hat and go down and have a private talk with the President and find out what was ~~be~~ behind something like this.

B: But this was not easy to do.

H: Well, this was ~~not~~ (a) not easy to do but (b) considering the fact that Nixon was after us, consistently anyway, to perform about this, that, and the other thing, that it didn't seem to be particularly sensible to, you know, blow up something that there was no reason to blow it up. In other words, blow it up into such a thing that I had asked for a private audience to sit down and talk to him about it. You remember on one of those tapes, there was a segment from Nixon that we've done a lot to help Helms and so forth?

B: Yes.

H: Well, you know what that turned out to be, and then he later admitted that all that was was my request for some help from the Justice Department with

the Marchetti case.

B: In what context did he make that statement, regarding his book?

H: No, it was on one of those tapes.

B: It wasn't, no, no, I understand. The statement that he was getting used to \_\_\_\_\_.

H: I don't think it was in one of his books, I think it was in an interview that he \_\_\_\_\_.

B: The fact is Marchetti \_\_\_\_\_ Yes, well, good.

On this issue of providing funds to bail the Watergate accomplices out, I believe that ~~on verification~~, former Presidents, Johnson, for example, had asked you to commit Agency funds for purposes which were not immediately germane to the Agency's (franchise) and that you had insisted that you advise the appropriate Congressional Committee \_\_\_\_\_ of this fact.

H: That's right. In other words, John, this was not the first time, certainly, that I had been approached for the use of special funds for purposes other than ~~the~~ purely intelligence purposes. There was this time when Johnson wanted some money to help pay for an unexpected and very expensive trip to the Far East, that was the one I fought with him about. And Marvin Watson tried to get me to OK the money and I told him that I wasn't going to OK the money because I had been led to understand <sup>that I was</sup> ~~he~~ was the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and that if I need come to anything that was outside of the normal purposes of the Agency, that I would report to them. And I fought with Watson about this and finally I said to him, "Look, you just tell President Johnson that you'll get the

(the Chairman of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee)

money and that if you ~~want~~ need the money and want the money, ~~Committee~~ then I'm gonna go down and ask him if it's OK." And Johnson finally acquiesced. In other words, he wasn't, he couldn't get me to give it to him without my telling ~~him~~ <sup>them</sup> and I did go talk to both those people and they didn't like it but they said, well I guess we'll have to do it if the President wants the money. And then there was another occasion, it was John Scali, having been made Ambassador to the United Nations, called me over to his office before he went up to New York, and to put this in conversation of very brief form, he told me that he had a lot of alimony to pay to his wife whom he had just divorced, that this job in New York was going to be expensive, there was a lot of expensive entertainment that had to be done and he wondered if the Agency would put up the money for his entertaining, this on the grounds that I might be able to exploit some of these connections.

B: No harm trying.

H: Well, I turned that down, obviously. And there were others through the years, I don't recall right now what some of them were, but, in other words, demands on the special funds of CIA were something that happened frequently enough so that you couldn't surprise me all that much, that we were being asked for, and I had, in other words, my mind fairly well set on how I dealt with matters of this kind.

B: As far as Hunt was concerned, it, I presume, never became apparent to you personally that a break in of the psychiatrist office was contemplated, as far as you knew?

H: I knew nothing about Hunt's operation. I was never given one single word or syllable about what he was up to, or what he was planned to do.

B: The question of dissatisfaction, of what was going on in the President's mind, was seldom communicated, I gather, vis-a-vis, face to face, with the people that he had deemed were disappointing, as I remember, in the Government, but he dealt through the ~~small immediate fans~~ <sup>his staff</sup>. As far as you're concerned that would mean Kissinger, ~~Haig, official fans,~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~so to speak.~~

H: That's right, with those two.

B: And Erhlichman and Haldeman sort of represented Presidential presence.

H: On rare occasions, they'd get in touch with me about some particular thing that he wanted.

B: But did either of them, or any of their entourage, ever come to you to indicate that the President wasn't happy with what was going on?

H: No.

B: In the field??

H: No.

B: They were just in the background.

H: That's right.

B: Of course to, back to your original appointment, it changed from a very healthy and informal effective relationship that you had established with the White House and with President Johnson, it changed from that to the statement that you were to only remain for the purpose of providing the briefing and then leave and not participate, ~~it~~ must have been a rather unpleasant and I must say somewhat shattering experience.

H: Well, I don't think that I want to characterize it quite as radically as that. I recognized that with President Nixon I was gonna be going into an entirely different situation. The few things that came up in this form ~~was~~ <sup>were</sup>, I must say, disheartening. But, I thought to myself,

well, we'll give it a try, and if it doesn't work, obviously, then I can go off and do something else. But since the length of time between the time Kissinger told me this and the time of the thing which theoretically had gone into effect in the first half of the Security Council meeting was certainly no more than about a week or ten days and then it was quite clear to me that wasn't the way it was going to be anyway. So I stopped worrying about it.

B: It seems, to go back for a moment to the statement which you made much earlier in the discussion, to the effect that the President's decision not to keep you on until your 60th birthday, but to replace you sooner, was ~~to, as far as you indicated,~~ <sup>it was because of</sup> his desire to have all his senior appointments announced simultaneously?

H: Yes. Everybody was sworn in on the same day, at the same time.

B: Including the FBI?

H: No, that was in, the FBI thing, it seems to me, came about as a result of Hoover's death.

B: Did he die after the \_\_\_\_\_?

H: No, I think he died in the \_\_\_\_\_.

B: Well then Gray was already in office.

H: Yes.

B: But he had to be reappointed, or did he? Well, maybe not.

H: You see, Gray never got to the Congress.

B: Oh, that's right. Yes. But, it was this desire for a new look, I know, on the part of his Administration that determined the timing on this?

H: Yeah. That's correct.

B: Dick, what, to what extent do you feel that you were identified in Nixon's mind, ~~that made the question of his~~ <sup>with regard to the CIA or people I've</sup> ~~in~~ how the CIA is ~~is~~ a liberal bunch of people on the whole, that ~~we~~ went to cocktail parties and disparaged the basic philosophy that the President felt he represented, ~~and involved the sort of anti-Ivy League attitude~~ <sup>to what extent was</sup> ~~involved~~ ? Do you feel that that was a factor in your relations with him?

H: Well, I think undoubtedly, at the, certainly at the outset, because he did have this feeling about Georgetown people, in quotes, and I don't think that even Walters ever ~~complied, at least,~~ ever succeeded in convincing him there wasn't something to it. And, therefore, he was distrustful of those Georgetown people. Why he put me in this category particularly I don't know because he didn't know very much about me and I don't think he did. I told you earlier ~~and~~ when push came to shove at the very end he didn't know anything about my career at all.

B: Did you deal with him much when he was the Vice President?

H: Well, I dealt with him on two or three occasions, that was all. I went down to brief him on a trip he was going to make to Hungary and so forth, and this would not have been something that would have had a great deal of impact on him, I don't think. I certainly did not know him well and he may have forgotten these things. You know, life is like that, that you don't think about the John Smiths' background and history and put it all together in your mind until something causes you to put it together in your mind. In other words, you got this impression and no doubt you should have that impression. So, I don't



put a great deal of stock in this; I've just been attempting to say that Nixon was really not up on his lesson very well about me and the Agency.

B: What I keep coming back to here in my mind is how significant a factor in Nixon's attitude towards the Agency, ~~was that the missile crisis and~~ his attribution of the alleged missile crisis to CIA, ~~though he was~~ <sup>and I suspect</sup> ~~systems and etc~~ <sup>had</sup> always harbored a feeling that the CIA was staffed with subverts?

H: Well, I'm inclined to think that you're correct about that because one of the things that I noted about Nixon was, that once he had an idea in his head, it was almost impossible to get it out. For example, he would say to me that I know about your relationships with Hoover and so forth. In other words, he was talking about the relationship between the FBI and the CIA back in the '60s when he was Vice President. They'd changed dramatically by the end of the '60s and the '70s. Maybe Hoover and I didn't have any great affection for each other, but the collaboration between the two organizations on a day-to-day basis had changed dramatically. But Nixon was totally unaware of this and wouldn't believe it if you told him. So, I have no doubt that you are correct in this, that he brought these impressions along with him and they never did change very much, if they changed at all.

B: Stewart Alsop always felt that there was a certain basic insecurity in Nixon's makeup which made him shy away, and rather apprehensive in a way about people like Allen Dulles, and yourself and others, whom he felt sort of awkward with.

H: Nixon just plain didn't like being with people on a one-on-one basis and that's all there is to it. I think it was an insecurity, it was

the fact that he was fairly gauche in his personal dealings with people. And as recently as last week, I was talking with \_\_\_\_\_ of the Times who had been up to interview Nixon about his trip to China. He said, you know, for me a young man, it was just fascinating to meet that man because I had heard all these things about him and so forth, he was very pleasant, he was good in the interview, and very cooperative, he said, but the personal relationship with me \_\_\_\_\_ and before the trip around the house was over he seemed to me to be the most uncomfortable man that I have ever seen. Well, I mean, here it is, he's out of office, he isn't even President anymore and he still has this terrible time relating to people as human beings.

B: Let me ask you what's probably a silly question but, suppose Nixon had decided to keep you on, and because at that point these attacks on the Agency had escalated as they did, would you say that in most respects you were better off leaving the Agency at the time that you did?

H: Well, I think I must say I realize that if a record were made of the people of the Agency, that it might as well be a candid record because of these \_\_\_\_\_ floating around. I have felt consistently, and I don't think I exaggerate, that if the Congress had taken on these investigations in the form they did and I had still been Director, that I would have fought them to the death about turning all those papers down there, and I would have tried to get Nixon or Ford or whoever it was to back me up in this. But, I can't believe that I would have sat there and turned over bales and bales of SECRET reports to those Senate Committees without a fight. And, because to this day, I regard those hear-

ings as <sup>a travesty</sup> ~~an honest assault~~ of what we'd all been led to believe, those of us who at least grew up before 1930, about espionage, counter-espionage, the sanctity of your files, and the custom to keep them in tact, the fact that there was a lot of nastiness that was gonna have to go on, and this was not going to be revealed to the public for a whole lot of perfectly sensible, public policy reasons, therefore, when all this was regurgitated and shipped up to Capitol Hill, I, and I think others, particularly I speak for myself, regarded this as an ~~act of~~ <sup>betrayal of</sup> ~~assault~~ of trust.

B: As I remember it, one of your successors, Bill Colby, responded to the Attorney General, ~~and this certain action \_\_\_\_\_ and directed it to the Attorney General.~~ Is it your opinion that the Director of Central Intelligence ~~be required of responding~~ <sup>should be subordinated</sup> to the Attorney General or did you conversely require it to be sure that the President himself be consulted on important matters - affecting

<sup>CIA?</sup>  
H: Well, I suppose every Director is entitled, up to a point, to interpret his mandate as he reads it. I believe that I reported to the National Security Council, this is what the law said. That in turn to me meant that I reported to the President of the United States and that, therefore, anybody else in the Government that wanted access to something that I didn't think he ought to have access to or information, or Directives, and so forth which I didn't think I, he should have, I would go to the President about it. Now it was quite clear that the Attorney General was not on the National Security Council and therefore it would seem to me that any instructions to the Agency, which are not perfectly routine and normal in the conduct of Government, therefore, should either be

referred to the President or to the National Security Council for adjudication. And the fact that this was not done on these various occasions always struck me as somewhat odd. The whole thing of setting up a Director of Central Intelligence is to have a man that was independent of all these cabinet officers in the Executive Branch so that he could make ~~the force of~~ <sup>reports to</sup> the President which ~~was~~ <sup>were</sup> as unbiased and objective as possible and weren't contaminated by policy considerations. Now that applies to the Attorney General, it seems to me, as it applies to the Secretary of Labor and to the Secretary of State, and that the Attorney General should have some privileged position vis-a-vis the Director doesn't seem to me to make sense.

B: Dick, this is a fascinating subject and we could go on and discuss it as far as I'm concerned for a week. I have only one more question which you might, or may not want to comment on. Let me put it this way, it seemed to me that Jim Schlesinger's performance when he became the Director of Central Intelligence, initially, he wasn't there very long, was to cut the Agency down to size which amounted to a cut of its programs, and generally take a sort of housecleaning approach to the Agency. Have you any comment on that?

H: I have no doubt that that was his attitude. I have no doubt that was what President Nixon told him to do. It reminded me of the time that I was flying back from Texas with President Johnson, after just having been appointed Deputy Director, with Admiral Raborn in his stateroom in the plane and he was talking to us about the future and so forth and he said, now I want you fellows to get out there and shake up the crockery, break things up, you know, shake that place up. So it never seemed to me

to make any sense to shake it up, so I never shook anything and he never mentioned it again and I never mentioned it again. I think Carter gave the same kind of instructions to Turner. Turner took them too seriously. I think Schlesinger took them too seriously. And this is a sort of a way with Presidents when they make a change, you know, they want to see change, they want to see something dramatic happen. And it just never made sense to me and so I never did anything about it and I think that Schlesinger made a mistake and I think Turner made a mistake when they took these injunctions too seriously. There was also in Schlesinger's affair, I think, some kind of a resentment, I'm not too sure what

End of Side 1 of Tape 2

Nothing on Side 2 of Tape 2