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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST: 

Friday, March 9, 2007: 

Homeland Security: 

Preparing for and Responding to Disasters: 

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO-07-395T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-395T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 stipulates 
major changes to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the agency’s 
preparedness for and response to catastrophic disasters. For example, 
the act establishes a new mission for and new leadership positions 
within FEMA 

As GAO has reported, DHS faces continued challenges, including clearly 
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary 
disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems 
to provide effective response while also protecting against waste, 
fraud, and abuse. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has 
taken steps to overcome these challenges 

This testimony summarizes earlier 
GAO work on: (1) leadership, response capabilities, and accountability 
controls; (2) organizational changes provided for in the Post-Katrina 
Reform Act; and (3) disaster management issues for continued 
Congressional attention. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO reported in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that DHS needs to 
more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and 
recovery efforts. GAO analysis showed improvements were needed in 
leadership roles and responsibilities, development of necessary 
disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need 
for fast, flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and 
abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal 
authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all 
government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, 
and well understood. Improved capabilities were needed for catastrophic 
disasters—particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and 
awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search 
and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. 
Effectively implementing the provisions of the Post-Katrina Reform Act 
will address many of these issues, and FEMA has initiated reviews and 
some actions in each of these areas. But their operational impact in a 
major disaster has not yet been tested. 

As a result of its body of work, GAO’s recommendations included that 
DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent 
clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority 
for all levels of leadership; (2) direct that more robust and detailed 
operational implementation plans support the National Response Plan 
(NRP); (3) provide guidance and direction for all planning, training, 
and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, 
response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and 
regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts 
to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim 
National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in 
making its investment decisions. We also recommended that Congress give 
federal agencies explicit authority to take action to prepare for all 
types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. 

In his oversight letter to Congress, the Comptroller General suggested 
that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a 
strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, 
and rebuild from catastrophic events. Congress may wish to consider 
several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) 
evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness 
System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing 
state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance 
those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and 
preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and 
(5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. 

What GAO Recommends: 

This testimony contains no new recommendations but does identify issues 
that Congress and DHS may wish to give continued attention to so that 
FEMA may more effectively fulfill the requirements of the Post-Katrina 
Reform Act. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr. 
at (202) 512-8757 or jenkinsWO@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on disaster 
preparation and response. The goal of disaster preparedness and 
response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as 
follows: 

To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to 
disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and 
effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set 
the stage for a quick recovery. 

Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in 
particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre-and 
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of 
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. 
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as 
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having 
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies. 

GAO has identified disaster preparedness and response as a major 
challenge for the 21st century. In 2005, GAO issued a special report 
examining the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook, the 
nation's ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American 
society, and the future role of the federal government. Among the 
issues discussed was homeland security.[Footnote 1] In our report we 
identified the following illustrative challenges and questions for 
examining emergency preparedness and response: 

* What is an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints) level 
of risk? The nation can never be completely safe; total security is an 
unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable 
level of risk to guide homeland security strategies and investments, 
particularly federal funding. What criteria should be used to target 
federal and state funding for homeland security in order to maximize 
results and mitigate risk within available resource levels? 

* What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments in 
identifying risks--from nature or man--in individual states and 
localities and establishing standards for the equipment, skills, and 
capacities that first responders need? 

* Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector 
protection of critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and what 
changes might be necessary? 

* What is the most viable way to approach homeland security results 
management and accountability? What are the appropriate goals and who 
is accountable for the many components of homeland security when many 
partners and functions and disciplines are involved? How can these 
actors be held accountable and by whom? What costs should be borne by 
federal, state, and local governments or the private sector in 
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters large and 
small--whether the acts of nature or the deliberate or accidental acts 
of man? 

* To what extent and how should the federal government encourage and 
foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency planning 
and response? 

These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels of 
government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to 
major disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and 
capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response 
to major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of 
multiple actors from multiple first responder disciplines, 
jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as nongovernmental 
entities. Parochialism must be put aside and cooperation must prevail 
before and after an emergency event. The experience of Hurricane 
Katrina illustrated why it is important to tackle these difficult 
issues. 

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006[Footnote 2] 
(Post-Katrina Reform Act) requires major changes designed to increase 
the effectiveness of preparedness and response. The act has established 
new leadership positions and position requirements within the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), establishes new missions for FEMA, 
requires the transfer of preparedness functions to it, and requires the 
FEMA Administrator to undertake a broad range of activities before and 
after disasters occur. However, as the Comptroller General testified 
last month on DHS's high-risk status and specifically disaster 
preparedness and response, DHS must overcome continued challenges, 
including those related to clearly defining leadership roles and 
responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, 
and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services 
while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. 

My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings regarding 
leadership, response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2) 
discusses the organizational changes provided for the in the Post- 
Katrina Reform Act; and (3) highlights several disaster management 
issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are 
based on our Hurricane Katrina work on disaster and emergency 
management and our review of recent emergency management reform 
legislative changes. We conducted our audit work in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains a 
selected list of GAO reports related to my statement. 

Summary: 

Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of 
an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and 
define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how 
well it should be done--that is, according to what standards. The 
principal national documents designed to address each of these are, 
respectively, the National Response Plan, the National Incident 
Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal. 

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we reported that DHS needs to 
coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts more 
effectively.[Footnote 3] FEMA officials have acknowledged that FEMA was 
unprepared for a disaster of Katrina's geographic scope and 
destruction, including an unprecedented number of displaced households. 
Our analysis showed improvements were needed in leadership roles and 
responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, 
and accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast 
and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and 
abuse. Legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of 
authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, 
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making. We found improved capabilities for 
catastrophic disasters were needed --particularly in the areas of (1) 
situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) 
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care 
and sheltering. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms 
help to ensure that resources are used appropriately. FEMA has 
initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their 
operational impact in a major disaster has not yet been tested. 

In line with a similar recommendation following Hurricane Andrew, the 
nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended 
that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions 
to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is 
warning. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and 
exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and 
lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes 
needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the 
NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be 
supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans; 
(3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local 
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully 
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a 
jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring 
federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities 
under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a 
risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite 
resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. The 
Post-Katrina Reform Act requires major changes within DHS, and at FEMA 
particularly, designed to increase the effectiveness of preparedness 
and response. Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's 
organizational changes, related roles and responsibilities and 
capabilities should address many of our emergency management 
observations and recommendations. 

In his November 2006 letter to Congress on oversight issues, the 
Comptroller General suggested that one area for fundamental reform and 
oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare 
for, respond to, recover from, and rebuild after catastrophic events. 
Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate 
oversight. These include (1) evaluating development and implementation 
of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an 
influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the 
use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining 
regional and multistate planning and preparation; (4) determining the 
status of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices 
regarding oversight assistance. 

Background: 

Several federal legislative and executive provisions support 
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford 
Act)[Footnote 4] primarily establishes the programs and processes for 
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency 
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and 
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has 
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. 

Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a 
catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in 
obtaining surge capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources, 
such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from 
the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state 
lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact, an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative 
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia. We have ongoing work 
examining how the Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been used 
in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to 
report within a few months. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 5] required the newly 
established DHS to develop a comprehensive National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). NIMS is intended to provide a consistent framework for 
incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the 
cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles and 
responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and various 
first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency event. It 
also prescribes interoperable communications systems and preparedness 
before an incident happens, including planning, training, and 
exercises. The act required DHS to consolidate existing federal 
government emergency response plans into a single, integrated and 
coordinated national response plan. DHS issued the National Response 
Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan 
establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the management of 
domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary. The NRP, 
operating within the framework of NIMS, provides the structure and 
mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for 
domestic incident management. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, which describes an accelerated, proactive national 
response to catastrophic incidents. 

Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of 
an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and 
define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how 
well it should be done--that is, according to what standards. The 
principal national documents designed to address each of these are, 
respectively, the National Response Plan, the National Incident 
Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal. The interim 
National Preparedness Goal, required by Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8, is particularly important for determining what 
capabilities are needed, especially for a catastrophic disaster. All 
states and urban areas are to align existing preparedness strategies 
within the National Preparedness Goal's eight national 
priorities.[Footnote 6] The December 2005 draft National Preparedness 
Goal defines both the 37 major capabilities that first responders 
should possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from a 
wide range of incidents and the most critical tasks associated with 
these capabilities. An inability to effectively perform these critical 
tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental affect on effective 
protection, prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. A final 
National Preparedness Goal is expected to be released soon. 

As the subcommittee is aware, beginning in February 2006, reports by 
the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,[Footnote 7] the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,[Footnote 8] the White 
House Homeland Security Council,[Footnote 9] the DHS Inspector 
General,[Footnote 10] and DHS and FEMA[Footnote 11] all identified a 
variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations for, 
response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Collectively, 
these reports, along with GAO's various reports and testimonies, 
offered a number of specific recommendations for improving the nation's 
ability to effectively prepare for and respond to catastrophic 
disasters. Table 1 contains the resulting reports and a brief 
description of their findings. 

Table 1: Findings in Reports by Congress and the Administration: 

Title and author: DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina 
in Louisiana (February 13, 2006); Source: FEMA; 
Major findings: Found improvements needed in areas of communications 
and interoperability; FEMA staffing, unified command, logistics and 
staging, and operating procedures. Recommendations for FEMA included: 
work to strengthen emergency management capability at state and local 
levels; review emergency management architecture for response and 
recovery operations; train, equip, and staff response teams; improve 
the financial management of disasters; improve leadership and 
management; establish command authority in the Joint Field Office 
(JFO); and continue catastrophic planning with federal, state, and 
local governments. 

Title and author: A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina (February 15, 2006); Source: House of 
Representatives; House Select Bipartisan Committee; 
Major findings: Identified 14 major findings including the following: 
critical elements of the NRP were executed late, ineffectively, or not 
at all; there was massive communications damage; command and control 
was impaired at all levels, delaying relief; and the military played an 
invaluable role but coordination was lacking, among others. No 
recommendations provided. 

Title and author: The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (February 23, 2006); Source: White House Homeland Security 
Council; 
Major findings: Identified 17 critical challenges including national 
preparedness, integrated use of military capabilities, communications, 
logistics and evacuation, search and rescue, public safety and 
security, public health and medical support, human services, mass care 
and housing, public communications, critical infrastructure and impact 
assessment, environmental hazards and debris removal, foreign 
assistance, non-governmental aid, training, exercises, and lessons 
learned, professional development and education, citizen and community 
preparedness. Identified 125 recommendations for DHS, Department of 
Defense, and other federal departments and agencies, including 44 that 
were to be implemented by June 1, 2006. 

Title and author: A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management 
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina (March 31, 2006); Source: 
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General; 
Major findings: Found FEMA adapted to new response plans with 
difficulty; FEMA provided record levels of support but needs to improve 
delivery structure; and FEMA needs to improve readiness. Identified 38 
recommendations. 

Title and author: Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared: Report 
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (May 
2006); Source: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs; 
Major findings: Found differing roles at different levels of government 
affected the response; long-term and short-term warnings went unheeded; 
preparation proved insufficient; response at all levels of government 
was unacceptable; long-term factors contributed to poor response; and 
waste, fraud, and abuses were identified. Report identified seven 
foundational recommendations based on identified systematic weaknesses 
and challenges. 

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch and congressional reports. 

[End of table] 

Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will 
Improve Emergency Management: 

After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were 
over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS 
as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, 
whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested 
disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and 
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding 
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Based on work done 
during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that 
DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, 
response, and recovery efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters 
in which the response capabilities of state and local governments are 
almost immediately overwhelmed.[Footnote 12] Our analysis showed the 
need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and 
responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse. 

Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from 
Catastrophic Disasters: 

In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines 
of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, 
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve 
leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a 
catastrophic disaster. For example, there were problems with roles and 
responsibilities under the NRP and ambiguities about both what 
constituted an incident of national significance to trigger the NRP and 
what constituted a catastrophic incident to trigger the proactive 
response of the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex. On May 25, 2006, DHS 
released changes to the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as which 
situations require secretarial leadership; the process for declaring 
incidents of national significance; and the scope of the NRP and its 
Catastrophic Incident Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, who reports directly to the President, 
is responsible for declaring and managing incidents of national 
significance, including catastrophic ones. At the time of Katrina, the 
supplement to the catastrophic incident annex, which provides more 
detail on implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent to 
Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, dated August 2006. 

The White House Homeland Security Council report included 44 
recommendations that were intended for quick implementation, of which 
18 were focused on improving and clarifying the legal authorities, 
roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority. DHS has provided 
limited information on the status of its implementation of the White 
House recommendations, although it has reported actions taken on some 
issues raised in the White House Homeland Security Council report and 
in other reports. For example, DHS has pre-designated Principal Federal 
Officials and Federal Coordinating Officers for regions and states at 
risk of hurricanes and described their respective roles in coordinating 
disaster response--which was a source of some confusion in the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina. However, the changes may not have fully 
resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of the principal 
federal officer and federal coordinating officer. While the Secretary 
of Homeland Security may avoid conflicts by appointing a single 
individual to serve in both positions in nonterrorist incidents, 
confusion may persist if the Secretary of Homeland Security does not 
exercise this discretion to do so. Furthermore, this discretion does 
not exist for terrorist incidents, and the revised NRP does not 
specifically provide a rationale for this limitation. 

Congress also raised concerns in 2006 that FEMA's performance problems 
during the response to Hurricane Katrina may have stemmed from its 
organizational placement and its budgetary relationship within DHS. In 
May 2006, we noted that organizational changes alone, while potentially 
important, were not likely to adequately address the underlying 
systemic conditions that resulted in FEMA's performance 
problems.[Footnote 13] We noted that a number of factors other than 
organizational placement may be more important to FEMA's success in 
responding to and recovering from future disasters, including 
catastrophic ones. Conditions underlying FEMA's performance during 
Hurricane Katrina involved the experience and training of DHS or FEMA 
leadership; the clarity of FEMA's mission and related responsibilities 
and authorities to achieve mission performance expectations; the 
adequacy of it human, financial, and technological resources; and the 
effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships. The 
Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions that address each of these 
issues. 

Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery Are 
Needed: 

Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial 
resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal 
governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet 
the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage 
and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be 
part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to 
integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be 
done, and how well it should be done--that is, according to what 
standards. The principal national documents designed to address each of 
these are, respectively, the National Response Plan, the National 
Incident Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal. The 
nation's experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of 
the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context 
of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1) 
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) 
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care 
and sheltering. 

Capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, 
skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are 
available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction 
with training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically 
tested and problems identified and subsequently addressed in 
partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders. In 
recent work on FEMA management of day-to-day operations, we found that 
although shifting resources caused by its transition to DHS created 
challenges for FEMA, the agency's management of existing resources 
compounded these problems.[Footnote 14] FEMA lacks some of the basic 
management tools that help an agency respond to changing circumstances. 
Most notably, FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human 
capital strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated 
training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they 
enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical 
skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps 
between current and future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have 
said they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational 
management issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 
areas, whose final reports and recommendations are due later this 
spring.[Footnote 15] 

In identifying available capabilities, FEMA needs to identify and 
assess the capabilities that exist across the federal government and 
outside the federal government. For example, in a recent report on 
housing assistance, we found that the National Response Plan's annex 
covering temporary shelter and housing (Emergency Support Function--6) 
clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two primary 
responsible agencies--FEMA and the Red Cross.[Footnote 16] However, the 
responsibilities described for the support agencies--the Departments of 
Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans 
Affairs--did not, and still do not, fully reflect their capabilities. 
Further, these support agencies had not, at the time of our work, 
developed fact sheets describing their roles and responsibilities, 
notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific 
authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. We 
recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that 
fully reflect each respective support agency's capabilities for 
providing temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the needed fact 
sheets, and develop operational plans that provide details on how their 
respective agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities. 
The Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans 
Administration, and Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations. 
The Red Cross did not comment on our report or recommendations. As part 
of a housing task force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of 
incorporating housing assistance offered by private sector 
organizations. 

Further, recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the 
responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially 
for those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state 
and local governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate 
transportation-disadvantaged populations (ie. planning, training, and 
conducting exercises), but some states and localities have begun to 
address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006 DHS reported 
that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the 
urban area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating 
these populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include 
collaboration with social service and transportation providers and 
transportation planning organizations--some of which are Department of 
Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders--to determine 
transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of 
drivers and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation 
assistance to state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance 
have hindered many of these governments' ability to sufficiently 
prepare for evacuations. This includes the lack of any specific 
requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of 
transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in the 
usefulness of DHS's guidance. We recommended that DHS should clarify 
federal agencies' roles and responsibilities for providing evacuation 
assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed. DHS should 
require state and local evacuation preparedness for transportation- 
disadvantaged populations and improve information to assist these 
governments. DOT should encourage its grant recipients to share 
information to assist in evacuation preparedness for these populations. 
DOT and DHS agreed to consider our recommendations, and DHS stated it 
has partly implemented some of them. 

Finally, the use of a risk management methodology--integrating 
systematic concern for risk into the normal cycle of agency decision 
making and implementation--should be central to assessing the risk for 
catastrophic disasters, guiding the development of national 
capabilities and the expertise that can be used to respond effectively 
to catastrophic disasters. As I stated in my testimony to this 
subcommittee on applying risk management principles to guide federal 
investments, risk management should be viewed strategically, that is, 
with a view that goes beyond assessing what the risks are, to the 
integration of risk into annual budget and program review 
cycles.[Footnote 17] 

Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring 
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: 

Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources 
are used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, 
decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls 
and accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and 
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples 
where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required 
extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital 
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found 
examples where FEMA's processes assisting disaster victims left the 
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited 
assistance payments. 

We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million 
to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to 
applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash 
assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to 
be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery 
programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic 
incident but also provide accountability. Examples include 
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such 
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply 
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of 
supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance 
applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving 
computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those 
applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other 
planned improvements will be critical to achieving their intended 
outcomes. 

Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude 
of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also 
require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a 
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making 
should quickly replace "business as usual" and unquestioned adherence 
to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal 
situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time, 
controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide 
the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable 
assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes 
intended. The federal government also will be a major partner in the 
longer-term recovery and rebuilding of communities along the Gulf 
Coast. Among the areas requiring federal attention are (1) assessing 
the environmental hazards created by the storms; (2) rebuilding and 
strengthening the levees; (3) providing assistance to school districts 
that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee children; and (4) building 
the capacity to address demand in multiple victims assistance programs 
such as financial assistance or loans for repair and replacement of 
housing and the rebuilding of businesses. 

GAO Recommendations Stress Changes in Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability: 

In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the 
nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended 
that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions 
to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is 
warning. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and 
exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and 
lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes 
needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the 
NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be 
supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans; 
(3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local 
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully 
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a 
jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring 
federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities 
under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a 
risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite 
resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. 

As I mentioned earlier, DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released 
the final Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex--both designed 
to further clarify federal roles and responsibilities and relationships 
among federal, state and local governments and responders. However, 
these revisions have not been tested in a major disaster. FEMA and DHS 
have also announced a number of actions intended to improve readiness 
and response based on our work and the work of congressional committees 
and the Administration. DHS is also currently reorganizing FEMA as 
required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act. However, there is little 
information available on the extent to which these changes are 
operational and they also have not yet been tested in a major disaster. 

Originally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following 
Hurricane Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of 
needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or 
ensure that there were provisions in contracts for response and 
recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We 
recommended that DHS create accountability systems that effectively 
balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to 
prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We also recommended that DHS provide 
guidance on advance procurement practices (precontracting) and 
procedures for those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities 
under the NRP. These federal agencies could then better manage disaster-
related procurement and establish an assessment process to monitor 
agencies' continuous planning efforts for their disaster- related 
procurement needs and the maintenance of capabilities. For example, we 
identified a number of emergency response practices in the public and 
private sectors that provide insight into how the federal government 
can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These practices 
include developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and 
establishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and 
establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity 
to match the response with the need.[Footnote 18] 

Post-Katrina Reform Act Changes: 

The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and 
recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for 
and response to Hurricane Katrina. Most of the Act's provisions become 
effective as of March 31, 2007, while others became effective upon the 
Act's enactment on October 4, 2006. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the 
act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. Under 
the act, for example, FEMA's mission is to reduce the loss of life and 
property and protect the nation from all hazards, including natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. To 
accomplish this mission, FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a 
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA 
Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a 
distinct entity within DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer 
substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, 
responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to perform 
them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA will absorb the 
functions of DHS's Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The 
statute establishes 10 regional offices with specified 
responsibilities. The statute also establishes a National Integration 
Center responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the 
NIMS and NRP. The Post-Katrina Reform Act also includes provisions for 
other areas, such as evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the 
needs of individuals with disabilities, In addition, the act includes 
several provisions to strengthen the management and capability of 
FEMA's workforce. For example, the statute calls for a strategic human 
capital plan to shape and improve FEMA's workforce, authorizes 
recruitment and retention bonuses, and establishes a Surge Capacity 
Force. Most of the organizational changes become effective as of March 
31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in organizational autonomy for 
FEMA and establishment of the National Integration Center, became 
effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4, 
2006. 

DHS Reports Planned Changes Consistent with the Legislation: 

On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation 
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and 
additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, will become effective on 
March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough 
assessment of FEMA's internal structure to incorporate lessons learned 
from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and existing 
assets and responsibilities within FEMA. The department's core 
structural conclusions are described in the letter. 

DHS will transfer the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA: 

* United States Fire Administration, 

* Office of Grants and Training, 

* Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division, 

* Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, 

* Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and, 

* Office of State and Local Government Coordination. 

DHS officials say that they will carefully manage all financial, 
organizational, and personnel actions necessary to transfer these 
organizations by March 31, 2007. They also said they will establish 
several other organizational elements, such as a logistics management 
division, a disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations 
division. In addition, FEMA will expand its regional office structure 
with each region in part by establishing a Regional Advisory Council 
and at least one Regional Strike Team. With the recent appointment of 
the director for region III, FEMA officials noted that for the first 
time in recent memory there will be no acting regional directors and 
all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by experienced 
professionals, according to FEMA officials. 

Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate 
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from 
existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate 
programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions 
related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It 
also will include DHS's exercise coordination and evaluation program, 
emergency management training, and hazard mitigation associated with 
the chemical stockpile and radiological emergency preparedness 
programs. 

Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Provisions 
Should Respond to Many Concerns: 

Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's 
organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities, in 
addition to those changes already undertaken by DHS, should address 
many of our emergency management observations and recommendations. As 
noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse. 

The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and 
responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA 
Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management adviser 
to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of 
DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress after informing 
the Secretary of DHS. The incident management responsibilities and 
roles of the National Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary 
of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a clear chain of command 
to lead and coordinate the federal response to any natural disaster, 
act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The law also establishes 
qualifications that appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA 
Administrator must have a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of 
emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of executive 
leadership and management experience. 

Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For 
example, the statute requires the President to establish a national 
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national 
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities, 
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, 
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting 
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a 
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program 
to test and evaluate the National Preparedness Goal, NIMS, NRP, and 
other related plans and strategies. 

In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a 
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that 
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in 
order to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state 
annexes must be developed in consultation with local officials, 
including regional commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to 
foster the development of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA 
must enter into a memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal 
entities to collaborate on developing standards for deployment 
capabilities, including credentialing of personnel and typing of 
resources, must be developed. In addition, FEMA must implement several 
other capabilities, such as (1) developing a logistics system providing 
real-time visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics 
system, (2) establishing a prepositioned equipment program, and (3) 
establishing emergency support and response teams. 

FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems: 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA's performance in the logistics 
area came under harsh criticism; within days, FEMA became overwhelmed 
and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics 
mission.[Footnote 19] In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required 
FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. Since 
the legislation, FEMA has been working to address its provisions, but 
it is too early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA 
logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas 
necessary for an effective logistics system. Below, we describe these 
five areas along with FEMA's ongoing actions to address each. 

* Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place to 
address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information on 
states' capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not have 
information from these sources to define what and how much it needs to 
stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of operations to underpin 
its logistics program and told us that it is working to develop 
detailed plans and the associated stockage requirements. However, until 
FEMA has solid requirements based on detailed plans, the agency will be 
unable to assess its true preparedness. 

* Inventory management: FEMA's system accounts for the location, 
quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in- 
transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve 
transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as 
expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test 
regions to all FEMA regions. 

* Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of 
smaller storage facilities across the country. However, it has little 
assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in the 
right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of 
determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where they 
should be located. 

* Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA's distribution system, 
including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and 
lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives under 
way that should mitigate some of the problems with contractors, and has 
been working with Department of Defense and Department of 
Transportation to improve the access to transportation when needed. 

* People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the 
logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff, 
supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff. 
However, FEMA's recent retirements and losses of staff, and its 
difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created 
staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a January 
2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls in 
staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the 
planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills 
needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently 
hired a logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort to hire 
qualified staff for the entire agency, including logistics. 

In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics 
program to be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and 
other initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics 
capabilities, it will be years before they are fully implemented and 
operational. 

Post-Katrina Reform Act Provisions Also Respond to Accountability 
Issues: 

Statutory changes establish more controls and accountability 
mechanisms. For example, the Post-Katrina Reform Act requires FEMA to 
develop and implement a contracting system that maximizes the use of 
advance contracting to the extent practical and cost-effective. The 
Secretary of DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to 
limit the excessive use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The 
Secretary of DHS is also required to promulgate regulations that limit 
certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional 
circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate 
up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as 
oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain 
internal management controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and 
develop and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and 
abuse of federal funds in response to or recovery from a disaster. 
Verification measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients 
of disaster relief assistance. 

Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional 
Attention: 

In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional 
leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.[Footnote 20] 
He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was 
preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after 
catastrophic events. Recent events--notably Hurricane Katrina and the 
threat of an influenza pandemic--have illustrated the importance of 
ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster 
management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and 
coordinated can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively 
functioning insurance market can substantially reduce the government's 
exposure to post-catastrophe payouts. Lessons learned from past 
national emergencies provide an opportunity for Congress to look at 
actions that could mitigate the effects of potential catastrophic 
events. Similarly, the Comptroller General suggested that Congress 
could also consider how the federal government can work with other 
nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector 
organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help 
ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given the 
billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to, 
recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters, 
congressional oversight is critical. 

A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term 
efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas 
for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and 
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including 
preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local 
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining 
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and 
preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and 
(5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. 

The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster 
Capabilities: 

More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the 
construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, 
which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to 
coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal "to establish measurable readiness priorities and 
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude 
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters 
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from 
them." The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for 
preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the 
nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events. 

To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness 
Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist 
related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major 
earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS's National 
Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to 
illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic 
emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared and to form 
the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide 
range of large scale emergency events. The scenarios focused on the 
consequences that first responders would have to address. Some state 
and local officials and experts have questioned whether the scenarios 
were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in 
terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios. 

Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local 
emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600 
discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then 
identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, 
state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need to 
develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS 
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. 
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform 
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing 
and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and 
federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is 
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for 
these capabilities and the National Preparedness Goal in light of the 
Hurricane Katrina experience. 

Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in 
the Post-Katrina Reform Act--the National Preparedness Goal, target 
capabilities and preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment 
systems--should be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS 
had established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder 
preparedness, including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; 
strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; 
and strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. 
Those seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 
homeland security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth 
priority that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic 
planning. 

In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching 
priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on 
risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized 
regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize 
regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two 
overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others. 
These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the National 
Preparedness Goal, (2) integrating and synchronizing preparedness 
programs and activities, (3) developing and sustaining a statewide 
critical infrastructure/key resource protection program, (4) enabling 
information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications 
interoperability, (6) strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear 
detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to 
address nationwide plan review results. Under the guidance, all fiscal 
year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an investment 
justification that provides background information, strategic 
objectives and priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan, 
and the impact that each proposed investment (project) is anticipated 
to have. 

The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic: 

The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant 
threat to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a 
question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues 
associated with the preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are 
similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles 
and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management; 
realistic planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the 
capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective 
information sharing and communication; and accountability for the 
effective use of resources. 

However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, 
earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short 
period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can 
have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following 
Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely 
to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate 
damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely 
to continue in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months 
and affect wide areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. 
Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could 
be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza in the United States 
results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the 
pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of 
detection and response. 

The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a 
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an 
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family 
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's 
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing 
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. 
In addition, our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes 
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as 
first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or 
otherwise unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences 
of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and 
response for such a disaster will require particularly close 
cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector, 
individuals within the United States, as well as international 
cooperation. 

We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to 
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services' National 
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for 
pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of 
Agriculture's preparedness efforts and plans, public health and 
hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease 
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late 
summer 2007. 

Our Knowledge of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities 
Is Limited: 

Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on 
state and local capabilities. As I testified before this subcommittee 
last month on applying risk management principles to guide federal 
investments, over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion 
in federal funding to states, localities, and territories through its 
HSGP grants. Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and 
localities finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal 
funds, and are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those 
funds. 

Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define 
and act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about 
emergency preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what 
are our priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk 
assessments, performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and 
sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given 
finite resources? 

There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data 
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have 
better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some 
types of major emergency events than for others. For some natural 
disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more 
experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation 
and response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed. 
California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. 
However, no one in the nation has experience with such potential 
catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Although both 
the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, there have 
been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people 
across the nation. 

A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant 
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that 
eligible recipients must provide an "investment justification" with 
their grant application. States were to use this justification to 
outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that 
will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program 
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global 
program management plans for the entire state homeland security program 
that look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. 
The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS 
homeland security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it 
would use a peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the 
basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities 
it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk. 

For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate 
the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security 
investments. For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk 
and effectiveness assessments to inform final funding decisions, 
although changes have been made to make the grant allocation process 
more transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said 
that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from 
grant funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because 
they do not yet have the metrics to do so. 

Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust: 

Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate 
planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been 
focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent 
neighbors. However, well-documented problems with the abilities of 
first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site 
of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist 
disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first 
responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a 
regional and multigovernmental basis. 

As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the 
National Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to 
building, sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of 
government. All HSGP applications are to reflect regional coordination 
and show an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional 
security strategy integration. However, it is not known to what extent 
regional and multi-state planning has progressed and is effective. 

Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. 
Our early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region 
Coordination (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic 
planning reported that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated 
challenges in managing federal funds in a way that maximizes the 
increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while 
minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of 
expenditures.[Footnote 21] One of these challenges included a 
coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder 
performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of 
expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent 
work on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted 
areas that needed strengthening in the Region's planning, specifically 
improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide decision 
makers.[Footnote 22] For example, additional information could have 
been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned 
goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and 
measures; designation of priority initiatives to meet regional risk and 
needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation; 
resources and investments; and operational commitment. 

Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons 
Learned: 

Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and 
refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on 
the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective 
assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a 
national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included 
as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any 
skill and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For 
first responders, exercises--especially of the type or magnitude of 
events for which there is little actual experience--are essential for 
developing skills and identifying what works well and what needs 
further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly 
catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of 
personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of 
government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. It is 
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective 
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises 
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective 
response. 

For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas 
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to 
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be 
involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest 
and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are 
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise 
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the 
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who 
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to 
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance. 

DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational 
Decisions: 

Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's policies 
regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified 
that DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its 
management areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive 
work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been 
receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with 
access to various documents and officials have impeded our work. 

We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that 
DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other 
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, 
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent 
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and 
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives 
annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in 
numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives. 

Concluding Observations: 

Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions 
of dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to 
assist in strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has 
developed several key policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and 
the National Preparedness Goal to guide federal, state, and local 
efforts. The aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a 
reassessment of the federal role in preparing for and responding to 
catastrophic events. The studies and reports of the past year--by 
Congress, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS 
and FEMA, GAO, and others--have provided a number of insights into the 
strengths and limitations of the nation's capacity to respond to 
catastrophic disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for 
strengthening that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports 
paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that the nation--federal, 
state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental entities; the 
private sector; and individual citizens--faces in preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post- 
Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy 
changes to respond to these findings and challenges. 

Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task 
that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many 
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of 
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no "silver 
bullet," no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but 
requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because 
circumstances change and we will never have the funds to do everything 
we might like to do. 

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any 
questions you and subcommittee members may have. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this statement, please contact William O. 
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202) 
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from 
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors 
to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino, 
Analyst-in-Charge; and Richard Ascarate, Communications Analyst. The 
following individuals from GAO's Defense Capabilities and Management 
Team also made major contributors to this testimony: John Pendelton, 
Director; Ann Borseth, Assistant Director. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products: 

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of 
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.: 
February 7, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to 
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T. 
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007: 

Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal 
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to 
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. GAO-07-139. 
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify 
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44. 
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006. 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R. 
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and 
Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the 
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed 
to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.: 
September 27, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 
D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September 
6, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red 
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. 
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and 
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T. 
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All- 
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2005. 

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05- 
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

[2] Pub. L. 109-295. 

[3] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §5121 et seq.) 

[5] Pub. L. No. 107-296, §502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2212 (2002) (codified as 
amended at 6 U.S.C. §314. 

[6] Those priorities are (1) implement the National Incident Management 
System and National Response Plan; (2) expand regional collaboration; 
(3) implement the interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; (4) 
strengthen information-sharing and collaboration capabilities; (5) 
strengthen interoperable communications capabilities; (6) strengthen 
chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive detection, 
response, and decontamination capabilities; (7) strengthen medical 
surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities; and (8) review emergency 
operations plans and the status of catastrophic planning. 

[7] House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A 
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane 
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

[8] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2006). 

[9] White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

[10] Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. A 
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 

[11] Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response 
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006). 

[12] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, 
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the 
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

[13] GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future 
Success and Issue to Consider for Organizational Placement, GAO-06-746T 
(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006) 

[14] GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems 
to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 

[15] The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance 
contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4) 
payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6) 
capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human 
resources, (9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency 
communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource 
management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15) 
federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget 
process, and (18) disaster relief fund. 

[16] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing 
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
28, 2007). 

[17] GAO, Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to 
Guide Federal Investments, GAO-07-386T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 
2007). 

[18] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges 
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

[19] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643 
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

[20] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006. 

[21] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in 
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning 
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); 
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better 
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO-04-
904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective 
Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First 
Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National 
Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and 
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National 
Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006). 

[22] GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region 
Strategic Plan, GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006). 

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